1

G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942 article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee.
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs. The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents. against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article
1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an
Jose G. Advincula for respondents. employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued
in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must
cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled
BOCOBO, J.: together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence
under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are
Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists
Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo. and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the
solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit
injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate safely anchored.
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the
criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino
Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the CIVIL CODE
Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First
Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from
from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence
reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It intervenes.
is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on
the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of xxx xxx xxx
Appeals found:

... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22,
appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who
had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding
(Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works
available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under
the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil
action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In
other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of
the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as
in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code,
in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to
"those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed
by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his
fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another
is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to
their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any
damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in
which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.

... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be

imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not
misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved
the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next
preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein
prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover
from the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority
or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority,
legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or
minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with the civil law.
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ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093
limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365
of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or
negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been
crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a
closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not
destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or
create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.

Second. In cases falling w/n subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This
the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the
they may have received. Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as
culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es
each one shall be liable. de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero
acaescio por su culpa."

When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when
the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089,
and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then
regulations. article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of
Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or
causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons,
those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
exempt from execution. aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:

ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of 1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers,
and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in 2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees. 3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all
theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and
such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.

Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola"
(Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende
a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en
ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es
consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case
carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary
consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a
collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the
Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in
which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del
Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril
Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte.
Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-
513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos,
todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion
civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los
trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no
puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera
exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que
motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o
falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o
indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal motivo
vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta
via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el
ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra
la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian
a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo
Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga
culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los
Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que
mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal,
atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y
ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos
separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por
alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo
entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa
civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal
paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del
delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio
de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el
texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide
en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el
articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los
de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion
de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o
empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto
acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de
intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su
responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y
aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
3
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero
postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y
tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en
distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por
aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compaia del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub
judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta,
al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de
inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente
reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni
responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion
aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se
patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece
incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less
tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for
damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title
upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil
responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each
nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal
measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications
which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily
entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this
means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to
seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar
nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which
are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article
1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in
which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every
day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith.
Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and
the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of
civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common
law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent
of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison
between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on
account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such
differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary
character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of
those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding
article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are
the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts
during their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it
happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or
enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil
responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil
courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between
punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so
that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different
modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has
abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to
exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the

losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before
the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact
when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that
of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately
reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the
non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from
the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del
Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it
becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res
judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the
Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of
the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another),
without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory
in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the
employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after
the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the
principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the
action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and
734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u
omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es
principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en
que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad
por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria
contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son
personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La
responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero
no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o
de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del
maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado
(menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la
ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de
negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No
hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la
responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad
sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In
order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the
legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another
person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice
and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable
for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed
on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of
the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian,
proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone
of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father,
guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore,
only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is
subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil
Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
4
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia
culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena
respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o
razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el
orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los
demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos
20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse
directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los
actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only
for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is
liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise
to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the
penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons
on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for
the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but
in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be
understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes
responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be responsible."
distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability,
and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that
case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by
the "compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal
case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car
company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded
damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles
1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or
negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto
de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del
dao causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y
efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se
siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos
jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de
los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de
delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye,
siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o
negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de
establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes en
determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo
hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente a la
indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los
mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento
Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su
jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition
that the trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the
damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value
and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case
instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had
taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as the criminal
jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not
constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and
this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to
article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among
other persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the

damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil
jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering
the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one
of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116
of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading
attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way
contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not
been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he
had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the
same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of
his own presumed negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus,
there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary
liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to
take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights.
It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective
method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment
against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held
liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous
criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held
liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted.
The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of
the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case
while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was
brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the
company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of
the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que
consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas
por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en
su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes
con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se
quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo
justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega de estas
expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos y
perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que
era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de
servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos
que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no
contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez
que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro
vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de
aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa
5
el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos y perjuicios
producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del
porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo
reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el
articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia
demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter
economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it
declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the
railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles
referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and
liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery
to the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and
with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they
were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable
importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to
realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the
consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of
error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-
fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the
delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and,
therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed
from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and
damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified
and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as
stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article
1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage
by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified
and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also
to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year
1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because
the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off
while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court
held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the
arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the
track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable
primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject.
Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or
negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of
Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.
 6
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the
those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the
comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his
damages caused by the minors who live with them. employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence
punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than
this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the
xxx xxx xxx law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But
liable for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from
branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles
their duties. 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction
may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective
xxx xxx xxx machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out
of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for
passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons itself.
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child
Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the
to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than
criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be
reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana
codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the
would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again
prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along
reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which
articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely
clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto
Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred
actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the
effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in
might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter
the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had
the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the
party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the
future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance
be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a
extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions
of our Penal Code on the same subject. had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the
death of the child would not have occurred.

