Mark Clemente y Martinez v.

People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 194367, June 15,
2011.
Illegal possession and use of false bank notes. The elements of the
crime committed under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code are
the following: (a) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or
other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument
payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer
is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender
knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and
(3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such
forged or falsified instruments.
Illegal possession and use of false bank notes. In this case, the
Supreme Court, citingPeople v. Digoro, reversed and set aside the
findings of the lower courts and acquitted petitioner of the crime of
Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and
penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. In Digoro,
possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything
more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense
under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to
use said false treasury or bank notes. In the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit
money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela
Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500 bill to buy
soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail
officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that
petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail
bakery using a fake P500 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have
personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz to use
the P500 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on
the personal knowledge. Mark Clemente y Martinez v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011.
ALEJANDRO TECSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on appeal by certiorari is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11744 promulgated
on August 31, 1993, and its Resolution dated December
23, 1993, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
This case stemmed from a charge of illegal
possession and use of counterfeit US dollar notes, as
defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised
Penal Code, against herein petitioner Alejandro Tecson
y Florencio. The Information reads:
That on or about April 28, 1990, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in
his possession and under his custody and control, with
intent to use and pass, as in fact he did use and pass
ten (10) pieces of 100-US dollar notes of the Federal
Reserve Note, or a sum of $1,000.00 (US Dollar) to
Pedro C. Labita, a confidential assistant of the Central
Bank of the Philippines, which bills were in the SO ORDERED.
resemblance and similitude of the dollar bills issued by
the United States Government, the said accused Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the
knowing, as he did, that the said US dollar bills were petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals
forged and falsified. which affirmed the judgment of the trial court in
toto on August 31, 1993. Petitioner sought a
Contrary to law. reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court
but it was denied on December 23, 1993.[3]
Upon being arraigned on July 20, 1990, the
Hence, the instant petition.
petitioner entered the plea of Not guilty to the charge.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a
appears that a civilian informer personally informed the
Decision[2] dated May 6, 1991, the dispositive portion of
Cash Department of the Central Bank of the Philippines
which reads:
that a certain Mang Andy was involved in a syndicate
engaging in the business of counterfeit US dollar
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares accused
notes. On April 26, 1990 a test-buy operation was
ALEJANDRO F. TECSON, GUILTY beyond reasonable
ordered by Atty. Pio Chan, Jr., Chief of the Investigation
doubt of the offense as defined in Art. 168 and
Staff of the Central Bank, which resulted in the
penalized in Art. 166 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
purchase from Mang Andy of one (1) US dollar note for
Code; and hereby sentenced him to suffer an
Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) that was found to be
indeterminate penalty of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and
counterfeit by the Currency Analysis and Redemption
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium period as
Division of the Central Bank.Consequently, Atty. Chan
minimum to TEN (10) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and
formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium period as
composed of prosecution witnesses Pedro Labita,
maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00; and to pay the
Confidential Assistant of the Investigation Staff of the
cost.
Central Bank, and Cpl. Johnny Marqueta, a
representative of the US Secret Service, together with
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to burn the ten
William Pasive, Warren Castillo and Carlos Toralde,
(10) pieces of 100 US dollar notes subject of the
Jr. also of the Investigation Staff of the Central Bank.[4]
offense.
 On April 28, 1990, at about 11:30 oclock in the shows that the ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes
morning, the team proceeded to the Jollibee restaurant confiscated from the petitioner are indeed counterfeit.[9]
in Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila. Three (3) members of
The defense denied any liability of the petitioner for
the team namely: William Pasive, Carlos Toralde, Jr., and
the crime of illegal possession and use of counterfeit
Warren Castillo positioned themselves outside the
US dollar notes. Petitioner testified that he was inside
Jollibee restaurant while Pedro Labita and Johnny
the Jollibee restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Manila on April 28,
Marqueta proceeded inside. Subsequently, the civilian
1990 to meet a certain Nora Dizon, wife of his friend,
informer arrived inside the restaurant and approached
Reynaldo de Guzman, who previously sought his
a man who was seated two (2) tables away from where
assistance in securing insurance payment bond. After
Labita and Marqueta were positioned. The informer
Noras arrival at the restaurant, she handed to him a
introduced to Mang Andy the said Pedro Labita and
sealed envelope which he accepted thinking that it
Johnny Marqueta as the persons interested in buying
contained the documents pertaining to the insurance
US dollar notes. Apparently convinced, the man drew
payment bond. Upon receipt of the sealed envelope,
ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes from his
however, two (2) male persons approached and
wallet. At that moment, and upon a pre-arranged signal
immediately handcuffed him. They dragged him outside
from the informer, Labita and Marqueta introduced
the restaurant where three (3) other persons were
themselves as Central Bank operatives and
waiting. After boarding a taxi, they blindfolded the
apprehended the man called Mang Andy whom they
petitioner and took him to the Central Bank building in
later identified as the herein petitioner Alejandro
F. B. Harrison St., Manila where he was investigated.[10]
Tecson.[5]
The investigators inquired from the petitioner about
During the investigation at the Central Bank, the
the source of the fake US dollar notes. Petitioner
petitioner affixed his initial on the dorsal portion of
vehemently denied having possession nor any
each of the ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar
knowledge as to the source of the fake US dollar notes
notes[6] and signed the corresponding receipt[7] for the
and claimed that the same were merely planted by the
said US dollar notes seized from him. He also executed
arresting officers. Petitioner also claimed that he was
a Pagpapatunay[8] attesting to the proper conduct of the
tortured into initialing the dorsal portions of the ten
investigation by the Central Bank operatives on the
(10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes and into signing
petitioner. Subsequent examination by the Currency
Analysis and Redemption Division of the Central Bank
the Receipt and Inventory for Property/Articles Seized
as well as the Pagpapatunay.[11]
The instant appeal by certiorari[12] reveals the
following assignment of errors:
I
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO FIND THAT
THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT PETITIONERS CONVICTION OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN LAW.
In essence, petitioner claimed that no buy-bust
operation took place inside the Jollibee restaurant in
Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila on April 28, 1990 inasmuch
as there was no haggling as to the price between him
and the poseur buyers, and that no money changed
hands. He was merely framed up by the Central Bank
operatives by planting fake US dollar notes inside the
envelope which was handed to him by the wife of his
friend who earlier asked for his assistance regarding
insurance payment bond. He accepted the envelope
thinking that it contained the documents pertaining to
the insurance payment bond.
Assuming arguendo that a buy-bust operation was
conducted, the petitioner claimed that the testimony of
prosecution witness Pedro Labita to the effect that the
civilian informer had to convince the petitioner negated
any alleged intent on his part to sell counterfeit US
dollar notes to the poseur buyers. In addition, he
averred that prosecution witnesses Labita and
Marqueta had no personal knowledge as to petitioners
alleged possession of counterfeit US dollar notes as
they merely relied on the predetermined signal of the
civilian informer before making the arrest. Hence, the
ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes allegedly
confiscated from him (petitioner) incidental to his arrest
are inadmissible in evidence. Likewise, his initial on the
dorsal portion of the said US dollar notes and his
signature on the Pagpapatunay are inadmissible for
having been obtained without the aid of counsel. That
is the version of the petitioner.
