Political Revisions: Stanley Cavell and Political Philosophy

Author(s): Andrew Norris

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 30, No. 6 (Dec., 2002), pp. 828-851
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 POLITICAL REVISIONS
StanleyCavell and PoliticalPhilosophy

ANDREWNORRIS
TheUniversity
ofPennsylvania

Butplay,youmust,
A tunebeyondus,yetourselves,
A tuneupontheblueguitar
Of thingsexactlyas theyare.t
-Wallace Stevens1

Whenpoliticaltheorists readtheworkofStanleyCavell,theyareinitially
likelytobe drawntohisdiscussionofcontract theory.2In a substantial
body
of workdevotedto topicssuchas skepticism, Romanticism, tragedy, film,
and theproblemof otherminds,Cavell's discussionof thesocial contract
emergesas one ofhisfewextended considerations ofan explicitly political
topic.Anditservesto unifyCavell'sbriefer discussionsofdisparateother
politicalthemes, suchas chattelslaveryandcivildisobedience. Notsurpris-
inglythen,itis also theonlysubjectthathasdrawnhimintocriticalengage-
mentwitha politicaltheorist,inthiscase JohnRawls.IfthismakesCavell's
discussionofthecontract an obviousplace to beginstudying his work,his
unusuallineofapproachprovidesgreatrewards forthosewhodo so. Cavell's
extensive engagement withordinary languagephilosophy and his workon
theuniversalvoiceofKantianaesthetics allowhimtoproducea richaccount
oftheRousseauiansocialcontract thatcastsconsiderable lightonourability
as citizensto speak politicallyforone anotherin thefirst-person plural.

AUTHOR'SNOTE: I amindebted toStanleyCavell,TomDumm,RichardEldridge,YaseminOk,

RogersSmith,TracyStrong,
StephenWhite, Eric Wilson,andan anonymous Politi-
reviewerfor
fortheirhelpon earlierdraftsofthisessay.
cal Theory

t FromThePalmattheEndoftheMindbyWallaceStevens, editedbyHollyStevens,copyright
? 1967,1969,1971byHollyStevens.Usedbypermission
ofAlfredA.Knopf,a divisionofRan-
domHouse,Inc.
POLITICAL THEORY,Vol. 30 No. 6, December2002 828-851
DOI: 10.1177/0090591702238205
? 2002 Sage Publications

828

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 829

Cavellthushas muchto teachus abouthowan individual can represent her

community, thereby makinghercommunity present in thisworld.3
It is important,however, to see thelimitations ofa reception ofCavell's
workthatfocusestoointently onhisdiscussionofthecontract. Theexample
ofRousseauand,toa somewhat lesserextent, thatofRawlsencourageus to
focuson a modelofpoliticsas legislation. In Rousseau,thegeneralwillis a
specifically legislating will;likewise, inRawlswe speakforoneanother first
andforemost intheOriginalPosition, wheretheonlytaskweengageinis that
of choosingtheprinciples ofjusticeforthebasic structure of society.But
Cavellis notjustconcerned withourabilitytospeakforoneanother butalso
ourabilitytospeakwithone another. Hence,conversation takestheplaceof
legislation as theprimary modeofpoliticalspeech.Or,perhapsbetter, ifleg-
islationis tooccur,itwilloccur,forthemostpart,inconversation. Mostciti-
zensarenotfounding fathers. Butthatonlymeansthatthevoiceofthedemo-
craticcitizenwhospeaksin ournameis notfirst andforemost thevoiceof
sucha patriarch. Thisis something towhichRousseauinparticular is simply
notopen.As muchas Cavellcanusehisworkas a modelofhowanindividual
can speakfora community, Rousseau'sowntheory ofthecontract is one in
whichthecitizenry use speechonlyto acclaimor notacclaimthemodeof
government andtheidentity ofthegovernors. He canpicture a healthy polity
inthiswaybecausetheissueforhimis oneofthecorrect answertotheques-
tionsposedtothecitizenry. In thisway,he is a classicinstanceofa modern
philosopher whotakesthedifflculties wehaveacknowledging oneanother in
ourdifferences tobe anabstract problem ofknowledge-anevasivetranspo-
sitionof thepoliticaland existential intotheepistemological thatCavell
names"skepticism."4
Notingthiscomplicates Rousseau'sowncategorical distinction between
thegeneralandtheprivatewillsandhencebetweenthevoiceofthepeople
and thevoice of thealienated,corrupt individualsportrayed in thesecond
Discourse.Appreciating thisinturnalertsus tothelimitations ofanother ini-
tiallytempting wayto readCavell.If liberalpoliticaltheory needsa richer
understanding ofvoiceandagencyifitis tocontinue justifying itselfwiththe
thought ofthecontract, italso needstoclarify howitspublicinstitutions can
be trulypublicand notsimplythesmokescreens and tools of privileged
classesandfactions. Thishasbeena majorconcernofpoliticaltheorists like
ArendtwhohavedrawnuponAristotle's categorical distinction betweenthe
publicandtheprivate. In thiscontext, Cavell'sexplication anddefenseofthe
first-person pluralsoundslikea familiar rebuketo individualistic formsof
liberalism inwhichtheprivate as itwereswallowsupthepublic,leavingonly
a night-watchman stateregulating clashes betweenindividualswho can

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830 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

speakonlyforthemselves andtheirowninterests. Andthisis certainlyhow

Cavell is readin thefirstmajorworkof politicaltheoryto drawuponhis
work,HannaPitkin's1972studyWittgenstein andJustice.5 Butthough sucha
rebukeis tobe foundinCavell,itis neither so straightforward norso categori-
cal as Pitkinsuggests.Ifthepublicis not,as in Arendt, thenameofa realm
butratherthatof a voice we use in conversing withone another, theline
betweenthepublicand theprivateis notone thatcan cleanlyseparatean
agorafroma household.6 IfCavelldemonstrates thatthepersonalis political,
he also showsus howthepoliticalis personal.This sometimes makeshis
workdifflcult tountangle; butgiventheproblems towhichArendt's ownspa-
tiallanguageand insistenceon categoricaldistinctions has givenrise,that
maybe all tothebetter.7
Ratherthanbeingseenas a latter-day Aristotelian,Cavellis betterunder-
stoodas a Socraticfigure:likeSocrates,Cavelltraverses thepublicandthe
private distinction
without simplydenying it.AndlikeSocrates,hedoesso in
anattempt hispoliticalculture
tocriticize fromwithin, showingittobe lack-
ingin itsownterms,termsituses without understanding. Considerin this
regardSocrates'surelyintentionally provocative claimthathe is "oneofthe
veryfewamongtheAthenians, notto saytheonlyone,engagedin thetrue
politicalart."8To saythisinthecitythatprideditselfas beingthemostpoliti-
cal intheworldis todenythatitscitizensknowwhatpoliticsis orwhereitcan
be found.Socrates'claimis precisely thattheAthenians arenotyetina posi-
tiontogivethatendorsement ofhisclaimsaboutthem, although theseclaims
arecorrect andarecorrectly madebya loyalAthenian, a manwhois notable
todivorcehimself fromthecityhe condemns. More:thatthatcityis notyet
trulya city,inhabited as itis bypeoplewhofailtopracticethetruepolitical
art,andthatSocratescleavestoitandtreatsitas a citytowhichhe oweshis
loyalty becauseherecognizes ittobe something ithasnotyetbecome.Socra-
tes as citizenmustprecedetheeventualcityin whichhe willbe at home.
Muchthesamelogicthatis at workin theRepublic'saccountofthenoble
lie(s), thetellingof which,as a lie, is theconditionforthestoryit tellsto
becometrue,insofar as itallowsthecitizenstobecomethepeopletheytruly
are,members ofapolis.9QuiteasidefromCavell'sfondness for(Nietzsche's
reiterations of) Pindar'sinjunction, Becomewhatyouare! one is reminded
here,first, ofhisobservation thatWittgenstein's definition ofa philosophical
problemas oneinwhichichkennemichnichtaus identifies meas notknow-
ingmywayand,in suchignorance, as notknowing myself;and,second,of
Cavell's linkingofthisconception ofphilosophy withKierkegaard's claim
that"mostmenlive in relationto theirown selfas iftheywereconstantly
out... in a foreign land."10

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 831

Whatshouldalreadybe clearis thatforCavell,as forSocrates,theactivity

ofphilosophizingis whereprivatedeedstakeon a publicsignificance. It is
thatCavell'sworkontheuseofthefirst-person
tooeasilyforgotten pluraldid
notbeginin a setofreflectionson politicsbutratheronphilosophy. Cavell
soughttoexplainhowordinary languagephilosophers mightjustifytheirreg-
appealstowhat"wewouldsay."Itis obviousthatsuch
ularandcharacteristic
surveysor anticipations
appeals are notbased on statistical of thesame.
Cavellsees themas expressions ofcommitment:

Theauthority onehas,orassumes,inexpressing ofinitiation,

statements insaying"We,"
onehasinexpressing
is relatedtotheauthority ordeclaring
one'spromises orintentions.
Such declarations cannotbe countered
byevidencebecausetheyarenotsupported by
I
evidence.

