FORMAT: Arial 11, Spacing 1.

15, Justified
FACTS: Asdfghjkl

ISSUE/S:
1.) Asdfghjkl
2.) Asdfghjkl

DOCTRINE: Asdfghjkl

HELD:
1.) YES/NO. Asdfghjkl
2.) YES/NO. Asdfghjkl

Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006)
DIMACULANGAN
FACTS: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Paraaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real estate tax delinquency was
estimated at P624 million. The City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of
levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail
to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction,
with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to
restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning
for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
The city therefore contends that Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly
withdrew the tax exemption privileges of government-owned and-controlled corporations upon
the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of
statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all
others. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the
Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport
Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.
However, herein petitioners contend that airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the
Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is
that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is
also the tax creditor.

ISSUE/S: 1. Are the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws?

DOCTRINE: These provisions recognize the basic principle that local governments cannot tax
the national government, which historically merely delegated to local governments the power to
tax.

HELD: YES. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and
therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. They are devoted to public use
because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation.
The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove
the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.
The Supreme Court held that airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real
estate tax imposed by local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax
any real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in
relation with Sec. 133(o) of the LGC, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of
local governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. These provisions recognize the basic
principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which historically merely
delegated to local governments the power to tax. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and
there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater force
when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax
exemption is construed liberally in favor of national government instrumentalities.
However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities
are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA
leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos (G.R. No. 120082, 11 September
1996) DESUASIDO

FACTS: Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority was created by virtue of R.A.
6958, mandated to principally undertake the economical, efficient, and effective control,
management, and supervision of the Mactan International Airport and Lahug Airport, and such
other airports as may be established in Cebu.

Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment
of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its charter. However, on October 11, 1994, Mr.
Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer in Charge, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded
payment from realty taxes in the total amount of P2229078.79. Petitioner objected to such
demand for payment as baseless and unjustified claiming in its favor the afore cited Section 14
of R.A. 6958. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing
governmental functions, citing Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Section 133. Common limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.

The exercise of the taxing powers of the provinces, cities, barangays, municipalities shall not
extend to the levi of the following:

xxx Taxes, fees or charges of any kind in the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and LGUs. xxx

Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioners realty tax account, insisting that the
MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been
withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of Labor Code that took effect on January 1, 1992.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a taxable person

DOCTRINE: Statutes granting tax exemptions shall be strictly construed against the taxpayer
and liberally construed in favor of the taxing authority.

HELD: Yes. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. MCIAAs exemption from
payment of taxes is withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of Labor Code.

The petitioner cannot claim that it was never a taxable person under its Charter. It was only
exempted from the payment of realty taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax
is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes,
except real property tax.

City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (G.R. No. 162015, 06
March 2006) DEIPARINE

FACTS: Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) is a legislative franchise

holder under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3259 (1961) to establish and operate radio stations for
domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting. Section 14 (a) of R.A.
No. 3259 states: The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings
and personal property, exclusive of the franchise, xxx. In 1992, R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) took effect. Section 232 of the Code
grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real
properties. Barely few months after the LGC took effect, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7633,
amending Bayantels original franchise. The Section 11 of the amendatory contained the
following tax provision: The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same
taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, xxx. In
1993, the government of Quezon City enacted an ordinance otherwise known as the Quezon
City Revenue Code withdrawing tax exemption privileges.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayantels real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real
property taxes under its franchise.

HELD: YES. A clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature, which
necessarily includes the power to exempt, and the local governments delegated power to tax
under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution must be ruled in favor of the former. The grant of taxing
powers to LGUs under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to
grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of
the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory
provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations.
The legislative intent expressed in the phrase exclusive of this franchise cannot be construed
other than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties, be they real or personal, owned by
the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively used in its radio or
telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are not so used. It is worthy to
note that the properties subject of the present controversy are only those which are admittedly
falling under the first category.
Since R. A. No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC, perfectly aware that the LGC has
already withdrawn Bayantels former exemption from realty taxes, the Congress using, Section
11 thereof with exactly the same defining phrase exclusive of this franchise is the basis for
Bayantels exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language, the Court views this
subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to once
again remove from the LGCs delegated taxing power, all of the franchisees (Bayantels)
properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.

Drilon v. Lim (G.R. No. 112497, 04 August 1994) CABANGBANG

FACTS: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Sec. 187 of the LGC.
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local
tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for
the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question
on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may
be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not
have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual
and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved
party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

Pursuant thereto, the Sec. of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null
and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances
and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari
filed by the City of Manila, the RTC of Manila revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained
the ordinance. It also declared that Sec. 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because of its
vesture in the Sec. of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of specific provision therein
conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments.

ISSUE: Whether Sec. 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional?

DOCTRINE: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted
the measure.
HELD: NO. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted
the measure.

Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or
unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law.
What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with
the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code.