The respondents, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), countered in their Comment
that the absence of haggling among the parties to the
buy-bust operation did not negate petitioners actual
possession and use of the ten (10) counterfeit US $100
dollar notes, which fact of possession is punishable by
law. Prosecution witnesses Pedro Labita and Johnny
Marqueta, who acted as poseur buyers, testified that
they saw the petitioner drew the subject fake US dollar
notes from his wallet[13] in order to sell the same to
them.
While respondents, through counsel, conceded that
the Pagpapatunay and the Receipt and Inventory for
Property/Articles Seized which were signed by the
petitioner during his custodial investigation are
inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in
the absence of his counsel, they maintained that there
are sufficient independent evidence on record to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[14]
By way of reply,[15] the petitioner, who is now 70
years of age,[16] contends that possession should be
coupled with intent to use the counterfeit US dollar bills
in order to hold him liable under the provision of Article
168 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or
bank notes and other instruments of credit.Unless the
act be one of those coming under the provisions of any
of the preceding articles, any person who shall
knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to
use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to
in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed in said articles.
The elements of the crime charged for violation of
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, are: 1) that any
treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation
and security payable to bearer, or any instrument
payable to order or other document of credit not
payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another
person; 2) that the offender knows that any of the said
instruments is forged or falsified; and 3) that he either
used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged
or falsified instruments.[17] Hence, possession of fake
dollar notes must be coupled with the act of using or at
least with intent to use the same as shown by a clear
and deliberate overt act in order to constitute a crime,
[18]
as was sufficiently proven in the case at bar.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court finding the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
case at bar. The prosecution established, through the
testimonies of Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta, that
a buy-bust operation was conducted by the combined
agents of the Central Bank of the Philippines and the
US Secret Service, and that the petitioner was therein
caught in flagrante delicto in the possession of and in
the act of offering to sell counterfeit US dollar
notes. During the buy-bust operation, prosecution
witnesses Labita and Marqueta were introduced by the
civilian informer to the petitioner as interested buyers
of fake US dollar notes. When the petitioner was in the
act of drawing the ten (10) pieces of fake US $100
dollar notes from his wallet, he was immediately placed
under arrest by Labita and his team.
The testimony of Pedro Labita which was
corroborated by Johnny Marqueta and the presentation
during the trial of the ten (10) counterfeit US $100
dollar notes, which were confiscated from the petitioner
when he was arrested, proved beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of illegal
possession and use of fake US dollar notes under Article
168 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court in its
decision characterized the respective testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta as clear,
straightforward, impartial and (thus) convincing. [19] We
fail to discern any ill motive on the part of the said
prosecution witnesses in testifying against the
petitioner whom they met for the first time only on April
28, 1990. Petitioner himself admitted during the trial
that he was not aware of any ill motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses to implicate him in the crime
of counterfeiting US dollar notes.[20] The settled rule is
that the testimony of even a lone prosecution witness
as long as it is positive and clear and not arising from
an improper motive to impute a serious offense to the
accused, deserves full credit.[21]
The absence of haggling as to the price of the
subject fake US dollar notes between the petitioner and
the poseur buyers did not negate the fact of the buy-
bust operation. Significantly, the transaction for the
purchase of fake US dollar notes was only at its
inception when the Central Bank operatives at that
point decided to apprehend the petitioner. Mere
possession coupled with intent to use the counterfeit
US dollar notes, as proven in the case at bar, is
sufficient to constitute the crime under Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The facts, as established by the evidence adduced,
show that the civilian informer introduced prosecution
witnesses Labita and Marqueta to the petitioner as the
persons interested in buying fake US dollar
notes. Having been thus convinced, petitioner removed
his wallet from his pocket and drew the ten (10) pieces
of fake US $100 dollar notes to show the same to the
supposed buyers. Petitioners natural reaction to the
seeming interest of the poseur buyers to buy fake US
dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly
showed his intention to use or sell the counterfeit US
dollar notes. In any event, what we have here is a case
of entrapment which is allowed, and not instigation.
Petitioner cannot validly claim that he had no
intention of committing the crime by citing the
testimony of Pedro Labita to the effect that he
(petitioner) was merely convinced by the civilian
informer that Labita and Marqueta were interested to
buy fake US dollar notes. The pertinent portion of
Labitas testimony reads, thus:
 ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR:
Q All right, let me clarify this, Mr. Witness. This
informant or informer that you mentioned, he
also arrived there at the Jollibee Restaurant, Mr.
Witness?
A Yes, sir, but he arrived late.
Q So, he arrived late. Now, after the arrival of this
informant at the Jollibee Restaurant, what did this
informant do inside the Jollibee restaurant while
you were there, Mr. Witness?
A Our informer tried to convince the accused and
after convincing that we are the buyers of said
counterfeit notes, he immediately draws (sic)
from his wallet that (sic) counterfeit notes, and
upon pre-signal of our informer, we immediately
apprehended the accused, sir.[22]
The above-quoted testimony of prosecution witness
Labita negates the petitioners claim that he was merely
instigated into committing the crime by the civilian
informer. It appears that prior to the buy-bust
operation, the petitioner already had the intention to
sell counterfeit US dollar notes as he, in fact, had an
agreement with the civilian informer to arrange for a
meeting with interested buyers. In other words, the
civilian informer did not have to convince the petitioner
to sell fake US dollar notes during the buy-bust
operation on April 28, 1990 inside the Jollibee
restaurant in Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila.What the
informer actually did during the buy-bust operation was
simply to convince the petitioner that prosecution
witnesses Labita and Marqueta were interested buyers
of counterfeit US dollar notes.
The petitioner cannot validly impugn the
admissibility of the subject ten (10) counterfeit US $100
dollar notes confiscated from him when he was thus
arrested. It is clear from the testimony of prosecution
witness Pedro Labita that he saw the petitioner drew
several pieces of fake US dollar notes from his wallet to
show to them after they were introduced by the civilian
informer as the interested buyers while they were
inside the Jollibee restaurant, thus:
ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, after this Johnny Marqueta and
you were introduced to the accused, what did the
accused do after the introduction?