Whatconcerns us herearenotthedetailsofthisargument, butsimplythefact

thatCavell'sinsights intothesocialcontract arewonbyassuming a common-
alitybetweenthepoliticaland thephilosophical of preciselythesortthat
comparisons withAristotle (particularlyanArendtian versionthereof) would
discourageus fromseeing.
Theconnection betweenthephilosophical andthepoliticalis ineachcase
a therapeuticone.HereCavelldrawshisdirectinspiration notfromSocrates
butfromWittgenstein, whoseworkliesbehindCavell'sdiscussionsofpub-
licityandprivacy. 12 Contrary toa popularmisconception, Wittgenstein does
notsimplydenythepossibility ofa private
language.Instead,heaskswhywe
wouldbe inclinedto thinkthatsuchlanguagemightbe possible,whywe
wouldevenwanttoconsidersucha thought. AndWittgenstein's approachis
toconsidersuchthingsbypresenting a dialogueinwhichitis farfromobvi-
ouswhenhespeaksinhisownvoiceandwhenhetakesupviewsheconsiders
falseormisguided.His therapy, likePlato'sdialogues,does notalloweasy
summation orcitation. As mayalreadybe clear,thesameis trueofCavell's.
Thisis furthercomplicated bytheformthatphilosophical andpoliticalther-
apytakein Cavell's work.WhileWittgenstein presentsconversations with
imaginary interlocutors,Cavellworksthrough readingsofthecanon.In The
ClaimofReasonhe writes, "I havewishedtounderstand philosophy notas a
setofproblems butas a setoftexts." 13A corollary ofthatis thathisownwork
is a setofreadings thatdefyeasysummation inprogrammatic statements ofa
philosophical"position"thatcan be evaluatedwithstraightforward argu-
ments.Instead,thesereadingsmustthemselves be "read"-somethingthat
willsurelystrikesomeas a requirement thatone kneelin orderto believe.
StanleyRosen,forinstance, hasattempted todismissCavellsimplybyquot-
ing him,as if his resistanceto unqualified assertionwereembarrassment

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832 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

enough. 14 Wewoulddo better, I think,toacceptthatCavellis notinthebusi-

nessofoffering proofsbutrather thatofproviding newperspectives ontexts
anddifficulties thatwe haveseenalready.Andherethemeasureofhissuc-
cess is whathe allowsus to see.'5
If Cavell's intertextuality distinguisheshis workfromWittgenstein, it
does notdisentangle thetwo.It is Wittgenstein whoinitiallyteachesCavell
thatphilosophy is a conversation thatreflectson itsownpreconditions as a
conversation-andthisis at theheartof Cavell's significance forpolitical
theory. In theforeword toTheClaimofReason,Cavellwritesthatinhisdoc-
toraldissertation he soughttodrawout"theimplications ofAustin'sproce-
duresformoralphilosophy-implications, letus say,of thesensethatthe
humanvoiceis beingreturned tomoralassessments 16A pagelater,
ofitself."
Cavell tellsus thathe came onlywithtimeto experienceWittgenstein's
Investigations as "a discovery forphilosophy of theproblemoftheother."
Whilethechronology clearhere,thefiveyearsorso between
is notentirely
hisfirst working withAustinandhisperception ofthisabouttheInvestiga-
tionsleadsone to ask whether Cavell'sownapproachto thevoicein moral
philosophy was initially toa voiceexperienced as speakingalone,as notyet
properly inconversation withan other.Ifthiswereso, itwouldfitwellwith
thecentrality questionsofnarcissism andisolationassumeinhisworkinthe
nextforty years.'7Itis inanyeventclearthat"thefeatofwriting" thatCavell
associateswiththeInvestigations andwhatitcontributed toCavell'sunder-
standing of "theconnection of writing and theproblemof theother"have
everything todo withWittgenstein's depiction, inwriting,of"therecurrence
of skepticalvoices,and answering voices"-thatis, withitsenactment of
conversation. 18

DISFIGURED POLITICS
I havesuggested as Pitkinproposes,
thatCavellis notso Aristotelian yetit
is undeniablethatheencourages thecomparison. Considerinthisregardthis
ofconversation
identification withthepolitical,whichis takenfroma discus-
sion of narcissismand cannibalismin "Coriolanusand Interpretationsof
Politics":

Thisis nota playaboutpolitics,ifthismeansaboutpoliticalauthority or conflict,

say
aboutquestionsoflegitimate Itis abouttheformation
successionordividedloyalties. of
thepolitical,
thefoundingofthecity,aboutwhatmakesa rational animalfitforconversa-
Thisplayseemstothink
tion,forcivility. ofthiscreation
ofthepolitical,
callitthepublic,
as theovercoming ofnarcissism, andcannibalism;
incestuousness, as ifitperceivesan
identityamongtheserelations.19

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 833

Thispassageseemscalculatedto remindone oftheAristotelian claimthat

manis a politicalanimalbecauseheis a speakingandrationalone,andthata
fromall otherforms
polisis different ofassociationinthatitis onlyina polis
thatwe can trulyspeak:

Nature,according toourtheory, makesnothinginvain;andmanaloneoftheanimalsis

endowedwiththefaculty of language.The meremakingof soundsservesto indicate
pleasureandpain,andis thusa faculty thatbelongsto animalsin general.... Butlan-
guageservesto declarewhatis advantageous and whatis thereverse,and ittherefore
servesto indicatewhatis justandunjust.20

To giveandreceiveordersas inthePersianempireis nottrulytorealizethe

telosorendofspeech;thatis achievedonlywhendeliberating andarguing as
a citizenaboutjusticeandinjustice. belongstothepolis;forjustice,
"Justice
whichis thedetermination [krisis]ofwhatisjust,is anorderingofthepoliti-
cal association"(1253a). Thisidentificationofjusticewithitsowndetermi-
nationfitswellwithCavell'ssensethatthespeechthatwe engageinunend-
inglyis devotedto determining who we are and whatthe orderof our
associationis.21Andtheparallelhereis reinforced bythefactthatitdoesnot
occur in isolation.Othercommonaltiesincludephronesis,homonymy,
vagueness, exactitude,
friendship, walking,theprimacy ofthepractical,and
theordinary lifeas opposedtothephilosophical life.
How thenare we to explainthefactthatCavell almostneverrefersto
Aristotle? Perhapsthebestwaytobegintoanswerthiswouldbe tolookata
placewhereonemight initially
be mostsurprised byCavell'sreticence inthis
regard.Cavell has repeatedlyreturned to Emerson'sdescription of "the
dividedor social state"as one in whichtheOne Man is cutintopartsthat
attempt tolivemonstrous livesoffalseindependence: "Thestateofsocietyis
oneinwhichthemembers havesuffered amputation fromthetrunk, andstrut
aboutso manywalkingmonsters,-agood finger, a neck,a stomach,an
elbow,butnevera man."22 CavellproposesthatthispassagefromEmersonis
transcribed inthepassagefromthechapter"OfRedemption" ofNietzsche's
Zarathustra thatreads,"I walkamongthefragments andlimbsofmen.This
is whatis terribleformyeyes,thatI findmeninruinsandscattered as overa
orbutcher-field."23
battlefield Without thatclaim,I takeittobeclear
contesting
thatbothpassagesare also transcribing othertexts,amongthemAristotle's
Politics:

Thecityis priorintheorderofnature tothefamily andtheindividual.

Thereasonforthis
is thatthewholeis necessarily
priortothepart.Ifthewholebodyis destroyed,
therewill
notbe a footora hand,exceptinthatambiguoussenseinwhichoneusesthesameword
to indicatea different
thing,as whenone speaksofa "hand"madeofstone.(P. 1253a)

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834 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

As thehandofAristotle'sdestroyedbodyis nota realhand,so Emersonand

Nietzsche'spartialmenarenotmenatall. Moresignificant,
though,thanthe
metaphor ofthebodypoliticis thedemocratic nuanceAristotleaddsto the
imagewhenhecomestosomewhat defendthesuggestion
reluctantly thatthe
peopleatlargeshouldbe sovereign:

Whentheyall cometogetheritis possiblethattheymaysurpass-collectively andas a

body,althoughnotindividually-thequalityofthefewbest,inmuchthesamewaythat
feaststowhichmanycontributemayexcelthoseprovidedatoneperson'sexpense.For
whentherearemany,each has his ownshareofgoodnessandpracticalwisdom;and,
thepeoplemaythusbecomesomething
whenall meettogether, likea singleperson,who
as hehasmanyfeet,manyhands,mayalso havemanyqualitiesofcharacter andintelli-
gence.(P. 1281a)24

