1
1. PUBLIC POSITION
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135784. December 15, 2000]
RICARDO FORTUNA Y GRAGASIN, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J . :
Perhaps no other profession in the country has gone through
incessant maligning by the public in general than its own police force.
Much has been heard about the notoriety of this profession for excessive
use and illegal discharge of power. The present case is yet another
excuse for such vilification.
On 21 July 1992 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, while
Diosdada Montecillo and her brother Mario Montecillo were standing at the
corner of Mabini and Harrison Streets waiting for a ride home, a mobile
patrol car of the Western Police District with three (3) policemen on board
stopped in front of them. The policeman seated on the right at the front
seat alighted and without a word frisked Mario. He took Marios belt,
pointed to a supposedly blunt object in its buckle and uttered the word
"evidence."[1] Then he motioned to Mario to board the car. The terrified
Mario obeyed and seated himself at the back together with another
policeman. Diosdada instinctively followed suit and sat beside Mario.
They cruised towards Roxas Boulevard. The driver then asked
Mario why he was carrying a "deadly weapon," to which Mario answered,
"for self-defense since he was a polio victim."[2] The driver and another
policeman who were both seated in front grilled Mario. They frightened
him by telling him that for carrying a deadly weapon outside his residence
he would be brought to the Bicutan police station where he would be
interrogated by the police, mauled by other prisoners and heckled by the
press. As they approached Ospital ng Maynila, the mobile car pulled over
and the two (2) policemen in front told the Montecillos that the bailbond for
carrying a "deadly weapon" was P12,000.00. At this point, the driver
asked how much money they had. Without answering, Mario gave his
P1,000.00 to Diosdada who placed the money inside her wallet.
Diosdada was then made to alight from the car. She was
followed by the driver and was told to go behind the vehicle. There, the
driver forced her to take out her wallet and rummaged through its
contents. He counted her money. She had P5,000.00 in her wallet. The
driver took P1,500.00 and left her P3,500.00. He instructed her to tell his
companions that all she had was P3,500.00. While going back to the car
the driver demanded from her any piece of jewelry that could be pawned.
Ruefully, she removed her wristwatch and offered it to him. The driver
declined saying, "Never mind,"[3] and proceeded to board the car.
Diosdada, still fearing for the safety of her brother, followed and sat beside
him in the car.
Once in the car, Diosdada was directed by the policeman at the
front passenger seat to place all her money on the console box near the
gearshift. The car then proceeded to Harrison Plaza where the
Montecillos were told to disembark. From there, their dreadful experience
over, they went home to Imus, Cavite.
The following day Diosdada recounted her harrowing story to her
employer Manuel Felix who readily accompanied her and her brother
Mario to the office of General Diokno where they lodged their complaint.
Gen. Diokno directed one of his men, a certain Lt. Ronas, to assist the
complainants in looking for the erring policemen. They boarded the police
patrol car and scoured the Mabini area for the culprits. They did not find
them.
When they returned to the police station, a line-up of policemen
was immediately assembled. Diosdada readily recognized one of them
as the policeman who was seated beside them in the back of the car. She
trembled at the sight of him. She then rushed to Lt. Ronas and told him
that she saw the policeman who sat beside them in the car. He was
identified by Lt. Ronas as PO2 Ricardo Fortuna. A few minutes later, Gen.
Diokno summoned the complainants. As they approached the General,
they at once saw PO2 Eduardo Garcia whom they recognized as the
policeman who frisked Mario. The following day, they met the last of their
tormentors, the driver of the mobile car who played heavily on their nerves
- PO3 Ramon Pablo.
The three (3) policemen were accordingly charged with robbery.
After trial, they were found guilty of having conspired in committing the
crime with intimidation of persons. They were each sentenced to a prison
term of six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor, to
restitute in favor of private complainants Diosdada Montecillo and Mario
Montecillo the sum of P5,000.00, and to indemnify them in the amount of
P20,000.00 for moral damages and P15,000.00 for attorneys fees.[4]
The accused separately appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31
March 1997 the appellate court affirmed the lower court's verdict.[5]
Accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna moved for reconsideration but the
motion was denied. Hence, this petition by Fortuna alone under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. He contends that the appellate court erred in
holding that private complainants gave the money to the accused under
duress, the same being negated by the prosecutions evidence, and in
affirming the decision of the court below. He argued that the evidence
presented by the prosecution did not support the theory of conspiracy as
against him.[6]
The issues raised by accused-appellant, as correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, are purely factual. We have consistently stressed
that in a petition for review on certiorari this Court does not sit as an
arbiter of facts. As such, it is not our function to re-examine every
appreciation of facts made by the trial and appellate courts unless the
evidence on record does not support their findings or the judgment is
based on a misappreciation of facts.[7] The ascertainment of what actually
happened in a controverted situation is the function of the lower courts. If
we are to re-examine every factual finding made by them, we would not
only be prolonging the judicial process but would also be imposing upon
the heavily clogged dockets of this Court.
We do not see any infirmity in the present case justifying a
departure from this well-settled rule. On the contrary, we are convinced
that the trial and appellate courts did not err in holding that accused-
appellant Fortuna conspired with the accused Pablo and Garcia in
intimidating private complainants to give them their money.
We are convinced that there was indeed sufficient intimidation
applied on the offended parties as the acts performed by the three (3)
accused, coupled with the circumstances under which they were executed,
engendered fear in the minds of their victims and hindered the free
exercise of their will. The three (3) accused succeeded in coercing them
to choose between two (2) alternatives, to wit: to part with their money or
suffer the burden and humiliation of being taken to the police station.
To our mind, the success of the accused in taking their victims'
money was premised on threats of prosecution and arrest. This intense
infusion of fear was intimidation, plain and simple.
Accused-appellant further argues that assuming arguendo that the
element of intimidation did exist, the lower court erred in holding that he
conspired with his companions in perpetrating the offense charged.
This indeed is easy to assert, for conspiracy is something which
exists only in the minds of the conspirators, which can easily be denied.
However, conspiracy may be detected and deduced from the
 2
circumstances of the case which when pieced together will indubitably PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEXANDER
indicate that they form part of a common design to commit a felony; and, TAO y CABALLERO, accused-appellant.HATOL
to establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof
evincing that all of the conspirators took a direct part in every act, it being DECISION
sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.[8]

In the present case, accused-appellant would want to impress PANGANIBAN, J.:

upon this Court that his silence inside the car during Marios interrogation
confirmed his claim that he did not participate in the offense. The appellant cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery
with rape because the asportation was conceived and carried out as an
We do not agree. As a police officer, it is his primary duty to avert
afterthought and only after the rape has been consummated. Dwelling
by all means the commission of an offense. As such, he should not have
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case
kept his silence but, instead, should have protected the Montecillos from
because the rape was committed in the ground floor of a two-story
his mulcting colleagues. This accused-appellant failed to do. His silence
structure, the lower floor being used as a video rental store and not as a
then could only be viewed as a form of moral support which he zealously
private place of abode or residence.
lent to his co-conspirators.

In one case, we ruled that in conspiracy all those who in one way The Case
or another helped and cooperated in the consummation of a felony were
co-conspirators.[9] Hence, all of the three (3) accused in the present
This is an automatic review of the Decision[1] dated April 23, 1998 of the
case should be held guilty of robbery with intimidation against persons.
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127, in Criminal Case No.
C-53066, finding Accused-Appellant Alexander Tao y Caballero guilty
We however observe that the courts below failed to appreciate the
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape and imposing upon him the
aggravating circumstance of "abuse of public position."[10] The mere fact
supreme penalty of death. The case arose out of an Information,[2] dated
that the three (3) accused were all police officers at the time of the robbery
November 10, 1997, signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador C.
placed them in a position to perpetrate the offense. If they were not
Quimpo, accusing the appellant of robbery with rape allegedly committed
police officers they could not have terrified the Montecillos into boarding
as follows:
the mobile patrol car and forced them to hand over their money. Precisely
it was on account of their authority that the Montecillos believed that Mario
had in fact committed a crime and would be brought to the police station
for investigation unless they gave them what they demanded.
"That on or about the 6th day of November, 1997 in Kalookan City,
Accordingly, the penalty imposed should be modified. Under Art.
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
294, par. (5), of The Revised Penal Code, the penalty for simple robbery is
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and by means
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
fo force and intimidation employed upon the person of one AMY DE
period. In view of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public
GUZMAN Y MAQUINANA, did there and then wilfully, unlawfully and
position, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period[11] while
feloniously take, rob and carry away the following articles, to wit:
the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is
arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium in any of its
periods the range of which is four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) Cash money - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P5,000.00
years and two (2) months.
Three (3) bracelets - - - - - - - - - - -3,500.00
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed that of the trial court finding accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna
guilty of robbery and ordering him to pay complaining witnesses Diosdada Two (2) rings - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5,000.00
Montecillo and Mario Montecillo P5,000.00 representing the money taken
from them, P20,000.00 for moral damages and P15,000.00 for attorney's One (1) pair of earrings - - - - - - - -2,000.00
fees, is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant Ricardo
Fortuna is SENTENCED to the indeterminate prison term of two (2) years One (1) Alba wristwatch - - - - - - -1,500.00
four (4) months and twenty (20) days of the medium period of arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8)
...............................................--------------
years two (2) months and ten (10) days of the maximum period of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, as maximum.
TOTAL.....................- -P16,000.00
Costs against accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna.

SO ORDERED. with the total amount of P16,000.00 belonging to one ANA MARINAY
Y SICYAN; that in the course of said robbery, said accused, with the
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. use of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said AMY
DE GUZMAN Y MAQUINANA, against the latters will and without
her consent and with the use of a bladed weapon."

2. DWELLING
During his arraignment on November 26, 1997, appellant, assisted by his
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge.[3] After trial on the
EN BANC
merits, the lower court promulgated the herein assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
[G.R. No. 133872. May 5, 2000]
"W H E R E F O R E the prosecution having established beyond an

iota of doubt the guilt of Accused ALEXANDER TAO Y
CABALLERO of the crime of Robbery with Rape, and considering
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling without
any mitigating circumstances to offset the same, this Court hereby
sentences the Accused to suffer the maximum penalty of D E A T H
with all the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify Victim
AMY DE GUZMAN the amount of P50,000.00 and pay her actual
damages of P2,687.65 and to restore to the victim her gold ring of
undetermined amount as well as moral and exemplary damages in
the total sum of P100,000.00; and to pay the costs."
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general sums the evidence for the prosecution in this wise:[4]
"On November 6, 1997, at around 7:30 p.m., Amy de Guzman (Amy)
was tending a Video Rental Shop owned by her employer and
cousin, Ana Marinay (Ana) located at 153 Loreto Street, Morning
Breeze [S]ubdivision, Caloocan City (Tsn., January 8, 1998, p. 3).
Thereupon, accused-appellant Alexander Tao, a relative of Anas
husband Gerry Marinay (Gerry), arrived at said shop (ibid., p. 4).
Alexander Tao then asked Amy about the time when Gerry would
be coming home, to which she replied, 10:00 p.m. (id.). He then
asked about the time when Ana would be coming home and Amy
replied that she did not know (id.).
"Thereafter, but still on the same date, Alexander Tao kept on going
in and out of the Video Shop, and on the last time that he went
inside said shop, he jumped over the counter of the shop to where
Amy was and seized the latter by placing one of his arms around
Amy[s] neck, while his other hand held a knife which he poked at
her neck (id., pp. 4-5).
"Terrified by the attack, Amy started shouting for help but
Alexander Tao increased the volume of a karaoke which was on
at the time to drown Amys cries for help (id., p. 5).
"Alexander Tao then dragged Amy to the kitchen of the shop
where, at knife point, he ordered the latter to undress and he
thereafter started raping her (id., pp. 5-6).
"However, while Alexander Tao was raping Amy, somebody
knocked at the door of the shop prompting the former to stop what
he was doing and ordered Amy to put on her clothes (id., pp. 6-7).
"Alexander Tao then directed Amy to go upstairs to the second
floor of the shop to change clothes as he will be taking her with
him (id., p. 7). But suddenly thereafter, Tao pulled her down and
punched her in the stomach thrice causing her to lose her balance
(id.). Tao then started cursing her and again placed himself on
top of her while poking a knife at her neck (id.). Amy then pleaded
with Tao to just take anything inside the shop and to spare her
life, to which Tao replied no, I will not leave you here alive. (id.).
"But after a while and upon Amys pleading, Tao put down his
knife and while he was kissing Amy, the latter got hold of the knife
which she surreptitiously concealed under the stairs (id.).
"Therafter, Tao became violent again and banged Amys head on
the wall causing the latter to lose consciousness (id., p. 9). When
she regained consciousness she found herself and Tao inside the
toilet of the shop and the latter again banged her head, this time
3
on the toilet bowl, several times causing Amy to again lose
consciousness (id., pp. 8-10).
"Thereafter, Tao went upstairs and looted the place of valuables
belonging to Amys employer, Ana. Amy, herself lost her ring,
bracelet and wristwatch during the incident in question (id., p. 10).
"At about 9:00 oclock p.m. of the same day, Amys employer Ana
arrived and found the shop in disarray with the karaoke in full
volume (Tsn., 13, 1998, pp. 2-4). After turning off the karaoke[],
Ana proceeded to the toilet where she found Amy bathed in blood
(ibid., p.4).
"Ana immediately sought the help of Barangay officials of the place
and Amy was brought to the MCU Hospital where she was initially
treated of her injuries (id., p. 5). Amy was, later on, transferred to
Jose P. Reyes Memorial Medical Center (JPRMMC) where she
was confined for four (4) days."
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellants version of the incident is as follows:[5]
"x x x [O]n November 6, 1997, at around 7:40 p.m., he went to the
house of his cousin Gerry Bautista Marinay at 113 Loreto St.,
Morning Breeze Subdivision, Kalookan City and upon arrival
thereat he found therein Amy de Guzman alone which she greeted
him because she knew that the accused was a frequent visitor
thereof. Upon learning from her that Gerry was not around,
accused proceeded to the kitchen to drink water and after he
bought cigarettes at the nearby store, he returned to the shop and
seated himself infront of Amy de Guzmans counter. After the lapse
of five minutes he got bored and went out again to wait for the
arrival of GERRY. After finishing his cigarette he returned to Amy
and talked with her and learned that ANA was at her newly opened
restaurant. After a while, the thought of stealing his cousins
valuables struck his mind owing to his dire need of cash/money.
Thus, he approached Amy and held her hands and asked her to
come with him because he badly needed money, to lead him to
where his cousin was keeping his money and valuables. As to
Amys surprise [sic], she shouted and to stop her, the accused
covered her mouth with his right hand but Amy put up a struggle
and in the process they both fell down and rolled on the floor.
Thence, the accused was able to subdue Amy and forcibly took
her in the upstairs where he did the ransacking of the drawers
while holding the private complainants hand. However, she was
able to free herself from his hold and ran downstairs to the kitchen
where she tried to get hold [of] a knife but he was able to wrest
with her. As the accused was rattled, he pushed Amy inside the
comfort room and shoved her head against the tiles to mum her.
He took Amys bag wherein he placed his loot consisting of 2 wrist
watches, including Amys Alba watch, a bracelet, clothes and hair
blower as well as jewelry box containing five rings which he placed
in his pocket, then he proceeded to his brothers house in Taytay.
Upon arrival of the police and his cousin thereat he returned the
jewelry box to the latter but the same was not presented in court,
that no other jewelry was taken by him from the place except those
already specified, muchless has he taken any cash money from
his cousin Gerry Marinay, that he has a wife staying in Iloilo and he
has a girlfriend here in Manila, that he never raped the private
complainant Amy de Guzman and neither [had he] courted her
prior to the incident. (TSN., March 3, 1998, pp. 2-9) (TSN., March
4, 1998, pp. 2-6)"