All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without
the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has
no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only
on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the
legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. As the Coury see it, that was an
act not of control but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may,
in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to
do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may
order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely
this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

Batangas City v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. (G.R. No. 187631, 08 July 2015)
BRINAS

FACTS: Batangas City is a local government unit (LGU) with the capacity to sue and be sued
under its Charter and Section 22(a)(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. While
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation operates an oil refinery and depot in Tabagao, Batangas
City, which manufactures and produces petroleum products that are distributed nationwide.

In 2002, respondent was only paying the amount of P98,964.71 for fees and other charges
which include the amount of P1,180.34 as Mayors Permit. However, on February 20, 2001,
petitioner Batangas City, through its City Legal Officer, sent a notice of assessment to
respondent demanding the payment of P92,373,720.50 and P312,656,253.04 as business taxes
for its manufacture and distribution of petroleum products. In addition, respondent was also
required and assessed to pay the amount of P4,299,851.00 as Mayors Permit Fee based on
the gross sales of its Tabagao Refinery. The assessment was allegedly pursuant of Section 134
of the LGC of 1991 and Section 23 of its Batangas City Tax Code of 2002.

In response, respondent filed a protest contending among others that it is not liable for the
payment of the local business tax either as a manufacturer or distributor of petroleum products.
It further argued that the Mayors Permit Fees are exorbitant, confiscatory, arbitrary,
unreasonable and not commensurable with the cost of issuing a license. The protest was
denied by the petitioner. It was declared that under Section 14 of the Batangas City Tax Code of
2002, they are empowered to withhold the issuance of the Mayors Permit for failure of
respondent to pay the business taxes on its manufacture and distribution of petroleum products.

ISSUE: Whether or not a LGU is empowered under the LGC to impose business taxes on
persons or entities engaged in the business of manufacturing and distribution of petroleum
products?

DOCTRINE: Although the power to tax is inherent in the State, the same is not true for LGUs
because although the mandate to impose taxes granted to LGUs is categorical and long
established in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the same is not all encompassing as it is subject
to limitations as explicitly stated in Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. The taxing
power of the LGU must be delegated by Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines
and limitations that Congress may provide.

HELD: NO, one of the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs under Sec. 133 of the
LGC is paragraph (h). It clearly specifies the two kinds of taxes which cannot be imposed by
LGUs: (1) excise taxes on articles enumerated under the NIRC, as amended; and (2) taxes,
fees or charges on petroleum products. Indisputably, the power of LGUs to impose business
taxes derives from Section 143 of the LGC. However, the same is subject to the explicit
statutory impediment provided for under Section 133(h) of the same Code which prohibits LGUs
from imposing "taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products." It can, therefore, be deduced
that although petroleum products are subject to excise tax, the same is specifically excluded
from the broad power granted to LGUs under Section 143(h) of the LGC to impose business
taxes.

City Gov. of Quezon City v. Ericta (G.R. No. L-34915, 24 June 1983) BONIFACIO

FACTS: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 in Quezon City is entitled "ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE
MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. It provides:

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall
 immediately be developed and should be open for operation not
later than six months from the date of approval of the application.

In summary, a resolution was later passed by the same city which approved the regulation of
establishment of private cemeteries pursuant to the ordinance. As provided above, 6% of the
total area of the private memorial park will be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons
who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City.

According to the petitioners, taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable
exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial
ground of paupers. They further cite as basis that Quezon City Council is authorized under its
charter, in the exercise of local police power, to make such further ordinances and resolutions
not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

Private respondent Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or
confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends
that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise
of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance was enacted as a valid exercise of police power

DOCTRINE: Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is the need to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the
peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms

HELD: No. the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining
public cemeteries. The States exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just
compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent
of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. Passing the
ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process,
would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken
will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward
and not the police power of the state.

City of Cebu v. Spouses Apolonio (G.R. No. 142971, 07 May 2002) BELTEJAR

FACTS: The City of Cebu expropriated the parcel of land owned by the Sps. Apolonio and
Blasa Dedamo for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve
as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the
back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lots are the most suitable site for
the purpose. The parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement wherein they
declared that they have partially settled the case. Pursuant to the Agreement, the trial court
appointed 3 Commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be
expropriated. The 3 Commissioners rendered an assessment for the lot in dispute and fixed it at
P 12, 824.10 per sq. m. The assessment was approved as just compensation thereof by the trial
court. As a result, the City of Cebu elevated the case to the SC and raised the issue that just
compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings and not at the time the property was actually
taken.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to attack or question the report of the
Commissioners on which the decision was based.

DOCTRINE: The parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by the
petitioner and the respondents, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and
approved by the trial court. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in
good faith.

HELD: NO. Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.
It is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose. However, the Government must pay the owner
thereof just compensation as consideration therefor. In the case at bar, the parties, by a solemn
document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by the petitioner and the respondents, agreed to
be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The AGREEMENT is
a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied
with in good faith. Article 1159 and 1315 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith,
usage and law.
Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not interpose a
serious objection. It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without
violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally
or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other
rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to
deny the existence of such facts. Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the
valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement now and
assail correctness of the commissioner's assessment.

