Abunado v. People
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if
Abunado eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled. In short, all the elements of bigamy were present
the nullity of the prior marriage is immaterial.
CASE NO. 59:
Morigo vs. People
HELD: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering
that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration
of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second
marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is
acquitted in the case filed.
CASE NO. 60:
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy
HELD: It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage
was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely
voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment
has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still
validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to
Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on
the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still
needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl
and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law.
Case No. 61:
Domingo v. CA
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is required for the purpose
of remarriage. It is necessary for the protection of the subsequent
spouse who believed in good faith that his partner was not lawfully
married thus free from being charged with bigamy.
The marriage of Soledad and Roberto was celebrated while the
formers previous marriage was still subsisting, thus, bigamous and
void ab initio.
Law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes.
There is no need for a separate action of partition of property
because it will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.
CASE NO. 62:
Valdes vs. RTC
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless
of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are
governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family.
CASE NO. 63:
People vs. Aragon
HELD:
The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife
whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the
first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence,
the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima
for contracting marriage cannot prosper.
CASE NO. 64:
Mercado vs. Mercado
.
HELD: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One
who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by
then, the crime had already been consummated. He contracted
second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The
fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge.
CASE NO. 65:
Republic vs. Nolasco
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolascos efforts to locate
Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief
that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking
assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even
secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did
not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.
CASE NO. 66:
Lukban vs Republic
HELD: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure
declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code
prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that for the
purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For
the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that
the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse
is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
CASE NO. 67:
Armas vs. Calisterio
HELD: The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was
solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time was the
Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August
1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive
governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of
presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage
where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is
enough to remarry then Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid
and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
Case No. 68:
Anaya vs. Palaroan
HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with
another woman was not one of those enumerated that would
constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded
by the last paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or
deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and
therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.
CASE NO. 69:
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
Held: No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a
marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested and
where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student,
did not suspect anything about Luidas condition considering that
she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed
physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got
married.

CASE NO. 70:
Aquino vs. Delizo
HELD: The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of
the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo
was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the
time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally
plump or fat. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the womans abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new
trial and decision complained is set aside.
CASE NO. 71
Menciano v. San Jose
The marriage of Matilde and Faustino was evidenced by a valid
Marriage License and Marriage Certificate both of which were signed
by the parties and properly recorded at the Office of the Civil
Registrar. Being official and public documents, their validity can be
successfully assailed only by strong, clear, and convincing oral
testimony.
Faustinos meticulous signature cannot be signed by one who is not
of sound mind and of fair physical condition. He may have been sick
at that time, but not to such a degree as to render him unconscious
of what he was doing.
Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse. The
presumption is in favor of potency. The fact that the deceased was
able to produce the specimen as what was instructed by his doctor
shows that he was potent. The necessary conclusion is that the child
Faustino Neri, Jr., is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son
of the deceased Faustino Neri with Matilde Menciano in lawful
wedlock.
CASE NO. 72
Jimenez vs. Canizares
HELD: The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did
not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim
cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that
women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily
and unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless
compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in
this case is not self-incriminating. She is not charged with any
offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness against
herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The case was remanded to trial court
CASE NO. 73:
Sin vs. Sin
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment
or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The
trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or
opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution
of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
CASE NO. 74:
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
HELD: Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she
committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other
than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed
by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession
of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading.
Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the
defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree
of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the
confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What
the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants
confession. The petition should be granted based on the second
adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
Case No. 75
Lapuz v. Eufemio
The Article 100 of Civil Code allows only the innocent spouse to
claim legal separation; and in Article 108, provides that the spouses
can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even
rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being
personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the
action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis
moritur cum persona.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the
death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that
these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come
into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation. Property rights acquired by either
party could be resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
As to the petition of Eufemio for a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Carmen Lapuz, such action became moot and academic
upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest
in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically
dissolved the questioned union.
Case No. 76
Gandionco v. Peneranda
HELD:
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage,
may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the
civil liability arising from the offense even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such
civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately,
with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of off springs, support, and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among
others.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be
issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for
legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action
for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If
petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too
onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
Case No. 77
Bugayong v. Ginez
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation or conditional forgiveness or remission,
by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed.
The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and
the fact that she went with him to the house of his cousin and slept
as husband and wife for one day and two nights; these facts show
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a
condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred
almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the
wife, the conduct of the husband despite his belief that his wife was
unfaithful, deprives him of the right of any action for legal
separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct
comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
Case No. 78
Pacete v. Cariaga
HELD:
No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion
between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene
for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code,
further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of
the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-
off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward
getting the parties to reconcile.
The decision of the lower court was nullified.
Case No. 79
Macadandang v CA

Upon finality, legal separation shall have the following effects: 1.)
Spouses shall be entitled to live separately, but the marriage bond
shall be severed; 2.) Conjugal properties shall be liquidated and
dissolved but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share
of the profits earned by the partnership or community.
The decision of the trial court on Jan 4, 1973 finding Antonio guilty
of concubinage and granting the legal separation and all its legal
effects along with the division of conjugal property had long been
final and executory.
Upon the death of the guilty party, the liquidation of the conjugal
property can be resolved by the application of the rules on
intestate succession with respect to the exclusive property of the
deceased petitioner. Thus, the process be:
1 Liquidation and distribution governing the effects of the final decree
of legal separation;
Whatever remaining properties allocated to the deceased petitioner
shall be governed by intestate succession.
CASE NO. 80:
Ayala Investments vs CA
HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the
debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a
personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite
the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate
entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse
to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate
stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the
money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot,
by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a
surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing
as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession,
it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership
should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was
clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a
benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in
favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of
shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits
contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly
resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin
off of the loan itself.