Lestthisseemtobetoomucha celebration ofthepowerofnumbers, Aristotle

goeson to sayexplicitly thatthiswillnotbe trueofeverygroup,oritwould
applytobeastsas well.Thecitizens mustbeperfected tosomeextent (Aristotle
saystheymustnotbe "toodebasedincharacter") beforetheycanbe brought
together intoa wholethatis greaterthanitsparts(pp. 1282a and 1281b).
Readingthisas transcribed inEmersonandNietzsche'swords-andthusin
Cavell's citingof them-we can see thattheirlongingfortheOne Man is
alreadya longingfora democracy withinwhichunityis notboughtat the
expenseofdifference. callsthisformofassociationa polis,allow-
Aristotle
ingittobearthenameofitsgenus;thelongingforit,then,can be seenas a
longingforthepoliticalas such.
Cavellis drawntousesofthisimagery thatpicture "thesocialstate"as dis-
figured,notyeta(n Aristotelian) In thepassagecitedabove
politicalstate.25
fromtheessayonCoriolanus, hespeaksof"theformation ofthepolitical,the
founding ofthecity,aboutwhatmakesa rationalanimalfitforconversation,
forcivility"-inshort, aboutthe"creationofthepolitical,call itthepublic."
Andhe goes on inthatessaytocharacterize thenarcissism andcannibalism
thatresistsuchfoundings andformations as,forCoriolanusatleast,an alarm
"atsimplybeingpart,onemember amongothers ofthesameorganism." This
repulsionis one thatalienateshimfromhis ownlanguage:Cavell under-
standsCoriolanustoequatetheexchangeoflanguagewithcannibalistic con-
sumption, andheproposesthatShakespeare's play"asksus ... totrytoimag-
ine a beneficial,mutualconsumption, arguingin effectthatthisis whatan
audienceis."26Wearetoimagine, then,a wayofspeaking, andinso imagin-
ingto openourselvesup to language-here,thelanguageof thispolitical
play.Similarly, Cavell writesof thepossibilitythat"some of thethings
[Wittgenstein] sayshavelost,orhaveyettofind,thehumancirclein which
theycan usefully be said."27
Aristotle,in sharpcontrast,pictures ourspeech

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 835

as alreadyfullandpresent tous,thepolisas achieved-as theinitialpassageI

citedfrombook1 speaksofthepolitical, deliberative natureofmanas some-
thingthatis alreadyproducedorachieved.Thedeliberation betweencitizens
thatAristotle as takingplacewithin
presents thepolisis on Cavell'saccount
onethattakesplace,as itwere,atthecity'sgates:we areaskinghowwe can
founda cityina waythatonlythosewhoarealreadysomehowcitizenscan.
We areasking,thatis,howwe canbecomewhowe areandwhywe might be
resistanttodoingso. Thereasonswe willrecount will,as Cavellindicatesin
theopeningpagesoftheCoriolanusessay,be as muchpsychological orinti-
mateas theywillbe political.Indeed,itis becausetheywillbe bothatonce
thattheirrecounting can be politicalat all-that is, thatitcan considerthe
construction of thepublicthatis thetrueconcernof thepolitical.It is pre-
ciselythisincorporationoftheintimate thatwilldistinguish Cavell'sevoca-
tionsofAristotle from,say,thoseofGadamerandArendt.28

ACKNOWLEDGMENTVERSUS
RECOGNITION:BECOMING
POLITICALAND BECOMING HUMAN
workrevolvesaroundhis senseoftheexistential
Cavell'sphilosophical
relevanceof modernskepticism. And it is surelyof crucialsignificance-
thoughsurprisinglyoverlooked-that TheClaimofReason'sfirst discussion
ofpoliticalphilosophical
topicsis introducedwiththeclaimthat

thephilosophical
appealto whatwe say,andthesearchforourcriteria
on thebasisof
whichwe saywhatwe say,areclaimstocommunity....
Thewishandsearchforcommu-
nityarethewishand searchforreason.29

Theselinesandtheirreference toourclaimstocommunity providea reading

ofthetitleofthemagnum opusinwhichtheyoccur,as theyindicatetherea-
sonforthedistanceCavellkeepsfromtheAristotelianism hecomesso close
toembracing. Aristotlewritesinsupreme confidenceoftherationality ofhis
world,a confidence withwhichCavellis constitutionally outoftemper.30 But
as theAristotelianimageofthebodypoliticcanbe appropriated forCavell's
verydifferent purposes,so can we readAristotle'sidentificationofthetelos
ofthepolisin a Cavellianlight:"Justice," Aristotle
writes,"belongsto the
polis; forjustice,whichis thedetermination [krisis]of whatis just,is an
ordering ofthepoliticalassociation."FromCavell'sperspective, thiskrisis
can presentitselfas a recurrentcriticalcondition
thatrequiresa decisionas
muchas a determination. As such,itrequiresthatwe cutourselvesofffrom

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836 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

ourpolity,orunderstand ourselvesas alreadyso cutoff,so as tochooseagainto

bindourselves toit.31
HenceinTheSensesofWalden, CavelldescribesWalden
as "a tract
ofpoliticaleducation,education formembership inthepolis[which
shows]thateducation forcitizenshipis educationforisolation."32
A politicsofacknowledgment thatgrowsoutofsucha senseofcrisis,of
ourbeingatoncewithin andwithout ourpoliticalcommunity, willbe sharply
contrasted withthesuperficially similarpoliticsofrecognition. Whileeach
understands thepoliticalas beinga questionofourauthentic identity,33
the
identityinquestion,as wellas howitis questioned, is ineachis quitediffer-
ent.ConsiderCharlesTaylor'sbriefgenesisoftheauthentic selfthatheper-
ceivesbehindthenewpoliticaldemandsforrecognition (in additiontofor-
malrights):

The mostimportant philosophicalwriterwho helpedto bringaboutthischangewas

Jean-Jacques Rousseau.... Rousseaufrequentlypresentstheissueofmoralityas thatof
ourfollowing a voiceofnaturewithinus.... Ourmoralsalvationcomesfrom recovering
authenticmoralcontactwithourselves. Rousseauevengivesa nametotheintimate con-
tactwithoneself,morefundamental thananymoralview,thatis thesenseofjoyandcon-
tentment:"le sentimentde 1'existence."34

This sentiment is introduced in theFifthWalkofRousseau'sReveriesofa

SolitaryWalker, a bookthatrevolvesaroundRousseau'smiserable sensethat
he is thevictimofa societythathas conspiredagainsthimandin so doing
conspired againstitself.All ofthisis crystallized
inhisdefensive celebration
of "thesimplefeelingofexistence," whichcan makeeven"an unfortunate
man [likeRousseau]who has been excludedfromhumansociety""self-
sufficientlikeGod."35 Resemblances toGod arenotusuallywhatonethinks
ofwhenconfronted witha claimtoan authentic individual orpoliticaliden-
tity.Does itmakemoresensetocreditsucha confusion toRousseauthanit
does totakethesereveries ofa solitary walkeras beingawareofthePeripa-
teticPhilosopher's claimthat"themanwhois isolated,whois unabletoshare
inthebenefits ofpoliticalassociation, orhas no needto sharebecausehe is
alreadyself-sufficient,is no partofthecity,and musttherefore be eithera
beastora god" (Politics1253a)?The verysentiment thatTaylorisolatesas
thesenseofselfthat, previously(apolitically)
existing,canbe asserted(ornot
asserted)in thepoliticalrealmis itselfpoliticalfromthestart.36 Rousseau's
pointis preciselytheoppositeof whatTaylortakesit to be: he cannotbe
himself-a humanbeing-because hecannotbe a member ofa community,
and at thesametimeitis in beingawareofthisthathe becomesawareof
(senses)hisexistence.Likewise,he is castoutofsocietybymenwhohave
forfeitedhisaffection, whocouldonlyforfeit hisaffection,"byceasingtobe

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 837

human."37 Thisis politicsthatdoesnotmovefrommetoyoubuthoversover

thebordersbetweenus,betweenin andout.
SomemayobjectatthispointthatifRousseauis alludingtoAristotle here,
he is surelyalso alludingtoAristotle's ofthelifeofthephiloso-
description
pheras a godlikelifethatis "superiorto thehumanlevel."38 Rousseauis
asserting,thatis,notsimplyhislossofthehumanbutalso itstranscendence.
Here,however, itis important in theEthicsgivesus
to recallthatAristotle
two,quitecontradictory definitionsof self-sufficiency:
in thefirstbook,
whichcelebratesthepoliticallife,he writesthat

whatwe countas self-sufficient is notwhatsufficesfora solitarypersonbyhimself,

livingan isolatedlife,butwhatsufficesalso forparents,
children, wifeandingeneral
forfriendsandfellow-citizens, sincea humanbeingis a naturally political[animal].
(Ethics,p. 1097b)

In thetenthbook,however,he givesa different thatcelebratesin

definition
sharpcontrastthephilosopher's
godlikeindependencefromothers:

Admittedlythewiseperson,thejustpersonandothervirtuous peopleall needthegood

thingsnecessaryforlife.Still,whentheseareadequatelysupplied,thejustpersonneeds
otherpeopleas partners
andrecipients ofhisjustactions.. . . Butthewisepersonis able,
andmoreablethewiserheis,tostudyevenbyhimself; andthough hepresumably doesit
better
withcolleagues,evensoheismoreself-sufficientthananyother. (Ethics,p. 1177a)

Whatis decisivehereis thatAristotledoesnotreconcilethesetwoidealswith

oneanother.39Inboth,thehumanlife-theordinary life?-is thepoliticallife
thatallowsforanddemandsthepracticeofjustice.Book 10 anditsredefini-
tionofautarkesonlyaskwhether thathumanlifeis trulygood-for humans.
If thephilosophicalis a standingpossibilityto be something otherthan
human,thatpossibility is alwaysa humanpossibility. ReadingRousseau
withtheAristotleheinvokesallowsus tosee thatthistranscendence canbe a
kindofpoliticalexile,oranexilefrompolitics,andviceversa.Rousseaucel-
ebrateshisdivinephilosophical statuswiththesamegesture thatindicates his
abandonment fromthepoliticalcommunity ofhis fellowmen.This surely
setsouttheconditions withinwhichWittgenstein's struggle toendphiloso-
phytakesa philosophical form.Whatis inquestionis thelimitorhorizonof
thehuman-in TheClaimofReason,Cavellrefers toitas "theframeofthe
world."' Suchlimits,oncerecognizedandcrossed,remaintheretobe seen
andcrossedagain.Itis,I think, inresponsetothisthatCavellwillidentify the
strugglewithskepticism as an argument thatcan neverbe won,and that
shouldneverbe won,insisting thatthatwouldonlyclosedownoneoranother