Republic v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 146587, 02 July 2002) ABUZO

FACTS:Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of 544,980 square

meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized
for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the
Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took over the
premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its operations thereat.
Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable
value of the property. More than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings,
the RTC decided in favor of petitioner.
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property
previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms
part of the expropriated area. Respondents contend that the national government failed to pay
to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The Bulacan RTC,
after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of
execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the
implementation thereof. The order was not complied with.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20
hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its
facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine
carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. This fact notwithstanding, and despite
the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case
until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit
in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated
property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the
court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a
counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the
1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the
alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property.
Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly deniedfor
failure in filing of a motion for reconsideration in due time.

ISSUE:1. WON expropriated property should be returned to respondents.

2. WON respondents should be paid at the current zonal valuation.

DOCTRINE:

HELD:1. NO. In Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid
ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled
The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what
amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and
executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of
an airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the
judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title
certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots -
which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to
demand the fair market value of the same.
In Alfonso vs. Pasay City where the recovery of possession of property taken for public use
prayed for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation
proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of recovering
compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it was taken and
appropriated by the State.
2. NO. The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings
provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise
adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their
privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised
dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as
the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979
judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of non-execution. In
arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact
that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales,
to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation
acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and
independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation
proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance.
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its
decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it
being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the
expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just
compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at
P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date
of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully
paid.

NOTES: 1.The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely,
petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter
and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which,
decidedly, it is.

2. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the
pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya where the unpaid
landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It
might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which
the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application.
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160
cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the
legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must,
by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated
power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior,
domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.

Department of Agrarian Reform v. Saranggani Agricultural Co., Inc. (G.R. No. 165547, 24
January 2007) - ABUZO

FACTS: The Province of Sarangani was created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7228 on March
16, 1992, composed of seven (7) municipalities which were segregated from the Province of
South Cotabato. Under said Act, the Municipality of Alabel was made the capital of the new
province.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 97-08 adopting a 10 year
comprehensive development plan of the municipality and its land use. On January 30, 1998,
pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of 1997, and to accelerate the
development and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution
No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005
Land Use Plan of the municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses. The Zoning
Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and Development Council (MPDC)
showed that respondents properties located at Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those
reclassified from agricultural and pasture land to residential, commercial institutional, light
industrial and open space in the1995-2005 land use plan of Alabel.
The respondent then filed an application for land use conversion of certain parcels of land.
Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc.
(SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary opposing the application for land use
conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members were merely forced to sign the
waiver of rights, considering that the commercial farm deferment period ended on June 15,
1998. Later, the PLUTC agreed to recommend the disapproval of a portion of a property which
was still viable for agriculture. The conversion was deferred subject to the submission of certain
requirements. Later, the DAR Secretary denied SACIs application for land use conversion. On
November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACIs application for land
use conversion. SACI appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the President
dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents motion for
reconsideration was denied, so they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review raising
substantially the same issues. The CA granted the petition and ordered DAR to issue a
conversion order. As to the deferred portion, DAR was directed to expedite the processing and
evaluation of petitioners application.

ISSUE: WON the conversion order of CA is valid

HELD: YES. DAR Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997, or the Omnibus Rules and
Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses allows
conversion if at the time of the application, the lands are reclassified as commercial, industrial,
residential or other non-agricultural in the new or revised town plans promulgated by the local
government unit (LGU) and approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
or by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) after June 15, 1988, in accordance with Section 20 of
R.A. No. 7160, as implemented by MC No. 54, and Executive Order No. 72, Series of 199317 of
the Office of the President.

In connection with the afore-stated administrative order, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, empowers the local government units
to reclassify agricultural lands:
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance
passed by the Sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize
the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible
and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture or
(2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the Sanggunian concerned.
 Provided further, that agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law," (CARL) shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the
conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said
Act.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any
manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
Memorandum Circular No. 54 "Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No.
7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991 Authorizing Cities and
Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-Agricultural Uses" issued by President
Fidel V. Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified the scope and limitations on the power of the cities
and municipalities to reclassify agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all ordinances
authorizing reclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and approval of
the province in the case of component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for highly
urbanized or independent component cities in accordance with Executive Order No. 72, Series
of 1993, thus:
SECTION 4. Use of the comprehensive land use plans and ordinances as primary
reference documents in land use conversions. - Pursuant to RA 6657 and EO 129-A,
actions on applications for land use conversions on individual landholdings shall remain
as the responsibility of DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference documents the
comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinance passed upon and approved
by the LGUs concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy.
Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for non-agricultural
uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in declaring that DAR
should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the ordinances of the Sanggunian
in assessing land use conversion applications. This is not to say, however, that every
property of respondents which is included in the comprehensive land use plan of the
Municipality of Alabel shall be automatically granted non-coverage. As mentioned earlier,
said application is subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed by law. One such
limitation that is present here is that a portion of respondents property of 376.5424
hectares, a portion totaling 154.622 hectares which are planted to bananas and coconuts,
are covered by CARLs ten-year deferment scheme, which has expired on June 15, 1998.
By law, these lands are subject to redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon the lapse of
the ten-year period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL or R.A. No. 6657
on June 15, 1988, which was way before the creation of the Province of Sarangani and
the eventual reclassification of the agricultural lands into non-agricultural in the
Municipality of Alabel where respondents properties are located.
Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification of lands explicitly states that
"nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner
the provisions of R.A. No. 6657." Thus, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.

Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 71169, 25 August 1989) - BELTEJAR

FACTS: Ayala Corporation (original owner of the property subsequently subdivided as Bel-Air
Village) executed a Deed of Donation covering Jupiter and Orbit streets to Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA). Upon the instructions of respondent Mayor Nemesio T. Yabut of Makati,
Metro Manila, studies were made by the other respondents on the feasibility of opening streets
in Bel-Air Village calculated to alleviate traffic congestions along the public streets adjacent to
Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that the subdivision plan of Bel-Air Village was approved
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal on condition, among others, that its major thoroughfares
connecting to public streets and highways shall be opened to public traffic. Accordingly, it was
deemed necessary by the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general public to open to
traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit and Paseo de Roxas streets. On
January 28, 1977, a meeting was held between representatives of the Municipality of Makati
and petitioner.

Respondents claim: BAVA had agreed to the opening of Bel-Air Village streets and that
the opening was demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of police power.

Petitioners counter-argument: It has never agreed on the opening of Jupiter and Orbit
streets. By virtue of its ownership of the streets, it should not be deprived without due process of
law and without just compensation.

ISSUE/S:
1.) W/N the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit streets?
2.) If yes, what is the nature of the state power being invoked by the Mayor?

DOCTRINE:

HELD:
1.) YES. BAVA cannot rightfully complain that the Mayor of Makati, in opening up Jupiter and
Orbit streets, had acted arbitrarily.
Citing Sangalang v. IAC, the Court held that Jupiter street lies as the boundary between
Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporations commercial section. Being considered as merely
a boundary and hence not part of Ayalas real estate development projects it cannot
be said to have been for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air Village residents.
The very Deed of Donation executed by Ayala Corp. covering Jupiter and Orbit Streets,
amongst others, effectively required both passageways open to the general public.
o the property will be used as a street for the use of the members of the DONEE (BAVA),
their families, personnel, guests, domestic help and under certain reasonable conditions and
restrictions, by the general public
As the Court asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets was
warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and
public convenience.
2.) POLICE POWER. The act of the Mayor now challenged is in the concept of police power.
o The demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter streets does not amount to deprivation of
property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation there is no
taking of property involved.
o Police power as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
o Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to
ones will. It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater
number.
o Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to
prevail through the states exercise of its police power.
o The exercise of police power, however, may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the
burden of showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.
o In the case at bar, BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit and Jupiter streets
was unjustified or that the Mayor acted unreasonably.
o The fact that the opening has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument
against the Municipalitys effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. The duty of local executive is
to take care of the needs of the greater number, in many cases at the expense, of the minority.

MMDA v. Bel Air Village Assoc. Inc. (G.R. No. 135962, 27 March 2000) - BONIFACIO

FACTS: The petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila while the respondent is Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) which
is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a
private subdivision in Makati. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside
Bel-Air Village.

MMDA wrote a letter to BAVA requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and
convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was
pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, BAVA was apprised that
the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a
TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On
appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of
Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is
lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.

DOCTRINE: Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged

primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and
administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies

HELD: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power.
Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be
delegated to government units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political
government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be
delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not
empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants
MMDA police power. The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power.

The MMDA is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations
and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area.

Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc. (G.R. No. 148339, 23 February
2005) - BRINAS

FACTS: Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., is a common carrier operating buses which ply various
routes to and from Lucena City. It is assailing City Ordinance Nos. 1631 (AN ORDINANCE
GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO
CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON
BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA) and 1778 (AN ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES
AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING
ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995) as
unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police
power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies. These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years,
renewable for another twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one
common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper,
were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused
by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted
the subject ordinances?

DOCTRINE: As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly
exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State,
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must
be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.

HELD: NO, the City of Lucena did not properly exercise its police power when it enacted the
subject ordinances. While the questioned ordinances involve public interest warranting the
interference of the State, they prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within
Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal
located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The common
carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing
terminals and use the facilities of petitioner.

As for petitioners argument that the challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the power
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to [r]egulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit
encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare,
authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places: Absent any
showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not
obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are.
The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does
not extend to terminals. Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. Their
operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of
property, health, or comfort of the community.

City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. (G.R. No. 118127, 12 April 2005) - CABANGBANG
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It
built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the DOT as a hotel. MTDC filed a Pet. For Declaratory Relief with the Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein pet. City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo Lim, Hon. Joselito Atienza
and members of the City Council of Manila. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
include motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. Enacted by the City Council on 9 March 1993 and approved by pet. City
Mayor, the Ordinance is entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

MTDC contends that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons:
(1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate
area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a
proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no
reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4) The
Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which
was a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's
constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiffs property
rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per
se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a
denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the
operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area. Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from
implementing the Ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 7783 of the City of Manila is void and unconstitutional.