Ruling of the Trial Court
Assessing the testimony of the private complainant, the trial judge
observed:[6]
"Verily this Court finds the forthright account of the incident by the
private complainant whose small and slender physique was certainly no
match to the tall well-built body of an ex-convict, to be candid,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank which remained consistent and
unwavering despite the rigid cross-examinations of the defense counsel
wherein she narrated in detail the sexual assault with the use of a knife
perpetrated by the accused against her.
Parenthetically this Court has observed the deportment of the private
complainant at the witness stand and certainly she did not appear to
have the callousness and shrewdness of a woman capable of imputing a
heinous crime against the [a]ccused if the same is not true. Besides, the
defense has not shown any evil motive or ill will on the part of the private
complainant for testifying the way she did in this case."
The lower court accepted the judicial admission of the accused that he
stole valuables belonging to private complainant and her employer, and
then proceeded to determine "whether or not the prosecution evidence
has sufficiently established the rape angle of the case."
"In fine, the [a]ccused having already admitted the robbery charge
coupled with the fact that the prosecution has established with
clear and convincing evidence [a]ccuseds culpability for sexually
assaulting the pri[v]ate complainant leaves no room for doubt of
the guilt of the accused for the complex crime of robbery with
(aggravated) rape[.]"
Furthermore, the trial court appreciated dwelling as an aggravating
circumstance because the incident took place supposedly at the residence
of private complainant's employer, "which doubles as a video rental
shop."[7] Applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
RA 7659, it imposed the maximum penalty provided under Article 294 of
the same Code as amended, which is death.
Thus, this automatic review by this Court.[8]
Issues
In his Brief,[9] Appellant Tao assigns only two errors or issues. These
are:
"I
The lower court erred in not taking into consideration the testimonies
of Dr. Godofredo Balderosa and Dr. Maria Redencion Bukid-Abella
which negate the rape [charge] imputed against the accused.
II
The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape despite the
prosecutions insufficiency of evidence."
In criminal cases, an appeal throws the whole case open for review and
the appellate court may correct such errors it may find in the appealed
judgment, even if they have not been specifically assigned.[10] Hence, this
4
Court likewise reviewed (a) the propriety of appellant's conviction of the
special complex crime of robbery with rape and (b) the trial court's
appreciation of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. These two items
will be discussed as the third and fourth issues.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful review of the evidence on record, the Court finds that (a)
appellant is guilty of two separate crimes -- rape and robbery, (b) dwelling
cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, and (c) the proper
penalty for rape is reclusion perpetua, not death.
First Issue: Evaluation of the Examining Doctors' Testimonies
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to give due credence to the
testimonies of Dr. Godofredo Balderosa and Dr. Ma. Redencion Bukid-
Abella, who both examined and treated Amy de Guzman's physical
injuries immediately after the incident. Both doctors similarly stated that
the victim complained to them of physical assault and attempted rape only,
not of consummated rape.[11] Additionally, the findings of NBI Medico-
Legal Officer Aurea Villena were allegedly inconclusive as to whether
there was sexual intercourse between the appellant and the victim.[12]
Their testimonies supposedly bolster appellant's innocence of the rape
charge.
Otherwise stated, appellant claims that the failure of Amy de Guzman to
immediately disclose the rape to her examining physicians could only
mean that she was not in fact sexually assaulted.
In many criminal cases, especially of rape, this Court has acknowledged
that the vacillation of the victim in reporting the crime to the authorities is
not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge. Neither does it always
cast doubt on the credibility on the complaining witness.[13] The initial
reluctance of a young, inexperienced lass to admit having been ravished is
normal and natural.[14] The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipina's
inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts
which blemish her honor and virtue.[15] She cannot be expected to readily
reveal the fact of her sexual violation to total strangers.
It is thus perfectly understandable and consistent with common
experience that Amy initially tried to downplay the assault upon her
chastity by telling the doctors that there was no consummation of the act.
The following day, however, she was finally able to gather the courage to
reveal the entire truth to her cousin-employer, Ana Marinay.[16] She also
executed a Sworn Statement[17] before PO3 Jaime Basa, detailing how
she had been raped and beaten by appellant. Four days later, she
acceded to undergo a medico legal examination of her genital organ,
which was conducted by Dra. Aurea Villena of the Jose R. Reyes
Memorial Hospital, where she was confined.
Time-honored is the doctrine that no young and decent woman would
publicly admit that she was ravished and her virtue defiled, unless such
was true, for it would be instinctive for her to protect her honor.[18] No
woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an
open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to
have the culprit apprehended and punished.[19] Thus, absent any credible
imputation of ill motive on the part of the private complainant to falsely
accuse the appellant of a heinous crime, her candid and consistent
testimony should be given full faith and credit.[20] It is a basic rule,
founded on reason and experience, that when a victim testifies that she
has been raped, she effectively says all that is necessary to show that
rape was indeed committed.[21]
In the case at bar, we find no reason to deviate from these doctrines. Amy
 5
de Guzman's straightforward and convincing testimony, which will be voice, he took me to the kitchen.
detailed later, bears no badge of material inconsistency which would bring
doubt to its veracity. She stood firm on her tale throughout her court COURT:
appearance. The trial judge observed her "to be candid, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank x x x [and she] remained consistent and
q.......How [were] you taken to the kitchen?
unwavering despite the rigid cross-examinations of the defense counsel x
x x."[22]
.......'Paano ka dinala sa kusina?'
Besides, no ill motive was imputed on her. Appellant offers us no plausible
explanation why Amy de Guzman cried rape against him. We believe she a.......Sakal-sakal po niya ako.
did so in order to bring out the truth and to obtain justice.
x x x.......x x x.......x x x
Appellant's contention that the absence of genital and other injuries on
Amy's body proves his innocence is unacceptable. Time and again, we a.......x x x and once in the kitchen he made me lay my back against
have ruled that hymenal laceration is not an element of rape.[23] The the stairs and told me to take[ ]off my pants. Due to fright I did as told
victim need not sustain genital injuries, for even the slightest penetration of and the knife was then poked at my stomach.
the labia by the male organ is equivalent to consummated rape.[24]

q.......You said you removed x x x your pants, where [sic] you wearing
Besides, the examining physician satisfactorily explained the absence of your panty at that time?
lacerations on private complainant's genitalia:[25]

a.......Yes, Sir. I was wearing one.

"x x x during the examination I found out that [the victim's] hymen
is that of elastic type and so it is disten[s]ible and it could
q.......What happened to that panty?
accommodate the penis without producing any genital injuries."

a.......He told me to take off my pants, in doing so I took off completely

She elucidated that "[l]aceration only occur[s] on non-elastic hymen
together with my panty.
because non-elastic hymen cannot accommodate the size of the penis
without producing injury but hers is that of the elastic type, like rubber
band that could stretch and turn back into its proper size."[26] q.......Then, what happened next?

Second Issue: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Time-tested is the guiding principle that when a victim cries rape, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime was inflicted on her;
and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may
be convicted on the basis thereof.[27] We have no reason in the instant
case to deviate from this settled jurisprudence.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following instances: (1) force or intimidation is used, (2) the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (3) she is under twelve
years of age.[28] We find the necessary elements of rape duly established
by Private Complainant Amy de Guzman when she candidly testified thus:
[29]
a.......And once [I laid] down on the floor, he tried x x x to make me
spread[-]eagle my legs and in that process he knelt between my legs
then took off his pants.
q.......And after that, what happen[ed] next after accused removed his
pants x x x?
a.......Then after taking off his pants, he lay atop me and I felt he was
forcing his penis in and [while] in that process the knife was still poked
at my left neck.
q.......When he inserted his penis into your private parts, what did you
feel?

a.......Pain. (Masakit po).

"a.......Then Alexander Tao kept coming in and out of the video rental
shop and last time he went in, he slammed the door and jumped over
q.......After inserting his penis into your private parts, what did he do?
the counter where I was and strangled me while his other hand is
holding a knife, the knife was poked at the right side of my neck.
a.......He kept on pumping."

q.......What else transpired thereafter?

a.......And he took the knife from the right hand and held it with his left
hand and turned the volume of the karaoke louder so that my voice will
not be heard since I was shouting.
q.......When the accused poked the knife, what did you feel?
a.......'Natakot po.'
q.......What happen[ed] next Ms. Witness?
a.......Then after turning louder the volume of the karaoke to down my
As noted earlier, the trial judge, who was able to observe firsthand the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, perceived Amy to
be candid, straightforward, spontaneous and frank. Said witness was also
found to have been consistent and unwavering despite the rigid cross-
examination of the defense counsel. We note from the transcript of
stenographic notes that the judge herself had posed additional clarificatory
questions upon Amy.[30] Throughout her testimony, she indeed remained
consistent as well as convincing.
Of long-standing is the rule that findings of trial courts, especially on the
credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and accorded the
highest respect by the reviewing courts, unless certain facts of substance
and value were overlooked or misappreciated such as would alter the
conviction of the appellant.[31] Trial judges are in a better position to