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838 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

sideofthehuman.Theconversation is a conversation
ofphilosophyagainst
itself,
carriedon atthegatesofan eventualpolisthatwill,itseems,neverbe
fullyentered.This is, of course,quitea different
claimthanthehistorical
claimthatidentifiesthepoliswiththecitywallsthatseparatetheinsidefrom
theoutside-quitetheoppositeclaim,infact.
Cavellwritesthefollowing ofThoreauandhisnativeConcord:

Concordis strangerto him,andhe to it,thantheendsof theearth.Butwhydoes this

watchman oftheprivatesea insistespeciallyon hisreaders'outwardcondition or cir-
cumstances intheworld?Becausetheoutward positionorcircumstanceinthisworldis
preciselythepositionof outwardness, outwardness to theworld,distancefromit,the
positionof thestranger.
The firststepin attending to oureducationis to observethe
strangenessofourlives,ourestrangement fromourselves, thelackofnecessity inwhat
we perceiveto be necessary.The secondstepis to graspthetruenecessityof human
strangenessas such,theopportunity ofoutwardness.41

Ifthecritiqueofideologyentails"makingproblematic ... whathashitherto

seemedtobe natural Cavellis clearlyenoughchampioning
andnecessary,"42
it. Indeed,one mightsee himas proposingan existential politicsof anti-
hegemony, onethatquestionseveryattempttoforeclosediscussionthrough
appealsto commonsenseanditssenseofthepossible.Cavellwritesof

howat oddsI findmyselfwiththosewhounderstand Wittgenstein to beginwith,orto

thepublicnessof language,neverseriouslydoubting
assertthesis-wise, it,and in that
waytofavorcommonsense.I mightsaythatpublicness is hisgoal.Itwouldbe likehav-
ingsanityas one's goal.Thenwhatstatewouldone takeoneselftobe in?43

We mightanswer:thestatethatRousseaudescribesinhisReveries.

CONVERSATION,CONVERSION,
AND REVISION
A philosophicalpoliticscallsfora politicalphilosophy. As theconversa-
tionofthepoliticalmovesfromthecentertotheborderofthepolis,whichas
itwereturnsitselfinsideout,so doesthephilosophy thatcountersphilosophy
assumea newanddifferent guise.In discussingWittgenstein as a "philoso-
pher of culture,"Cavell argues that the common perceptionthat
Wittgenstein'sleavingthingsas theyareamountsto a formof "politicalor
social"conservatism is notso muchinaccurate To empha-
as itis incomplete.
sizethisabouttheInvestigations inthemanner ofErnestGellner'sWords and
Things"neglectstheequallypalpablecall in thebook fortransfiguration,

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 839

whichone maythinkofintermsofrevolution orofconversion."'Thiscall

fortransfigurationtakestheformofcontesting thanblindlyconserv-
(rather
ing)theculture'sunderstanding of itstrueneeds.45Such a call, and sucha
contestation,Cavellhearsandsees enactedinmorefamously andexplicitly
politicaltexts"suchas theRepublicandTheSocial Contract andWalden." It
is striking
thatthefirsttwooftheseareperhapstheclassictextsofphilosophi-
textsinwhichphilosophers
cal legislation, ornovicestophilosophy laydown
thelaws ordesignblueprints fora justpolity,one thatas muchas possible
meetsthedemandsofphilosophy. Thisis all themorestrikingas Cavellgoes
on inthesamepagetoplacetheauthoroftheInvestigations inan apparently
muchdifferent genealogy,thatof

a lineofapparently
contradictory onesthatmayappearas radically
sensibilities, innova-
tive(inactionorfeeling)orradically Lutherwassucha sensibility;
conservative: so were
Rousseauand Thoreau.... Sensibilities in thisline seembettercalled revisorsthan
reformers orrevolutionaries.46

Revisors,presumably, becausetheysee and showthingsagainand differ-

ently,inwriting likeWittgenstein's thatpresentsconversations thatdrawus
in, and are themselves therefore opento ourinterpretation, ourrewriting.
Rousseau'spresenceinbothoftheselistsis I thinkeasilyunderstood, given
hisexplicitanddeepambivalence aboutthepossibilities ofpolitics.47More
significantis thedecisionCavellquietlymakeshereconcerning thesortof
transfiguration calledforintheInvestigations: whileone "maythinkofthis
transfiguration intermsofrevolution orofconversion," insofaras theInvesti-
gationsis theworkofa revisor, itscall fortransfiguration willbe a call for
conversion, and notrevolution, at leastnotin thesensethatthatcouldbe
calledforby,say,a Marxistrevolutionary.48
Inreference tothisclaimthattheparticular intensityoftheInvestigations
amountsto a call forconversion thatgoes beyondethicalprescriptions and
proscriptions, Cavellinvokessection108:"One mightsay:theaxisofrefer-
ence of ourexamination [Die Betrachtung] mustbe rotated, butaboutthe
fixedpointofourneed[umunsereigentliches Bediirfnisals Angelpunkt]."49I
assumethatintakingthisas a call forconversion Cavellis wellawarethatit
mightbe takeninsteadas an echo of thebook's preface,specifically of
Wittgenstein's characterizationoftheInvestigations as a bookofsketches of
landscapesinwhich"thesameoralmostthesamepointswerealwaysbeing
approached afreshfromdifferent directions,andnewsketches made."Taken
inthislight,108mightbe seenas a call fora rotation rather than(orinaddi-
tionto)a conversion, inmuchthesenseofAristotle's celebration ofthepolity

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840 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

as a modeofassociation
thatcapitalizesonourdifferences
fromoneanother,
orofthe"perspectivism" Nietzschearguablyderivesfromit:

Thereis onlya perspective

seeing,onlya perspective
"knowing";andthemoreaffectswe
allowtospeakaboutonething, themoreeyes,differenteyes,we canusetoobserveone
themorecompletewillour"concept"ofthisthing,
thing, our"objectivity"
be.50

Havingmoreeyescould well be understood as involvinga conversion or

exchangeofviews(in conversation). Takenas a figureofconversion within
theindividual, 108is somewhat morecomplicated. Conversion is typicallya
figurefora turning in whichwe aimtowardrather thanawayfromourreal
need(thesun,theGood,God) so thatwe can see (betrachten) thetruth. I
assumeAngelpunkt has a figuralmeaninghereas well;howafterall does it
add anything totheidea of"ourrealneed"to saythatitis thecrucialpoint?
Butinsofar as itdoeshavesucha meaning, itfigures ourrealneedas thepoint
aboutwhichwe turn.I thinkofthisas takingtwopossibleforms, thefirstin
whichourrealneedis,as itwere,attached tothebeamofourlifelikea hinge;
theotherinwhichthebeamofourlifeis moreorlesscentered andbalanced
on ourrealneed.Whatis striking is thatineachcase theAngelpunkt ofour
realneedis behindus whichever waywe turn.51 Ifwe beginbynotseeingit,
thennothing changesbutthecontext ofouraversion.In lookingout,we do
notseeitso muchas seewhattheworldlookslikefromitsperspective; as ifto
say,withthisexperience behindus,we can see theworldforwhatitis-as
something thatrevealsitselfin theacknowledgment of a needthatit itself
does notcontain.Perhapsnot a surprising figurefora philosopher who
spendsas muchtimegrappling withsolipsismas Wittgenstein andmoreor
less whatwe mightexpectfroma lessonon thenecessity andfruitfulness of
alienationsuchas Cavell's.52
Cavell'ssenseoftheneedforsuchconversion is oneinwhichourworldis
as a wholeinadequate, inneednotofdiscrete reforms orinstitutional changes
buta completetransfiguration thatwillgiveoureveryworda meaning thatit
presently lacks,at thesame timeleavingeverything as it is. An uncanny
change,onethatwillrespondtotheextraordinary intheheartoftheordinary,
andallowustospeaknotnewphrasesbutina newway.As Emersonputsitin
a "totalizingremark" thatCavellis particularly fondofciting,"Everyword
theysaychagrinsUS."53 So everywordneedsto be changed,thoughnotfor
anotherlanguageof thesame sort(e.g., German,or Hindi).Cavell's own
responsetothischagrin hasbeentotryandsee "whether I couldspeakphilo-
sophicallyandmeaneverywordI said.",54 In itsemphasison thetotalatthe
expenseofanyparticular faultorreform, thisis reminiscent ofAugustine's
variationonthePlatonicfigure oftheconversion. As hearguesinTheCityof

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 841

God,as God couldnothavemadeanything evil,andas God madeall things,

evilcannotbe a thingorderived
froma thing.
Wecannotthereforepointtothe
thingthatoffendsGod; it mustinsteadbe a matter of ourownmovement
withinthings,ourturning fromthetruth:

Howcana goodthingbe theefficient causeofanevilwill?Howcangoodbe thecauseof

evil?Whenthewillabandonswhatis aboveitselfandturnstowhatis lower,itbecomes
evil.Thisis true,notbecausewhatitturns
towardis evil,butbecausetheturning isa
itself
deformity."55

