DEVELOPING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AS A CAUSE OF ACTION IN GHANA: LESSONS

FROM THE NORVOR CASES [2004] VOL. 1 NO. 2 KNUST 6474

Renee A. S. Morhe*
I. Introduction
Sexual harassment in the workplace, as a cause of action, may be one of the least developed areas of Ghanaian law
and there is hardly any literature on the subject. But this lapse could be excused when one considers that in the
United States of America where such actions seem to be firmly established, the American courts did not decide the
first sexual harassment case until 19761 but even then, public appreciation of the scope of the problem was minimal
until 1991, when the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the Anita Hills charges against Supreme Court
nominee Clarence Thomas2
Then, in May 1994, one Paula Jones, an Arkansas State employee, filed a lawsuit against the then United States
president, for sexual harassment.3 She claimed that he exposed himself to her in a hotel room in 1991. The lawsuit
went on from 1994 to 1998 and was settled when President Clinton agreed to pay Jones, $850,0004 Since then there
has been some interest and queries especially within the Ghanaian public and civil society as a whole on the
possibility of sexual harassment as a cause of action in Ghana.
Indeed, one may prefer to make jest of the issue or at best write it off as aberrant behaviour, but the decision on the
Ghanaian Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice in the complaints of Manso v. Norvor and Tetteh
v. Norvor5 establish without any doubt the relevance of sexual harassment in modern day Ghanaian jurisprudence.
Again, the fact that the new Ghanaian Labour Act, 2003, (Act 651), makes sexual harassment a ground for
termination of employment by the worker, further establishes the importance of this issue.6 The paper draws attention
to the possible grounds for action of this less talked about social problem, the essential elements to be established to
sustain such an action and the legal implications for the offender and the employer.
In the Norvor cases,7 separate complaints were instituted by two former employees of an Airline, known as, Fan
Airways Ltd. The complaint was brought against the respondent who was the owner and Managing Director of the
Airline. In the first case, the complainant, one Olivia Kareen Annor Manso, alleged that the respondent had sexually
harassed her in the course of her employment and caused her to terminate her employment. In her complaint to the
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (hereinafter called the Commission), she alleged that the
conduct of the respondent, constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, contrary to article 17(2) of the 1992
Constitution of Ghana (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution).
In the second case, the complainant, Augustina Tetteh, stated that in March 1997, she was employed by the
respondent, as a Flight/Cabin Attendant. She worked for a period of nine months, that is, until 2 January 1998, when
the respondent gave her a letter of dismissal. No reasons were given for the dismissal. On 20 January 1998, the
complainant filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the respondent had sexually harassed her and
subsequently dismissed her because of her refusal to acquiesce to his unwelcome sexual attention and demands.
Such unwelcome sexual attentions and demands complained of include comments about the body and looks,
invitations to sit by him and to hug him, instructions not to date other men, quid quo pro statements involving
promises of rewarding treatment if she acquiesced, fondling and attempts to kiss the complainant. Apart from seeking
a declaration that the above conduct constituted discrimination contrary to article 17(2) of the Constitution, the
second complainant also claimed, among others, compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect.
The respondent denied both allegations and in a written response to the complaint, counsel for the respondent stated
that Miss Manso in particular left the employment because she refused to account for an amount of five hundred
thousand cedis that was to be used for accommodation at her new post. In the case of Miss Tetteh, counsel stated
that she was fired because of her unsatisfactory work performance. In particular, that unlike her colleagues, the
complainant engaged in unacceptable conduct including, making unwarranted use of the telephone in the companys
reservations office for long periods, thereby disrupting the business of the company, refusing to tidy up the office and
quarrelling with her co-workers who resented her attitude and refusing to carry her own service bags containing
snacks and related supplies from the operations office to the aircraft on which she was working. Counsel stated
further that all supervisors who flew with the airhostesses came back with adverse reports about her.
During cross-examination of the complainant and her witnesses, the respondent added that another reasons for her
dismissal was her alleged flirtatious conduct towards several of the captains, pilots and male customers of the airline.
