7.62 mm Versus 5.

56 mm - Does NATO
Really Need Two Standard Rifle Calibers
CSC 1986
SUBJECT AREA General
TITLE: 7.62 mm Versus 5.56 mm - Does NATO Really Need Two
Standard Rifle Calibers?

I. Purpose: To reestablish the 7.62mm NATO cartridge as

the optimum rifle caliber ammunition for the U. S. and NATO.
II. Problem: NATO recently adopted the 5.56mm as its
second standard rifle caliber cartridge. As a result, the
existing NATO standard, the 7.62mm, has been relegated to a
secondary supporting role within NATO's armed forces.
Although the selection of the 5.56mm was based on extensive
testing, research, and documented battle performance, this
intermediate power round is not the optimum ammunition and
caliber for U. S. and NATO forces in the contemplated
battlefields of the future.
III. Discussion: Proponents of the intermediate power
5.56mm have continuously compared their smaller cartridge
to the large full power 7.62mm. The results of these
comparisons purportedly show the superiority of the smaller
ammunition in the areas of penetration, lethality, weapon
portability, and fire power. Careful examination of these
tests and the touted advantages of the 5.56mm, however,
shows that the 7.62mm is still potentially superior to the
smaller round. For example, in the NATO tests, researchers
have compared a modern, semi-armor piercing round of
ammunition (5.56mm) against a standard ball cartridge
(7.62mm) that has not been improved since its adoption in
1953. An improved 7.62mm NATO, using the same technology as
the 5.56mm, would definitely out-perform the smaller
cartridge. With respect to portability, second generation
7.62mm rifles are smaller, more compact, and very
comparable to certain 5.56mm weapons. Concerning fire
power, any full automatic fire with light assault rifles,
even with the low-recoil 5.56mm, is not effective and only
results in a waste of ammunition. In addition, new
technological developments in body armor may soon defeat
the penetration capability of the small 5.56mm. New
developments in optical sighting equipment will soon
increase battlefield engagement ranges and thereby exceed
the long range accuracy capability of the smaller 5.56mm.
The large case and projectile of the 7.62mm, however, are
more than sufficient to accept significant improvements in
penetration, lethality, and long range performance. This
will allow the 7.62mm to remain effective on future
battlefields.
IV. Conclusion: The 5.56mm will, at best, only be an
interim NATO standard. Due to its small size, further
improvements of the 5.56mm will be insufficient to keep up
with the changing requirements of future battlefields.
Overall, the older 7.62mm NATO is a better standard
cartridge since it has the capacity and the flexibility to
be significantly improved and thereby remain effective.
V. Recommendations: The 7.62mm NATO cartridge should be
developed with current technology to improve its
penetration, lethality, and overall-performance. Modern
weapons systems should be further developed to utilize the
7.62mm. No, NATO does not need two standard rifle calibers.

Major Vern T. Miyagi Conference Group 6

RESEARCH PAPER
Title
7.62mm Versus 5.56mm - Does NATO Really Need Two Standard
Rifle
Calibers?

Thesis Statement
Although the selection of the 5.56 x 45mm cartridge was
based on extensive testing, research, and documented battle
performance, this intermediate power round is not the
optimum ammunition and caliber for U. S. and NATO forces in
the contemplated battlefields of the future.
I. Significance of the Controversy
A. Thesis statement
B. Method of analysis
II. Evolution of the Intermediate Power Cartridge Concept
A. Germany
B. Soviet Union
C. United States
III. Development of the Two Standard NATO Cartridges
A. 7.62 x 51mm NATO
B. 5.56 x 45mm NATO
C. NATO trials
D. Concepts of employment - NATO
IV. Comparison of the 7.62mm With the 5.56mm
A. Physical characteristics and ballistics
B. Penetration
C. Portability and weight
D. Firepower
V. Analysis
A. Problems with the NATO comparisons and tests
 B. Factors not considered in the NATO tests
C. Effects of technological advances in optical
sights and body armor on the initial intermediate power
concepts
D. Potential for improvement and development -
5.56mm v. 7.62mm
E. Lethality of improved round is reduced
F. Potential ineffectiveness on NATO scenario
battlefields 7.62 mm Versus 5.56 mm - Does NATO Really Need
Two Standard Rifle Calibers?