In Cavelltoothereis a focuson ourposturetowardthingsrather thanthe

thingsthemselvesand a repeateduse of thelanguageof redemption and
deliverance, thoughalwaysin an avowedlysecularsense.Moreover, while
onefindsinCavella focusonthetotality attheexpenseoftheparticular, this
is not,as itis inAugustine, intheserviceofthehumbling oftheparticular-
quitetheopposite.Forinstance, inhisdiscussionofA Doll's House in"The
Conversation ofJustice,"Cavellfocusesentirely onNora'sinability topartic-
ipateinthisconversation andtoargueforher"position" as beinga function of
hernotyethavinga voiceofherown."Nora,"he says,"hasno reasonsthat
areacceptable."56 Thisentailsdisregarding thereasonsthatshedoesoffer-
mostpertinently, hercomplaint thatthelaw is unjustbecauseinequitable, a
complaint thatis ironically motivated byTorvald'sattempt toremind herthat
shehasmoralsense57-aswellas thewebofconnections andparallelsIbsen
establishesbetweenNora and theplay'sothercharacters. But whilea full
readingoftheplaywouldneedtotakeaccountofall ofthis,Cavell'sempha-
sis is notmisplaced,nordoes itrendertheplayapolitical.As Cavell'scom-
parisonofNorawithMarx'svisionofthe[German] proletariatas a universal
classreminds us,thisis a playofemancipation: Itbeginswiththesoundofa
dooropening,anditsfirst wordis hide;58 itconcludesbybringing everything
outintothelight,bringing Norabackoutofthedollhouse,toa newoutside,
one thatwillbe madepossiblebywhattranspires on hercircuitthrough the
house.Nora saysthatshe andTorvaldmustbe liberatedfromone another
beforetheycanbegintoconstruct a worldinwhichtheycanfindthemselves.
Butthatliberation is notthatworld,thatfreelife.To imagineotherwise is to
imaginea seriesofplaysthatendwithslamming doors,as thisonedoes,and
imaginethattheyarea happycycleofplays.
Revoltlikethishas a secondary qualityas regardsitssourceas wellas its
effects. The firstandmostbasicmovement is theone thatdrivesNorafrom
Torvald'shouse,notthatofcrossing thethreshold. Ifwe think ofthisas spiri-
tualandnotpolitical,itmaybe helpful torecallthattheimageoftheindivid-
ual soul's conversion is politicalin itsorigin:whenSocratesdescribesthe

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842 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

aristocraticormonarchical alternative
to politicsas itis known(timocracy,
oligarchy,democracy, andtyranny),hemustprovideanaccount(hesays,"an
image")of "ournaturein itseducationand wantof education"(Republic,
514a) so as to explainthepossibility of forming (theyhave alreadybeen
"bred")thecharacters ofthemenandwomenwhoshallinturngivethecity
itscharacter andform.Significantly,thiseducationwilldiffer as muchfrom
theconversation pursuedbySocratesandPlato'sbrothers as thephilosophers
it produceswill differ fromtheskepticalSocrates.59 As Plato repeatedly
emphasizes, thepotential
philosopher mustbe "compelled"toleavethecave
andforcedtofacethelightthathascasttheshadowsthatformerly beguiled
him.Conversation is quiteinsufficient:
"Iftheywereable to discussthings
withoneanother, don'tyouthink theywouldholdthattheyarenamingthese
thingsgoingbybeforethemthattheysee?" (p. 515b).So theimageSocrates
presentsis notyettheeducationitdepicts-notyet,wemightsay,a revision.
It is,nonetheless,
a conversion:

Educationis notwhattheprofessions of certainmenassertitto be. Theypresumably

assertthattheyputintothesoulknowledge thatisn'tin it,as thoughtheywereputting
sightintoblindeyes.... Butthepresentargument,on theotherhand,indicatesthatthe
poweris inthesoulofeach,andthattheinstrument withwhicheachlearns-justas an
eyeis notable toturntowardthelightfromthedarkwithout thewholebody-mustbe
turned around.(Republic,p. 518c)

In hisownaccountoftheRepublic-one openlyselectively concerned with

"thefeaturesitcontributestotheconceptofperfectionism"-Cavell glosses
overthedistinctionherebetweentheSocraticconversation andtheeducation
in compulsionthefuture philosopher-kings will sufferand undertake. He
beginshisaccountbysingling outtheconversational aspectoftheRepublic
andinfers fromthattheconversion, as iftheconversion werenotthetopicbut
theeffectof theconversation.60 If sucha readingis possible(reasonable,
responsible),onemight concludethattheRepublicis givingustwomodelsof
conversion, whichpresumably aremeanttocomment on one another. Is it?
ThefactthatSocratesproposesthisas animageencourages ustoapplythe
image'sowntermsto it.It is seen,andhencecan be seenagainorrevised,
fromanother perspective.Inwhatperspective oughtwetoseeit?Fromwhere
oughtwetolookatit-fromwithin thecityinwords,within thestorySocra-
tesis depictednarrating,
orfromsomewhere else (nowhere else) altogether?
Theimageis oneofthephilosopher's oftheexperience
training, ofphiloso-
eventthatprepares
phyas a nonpolitical oneforpoliticalrule.Thisdisparity
is underscoredbythefactthatthephilosopher whowillbe theproduct ofthe
conversion willnotbe athomeinthecity,atleastnotas othersare.Otherswill

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 843

findtheirpersonalfulfillment in thecity;theywillbe madewholebyit:ifI

cannotrulemylowerdesireswithmyspiritas guidedbymyreason,I will
findsuchguidanceinthecityandinso doingwillbe abletosee thecityas an
organicwholeofwhichI am a part.Itsreasonwillbe myreason.6" Butthe
philosopher Socratesdepictsis notin thissituation. He has already(in the
conversion) attained theproperbalanceothersfindonlyinthecity.62 Hence,
Socratesmustaddresstheproblemofhowonewillpersuadeand"compel"
such charactersto join the city,to be its reasonratherthantheirown
(p. 520a). Whereotherswillfindfulfillment andharmony, thephilosopher
willfindanalienation fromhistrueselfandan assumption ofa falseself.For
howcan itbe myselfifitis notnecessarily mine?63
Raisingthequestionofwhatmyselfis bringsusbacktowherewe started,
reflectingon theplaceofintimacy inthepolitical.Raisingthatoftheneces-
sarygivesus a hintofhowCavellmight go onfromhere.In"ThePhilosopher
inAmerican Life,"CavellproposesthatWaldenis linkedwith"worksofour
culturespecifically devotedtoanattackonfalsenecessities"-amongwhich
Cavellcounts"Plato'svisionofus as staring at a wallin a cave."'4Butthe
alternativeofturning towardthesunis itselfa falsenecessity. Itonlyappears
thatifwe aren'tina cave we mustbe outsideofone.Butifthereis no cave,
thereis not(necessarily)anyoutsideeither:"We have abolishedthereal
world:whatworldis left?theapparent worldperhaps?... Butno! withthe
real worldwe have also abolishedthe apparentworld!"65Seeing this
involvesa wayofreading, a wayof(approaching) writing,thatCavellcharac-
terizesas the workof revision.That thisworkis philosophicalis clear
enough;we needthinkonlyof Cavell's characterization of Wittgenstein's
workas "breaking upone'ssenseofnecessity, todiscovertruer necessities."66
Butitis politicalas well.Wecan see thisinCavell'sdescription ofThoreau's
politicaleducation as beginning intherecognition of"thelackofnecessity in
whatwe taketobe necessary." Andwe can see itinCavell'suse ofprecisely
thesamelanguagewhenhe opposes"politicaltyranny" to "thefreedom to
convene":

What[tyranny's suppression ofthisfreedom]preventsis notmerely,as Mill urges,the

freeexchangeoftruths withpartialtruth
andwithfalsehoods,fromthefireofwhichtruth
rises.Thatmight happeninanisolatedstudy. Itpreventsthearisingoftheissueforwhich
convening is necessary,viz.,tosee whatwedo,tolearnourpositioninwhatwetaketobe
necessaries,to see in whatservicetheyarenecessary.67

If thereis no cave,we do notleaveitas Noraleavesthedollhouse.The

workofseeingthatwe arenotina cave,though we maybe staring ata wall,is
thusnotonlya philosophical preparationforpolitics:it is politics.If this

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844 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

doesn'tlooklikewhatpoliticshasbeenthusfarforus,that,
presumably,
is the
point.