assess the behavior of witnesses and to detect whether they are telling the
truth or not because they could directly observe them in court.[32] The
reviewing magistrate, on the other hand, has only the cold and impersonal
records of the proceedings to rely upon.
With respect to the robbery, its elements are: (1) the subject is personal
property belonging to another; (2) there is unlawful taking of that property,
(3) the taking is with the intent to gain, and (4) there is violence against or
intimidation of any person or use of force upon things.[33] There is no
question on the unlawful taking of valuables belonging to Amy and her
employer, Ana Marinay. Appellant openly admitted in court the unlawful
asportation, thus:
"q.......[W]ere you able to get some valuables from the room of
[the] Bautista[34] couple?
a.......[Y]es sir.
q.......[W]hat are these valuables?
a.......I remember the jewelry box containing jewelry, clothes and
other valuables [sic] things sir."[35]
..............x x x.......x x x.......x x x
"q.......[W]here did you get that jewelry box containing rings?
a.......[I]nside the locker or aparador sir.
q.......[A]fter having taken all these jewelries and clothes you
placed them all in a blue bag and left the place?
a.......[T]he jewelry box was placed inside my pocket. I did not
place in the blue bag sir.
q.......[Y]ou mentioned five rings, Alba wrist watch owned by rape
victim [A]my de [G]uzman, you also mentioned other jewelries,
what other jewelries aside from the jewelry that you took in the
house of the couple Gerry [and Ana] Bautista?
[A]tty. [C]risostomo
.......[O]bjection he did not mention other jewelries. He specified
one bracelet and one wrist watch.
Court
.......[W]itness may answer.
Witness
.......a.......[T]here were sir.
Fiscal
.......q.......[W]hat are they?
Witness
.......a.......[C]lothes and a hair blower because I was in a
hurry."[36]
6
During his arrest, the following stolen valuables were found in his bag:
P5,000 cash, two bracelets, two rings and a pair of earrings, which Ana
Marinay identified as belonging to her; and one wristwatch and a bracelet
belonging to Amy de Guzman.[37] Unrebutted is the presumption that a
person in possession of stolen personal effects is considered the author of
the crime.
Third Issue: Crime(s) Committed
We do not, however, agree with the trial court that appellant is guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with rape. This felony contemplates a
situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to
gain, personal property belonging to another; and rape is committed on
the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.[38]
Such factual circumstance does not obtain here. As related by Private
Complainant Amy de Guzman, accused-appellant suddenly jumped over
the counter, strangled her, poked a knife at the left side of her neck, pulled
her towards the kitchen where he forced her to undress, and gained carnal
knowledge of her against her will and consent. Thereafter, he ordered her
to proceed upstairs to get some clothes, so he could bring her out, saying
he was not leaving her alive. At this point, appellant conceived the idea of
robbery because, before they could reach the upper floor, he suddenly
pulled Amy down and started mauling her until she lost consciousness;
then he freely ransacked the place. Leaving Amy for dead after repeatedly
banging her head, first on the wall, then on the toilet bowl, he took her
bracelet, ring and wristwatch. He then proceeded upstairs where he took
as well the jewelry box containing other valuables belonging to his victim's
employer.
Under these circumstances, appellant cannot be convicted of the special
complex crime of robbery with rape. However, since it was clearly proven
beyond reasonable doubt that he raped Amy de Guzman and thereafter
robbed her and Ana Marinay of valuables totaling P16,000, he committed
two separate offenses -- rape with the use of a deadly weapon and simple
robbery with force and intimidation against persons.
Appellant may well be convicted of the separate offenses of rape and
robbery notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged in the
Information is only "Robbery with Rape." In a similar case, People v.
Barrientos,[39] this Court held:
"x x x Controlling in an Information should not be the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by
and large, mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but
the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. Neither is it the technical name given to the offense
by the prosecutor, more than the allegations made by him, that
should predominate in determining the true character of the crime.
There should also be no problem in convicting an accused of two
or more crimes erroneously charged in one information or
complaint, but later proven to be independent crimes, as if they
were made the subject of separate complaints or informations."
In the case at bar, we find the Information filed against appellant to have
sufficiently alleged all the elements necessary to convict him of the two
separate crimes of rape and robbery. Needless to state, appellant failed,
before his arraignment, to move for the quashal of the Information which
appeared to charge more than one offense. He has thereby waived any
objection and may thus be found guilty of as many offenses as those
charged in the Information and proven during the trial.[40]

Fourth Issue: Dwelling as an Aggravating Circumstance
Dwelling aggravates a felony when the crime was committed in the
residence of the offended party and the latter has not given any
provocation.[41] It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily
because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human abode.
[42] As one commentator puts it, ones dwelling place is a sanctuary
worthy of respect; thus, one who slanders another in the latters house is
more severely punished than one who offends him elsewhere.[43]
According to Cuello Calon, the commission of the crime in anothers
dwelling shows worse perversity and produces graver alarm.[44]
In the case at bar, the building where the two offenses were committed
was not entirely for dwelling purposes. The evidence shows that it
consisted of two floors: the ground floor, which was being operated as a
video rental shop, and the upper floor, which was used as a residence. It
was in the video rental shop where the rape was committed. True, the
victim was dragged to the kitchen and toilet but these two sections were
adjacent to and formed parts of the store. Being a commercial shop that
caters to the public, the video rental outlet was open to the public. As
such, it is not attributed the sanctity of privacy that jurisprudence accords
to residential abodes. Hence, dwelling cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in the crime of rape.
7
must be supported by proof still stands. It must be anchored on proof
showing that the claimant experienced moral suffering, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation or similar injury.[52] The private complainants, however,
did not present any evidence of their moral sufferings as a result of the
robbery. Thus, there is no basis for the grant of moral damages in
connection with the robbery.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-
Appellant Alexander Tao y Caballero is found guilty of two separate
offenses: rape and robbery. For the crime of rape, appellant is hereby
SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua and to pay Private Complainant Amy
de Guzman P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P30,000 as moral
damages. For the crime of robbery, appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum; and to pay De Guzman P2,487.65 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED. 6/21/00 1:43 PM
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.

Proper Penalties

3. INUNDATION
Under Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
"[w]henever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
E N BA N C
weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death." Under
Article 63 of the same Code, reclusion perpetua is the appropriate penalty
imposable upon accused-appellant for the crime of rape, inasmuch as no PEOPLE OF THE G. R. No. 170470
aggravating circumstance was proven. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, PHILIPPINES,
the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon the Appellee, P r e s e n t:
finding of the fact of rape.[45] Moral damages may additionally be
awarded to the victim in such amount as the Court deems just, without the PA N G A N I BA N , C . J . ,
need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof.[46] In rape cases, it is - ve r s u s - PUNO,
recognized that the victim's moral injury is concomitant with and QUISUMBING,
necessarily results from the odiousness of the crime to warrant the grant Y N A R E S - SA N T I AG O ,
of moral damages.[47] In the instant case, we deem it appropriate to grant E D N A M A L N G A N y M AYO , SA N D OVA L- G U T I E R R E Z ,
Amy de Guzman P30,000 as moral damages. However, since no Appellant. CA R P I O ,
aggravating circumstance attended the rape, no exemplary damages may AU ST R I A - M A RT I N E Z ,
be awarded.[48] CORONA,
CA R P I O M O R A L E S ,
For the crime of robbery committed under the circumstances of this case, CA L L E J O , S R . ,
the Code provides the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum AZCUNA,
period to prision mayor in its medium period.[49] Further, the appellant is TINGA,
also entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. For the CHICO-NAZARIO,
actual damages incurred by Amy de Guzman in connection with her GARCIA, and
physical injuries, the lower court awarded P2,687.65, based on receipts VELASCO, JR., JJ.
submitted by her. A recomputation of the receipts, however, reveals a total
of only P2,487.65. We, therefore, reduce the award accordingly. The trial Promulgated:
court also ordered appellant "to restore to the victim her gold ring of
undetermined amount," which was supposedly unrecovered. Upon an September 26, 2006
examination of the records, we note that the Information alleges the x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
robbery of the following items: P5,000 cash, three (3) bracelets, two rings, - - x
one pair of earrings and one (1) Alba wristwatch. Except for the cash
money, which has already been returned to Ana Marinay by the police, the D E C I S I O N
other items were offered as evidence[50] and submitted to the custody of
the trial court. Upon Motion[51] of Ana Marinay and Amy de Guzman, the
release to them of these items was ordered by this Court via a Resolution
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
issued on December 7, 1999. The stolen items are therefore all accounted
for. Thus, we find no sufficient basis for the trial court's order for the
appellant to return a "gold ring of undetermined amount."
The Case

In robbery and other common crimes, the grant of moral damages is not Fo r r ev i e w i s t h e D e c i s i o n [ 1 ] o f t h e C o u r t o f
automatic, unlike in rape cases. The rule that a claim for moral damages A p p e a l s i n CA - G . R . C R H C N o . 0 1 1 3 9 p r o m u l g a te d o n 2