An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of
these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the
provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime
criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
enforcement of the civil right. 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even
with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only for this civil liability arising from his crime.
while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the
existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under
the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal
by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of
been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the
Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On
to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality
civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines. to attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were
passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite

direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot
water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The
trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But
this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the
parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was
the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the
court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child
had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the
evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened
child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced
in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7
Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The
contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a
bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.
7
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37
[year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so
negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that
said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article
1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or
director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while
the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages
brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his
way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and
pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco
Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co.,
pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced
accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship
the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes
his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck
the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was
a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed
International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any
Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation
plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the
shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been
presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said: overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all
diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable liability.
garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by
in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly
had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of
the defective condition of the steering gear. Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City
of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus: City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The
truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless
but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says: imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City
of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect
the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
good father of a family to avoid the damage." prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court
held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion
law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The
selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from
jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or
presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability. omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up
 8
with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and
the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises
and not a case of civil negligence. The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
xxx xxx xxx understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of
but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to
advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Codebring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.) laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising
from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under
independent remedy. articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to
simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling
sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is
as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on
the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held: Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure
indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not
the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required
all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In
applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code. construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right
and justice.

The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case,
because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary
liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based
on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In
fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the
principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is
different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to
recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the
Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code,
and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not
be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a
crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-
delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal
Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code,
and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they
should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection
and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just
that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a
careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such
selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or
director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says
in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and
employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente
en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person
of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire
a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres
already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action
for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of
the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is
 9
by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time
we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so
that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will,
it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely
directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
10
 11

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977 THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT,
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. II
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees. THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR
RES-ADJUDICTA;
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
III
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL
BARREDO, J.: CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 IV
in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion
to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said
accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent
to kill, coupled with mistake." It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the
parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And
which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court; so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty.
Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res- above-referred to.
adjudicata;
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because resolution are:
he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by
marriage. 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of.
defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued: Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already
legally married?

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January

14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded. clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607.
In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault,
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case. with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized
civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil
SO ORDERED. liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our
resolution the following assignment of errors:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer
and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE

CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT - It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted
in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
I negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
 12
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that
aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2 force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from
acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could
criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than
also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law
awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3 development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa
have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
their foundations. whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the
new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import
of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. or omission of the defendant.
In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a
situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence
1910 of the Spanish Civil Code. and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.",
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the
jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.) same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift-
rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in
applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.) punishable by law.4

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished
from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper
 13
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when
the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld. to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587,
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am.
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money
or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that
Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the
time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and
dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of
the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to
third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter
into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol.
II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that
the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child
without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to
that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed
in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when
judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough
to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587,
600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am.
Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second
Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-
appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his
automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and
Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a
criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the
pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action
pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension
of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on
August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had
acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law
and jurisprudence. 2
On Nov. 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil
action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil
action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the
law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the resolution of the
City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is
defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R").
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated
Nov. 14,1970 (Annex "S" & Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on
February 25, 1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF
MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED
IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAY THE
OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR certiorari IS NOT
PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.
14
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an
independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is
evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally
on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is caned a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver,
Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner
because of the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he
suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant,
Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees,
particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-
delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is readily
discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded in Barredo
vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very
little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil hability arising from crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are
loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
 15
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code. section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the injured
criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and required in the preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus
ibi remedium. Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for
in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and
that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules
obtaining a reliel True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a of Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in the
more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal
defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated by the defendant is prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final
wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal
required in all cases to go through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently
avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that
they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation
safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, "not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code
some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such
responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who could have chosen a Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
careful and prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also
base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of (1) Law;
the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p.
747) that before third persons the employer and employee vienen a ser como una (2) Contracts;
sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien la emplea y
utihza (become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in (3) Quasi-contracts;
that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar
force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed
out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of
private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the
further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, stations
and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (Garcia vs.
Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of
quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes
not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between
"damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done.
And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since
"harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-
delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil
Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which
may be harmful to persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally
terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned
becomes unnecessary.
 16
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue
City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of
that Court.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the Decision 1of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not
damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation
of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22)
years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical
course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the
latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester,
which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a
virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's
attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of
such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already
married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment
ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and
granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence
for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the follows:
parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true
facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he
never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did
not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she
had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took
place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the
complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily
dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses
and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order 4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano
Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
17
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan
City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff
on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to
pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos
at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and
private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because
of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by
reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that was to be
held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and
relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g)
such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality,
have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court
gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have
had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted
his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day
he went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted
to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get
married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant
with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that
occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended
to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep
with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her
medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night
until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became

pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents,
and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by
the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff,
but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a
girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is
that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed
them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the
wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens,
and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which case at bar.
18
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him
on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who
has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant
should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as
the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he
raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the
13

docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, he contended that the trial court
9

erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed
to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed
love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
10

toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs,
respondent Court made the following analysis: traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian
ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to
fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes
already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral
is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
certainly would (sic) not have allowed pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also
plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic)
loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We
cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and
except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, complied with.
1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of
when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Baaga, the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the
Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant
after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court
women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he
also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just xxx xxx xxx
like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little
compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11 or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
and then concluded: [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil.
 19
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
(Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]);
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]). general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have
must be respected. been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
And now to the legal issue. scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than
the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote: love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
American states. . . . 19
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20 that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.
The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
Civil Code the following rule: vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction,
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
compensate the latter for the damage. complainant who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that,
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the even before they had the benefit of clergy.
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not
a right of action. convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion
were made in the said case:
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21 Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had

been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part
of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
20
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding
the incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the
Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal
sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is
accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or
influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it
cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty
56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and
and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. reason.
123).
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting,
And in American Jurisprudence we find: for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is
nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant
to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far
or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their
is insufficient to warrant a recovery. relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual . . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner
desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, Jan. 25, 1988) in a
that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization luncheonette and w/o doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18,
of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662) 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have
been offered by the petitioner. 34
xxx xxx xxx
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year,
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant,empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, withoutbelieving that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged,
defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the
no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code
which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been
carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered: No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. CA, L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay,
Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang
vs. CA, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the
promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance
that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages
will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may
not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner
in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that
she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime;
equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of
the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
 21
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action
by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less,
equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other
one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said
that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the
petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse
upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 22

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children
KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed
DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
CA, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the RTC NCR, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION &
SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORP., respondents.
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed
that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the
alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:

BIDIN, J.: Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on
Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated November 17, 1991 negligence under Article 2176 of the NCC, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie,
denying herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration. since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a
condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on
Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
Napoleon Dulay.
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which
behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages provides:
against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89- own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
1751 among others alleges the following:
xxx xxx xxx
1. . . .
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard) the former are not engaged in any business or an industry.
are corporations duly organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with
offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila. They are xxx xxx xxx
impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the former appears to be the employer
of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly
acknowledged responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA by extending its (Emphasis supplied)
sympathies to plaintiffs.
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3,
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as
SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation
complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . . Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that Torzuela is an employee of
SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to
petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
3. On Dec. 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was on duty
as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide
defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated January 7, was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No.
1989, copy attached as Annex A); 89-1896.

4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and
reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and
control of its employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S
motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent
judge held that the complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-
delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon
Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled
that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private respondents
herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo,
p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded
on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished
from those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989
states:
 23
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
alleged in the verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
the matter as well as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint arising from the same act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
against the alternative defendants Superguard Security Corporation and
Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the
dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110) criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement
of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents
reconsideration thereof was denied. opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a
quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v.
IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. constituting the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of
an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243
employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or negligence [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs,
and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private
The civil action against the employer may therefore proceed independently of the criminal respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act
action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
question of whether Torzuela is an employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD
would be better resolved after trial. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit: fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-
supplied) entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides: v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:

Rule 111. . . . . . . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently In the cases provided a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied) two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
is unnecessary since the civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
other hand, it is the private respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed by law. (Emphasis supplied)
with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191
was done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security guard. SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within the scope of the
employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently,
We find for petitioners. a civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
prosecuted or found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages
of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial
reasons, this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
 24
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury.
that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical
injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
(Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April
Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to
Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case
(supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the
crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the SO ORDERED.
accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas
the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a
civil action based on Article 33 lies.

Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal
Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties
as a security guard. It having been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto,
petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article
2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167
SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it
is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]).
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Since Art. 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts w/c are intentional &
voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's
complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to
private respondents.

With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action,
the general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
& under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; & (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for w/c the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages
(Del Bros Hotel Corp. v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); DBP v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])

This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an
actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot
Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was
on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and
responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants
below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended
by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties;
whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are
questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present
evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the
allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind
that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a
cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case
(Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v.
CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA
 25

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT
CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.
Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private respondents.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no
cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for
damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the
Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of
Police for "double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence",
and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed
subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is
premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until
after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence;
that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the
crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.

Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf. On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that
the aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the
ANTONIO, J.: respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-
delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking
Branch III, in Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after
conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained
Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying the arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. whether or not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence
known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a
showing that the offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not
together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of
hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally
respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the
from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional
Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating
a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972,
Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate hence this appeal on certiorari.
No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by
defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the
physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the
accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision
imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the
Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence
Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The circumstance that the complaint
respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip
figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment. in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without
due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the
nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in
imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act
oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court
an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments
give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be
the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners. from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or
culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). 1
motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no
cause of action; 2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court
requisite verification, hence defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39
Court; and 3) that the defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with maximum care and prudence. civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted,
however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such
 26
reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v. Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after the
tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his
appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal proceedings, BARREDO, J., concurring:
and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the offended party by
final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally ineffective
because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of I would like to limit my concurrence.
the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat 3 that when the criminal action for physical
injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this case are Articles 2176 and
and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages suffered by the injured 2177 of the Civil Code which read as follows:
party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party in said
criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to ART 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
press a claim for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
action for damages subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of the New done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
Civil Code. relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said ART 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal defendant.
case, and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.
These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No.
has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the
right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As
action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view
civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective,
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature
civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. superseding the Rules of 1940.
The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation
the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may required, there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.
proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of
the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, order that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last
for these articles were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments,
rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso which is procedural, may also the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one.
be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the
Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso." 4 But in whatever
way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by
petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule
111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the Separate Opinions
institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case,
petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation BARREDO, J., concurring:
to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the
Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does
not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find I would like to limit my concurrence.
no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this case are Articles 2176 and
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, 2177 of the Civil Code which read as follows:
and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private
respondents. ART 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
Zaldivar, Castro Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Makalintal, Actg., C.J., concurs in the result.

ART 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding

article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
Separate Opinions
These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action
arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No.
 27
2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the
Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As
to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view
that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective,
it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature
superseding the Rules of 1940.

Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation
required, there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in
order that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last
sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments,
the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one.

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES
OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and 748:
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can
be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial
lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a
young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-
82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi,
Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation,
for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition
to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular
inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an
order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related
Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court
issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules
of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi- cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
28
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the
law to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of
the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or
controlled by its title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid
possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial
laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove
their respective claims. 9
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant
constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a
big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its
concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate
fronting the provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man height
inter-connected cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by
defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of
the said inter-connected culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or
opening thru the lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the
left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected
by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by
defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also
built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence
which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves
as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the
same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs,
year after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of
plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil,
which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-
connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during
rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the
excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned
water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep,
wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be planted to
any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions,
washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their
laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of
plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict
by the plaintiff. 11
 29
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
may be the basis for the recovery of damages. extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in
12

Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil
stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing liability.
loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is
damages to the injured party. entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal
the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of
respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch
between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial
court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. respondent corporation.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and SO ORDERED.
interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner
or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his
act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable
by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant.