That such sexual conduct at the work place had the potential to destroy the image of the airline and negatively affect
staff morale.
The Commission found for the complainants and held that the conduct of the respondent constituted sexual
harassment in the workplace and amounted to sex discrimination within the meaning of article 17(1)-(3) of the 1992
Constitution.
It is worthy at this point to note that the Commission is not a law making body though it is cloaked with some powers
of adjudication that involves hearing complaints and solving issues by negotiation and compromise between the
parties concerned8 (and sometimes even having a full hearing of complaints, with the purpose of giving decisions on
the merits). The Commissions decisions can only be enforced by a court of law. The Commission, therefore, is not a
court or the final arbiter. However, its decisions can be cited as being of persuasive authority especially in instances
where despite no enforcement of the Commissions decision in court, the guilty party accepts to be bound by it.
Before analysing the Commissions decision and to find out the basis of liability for the charge of sexual harassment
in Ghana and the extent of such liability, it is important to find out the definition and scope of sexual harassment in the
work place.
The Chambers Dictionary defines sexual harassment as conduct consisting of misplaced and unwelcome advances,
remarks, especially from a senior colleague in the workplace.
Sexual harassment has also been defined as employment discrimination consisting of unwelcome verbal or physical
conduct directed at an employee because of his or her sex. It is also the tort of engaging in such discrimination.9 In
the United States of America, both State statutes and the federal courts have found sexual harassment to be a
violation of the protection against discrimination guaranteed under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under
the said Act, sexual harassment constitutes:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favours and other verbal or physical conduct of sexual nature when
submission to or rejection of this conduct explicitly or implicitly affects an individuals employment, unreasonably
interferes with an individuals work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment10
Sexual harassment in the workplace presents in two forms; the first is called quid pro quo harassment and the
second is hostile work environment harassment. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when someone is forced to
submit to a sexual act as a condition for hiring, promotion, keeping ones job, or getting other benefits in the
workplace. Usually the offender is a person in authority, for example, a supervisor, who demands sexual favours of a
subordinate as a condition for getting or keeping a job. The essential element, therefore, is the insistence or demand
for sexual favour in return for a benefit or reward. Hostile work environment harassment, involves the creation of a
sexually unwelcome or offensive work environment.
The first form of harassment is easier to identify because it is linked directly to an employees terms of employment.
Under the second type of harassment is the situation where the victim is not threatened with dismissal or lack of
advancement but endures repeated abuse when the offender engages in unwelcome and inappropriate sexually
based behaviour rendering the atmosphere at the workplace intimidating, hostile or offensive. Instances of such
harassment are clearly illustrated in one case11 where a male co-worker broadcasts obscenities about the female
victim over the companys public address system. She (the victim) also received pornographic pictures in her locker.
Another employee told the victim that he would cut off her left breast and shove it down her throat. In another case,
12 a shipyard company employed a female welder who was continually subjected to nude pictures posted in not only
common places but also in her tool box. Her male co-workers referred to her as baby, sugar and momma.
Of course, one may argue that this second type of harassment is problematic and could lead to difficulty in
determining what a joke is and what constitutes harassment. But the United States courts, in determining what
constitutes hostile environment discrimination, have taken into consideration the circumstances of each case,
especially the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, the severity of the conduct, whether it is physical threatening
or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance or whether it unreasonably interferes with an employees work
performance. The cases cited above eliminate the idea that ordinary jokes constitute harassment and rather show the
seriousness of the conduct contemplated.
It is submitted that the workplace may mean any premises where the parties conduct their business and as such
could be extended to house helps working in the home environment and students at educational institutions.
Though it is easy to conclude that the most common form of harassment cases involve men engaging in improper
conduct toward a woman, there are cases dealing with womens improper conduct directed at men. In other
jurisdictions, there is also now an increase in the number of cases dealing with same sex harassment and in the
United States of America for instance, such harassment is recognized under federal and state laws. It is apparent,
then, that sexual harassment can be directed at both males and females and it is submitted that the victim as well as
the perpetrator may be male or female.