DOCTRINE: The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

HELD: The Court held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.
First. It did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of
police power, not only must it appear that (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but
(2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and protection of the
social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its
purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable
and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property.
The ordinance forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and
instructs owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or
convert said business into allowed business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use
of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must
be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative
of the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A possessory taking
and a regulatory taking. The latter occurs when the governments regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as
to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation
provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply
equally to all members of the class. In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinction
between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments.
By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other
services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic
for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside
this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the
area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in
contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it
likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the
residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment
and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the O rdinance and is therefore u
ltra vires, null and void.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza (G.R. No. 156052, 13 Feb.2008) DEIPARINE

FACTS: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28,
2001. and it became effective on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area
of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators
of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in
the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a
memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that :scaling down
of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Under the memorandum of
understanding, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting
from the joint operations and the scale down program.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97.
In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was
effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April
30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies.
Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And Whether or not the June 26,
2002 memorandum of understanding and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027.

HELD: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor
of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these
is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the
courts.
On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were
contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on
the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is
nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the
Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the
transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Republic of the Philippines v. Rambuyong (G.R. No. 167810, 04 October 2010) -

DESUASIDO

FACTS: Alfred Chu filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/ or damages against the
National Power Corporation which was raffled to the RTC of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay Branch
24. Appearing for Chu is Atty. Richard Rambuyong who was the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Atty. Rambuyong arguing that under
Sec. 90(b) RA 7160 (LGC), sanggunian members are prohibited to appear as counsel before
any court wherein any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party.
NPC argued that being a GOCC, it is embraced within the term instrumentality.

ISSUE: Whether NPC is an instrumentality of government such Atty. Rambuyong, as a

sanggunian member, should not appear as counsel against it

DOCTRINE: Sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not appear as
counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency,
or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party.

HELD: Yes, NPC is government instrumentality thus, Atty. Rambuyong should not appear as
counsel against it.

Based on jurisprudence, Maceda vs Macaraig, Jr., 1997 197 SCRA 771 (1991), the Court stated
that NPC is a government instrumentality with the enormous task of undertaking development of
hydroelectric generation of power and production of electricity from other sources, as well as
transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis, to improve the quality of life pursuant to
the State policy embodied in Section 9, Article 2 of 1987 Constitution. With this, the LGC
prohibits a sanggunian member (Atty. Rambuyong) to appear as counsel of a party adverse to
the NPC.

Catu v. Rellosa (A.C. No. 5738, 19 February 2008) - DIMACULANGAN

FACTS: Regina Catu and Antonio Catu initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio
Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the
former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79
of the 5th District of Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having
been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement,
were issued by the respondent a c ertification for the filing of the appropriate action in c ourt.
Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the
respondent on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the
conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent
claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and that he acceded to
Elizabeths request to handle the case for free as she was financially distressed.
The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where
after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them,
respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective
official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the
latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of
the latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law
for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely.

ISSUE/S: Was the appearance of respondent in behalf of the Catus proper?

DOCTRINE: A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to
be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the
written permission of the head of the department concerned

HELD: NO. Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their
incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the
sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the
members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members
of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise
of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time
service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their
official duties. On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours.
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his
profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head
of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. A civil service officer or employee
whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can
engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the
department concerned as provided for in Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service
Rules. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.

Flores v. Drilon (G.R. No. 104732, 22June 1993) - GAMO

FACTS: The petitioners are taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales,
and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the
Philippines, and maintain that the Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,", is unconstitutional. The provision reads as:
(d) Chairman administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and
who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for
the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo
shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis
supplied).

Petitioners claim that the appointment of Richard Gordon to Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is contrary to
(a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his
tenure," because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts
are public offices;
(b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the

questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and,
(c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, prohibits the appointment of new
employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases - during the period of
45 days before and thirty days before a special electionfor the reason that the appointment of
respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April
1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.

ISSUE: Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however,
That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,"
violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts.

DOCTRINE: Construction of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution - While the second paragraph
authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not
providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to
the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself. The
exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to
elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.

HELD: Yes, Sec. 13, par (d) of RA 7227 is violative of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution. In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his office. But, Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of
the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the
fundamental law of the land.

It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of
Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance. The phrase "shall be appointed"
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to
the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power
to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he
really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of
choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. While
the conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the
proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.

Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.

As incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains
Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may
be considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law,
upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the
public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a
known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was
a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in
its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or]
under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law,
before the same is adjudged to be such

Jalosjos v. Comelec (G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 09 October 2012) - LIM

FACTS: Petitioners Dominador Jalosjos and Agapito Cardino were candidates for Mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Cardino filed a petition to deny
due course and to cancel the candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino alleged that Jalosjos made false
material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Jalosjos declared under oath that he
was eligible to run for the Office of the Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his
Certificate of Candidacy, he was convicted by final judgment for the crime of robbery and
sentenced to prision mayor. Jalosjos admitted the said conviction but claimed that he was
granted probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the May 2004 elections, the COMELEC
denied a petition filed against him on the same ground.
The COMELEC granted Cardinos petition and cancelled Jalosjos COC. COMELEC concluded
that Jalosjos has indeed committed false material representation when he declared under oath
that he was eligible to run for mayor when in fact he is not because of a final conviction in a
criminal case, the sentence of which he had not yet served. Jalosjos then filed this petition for
certiorari challenging the COMELEC resolution.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Jalosjos is qualified to run for mayor.
2. Whether or not Cardino should be proclaimed as the newly elected mayor.

DOCTRINE: The rule that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is
disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of
candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of the filing but subsequently had to be
cancelled because of a violation of law.

HELD:
1. NO. Jalosjos is disqualified to run for the Office of the Mayor. The perpetual special
disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a
material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code.

A sentence of prisin mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under

Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74
and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition under Section
40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:

Section 40, (Local Government Code): Disqualifications. - The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence; XXX

In addition, the penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law
(RPC), the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the temporary
absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand,
under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that
"the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A
person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he
is eligible to so run.
 2. YES. Cardino should be proclaimed as the newly elected mayor. Jalosjos certificate of
candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time,
and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered
the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

Jalosjos v. Comelec (G.R. No. 205033, 18 June 2013) - MANGILA

FACTS: On November 2001, the SC promulgated a decision convicting Romeo Jalosjos two
counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. On April 2007, President
Arroyo issed an order commuting his prison term to 16 yrs, 3 months and 3 days. Petitioner
applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga but it was denied because of his previous
conviction prompting him to file a petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters. On
October 2012, the petitioner filed a Certificate of Candidacy seeking to run as mayor for
Zamboanga. The MTCC denied his petition for inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute
disqualification which deprived him of the right to vote. Five petitions were lodged before
COMELEC praying for the denial of petitioners CoC. The Comelec En Banc issued a resolution
resolving to cancel and deny the certificate of candidacy filed by Romeo Jalosjos as Mayor due
to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter
registration. It is petitioners submission that Art. 30 of RPC was partially amended by Sec 40(a)
of LGC and thus claims that his perpetual absolute disqualification had already been removed.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had
already been removed by Sec 40(a) of the Local Government Code.

DOCTRINE: While Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office
after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the said provision should
not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as principal or
accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.

HELD: No. Sec 40(a) of LGC provides the persons disqualified from running for any elective
local position: Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence. On the other hand Art. 30 of the RPC provides for the effects of the penalties
of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification on of which is as follows: The loss of all
rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held. Well-established is the rule
that every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation
to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can
be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. While Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior
convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his
sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a
penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run
for elective office. In this relation, Art. 30 of RPC provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for elective
office. This penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on the presumptive rule
that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of
moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes of a privilege which the State
grants only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common good.
Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioners service of his commuted prison term,
he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon

Aratea v. Comelec (G.R. No. 195229, 09 October 2012) - MARCILLA

FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S.
Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify
Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on the
ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor for 4 consecutive terms
immediately prior to the 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was
eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being
elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The Second Division of COMELEC rendered a Resolution February 18, 2010 cancelling the
COC of Lonzanida. Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc
remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea)
garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before the RTC Judge of Olongapo. On the same
date, he wrote the DILG and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was
legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanidas disqualification.

DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction,
and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and thus, Aratea should
assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELECs
resolution of Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010,
Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales. In his response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take anoath of
office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however
to the outcome of the cases pending before COMELEC.

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from
running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bancs resolution was based
on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three
consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final
judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. The judgment of
conviction became final on October 23, 2009 before the filing of COC by Lonzanida on
December 1, 2009.
ISSUE: Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his
certificate of candidacy being void ab initio as to determine who between Aratea or Antipolo is
the rightful occupant to the Mayors Office of San Antonio, Zambales
DOCTRINE: A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that Antipolo should be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales since Lonzanidas COC was void ab initio. The grounds for disqualification for a
petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are specifically enumerated. A petition
for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned in
Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other
penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify including
violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification
under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68.

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a COC may be denied or cancelled when
there is false material representation of the contents of the COC. The conviction of Lonzanida
by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding
any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took
effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy.

A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office and
commits a false material representation if he states in his COC that he is ineligible to run.

Japzon v. Comelec (G.R. No. 180088. 19 January 2009) - MUNGCAL

FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel B. Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty were candidates for the office
for Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in elections held on May 14,
2007. On June 15, 2007, petitioner filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify and/or
cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material representation. Japzon stated in
the petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother,
and that he eventually migrated to the US and became an American citizen, residing in USA for
the last 25 years. When Ty filed his certificate, petitioner alleged that he falsely represented that
he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for one year
immediately preceding the date of elections, and that he was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country.