On 28 October 1980, after more than four years of

extensive testing at the German Infantry School at
Hammelburg, Federal Republic of Germany, the NATO Small
Arms Test Control Commission (NSMATCC) approved the
standardization of a second rifle caliber cartridge. The
cartridge selected was the intermediate power 5.56 x 45mm
(.223 Caliber) and the improved Belgian version, the SS109,
was selected as the basis for standardization.1 As a
result, NATO now has two standard rifle caliber cartridges,
the full power 7.62 x 51mm NATO (.308 Caliber), in service
since 1953, and the new intermediate power 5.56 x 45mm NATO
adopted in 1980. Although the selection of the 5.56 x 45mm
cartridge was based on extensive testing, research, and
documented battle performance, this intermediate power
round is not the optimum ammunition and caliber for U. S.
and NATO forces in the contemplated battlefields of the
future. Let's examine the concept of intermediate power
rifle ammunition, the evolution of the two standard
NATO rifle cartridges, their advantages and disadvantages,
and discuss why the older, full power 7.62 x 51mm NATO
cartridge can better satisfy the present and future
tactical needs of the individual NATO rifleman.
The concept of intermediate power rifle cartridges
began in Germany prior to World War II. The standard
German rifle cartridge used since 1888 was the full power
7.92 x 57mm which propelled a 198 grain bullet at a muzzle
velocity of 2,550 feet per second (fps) or 773 meters per
second (mps). Comprehensive studies of the actual
distances over which rifle fire was employed and of the
marksmanship capabilities of the average German
infantryman, especially during the heat of battle,
convinced German researchers that a smaller, substantially
less-powerful, and lighter cartridge would be more than
adequate. In addition, the adoption of smaller
intermediate power cartridges would allow the development
of shorter and lighter rifles, the ability to carry more
rounds of ammunition, and the enhancement of accuracy due
to lighter recoil. German research for a new intermediate
round commenced in 1934, and in 1938 a new intermediate
cartridge was adopted and designated the 7.9 mm Infanterie
Kurz Patrone (7.9 mm Kurz). This cartridge propelled a
small 125 grain bullet at a relatively moderate muzzle
velocity of 2,100 fps (636 mps), Paralleling the evolution
of the 7.9 mm Kurz was the development of a new, compact,
select-fire rifle chambered for the new ammunition. In
1940, two designs were accepted for field testing and were
extensively used on the Russian front. The final version
"Sturmgewehr" or assault rifle, the MP43, was adopted in
1943 and significant numbers were produced prior to the end
of the war. This weapon utilized a thirty round magazine
and could provide both semiautomatic and full automatic
fire. Although the MP43, with a fully loaded thirty round
magazine, was more than three pounds heavier than the
standard bolt-action Kar 98k rifle, the new weapon's
performance in the field was excellent due to the terrific
firepower now available to the German infantryman.2
The effectiveness of the new rifle and ammunition did
not go unnoticed by Soviet forces, especially since they
were the first recipients of its firepower. Captured
rifles and ammunition were carefully studied, and in 1943
an intermediate power cartridge designed by Soviet
engineers, N. M. Elizarov and B. V. Semin, was adopted by
the Soviet Union. This cartridge was designated the
7.62 x 39mm Model 1943 and consisted of a 125 grain bullet
with a muzzle velocity of 2,200 fps (667 mps). Due to
wartime materiel and production shortages, the first weapon
designed to use this new ammunition, the SKS Carbine, was
not adopted until 1946. One year later, the famous AK-47,
designed by M. Kalashnikov, was formally adopted by the
Soviet armed forces.3 In 1974, a product improved version
of the same basic design, the AKS74 rifle, was adopted by
the Soviet army. The AKS74 is chambered for a new 5.45
x 39mm (.221 Caliber) cartridge, very similar to our own
5.56 x 45mm NATO. The Soviets also adopted, at the same
time, a new 5.45mm squad automatic weapon, called RPK74.4
These recent changes in Soviet small arms development are
very important because they closely parallel the small arms
concepts of the U. S. and NATO.