II. The Basis of Liability for Sexual Harassment in Ghana
A. Sexual harassment and discrimination.
In the Norvor cases, the plaintiffs claimed, amongst others, that the respondent had sexually harassed them in the
course of their employment. They alleged that this constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex, contrary to article 17
(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.
Article 17(2) of the Constitution states that:
a person shall not be discriminated against on grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social
or economic status.
In his reply to this allegation, which said reply formed part of his preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the
Commission to determine the matter, Counsel for the respondent stated that sexual harassment is a matter
concerning one person and another person and that within the context of Article 17(3) of the Constitution, there is
no issue of discrimination at all because discrimination or to discriminate means, putting somebody in preference
over another.13
According to Chambers English dictionary, discrimination is defined as treating differently especially because of ones
feelings or prejudices about a persons sex, race and religion. Discrimination could also be taken to mean the unjust
imposition of disadvantaged obligations upon a person or group of persons because of their colour, origin and, in this
context, their gender or sex.
Again, under Article 17 (3) of the Constitution, discriminate means
to give different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly to their respective descriptions by race,
place of origin, political opinions, colour, gender, occupation, religion or creed, whereby persons of one description
are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another description are not made subject or are
granted privileges or advantages which are not granted to persons of another description.
The Commission ruled, amongst others, that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination and disagreed with
the interpretation of the above definition of discrimination as given by counsel for the respondent. Taking notice of the
fact that Ghanaian case law on the issue is non-existent, the Commission relied on cases from foreign jurisdictions.
One such case referred to is the Canadian Supreme Court case of Janzen v Platy Enterprise Ltd14 where it was
established that sexual harassment was included in the range of sex discrimination prohibited by human rights
legislation. The court went on to define sex discrimination as any practices or attitudes which have the effect of
limiting the conditions of employment of, or the employment opportunities available to, employees on the basis of
characteristics related to gender15
The Commission in adopting the above definition of sex discrimination found that it was appropriate and harmonious
with the spirit and letter of Article 17(2) and (3) of the Constitution.16 The Commission noted that, though
discrimination may be directed at only a particular individual, it could also be directed at a vulnerable segment of a
group selected for differential treatment on the basis of group characteristic. It noted further that for discrimination to
occur, it is not necessary that all members of a social group directly experience the impugned conduct. Indeed,
according to the Commission, the defining characteristic of sexual harassment as a form of discrimination is that, it is
conduct visited upon a person because of the sex of that person.
It is submitted that the above showed clearly that counsel for the respondent took a narrow view of the word
discrimination. As already noted, the Commission found that the respondent had directed a series of verbal and
physical conduct of a sexual nature toward the complainants, including the following: comments about her body and
looks, invitations to sit by him and to hug or kiss him; instructions to the complainant not to other men if she would not
date him, quid pro quo statements involving promises of rewarding treatment if she acquiesced, fondling of the
complainant around in the office and attempted kissing of the complainant. These actions according to the
Commission constituted sexual harassment in the workplace and amounted to sex discrimination within the meaning
of Article 17(1)-(3) of the 1992 Constitution.
B. Sexual harassment as a violation of human rights
According to Counsel for the respondent, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act, 1993
(ACT 456) which spells out the jurisdiction and functions of the Commission, empowers the Commission by its
section 7(c) only to:
Investigate complaints concerning practices and actions by persons, private enterprises and other institutions where
those complaints allege violations of fundamental rights and freedoms under the Constitution
Apart from submitting that sexual harassment is not a form of discrimination, counsel for the respondents also
submitted that it is not a violation of fundamental human rights and freedom under the Constitution. And this being so,
counsel concluded that the Commission, in the light of its functions as spelt out in the above section 7 (c) of its
enabling Act, does not have jurisdiction to hear the matter.