NOTES

1.Fromthepoem,"TheManwiththeBlueGuitar," inWallaceStevens,ThePalmattheEnd
oftheMind:SelectedPoemsand a Play,ed. HollyStevens(New York:Vintage,1972), 133.
is thetacktakenbyDavidOwenin"Cultural
2. This,forinstance, Diversity andtheConver-
sationofJustice," PoliticalTheory27, no. 5 (October1999):579-96.
3. On contract theory, see Cavell,The ClaimofReason (New York:OxfordUniversity
Press,1979),22ff.;Cavell,"TheConversation ofJustice:RawlsandtheDramaofConsent," in
Conditions Handsomeand Unhandsome (Chicago:TheUniversity ofChicagoPress,1990);and
chapter 3 ofStephenMulhall,StanleyCavell:Philosophy's Recounting oftheOrdinary (Oxford:
Clarendon,1994). On theuniversalvoice,comparetheprefaceto Conditions Handsomeand
Unhandsome, p. xxvi-xxvii;and"AestheticProblems ofModernPhilosophy," inMustWeMean
WhatWeSay? (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,1969).
4. Fortherole,suchthatitis,oflanguageinRousseau'scontract theory, see TheSocial Con-
tract,trans.M. Cranston(NewYork:Penguin,1968),86, 137,148-49,151;andthediscussionof
fablesintheFourth WalkoftheReveriesofa SolitaryWalker, trans.P. France(NewYork:Pen-
guin,1979). On knowingand acknowledgment, see theessayof thatnamein MustWeMean
WhatWeSay? Fora provisional of Cavell's centralconceptof skepticism,
definition see The
ClaimofReason,46; and"ThePhilosopher in AmericanLife,"In QuestoftheOrdinary (Chi-
cago: University ofChicagoPress,1988).
5. For Pitkin's"unusual"relianceon Cavell's publishedand unpublishedwork,see
Wittgenstein andJustice(Berkeley:University ofCalifornia Press,1972),viiiandxiii,andthe
footnotes citinghimthroughout thetext.PerhapsinpartbecauseCavell'sdiscussionofcontract
theory hadnotyetbeenpublished, Pitkindoes notdiscussit.
6. Cavellnotesthat
moraldiscourseis notsinglyanorderofpublicdebateonissuesknownandtakentobe of
moment, butis a formof intimateexamination,youmightsayprivate, byone soul of
Itteachesus toasknotalone,Whatis tobe done?,butas well,WhatamI todo?
another.
Andnotjust,Is whattheotherdoesacceptable?, butas well,HowamI preparedtocon-
thatother?(The ClaimofReason,xii)
front
Whatis tooeasilyoverlooked singlyandthefactthatCavellis describ-
hereis thequalifying
ingnottwofieldsofactivity buttwoaspectsofthesameactivity: talking.Contrast
Pitkin, who
writesinstrikinglysimilarlanguage,"Thecentral questionofmoraldiscoursemight be charac-
terizedas 'whatwas done?'[while]thecentralquestioninpoliticswouldhavetobe . . . 'what
shallwe do?' " (pp. 206-7),andwhoarguesthat"Thereis no suchthingas private politics,inti-
matepolitics"(p. 204).
7. See inthisregardArendt'sadmissionthatsheherself askswhatis leftofpoliticalques-
tionswhentheir"social" contentis removedin HannahArendt:The Recoverof thePublic
World, ed.M. Hill(NewYork:St.Martin's,1979),315ff.Itis striking thatArendtavoidsmaking
thepoliticalemptyand irrelevant insofaras she de-emphasizes thecategoricaldistinctions
betweenthepublicandtheprivateandemphasizesthenotionofpoliticsas actionin speechas
opposedto socialadministration.

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 845

8. Plato,Gorgias,trans.W. D. Woodhead,in The CollectedDialogues ofPlato, ed. E.

HamiltonandH. Cairns(Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,1961),521d.
9. Plato,Republic,trans.A. Bloom(New York:Basic Books,1991),414d. (Further refer-
encestotheRepublicwillbe giveninthetext.)Thisexamplemayseemoverlyprejudicial, focus-
ingas itdoesona notorious attempt toeliminate distinctionsbetweenthepublicandtheprivate.
Butthiswillhingeonhowseriously onetakesSocrates'claimthatthisistheelimination ofa mis-
understanding. Comparethediscussionofmyths(withan examplefromtheRepublic)in The
ClaimofReason,365.
10. Wittgenstein, PhilosophicalInvestigations, 3d ed., trans.G. E. M. Anscombe(New
York:Macmillan,1968),I, 123;andCavell,"DecliningDecline:Wittgenstein as a Philosopher
ofCulture," ThisNew YetUnapproachable America(Albuquerque, NM: LivingBatch,1989),
36,39-40.Compare"Kierkegaard's OnAuthority andRevelation," 172(inMustWeMean What
WeSay?),in whichCavellpairsthesamepassagefromKierkegaard withthepassagefromthe
Investigations(p. 223) thatdescribesourfinding othersenigmatic as oneinwhicha knowledge
ofthelanguageofa peoplewithout familiaritywiththeirtraditions leavesus unabletofindour-
selvesin them(Wirkonnenunsnichtinsiefinden).
11. TheClaimofReason,179.AndcompareCavell'scharacterization ofthewishofself-
effacement thatunderliesskepticism at TheClaimofReason,351-52,a characterization that
explicitlycomparesthisproblemtothatofthelegitimacy ofthestate.
12.Thoughitshouldbe notedthatCavell'steacherAustinclaimsSocratesas a predecessor
whenheaddressesthestatusofwhatheprefers tocall "linguisticphenomenology" in"APleafor
Excuses,"PhilosophicalPapers,ed. UrmsonandWarnock(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,
1961), 130-31.On Socratesas therapist, see Jonathan Lear,OpenMinded:Working Out the
LogicoftheSoul (London:HarvardUniversity Press,1998),particularly thefourth andseventh
essays.
13. Cavell,TheClaimofReason,3.
14. Rosen,Nihilism:A PhilosophicalEssay (London:Yale University Press,1969), 12,
note12.
15. Forunusually concreteexamplesofthis,see thediscussionofwhatitmeans"tospeak
sensiblyof seeingor treating or takingpersonsas persons"in Cavell,The ClaimofReason,
372ff.
16.Cavell,TheClaimofReason,xi-xii;compareA PitchofPhilosophy (London:Harvard
University Press,1994),58,inwhichthesameis saidofthebookthat(partsof)thatdissertation
eventually became.
17.Cavellwilldrawconnections betweennarcissism andWittgenstein's "privatelanguage
argument"; see,forexample,Cavell,PursuitsofHappiness:TheHollywoodComedyofRemar-
riage(London:HarvardUniversity Press,1981),74; andnotethepoliticalechoesinthetitleof
thelatter.
18. Cavell,TheClaimofReason,xii.
19. Cavell,"Coriolanusand Interpretations of Politics,"ThemesOutofSchool(Chicago:
University ofChicagoPress,1984),84.
Politics,trans.E. BarkerandR. F. Stalley(NewYork:OxfordUniversity
20. Aristotle, Press,
1998),1253a.Further references tothePoliticswillbe givenin thetext.
21. On theinterminable nature of"theconversation ofjustice,"see Cavell,Conditions Hand-
someand Unhandsome, xxv.
22. Emerson,"TheAmericanScholar,"SelectedEssays(New York:Penguin,1982),84.
23. Cavell,A PitchofPhilosophy, 46, 76.

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846 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

24. The exampleofthefeasthererecallstheCoriolanusessay'sinterest incannibalism, in

theconnection
particular Cavellmakestherebetweenthecommonfeastandthecommonlan-
guage(p. 83f.).
25. Itmaybe forthisreasonthatwhenhewritesofEmerson's"reversing ... Plato'sallegory
ofthesoulbythesocial,"hefocusesonPlatoandnotAristotle: inwhatis perhapsalreadynostal-
celebrates
gia,Aristotle a polislifethat,thoughquicklyvanishing, is foundincitiesotherthan
thosemadeofwords(Luftgebdude). Thatsaid,Aristotle's
connection ofthebodywithdemoc-
racyis an importantone forCavell'spurposes.See Conditions Handsomeand Unhandsome,
xxx;andcompareoneofCavell'sfewreferences toAristotlein"Aversive Thinking,"page56 in
thesamevolume,inwhichAristotle's emphasisonthecultural
perfectionist preconditions of"a
democratic existence"is comparedwiththatofPlatoandNietzsche.
26. Cavell,"CoriolanusandInterpretations ofPolitics,"88, 83-84,and86. Ifthisseemsto
castthemajority of us intotoo passivea role,we shouldrecallThe ClaimofReason:"Who
makessurethatthesingingis onpitch,thesingerorthesungto?"(p. 58); andEmerson, whose
questionin"Self-Reliance" makessenseofCavell's:"Ifyoucanhearwhatthesepatriarchs say,
surelyyoucan replytothemin thesamepitchofvoice?"(SelectedEssays,199).To gaugethe
widersignificance of thisback and forth,considerthe titleof Cavell's recentA Pitchof
Philosophy.
27. Cavell,TheClaimofReason,5.
28. Gadamer'saccountis themorerelevant here,focusing as itdoeson thethreat ofskepti-
cism:Gadamerarguesthat,in theAristotelian, humanist tradition,

whatgivesthehumanwillitsdirection universality
is nottheabstract ofreasonbutthe
concrete bythecommunity
represented
universality ofa group,a people,a nation,
orthe
wholehumanrace.Hencedeveloping thiscommunal senseis ofdecisiveimportancefor
living.(Truthand Method,2d ed., trans.J.Weinsheimerand D. Marshall[NewYork:
Continuum, 1999],21)

Butsucha sensecannotmeettheepistemologicaldemandsofmodernity. Kant"solves"this

problembygrounding aesthetics as thefreeplayofthecognitive
ontasteas understood faculties.
Thisgrounding

doesjusticetobothaspectsofthephenomenon: anditsa
itsempiricalnon-universality
prioriclaimtouniversality. ofcritiquein
Butthepricethathe paysforthislegitimation
theareaoftasteis thathedeniesthattastehasanysignificance He reduces
as knowledge.
sensuscommunis toa subjective
principle.(P. 43)