Ty's answer alleged that he performed these acts: with the enactment of R.A. 9225 granting
dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, he filed with the Philippine Consulate General of Los
Angeles, USA an application for the reacquisition of his citizenship; he executed an Oath of
Allegiance to the Philippines, applied for a Philippine passport, acquired CTCs and registered
himself as a voter, stating that Poblacion, Eastern Samar is his address or residence,
renounced his Foreign Citizenship, paid community tax, among other similar acts. He sought the
dismissal of Japzon's petition.

Pending the submission of the parties' position papers, the local elections were held and Ty
garnered the highest number of votes; he was thus declared the mayor. The COMELEC then
ruled in favor of Ty, dismissing the petition to cancel and/or disqualify Ty's certificate of
candidacy. Japzon filed for a Motion for Reconsideration but was also denied by COMELEC.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Did the COMELEC commit a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in refusing to cancel and/or disqualify Ty's certificate of candidacy?
- Is Ty a natural-born Filipino citizen?
- Is Ty a resident of the Philippines?
- Did Ty reside in Eastern Samar one year immediately preceding the elections?

DOCTRINE:
The requisites to allow a natural-born Filipino who reacquired his Philippine citizenship to run for
public office are (R.A. 9225, sec. 5(2)):
1. he must meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws
2. make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer oath

---

Qualifications for local elective office are laid down in R.A. 7160 (LGC of 1991), Section 39:
An elective local official must be:
1. a citizen of the Philippines;

2. a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in case of a

member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected;

3. a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and

4. able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect

[...] Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities,
component cities or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day.

---

Residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or

habitation but rather to domicile or legal residence, the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's
parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile
(domicile of choice).

--

Findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the specific matters
entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by the court not only respect but even finality if they
are supported by substantial evidence.

HELD:

NO, COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in refusing to cancel and/or
disqualify respondent's certificate of candidacy. Petition was DISMISSED.

Ty is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has complied with the requirements set forth in R.A.
9225, sec 5(2) by personally executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
public. By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on March 28, 2007, he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping his Filipino citizenship.

Ty had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the
time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.

Ty's intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Eastern Samar became apparent when, after
his renunciation, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating as his residence the province of
Eastern Samar, paid community tax and secured CTCs from the municipality in 2005-2007.
Furthermore, he has been physically present in Eastern Samar since his arrival on May 4, 2006.
He is compliant with the one-year residency requirement.

Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec (G.R No. 198742, 10 August 2012) - NOBLE

FACTS: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on
August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known
as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved and
the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which
in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an
Australian citizen.

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in
her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position
of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8
(private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the
petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and
that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to
be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of
running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be disqualified from running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance with RA 9225

DOCTRINE: A Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time
of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held
that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of
the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing all foreign citizenship.

HELD: YES. The petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a
person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of
foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225
on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation
of foreign citizenship.
The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the
most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship
and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those
who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are
still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public
office.

Corodora v. Comelec (GR No. 176947, 19 February 2008) - RUBIO

FACTS:
 The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution as well as the
Resolution dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC En Banc which denied Cordoras motion
for reconsideration.

In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted
that Tambunting made false assertions in the following items: Tambuntings Certificate of
Candidacy for the 2001 elections and Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004
elections which state, among others that :

I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen

No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001. 36 in the Philippines and 25 in the
Constituency where I seek to be elected; and
I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected

Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because
Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.

To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora

presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances,
Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December
2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these
travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in
Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.

Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation
in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born
Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of
a Filipino mother and an American father.

Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The

certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambuntings father petitioned
him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed Tambuntings citizenship
which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings possession of an American passport did not mean that
Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18
November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.

The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordoras complaint.

Cordoras reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled on
an American passport is not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen. The
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the decision.

Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate opinion

which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed
out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting effectively
renounced his American citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004
and ran for public office. Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is disqualified from running for any elective position being a
dual citizen

DOCTRINE: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

HELD: No
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein
we ruled that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective
local position.

Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual
citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individuals active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No.
9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his
Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The
act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign
citizenship.

Kida v. Senate of the Philippines (supra) - SALONGA

FACTS: On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with
the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset the ARMM
elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3)
years thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as
well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions
against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions
filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws
amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to
become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as
well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the
President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials
until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office.
Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of
control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE: May the Congress enact RA 10153 to change the date for the local elections?

DOCTRINE: While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.

HELD: Yes. the Constitution mandates synchronization. Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held
on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of
all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of
votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held
on the second Monday of May, 1992.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.

Abundo v. Commission on Elections (GR No. 201716, 08 January 2013) - SANGALANG

FACTS: For four successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national
and local elections, Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the
winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the
2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of
mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared
the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office
starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a
little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and
Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the
mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the formers
disqualification to run, predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.

The RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor because he was found to
already served three consecutive mayoralty terms. To the RTC, the year and a month service
constitutes a complete and full service of Abundos second term as mayor. Therefrom, Abundo
appealed to the COMELEC. Just like the RTC, the COMELECs Second Division ruled against
Abundo on the strength of the case Aldovino, Jr. v. Comelec and held that service of the
unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is
considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule. In
time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its equally
assailed Resolution stating that there was no involuntary interruption of Abundos 2004- 2007
term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never
to have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the
Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to be in office for the same position for more than
three consecutive terms and not to the service of the term.