Like the Germans and Soviets, the U. S. also
experimented with intermediate power cartridges during
World War II. Designed as a replacement for the pistol and
submachine gun during World War II, the U. S. .30 Caliber
M1 and M2 carbines fires lighter and smaller .30 caliber
cartridges (7.62 x 33mm). This cartridge propelled a small
round-nosed 115 grain bullet at an initial velocity of
1,970 fps (597 mps). The carbine and its cartridge,
however, were designed for issue only to officers, non-
commissioned officers, service troops, and members of heavy
weapons crews. The carbine, with its intermediate power
cartridge, was never designed to replace the M1 Garand and
its full power .30 Caliber M2 (30-06) ammunition. Over six
million carbines were produced during World War II and the
Korean War. Although the carbines were light, compact, had
a select fire capability (M2 model), and utilized magazines
with capacities of thirty or fifteen rounds, these weapons
eventually came to be unpopular with U. S. troops due to
the limited range and inadequate stopping power of the
carbine ammunition. Soon after the Korean War, the U. S.
M1 and M2 Carbines were retired from service.5
Such was the evolution of the intermediate power
cartridge concepts in Germany, the Soviet Union, and the
United States during the 1940's. Lets now take a look at
the development of the 7.62 x 51mm NATO and the 5.56 x 45mm
NATO during the 1950's and 1960's
The first standard NATO cartridge, the 7.62 x 51mm
NATO, was developed by the United States as a successor to
the .30 Caliber M2 round (30-06), which had served as the
standard U. S. rifle cartridge since 1906. The .30 Caliber
M2 cartridge propelled a 150 grain projectile at a muzzle
velocity of 2,800 fps (848 mps)and served the U. S. very
effectively in the 1903 Springfield and M1 Garand service
rifles, the Browning automatic rifle, and the heavy and
light models of the Browning machine guns. Although the M1
Garand was very effective and highly praised during its
service as the standard U. S. rifle in World War II and
Korea, many infantrymen desired a lighter weapon with
greater ammunition capacity and a select-fire capability.6
Many soldiers attempted to use the M2 carbine as a
replacement for the M1 Garand, but this proved
unsatisfactory due to the inadequate power of the carbine
ammunition. In September 1945, after conducting
preliminary tests to improve the M1 rifle, the U. S.
Ordnance Technical Committee turned its attention to the
development of a new and lighter rifle cartridge that would
replace the .30 Caliber M2 round. This interest in a new
cartridge was influenced by the battlefield success of the
German 7.9mm Kurz, and Soviet adoption of their Kalashnikov
light assault rifles using the new 7.62 x 39mm Model 43
intermediate power ammunition. As the development of the
new U. S. service rifle cartridge progressed, however,
traditionalism took hold as U. S. Army participants began
to feel that the intermediate power ammunition, used by the
Soviets and the Germans, were too limited in their
effective combat ranges and power to satisfy U. S. infantry
requirements. The result was a compromise. The Ordnance
Technical Committee came up with a shortened version of the
old .30 caliber M2 cartridge. This new cartridge,
designated the 7.62 x 51mm T65, was not an intermediate
power round. Although shorter by a half inch than the old
Caliber .30 M2 round, it still propelled a 147 grain bullet
at a muzzle velocity of 2,800 fps (848 mps) -- essentially
identical to the old .30 Caliber M2 round. Newly developed
ball powder allowed the use of smaller cartridge case to
produce pressures and velocities identical to the old full
power .30 Caliber M2 round.7
Final U. S. adoption of the new 7.62 x 51mm T65
cartridge depended upon the acceptance of the new round by
members of the NATO alliance. During the early 1950's, the
British conducted their own tests to determine the optimum
rifle ammunition for their troops. They concluded that a .
280 Caliber (7 mm) cartridge was the ideal rifle caliber.
The proposed British cartridge was a true intermediate
power cartridge based on German experience and Soviet
developments. In 1953, after much political debate, the U.