Hence,theKantiansensuscommunis aestheticusisonlya subjectivizedformofthecommon

sensethatforrepublicans suchas Vico andShaftesbury madepossiblefreecivicculture.Kant
himselfhintsat thepoliticaloriginsofthesensuscommunis whenhe distinguishes judgment
(Urteilskraft)fromtheunderstanding andreasonbywriting thatthough judgment has a "terri-
unliketheothertwo"ithasnota fieldofobjectsappropriate
tory," toitas itsrealm"overwhichit
mighthavetheauthority to prescribe laws; Kant,CritiqueofJudgment, trans.J.C. Meredith
(Oxford:Clarendon, 1989),15.Thisfieldwasprecisely thefreerepublic,the"publicthing"that
is nowfoundonlyin thereflective judgments of aesthetics.
Whether thisdisplacement is the
resultofthethreat ofskepticism is lessclear.Kantsaysthat"Weassumea commonsenseas the
necessary conditionoftheuniversal communicability ofourknowledge, whichis presupposed
ineverylogicandeveryprinciple ofknowledge thatis notoneofskepticism" (CritiqueofJudg-
ment, 84). Butdoesthismeanthatinassuming thesensuscommunis Kantis assumingthatskep-
ticismis false,orthatinassuming thatlogicandprinciples ofknowledge areanswerable toskep-

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 847

ticismheis makingthesensuscommunis otherandlessthanitwouldotherwise be,otherthanit

was?
29. Cavell,TheClaimofReason,20. Mulhall,forinstance,sees thisdiscussionas begin-
ningtwopageslaterthanitdoes,andhencepassesoverthisconnection. See Mulhall,Stanley
Cavell,55.
30. Although thedistinguished AristotlescholarJonathan Lear suggeststhatsomeofthis
confidence is a performativefrontforAristotle'sownsensethatthislifeis unfounded. See Lear,
Happiness,Death, and theRemainderof Life(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press,
2000),6ff.
31. Considerin thisregardtheetymological rootsof decision-or of Entscheidung. As a
counter totheperhapsoverlyexistentialist noteI strike here,see Cavell'sdiscussionofthecon-
ceptof decisionthroughout The ClaimofReason and in "The Availability of Wittgenstein's
Later Philosophy," particularlythe note on 54. For a good discussionof krisis,see Ron
Polansky's"The Unityof Plato's Crito"in Scholia: Natal Studiesin Classical Antiquity 6
(1997).
32. Cavell,TheSensesofWalden,85. JayBernstein is thusoffthemarkwhen,inhisgener-
allyexcellentTheFate ofArt(University Park:Pennsylvania StateUniversity,1992),he sug-
geststhatCavell'saccountofthesensuscommunis is "animageofgivencommunity, ofa passive
sensuscommunis, of like-mindedness without history, of like-mindedness thatis givenrather
thancreated"(p. 102).
33. Cavell,TheClaimofReason,23; andcompare25.
34. CharlesTaylor,TheEthicsofAuthenticity (CanadianBroadcastCorporation, 1991),27;
compareTaylor's"ThePoliticsofRecognition," inD. Goldberg, ed.,Multiculturalism:A Criti-
cal Reader(Cambridge: Blackwell,1994),77-78,whichwithout acknowledgment repeatsthis
as wellas mostoftheearlierbook'smainpointsalmostwordforword.
35. Rousseau,Reveriesofa SolitaryWalker, 89. Significantly, inbothhisbookandhisarticle
Taylorbeginshiscitation fromthefifth walkimmediately after thispassageandendsitimmedi-
atelyonelinebeforeRousseauexplainsthatthissentiment is a "compensation" foronewhohas
been"excludedfromsociety."
36. ItfollowsthatStephenMulhallis ifnothing elseoverlyhastywhenhewrites thatCavell's
work"confirms[s] theaccuracyandperceptiveness ofTaylor'sanalysisofmodernity" (Stanley
Cavell,p. 305).
37. Rousseau,Reveriesofa SolitaryWalker, 27. In theDiscourseon theOriginsofInequal-
ity,Rousseaunotesthatpeopletodayhavea different "sentiment ofexistence"thantheyonce
did.The soulofthe"savage... is givenovertothesole sentiment ofitspresentexistence[seul
sentiment de sonexistence actuelle]withoutanyideaofthefuture" (TheFirstand SecondDis-
courses,trans.R. andJ.Masters[NewYork:St.Martin's,1964],117).Itis also oblivioustooth-
ersofitstype:
The savageliveswithinhimself; thesociableman,alwaysoutsidehimself,
knowsonly
howtoliveintheopinionofothers;anditis,so tospeak,fromtheirjudgment alonethat
he drawsthe sentiment of his own existence[le sentiment
de sa propreexistence].
(P. 179)
Clearly,theformerfitsTaylor'smodelbetter.
Butreadingthisas a descriptionofRousseauin
thefifth
reveriewouldrequireseeinghimas a savageandwouldviolateRousseau'sinsistence
thatsuchanachronism oratavismis foolishness
(p. 201). Instead,he shouldbe seenas he sees
himself:
as a character
atthemargins ofsociety,
onewhowritestoothersofwhathefeelsintheir
absence.

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848 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

38. Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics,trans.T. Irwin(Cambridge: Hackett,1985),1177b.Fur-

therreferences totheEthicswillbe giveninthetext.
39. He makesa rather feebleattempt tointhePolitics,whenheconcludesa discussionofthe
relativemerits ofthepoliticalandthephilosophical liveswitha somewhat bizarreaccountofa
contemplative city(pp. 1324a-1325b).Becausemyidentification ofAristotle as symptomatic or
exemplary ofthesplitbetweentheseidealsorideasofthehumandoesnottakehimtobe identi-
fyinghimselfas such,theanalysisI proposeherediffers considerably fromthatadvancedby
MarthaNussbauminTheFragility ofGoodness(NewYork:Cambridge University Press,1986).
NussbaumarguesthatAristotle's "philosophy ofappearances"shouldbe seenas a therapeutic
attempt toreturn us totheordinary comparable tothatofWittgenstein (pp.260 and261),though
withthecaveatthatAristotle's workis less destructive in intent,aimedas it is at "removing
imposture" (whichsheearlieridentifies as "badphilosophy") so as to makeitpossibleforthe
averagepersontobegintoget,andappreciate, thepositivepaideia thatheorshedesires(p. 262).
Contrasting Aristotle withEmpedocles,Parmendides, and Plato'sSocrates,whoall associated
philosophy withthedivine,Nussbaumdescribes himas "theprofessional humanbeing"(p. 261).
She is ofcourseawareoftheimagery ofdivinity thatcharacterizes book 10 of theEthicsand
arguespersuasively thatthisPlatonism is atoddswiththebulkofAristotle's work(p. 377). But
whatshedoesnotdo is toshowhowAristotle incorporates thisrejectedPlatonism intohisown
work.Indeed,notonlydoesAristotle nottrytoresolvetheconflict betweenthetenth bookand
theviewsthatprecedeit;hedoesnotevenacknowledge theconflict.Whatwe haveis a seriesof
contradictions,rather thanconversational exchanges-andthisinitselfdoesnotconstitute a dia-
lecticalconsideration ofan opposingview.Leastofall doesitconstitute therapy foronewhois
bewitched bythePlatonicposition.Giventheseprofound differences, itis somewhat ironicthat
Nussbaummayhavebeeninfluenced byCavell;see inthisregardheracknowledgments, and
note78, 442.
40. Cavell,TheClaimofReason,79.
41. Cavell,TheSensesofWalden,55.
42. ThomasMcCarthy, "Critiqueof ImpureReason,"PoliticalTheory18, no. 3 (August
1990):440.
43. Cavell,TheClaimofReason,44. On commonsenseandthehegemonic, see Ian Lustick,
Unsettled States,DisputedLands(London:CornellUniversity Press,1993),43, 53-6,and60.
44. Cavell,"DecliningDecline,"43-4.
45. Theconservative andthetransfigurative aresaidbyCavelltobe different waysofunder-
standing Wittgenstein's notionofformsoflife(Lebensformen), inwhichtheconservative read-
ingemphasizes theideathatourlanguageandhenceour(vocabulary of)needis a setofhistorical
conventions, conventions thatmight be thesubjectofa decisionora contract; andthechallenge
tothatreadingemphasizesthenotionthatsuchconventions andcontracts andchoicesarebased
on "biological"andnatural needsthattheycan themselves misinterpret, ormisrepresent: "The
biologicalinterpretation offormoflifeis notmerelyanother availableinterpretation tothatof
theethnographical, butcontestsitssenseofpoliticalorsocialconservatism" (Cavell,ThisNew
YetUnapproachable America,44). ThisraisesissuesthatCavell does notherepursue.In the
introduction to thevolumewithinwhich"DecliningDecline"is found,he notesthathe has
recently begunbutnotyetfinished NancyandLacoue-Labarthe's Literary Absolute(pp. 2, 11,
and20). Whatprimarily interests
himhereinthistextaretheinterwoven (Romantic)notionsof
thefragment as a formofwork,ofAusbildung as thecompletion andperfection ofnature, andof
thateducation centrally requiringa uniting ofpoetry andphilosophy. He movesfromnoting this
toconsidering thesefavorite linesfromEmerson's"TheAmericanScholar":

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 849

Thisrevolution[inhumanaspiration]is to be wroughtbythegradualdomestication of
theidea of Culture.The mainenterprise of theworldforsplendor,forextent,is the
upbuildingofa man.Herearematerialsstrewn alongtheground.(quotedinCavell,This
New YetUnapproachable America,8)

