ADARNE vs ALDABA

FACTS:
Spouses Cumpio filed an action for forcible entry against herein complaint Cesario Adarne, Aning
Arante, and Miguel Inokando with the Justice of the Peace of Alang-alang Leyte.
Atty. Isauro Marmita represented the defendants who raised the issue of ownership of the land in
question.
Justice of the Peace dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
plaintiffs again appealed to the Court of First Instance of Leyte
Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso Casimpan filed the answer for the defendants.
At the hearing of the case on August 7, 1961, Cesario Adarne, noting that his attorneys had not
yet arrived, prevailed upon the respondent Atty. Damian Aldaba, who was present in court to
attend the trial of an electoral case, to appear as counsel for them.
The respondent, who is a third degree cousin of the complainant, agreed, and entered a special
appearance. Upon noticing that the plaintiffs and their counsel were not also present in court, the
respondent, instead of asking for a postponement, moved for the dismissal of the case. This
motion was granted and the case was again dismissed. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the order, to which the respondent filed an opposition in behalf of the
defendants, and the motion was denied. CA remanded the case to the lower court for further
proceedings.
on October 23, 1964 the respondent was again prevailed upon by the complainant to appear in
his behalf. The respondent entered a "special appearance" for the complainant and argued that
the interest of justice would best be served of the defendants were allowed to file an action for
quieting of title and the case heard jointly with the pending action for forcible entry. Finding merit
in the argument, the court ordered the defendant Cesario Adarne to file an action for quieting of
title within one (1) week and the plaintiffs to answer the same within the reglementary period,
after which both cases would be tried jointly. The hearing was deferred until after the filing of the
action for quieting of title.
On June 17, 1965, the court declared the defendants in default for their failure to appeal at the
hearing set for that day .
Because of this, Adarne against the respondent Atty. Damian V. Aldaba an Administrative action
against the respondent attorney for gross negligence and misconduct, for failure to give his
entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the . maintenance and defense of his
rights, and exertion of his utmost learning and ability in the prosecution and defense of his client,
and for not taking steps to protect the interests of his client in the face of an adverse decision.

ISSUE: WON resp atty. ALDABA is gulity for such misconduct?

HELD:
The judgment by default rendered against the complainant cannot be attributed to the
respondent attorney. The blame lies with the complainant for having engaged the services of
several lawyers to handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he had given to
them to appear in his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the respondent.
The rule followed on matters of substitution of attorneys as laid down by this Court is that no
substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless there be filed: (1) a written application for such
substitution; (2) the written consent of the client; (3) the written consent of the attorney
substituted; and (4) in case such written consent can not be secured, there must be filed with the
application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the attorney to be substituted, in the
manner prescribed by the rules.
It was neither gross negligence nor omission to have entertained such belief. An attorney is not
bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill.
CASE DISMISSED.

Plaintif: Jose & Juan Agravente

Defendant: Juana Patriarca (substituted by Rosita)
Ponente: Narvasa
FACTS:
1960: Juana Patriarca filed ACTION TO QUIET TITLE with CoFI CamSur.
Fire before pretrial.
1 Reschedule pretrial: Agravante moved for cancellation.
2 Reschedule pretrial again: Agravante moved for cancellation (illness of atty) motion
attached medcert. DENIED for lack of notice to adverse party, etc.
Pretrial pushed through with defendants absent. Agravante declared in default and
authorized plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Patriarca died. Heirs presented motion praying to be substituted in her stead. GRANTED.
Agravante filed PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with SC:

ISSUE: (topical) whether Court acquired jurisdiction over Patriarca.

HELD: YES
RATIO:
Allegation of Agravante: demise of Patriarca long before the pre-trial setting prevented the
TC from acquiring jurisdiction over her.
SC: Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is acquired by the court by the filing of
complaint.
Subsequent death will not affect jurisdiction, all that is entailed is the substitution of the
heirs for the deceased in accordance with Rule 3, Sec 17. In this case, theres no showing
that Agravantes had any ground to oppose the substitution or that they had suffered any
prejudice of any sort by reason of the substitution. JUDGMENT: Dismissed.

TOPIC: AUHTORITY TO APPEAR, AUTHORITY TO BIND CLIENTS, COMPENSATION, ATTYS LIEN

TUPAS VS. CA
AEQUETAS NUNQUAM CONTRAVENIT LEGIS EQUITY NEVER CONTRAVENES THE LAWS.
Ponente: Justice CRUZ, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners received a copy of the RTC and then they filed their respective motion for
reconsideration 14 days later. The motion was denied, instead, of filling the petition for review
with the court of appeals with the remainder of the 15 day reglementary period , that is, a day
after they received the order, petitioner filed the said petition 14 days after. The petition was
denied by the Court of Appeals on grounds of tardiness.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. They allege that they should not be prejudiced by
the mistakes of their counsel because they are laymen and not familiar with the intricacies of the
law.
DECISION:
The motion was denied with finality by the Court.
The Court found that the petitioners have not shown that their counsel was exceptionally inept or
motivated by bad faith or excusably misled by the facts. There is no reason why we should not
apply the rule that clients should be bound by the acts of their counsel, including his mistakes
The Court stated, Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and
recognize his earlier claims to the disputed property on the justification that his counsel was
grossly inept. There would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every shortcoming of
counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is also
found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so
on.