S e p te m b e r 2 0 0 5 , a ffi r m i n g w i t h m o d i fi c a t i o n t h e
J u d g m e n t [ 2 ] o f t h e R e g i o n a l Tr i a l C o u r t ( RTC ) o f M a n i l a ,
Branch 41, in Criminal Case No. 01-188424 promulgated
o n 1 3 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 3 , fi n d i n g a p p e l l a n t E d n a M a l n g a n y
M ayo ( E d n a ) g u i l t y b eyo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t o f t h e c r i m e
o f A r s o n w i t h M u l t i p l e H o m i c i d e o r A r s o n r e s u l t i n g t o t h e
d e a t h o f s i x ( 6 ) p e o p l e , a n d s e n t e n c i n g h e r t o s u ff e r t h e
penalty of death.
T h e Fa c t s
A s s u m m a r i z e d [ 3 ] by t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , the
a n te c e d e n t f a c t s a r e a s f o l l o w s :
Fr o m t h e p e r s o n a l a c c o u n t o f R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o ,
t h e B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n i n t h e a r e a , a s w e l l a s t h e
p e r s o n a l a c c o u n t o f t h e p e d i c a b d r i ve r n a m e d R o l a n d o
Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on Januar y 2, 2001
w h e n R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o a n d h i s t a n o d s s aw t h e a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t E D N A , o n e h i r e d a s a h o u s e m a i d by R o b e r t o
S e p a r a , S r. , w i t h h e r h e a d t u r n i n g i n d i ff e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s ,
h u r r i e d l y l e av i n g t h e h o u s e o f h e r e m p l oye r a t N o . 1 7 2
M o d e r n a S t r e e t , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a . S h e w a s s e e n t o
h ave b o a r d e d a p e d i c a b w h i c h w a s d r i ve n by a p e r s o n
l a te r i d e n t i fi e d a s R o l a n d o G r u t a . S h e w a s h e a r d by t h e
p e d i c a b d r i ve r t o h ave i n s t r u c te d t h a t s h e b e b r o u g h t t o
N i p a St r e e t , b u t u p o n h e r a r r i va l t h e r e , s h e c h a n g e d h e r
m i n d a n d a s ke d t h a t s h e b e b r o u g h t i n s t e a d t o B a l a s a n
S t r e e t w h e r e s h e fi n a l l y a l i g h te d , a f te r p ay i n g f o r h e r f a r e .
T h i r t y m i n u te s l a te r, a t a r o u n d 5 : 1 5 a . m .
B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n B e r n a r d os g r o u p l a te r d i s c ove r e d t h a t
a fi r e g u t te d t h e h o u s e o f t h e e m p l oye r o f t h e h o u s e m a i d .
B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n B e r n a r d o a n d h i s t a n o d s r e s p o n d e d t o
t h e fi r e u p o n h e a r i n g s h o u t s f r o m t h e r e s i d e n t s a n d
t h e r e a f t e r, fi r e m e n f r o m t h e F i r e D i s t r i c t 1 - N C R a r r i ve d a t
t h e fi r e s c e n e t o c o n t a i n t h e fi r e .
W h e n B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n B e r n a r d o r e t u r n e d t o
t h e B a r a n g ay H a l l , h e r e c e i ve d a r e p o r t f r o m p e d i c a b
d r i ve r R o l a n d o G r u t a , w h o w a s a l s o a t a n o d , t h a t s h o r t l y
b e f o r e t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f t h e fi r e , h e s aw a w o m a n ( t h e
housemaid) coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna
S t r e e t , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a a n d h e r e c e i ve d a c a l l f r o m
h i s w i fe te l l i n g h i m o f a w o m a n ( t h e s a m e h o u s e m a i d ) w h o
w a s a c t i n g s t r a n g e l y a n d s u s p i c i o u s l y o n B a l a s a n St r e e t .
B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n B e r n a r d o , R o l a n d o G r u t a a n d t h e
other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the
w o m a n w h o w a s l a te r i d e n t i fi e d a s t h e a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t .
A f te r R o l a n d o G r u t a p o s i t i ve l y i d e n t i fi e d t h e w o m a n a s t h e
same person who lef t No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut,
To n d o , M a n i l a , B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n B e r n a r d o a n d h i s
t a n o d s a p p r e h e n d e d h e r a n d b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e B a r a n g ay
H a l l f o r i nve s t i g a t i o n . At t h e B a r a n g ay H a l l , M e r c e d i t a
M e n d o z a , n e i g h b o r o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. a n d w h o s e
h o u s e w a s a l s o b u r n e d , i d e n t i fi e d t h e w o m a n a s a c c u s e d -
appellant EDNA who was the housemaid of Rober to
S e p a r a , S r. U p o n i n s p e c t i o n , a d i s p o s a b l e l i g h t e r w a s
f o u n d i n s i d e a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N As b a g . T h e r e a f t e r,
a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A c o n fe s s e d t o B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n
Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angr y residents
o u t s i d e t h e B a r a n g ay H a l l t h a t s h e s e t h e r e m p l o ye r s
h o u s e o n fi r e b e c a u s e s h e h a d n o t b e e n p a i d h e r s a l a r y
f o r a b o u t a ye a r a n d t h a t s h e w a n te d t o g o h o m e t o h e r
p r ov i n c e b u t h e r e m p l oye r t o l d h e r t o j u s t r i d e a
broomstick in going home.
A c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A wa s t h e n t u r n e d ove r
8
t o a r s o n i nve s t i g a t o r s h e a d e d by S [ F ] O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n ,
w h o b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e S a n L a z a r o F i r e St a t i o n i n S t a .
C r u z , M a n i l a w h e r e s h e wa s f u r t h e r i nve s t i g a te d a n d t h e n
detained.
When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San
L a z a r o F i r e S t a t i o n t o g i ve h e r s w o r n s t a te m e n t , s h e h a d
the oppor tunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA at the
l a t te r s d e te n t i o n c e l l w hy s h e d i d t h e b u r n i n g o f h e r
e m p l oye r s h o u s e a n d a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A r e p l i e d
t h a t s h e s et t h e h o u s e o n fi r e b e c a u s e w h e n s h e a s ke d
p e r m i s s i o n t o g o h o m e t o h e r p r ov i n c e , t h e w i fe o f h e r
e m p l oye r R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. , n a m e d V i r g i n i a S e p a r a
( s i c ) s h o u te d a t h e r: S i g e u m u w i ka , p a g d a t i n g m o m a p u t i
ka n a . S u m a kay ka s a wa l i s , p a g d a t i n g m o m a p u t i ka n a
( TS N , J a n u a r y 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , p . 6 ) ( G o a h e a d , w h e n yo u a r r i ve
yo u r c o l o r w o u l d b e f a i r a l r e a d y. R i d e a b r o o m s t i c k , w h e n
yo u a r r i ve yo u r c o l o r w o u l d b e f a i r a l r e a d y. ) A n d w h e n
M e r c e d i t a M e n d o z a a s ke d a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A h o w
s h e b u r n e d t h e h o u s e , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A t o l d h e r:
Na g l u kot a ko n g m a r a m i n g d i ya r yo , s i n i n d i h a n ko n g
d i s p o s a b l e l i g h te r a t h i n a g i s ko s a i b a b aw n g l a m e s a s a
l o o b n g b a h ay ( TS N , J a n u a r y 2 2 , 2 0 0 2 , p . 7 . ) ( I
crumpled news papers, lighted them with a disposable
lighter and threw them on top of the table inside the
h o u s e . )
W h e n i n te r v i e w e d by C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z , a
r e p o r te r o f A B S - C B N N e t w o r k , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A
w h i l e u n d e r d e te n t i o n ( s i c ) wa s h e a r d by S FO 4 ( s i c )
D a n i l o Ta l u s a n a s h av i n g a d m i t te d t h e c r i m e a n d ev e n
n a r r a te d t h e m a n n e r h o w s h e a c c o m p l i s h e d i t . S FO 4 ( s i c )
D a n i l o Ta l u s a n w a s a b l e t o h e a r t h e s a m e c o n fe s s i o n , t h i s
t i m e a t h i s h o m e , w h i l e w a t c h i n g t h e t e l ev i s i o n p r o g r a m
Tr u e C r i m e h o s te d by G u s A b e l g a s a l s o o f A B S - C B N
Net work.
T h e fi r e r e s u l t e d i n [ t h e ] d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e
h o u s e o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. a n d o t h e r a d j o i n i n g h o u s e s
a n d t h e d e a t h o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. a n d V i r g i n i a S e p a r a
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r f o u r ( 4 ) c h i l d r e n , n a m e l y: M i c h a e l ,
D a p h n e , P r i s c i l l a a n d R o b e r t o , J r.
O n 9 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 1 , a n I n f o r m a t i o n [ 4 ] w a s fi l e d
b e f o r e t h e RTC o f M a n i l a , B r a n c h 4 1 , c h a r g i n g a c c u s e d -
appellant with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide.
T h e c a s e wa s d o c ke t e d a s C r i m i n a l C a s e N o . 0 1 - 1 8 8 4 2 4 .
T h e a c c u s a t o r y p o r t i o n o f s a i d I n f o r m a t i o n p r ov i d e s :
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
i n te n t t o c a u s e d a m a g e , d i d t h e n a n d t h e r e w i l l f u l ly,
u n l aw f u l l y, fe l o n i o u s ly a n d d e l i b e r a te l y s e t fi r e u p o n
t h e t w o - s t o r ey r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f R O B E RTO
S E PA R A a n d f a m i l y m o s t l y m a d e o f w o o d e n
m a te r i a l s l o c a te d a t N o . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t ,
To n d o , t h i s c i t y, by l i g h t i n g c r u m p l e d n e w s p a p e r
w i t h t h e u s e o f d i s p o s a b l e l i g h te r i n s i d e s a i d h o u s e
k n o w i n g t h e s a m e t o b e a n i n h a b i te d h o u s e a n d
s i t u a te d i n a t h i c k ly p o p u l a te d p l a c e a n d a s a
c o n s e q u e n c e t h e r e o f a c o n fl a g r a t i o n e n s u e d a n d t h e
s a i d b u i l d i n g , t o g e t h e r w i t h s o m e s eve n ( 7 )
a d j o i n i n g r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e s , w e r e r a z e d by fi r e ;
t h a t by r e a s o n a n d o n t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h e s a i d fi r e ,
t h e f o l l o w i n g , n a m e l y,
1. R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. , 4 5 ye a r s o f a g e
 9
2. V i r g i n i a S e p a r a y M e n d o z a , 4 0 ye a r s
of age Q: W h e n wa s t h a t ?
3. M i c h a e l S e p a r a , 2 4 ye a r s o f a g e
4. D a p h n e S e p a r a , 1 8 ye a r s o f a g e A: L a s t Fr i d ay, s i r. I t wa s s h o w n i n Tr u e C r i m e o f G u s
5. P r i s c i l l a S e p a r a , 1 4 ye a r s o f a g e A b e l g a s . S h e wa s i n te r v i e w e d a t t h e C i t y J a i l a n d
6. R o b e r t o S e p a r a , J r. , 1 1 ye a r s o f a g e s h e a d m i t te d t h a t s h e w a s t h e o n e w h o a u t h o r e d
t h e c r i m e , s i r.
sustained burn injuries which were the
d i r e c t c a u s e o f t h e i r d e a t h i m m e d i a te l y P r o s . R e b a g ay:
t h e r e a f t e r. [ 5 ] A n d w h e r e w e r e yo u w h e n t h a t a d m i s s i o n t o G u s A b e l g a s
wa s m a d e ?

When arraigned, accused-appellant with A: I wa s i n t h e h o u s e a n d I j u s t s aw i t o n t v, s i r.

a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l d e o fi c i o , p l e a d e d [ 6 ] N o t G u i l t y t o
t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . T h e r e a f te r, t r i a l e n s u e d . [ 7 ]
T h e p r o s e c u t i o n p r e s e n te d fi ve ( 5 ) w i t n e s s e s ,
n a m e l y, S P O 4 [ 8 ] D a n i l o Ta l u s a n , R o l a n d o G r u t a , R e m i g i o
B e r n a r d o , M e r c e d i t a M e n d o z a a n d R o d o l f o M ov i l l a t o
establish its charge that accused-appellant Edna
c o m m i t te d t h e c r i m e o f a r s o n w i t h m u l t i p l e h o m i c i d e .
Q: W h a t w a s t h a t a d m i s s i o n t h a t yo u h e a r d p e r s o n a l l y,
w h e n yo u w e r e p r e s e n t , w h e n t h e a c c u s e d m a d e
t h e c o n fe s s i o n t o C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z ?
A: N a g l u kot p o s i ya n g p a p e l , s i n i d i h a n n i ya n g l i g h t e r
a t i n i l a gay n i ya s a i b a b a w n g m e s a y u n g m ga
d i ya r yo a t s i n u n o g n i ya .

S P O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n , a r s o n i nve s t i g a t o r,
te s t i fi e d t h a t h e w a s o n e o f t h o s e w h o r e s p o n d e d t o t h e
fi r e t h a t o c c u r r e d o n 2 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 1 a n d w h i c h st a r te d a t
N o . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a . H e st a t e d t h a t
t h e fi r e k i l l e d R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. a n d a l l t h e o t h e r
m e m b e r s o f h i s f a m i l y, n a m e l y h i s w i fe , V i r g i n i a , a n d h i s
c h i l d r e n , M i c h a e l , D a p h n e , P r i s c i l l a a n d R o b e r t o , J r. ; t h e
fi r e a l s o d e s t r oye d t h e i r a b o d e a s w e l l a s s i x n e i g h b o r i n g
h o u s e s . H e l i ke w i s e te s t i fi e d t h a t h e t w i c e h e a r d a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t o n c e w h i l e t h e l a t te r w a s b e i n g i n t e r v i e w e d by
C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z , a r e p o r te r o f A B S - C B N , a n d t h e o t h e r
t i m e w h e n i t w a s s h o w n o n c h a n n e l 2 o n te l ev i s i o n d u r i n g
t h e a i r i n g o f t h e te l ev i s i o n p r o g r a m e n t i t l e d Tr u e C r i m e
h o s te d by G u s A b e l g a s c o n f e s s t o h av i n g c o m m i t te d t h e
c r i m e c h a r g e d , t o w i t:
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
B a s e d o n yo u r i nve s t i g a t i o n , w a s t h e r e a ny
occasion when the accused Edna Malngan
a d m i t te d t o t h e b u r n i n g o f t h e h o u s e o f t h e
S e p a r a Fa m i l y ?
x x x x
Witness:
Ye s , s i r.
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
When was that?
A: O n J a n u a r y 2 s h e w a s i n te r v i e w e d by t h e m e d i a , s i r.
T h e o n e w h o t o o k t h e c ove r a g e wa s C a r m e l i t a
Va l d e z o f C h a n n e l 2 , A B S - C B N . T h ey h ave a
f o o t a g e t h a t E d n a a d m i t te d b e f o r e t h e m , s i r.
x x x x
Q: A s i d e f r o m t h a t s t a te m e n t , wa s t h e r e a ny o t h e r
st a te m e n t m a d e by t h e a c c u s e d E d n a M a l n g a n ?
A: Ye s , s i r. Kaya p o n i ya n a g a wa yo n ga l i t p o s i ya s a
ka nya n g a m o n a s i V i r g i n i a , h i n d i s i ya
p i n a s u we l d o a t g u sto n a p o n i ya n g u m u w i n a
( s i c ) ayaw s i ya n g p aya g a n . Na g s a l i t a p a p o s a
ka nya n a , S u m a kay ka n a l a n g s a wa l i s .
Pa g b a l i k m o d i to m a p u t i ka n a . ( s i c ) Yo n p o a n g
s i n a b i n g ka nya n g a m o .
At t y. M a s w e n g :
T h a t w a s a s t a te m e n t o f a n a l l e g e d d e a d p e r s o n , yo u r
H o n o r.
C o u r t:
S a b i n i Va l d e s , h a ?
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
S a b i n i E d n a M a l n ga n kay C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z , Yo u r H o n o r.
C o u r t:
D o u b l e h e a r s ay n a yo n .
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
N o , Yo u r H o n o r, t h e w i t n e s s w a s p r e s e n t , Yo u r H o n o r,
w h e n t h a t c o n f e s s i o n w a s m a d e by t h e a c c u s e d
t o C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z . [ 9 ]
R o l a n d o G r u t a , t h e p e d i c a b d r i ve r a n d o n e o f t h e
b a r a n g ay t a n o d s i n t h e a r e a , te s t i fi e d :

Q: A n d w h e r e w e r e yo u w h e n E d n a M a l n g a n m a d e t h a t P r o s . R e b a g ay:
st a te m e n t o r a d m i s s i o n t o C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z o f M r. W i t n e s s , w h a t i s yo u r p r o f e s s i o n ?
ABS-CBN?
A: S i d e c a r d r i ve r, s i r.
A: I wa s a t o u r o ffi c e , s i r.
Q: On January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the morning,
Q: Wa s t h e r e a ny o t h e r o c c a s i o n w h e r e i n t h e a c c u s e d d o yo u r e c a l l w h e r e w e r e ( s i c ) yo u ?
m a d e a n o t h e r c o n f e s s i o n r e l a t i ve t o t h e
admission of the crime? A: I wa s a t t h e c o r n e r o f M o d e r n a S t r e e t , s i r.

A: Ye s , s i r. P r o s . R e b a g ay:
 10
A n d w h i l e yo u w e r e a t t h e c o r n e r o f M o d e r n a S t . , A: N a g m a m a d a l i p o s i ya n g l u m a ka d a t p a l i n ga -
w h a t h a p p e n e d i f a ny, M r. W i t n e s s ? l i n g a .

A: I s aw E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e d o o r o f t h e h o u s e o f x x x x
R o b e r t o S e p a r a , s i r.
Q: A f te r s h e b o a r d e d yo u r p e d i c a b , w h a t
Q: D o yo u k n o w t h e n u m b e r o f t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a h a p p e n e d , i f a ny ?
Fa m i ly ?
A: N a g p a h a t i d p o s i ya s a a k i n .
A: 1 7 2 M o d e r n a S t . , B a l u t , To n d o , M a n i l a , s i r.
Q: Where?
x x x x
A: To N i p a S t r e e t , s i r.
Q: A n d yo u s a i d yo u s aw E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e
h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y. H o w f a r i s t h a t Q: D i d yo u b r i n g h e r t o N i p a St r e e t a s s h e
h o u s e f r o m t h e p l a c e w h e r e yo u w e r e w a i t i n g a t r e q u e s te d ?
t h e c o r n e r o f M o d e r n a a n d Pa u l i n o S t r e e t s ?
A: Ye s , s i r.
A: A b o u t t h r e e m e te r s f r o m M o d e r n a a n d Pa u l i n o
S t r e e t s w h e r e my p e d i c a b wa s p l a c e d . M y x x x x
d i s t a n c e wa s a b o u t t h r e e m e te r s , s i r.
Q: Yo u s a i d t h a t yo u b r o u g h t h e r t o N i p a S t r e e t .
x x x x W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n yo u g o ( s i c ) t h e r e a t
N i p a St r e e t , i f a ny ?
Q: A n d h o w d i d yo u k n o w t h a t t h e h o u s e w h e r e
Edna came out is that of the house of the A: N a g p a h i n to p o s i ya d o o n n g s a g l i t , m ga
S e p a r a Fa m i l y ? t a t l o n g m i n u to p o .