A He immediately drew his counterfeit dollar notes
from his wallet and right after that we identified
ourselves as agents of the Central Bank, sir. [23]
When the arrest of the petitioner was made, Labita
did not have to rely on the prearranged signal of the
informer inasmuch as he (Labita) had unhindered view
and appreciation of what was then taking place right
before his eyes. Hence, the ten (10) counterfeit US
$100 dollar notes are admissible in evidence for the
reason that the petitioner was caught in flagrante administrative action against his alleged
delicto by the prosecution witnesses during the said tormentors. Suffice it to state that petitioners
buy-bust operation. In other words, this is a case of a conviction for the crime charged in the information is
legally valid warrantless arrest and seizure of the not anchored on the evidence obtained during his
evidence of the crime. custodial investigation which were disregarded by
respondent appellate court for having been obtained
In view of the foregoing, petitioners allegation that
without the assistance of his counsel.
he was framed-up by the Central Bank agents does not
deserve any consideration. This hackneyed defense of In sum, there is no reversible error in the subject
alleged frame-up of the accused caught inflagrante Decision of the Court of Appeals.
delicto during a buy-bust operation has been viewed
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
with disdain by the courts for it is easy to concoct and
in CA-G.R. No. 11744 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
difficult to prove.[24] Besides, there is a legal
presumption that public officers, including arresting SO ORDERED.
officers, regularly perform their official duties. [25] That
legal presumption was not overcome by any credible
evidence to the contrary.
concoct and difficult to prove. 24 Besides, there is a legal
presumption that public officers, including arresting
officers, regularly perform their official duties. 25 That
legal presumption was not overcome by any credible
evidence to the contrary.
Apparently clutching at the last straws, as it were,
petitioner also alleged that he was tortured into signing
the dorsal portions of the fake ten (10) US $100 dollar G.R. No. L-16806 December 22, 1961
notes confiscated from him by the arresting officers and
SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
the Pagpapatunay. Other than his self-serving
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
testimony, the petitioner failed to prove his allegation
of torture. Also, he did not file any criminal or P. N. Stuart del Rosario for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del
Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by
the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal possession of said
forged treasury notes and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, and pay a fine of P5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, as well as a proportionate part of the costs.
On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
except insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate penalty
which was increased to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision
mayor. The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by
Sergio del Rosario.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del
Rosario the Philippine one-peso bills Exhibits C, E and G and the
Philippine two-peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing him to believe that
the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them,
although in fact they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine
Government one of the digits of each of which had been altered
and changed, the aforementioned defendants had succeeded in
obtaining P1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of Davao,
on June 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the
manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines.
The only question raised in this appeal is whether the possession
of said Exhibits C, E, G and H constitutes a violation of Article 168
of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant maintains that, being
genuine treasury notes of our government, the possession thereof
cannot be illegal. We find no merit in this
pretense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-
79692619 of Exhibit C, had been erased and changed so as to read
0 and that similar erasures and changes had been made in the
penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the
last digit in Serial No. D-716326 of Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9
of Serial No.
D-716329 of Exhibit H.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank
notes and other instruments of credit. - Unless the act be one of
those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles,
any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with
intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in
this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed in said articles.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
ART. 169. How forgery is committed. - The forgery referred to in
this section may be committed by any of the following
means;chanrobles virtual law library
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable
to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the appearance of a true
and genuine document.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any
means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein.
It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuine
treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words
or signs contained" in which had been erased and or altered, with
knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein
and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is
punishable under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166,
subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3
Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil.,
785).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the decision
appealed from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs against
petitioner Sergio del Rosario. It is so
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Paredes, J., took no part.
FELICIANO MALIWAT, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Former Special First Division, and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
5. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTIONS; PERSON TAKING ADVANTAGE
OF A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT, PRESUMED THE MATERIAL
AUTHOR OF THE 'FALSIFICATION. - The settled rule is that
in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in
possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and therefore guilty of falsification. If a person had
in his possession a falsified document and he made use of
it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby,
the clear presumption is that he is the material author of
the falsification.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is the decision[1] of public respondent Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. Nos. 09428-
09429, entitled People of the Philippines versus Feliciano Maliwat,
as well as the resolution dated 17 September 1992 which denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The CA decision and
resolution affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City which convicted herein petitioner of falsification of
public documents as defined and penalized under Article 172 par.
1 of the Revised Penal Code.
In a resolution dated 16 November 1992, this Court denied the
present petition for review for failure to comply with the Rules of
Court and Circular 28 -9 1.[2] Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which the Court denied with finality on 18 January
1993.[3] Petitioner followed with a second motion for
reconsideration which the Court noted without action in its 3 March
1993 resolution.[4]
On 21 June 1993, petitioner filed a motion for declaration of
mistrial, pleading for the first time that his constitutional right to
due process was impaired when Judge Rolando Diaz rendered the
judgment of conviction in Criminal Cases Nos. 158-77 and 159-77,
knowing fully well that he (Judge Diaz) previously testified against
the petitioner (then accused) in said cases, while then the Clerk of
Court of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Branches 2 and 3 of
Cavite City.
The Court issued a resolution[5] on 7 July 1993 requiring Judge
Diaz to comment on the said motion for declaration of mistrial. On
14 July 1993, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and inhibition order against Judge
Diaz. On 21 July 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining Judge Diaz from conducting further proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 158-77 and 159-77 (entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Feliciano Maliwat, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17).
[6]
Judge Diaz filed his comment on petitioner's motion.[7] After
careful deliberations, the Court resolved on 14 March 1994 to lift
the entry of final judgment dated 3 February 1993 and to reinstate
and give due course to this petition for review. The parties were
required to file their respective memoranda as the Court ordered
the RTC of Cavite City to forward the records of the cases to the
Court.[8]
The antecedent facts of the case may be summarized as follows:
On 18 November 1977, two (2) separate informations were filed
before the then CFI of Cavite, Branch 3 (now RTC, Branch 17)
charging petitioner with the crime of Falsification of Public and
Official Documents.
The first information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 158-77, reads
as follows:
"That on or about the first week of November 1975, in the City of
Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private person,
having somehow obtained possession of a blank form of a transfer
certificate of title with Serial No. 1403456, which is a public and
official document, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of falsification, by then and there, filling,
typing and inserting on the blank spaces therein or causing to be
filled, typed and inserted on said public and official document, the
technical descriptions of a parcel of land, Lot No. 5825 of the Imus
Estate Subdivision, Province of Cavite, with an area of 553,853 sq.
meters including the corresponding title number, and making it
appear that the same is the owner's reconstituted copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-11850 of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite, with the herein accused as the registered
owner and that the said public and official document was
reconstituted by virtue of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite dated November 13, 1963 and causing it to appear further
that the then Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite,
Escolastico Cuevas had participated in the preparation and signing
of the said falsified Owner's copy of TCT No. RT-11850, when in
truth and in fact, the said accused well knew that said parcel of
land is already registered in the name of Green Valley Realty
Corporation and that then Register of Deeds Escolastico Cuevas
never intervened in the preparation and signing of said falsified
document much less did he authorize anybody to write his name
or affix his signature therein nor was there any judicial proceedings
for reconstitution nor order from the Court regarding TCT RT-
11850, and thereafter, the above-named accused presented the
said falsified owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-11850, in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite, for
the purpose of reconstituting the original thereof.
Contrary to law."[9]
The second information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 159-77
and recited the same allegations as in the first information, except
that the number of the TCT involved in the second information was
TCT No. RT 11854 with serial no. 1403457, allegedly covering lot
no. 5826 of the Imus Estate Subdivision, with an area of 299,403
sq. meters.