Avelino vs Palana

Facts:
Atty. Pedro K. Palana represented the petitioner in a Civil Case before CFI of Leyte. It
appears that a hearing was scheduled on November 15, 1957 at 8:30 in the morning. During the
said hearing, the respondent attorney failed to attend due to severe stomachache followed by
constant moving of bowel and vomiting. As a result thereof, the trial court ruled against the
petitioner and ordered the latter to surrender the ownership and possession of the land subject
of the case to Fermin Natividad.
A Motion for New Trial was filed by Atty. Palana, which was later amended. However, said
Motions were denied by the court.
Petitioner now charge Atty. Palana of malpractice in connection with his professional
conduct, for his failure to inform them of the date of hearing and for failing to appear in the said
date of hearing.
The case was refered Office of the Solicitor General
Issue: WON Atty. Palana is guilty of negligence in the performance of his duties as member of the
bar.
Held:
Yes. In ruling against Atty. Palana, the Court adopted the findings of the Office of the
Solicitor General. It was found Atty. Palana did not duly inform his client of the date of the trial
scheduled for November 15, 1957 when the evidence shows that he received notice of such
hearing on October 11, 1957. Also the Motion for new trial was made out of time, exactly 40 days
after he received the decision, and he never explained such delay.
As regards respondent's failure to appear in court on the day set for the trial, the Court is inclined
to accept his claim that it was due to the fact that early in the morning of that date he had "a
severe stomach ache, followed by constant moving of bowel and vomiting and that as a
consequence he became very weak." But while this might be, to a certain extent, a good excuse
for his non-appearance in court, it is obviously not sufficient to explain his failure to notify his
clients in due time of the date of the trial. Had he done so, his clients would probably have tried
to contact him in due time, and upon discovering that he was sick they would have either gone
to court to ask for the postponement of the trial, or they would have looked for another lawyer to
represent them in court.
The Court found no sufficient exculpatory evidence for respondent filing a motion for new trial
"out of time," exactly forty days after notice of the decision rendered by the court. Moreover,
although he was given an opportunity to file a second motion for new trial, it appears that the
same was denied by the court "on the ground that he had failed to comply with its previous order
dated February 1, 1958.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the respondent, as hereby found guilty as charged in the report
and complaint filed by the Solicitor General, and considering all the circumstances of the case,
he is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months from notice hereof.

Jose Alcala vs Honesto De Vera

56 SCRA 30 Legal Ethics Duty of a lawyer to update his client of the status of the case

Jose Alcala engaged the services of Atty. Honesto De Vera to defend him in a civil case.
On April 17, 1963, the court rendered a decision against Alcala.
On April 19, 1963, Atty. De Vera received a copy of the adverse decision. Atty. De Vera failed to
inform Alcala about the adverse decision.
On July 17, 1963, the court sheriff went to Alcala to serve a writ of execution. That was the only
time when Alcala learned that he lost. And because of Atty. De Veras failure to inform him of the
adverse decision, the period within which Alcala can appeal his case had already lapsed.
As a result, in September 1963, Alcala filed a civil case against Atty. De Vera in order to collect
damages as he averred that he sustained damages due to Atty. De Veras negligence. The court
however ruled that Alcala is not entitled to damages.
Unfettered, Alcala filed a disbarment case against Atty. De Vera.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be disbarred because of his failure to update his
client of the status of the case.

HELD: No. Disbarment is not warranted in this case. It is true that Atty. De Vera had been remiss
in his duties as counsel for Alcala because he failed to update him of the status of the case,
however, it appears that Alcala did not sustain any damage by reason of such negligence. But
this is not to say that Atty. De Vera can go scot-free. The lack of damage to Alcala will only serve
as a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court found Atty. De Vera guilty of simple negligence
and he was severely censured for his negligence. Atty. De Veras failure to notify his clients of the
decision in question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to the clients interest
expected of Atty. De Vera under the lawyers oath.
In this case, it can also be gleaned that not all negligence by counsel entitles the client to collect
damages from the negligent lawyer.

MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES V. CFI RIZAL

FACTS:
On November 8, 1972, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against
the partnership La Mallorca and its general partners, which included private respondents, for
collection of a sum of money arising from gasoline purchased on credit but not paid, for damages
and attorneys fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in declaring null and void its earlier decision of July 25, 1974.

HELD:
Yes, respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. The judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the defendant La Mallorca Partnership to pay
the plaintiff. From a joint venture/partnership theory which he adopted and consistently pursued
in his complaint. Respondents shall be excluded and that only nominal attorney's fees shall be
awarded. Petitioner embraced the innominate contract theory. The defense agreed to submit the
case for decision solely on the basis of evidence adduced by plaintiff Mobil Oil but past interest in
the amount of P150. An inventory of the contributed property duly signed by the parties should
be attached to the public instrument. Being unsigned and referring to a partnership involving
more than P3. MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES. the counsel of the defendant successfully bargained for a
compromise agreement.