A: M i s m o n g n a k i t a p o n g d a l a wa n g m a t a ko n a Q: W h a t d i d s h e d o w h e n s h e a s ke d ( yo u ) t o st o p
d o o n s i ya ga l i n g s a b a h ay n g S e p a ra there for three minutes?
Fa m i ly.
A: A f te r t h r e e m i n u te s s h e r e q u e s te d m e t o b r i n g
Q: H o w l o n g h ave yo u k n o w n t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y, i f h e r d i r e c t l y t o B a l a s a n St r e e t , s i r.
yo u k n o w t h e m ?
x x x x
A: A b o u t t w o ye a r s , s i r.
Q: W h a t h a p p e n e d a f te r t h a t ?
Q: H o w a b o u t t h i s E d n a , t h e o n e yo u j u s t p o i n te d
( t o ) aw h i l e a g o ? D o yo u k n o w h e r p r i o r t o A: W h e n w e a r r i ve d t h e r e , s h e a l i g h te d a n d p ay
January 2, 2001? ( s i c ) P 5 . 0 0 , s i r.

A: Ye s , s i r. I k n e w ( s i c ) h e r f o r t w o ye a r s . Q A n d t h e n w h a t t r a n s p i r e d a f te r s h e a l i g h te d
f r o m yo u r p e d i c a b ?
C o u r t:
W hy ? Witness:
I w e n t h o m e a n d I l o o ke d f o r a n o t h e r p a s s e n g e r, s i r.
Witness:
M a d a l a s ko p o s i ya n g m a g i n g p a s a h e r o n g a k i n g P r o s . R e b a g ay:
p e d i c a b . A f te r t h a t , w h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n yo u w e r e o n yo u w ay
t o yo u r h o u s e t o l o o k f o r p a s s e n g e r s ?
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
H o w a b o u t t h e S e p a r a f a m i l y ? W hy d o yo u k n o w A Na k i t a ko n a n g a p o n a p a g d a t i n g ko s a
them? M o d e r n a , n a g l a l a g a b l a b n a a p oy.

A: T h ey w e r e t h e e m p l oye r s o f E d n a , s i r. Q: Fr o m w h a t p l a c e wa s t h a t fi r e c o m i n g o u t ?

Q: Yo u s a i d yo u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e
h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y. W h a t
h a p p e n e d w h e n yo u s aw E d n a c o m i n g o u t
f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y ?
A: Wa l a p a p o n g a n o ya n n a i s a kay ko n a s i ya s a
s i d e c a r.
Q: A n d w h a t d i d yo u o b s e r ve f r o m E d n a w h e n yo u
saw her coming out from the house of the
Separa family?
A: Fr o m t h e h o u s e o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a Fa m i l y, s i r.
x x x x
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
A f te r yo u n o t i c e d t h a t t h e r e wa s a fi r e f r o m t h e h o u s e
o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a Fa m i ly, w h a t d i d yo u d o
i f a ny ?
A: S i ye m p re p o , i s a n g B a ra n gay Ta n o d p o a ko ,
n a g r e s p o n d e n a p o ka m i s a s u n o g .
B i n u ks a n n a p o n g C h a i r m a n n a m i n g y u n g
 11
t a n g ke , b i n o m b a n a p o n a m i n g y u n g a p oy
n g t u b i g . x x x x

Q: A f te r t h a t i n c i d e n t , M r. W i t n e s s , h ave yo u s e e n P r o s . R e b a g ay:
E d n a A g a i n ( s i c ) . Yo u s a i d t h a t yo u r e s p o n d e d t o t h e p l a c e , w h a t
t r a n s p i r e d a f t e r yo u r e s p o n d e d t o t h e p l a c e ?
A: N o , s i r.
I yo n n ga p o a n g n a g s a b i m ay l u m a b a s n a i s a n g b a b a e
P r o s . R e b a g ay: p o n o o n s a b a h ay n a n a g m a m a d a l i h a b a n g m ay
A n d a f te r t h a t i n c i d e n t , d i d yo u c o m e t o k n o w i f E d n a s u n o g , m e i s a n g b a r a n gay t a n o d p o a ko n g n a g s a b i
was apprehended or not? m ay h u m a h a n g o s n a i s a n g b a b a e n a m ay d a l a n g
b a g p a p u n t a p o ro o n p a l a b a s n g s a s a k ya n , s i r.
x x x x
Q: And so what happened?
A: I w a s c a l l e d by o u r B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n i n
o r d e r t o i d e n t i f y E d n a , s i r. S i ye m p re h i n d i n a m a n a ko n a g t a n o n g ku n g s i n o n g ayo n
m ay d u m a t i n g ga l i n g n a s a b a h ay n a m i n g , m ay
x x x x[10] t u m a wa g , t u m a wa g p o s i Ko n s e h a l a A l fo n s o n a m ay
i s a n g b a b a e n a h i n d i m a p a k a l i d o o n s a C a l l e Pe d ro
A l fo n s o , ke ko n s e h a l n a b a ka i to s a b i n i ya i yo n g
R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o , B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n o f t h e g a n i to g a n o o n n i re s p o n d e h a n ko p o , s i r.
a r e a w h e r e t h e fi r e o c c u r r e d , st a t e d :
Q: W h e r e d i d yo u r e s p o n d ?
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
A: At B a l a s a n , s i r, b u t i t s n o t t h e a r e a o f my
O n J a n u a r y 2 , 2 0 0 1 , d o yo u r e c a l l i f t h e r e i s a fi r e jurisdiction.
t h a t o c c u r r e d s o m e w h e r e i n yo u r a r e a o f
j u r i s d i c t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y M o d e r n a St r e e t ? x x x x

A: Ye s , s i r. Q: W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n yo u r e a c h e d t h a t p l a c e ?

Q: N o w, w h e r e w e r e yo u w h e n t h i s i n c i d e n t A: S i ya p o a n g n a h u l i ko d o o n , s i r.
happened?
C o u r t:
A: Ka s i u ga l i ko n a p o t u w i n g u m a ga n g - u m a g a p o a ko n a Witness pointing to accused Edna Malngan.
p u p u n t a s a b a r a n gay H a l l m ga s i g u ro 6 : 0 0 o r 5 : 0 0 o
c l o c k, m e s u m i g aw n g s u n o g n i re s p o n d e h a n n a m i n P r o s . R e b a g ay:
i yo n g s u n o g e h m e d a l a ka m i n g fi re . And what happened?

C o u r t: A: I b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e b a r a n g ay h a l l , s i r.
Yo u j u s t a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n . W h e r e w e r e yo u w h e n
this incident happened? Q: A n d w h a t h a p p e n e d a t t h e b a r a n g ay h a l l ?

Witness:
I wa s a t t h e B a r a n g ay H a l l , Yo u r H o n o r.
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
A n d yo u s a i d t h a t t h e r e wa s a fi r e t h a t o c c u r r e d ,
w h a t d i d yo u d o ?
Witness:
I yo n n ga n a g r e s p o n d e ka m i d o o n s a s u n o g e h
n a k i t a ko i yo n g s u n o g m u k h a t a l a ga n g a r s o n d a h i l
n a p a ka l a k i ka a g a d , m e ro n p o n g m g a t i p o n g I yo n g
n a m a t ay p o c o n t r a c to r p o i yo n e h kaya s i g u ro
n a p a ka ra m i n g ka l a t n g m ga p i n t u ra , m ga c o n t a i n e r,
kaya h i n d i p o n a m i n n a a p u l a ka a g a d i yo n g a p oy,
n a s u n o g u l t i m o i yo n g fi r e t a n k n a m i n s a l a ka s , s i r.
I n e m b e st i ga h a n ko , k i n u h a n a m i n g i yo n g b a g n i ya , m e
l i g h te r s i ya e h . I n a m i n n i ya p o s a a m i n n a kaya n i ya
s i n u n o g h i n d i s i ya p i n a s a s a h o d n g m o re o r l e s s
i s a n g t a o n n a e h . N gayo n s a b i ko b a k i t e h g u sto ko
n g u m u w i n g p r o b i n s ya a n g s a b i s a a k i n n g a m o ko
s u m a kay n a l a n g d aw p o a ko n g wa l i s t i n g t i n g p a r a
m a ka u w i , s i r.
At t y. H e r m a n :
We w o u l d l i ke t o o b j e c t , Yo u r H o n o r o n t h e g r o u n d
t h a t t h a t i s h e a r s ay.
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
T h a t i s n o t a h e a r s ay s t a te m e n t , Yo u r H o n o r,
straight from the mouth of the accused.

P r o s . R e b a g ay: At t y. H e r m a n :
N o w, w i l l yo u p l e a s e te l l u s w h e r e t h i s fi r e I t s n o t u n d e r t h e exe m p t i o n u n d e r t h e R u l e s o f
occurred? C o u r t , Yo u r H o n o r. H e i s te s t i f y i n g a c c o r d i n g t o
what he has heard.
A: At t h e h o u s e o f t h e s i x v i c t i m s , s i r.
C o u r t:
Q: Whose house is that? T h a t s p a r t o f t h e n a r r a t i o n . W h e t h e r i t i s t r u e o r
n o t , t h a t s a n o t h e r m a t te r. L e t i t r e m a i n .
A: T h e h o u s e o f t h e v i c t i m s , s i r.
 12
P r o s . R e b a g ay: Mendoza Cifara (sic)?
N o w, w h o w e r e p r e s e n t w h e n t h e a c c u s e d a r e te l l i n g
yo u t h i s ? A: M y h u s b a n d , s i r.

I yo n n ga i yo n g m ga t a n o d ko , m a m a m aya n d o o n Q:
n a k a p a l i g i d , s i ye m p re m ay s u n o g n a g k a ka g u l o ,
g u st o n g a s i ya n g ku n i n n g m ga m a m a m aya n p a r a
s a k t a n h i n d i ko m a i b i gay p a p a t ay i n s i ya g a wa n g
m ay n a m a t ay e h a n i m n a t a o a n d n a m a t ay, kaya
i yo n g m ga t a o k i n o ko n t r o l s i ya m a d i d i s g ra s ya s i ya Q:
d a h i l p i n - p o i n te d p o s i ya , Yo u r H o n o r, i yo n g d a m i n a
i yo n l i b o i yo n g n a k a p a l i g i d d o o n s a b a ra n g ay h a l l
n a p a ka h i ra p a wa t i n . G u st o n g - g u sto s i ya n g ku n i n n g A:
m ga t a o n g - b aya n , n a g a l i t d a h i l a n g d a m i n g b a h ay
h o n g n a s u n o g . [ 1 1 ] Q:
Fo r h e r p a r t , M e r c e d i t a M e n d o z a , o n e o f t h e
n e i g h b o r s o f t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y a n d w h o s e h o u s e wa s o n e A:
o f t h o s e d e s t r oye d by t h e fi r e , r e c o u n te d :
Q:
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
Madam Witness, on January 2, 2001, do
yo u r e c a l l w h e r e w e r e yo u r e s i d i n g t h e n ? A:
A: Ye s , s i r.
Q:
Q: W h e r e w e r e yo u r e s i d i n g a t ?
W h a t i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f yo u r h u s b a n d t o
t h e l a te V i r g i n i a M e n d o z a C i f a r a ( s i c ) ?
A: T h ey w e r e fi r s t c o u s i n s , s i r.
H o w f a r i s yo u r h o u s e f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e
C i f a r a ( s i c ) f a m i ly ?
M a g ka d i k i t l a n g p o . Pa d e r l a n g a n g p a g i t a n .
Yo u s a i d t h a t E d n a M a l n g a n w a s w o r k i n g w i t h
t h e C i f a r a ( s i c ) f a m i l y. W h a t i s t h e w o r k
of Edna Malngan?
Na n g a n ga m u h a n p o . H o u s e h e l p e r, s i r.
H o w l o n g d o yo u k n o w E d n a M a l n g a n a s
house helper of the Cifara (sic) family?
I c a n n o t e s t i m a t e b u t s h e s t aye d t h e r e f o r
t h r e e t o f o u r ye a r s , s i r.
D o yo u k n o w w h o c a u s e d t h e b u r n i n g o f t h e
h o u s e o f t h e C i f a r a ( s i c ) f a m i ly ?

A: At N o . 1 7 0 M o d e r n a St . , B a l u t , Witness:
To n d o , M a n i l a , s i r. E d n a M a l n g a n , s i r.