S. 7.62 x 51mm T65 round was finally adopted by the NATO
Alliance as its standard rifle caliber cartridge. In 1957,
after numerous trails, the U. S. finally adopted the M14
rifle as its new standard 7.62mm NATO caliber service
rifle. The other members of NATO adopted either the German
G3 or the Belgian FN FAL as their standard 7.62mm NATO
caliber service rifles.8
The 5.56 x 45mm cartridge and the M16 rifle was
originally developed and unilaterally adopted by the United
States in 1963 for initial employment in Southeast Asia. A
resurgence of U. S. interest in intermediate power rifle
cartridges developed soon after the 7.62 x 51mm NATO was
adopted in 1953. A series of tests, commissioned by the
U.S. Army and conducted by the Operations Research
Organization (ORO), concluded that the rifle was seldom
used effectively by U. S. troops at ranges in excess of 300
meters (330 yds). This conclusion was based on studies of
actual battles involving U. S. soldiers. According to the
ORO studies, the inability of U. S. soldiers to effectively
engage targets beyond 300 meters was due to their
inability, under battle conditions, to see and identify
targets beyond that range.9 The ORO studies, however,
failed to consider whether the enemy targets were behind
heavy brush, or barriers such as sandbags, dirt berms, and
coconut logs when fired on by U. S. soldiers. The study
assumed that there was nothing between the firer and the
target to impede the flight of the rifle projectile.
Concurrently, ballistic experiments, conducted as part of
the U. S. Army Project Caliber, demonstrated the small high
velocity bullets, ranging in caliber from .222 to .257
inches and weighing only 40 to 55 grains, were very
effective at ranges up to 400 meters.10 As a result of
these studies, the Continental Army Command (CONARC) asked
selected commercial arms organizations to develop high
velocity .223 Cal (5.56mm) ammunition and light weight
assault rifles chambered for them. After extensive testing
of candidate weapons and ammunition submitted by various
manufacturers, CONARC selected the AR15 rifle and the 5.56
x 45mm ammunition, both developed by Eugene Stoner of the
Armalite Division of the Fairchild Aircraft Engine
Corporation. The 5.56 x 45mm cartridge was derived from
the .222 Remington and .22 Hornet commercial cartridges
used by small game hunters throughout the United States.
After some modifications for military use, the AR15 and its
5.56 x 45mm, cartridge were accepted by CONARC and
designated as the M16 and the M193, respectively.11
The M193 cartridge, as finally accepted by CONARC,
propelled a small 55 grain bullet at an initial velocity of
3,180 fps (964 mps) through the standard 20 inch barrel of
the M16. Test weapons and ammunition were sent to
Southeast Asia in 1962 for combat field analysis. The
reports from both U. S. and allied forces were very good
and consequently, in 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara
ordered the cessation of M14 production and announced the
purchase of 85,000 M16 rifles for the Army and 19,000 for
the Air Force. Subsequent performance of the M16 in
Vietnam was marred by frequent jamming caused by improper
and insufficient maintenance in the field. Performance
quickly improved as chrome barrels and chambers were used
in the newer M16A1 model, and proper maintenance procedures
were employed by troops in the field. The U. S. finally
had adopted an intermediate power rifle cartridge and a
true light-weight assault weapon to use it.12
The adoption of the 5.56 x 45mm cartridge and the M16
rifle put the U. S. into the situation of having two
standard service rifles. The initial U. S. Army employment
concept called for the issue of the M16 to special
operations and airborne troops, and to troops in Southeast
Asia. The M14 would still be issued to troops stationed in
Europe of assigned to NATO.13 This initial concept proved
to be logistically impractical and, eventually, all U. S.
troops were issued the new M16 rifle and 5.56 x 45mm
ammunition.
Based on the overall success of the 5.56mm ammunition
in Southeast Asia, after the initial problems with the M16
were solved, other nations began to produce assault type
rifles using the U. S. 5.56 x 45mm ammunition. In order to
standardize the use and procurement of 5.56mm ammunition
among member nations, NATO commenced formal adoption trials
for a second small rifle caliber cartridge in 1976. The
Belgian product-improved version of the U. S. M193 5.56 x
45mm cartridge was adopted by the alliance in 1980.
The current NATO concept of employment calls for the
issue of the 5.56mm weapons to individual riflemen, members
of crew-served weapon teams, support troops, and officers
and NCO's. The current NATO concept also includes the
development and adoption of a squad automatic weapon (SAW)
in 5.56 x 45mm NATO caliber. The goal of NATO small arms
employment is to ensure ammunition interchangeability at
the basic infantry squad level. The full power 7.62 x 51mm
NATO remains the standard ammunition for the heavier belt-
fed medium machine guns (M60, MG3, and FN MAG) employed
with infantry weapons squads, weapons platoons, and as
vehicle mounted support weapons.14 In addition,
specialized sniper weapons still employ the longer ranged
7.62 x 51mm NATO.