Petitioner was arraigned on 2 August 1978 at which, he pleaded
not guilty to each charge. Thereafter, joint trial of the two (2) cases
ensued.
On 12 February 1986, the trial court rendered a decision, later
amended on 28 June 1988, the dispositive part of which, as
amended, reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Feliciano Maliwat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of
Public Documents as defined and penalized in par. 1, Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to - in Crim.
Case No. 158-77 to an indeterminate prison term of from six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prison correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00; in Crim. Case No. 159-77 to an indeterminate [prison]
term of from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prison correccional as maximum
and to pay a fine of P5,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs in both instances.
SO ORDERED."[10]
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that
sometime in October 1975, Maliwat, accompanied by two (2) other
persons, went to the office of Atty. Milagros Santiago, then the
acting Register of Deeds of Cavite, to inquire about the originals of
TCT Nos. T-11850 and T-11854 covering lots 5825 and 5826 of the
Imus Estate Subdivision. The original copies of said titles, however,
could not be located by the vault keeper of the office. Meanwhile,
Atty. Santiago examined the owner's duplicate copies presented to
her by Maliwat and upon closer scrutiny, she noticed the
annotations on the lower part of the two (2) titles which read:
"reconstituted as per order of CFI/Cavite City dated November 13,
1963 Sgd. Escolastico Cuevas." The same annotation on the two
(2) titles aroused her suspicion because she was familiar with the
customary signature of Escolastico Cuevas, and the signatures of
Cuevas appearing in the two (2) titles,[11] appeared to be forged.
Atty. Santiago did not confront Maliwat about the said signatures,
instead, she referred the latter to the Clerk of Court (of the CFI) to
verify the existence of such an order from the court records.
Maliwat allegedly obliged but did not return to the office of the
Register of Deeds. That same afternoon, Atty. Santiago went to see
the Clerk of Court, Atty. Rolando Diaz, who informed her that the
court had no record of the said orders.
On 6 November 1975, Atty. Santiago wrote a letter to the NBI
Director to report the existence of the alleged dubious certificates
of title in Maliwat's possession and requested for an investigation
of the matter.[12] The following year, Atty. Santiago went on sick
leave and Atty. Jorge Gutierrez was designated by the Land
Registration Commission Head Office to act in her stead from 26
January - 17 February 1976. When Atty. Santiago resumed her
position on 17 February, she received a letter[13] from Atty.
Gutierrez informing her that during her absence, Feliciano Maliwat
had applied for administrative reconstitution of title and that he
(Gutierrez) approved the same, based on the owner's duplicate
certificates of title submitted to him.
Concerned with these developments, Atty. Santiago informed the
NBI about the reconstitution of the two (2) alleged fake titles and
requested for an immediate investigation. The NBI acted swiftly
and sent subpoenas to Feliciano Maliwat, Atty. Gutierrez, Atty.
Santiago and Atty. Cuevas who all appeared and testified before
NBI agent Tobias Lozada.
Agent Tobias Lozada's investigation[14] revealed that on his first
day in office as acting Register of Deeds (of Cavite), Atty. Gutierrez
met a person in his office who introduced himself as Feliciano
Maliwat. Maliwat inquired why certain titles he had presented for
reconstitution as early as 14 January 1976 had not been acted
upon. Atty. Gutierrez had the papers located and seeing no formal
defects and believing them to be in order, reconstituted the titles.
Due to some typing errors, however, only one title was delivered to
Maliwat on that day.
The following day, when the deputy Register of Deeds Atty.
Alejandro Villanueva reported for work, Atty. Gutierrez recounted to
him the events of the previous day including the fact that he had
reconstituted the titles belonging to Feliciano Maliwat.
Atty. Villanueva informed Atty. Gutierrez that he should not have
reconstituted the titles since Atty. Santiago believed that they were
spurious and had in fact requested the NBI to look into the matter.
Atty. Villanueva also informed Atty. Gutierrez that Maliwat had
been previously convicted for estafa thru falsification of public
document and was generally believed to be part of a criminal
syndicate operating in Cavite.
With this information, Atty. Gutierrez told the NBI that he made his
own investigation and discovered that Maliwat had subsequently
tried to obtain a tax declaration from the Provincial Assessor's
Office (PAO) but this was denied because the PAO personnel
doubted the authenticity of his titles. Upon verification with the
LRC main office, he (Gutierrez) was further informed that no such
titles were originally issued to Maliwat. A similar Verification with
the Bureau of Lands yielded the same results. Atty. Gutierrez
alleged that the formal requisites presented by Maliwat for
reconstitution were the following:
(a) a verified petition for issuance of new titles under R.A. 26
signed and sworn to by Feliciano Maliwat before Salvador R.
Aguinaldo, a notary public for Manila and recorded in the latter's
notarial book as Document No. 1215 on Page3 of Book No. 116,
Series of 1976 (Annex D).
(b) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-11850 on Form No. 1403456
(Annex E) and TCT No. RT-11854 on Form No. 1403457 (Annex E-
2).
Atty. Gutierrez properly identified these documents before the NBI.
Atty. Escolastico Cuevas, retired Register of Deeds of Cavite
Province, whose signatures on the certificates of title were
allegedly forged, testified before the court a quo denying his
alleged signature appearing on the two (2) titles, i.e., TCT No. RT-
11850 on form No. 1403456 and TCT No. RT-11854 on form No.
1403457. He also stated that he executed a sworn statement[15]
before the NBI where he similarly made the same denial. In that
affidavit, he recalled that as witness for the prosecution in a
certain criminal case before Judge Coquia (of the CFI Manila)
several years before the present incident, he encountered the very
same titles in open court, and he testified that the signatures
attributed to him in the two (2) titles were not his, but were plain
forgeries.
Maliwat, for his part, denied authorship of the two (2) forged titles
and claimed that he bought the two (2) parcels of land from a
certain Benigno T. Aseo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale[16] dated 2 January 1963. He registered the same and
surrendered Aseo's titles to the Register of Deeds for cancellation,
after which he was issued two (2) new titles, namely: TCT No. RT-
11850 with Serial No. 603461 and RT- 11854 with Serial number
603462.[17] Maliwat further claimed that he witnessed Escolastico
Cuevas, the then Register of Deeds, actually sign his name over
the said titles before they were issued to him.[18]
Thus, from the issuance of his titles in 1963 up to 1975, Maliwat
averred that he took physical possession of the lands covered
thereby, and paid real estate taxes thereon except in 1974 when
he went to Canada. He was not aware of any title adverse to his
own titles and that he was informed only during the trial that a
certain Green Valley Corporation had titles to said property and
had been paying the real estate taxes thereon. Although he had a
location plan over the said properties, he did not have them
relocated anymore to determine whether or not there was an
overlap of titles.
In 1975, Maliwat alleged that certain buyers were interested in his
property. Together with a friend named Judge Alejo, they went to
the Register of Deeds to have his titles verified but the Register of
Deeds allegedly could not locate the original file copy of Maliwat's
owner's duplicate TCTs in their records. Maliwat was then informed
that since the Registry of Deeds was burned twice in the past, the
file (original) titles were presumably destroyed.