According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has
been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
 30

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910 lying for a considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to have
been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant. visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so
to do. As admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their
W. H. Lawrence, for appellant. play sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at
W. L. Wright, for appellee. will on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the
caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children
from visiting the defendant company's premises, although it must be assumed that the
CARSON, J.: company or its employees were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of
Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative. the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical
drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at
electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence,
small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at
the westerly end of the island. The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established
by the evidence of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 fact which are seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by
years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the property of the defendant, or that they
age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. had come from its possession and control, and that the company or some of its employees
left them exposed on its premises at the point where they were found.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12
years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company,
Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations
miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof.
impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in accord with his
seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's allegations in this regard.
premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw
or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy. It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less
extensively, on the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, caps were used in blasting a well on the company's premises a few months before the
they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company accident; that not far from the place where the caps were found the company has a
dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used by it in its operations as a street
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size railway and a purveyor of electric light; and that the place, in the neighborhood of which the
and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by caps were found, was being used by the company as a sort of dumping ground for ashes and
means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by
the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the
explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery
take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on
end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think
then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and
electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with
failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this
and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company
followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point
proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run on its premises which the general public, including children at play, where not prohibited from
away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that young boys were
David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured likely to roam about in pastime or in play.
his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were
called in to care for his wounds. Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on
which these conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the on the company's well and on its McKinley extension was done by contractors. It was
defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. It conclusively proven, however, that while the workman employed in blasting the well was
appears, however, that some months before the accident, during the construction of the regularly employed by J. G. White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well
defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those found by the boys directly and immediately under the supervision and control of one of defendant company's
were used in sinking a well at the power plant near the place where the caps were found; foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the McKinley
and it also appears that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps extension was done by independent contractors. Only one witness testified upon this point,
were in use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William and while he stated that he understood that a part of this work was done by contract, he
McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been could not say so of his own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the
alleged contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The
 31
fact having been proven that detonating caps were more or less extensively employed on (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some
work done by the defendant company's directions and on its behalf, we think that the person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
company should have introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it
wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it was the owner of the material used in (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
these operations and that it was responsible for tortious or negligent acts of the agents
employed therein, on the ground that this work had been intrusted to independent
contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent superior should not be applied. If the These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real
company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as those found on its premises, as difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the
intimated by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the absence case under consideration.
of such proof we think that the other evidence in the record sufficiently establishes the
contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left
premises were its property, and were left where they were found by the company or some of exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in
its employees. keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been
injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and
upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its
and 1908 of that code. premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a
match to its contents.

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and

illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry
occurs. upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the
negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident
which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident,
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate
cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of
they should be responsible. the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and
"Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them. In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an
injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes
xxx xxx xxx of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad
company knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for found explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the of which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant
latter may be employed or on account of their duties. found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as
to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury
therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
xxx xxx xxx

In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned the premises liable.
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal
question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was,
under circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on which
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers
placed in a safe and proper place. conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from
its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in
facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault
provisions of these articles, and since we agree with this view of the case, it is not necessary or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in
for us to consider the various questions as to form and the right of action (analogous to those regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to
raised in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would, his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
perhaps, be involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the court below. circumstances of the case."

We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally
accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under
consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent
evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and
sharply criticized in several state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the case
of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the
Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able
decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not
liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful
acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous
machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license

to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have
been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children
and adults as to the circumstances that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license
to enter upon another's premises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in
by the courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154
Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New
Hampshire, and perhaps in other States.
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing
and approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1
Q. B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases in accord with that announced in Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case
the Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the United States, in a of Powers vs. Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):
unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs.
McDonal and reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an
exhaustive and critical analysis and review of many of the adjudged cases, both English and
American, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case
of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows:
The plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon
and visited the defendant's premises, without defendant's express permission or invitation, And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied
and while there, was by accident injured by falling into a burning slack pile of whose invitation to visit the premises of another, says:
existence he had no knowledge, but which had been left by defendant on its premises
without any fence around it or anything to give warning of its dangerous condition, although
defendant knew or had reason the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these facts the court
held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and
protection while on the premises in question, against the unseen danger referred to, the
defendant was under no obligation to make provision.
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles
involved to the facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the
case at bar, and would seem to dispose of defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this
case being a trespasser, the defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be
held liable for injuries which would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on
defendant's premises.
We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied
to the case now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty
of negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its
depot building. It could have forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine
for purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so. On the
contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its mine, and witness its
operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow path
skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people of the village,
old and young, would often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of
frequenting that locality and playing around the shaft house in the immediate
vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard for the safety of these children would
have suggested that they were in danger from being so near a pit, beneath the
surface of which was concealed (except when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a
mass of burning coals into which a child might accidentally fall and be burned to
death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad company ought not to be heard
to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the
vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for whose
protection it was under no obligation to make provisions.
In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous
traps, baited with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the
premises of another, that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his
neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by their instinct into the traps,
and in consequence of such act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted and thereby
injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord
Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing the animal into the trap
by means of his instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by manual
force?" What difference, in reason we may observe in this case, is there
between an express license to the children of this village to visit the defendant's
32
coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied license, resulting from
the habit of the defendant to permit them, without objection or warning, to do so
at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the case of Townsend
vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence, volume 1,
page 305, note, well says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law that would make
the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking meat, so
that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct, might run into it and be
killed, and which would exempt him from liability for the consequence of leaving
exposed and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that his
neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts
equally strong, might thereby be killed or maimed for life."
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and
impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward
them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave
exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to
them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they
were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken.
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied
license might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus
leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be
likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to
make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises, near
the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication should arise.
(Chap. 10, p. 303.)
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the
cases of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra)
is not less cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases
originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by
curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be
found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and
indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them
to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the
range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive
to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to
enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for
pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such
cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered
upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner
owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to
prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that
children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are
likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child
does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard
the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the
owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other
fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express
invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the children in the community
to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land
upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a
man has a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under
the care of their parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of
others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States
all private property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used
as to injure the equal rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060,
decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it would be absurd
and unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we lived to hold that parents

or guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing
boys and girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the
child the negligence of the parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive
it a right to recover in such cases a point which we neither discuss nor decide.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's
express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for
injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were
attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on
its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and,
on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap
and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of
plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury
should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can
not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo
cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this
decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in
regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault
or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in
regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to
his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case." As we think we have shown, under the reasoning on which rests
the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of
responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-
grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises
without express permission or invitation' but it is wholly different question whether such youth
can be said to have been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the
detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his
action would result in an explosion. On this point, which must be determined by "the
particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo
cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the "Torpedo"
and analogous cases which our attention has been directed, the record discloses that the
plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender years that they
were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of the explosive
instruments which fell into their hands.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as
a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the
injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with
which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts
to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about
by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he
was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the
explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was
within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened
and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion
which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not
anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and Civil, 391), is directly in point. In that case the court said:
knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity
and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of
him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred
by him under such circumstances.
33
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such
acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very
nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to
understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a
minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their
consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will
necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which
may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in
force in these Islands may be gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our
laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights
and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law
are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate
the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with the
varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the Penal Code a minor over
fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally
responsible therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be
taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10
years of age a child may, under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live
with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a guardian
(Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 and
females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68,
sec. 1).
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of
the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury
incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful
and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred
but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which
inflicted the injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur
sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.)
The Patidas contain the following provisions:
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him
through his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from
another. (Law 25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the
grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit.
7, Partida 2.)
According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts
the grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit.
7 Partida 2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down
the law touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation
placed upon its provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case
of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in
the case at bar the right to recover damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the
injuries sustained by him.
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or
negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the
injury there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury produced

should not be the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no
obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omission were imprudent or
unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury
was the negligence of the injured party himself.
The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault
or negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the
damage."
See also judgment of October 21, 1903.
34
occasion for damagesthat is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron
rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not
contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself.
Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission
of duty, that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or
accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury,
he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.

To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the
his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a
decision of March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as
obligation when between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
and effect; but if the damage caused does not arise from the acts or omissions
of a third person, there is no obligation to make good upon the latter, even
though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when it We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon
is shown that the immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness of defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the
the injured party himself. relation of cause and effect between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion
of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an
And again infant of very tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but
whether in view of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed
upon the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to without fault in picking up the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we
establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and neither discuss nor decide.
September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first setting
forth in detail the necessary points of the proof, which are two: An act or Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of
omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability, and the the court below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the
production of the damage by said act or omission. record be returned to the court wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in
favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day.
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect So ordered.
between the act or omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result
of one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary
that the damages result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably
and wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a legal ground for imputability."
(Decision of October 29, 1887.)

Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.
(Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)

(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)

Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely
settled in this court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Co. (supra), wherein we held that while "There are many cases (personal injury cases) was
exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of
the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March,
1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme
court of Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes, though not the
principal one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other
countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the
application of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and definitely denied the
right of recovery when the acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of the
accident.