The foregoing paragraphs reviewed the evolution of the
Intermediate power cartridge concept, documented the
development of the two standard NATO cartridges, and
discussed the current concept of employment within the NATO
alliance. Let's now compare the two cartridges, examine
their strengths and weaknesses, and analyze why the 7.62 x
51mm NATO is a better rifle cartridge in the long run for
the U. S. and NATO (Table I).
The current production 7.62 x 51mm NATO ball cartridge
has remained unchanged since its adoption by NATO in 1953.
As typified by the U. S. M80 ball and the Belgian M77 ball,
this cartridge propels a 147-grain cupronickel-jacketed
lead bullet at a muzzle velocity of 2,800 fps (848 mps).
Total cartridge length and weight are 2.80 inches and 386
grains, respectively.15 Utilizing a standard 22-inch barrel
with a rifling twist of one turn in twelve inches (M14
rifle), the maximum effective range of the 7.62 x 51mm ball
cartridge is listed as 620 meters (682 yds). The U. S. M80
and the Belgian M77 ball projectiles can penetrate the
standard NATO 3.45 mm (.14 inch) thick steel plate up to a
range of 620 meters, and can penetrate one side of the
U. S. steel helmet up to a range of 800 meters (880 yds).16
In barrier and fortification penetration tests, the 147
grain ball projectile can consistently penetrate two test
building blocks.17
The SS109 5.56mm NATO cartridge is a second generation
intermediate power round developed with 1970's technology.
It is significantly more powerful and effective than the U.
S. M193 5.56mm ball round originally used with the M16
rifle. The new SS109 cartridge propels a heavier 62-grain
semi-armor piercing projectile at an initial velocity of
3,050 fps (924 mps).18 The improved projectile contains a
10-grain .182 caliber hardened steel penetrator that
ensures penetration at longer ranges. Total cartridge
length and weight are 2.26 inches and 182.0 grains,
respectively. The increased length and weight of the new
SS109 projectile requires a faster rifling twist of one
turn in seven inches to fully stabilize the new projectile
in flight.19 The predecessor M193 5.56mm, which used a
projectile weighting only 55 grains, was only marginally
stabilized with a slower rifling twist of one turn in
twelve inches. The new projectile can penetrate the
standard NATO 3.45mm steel plate up to a range of 640
meters (704 yds) and one side of the U. S. steel helmet up
to a range of 1,300 meters (1430 yds).20 In tests of
barrier and fortification penetration however, the steel
penetrator of the SS109 could not pierce any of the test
building blocks.21
The primary advantages of the intermediate power 5.56
x 45mm NATO cartridge are summarized as follows: (1) the
penetration and power of the SS109 version are superior to
the 7.62mm NATO and more than adequate for the 300-meter
average combat range documented in actual battle (ORO
studies): (2) the lower recoil generated by the 5.56mm
cartridge allows more control during full automatic fire
and therefore provides greater firepower to the individual
soldier; (3) the lesser weight of the 5.56mm ammunition
allows the individual soldier to carry more ammunition and
other equipment; (4) the smaller size of the 5.56mm
ammunition allows the use of smaller, lighter, and more
compact rifles and squad automatic weapons and; (5) the
lethality of the 5.56mm projectile is greater than the
7.62mm projectile at normal combat ranges, due to the
tendency of the lighter projectile to tumble or shatter on
impact. In summary, the 5.56mm NATO provides greater
firepower and effectiveness than the larger and heavier
7.62mm NATO. This concept of more for less appears very
convincing, however upon careful analysis, this idea loses
its credibility. Let's examine each of the advantages of
the 5.56mm NATO, compare them to the qualities of the
larger 7.62mm NATO, and discuss some critical factors not
addressed by proponents of the smaller cartridge.
The penetration results obtained by the NSMATCC with
the 5.56mm SS109 cartridge are impressive. The SS109 can
penetrate the 3.45mm standard NATO steel plate to 640
meters, while the 7.62mm ball can only penetrate it to 620
meters. The U. S. steel helmet penetration results are
even more impressive as the SS109 can penetrate it up to
1,300 meters, while the 7.62mm ball cannot penetrate it
beyond 800 meters. These comparisons however, do not
consider the fact that the SS109 uses a semi-armor
piercing, steel-cored projectile, while the 7.62mm ball
uses a relatively soft anti-personnel, lead-cored
projectile. A semi-armor piercing 7.62mm caliber
projectile, using second generation technology as the
SS109, would easily out-perform the smaller SS109
projectile in penetration tests at all ranges.22 With
respect to barrier and fortification penetration tests, the
7.62mm ball projectile can consistently penetrate two test
building blocks, while the SS109 semi-armor piercing
projectile cannot penetrate a single block. In light of
these considerations, the idea of SS109 penetration
superiority over the 7.62 x 51mm is not valid.