Maliwat admitted that in January 1976, he filed two (2) petitions
for reconstitution of the titles before the Register of Deeds, after
which he received a letter from then acting, Register of Deeds
Gutierrez requiring him to submit the owner's duplicate copies
before the Register of Deeds as basis for the reconstitution of title.
Maliwat claimed that Atty. Gutierrez got back the letter[19]when
his wife and his lawyer, Moreno Gaid, went to the office of Atty.
Gutierrez to surrender the owner's duplicate copies - which bore
Serial Nos. 603461 and 603462 respectively, and not Serial Nos.
1403456 and 1403457 as evidenced by a receipt[20] issued by
Atty. Gutierrez. Maliwat denied having any knowledge of the
existence of TCT-11850 RT and T-11854 RT with serial nos.
1403456 and 1403457 which found their way into the Register of
Deeds of Cavite and maintained that what were surrendered to
Atty. Gutierrez were genuine owner's duplicate copies of TCT
11850-RT and T-11854 RT bearing serial numbers 603461 and
603462.
After giving due course to the petition at bar, the Court
painstakingly reviewed the records to inquire and determine
whether or not petitioner was given a fair trial in the lower court.
The Court notes that from the time of petitioner's arraignment on 2
August 1978 up to the time the prosecution offered its evidence,
and rested, the hearings were either reset or cancelled no less
than thirty (30) times owing to a variety of reasons proffered by
petitioner. As early as 20 May 1982, the case was set for hearing
of the evidence for the defense, but the case was reset for another
eight (8) times, again owing to petitioner's absences. Within said
period, the defense also failed to file any written objections to the
prosecution's formal offer of evidence. When Judge Diaz took over
the case on 12 April 1983, Maliwat moved to postpone for yet
another eight (8) times, prompting Judge Diaz to issue an order on
17 October 1983 declaring Maliwat to have waived his right to
present further evidence.
This was not, however, the end of the trial court's leniency in
Maliwat's favor. Owing to Maliwat's manifestation that he was
suffering from chronic malaria, Judge Diaz reconsidered[21] and
set the case for hearing on 26 March 1984. When Maliwat and
counsel still failed to appear on said date, Judge Diaz deemed the
case submitted for decision, but again reconsidered and set
another hearing on 11 June 1984 to allow the defense to present
additional evidence. When both accused and counsel still failed to
appear, Judge Diaz deemed the case submitted for decision and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda. Maliwat's
lawyer appealed this order to the Court of Appeals but the appeal
was deemed abandoned and dismissed on 24 October 1987.[22]
Maliwat's absences continued up to the promulgation of judgment
by the trial court which also had to be reset four (4) times. It was
only after then that Maliwat's counsel filed a motion for new trial
before the trial court. When the motion was denied on 14
September 1988, Maliwat appealed the decision to the appellate
court. Maliwat could have filed another motion for new trial before
the appellate court on the ground of newly discovered evidence
material to his defense under Rule 124, Sec. 14 of the new Rules of
Criminal Procedure, but he did not. Instead he sought affirmative
relief by prosecuting his appeal from the judgment of conviction
until the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the
judgment of conviction of the court a quo.
Under the foregoing facts and circumstances, Maliwat certainly
cannot claim that he was denied due process. The records show
that he did testify on his own behalf and was cross-examined by
the prosecution. Admittedly, he was unable to adduce additional
documentary evidence that he claims would establish his
innocence and which he now attaches as annexes in his petition
for review and memorandum of law before the Court. But as noted
earlier, it was Maliwat who had sought the postponements and
cancellations of the hearings for no less than forty (40) times, from
the date of his arraignment to the promulgation of judgment, a
fact that spanned almost a decade (1978 to 1988).
Although admittedly a belated plea, petitioner argues that there
was a mistrial since a vital prosecution witness, then Clerk of Court
Rolando Diaz, became the judge of the case and had no choice but
to render a judgment of conviction against him.
The records show that Rolando Diaz, then Clerk of Court of the CFI
of Cavite City, indeed testified for the prosecution. But as
explained by the Solicitor General, his testimony was limited to
certain facts directly connected with or arising from the
performance of his official duties as Clerk of Court, without any
reference to or pronouncement as to the innocence or guilt of the
accused. And as explained by Judge Diaz himself in his comment
before this Court dated 19 January 1994,
"That the only participation of the undersigned Judge as [then]
Clerk of Court was to issue a certification and the only testimony
given in this case was, while still a Clerk of Court of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite with station at Cavite City, he saw the
accused Feliciano Maliwat in his office after he was referred to him
by the Acting Register of Deeds of Cavite Province, Atty. Milagros
Santiago and who presented to him two certificates of title and
requested for the production of the order annotated at the bottom
of the face of said certificates of title wherein it was shown that
the same had been reconstituted as per order of the Court of First
Instance dated November 30, 1983 and which after diligent search
he could not produce, as either the said order or a copy of the
petition were actually inexistent (sic) and he noticed further that
the signature of Escolastico Cuevas, Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite at the time said order was issued was not the
signature of Atty. Cuevas with which he was familiar;
That the undersigned did not consider said testimony as bias on
his part against the herein accused and he based his conviction of
the accused in these cases not on his prejudgment but rather on
the over-all evidence presented before the Court;
That accused did not question his actuations in these cases during
the trial and instead opted for the continuation thereof thus
perhaps believing that the undersigned would render judgment
according to the evidence presented;
That he did not likewise question the actuations of the Judge in his
appeal to the Court of Appeals nor on certiorari to this Honorable
Court which denied his petition for review for failure to comply the
Rules of Court in Circular No. 28-91 in a resolution of November 13,
1992 whereby entry of Judgment was issued on February 3, 1993
by the Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Judicial Records Office and
it was only on June 21, 1993 did he file the instant motion so as to
hold in abeyance the promulgation of judgment on the ground of
mistrial";[23]
The guiding rule is that a judge must not only render a just, correct
and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be
free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.
As applied to the case at bar, the attitude exhibited by Judge Diaz
speaks more of extraordinary leniency to the accused in granting
all his requests for postponements, even to the extent of
reconsidering his orders declaring the accused as having waived
his right to present further evidence.
Under Rule 137, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, Judge Diaz' previous
actuations did not render him legally disqualified from sitting and
deciding the case. The suggestion that he is not wholly free,
disinterested and independent could have been buttressed by the
exercise of his sound discretion in voluntarily disqualifying himself.
Yet, the manner in which he exhibited himself during the trial
negates any suspicion of prejudgment in the case.
The only remaining issue then is whether or not petitioner's guilt
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the interest of
justice, the Court treated the annexes attached to the petition
which had been marked as exhibits in the course of the trial but
were not formally offered, to form part of the records of this case.
And after close scrutiny thereof, the Court is of the considered
opinion, and so holds, that petitioner was correctly convicted of
having committed the crime of falsification of public documents.