One must take note of the fact that, the Commission is the body charged with the duty of investigation, protection and
promotion of the fundamental human rights and freedoms. As observed in the earlier section, the Commission held
that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Having so held, the Commission ruled that both the 1992
Constitution, Article 17 (2) and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act, 1993 (Act 456)
gives it the jurisdiction to investigate complaints alleging sexual harassment.
It must also be noted that Chapter five of the Constitution that comprises Articles 12 to 33, lays down the fundamental
human rights and freedoms respected under the laws of Ghana. And the author humbly submits that, the Constitution
by not specifically mentioning sexual harassment as a violation of human rights does not preclude us from holding it
so. Especially, since article 33(5) of the Constitution states that:
The rights, duties, declarations and guarantees relating to the fundamental human rights and freedoms specifically
mentioned in this chapter shall not be regarded as excluding others not specially mentioned which are considered to
be inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of man.
Sexual harassment, therefore, is a violation of human rights; and, indeed, the Commission took note of this and ruled
that the right to work is a fundamental human right and the right to work in an environment free from discrimination,
based on a natural or immutable characteristic is recognized around the world as a human right in every way as
fundamental as the right to life and security of the person.17
Accordingly, the Commission referred to the United States Court of Appeal case for the Eleventh Circuit where it was
established that:
Sexual harassment which creates hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary
barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equalitya requirement that a man or
woman run the gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be
as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets18
To buttress its point, the Commission further referred to other common law jurisdictions like England and Canada,
where sexual harassment has been known to have detrimental consequences for the victims of the harassment and
concluded that to the extent that sexual harassment injures the dignity and self-esteem of the person, causes
humiliation, embarrassment and awkwardness, it constitutes a violation of fundamental human rights of an individual
to the freedom from discrimination.
It is relevant at this point to draw attention to the fact that sexual harassment as a form of discrimination and a
violation of human rights, at least in relation to women, has been accepted at the international level for some years
now. It was established as a form of violence against women in the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence against Women.19 The Declaration, which was adopted in December 1993, describes
violence against women as
Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in
public or in private life.
According to the Declaration, some of the various forms or aspects of violence against women that should engage
our attention are:
1. physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family
2. physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse,
sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, (emphasis is mine) trafficking
in women and forced prostitution
3. physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State.
So important are the consequences of gender-based violence that in 1994, the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights adopted Resolution 1994/45 under which was established the office of the Special Rapporteur on
violence against Women, including its causes and consequences. Her mandate includes identifying and investigating
factual situations, as well as allegations of violence against women that may be forwarded to her by concerned
parties. Her report on the situation of violence against women in various countries shows that, victims of gender-
based violence can be found all over the world and regardless of the social status of the victim or the perpetrators.20
III. Ghanaian Legislation and Sexual Harassment
Until the passage of the Labour Act, 2003, (Act 651), sexual harassment was not mentioned in Ghanaian legislation
and the closest definition was found in the criminal code under the charge for indecent assault.21 According to the
code,
a person commits the offence of indecent assault if, without the consent of the other person he (a) forcibly makes any
sexual bodily contact with that other person; or (b) sexually violates the body of that other person in a manner not
amounting to carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge.
Clearly under our criminal code, a person could bring an action for indecent assault. But the section stopped short of
mentioning the term, sexual harassment. This defect is somewhat corrected under the Labour Act, 2003, (hereinafter
referred to as Act 651). Act 651 defines sexual harassment as
Any unwelcome, offensive or importunate sexual advances or request made by an employer or superior officer or a
co-worker to a worker, whether the worker is a man or woman22
Under the Act, a worker could terminate his/her employment based on the grounds of sexual harassment.23
The Act however, does not give content to the term sexual harassment. There is, therefore, the need for a
comprehensive legislation on the matter. In addition, the Act applies to all workers and to all employers except the
Armed forces, the Police Service, the Prison Service and the Security and Intelligence Agencies under the Security
and Intelligence Agencies Act 1996 (Act 526). The exclusion of the above persons from the ambit of the law creates a
lacuna in the law as far as the charge of sexual harassment is concerned. For instance, what would be the fate of an
officer from the above listed institutions who undergoes sexual harassment from his or her superiors? And what of the
fate of the student who undergoes sexual harassment from his or her lecturer? For such persons their remedy still
lies with the courts or the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice.