The concept that greater firepower can be achieved by
providing as much infantrymen with a full automatic fire
capability is not realistic. Battle experience has shown
that full automatic fire from light assault rifles is
largely ineffective and only results in the expenditure of
large quantities of ammunition. Even with the lower recoil
generated by 5.56mm ammunition, automatic fire dispersion
is still too large to be effective.23 Fire power is
normally equated with maximum "steel" on target, not with
maximum steel in the general direction of the target. Full
automatic fire with the 5.56mm NATO just as wasteful and
Confirming this view is the fact that second generation
assault rifles, such as the U. S. M16A2 and Belgian FN FNC,
are not employing a 3-shot burst control in lieu of a full
automatic capability.24 With this burst control feature, a
thirty round magazine produces only ten bursts. Do we need
thirty rounds to successfully hit and incapacitate ten
enemy targets? Even with 3-shot burst control and the
lower impulse of the 5.56mm ammunition, shot dispersion is
still too large to be effective. Perhaps a single well-
aimed 147 grain 7.62mm bullet would have more effect than
three rounds of 5.56mm fired in the burst control mode. As
a result, the lower recoil and impulse of the 5.56mm
ammunition does not provide greater fire power since full
automatic fire from an individual assault rifle is largely
ineffective and only wastes ammunition.
A great deal of emphasis has been placed, during the
development of intermediate power ammunition, on ammunition
weight. It is a fact that 5.56-mm NATO ammunition weight
only 47% as much as 7.62 mm NATO ammunition. This weight
reduction advantage however, comes with a corresponding
disadvantage in the power and effectiveness of the
ammunition. The 5.56mm NATO cartridge was originally
derived from commercial small game and varmint cartridges
used by hunters throughout the United States. In most
States, the .223 Remington cartridge, the commercial
version of the 5.56 x 45mm NATO, is outlawed for use
against deer-sized or larger game. This restriction even
includes the explosive hollow-point versions using 68-grain
projectiles. Years of hunting experience has shown that the
small 5.56 x 45mm cartridge is incapable of consistently
stopping deer-sized or larger game. Consequently, this
cartridge is limited to game such as woodchucks, gophers,
turkeys, and prairie dogs.25 Is this cartridge really
adequate for human-sizes targets? Soldiers can definitely
carry more 5.56mm ammunition, but will they be carrying
more effective ammunition? As a case in point, battle
experience in the Philippines, between government troops
(armed with the 5.56mm M16A1) and Communist rebels (armed
with vintage .30 Caliber M1 Garand and Browning automatic
rifles), has shown that the greater penetration capability
of the older full power cartridge gave the rebels superior
effective firepower.26
Another stated advantage of the smaller 5.56mm NATO
cartridge concerns the employment of shorter and lighter
weapons. Current versions of the Israeli Galil and FN FAL
Paratroop rifles, however, both in 7.62mm caliber, weigh
only nine to ten pounds fully loaded with twenty-round
magazines. These 7.62mm NATO weapons also have shorter
barrels and folding stocks that make them very compact.
The new U. S. M16A2 and the new Belgian FN FNC, both second
generation 5.56mm NATO assault rifles, weigh approximately
eight27 and ten pounds,28 respectively, when fully loaded
with thirty-round magazines. The purported reductions in
weight and improvements in compactness are really not
significant.
The lethality of the original M193 5.56mm projectile
is awesome, at ranges under 200 meters, due to the tendency
of the marginally stable 55-grain bullet to tumble or
shatter on impact with any target. Lethality of the M193
5.56mm projectile beyond 200 meters, however, falls very
sharply as range increases and velocity decreases.29 The
lethality of the new SS109 5.56mm projectile on the
battlefield is questionable. The SS109 projectile is
longer and heavier than the M193 projectile and is more
stabilized in flight with the faster rifling twist used in
second generation assault rifles. The emphasis, in the
development of the SS109 projectile, was to increase
stability and therefore penetration at longer ranges. The
increased flight stability of the new SS109 projectile does
effectively enhance penetration at longer ranges, but this
same stability reduces the projectile's tendency to tumble
or shatter upon target impact.30 As a result, the emphasis
on penetration in the new SS109 projectile may result in a
sharp decrease in lethality, as compared to its predecessor
M193 cartridge.