The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party

shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the
event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper
hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the displacement
of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the event giving
 35

G.R. No. L-50959 July 23, 1980 Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on
the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation
HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., petitioners, arising from other sources, 13 like quasi delict. 14
vs.
HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of
ROMEO VILLA Y CUNANAN, respondents. action was based upon a quasi delict. 15 Thus, the complaint alleged among others:

CONCEPCION JR., J.: xxxxxxxxx

This is a petition for certiorari, premised upon the following facts: 4. That on September 2, 1974, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Sitio Pag-asa,
Bo. San Rafael Tarlac, Tarlac, along MacArthur Highway and while riding on a bicycle
On September 25, 1974, the petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., namely: Crisanta Salazar, on his way home to Bo. San Sebastian, Tarlac, Tarlac, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped
Pedro Tayag, Jr., Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon Tayag and Rodolfo Tayag, filed with and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I, presided over by the respondent Judge, a '74 and as result of which he sustained physical injuries which cause his instantaneous
complaint 1 for damages against the private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. death and the bicycle he was riding on was damaged and destroyed;
and Romeo Villa y Cunanan docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5114 alleging among
others that in the afternoon of September 2, 1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a 5. That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time of the accident being driven by
bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way home, he was defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater speed than what was
bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 reasonable and proper and in a gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent
PUB '74, driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his manner, without due regards to injuries to persons and damage to properties and in
instantaneous death. In due time, the private respondents filed their answer, 2 admitting violation of traffic rules and regulations;
some allegations and denying the other allegations of the complaint
6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the diligence
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial 3 dated April 30, 1975, of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees,
on the ground that the criminal case 4 against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in question which
pending in said court, and that Section 3, Rule Ill of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property would not have
suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge occurred.
granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil Case No. 5114. 5
xxxxxxxxx
On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision 6 in Criminal Case No. 836,
acquitting the accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or
doubt. omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage
caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss 7 Civil Case No. 5114 on the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. In the
ground that the petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the bus having case of Elcano vs. Hill, 16 this Court held that:
been acquitted in the criminal action. The petitioners opposed the motions 8 alleging that their
cause of action is not based on crime but on quasi-delict. ... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminality prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
Acting upon the said motion as well as the opposition thereto, the respondent Judge issued offended party is not snowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to receiver
an order 9 dated April 13, 1978, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 5114. damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
The petitioners moved to reconsider; 10 however, the same was denied by respondent Judge other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e), Section 3, Rule
in his order 11 dated May 30, 1979. III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
Hence, the petitioners interposed the present petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
order of respondent Judge dated April 13, 1977, claiming that the respondent Judge acted by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia that culpa
without or in excess of his jurisdiction and for with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
disputed order, and that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law except thru the present petition.
The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver,
private respondent Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar
After the private respondents had filed their comment, 12 this Court Resolved to consider the to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict. 17
said comment as answer to the petition, and the case was deemed submitted for decision on
September 3, 1979.
In the light of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.
The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the respondent Judge
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Civil Case No. 5114. WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside, and the case is
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private
respondents.
The petition is meritorious. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

SO ORDERED.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Separate Opinions
 36
BARREDO, J., concurring: BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur and also in the opinion of Justice Aquino. I just like to add that in my view the I concur and also in the opinion of Justice Aquino. I just like to add that in my view the
proceeding and trial in Civil Case No. 5114 should not have been suspended at all just proceeding and trial in Civil Case No. 5114 should not have been suspended at all just
because of the filing of the criminal case. Aquino, J., see concurrence below. because of the filing of the criminal case. A Aquino, J., see concurrence below.

I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code,
under which, according to the Code Commission, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shag not be a bar to a subsequent civil
action, not for civil liability from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana.
I concur because petitioners' action for damages is based on article 2177 of the Civil Code,
under which, according to the Code Commission, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shag not be a bar to a subsequent civil
action, not for civil liability from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana.

Article 33 Of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages Article 33 Of the Civil Code also justifies the petitioners' independent civil action for damages
since the term "physical in. juries" therein embraces death Dyogi vs. Yateo, 100 Phil 1095). since the term "physical in. juries" therein embraces death Dyogi vs. Yateo, 100 Phil 1095).

Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was base on reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was base on reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as
plaintiffs in the civil case, can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29 plaintiffs in the civil case, can amend their complaint and base their action also on article 29
of the Civil Code which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on of the Civil Code which allows an independent civil action for damages in case of acquittal on
the ground of reasonable doubt. the ground of reasonable doubt.

The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation The requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that there should be a reservation
in the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law. in the criminal cases of the right to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law
(Garcia vs. Florida L-35095, August 31, 1973, 52 SCRA 420, 429).
Separate Opinions