IV. Remedial Action for Sexual Harassment
It must be reiterated that the two Norvor cases, are maiden cases on sexual harassment in Ghana. Unfortunately, the
inability of the respondent to appear before the Commission at the hearing and prosecute the case to its final
conclusion, and to address the issues raised by the complainants, erodes to a little extent, the weight and
significance to be attached to them as test cases. Also the respondents, by not contesting the Commissions decision
and by complying with it, deny us the opportunity of testing the reaction of the courts on the issue. But in any case,
the decision can be of persuasive authority. Furthermore, the Commission by its decision has established beyond any
reasonable doubt the possibility of our courts also entertaining sexual harassment actions in Ghana.
The Commission has the power to take appropriate action to call for the remedying, correction and reversal of human
rights violations by employing menas that are fair, proper and effective including bringing proceedings in a competent
Court for a remedy to secure the termination of the offending conduct.24
From the foregoing, the Commission could institute an action before the courts to enforce its decision when a
defendant refuses to comply with its decision. As already noted above and unfortunate for the jurisprudence in this
area of the law, the effectiveness of the Commissions decision in the Norvor cases, was not tested in the courts
since the respondent complied with it.
The Commission, apart from awarding punitive monetary compensation, could grant a person who is subjected to
sexual harassment, compensation for lost wages (where applicable), emotional and mental distress, and proven
transportation expenses. Taking the universally accepted principle in human rights cases, that a violation of human
rights warrants compensation, the Commission made the following orders;
1. That the respondent pay to the complainant an amount of five million cedis as compensation representing
compensation for emotional injury, injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect. This sum was arrived at after
consideration of the nature of the harassment, the degree of aggressiveness and physical contact in the harassment,
the ongoing nature or duration of the harassment, the frequency of the harassment, the age of the victim and her
vulnerability and the psychological impact of the harassment upon the victim.
2. That the complainant is entitled to her actual wage loss subject only to her duty to mitigate. Mitigating
circumstances could be a new job. The respondent was therefore ordered to pay three million, two hundred and forty
thousand cedis, representing the arrears for the nine months of lost wages, plus interest.
3. A restraining order placed on the respondent to desist from such behaviour and to refrain from committing similar
violations in the future.
4. An amount of fifty-six thousand cedis was also awarded for transportation expenses incurred in order to attend the
hearings.
For a long time, the Commission seemed to be the only avenue for redress for sexual harassment actions. Act 651
has, however, created a second avenue for redress for sexual harassment complaints. The Act made provision for
the establishment of a National Labour Commission25, which is to, among other functions, receive complaints from
workers, trade unions and employers or employers' organisations on industrial disagreements and allegations of
infringement of any of the requirements under the Act or infringement of the regulations made under the Act. Hence,
an employee could bring a complaint for unfair termination of employment on grounds of sexual harassment and the
National Labour Commission may, if it finds all allegations to be true, order the employer to pay compensation to the
employee. The Commission may also order the re-instatement or re-employment of the employee26 and under
section 172 of the Act, it has the mandate to make an application to the High court for an order to compel a person to
comply with its direction or order.
V. Safeguards against Sexual Harassment Actions
The employer is often cited as a defendant in most sexual harassment cases. The consequences of a sexual
harassment action could be costly to employers even when the offender is not the owner of the company or
institution. It has been held in certain jurisdictions that the employer is liable for sexual harassment actions even
when he or she had no knowledge of the harassment. This strict liability was explained in the 1982 case of Henson v
City of Dundee,27 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, when the court stated that:
The supervisor uses the means furnished to him by the employer to accomplish the prohibited purpose. He acts
within the scope of his actual or apparent authority to hire, fire, discipline or promote. Because the supervisor is
acting within his actual or apparent scope of his authority entrusted to him by the employer when he makes
employment decisions, his conduct can fairly be imputed to the source of his authority.