The adoption of intermediate power ammunition by a
large number of countries was based on the limited ability
of the average soldier to discern and identify targets
under battle conditions. The U. S. Army's ORO studies
during the 1950's, confirmed these ideas and established
300 meters as the practical range limit for rifles under
battle conditions. The ORO studies, however, failed to
consider the technological advances of the 1970's and
1980's in the area of optical weapons sights. The battle
proven British Trilux optical sight, with a four power
magnification, has been employed by the British effectively
on their 7.62mm FN FALs for many years.31 Their newly
adopted 5.56mm NATO individual weapon, the SA 80, utilizes
a built-in version of the Trilux called the SUSAT.32 The
Austrian developed 5.56mm NATO assault rifle, the AUG,
employs a 1.5 power optical sight built in to the weapon's
carrying handle.33 The U. S. Army is also considering a
new optical sight for its version of the M16A2. These
improved optical sights greatly increase the average
soldier's ability to see and identify enemy targets at
longer ranges. As the soldier's ability to engage targets
beyond the 300 to 400 meter NATO limitation increases, the
long range accuracy limitations of the 5.56mm SS109
projectile will become evident. The 62-grain 5.56mm NATO
projectile is significantly more affected by weather
conditions than the heavier projectile of the 7.62mm NATO.
For example, at 400 meters the required windage adjustment
for a 10 mph crosswind for the SS109 cartridge is
approximately 9 clicks into the wind using the M16A2
sights. Under the same conditions, the required windage
adjustment for the 7.62mm NATO cartridge is only 4 clicks
using the M14 sights. The larger sight adjustment, required
for the SS109 projectile, produces a greater margin of
error that increases as distance increases. As the
potential rifle engagement distances increase, due to
improvements in optical sights, the limited accuracy
potential of the small 5.56mm NATO projectile will severely
limit any benefits that may be derived from such optical
improvements.
New technological developments in body armor and
individual protection, such as kevlar and other light-
weight ceramic and composite armor, may soon defeat the
penetration capability of the small 5.56mm SS109
projectile. For example, the new Soviet 5.45 x 39mm
ammunition cannot now penetrate a relatively light 5.8
pound flak jacket composed to Kevlar and a 4.8mm (.19 inch)
sheet of hardened steel plate, even at point blank range.34
The SS109 however, with its steel penetrator still has this
capability. The primary question is how long will the
5.56mm SS109 retain this capability? As a second
generation intermediate power cartridge, further
improvements in the small 5.56mm SS109 may not be
sufficient to defeat new technological developments in body
armor. The 5.56mm SS109 projectile is too small for much
significant improvement.
It has also been maintained, by intermediate caliber
proponents, that the 5.56 x 45mm cartridge has proven
itself in battle since its adoption by the U. S. in 1963.
In most of these conflicts, however, the 5.56mm weapons
were employed against opponents armed with Soviet weapons
also using intermediate power ammunition. When the 5.56mm
weapon comes up against an opponent armed with weapons
using full-power ammunition, such as in the Philippine
example cited previously, the 5.56mm armed soldier finds
himself at a severe disadvantage.
The "obvious" advantages of the 5.56 x 45 mm NATO are
not obvious at all. The SS109 is a definite improvement
over the first generation M193 cartridge however, at best
it will serve only as an interim standard. As
technological improvements in optical sights extend the
practical engagement distances for rifle fire, and as
improvements in body armor require greater and greater
power from the rifle cartridge, the SS109 and other 5.56mm
caliber ammunition will have to give way to improve and
more powerful ammunition, such as the 7.62mm NATO. The
7.62 x 51mm NATO has not been improved or modified since
its adoption by NATO in 1953. This larger cartridge has a
greater capacity for growth and technological improvement
and should be developed to its potential now. The large
size of the 147-grain 7.62 mm projectile is more than
sufficient to incorporate significant improvements in
lethality and penetration. We must capitalize on the
Soviet trend toward their 5.45mm caliber weapons by
improving our full power 7.62mm NATO ammunition and
designing better and more efficient weapons to use it. We
have a chance to totally outclass Soviet small arms in the
area of individual and squad weapons. Let's do it by
upgrading the existing 7.62 mm NATO to its full potential.