As clearly observed by the trial court which was evidently in the
best position to weigh and evaluate the evidence:
"From the evidence submitted, there is no question that the two
certificates of title RT-11850 with serial no. 1403456 and RT- 11854
with Serial No. 1403457 Exhibits A and B are falsified; that as per
finding of the NBI, testified to by then Senior Agent Toribio Lozada
the same were among those intended for the province of Cotabato
but which were lost in transit as per certification issued by
Fortunato T. Pascual of the Land Registration Commission (Exhs. Q
and Q-2); and a memorandum circular of the loss was issued by
then Acting Commissioner Gregorio Bilog Jr. of the LRC (Exh. O)
and the titles found their way into the office of the Register of
Deeds of Cavite Province pursuant to a petition for reconstitution
filed by the herein accused on January 8, 1976 (Exh. R) and the
same were administratively reconstituted by then Acting Register
of Deeds of Cavite province Atty. Jorge V. Gutierrez and for which
the said owners duplicate were surrendered to the office of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite province and new owner's duplicates
issued to the herein accused. The Court cannot give credence
thereto over the positive identification made by Atty. Santiago in
open Court together with the confirmation made by the NBI agent
on the case. Atty. Tobias Lazada and the former Register of Deeds,
Atty. Escolastico Cuevas whose signature thereon was forged.
(Italics supplied)
Moreover, a closer scrutiny of the numbering of the titles in
question which accused alleges to have gotten from the office of
the Register of Deeds of Cavite Province when he registered the
sale executed in his favor by Benigno T. Aseo shows the letters 'RT'
precedes the number which the Court can take judicial notice of
that the letters RT stand for reconstituted title and these initials
with the corresponding number follow the original number of the
title issued, but in this case the same is missing and does not state
the original number of the title which is out of the ordinary
procedure of the Register of Deeds.
Likewise, it is quite absurd to see that Exhibits 'A' and 'B' which are
accountable forms bearing consecutive serial numbers (1403456
and 1403457) respectively would have been given nonconsecutive
title numbers (RT-11850 and RT-11854) and would have been
issued ten months apart (RT-11850) was issued on November 15,
1983 while RT-11854 was issued on January 18, 1963.
Moreover, RT-11850 does not bear the number of the certificate of
titles from which it was transferred whereas TCT No. RT-11854 is
supposed to have canceled T-8331 and which apparently conflicts
with the allegation of the accused that he acquired these two
parcels of land from Benigno T. Aseo whose ownership was
evidenced by TCT No. T-2474 and T-2475. If that were the case
then, the said title number would have appeared on Exhibits 'A'
and 'B'.
Anent, the testimony of the accused that the certificate of title, the
owner's duplicate of TCT No. RT-11850 and RT-11854 which he
presented for reconstitution bore the serial Nos. 603461 and
603462 it will be noted that he only presented xerox copies of the
said titles without producing the originals and during the
investigation at the NBI as per report marked as Exhibits H and H-4
he never submitted the originals thereof. Whichever serial
numbers they bore, it appears that said title forms were falsified in
view of the attestations of the Land Registration Commission that
they were never intended for the Register of Deeds of Cavite
Province." (Italics supplied)[24]
Additionally, the Court observes that the titles presented by
Maliwat for reconstitution were allegedly owner's duplicate
reconstituted titles, since the numbers were preceded by the
letters RT. This fact, assuming it to be true, negates petitioner's
allegation that these titles were obtained from the Registry of
Deeds by canceling Aseo's (the vendor's) titles which were not
reconstituted titles. It also bears stressing that there must have
been a petition for reconstitution, whether judicial or
administrative, before Maliwat could be issued said reconstituted
titles. But no such petition was produced. From Maliwat's
testimony, he averred that he obtained the said titles when Aseo's
titles were canceled by virtue of a deed of absolute sale between
him and Aseo.
The Court also observes that Exh. 1-A, which is TCT Nos. RT-11850
and Exh. 4-A which is TCT No. RT-11854[25] were made to appear
by accused as reconstituted titles. Thus, whether or not what were
issued to the accused bore SN 603461 and 603462 or SN 1403456
and 1403457 is of no moment because both titles should never
have been reconstituted titles in the first place. More so, because
the evidence[26] shows that Judicial Forms with SN 603461 and
603462 were issued to the Registry of Deeds of Cotabato province
in May 1963. Hence, the titles in Maliwat's possession cannot be
genuine.
The Court further notes that the signatures of Escolastico Cuevas
in SN-1403456; SN-1403457 and SN-603461 and SN-603462 were
not the same and, as plain to the naked eye, very different from
the specimen signature of Register of Deeds Escolastico
Cuevas[27] executed before the NBI. It is ineluctable, therefore,
that these titles were falsified and the evidence points to Maliwat
as the author of the falsification under par. 1 of Article 172 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
"When Judicial Forms 109-D, with Serial Nos. 1403456 and
1403457 were filled up, issued and made to appear in form, as
Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. RT-11850 and RT-11854,
respectively, both in the name of Feliciano Maliwat to show his
ownership of Lots Nos. 5825 and 5826 which are included in the
Imus Estate Subdivision although they were not, falsification as
defined in paragraph 7 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
was committed.
Again, when in the same forms it was made to appear that they
were signed and issued by Register of Deeds Escolastico Cuevas,
although in truth and in fact he has neither signed, issued nor
filled up the same, falsification penalized under paragraphs 1, 2, 3
and 4 of the same Article of the Revised Penal Code has also been
committed.
The fact that no proof was introduced to prove or show as to who
committed the falsification abovementioned, does not exempt or
exculpate the herein accused-appellant from liability. The accused-
appellant is the person who stood to benefit by the falsification of
the documents in question as such, 'it is presumed that he is the
material author of the falsifications.' (Sarep vs. Sandiganbayan,
177 SCRA 440; 449).[28]
The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and therefore guilty of falsification.[29]
If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made
use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby,
-the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the
falsification.[30]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. Nos. 0942829 dated 29 November
1991, which upholds the amended decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite dated 28 June 1988 in Criminal Cases Nos. 158-
77 and 159-77 is hereby AFFIRMED en toto. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED
In Dava v. People (1991),[151]
involving an accused who misrepresented to his friend that
he had no drivers license and thereafter induced his friend
to deal with fixers so that he could have a drivers license,
the Court ruled that the patent irregularity[152] that
attended the procurement of the license cannot escape the
conclusion that the accused knew that the license he
obtained was fake and that he acted as a principal by
inducement in the falsification of the license.
The above case law instructs us that if a person had in his
possession (actual or constructive) a falsified document and
made use of it, taking advantage of it and/or profiting from
such use, thepresumption that he authored the falsification
also applies.[153]
These cited cases, however, already involve a determination
of the guilt or innocence of an accused, requiring the
application of the rigid standard of moral certainty. In a
preliminary investigation that merely inquires into the
probability of guilt of a respondent, no reason exists why the
same presumption cannot apply mutatis mutandis, taking
into account the different level of certainty demanded.