Q: W hy d i d yo u t r a n s fe r yo u r r e s i d e n c e ? Aw h i l e P r o s . R e b a g ay:
a g o yo u te s t i fi e d t h a t yo u a r e n o w W hy d o yo u k n o w t h a t i t w a s E d n a M a l n g a n w h o
residing at 147 Moderna St., Balut, burned the house of the Cifara (sic)
To n d o , M a n i l a ? family?

A: B e c a u s e o u r h o u s e w a s b u r n e d , s i r. A: W h e n t h e fi r e i n c i d e n t h a p p e n e d , s i r, o n
Januar y 3, we went to San Lazaro Fire
Q: More or less, how much did the loss incurred Station and I saw Edna Malngan detained
o n t h e b u r n i n g o f yo u r h o u s e ( s i c ) ? t h e r e , s i r.

A: More or less, P100,000.00, sir Q: A n d s o w h a t i s yo u r b a s i s i n p o i n t i n g t o E d n a

Malngan as the culprit or the one who
Q: D o yo u k n o w t h e a c c u s e d i n t h i s burned the house of the Cifara (sic)
case Edna Malngan? family?

A: Ye s , s i r. A: I t a l ke d t o h e r w h e n w e w e n t t h e r e a t t h a t
d ay, s i r.
Q: W hy d o yo u k n o w h e r ?
Q: What transpired then?
A: She is the house helper of the family who
w e r e ( s i c ) b u r n e d , s i r. A: I t a l ke d t o h e r a n d I t o l d h e r, E d n a , b a k i t m o
n a m a n g i n a wa y u n g g a n u n ?
Q: What family?
Q: A n d w h a t wa s t h e a n s w e r o f E d n a ?
A: C i f a r a ( s i c ) f a m i l y, s i r.
A: S h e a n s w e r e d , Ka s i p a g n a g p a p a a l a m a ko
Q: W h o i n p a r t i c u l a r d o yo u k n o w a m o n g C i f a r a s a ka nya n g u m u w i n g p r o b i n s ya ,
( s i c ) f a m i ly ? n a g p a p a a l a m p o s i ya n g u m u w i n g
p r o b i n s ya a n g s i n a s a b i d aw p o s a ka nya
A: T h e w o m a n , s i r. n i B a by C i fa ra ( s i c ) n a , ( s i c ) S i g e u m u w i
ka , p a g d a t i n g m o m a p u t i ka n a . S u m a kay
Q: What is the name? ka s a wa l i s p a g d a t i n g m o m a p u t i ka n a .

A: V i r g i n i a M e n d o z a C i f a r a ( s i c ) , s i r. P r o s . R e b a g ay:
W h a t i s t h e b a s i s t h e r e t h a t s h e wa s t h e o n e w h o
Q: A r e yo u r e l a t e d t o V i r g i n i a burned the house of the Cifara (sic)

family?
A: I a l s o a s ke d h e r, Pa a n o m o g i n a wa y u n g
s u n o g ? S h e t o l d m e , Na g l u kot a ko n g
m a r a m i n g d i ya r yo , s i n i n d i h a n ko n g
d i s p o s a b l e l i g h te r a t h i n a g i s n i ya s a
i b a b a w n g l a m e s a s a l o o b n g b a h ay .
(sic)[12]
L a s t l y, t h e p r o s e c u t i o n p r e s e n te d R o d o l f o
M ov i l l a , o w n e r o f t h e h o u s e s i t u a te d b e s i d e t h a t o f t h e
S e p a r a f a m i l y. H e te s t i fi e d t h a t h i s h o u s e wa s a l s o g u t te d
by t h e fi r e t h a t k i l l e d t h e S e p a r a f a m i l y a n d t h a t h e t r i e d t o
h e l p s a i d v i c t i m s b u t t o n o ava i l .
T h e p r o s e c u t i o n p r e s e n te d o t h e r d o c u m e n t a r y
ev i d e n c e [ 1 3 ] a n d t h e r e a f te r r e s te d i t s c a s e .
W h e n i t c a m e t i m e f o r t h e d e fe n s e t o p r e s e n t
exc u l p a t o r y ev i d e n c e , i n s t e a d o f d o i n g s o , a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t fi l e d a M ot i o n to Ad m i t D e m u r r e r to E v i d e n c e [ 1 4 ]
a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g D e m u r r e r to E v i d e n c e [ 1 5 ] w i t h t h e
f o r m e r ex p r e s s l y st a t i n g t h a t s a i d D e m u r re r to E v i d e n c e
w a s b e i n g fi l e d x x x w i t h o u t ex p r e s s l e ave o f c o u r t x x
x . [ 1 6 ]
I n h e r D e m u r r e r to E v i d e n c e , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t
a s s e r t s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o ns ev i d e n c e wa s i n s u ffi c i e n t t o
p r ove h e r g u i l t b eyo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g
r e a s o n s : [ 1 7 ] ( a ) t h a t s h e i s c h a r g e d w i t h c r i m e n o t d e fi n e d
a n d p e n a l i z e d by l a w; ( b ) t h a t c i r c u m st a n t i a l ev i d e n c e wa s
i n s u ffi c i e n t t o p r ove h e r g u i l t b eyo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t;
a n d ( c ) t h a t t h e te s t i m o n i e s g i ve n by t h e w i t n e s s e s o f t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n w e r e h e a r s ay, t h u s , i n a d m i s s i b l e i n ev i d e n c e
a g a i n s t h e r.
T h e p r o s e c u t i o n fi l e d i t s C o m m e n t / O p p o s i t i o n t o
a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s D e m u r r e r to E v i d e n c e .
On 13 October 2003, acting on the Demurrer to
E v i d e n c e , t h e RTC p r o m u l g a te d i t s J u d g m e n t [ 1 8 ] w h e r e i n i t
p r o c e e d e d t o r e s o l ve t h e s u b j e c t c a s e b a s e d o n t h e
ev i d e n c e o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . T h e RTC c o n s i d e r e d a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t t o h ave wa i ve d h e r r i g h t t o p r e s e n t ev i d e n c e ,
h av i n g fi l e d t h e D e m u r r e r to E v i d e n c e w i t h o u t l e ave o f
court.
I n fi n d i n g a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E d n a g u i l t y b eyo n d
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple
H o m i c i d e , t h e RTC r u l e d t h a t:
T h e fi r s t a r g u m e n t o f t h e a c c u s e d t h a t
s h e i s c h a r g e d w i t h a n a c t n o t d e fi n e d a n d
p e n a l i z e d by l aw i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . x x x t h e
caption which charges the accused with the crime
of Arson with Multiple Homicide is merely
d e s c r i p t i ve o f t h e c h a r g e o f A r s o n t h a t r e s u l te d
to Multiple Homicide. The fact is that the
a c c u s e d i s c h a r g e d w i t h A r s o n w h i c h r e s u l te d t o
Multiple Homicide (death of victims) and that
c h a r g e i s e m b o d i e d a n d st a t e d i n t h e b o d y o f t h e
information. What is controlling is the allegation
in the body of the Information and not the title or
caption thereof. x x x.
x x x x
13
The second and third arguments will be
d i s c u s s e d j o i n t ly a s t h ey a r e i n te r r e l a te d w i t h
e a c h o t h e r. x x x .
x x x x
[ W ] h i l e t h e r e i s n o d i r e c t ev i d e n c e t h a t p o i n t s t o
the accused in the act of burning the house or
a c t u a l l y st a r t i n g t h e s u b j e c t fi r e , t h e f o l l o w i n g
circumstances that show that the accused
i n te n t i o n a l l y c a u s e d o r wa s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e
s u b j e c t fi r e h ave b e e n d u l y e s t a b l i s h e d :
1. t h a t i m m e d i a te l y b e f o r e t h e
burning of the house, the accused hurriedly and
w i t h h e a d t u r n i n g i n d i ff e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s ( p a l i n g a -
linga) went out of the said house and rode a
pedicab apparently not knowing where to go x x
x;
2. t h a t i m m e d i a te l y a f te r t h e fi r e ,
upon a repor t that there was a woman in Balasan
S t . w h o a p p e a r s c o n f u s e d a n d a p p r e h e n s i ve
( b a l i s a ) , t h e B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n a n d h i s t a n o d s
went there, found the accused and apprehended
h e r a n d b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e b a r a n g ay h a l l a s
s h o w n by t h e te s t i m o ny o f B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n
Remigio Bernardo; and
3. that when she was apprehended
a n d i nve s t i g a te d by t h e b a r a n g ay o ffi c i a l s a n d
w h e n h e r b a g wa s o p e n e d , t h e s a m e c o n t a i n e d a
d i s p o s a b l e l i g h te r a s l i ke w i s e s h o w n by t h e
te s t i m o ny o f t h e B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n .
[ T ] h e t i m i n g o f h e r h u r r i e d d e p a r t u r e a n d n e r vo u s
d e m e a n o r i m m e d i a te l y b e f o r e t h e fi r e w h e n s h e
lef t the house and rode a pedicab and her same
d e m e a n o r, p hys i c a l a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n w h e n
found and apprehended at the same place where
s h e a l i g h te d f r o m t h e p e d i c a b a n d t h e d i s c ove r y
o f t h e l i g h te r i n h e r b a g t h e r e a f te r w h e n
i nve s t i g a t e d i n d i s p u t a b l y s h o w h e r g u i l t a s
charged.
I f t h e r e i s a ny d o u b t o f h e r g u i l t t h a t r e m a i n s w i t h
t h e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ev i d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r, t h e s a m e
i s r e m ove d o r o b l i t e r a te d w i t h t h e
c o n fe s s i o n s / a d m i s s i o n s o f t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e
o ff e n s e a n d t h e m a n n e r t h e r e o f t h a t s h e m a d e t o
t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n
Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and to the
m e d i a , r e s p e c t i ve l y.
x x x x
[ H ] e r c o n fe s s i o n s / a d m i s s i o n s a r e p o s i t i ve
acknowledgment of guilt of the crime and appear
t o h ave b e e n vo l u n t a r i l y a n d i n te l l i g e n t l y g i ve n .
T h e s e c o n fe s s i o n s / a d m i s s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e
o n e g i ve n t o h e r n e i g h b o r M e r c e d i t a M e n d o z a
and the media, albeit uncounselled and made
while she was already under the custody of
a u t h o r i t i e s , i t i s b e l i eve d , a r e n o t v i o l a t i ve o f h e r
right under the Constitution.
T h e d e c r e t a l p a r t o f t h e RTC s
Judgment reads:

W H E R E FO R E , t h e D e m u r r e r t o
E v i d e n c e i s h e r e by d e n i e d a n d j u d g m e n t i s
h e r e by r e n d e r e d fi n d i n g t h e a c c u s e d E D N A
M A L N G A N Y M AYO g u i l t y b eyo n d r e a s o n a b l e
doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple
Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six
( 6 ) p e o p l e a n d s e n te n c i n g h e r t o s u ff e r t h e
mandatory penalty of death, and ordering her to
p ay t h e h e i r s o f t h e v i c t i m s R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r.
and Virginia Separa and children Michael,
D a p h n e , P r i s c i l l a a n d R o b e r t o , J r. , t h e a m o u n t o f
F i f t y T h o u s a n d ( P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) Pe s o s f o r e a c h
victim and the amount of One Hundred Thousand
( P 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) Pe s o s a s te m p e r a te d a m a g e s f o r
t h e i r b u r n e d h o u s e o r a t o t a l o f Fo u r H u n d r e d
T h o u s a n d ( P 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) Pe s o s a n d t o R o d o l f o
M ov i l l a t h e a m o u n t o f O n e H u n d r e d [ T h o u s a n d ]
( P 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) Pe s o s .
D u e t o t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i m p o s e d by t h e RTC ,
t h e c a s e wa s d i r e c t l y e l eva t e d t o t h i s C o u r t f o r a u t o m a t i c
r ev i e w. C o n f o r m a b l y w i t h o u r d e c i s i o n i n Pe o p l e v. E f re n
M a te o y G a r c i a , [ 1 9 ] h o w e ve r, w e r e fe r r e d t h e c a s e a n d i t s
r e c o r d s t o t h e CA f o r a p p r o p r i a te a c t i o n a n d d i s p o s i t i o n .
O n 2 S e p te m b e r 2 0 0 5 , t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s
a ffi r m e d w i t h m o d i fi c a t i o n t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e RTC , t h e
fa l l o o f w h i c h r e a d s :
W H E R E FO R E , p r e m i s e s c o n s i d e r e d , t h e
assailed October 13, 2003 Judgment of the Regional
Tr i a l C o u r t o f M a n i l a , B r a n c h 4 1 , fi n d i n g a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t E d n a M a l n g a n y M ayo g u i l t y b eyo n d
reasonable doubt of Arson with multiple homicide and
s e n te n c i n g h e r t o s u ff e r t h e D E AT H P E NA LT Y i s
h e r e by A F F I R M E D w i t h M O D I F I CAT I O N i n t h a t s h e i s
f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t o p ay P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s m o r a l d a m a g e s
a n d a n o t h e r P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s exe m p l a r y d a m a g e s f o r
e a c h o f t h e v i c t i m s w h o p e r i s h e d i n t h e fi r e , t o b e
p a i d t o t h e i r h e i r s . S h e i s o r d e r e d t o p ay R o d o l f o
M ov i l l a , o n e w h o s e h o u s e w a s a l s o b u r n e d , t h e s u m
o f P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s exe m p l a r y d a m a g e .
Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the
2 0 0 0 R u l e s o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e a s a m e n d e d by
A . M . N o . 0 0 - 5 - 0 3 - S C d a t e d S e p te m b e r 2 8 , 2 0 0 4 ,
w h i c h b e c a m e e ff e c t i ve o n O c t o b e r 1 5 , 2 0 0 4 , t h e
C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , a f te r r e n d e r i n g j u d g m e n t , h e r e by
ref rains from making an entr y of judgment and
f o r t h w i t h c e r t i fi e s t h e c a s e a n d e l eva te s t h e e n t i r e
r e c o r d o f t h i s c a s e t o t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t f o r r ev i e w.
[20]
It is the contention of accused-appellant that the
ev i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i s n o t s u ffi c i e n t t o
e s t a b l i s h h e r g u i l t b eyo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t a s t h e
perpetrator of the crime charged. In suppor t of said
exc u l p a t o r y p r o p o s i t i o n , s h e a s s i g n s t h e f o l l o w i n g
errors[21]:
I.
T H E H O N O R A B L E C O U RT E R R E D I N R U L I N G T H AT
T H E C I R C U M STA N T I A L E V I D E N C E P R E S E N T E D BY
T H E P RO S E C U T I O N I S S U F F I C I E N T TO C O N V I C T T H E
AC C U S E D ; a n d
14
II.
T H E H O N O R A B L E C O U RT E R R E D I N A L LOW I N G A N D
G I V I N G C R E D E N C E TO T H E H E A R SAY E V I D E N C E
A N D U N C O U N S E L L E D A D M I S S I O N S A L L E G E D LY
G I V E N BY T H E AC C U S E D TO T H E W I T N E S S E S
BA R A N G AY C H A I R M A N R E M I G I O B E R N A R D O ,
M E R C E D I TA M E N D O Z A A N D T H E M E D I A .
THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON
W I T H ( M U LT I P L E ) H O M I C I D E .
T h e I n fo r m a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e e r r o n e o u s l y c h a r g e d
a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t w i t h a c o m p l ex c r i m e , i . e . , A r s o n w i th
M u l t i p l e H o m i c i d e . P r e s e n t l y, t h e r e a r e t w o ( 2 ) l aw s t h a t
g ove r n t h e c r i m e o f a r s o n w h e r e d e a t h r e s u l t s t h e r e f r o m
A r t i c l e 3 2 0 o f th e R ev i s e d Pe n a l C o d e ( R P C ) , a s a m e n d e d
by R e p u b l i c Ac t ( R A ) N o . 7 6 5 9 , [ 2 2 ] a n d S e c t i o n 5 o f
P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c re e ( P D ) N o . 1 6 1 3 [ 2 3 ] , q u o te d h e r e u n d e r,
t o w i t:
R ev i s e d P e n a l C o d e :
A RT. 3 2 0 . D e st r u c t i ve A r s o n . x x x x
I f a s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f th e c o m m i s s i o n
o f a ny o f th e a c t s p e n a l i z e d u n d e r th i s A r t i c l e ,
d e a th r e s u l t s , t h e m a n d a t o r y p e n a l t y o f d e a t h s h a l l
be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Presidential Decree No. 1613:
S E C . 5 . W h e re D e a th Re s u l t s f r o m
A r s o n . I f by re a s o n o f o r o n th e o c c a s i o n o f th e
a r s o n d e a th r e s u l t s , t h e p e n a l t y o f r e c l u s i o n
p e r p et u a t o d e a t h s h a l l b e i m p o s e d . [ E m p h a s i s
supplied.]
A r t . 3 2 0 o f th e R P C , a s a m e n d e d , w i t h r e s p e c t t o
d e s t r u c t i ve a r s o n , a n d t h e p r ov i s i o n s o f P D N o . 1 6 1 3
r e s p e c t i n g o t h e r c a s e s o f a r s o n p r ov i d e o n ly o n e p e n a l t y
fo r t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f a r s o n , w h et h e r c o n s i d e r e d
d e st r u c t i ve o r ot h e r w i s e , w h e re d e a th re s u l t s th e r e f r o m .
T h e r a i s o n d ' t r e i s t h a t a r s o n i s i t s e l f t h e e n d a n d d e a t h
is simply the consequence. [24]
Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant death
o r w i l l h ave t o b e a s e p a r a t e c r i m e a l t o g e t h e r, t h e j o i n t
d i s c u s s i o n [ 2 5 ] o f t h e l a t e M r. C h i e f J u s t i c e Ra m o n C .
Aquino and Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, on the
subject of the crimes of arson and murder/homicide, is
h i g h l y i n s t r u c t i ve :
G r o i z a r d s ay s t h a t w h e n fi r e i s u s e d w i t h
t h e i n te n t t o k i l l a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n w h o m ay b e i n
a h o u s e a n d t h a t o b j e c t i ve i s a t t a i n e d by b u r n i n g
t h e h o u s e , t h e c r i m e i s m u r d e r o n l y. W h e n t h e
Pe n a l C o d e d e c l a r e s t h a t k i l l i n g c o m m i t te d by
m e a n s o f fi r e i s m u r d e r, i t i n te n d s t h a t fi r e s h o u l d
b e p u r p o s e l y a d o p te d a s a m e a n s t o t h a t e n d .
T h e r e c a n b e n o m u r d e r w i t h o u t a d e s i g n t o t a ke
l i fe . [ 2 6 ] I n o t h e r w o r d s , i f t h e m a i n o b j e c t o f t h e
o ff e n d e r i s t o k i l l by m e a n s o f fi r e , t h e o ff e n s e i s
m u r d e r. B u t i f t h e m a i n o b j e c t i ve i s t h e b u r n i n g o f
t h e b u i l d i n g , t h e r e s u l t i n g h o m i c i d e m ay b e

a b s o r b e d by t h e c r i m e o f a r s o n . [ 2 7 ]
x x x x
I f t h e h o u s e wa s s e t o n fi r e a f te r t h e v i c t i m s
t h e r e i n w e r e k i l l e d , fi r e w o u l d n o t b e a q u a l i f y i n g
circumstance. The accused would be liable for the
s e p a r a t e o ff e n s e s o f m u r d e r o r h o m i c i d e , a s t h e
c a s e m ay b e , a n d a r s o n . [ 2 8 ]
A c c o r d i n g l y, i n c a s e s w h e r e b o t h b u r n i n g a n d d e a t h o c c u r,
i n o r d e r t o d e te r m i n e w h a t c r i m e / c r i m e s wa s / w e r e
p e r p e t r a te d w h e t h e r a r s o n , m u r d e r o r a r s o n a n d
h o m i c i d e / m u r d e r, i t i s d e r i g u e u r t o a s c e r t a i n t h e m a i n
o b j e c t i ve o f t h e m a l e f a c t o r: ( a ) i f t h e m a i n o b j e c t i ve i s t h e
b u r n i n g o f t h e b u i l d i n g o r e d i fi c e , b u t d e a t h r e s u l t s by
reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply
arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on
t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e m a i n o b j e c t i ve i s t o k i l l a p a r t i c u l a r
p e r s o n w h o m ay b e i n a b u i l d i n g o r e d i fi c e , w h e n fi r e i s
resor ted to as the means to accomplish such goal the
c r i m e c o m m i t te d i s m u r d e r o n l y; l a s t l y, ( c ) i f t h e o b j e c t i ve
i s , l i ke w i s e , t o k i l l a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n , a n d i n f a c t t h e
o ff e n d e r h a s a l r e a d y d o n e s o , b u t fi r e i s r e s o r te d t o a s a
m e a n s t o c ove r u p t h e k i l l i n g , t h e n t h e r e a r e t w o s e p a r a te
a n d d i st i n c t c r i m e s c o m m i t te d h o m i c i d e / m u r d e r a n d
arson.
Where then does this case fall under?
Fr o m a r e a d i n g o f t h e b o d y o f t h e I n f o r m a t i o n :
That on or about January 2, 2001, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
a c c u s e d , w i t h i n te n t to c a u s e d a m a g e , d i d
t h e n a n d t h e r e w i l l f u l l y, u n l aw f u l l y, fe l o n i o u s l y
a n d d e l i b e r a te ly s et fi r e u p o n th e t wo - sto rey
r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f RO B E RTO S E PA R A a n d
f a m i l y m o s t l y m a d e o f w o o d e n m a te r i a l s
l o c a te d a t N o . 1 7 2 M o d e r n a St . , B a l u t , To n d o ,
t h i s c i t y, by l i g h t i n g c r u m p l e d n e w s p a p e r w i t h
t h e u s e o f d i s p o s a b l e l i g h te r i n s i d e s a i d
h o u s e k n o w i n g t h e s a m e t o b e a n i n h a b i te d
h o u s e a n d s i t u a te d i n a t h i c k l y p o p u l a te d
place and as a consequence thereof a
c o n fl a g r a t i o n e n s u e d a n d t h e s a i d b u i l d i n g ,
t o g e t h e r w i t h s o m e s eve n ( 7 ) a d j o i n i n g
r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e s , w e r e r a z e d by fi r e ; th a t by
r e a s o n a n d o n th e o c c a s i o n o f th e s a i d fi re ,
t h e f o l l o w i n g , n a m e l y,
1. R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. , 4 5 ye a r s o f a g e
2. V i r g i n i a S e p a r a y M e n d o z a , 4 0 ye a r s o f
age
3. M i c h a e l S e p a r a , 2 4 ye a r s o f a g e
4. D a p h n e S e p a r a , 1 8 ye a r s o f a g e
5. P r i s c i l l a S e p a r a , 1 4 ye a r s o f a g e
6. R o b e r t o S e p a r a , J r. , 1 1 ye a r s o f a g e
s u st a i n e d b u r n i n j u r i e s w h i c h w e r e t h e d i r e c t
c a u s e o f t h e i r d e a t h i m m e d i a te l y t h e r e a f te r.
[29] [Emphasis supplied.]
accused-appellant is being charged with the
crime of arson. It it is clear from the foregoing that her
i n te n t wa s m e r e l y t o d e s t r oy h e r e m p l oye r s h o u s e t h r o u g h
t h e u s e o f fi r e .
15
We n o w g o t o t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d . U n d e r t h e fi r s t
a s s i g n m e n t o f e r r o r, i n a s s e r t i n g t h e i n s u ffi c i e n c y o f t h e
p r o s e c u t i o ns ev i d e n c e t o e s t a b l i s h h e r g u i l t b eyo n d
reasonable doubt, accused-appellant argues that the
p r o s e c u t i o n wa s o n l y a b l e t o a d d u c e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
ev i d e n c e h a r d l y e n o u g h t o p r ove h e r g u i l t b eyo n d
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . S h e r a t i o c i n a te s t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g
circumstances:
1. T h a t i m m e d i a te l y b e f o r e t h e
burning of the house , the accused hurriedly and
w i t h h e a d t u r n i n g i n d i ff e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s ( p a l i n g a -
linga) went out of the said house and rode a
pedicab apparently not knowing where to go for she
fi r s t r e q u e s te d t o b e b r o u g h t t o N i p a S t . b u t u p o n
r e a c h i n g t h e r e r e q u e s te d a g a i n t o b e b r o u g h t t o
B a l a s a n S t . a s s h o w n by t h e te s t i m o ny o f
prosecution witness Rolando Gruta;
2. T h a t i m m e d i a te l y a f te r t h e fi r e ,
u p o n a r e p o r t t h a t t h e r e w a s a w o m a n i n B a l a s a n St .
w h o a p p e a r s c o n f u s e d a n d a p p r e h e n s i ve ( b a l i s a ) ,
t h e B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n a n d h i s t a n o d s w e n t t h e r e ,
found the accused and apprehended her and
b r o u g h t h e r t o t h e b a r a n g ay h a l l a s s h o w n by t h e
te s t i m o ny o f B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o ;
and
3. That when she was apprehended and
i nve s t i g a t e d by t h e b a r a n g ay o ffi c i a l s a n d w h e n h e r
b a g wa s o p e n e d , t h e s a m e c o n t a i n e d a d i s p o s a b l e
l i g h t e r a s l i ke w i s e s h o w n by t h e te s t i m o ny o f t h e
B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n . [ 3 0 ]
f a l l s h o r t o f p r ov i n g t h a t s h e h a d a ny i nvo l ve m e n t i n
s e t t i n g h e r e m p l oye r s h o u s e o n fi r e , m u c h l e s s s h o w g u i l t
b eyo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , g i ve n t h a t i t i s a f a c t t h a t
h o u s e m a i d s a r e t h e fi r s t p e r s o n s i n t h e h o u s e t o wa k e u p
e a r l y t o p e r f o r m r o u t i n e c h o r e s f o r t h e i r e m p l oye r s , [ 3 1 ]
one of which is preparing and cooking the morning meal for
the members of the household; and necessity requires her
t o g o o u t e a r l y t o l o o k f o r o p e n s t o r e s o r ev e n n e a r by
m a r ke t p l a c e s t o b u y t h i n g s t h a t w i l l c o m p l e te t h e e a r l y
m e a l f o r t h e d ay. [ 3 2 ] S h e t h e n c o n c l u d e s t h a t i t wa s
n o r m a l f o r h e r t o h ave b e e n s e e n g o i n g o u t o f h e r
e m p l oye r s h o u s e i n a h u r r y a t t h a t t i m e o f t h e d ay a n d t o
look at all directions to insure that the house is secure and
t h a t t h e r e a r e n o o t h e r p e r s o n s i n t h e v i c i n i t y. [ 3 3 ]
We a r e f a r f r o m p e r s u a d e d .
Tr u e , by t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i r j o b s , h o u s e m a i d s a r e
r e q u i r e d t o s t a r t t h e d ay e a r l y; h o w eve r, c o n t r a r y t o s a i d
assertion, the actuations and the demeanor of accused-
a p p e l l a n t o n t h a t f a te f u l e a r l y m o r n i n g a s o b s e r ve d
fi r s t h a n d by R o l a n d o G r u t a , o n e o f t h e w i t n e s s e s o f t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n , b e l i e h e r c l a i m o f n o r m a l c y, t o w i t:
Q: Yo u s a i d yo u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e
h o u s e o f t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y. W h a t h a p p e n e d
w h e n yo u s a w E d n a c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e
o f t h e S e p a r a Fa m i l y ?
A: Wa l a p a p o n g a n o ya n n a i s a kay ko n a s i ya
s a s i d e c a r .
Q: A n d w h a t d i d yo u o b s e r ve f r o m E d n a w h e n
yo u s aw h e r c o m i n g o u t f r o m t h e h o u s e o f t h e
 16
S e p a r a f a m i ly ? conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-
exa m i n a t i o n by c o u n s e l s . H e r e , R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o ,
A: N a g m a m a d a l i p o s i ya n g l u m a ka d a t R o l a n d o G r u t a a n d M e r c e d i t a M e n d o z a a r e d i s i n te r e s te d
p a l i n g a - l i n ga . w i t n e s s e s a n d t h e r e i s n o t a n i ot a o f ev i d e n c e i n t h e
r e c o r d s t o i n d i c a te t h a t t h ey a r e s u b o r n e d w i t n e s s e s . T h e
x x x x r e c o r d s o f t h e RTC eve n s h o w t h a t R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o , t h e
B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n , ke p t a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t f r o m b e i n g
Q: A f te r s h e b o a r d e d yo u r p e d i c a b , w h a t m a u l e d by t h e a n g r y c r o w d o u t s i d e o f t h e b a r a n g ay h a l l :
h a p p e n e d , i f a ny ?
P r o s . R e b a g ay:
A: N a g p a h a t i d p o s i ya s a a k i n . N o w, w h o w e r e p r e s e n t w h e n
t h e a c c u s e d a r e ( s i c ) te l l i n g
Q: Where? yo u t h i s ?