During the years just prior to World War II, the
Imperial Japanese Army replaced their 6.5mm (.256 Caliber)
rifle ammunition with a 7.7mm (.303 Caliber) cartridge due
to the smaller round's poor lethality and its inability to
penetrate barriers and effectively stop enemy troops.
During the same period, the Italians replaced their 6.5mm
rifle ammunition with a 7.35mm (.301 Caliber) cartridge
for the same reasons. Let’s learn from their examples and
concentrate now on the development and improvement of the
7.62mm NATO round. No, NATO does not need two standard
rifle calibers.

Footnotes
1Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised
Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) Pp. 57,61.
2IBID, Pp. 514 - 519.
3IBID, Pp. 34 - 35.
4Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Test Fires the AKS74,"
International Defense Review, October 1983, Pp. 1427 - 1428.
5Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised
Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) Pp. 779 - 784.
6Edward C. Ezell, The Great Rifle Controversy (Harrisburg:
Stackpole Books, 1984) P. 41.
7IBID, Pp. 57 - 61.
8IBID, Pp. 92 - 103.
9Norman Hitchman, Operational Requirements For An Infantry
Hand Weapon (Chevy Chase: Operations Research Office - The John
Hopkins University Publications, 1952) Pp. 2 - 3.
10William C. Benjamin Jr. and Joseph Dubay, The Effect of
Rifle Caliber and Muzzle Velocity on Experimental Probabilities
of Hitting as Obtained from Project Caliber (Aberdeen: Ballistic
Research Laboratories Report No. 964, 1955) Pp. 29 - 30.
11Edward C. Ezell, The Great Rifle Controversy (Harrisburg:
Stackpole Books, 1984) P. 172.
12IBID, P. 192
13IBID, P. 195.
14Herman Van Assche, "Small Arms and Their Ammunition - The
NATO Competition, "NATO's Fifteen Nations, August - September,
1981, Pp. 92-93.
15R. T. Huntington, Small-Caliber Ammunition Identification
Guide Vol 1 (Army Material Development and Readiness Command,
Foreign Service and Technology Center, June 1978) Pp. 32.
16Pierre Crevecoeur, "The Belgian SS-109 Round - Baseline
for NATO's Second Caliber Ammunition," International Defense
Review, March 1981, P. 302.
17Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Tests the M16A2 Assault Rifle,"
International Defense Review, September 1984, P. 1353.
18IBID, P. 1353
19Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised
Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) Pp. 59-60.
20Pierre Crevecoeur, "The Belgian SS-109 Round - Baseline
for NATO's Second Caliber Ammunition," International Defense
Review, March 1981, P. 302.
21Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Tests the M16A2 Assault Rifle,"
International Defense Review, September 1984, P. 1353.
22Edward C. Ezell, "NATO Small Arms Debate," International
Defense Review, March 1981, P. 297.
23Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Tests the M16A2 Assault Rifle,"
International Defense Review, September 1984, P. 1352.
24Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised
Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) Pp. 64, 255.
25Jack S. Chase, "Are We Arming American Soldiers to Flight
an Army of Woodchucks?" Armed Forces Journal International,
October 1981, Pp. 24 - 26.
26Interview with LTC Wenceslao Cruz, Philippine Marine
Corps, March 3, 1986.
27Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Tests the M16A2 Assault Rifle,"
International Defense Review, September 1984, P. 1351.
28Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised
Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) P. 255.
29Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Test the M16A2 Assault Rifle,"
International Defense Review, September 1984, P. 1353.
30Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised
Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) P. 60.
31W. J. G. Hancock, "The TRILUX Infantry Sight Unit,"
International Defense Review, April 1973, Pp. 113 - 114.
32Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised
Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) Pp. 298 - 301.
33IBID, P. 223.
34Andrew C. Tillman, "IDR Tests the AK74," International
Defense Review, October 1983, Pp 1429 -1430.
35Edward C. Ezell, Small Arms of the World, 12th Revised
Edition (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1983) P. 603.

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