This point was not clearly established under the Commissions decision in the Norvor cases, probably because the
offender also happens to be the owner of the Company. It is therefore important that certain safeguards be
maintained by all employers because a sexual harassment case could cause an employer to suffer in terms of costly
lawsuits, low employee morale and decline in productivity, in addition to an erosion of the companys public image.
An important safeguard is the institution of an effective sexual harassment policy which should be disseminated to all
workers. It is necessary for the policy to be so published because, an employer who failed to do so could still be held
liable for sexual harassment despite the existence of a policy on the issue.28 The said policy must be available with
avenue for an effective complaint procedure, which should contain provisions on the ability of a worker to sidestep
the supervisor to complain to any other person of higher rank, if the supervisor is the perpetrator of the offensive
conduct.
Other safeguards recommended are the implementation of no dating policies.29 The policy must describe what
dating is and define activities that amount to dating. It is obvious that this could create certain problems like the
position of a married couple working in the same office. Another problem would be the fact that many date and marry
someone they meet at work and outright prohibition would be a violation of employees right to privacy after work. An
alternate therefore would be to ensure that employees enter a consensual relationship agreement. This would be
signed by both employees and management and would provide that employees will not allow the relationship to
interfere with or impact the work environment. This it is submitted is also cumberson especially when there could be
the situation where one employee may change dates frequently and would have to sign such a policy anytime he or
she makes takes a different date. It is submitted that this would be observed more in breach than in compliance.
The best solution would be the first safeguard of having a general sexual harassment policy creating avenues for
redress as outlined above.
VI. Possible Defences to Sexual Harassment Actions
1. Pleading consent: Since sexual harassment actions are based on unwelcome sexual advances, the best defence
is to establish that there was consent and that relationship was consensual.
2. In hostile environment complaints, where the employer is being held vicariously liable, the employer could show
that it took reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment. This is usually a company sexual harassment policy; that,
the employer took prompt action to remedy the violation once it became aware of it, and that the employee did not
take advantage of the available opportunities to complain.
V. Conclusion
Sexual harassment is sex discrimination and a violation of the human rights of an individual. The labour Act, 2003
(Act 651), is a bold initiative in recognising sexual harassment as a ground for termination of employment, but more
needs to be done. There is, therefore, the responsibility on Ghanaian law-makers to come out with model sexual
harassment legislation. Furthermore, bearing in mind that the definition of sexual harassment covers both male and
female, despite the fact that cases involving females are greater, the said legislation must make provision not only for
male complainants but also for same sex complaints. Companies must institute comprehensive, detailed and
responsible sexual harassment policies to avoid protracted and embarrassing law suits. Grievance procedures must
be well established and adhered to.
Be it as it may, the Norvor cases are still pioneer test cases and it is hoped that they would open the flood-gates for
the many hitherto silent victims of sexual harassment to obtain remedy in court.
FOOTNOTES
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, KNUST Kumasi-Ghana
1 Roberts B. S. & Manu, R. A. Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A primer at // www.myfindlaw.com
2 Supra, n. 1
3 http://www.who2.com/billclinton.html assessed on 02-10-03. President Clinton was accused of committing perjury
and obstruction of justice in his attempt to cover up an extra-marital affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky.
Paula Jones told her story in retaliation to an article by David Brock in a Conservative Magazine the American
Spectator, which made her out to be a willing participant in President Clintons extra-marital activities. To set the
records straight, Jones filed a law suit against President Clinton.