Where the evidence before the investigating prosecutor jibes
with the factual premises[154]necessary for the application
of the presumption of authorship, a prima facie[155] case for
falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is
created. Correspondingly, the legal presumption gives rise to
the necessity for the presentation of contrary evidence by
the party (against whom the presumption applies) to
overcome the prima facie case established;[156] otherwise,
the existence of probable cause cannot be disputed.[157]
Based on these standards, the twin-issue we confront is
whether the presumption applies and whether the facts
giving rise to it have been adequately rebutted by the
respondents.
x x x."
G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984
CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Felipe O. Pascual for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review and reverse a
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Corazon
Legamia was accused of using an alias in violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended. The information
against her reads:
That on or about November 4th, 1974, and for sometime
prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully use the substitute or alias name CORAZON L.
REYES, which is different from Corazon Legamia y Rivera
with which she was christened or by which she has been
known since childhood, nor as a pseudonym for literary
purpose and without having been previously authorized by a
competent Court to do so; that it was discovered only on or
about November 4th, 1974. (Rollo, pp. 11-12.)
She was convicted by the trial court which sentenced her to
an indeterminate prison term of only (1) year, as minimum,
to two (2) years, as maximum; to pay a fine a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment; and to pay the
costs. The trial court recommended, however, that she be
extended executive clemency. On appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the sentence was affirmed in toto. Hence
the instant petition.
The facts:
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years
from November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio
died. During their live-in arrangement they produced a boy
who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was
born on October 18, 1971.
From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the
latter's death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she
styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to
friends as Mrs. Reyes.

Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the
Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. On October
29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a
letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit
Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed
"Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment of
Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed
"Corazon L. Reyes."
For using the name Reyes although she was not married to
Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a
complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution.
Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to
2/5 of that which is due to each legitimate child in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code" per advice
given by Atty. Diomedes A. Bragado of the Agricultural Credit
Administration to Felicisima. (Rollo, pp. 14-15.)
The law:
Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary,
cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes
and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a
normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth
in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which
he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry;
or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have
not been registered in any local civil registry and who have
not been baptized have one year from the approval of this
act within which to register their names in the civil registry
of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic
name and one or two surnames. (As amended by R.A. No.
6085.)
The issue:
Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts
abovestated?
The resolution:
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to
represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man
she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to
another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged
but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women
can be Identified who are living with men prominent in
political, business and social circles. The woman publicly
holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name
blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet
none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A.
No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and
understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural
environment that the law must be construed.
In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for
almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife
and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister
purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for
benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who
as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely,
the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what
Corazon had done especially because some of them
probably had their own Corazons.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set aside;
the petitioner is acquitted of the charge. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Makasiar (Chairman) and Guerrero, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur especially for the sake of the son. But the practice
should not be encouraged. If there is no impediment,
common-law husbands must marry their wives.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur especially for the sake of the son. But the practice
should not be encouraged. If there is no impediment,
common-law husbands must marry their wives.
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADEL
HERNANDEZ ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Lucas Paredes for Appellants.
Attorney-General Avancea for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. SEDUCTION; SENTENCE; RECOGNITION OF
OFFSPRING. When the case shows by the
statement of the injured girl herself that in two years
of carnal intercourse with the offender she had no offspring,
nor had she been pregnant, and that since March 1, 1912,
they had been definitely separated, the complaint having
been filed on July 3, 1913, there is no ground for sentencing
the offender to recognize the offspring, "if in due time any
should be had," since there would be no offspring as a result
of the crime. (Decision of October 7, 1903.)
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J. :
Adel Hernandez, in order to enjoy a girl of 15 years,
named Elena M. Santos, had a talk with the other
defendant, Juan Bautista; between them they concocted a
plan and then he proposed marriage to the girl. She agreed
and was told to come to a house, No. 104 Calle Isaac
Peral, in Ermita. The girl left the school she was attending
(Meisic Intermediate) to keep the engagement, and there
Juan Bautista, under the name of Aniceto de Castro, a
fictitious name, made out that he was a Protestant minister
and before two women who pretended to be witnesses he
simulated the performance of a marriage ceremony.
Afterwards he certified, issuing the suitable document, that
Adel Hernandez and Elena M. Santos "were legally united in
holy matrimony by me" (says Bautista) "in the presence of
Maxima Rambel and Manuela Agustin." Bautista also
certified, over the name of "Aniceto de Castro, Protestant
minister," that "the contracting parties were of the age fixed
by the law for contracting it." (Exhibit A.) In the certificate
the age of the girl was set down as 20 years when she was
only 15.
After the ceremony had been performed, Elena M. Santos
returned to her parents house and did not join Adel
Hernandez. According to her, she went on thus for several
months. Both before and after the ceremony in Calle Isaac
Peral, Adel Hernandez visited her in her house as a teacher
and as such was received by the girls mother. But during
the lesson one afternoon, her mother caught them in
dalliance and scolded her daughter, so that the latter felt
compelled to declare that they were married, showing
Exhibit A.
Convinced that they were married, the mother received Adel
Hernandez in her house, and Adel Hernandez and Elena M.
Santos lived therein as a married couple. So they continued
for two years, but Elena did not conceive of Adel nor did they
have any offspring. But on March 1, 1912, Adel Hernandez
told Elena that he was going to enter a college in Calle
Almansa to continue his studies. Elena went to visit him in
said college twice, but the second time she did not find him
there. He had gone to the provinces.
He returned from the provinces and Elena, accompanied by
her mother, had an interview with him and finally made an
agreement of separation before a lawyer who drew up the
grounds therefor, which were signed by both of them in a
notarial instrument in the presence of two witnesses; but
when the lawyer saw Exhibit A he then learned that it was
not a genuine but a simulated marriage.
The matter having been reported to the secret service, in
this case that on July 1, 1913, he conducted the
investigation regarding the false marriage certificate and
Adel Hernandez told him that he had in fact taken Elena on
January 31, 1909, to the house at No. 104 Calle Isaac Peral
before Juan Bautista, and when asked why he had not taken
her to a real minister of some religion to get married, he
replied that Elenas parents were forcing him by threats to
marry her, and what he did was to reach an understanding
with a friend of his, Juan Bautista, in order to make it appear
that he had got married; he did not apply to a real minister
of religion, because his parents had not given their consent
to his marriage with the girl; that he had lived with her some
six months; that house, No. 104 Calle Isaac Peral, belonged
to his women friends who figure as witnesses in Exhibit A.
With reference to Juan Bautista, Marshall stated that he was
examined by him, Marshall, on the afternoon of the same
day, July 1, 1913, regarding the document Exhibit A, and
Bautista told him that he had written it at the request of Adel
Hernandez, who "asked him to make out this document so
that he might have carnal intercourse with that girl;" that he
signed "Aniceto de Castro, Protestant minister," because his
friend Adel Hernandez begged him to make out the
document so that, as has been said, "he might have
complete liberty with that woman" and to put down
everything he might wish.