ISSUE: (1) The core issue is Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served 3 consecutive
terms.
(2) The pivotal determinative issue is whether the service of a term less than the full 3 years by
Abundo, arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest, is
considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the 3 consecutive term
limit for elective local officials

DOCTRINE: An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule,
be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.

HELD: No, Abundo is not deemed to have served 3 consecutive terms. The consecutiveness of
what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was
veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the constitutional
and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms. The principle behind the three-term limit rule covers
only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. An
elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for
a fourth term, albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the election
where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or
her third term. In the present case, the Court declares that the two- year period during which his
opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which
effectively removed Abundos case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule. It cannot be said
that Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise
entitled. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be
considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.

The Court further ruled that the COMELEC erred in applying Aldovino, Jr. v. Comelec, which
held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an
election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the
three-term limit rule as the doctrine refers to a situation where the elected official is under
preventive suspension and is only temporarily unable to discharge his functions yet is still
entitled to the office as compared to the situation of Abundo where he did not have title to the
office. The Court emphasized that pending the favorable resolution of Abundos election protest,
he was relegated to being an ordinary constituent and private citizen since his opponent, as
presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. While awaiting the
pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the
constituents of Viga and cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was
at that time not the duly proclaimed winner. It stressed that Abundos case differs from other
cases involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was the winning
candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents.

(2) NO. A "term" means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office." It also means the "time during which the officer
may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another." It is the period of time during which a duly elected
official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec.
43, RA 7160, the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30
of the first year of said term.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, Abundo cannot plausibly
claim that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Accordingly, Abundo actually
held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the
resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little
over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local
elected officials is three years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007.

Borja v. Comelec (G.R. No. 133495, 03 September 1998) - SIMEON

FACTS: Jose Capco, private respondent, was elected as the vice-mayor of Pateros in 1988 for
a term until 1992. In 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja. In 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which
ended on 1995. In 1995, he was reelected as mayor for another term of three years ending
1998. In 1998, the COMELEC declared Capco disqualified to run for reelection as Mayor of
Pateros in view of SEC. 8 of the Constitution which provides that

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

..which was reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC which provides that

No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.

Said decision was subsequently overruled the same by the COMELEC en Banc upon
filing of motion of reconsideration by Capco.

ISSUE: Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and
serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the
purpose of the three-term limit

DOCTRINE: It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply.

HELD: No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, Capco was
qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of
mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he
served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the
deceased mayor. The vice-mayors assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is
more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted
in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, 8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A
consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that
the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served
the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to
falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to
govern them.

Aldovino v. Comelec (G.R. No. 184836, 23 December 2009) - SY

FACTS: Private respondent Wilfredo Asilo was a councilor of Lucena City for the 3 consecutive
terms of 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. During his 3rd consecutive term, private
respondent was preventively suspended in September 2005 due to a criminal case against him.

In the 2007 elections, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. In response, petitioners filed a petition with the COMELEC to cancel private
respondents certificate of candidacy arguing that he had already served 3 consecutive terms.
Allowing him to campaign in the 2007 elections would violate the 3 term limit provided in Sec. 8,
Art. 10 of the Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of the Local Government Code. The COMELEC ruled
in favor of private respondent, arguing that the 3 term limit did not apply because private
respondent failed to render complete service for 2004-2007 because of his suspension.

ISSUE: Did the preventive suspension of Wilfredo Asilo interrupt his term of office during his
2004-2007 term that will allow him to campaign in the 2007 elections?

DOCTRINE: Interruption under Sec. 8, Art. 10 of the Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of the Local
Government Code should be read in the context of interruption of the term of office and not in
the context of interruption of the exercise of powers and functions by an elected official.

HELD: Under the 3 term limit, an elected official that holds the same title of office for 3
consecutive terms cannot hold the same title for a 4th consecutive term. An exception to the 3
term limit is an interruption to the title of office of the elected official. Interruption, in the context
of Sec. 8, Art. 10 of the Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of the Local Government Code, is the loss
of the right to hold and not the failure to render service.

An involuntary severance from office that results in a loss of title to office is an

interruption to the term of an elected official that renders the 3 term limit inapplicable, while
voluntary renunciation by the elected official of his title to office cannot be considered as an
interruption because it is an act of free will. A temporary inability to exercise the functions of an
elective post is not considered as an interruption of the term of office because the official does
not lose his title to office.

A preventive suspension is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an

official charged administratively or criminally where evidence indicates the likelihood of guilt or
liability. An official preventively suspended is barred from performing the functions of his office
but does not lose title to the office.

The preventive suspension of Wilfredo Asilo during his 3rd consecutive term was not an
interruption of his title to office that falls under the exception to the 3 term limit because he
continued to hold the title of Councilor of Lucena City, although he was not able to exercise his
functions because of the preventive suspension. Private respondent has effectively served 3
consecutive terms as councilor without any break in his term of office and cannot be allowed to
campaign for the same position in the 2007 elections.