4 Supra n. 3
5 (1994-2000) CHRAJ 1-36
6 See Section 15 of Act 651
7 Supra n.5.
8 See article 218 (d) (i) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana
9 Merriam-Websters Dictionary of Law at http://library 1p.findlaw.com/civilrights.html assessed on 10-10-03
10 Facts about sexual harassment at http://library.1p. findlaw.com/civilrights.html assessed on 10-10-03
11 Waltman v International Paper Co., 875 E2d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 1989)
12 Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards Inc., 116 FRD 525, 529-531 (M. D. Fla. 1988)
13 Manso v Norvor (1994-2000) CHRAJ 3
14 (1989) 10 CHRRD/6205, (1994-2000) CHRAJ 6
15 (1994-2000) CHRAJ 8
16 (1994-2000) CHRAJ 9
17 (1994-2000) CHRAJ 11
18 Henson v City of Dundee, 682 E2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)
19 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Resolution 48/104, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No 49)
at 217, U.N. Doc A/48/49 (1993). At website: htt:wwwLumn edu/humanarts/instree/.edvw.htm last assessed on 24-03-
01
20 Reporter of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women at the 57th Session of the Commission on Human
Rights, E/CN.4/2001/73/Add.1, on Communications to and from Governments, on 13th February 2001 at Website
http://www.unhchr.ch./huridocda /huridocda.nsf/AllSymbols/
21 Criminal Code (Amendment) Act, 1998 Act 544, section 103(1) and (2)
22 Section 175 of Act 651
23 Section 175 of Act 651
24 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, Article 218 (d)(iii)
25 See section 135 of Act 651
26 See section 64 of Act 651
27 Supra, n.20. Also see, Ackourey, M. A. (Freeman, Marthias & Gray, LLP.), At http://www.fmglaw.co//tblank last
assessed on 05-10-03
28 Faragher v City of Boca Raton (1998) WL 336322. See also http://library.1pfindlaw.com/articles/file/assessed" on
08-10-2003 and http://www.fmglaw.co//tblank", supra n. 29
29 Sutton R. (Saalfeld, Griggs, Gorsuch, Alexander & Emerick P.C.), Regulating workplace romance, at
http://www.library.1p.findlaw.com/articles/file/assessed on 15-10-03
national Politics: Essays In International Relations, p156
11 Raymond Firth, Human Types and Ian Robertson supra passim.
12 A point of similarity that readily calls to mind is the convergence of the philosophical correlative between rights and
duties in Hohfeld's analysis (eurocentric), and African notions of rights encapsulated in the ACHPR. For further
discussion on this see Neil McCormick "Dworkin as pre-Benthamite" in M. Cohen(Ed), R Dworkin and contemporary
jurisprudence (1983) p182 at 193 See also Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics-Practical Syllogism
13 Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of The Gikuyu (1965) at p109, where the author discusses
the elements of duty and communal spirit inculcated into Gikuyu children and therefore less private rights and
assertiveness, as distinguishable from the Eurocentric culture with which they came into contact. See also Charles
Taylor, Human Rights: The Legal Culture in UNESCO, Philosophical Foundations of human Rights (1986), at p49.
14 This conclusion is partly based on the logical derivation that the objective existence of reality is not affected by
one's private admission or otherwise of same.
15 James Crawford (Ed) The rights of people 127 (1988) 7
16 The writer does not share to full extremity, the tenets of Austinian positivism. Though I do not intend to go into the
ramifications and controversies of the Naturalists-Positivist dialogue, this analysis is only to highlight the practical
workings of the law.
17 Article 26, (1992) constitution
18 Another way to put this, is to say that the theory and practice of cultural relativism do not agree.
19 For contrasting views on the justiciabilitysic of the various categories of rights, see Bossuyt (1975) 8 HRJ 783;Van
Boven, in Vasak and Alston, eds, The International Dimension of Human Rights (1982), vol 1,Ch. 3; Van Hoof, in
Alston and Tomasevski, eds., The Right to Food
20 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.
21 Practices such as Female Genital Mutilation, Gender Caste Discrimination and general female Subjugation, and
other culturally unfair practices are all purportedly justified in the name of Cultural relativism.
22 M. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity- A classical defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Cambridge M.A; Harvard
University Press, 1997) pp139-145