Adriano Herrera, who acted as interpreter in these
declarations, corroborated them and added that "Adel
Hernandez declared the document to be false, and that he
had made it out as such solely in order to deceive the
injured girl," and that Juan Bautista declared that he was the
author of the document and had made it out in order to
please his intimate friend Adel Hernandez, "so that the latter
might exercise complete liberty over Elena M. Santos by
demonstrating that they were joined in marriage."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Hence the criminal complaint filed on July 3, 1913, drawn up
in these terms: That Adel Hernandez, by means of false
promises of marriage and availing himself of a simulated
ceremony, seduced Elena Miclat Santos, a virgin over 12 and
under 23 years, and succeeded in having carnal intercourse
and in living in marital relations with her; that in the
commission of this crime, Juan Bautista, conspiring and
confederating with Adel Hernandez, took part as a principal
through acts of cooperation without which the crime could
not have been consummated, simulating and pretending to
be a Protestant and a minister authorized to perform
marriage ceremonies, and simulating that he was
performing a marriage ceremony between said Adel
Hernandez and Elena Miclat Santos in order thus the more
easily to deceive said injured girl and cause her to live in
marital relations, as she in fact did, with the defendant Adel
Hernandez.
The Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced
Adel Hernandez, as guilty of seduction, to four months of
arresto mayor, to pay one-half of the costs of the trial, to
endow the injured girl with the sum of P500 Philippine
currency, or in case of insolvency to the equivalent
subsidiary imprisonment, and to recognize and maintain the
offspring in due time, if there were any. It sentenced Juan
Bautista, as accomplice of the foregoing convict, to a fine of
325 pesetas, or in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment according to law, and to pay the other half of
the costs. Both defendants appealed.
The first thing they allege, with respect to procedure, is that
the lower court erred in denying their petition for the
transfer of the hearing in the case to another day. This
ground of error cannot be sustained. The right of the
accused, after their plea, is to request a period of two days
at least, in order to prepare their defense. They pleaded "not
guilty," according to the record of the case, on July 7, 1913.
On the 15th next subsequent, they acknowledged summons
to appear for trial, which was to take place on the 22d. They
had sufficient time to prepare their evidence, and they did
not request any time to prepare their defense until the trial
had actually commenced.

With respect to the merits of the case, it is contended that it
is erroneous to affirm that the accused Adel Hernandez
committed seduction on the person of Elena M. Santos. But
there is nothing clearer than that this defendant, by means
of deception, succeeded in enjoying the girl the fact is
evident not only from the testimony of witnesses, but also
from documents demonstrating the deception and by facts
not denied or controverted at the trial by the defendant
himself, that he had enjoyed the girl by living in marital
relations with her only when her mother was informed from
the false certificate of marriage, issued by a pretended
Protestant minister, that they were married.
With reference to the responsibility of the defendants, the
part of accomplice cannot be attributed to Juan Bautista; for
he was a principal; it was really he who supplied the
essential element of deception without which there would
not have existed in the present case the crime of seduction,
"cooperating in the commission of the act by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished." (Penal
Code, art. 13, No. 3.)
But furthermore, as the prosecuting attorney remarks in this
instance, he cooperated in the commission of the act by an
act that in itself constitutes another crime. He is thus really
on a par with one who cooperates in the commission of a
fraud by means of the falsification of a document which in
itself is another crime. The law. (Penal Code, art. 328)
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Anyone who, without legal right or legitimate cause, shall
perform acts properly pertaining to any person in authority
or a public officer, assuming an official character, shall be
punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium degree."cralaw virtua1aw library
Without legal right Juan Bautista performed an act properly
pertaining to a person in authority, assuming the official
character of a minister of a religious sect in order to legalize
a marriage, and issuing a certificate, signed moreover, with
a false name under the predication, in an additional
signature, of being a Protestant minister. The crime charged
in the information is, therefore, the complex one of
seduction by means of usurpation of functions Hernandez
was likewise a coprincipal by inducement to this crime
actually committed by Bautista. Marshall said that it
appeared from his investigation that Bautista made out the
marriage certificate at the instance of an intimate friend of
his called Adel Hernandez, and that the latter admitted that
he had made that request because he wanted to live with a
female cousin of his "he reached an understanding with
an intimate friend of his called Juan Bautista, in order to
make out this document, so as to make it appear that he
had got married" (p. 29). "I acceded to this request," said
Bautista in his turn, "and I made out the document; the
reason was because this friend of mine, Adel Hernandez,
begged me to make out the document so that he might have
complete liberty with that woman and he asked me to put
down everything I might wish."cralaw virtua1aw library
Adriano Herrera testified that Adel Hernandez stated, as the
previous witness has said, that the document was false and
that he had made it out solely as such in order to deceive
the injured girl; and that Juan Bautista stated that he made
out this document only in order to please Adel Hernandez
who had told him of his desire to possess Elena M. Santos.
"Those who directly force or induce others to commit a crime
are considered as principals." (Penal Code, art. 13.)
"Inducement exists if the compact, the command, or the
advice is of such a nature that without its concurrence the
crime would not have been committed." (Decision of
December 2, 1902.)
"Fixing of individual responsibility is only proper when
between the proposals and the acts of each defendant there
is the necessary independence for weighing them
separately, not when there exist unity of action and mutual
assistance." (Decision of October 4, 1901.)
This being so, according to article 89 of the Penal Code, only
the penalty for the more serious crime will be imposed, to be
applied in its maximum degree, which, in this case, is the
Penalty for the crime of usurpation of functions that is, the
maximum degree of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium degrees two years eleven months and eleven
days to four years and two months.
Both the trial court and the prosecuting attorney in this
instance agree that the defendant Adel Hernandez must
recognize and support the offspring if in due time any should
be had. But Elena M. Santos, the injured girl, testified in
these words:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. How long did you and Adel live together in your mothers
house? A. Over two years.
"Q. Did Adel Hernandez live there, sleep there, and also eat
there? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you live a life of complete marital relations? Yes,
sir.
"Q. Were you ever pregnant? A. No, sir.
"Q. So you havent any offspring? A. No, sir.
"Q. When did you and Adel separate? A. The year 1912;
he asked my permission to enter a college in order to finish
his course of study. I went to the college twice, and the
second time I went I didnt find him any more.
"Q. And since then he hasnt returned to your house? A.
No, sir." (p. 24.)
This admitted, there is no ground for decreeing the forcible
recognition of the offspring that in the year 1912 or since
July 3, 1913, the date of the complaint, the injured girl could
or might have had.
On August 4 last Juan Bautista withdrew his appeal and his
withdrawal was entered on the record on the 6th next
following. The appeal actually pending is solely that of Adel
Hernandez.
On the foregoing grounds, Adel Hernandez is sentenced to
two years eleven months and eleven days of prision
correccional, to endow the injured girl with P500 Philippine
currency, and to pay one-half of the costs.

Torres, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Araullo, JJ., concur.