Cavellreadsthislastlineinpotentially politicalterms, as referringto"themenandwomen

thatarescattered (thatis,as yetunsocial),"andinturncharacterizes thislackofsociality as a lack
(perhapsitselfincomplete) ofhumanity: "To go further withthesethoughts is,forme,totakeon
theissuesofwhatI conceiveas moralperfectionism ... attractingthehuman... totheworkof
becominghuman"(pp. 9 and 10). (Giventhat,as we haveseen,Emersondepicts"thesocial
state"as oneinwhichwe aredismembered, we might better speakof"unpolitical" here.)Cavell
indicatesthatoneofhisdifferences withdeconstruction concerns thelatter's
distrust ordenialof
"a certainsociality." I do notknowifthatsocialityis thesameone Cavellhearscalledforin
Emerson,and I wouldnotwantto be theone to giveprecisereference to thetroubledterm
deconstruction. ButI imaginethatmostwouldseeNancyandLacoue-Labarthe as beingcovered
by it,ifonlybecauseof thenatureof theirrelationto theworkof Derrida.Hence,itmaybe
important to notethatTheLiterary Absolute'sdepictionof thethemesthatinterest Cavell is
muchmorecriticaland disturbedthanhis; in particular thatits pictureof the fantasyof
autopoeisisincorporated inthesethemesis partandparcelofwhatitsauthors elsewhere termthe
logicof fascism.Corresponding to thesubject-work of Romanticism ("thebecoming-artist of
theworkorabsoluteauto-production itself:manas theworkofartcreating itself,arthenceforth
identifiedwiththebeing-artist"; see Jean-Luc NancyandPhilippeLacoue-Labarthe, TheLiter-
aryAbsolute,trans.PhilipBarnardandCherylLester[Albany:StateUniversity ofNew York
Press,1988,77]) is thevisionoftheVolkas thereciprocation betweenandproduction ofnature
andcultureand as suchthemosthumanformofhumanity; as thenaturalcultureitis nothing
otherthanthe"autoimagining orautofictioning ofnature." Totalitarianmovements defyall utili-
tarianconsiderations because the naturaltotalityhas to be constantly reasserted, and this
requiresunceasingmovement, thecontinual production andelimination oftheunnatural. Terror
as thefreedefianceofall lawscanneversettleintoa wayoflifeofa nation-state; insteaditmust
endlesslypurify itselfandtheouterworld.Thisis theimpossiblelogicoftheautopoiesisofthe
absolutesubject.No doubtthisis longwaysfromEmerson'scallfora gathering ofourscattered
parts;but,iftheauthors ofTheLiterary Absoluteareright, thepassagehereis notimpassable.I
discussthisargument at lengthelsewhere("Jean-LucNancyand theMythof theCommon,"
Constellations 7, no. 2 [June2000]) andraisetheseclaimshereonlytoindicatethatifthereis a
distrustofsocialityhere,itis notwhollyunsupported. Andconsidering itmayprovenecessary
foranEmersonian moralperfectionist. Ifwe saythatwe areyettobecomehuman, arewe saying
thatwe arenotyethuman?Andifwe are,whatstatus(andrights) do theseas yetinhuman crea-
tureshave?Suchquestionsaremostforcefully raisedin therecentworkofGiorgioAgamben,
whichI discussin "GiorgioAgambenandthePoliticsoftheLivingDead,"Diacritics30, no.4
(winter 2002);CavellbeginstoaddresstheminConditions Handsomeand Unhandsome (pp.xvi-
xvii)andintheclosingpagesof"Emerson'sConstitutional Amending," PhilosophicalPassages
(Oxford:Blackwell,1995).
46. Cavell,ThisNew YetUnapproachable America,44.
47. Forevidenceofthis,simplycontrast theabovediscussions ofTheSocial Contract andof
theReveries.
48. It is truethatthelanguageof revolution will reappearin Conditions Handsomeand
Unhandsome, butalways,I think, inthesenseindicated above.So, forinstance, Cavellwilluse
theverbrevolutionize rather thanrevolt(pp. 6-7).

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850 POLITICAL THEORY /December2002

49. Cavell,ThisNewYetUnapproachable America, 43; andsee "TheArgument oftheOrdi-

nary,"83. CompareEmerson:"Theruinortheblankthatwe see whenwelookatnature, is inour
owneye.Theaxisofvisionis notcoincident withtheaxisofthings, andso theyappearnottrans-
parentbutopaque"(SelectedEssays,79).
50. FriedrichNietzsche,The Genealogyof Morals, trans.R. J. Hollingdaleand W.
Kaufmann (New York:Vintage,1989),III, 12.
51. Itis also worthy ofnotethatthemoreconcretetheimageis made,themoreourweight
restsuponandis supported byourneed.
52. One mightinvokeas wellKierkegaard's enigmatic descriptionofthe"essentialauthor":
he "hashisownperspective, heconstantly comesbehindhimself inhisindividual productions;
he strivesforward indeed,butwithin thetotality,notafterit;heneverraisesmoredoubtthanhe
can explain"("Introduction," On Authority and Revelation:TheBookon Adler,trans.Walter
Lowie [NewYork:Everyman's Library, 1994],117).In hisessayon TheBookonAdler,Cavell
proposesthatspeakingreligiously is "tospeakfroma particular perspective,as itweretomean
anything yousayin a specialway"("Kierkegaard's On Authority and Revelation," 172).
53. Cavell,"TheConversation ofJustice," 109.
54. Cavell,A PitchofPhilosophy, 60.
55. Augustine, TheCityofGod,bookXII,chap.6, inAugustine, PoliticalWritings,trans.M.
Tkacz andD. Kries(Indianapolis:Hackett,1994),87 (emphasisadded).
56. Cavell,"TheConversation ofJustice," 109.
57.Ibsen,ADoll's HouseandOtherPlays, trans.P.Watts(NewYork:Penguin,1963),228.
58. BrianJohnston, TextandSupertext inIbsen'sDrama(London:Pennsylvania StatePress,
1989),145.Thecomparison withMarxis oneCavelldoes"notquitewish"tomake("TheCon-
versation ofJustice," 110).
59. ConsiderinthisregardSocrates'characterization ofthenobledogsthatdefendthefever-
ish cityand fromwhomtherulingclass of philosophers will emergeas beingphilosophical
becausetheyareangrywhenconfronted withthosetheydon'tknowandgentlewiththosewhom
theyknow"evenif(they)neverhada goodexperience withhim"(p. 376a). Is thisa lovingpur-
suitofeitherwisdomorthehappylife?
60. "Obviouscandidatefeatures are itsideas of (1) a modeof conversation, (2) between
(olderandyounger) friends,(3) oneofwhomis intellectually authoritativebecause(4) hislifeis
somehowexemplary orrepresentative ofa lifetheother(s)areattracted to,and(5) intheattrac-
tionofwhichthesoulrecognizesitselfas enchained, and(6) feelsitselfremovedfrom
fixated,
reality,whereupon (7) theselffindsthatitcanturn(convert, (Cavell,Conditions
revolutionize)."
Handsomeand Unhandsome, 6-7; emphasisadded).
61. Thiscan,ofcourse,onlygo so far,as whatwillcountas "my"reasonwillbe experienced
bymeina whollypassiveway.ConsiderinthisregardLewisMumford's remarks, citedinW.K.
C. Guthrie, A HistoryofGreekPhilosophy, vol. IV (New York:CambridgeUniversity Press,
1975),469, on themannerin whichmostresidents of thecityare ruledand in beingruled
infantilized, deprived ofthepossibility ofmakingthedecisionstheconversation ofjusticewill
call forandreston.
62. Socratespretends torespondtotheobjectionsofGlauconthathe is makingthephiloso-
phermiserable bydegrading himandforcing himtoreturn tothecitybyreminding Glauconthat
"it'snottheconcernofthelaw thatanyone class in thecityfareexceptionally well,butthatit
contrives tobringthisaboutinthecityas a whole"(p. 519e).Butthepointis thatthephilosopher
is notreallypartofthewhole.Is he aloneonlya partofwhathe couldbe becausehe lacksan
intelligence thatotherscan supply?Orbecausehe,whois a warrior needsthespiritofoth-
first,
ers?Orarewe meanttobelievethatheneedstheirlowerdesires?On thispoint,contrast George

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 Norris/POLITICAL REVISIONS 851

Kateb's"compromise" betweenEmersonian perfectionism anddemocratic politicsin "Demo-

andtheClaimsofPolitics,"PoliticalTheory12,no.3(August1984): 358.
craticIndividuality
63. In"TheConversation ofJustice," Cavellslipsfrom speakingofNora'sviolation tospeak-
ingof"thephilosopher'sviolation" atthispointwecanbegintosee why.
(pp. 109-10);I think
64. Cavell,"ThePhilosopher inAmericanLife,"9.
65. Nietzsche,Twilightof theIdols, trans.R. J. Hollingdale(Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1968),41. Compare"DecliningDecline" (p. 46) and thediscussionsof Platoin Conditions
Handsomeand Unhandsome (pp. 6-10) andPhilosophicalPassages (p. 94).
66. Cavell,TheClaimofReason,21.
67. Ibid.,120.

AndrewNorrisis an assistant
professor at theUniversity
ofpolitics ofPennsylvania. He
and TomDummare currently editinga collectionof essayson Cavell and political
theory.

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