Hiyas Savings and Loan bank vs CA

Spouses Delfin Mendoza and Solita Santos and Spouses Felix Santos and Demetria Pacheco GR
No. 95625, October 4, 1991 Facts: RTC rendered decision and ordered that the plaintiff shall pay
Hiyas Savings and Loan Association the following sums:
1. P200,000 representing the principal amount of loan with 14% interest per annum
2. Ten percent (10%) of the amount due as and by way of attorneys fees; and
3. The costs of the suit.
June 7, 1989, private respondents deposited in court two treasury checks in the amount of
P428,600 in satisfaction of judgment favoring Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank in a civil case. The
amount of P40,735.35 was applied by the petitioner as attorneys fees. However, on August 18,
1989, petitioner filed an amended motion for execution. Petitioner claimed that the total liability
of the private respondents was P448,941.92. Hence, there was still an unsatisfied balance which
it claimed to be P20,250.38 as 10% of attorneys fee from the interest of principal obligation. The
motion was denied and dismissed by CA.

Issue: Whether or not the attorneys fee will only be based to 10% of the principal amount due?

Held: There is no ambiguity as regards the amount of attorneys fees awarded. It is clear that the
final and executory decision of the RTC awarded ten percent (10%) of the amount due as
attorneys fees. Since there was no qualification that the ten percent attorneys fees shall be
taken only is the total amount due on the loan obligation (principal + interest). Had the decision
really intended that the attorneys fees shall be ten percent (10%) of the principal only, it could
have so provided. Courts are cautioned to be careful in writing their decisions, to be clear and
precise in the use of words, especially in the dispositive portion. The petition was granted
declaring that the total amount of the judgment debt unsatisfied in Civil Case is P20,250.38 plus
14% interest until full payment.

Entitlement to Attorneys Fees

RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO AND AFRICA vs.

EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, PHILS., INC.
G.R. No. 104600, July 2, 1999

FACTS: Eastern Telecommunications, Phils., Inc. (ETPI) represented by the law firm SAGA, filed
with the Regional Trial court a complaint for the recovery or revenue shares against PLDT. Atty.
Rilloraza, a partner of the firm, appeared for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount. The latter was dissolved
and the junior partners formed RADA, which took over as counsel in the case for ETPI. ETPI
signed a retainer agreement with counsel wherein it was stated that in cases of collection or
judicial action, our attorneys fees shall be 15% of the amounts collected or the value of the
property acquired or liability saved. The retainer agreement was terminated in 1988. the next
day, RADA filed a notice of attorneys lien. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were
negotiations toward a compromise between ETPI and PLDT.
In 1990, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and the same was entered as a
judgment. The petitioner (RADA) filed a motion for the enforcement of attorneys lien.

ISSUE: Is RADA entitled to the awards of attorneys fees they are claiming?

HELD: RADA is entitled to attorneys fees but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
court of origin for the determination of the amount of attorneys fees to which the petitioner is
entitled.
Atty. Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until ETPI terminated the law firms
services in 1988. Petitioners claim for attorneys fees hinges on two grounds: first, the fact that
Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was working for SAGA, and second, the
retainer agreement.
Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable compensation
which lawyers may receive for their professional services. A lawyer has the right to be paid for
the legal services he has extended to his client, which compensation must be reasonable. A
lawyer would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount
must be determined on a quantum meruit basis.

Mercado vs. Ubay

G.R. No. L-35830 July 24, 1990

Facts:
A civil case was filed by the petitioners against the Samonte siblings in the CFI of Cavite. The
defendants filed their answer and amended answer through Atty, Pine. On July 31, 1970, the
court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, and since no appeal was made, it became
final and executory and a writ of execution was issued by the court. But before the said writ be
executed, Pine filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus but was dismissed for
lack of merit. On May 27, 1972, Lucina and Trinidad Samonte, 2 of the defendants in the civil
case, filed with the CFI of Rizal seeking for the annulment of the writ of execution alleging that
they didnt authorized anyone, including Atty. Pine to file an answer and the petition for certiorari
in their behalf. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss said case, thus the petition in the SC.

Issue:
Whether or not a lawyer need a written power of attorney in order to appear in the court in
behalf of his client.

Held:
No. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his
client (Sec. 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court). The fact that private respondents had not personally
appeared in the hearings of Case TM-223 in the trial court is immaterial. The filing of the answer
by and appearance of Atty. Danilo Pine in their behalf are sufficient to give private respondents
standing in court. It is hard to believe that a counsel who has no personal interest in the case
would fight for and defend a case with persistence and vigor if he had not been authorized or
employed by the party concerned. It is obvious that since the appellate court had decided
adversely against private respondents in their petition for certiorari, the latter filed the
annulment suit for a second chance at preventing petitioners from enforcing the decision
rendered by the Cavite court in favor of the latter.