A: To N i p a S t r e e t , s i r. A: I yo n n ga i yo n g m ga t a n o d ko ,
m a m a m aya n d o o n
Q: D i d yo u b r i n g h e r t o N i p a S t r e e t a s n a k a p a l i g i d , s i ye m p re m ay
s h e r e q u e s te d ? s u n o g n a g ka k a g u l o , g u sto
n ga s i ya n g ku n i n n g m ga
A: Ye s , s i r. m a m a m aya n p a ra s a k t a n
h i n d i ko m a i b i gay p a p a t ay i n
x x x x s i ya g a wa n g m ay n a m a t ay
e h a n i m n a t a o a n d n a m a t ay,
Q: Yo u s a i d t h a t yo u b r o u g h t h e r t o N i p a kaya i yo n g m ga t a o
S t r e e t . W h a t h a p p e n e d w h e n yo u g o ( s i c ) k i n o ko n t ro l s i ya
t h e r e a t N i p a S t r e e t , i f a ny ? m a d i d i s g ra s ya s i ya d a h i l
p i n - p o i n te d p o s i ya , Yo u r
A: Na g p a h i n to p o s i ya d o o n n g s a g l i t , H o n o r, i yo n g d a m i n a i yo n
m ga t a t l o n g m i n u to p o . l i b o i yo n g n a k a p a l i g i d d o o n
s a b a r a n gay h a l l
Q: W h a t d i d s h e d o w h e n s h e a s ke d ( yo u ) n a p a ka h i ra p a wa t i n .
to stop there for three minutes? G u st i n g - g u st o s i ya n g ku n i n
n g m ga t a o n g - b aya n , n a ga l i t
A: A f te r t h r e e m i n u t e s s h e r e q u e s te d m e d a h i l a n g d a m i n g b a h ay
to bring her directly to Balasan Street, h o n g n a s u n o g . [ 3 5 ]
s i r.

x x x x
We q u o te w i t h a p p r ova l t h e p r o n o u n c e m e n t o f
t h e RTC i n d i s c r e d i t i n g a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s
aforementioned rationale:
[ O ] b v i o u s l y i t i s n eve r n o r m a l , c o m m o n o r o r d i n a r y
t o l e ave t h e h o u s e i n s u c h a d i st u r b e d , n e r vo u s a n d
a g i t a t e d m a n n e r, d e m e a n o r a n d c o n d i t i o n . T h e
timing of her hurried depar ture and ner vous
d e m e a n o r i m m e d i a te l y b e f o r e t h e fi r e w h e n s h e l e f t
the house and rode a pedicab and her same
d e m e a n o r, p hys i c a l a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n w h e n
found and apprehended at the same place where
s h e a l i g h te d f r o m t h e p e d i c a b a n d t h e d i s c ove r y o f
t h e l i g h te r i n h e r b a g t h e r e a f te r w h e n i nve s t i g a te d
indisputably show her guilt as charged. [34]
A c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t h a s n o t s h o w n a ny c o m p e l l i n g
r e a s o n w hy t h e w i t n e s s e s p r e s e n te d w o u l d o p e n l y, p u b l i c l y
a n d d e l i b e r a t e l y l i e o r c o n c o c t a s t o r y, t o s e n d a n i n n o c e n t
person to jail all the while knowing that the real malefactor
r e m a i n s a t l a r g e . S u c h p r o p o s i t i o n d e fi e s l o g i c . A n d
w h e r e t h e d e fe n s e f a i l e d t o s h o w a ny ev i l o r i m p r o p e r
m o t i ve o n t h e p a r t o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s , t h e
p r e s u m p t i o n i s t h a t t h e i r te s t i m o n i e s a r e t r u e a n d t h u s
entitled to full faith and credence. [36]
While the prosecution witnesses did not see
a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t a c t u a l l y s t a r t i n g t h e fi r e t h a t b u r n e d
s eve r a l h o u s e s a n d k i l l e d t h e S e p a r a f a m i l y, h e r g u i l t m ay
s t i l l b e e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ev i d e n c e
p r ov i d e d t h a t: ( 1 ) t h e r e i s m o r e t h a n o n e c i r c u m s t a n c e ; ( 2 )
t h e f a c t s f r o m w h i c h t h e i n f e r e n c e s a r e d e r i ve d a r e p r ove n ;
and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such
a s t o p r o d u c e c o nv i c t i o n b eyo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . [ 3 7 ]

All the witnesses are in accord that accused-
a p p e l l a n t s a g i t a t e d a p p e a r a n c e w a s o u t o f t h e o r d i n a r y.
R e m a r k a b l y, s h e h a s n eve r d e n i e d t h i s o b s e r va t i o n .
We g i ve g r e a t w e i g h t t o t h e fi n d i n g s o f t h e RTC
a n d s o a c c o r d c r e d e n c e t o t h e te s t i m o n i e s o f t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s a s i t h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r ve
t h e m d i r e c t l y. T h e c r e d i b i l i t y g i ve n by t r i a l c o u r t s t o
p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s i s a n i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f ev i d e n c e
w h i c h a p p e l l a te c o u r t s c a n r e l y o n b e c a u s e o f i t s u n i q u e
o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r ve t h e m , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e i r d e m e a n o r,
C i r c u m s t a n t i a l ev i d e n c e i s t h a t ev i d e n c e w h i c h
p r ove s a f a c t o r s e r i e s o f f a c t s f r o m w h i c h t h e f a c t s i n
i s s u e m ay b e e st a b l i s h e d by i n fe r e n c e . [ 3 8 ] I t i s f o u n d e d
o n ex p e r i e n c e a n d o b s e r ve d f a c t s a n d c o i n c i d e n c e s
e s t a b l i s h i n g a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e k n o w n a n d p r ove n
f a c t s a n d t h e f a c t s s o u g h t t o b e p r ove d . [ 3 9 ] I n o r d e r t o
b r i n g a b o u t a c o nv i c t i o n , t h e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ev i d e n c e
p r e s e n te d m u st c o n s t i t u t e a n u n b r o ke n c h a i n , w h i c h l e a d s
to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
a c c u s e d , t o t h e exc l u s i o n o f o t h e r s , a s t h e g u i l t y p e r s o n .
[40]

I n t h i s c a s e , t h e i n t e r l o c k i n g te s t i m o n i e s o f t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s , t a ke n t o g e t h e r, exe m p l i f y a c a s e
w h e r e c o nv i c t i o n c a n b e u p h e l d o n t h e b a s i s o f
c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ev i d e n c e . F i r s t , p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s
R o l a n d o G r u t a , t h e d r i ve r o f t h e p e d i c a b t h a t a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t r o d e o n , te s t i fi e d t h a t h e k n e w f o r a f a c t t h a t s h e
w o r ke d a s a h o u s e m a i d o f t h e v i c t i m s , a n d t h a t h e
p o s i t i ve l y i d e n t i fi e d h e r a s t h e p e r s o n h u r r i e d l y l e av i n g t h e
house of the victims on 2 Januar y 2001 at 4:45 a.m., and
a c t i n g i n a n e r v o u s m a n n e r. T h a t w h i l e r i d i n g o n t h e
p e d i c a b , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t wa s u n s u r e o f h e r i n te n d e d
destination. Upon reaching the place where he originally
p i c ke d u p a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t o n l y a fe w m i n u t e s a f te r
d r o p p i n g h e r o ff , R o l a n d o G r u t a s aw t h e S e p a r a s h o u s e
b e i n g g u t te d by a b l a z i n g fi r e . S e c o n d , R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o
te s t i fi e d t h a t h e a n d h i s t a n o d s , i n c l u d i n g R o l a n d o G r u t a ,
w e r e t h e o n e s w h o p i c ke d u p a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E d n a a t
B a l a s a n S t r e e t ( w h e r e R o l a n d o G r u t a d r o p p e d h e r o ff )
a f te r r e c e i v i n g a c a l l t h a t t h e r e wa s a w o m a n a c t i n g
s t r a n g e l y a t s a i d s t r e e t a n d w h o a p p e a r e d t o h ave n o w h e r e
t o g o . T h i r d , S P O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n ove r h e a r d a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t a d m i t t o C a r m e l i t a Va l d e z , a r e p o r te r o f C h a n n e l
2 ( A B S - C B N ) t h a t s a i d a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s t a r te d t h e fi r e ,
p l u s t h e f a c t t h a t h e w a s a b l e s e e t h e te l e c a s t o f G u s
A b e l g a s s h o w w h e r e a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t , w h i l e b e i n g
i n te r v i e w e d , c o n fe s s e d t o t h e c r i m e a s w e l l . T h e f o r e g o i n g
te s t i m o n i e s j u x t a p o s e d w i t h t h e te s t i m o ny o f M e r c e d i t a
M e n d o z a va l i d a t i n g t h e f a c t t h a t a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t
c o n fe s s e d t o h av i n g s t a r te d t h e fi r e w h i c h k i l l e d t h e
S e p a r a f a m i l y a s w e l l a s b u r n e d s eve n h o u s e s i n c l u d i n g
t h a t o f t h e v i c t i m s , c o nv i n c i n g l y f o r m a n u n b r o ke n c h a i n ,
which leads to the unassailable conclusion pinpointing
accused-appellant as the person behind the crime of
simple arson.
I n h e r s e c o n d a s s i g n e d e r r o r, a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t
questions the admissibility of her uncounselled
ex t r a j u d i c i a l c o n fe s s i o n g i ve n t o p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s ,
namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza, and to the
m e d i a . A c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E d n a c o n te n d s t h a t b e i n g
u n c o u n s e l l e d ex t r a j u d i c i a l c o n fe s s i o n , h e r a d m i s s i o n s t o
h av i n g c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d s h o u l d h ave b e e n
exc l u d e d i n ev i d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r f o r b e i n g v i o l a t i ve o f
Ar ticle III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution.
Pa r t i c u l a r l y, s h e t a ke s exc e p t i o n t o t h e te s t i m o ny
of prosecution witnesses Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita
M e n d o z a f o r b e i n g h e a r s ay a n d i n t h e n a t u r e o f a n
uncounselled admission.
W i t h t h e a b ove v i t a l p i e c e s o f ev i d e n c e
exc l u d e d , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t i s o f t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e
remaining proof of her alleged guilt, consisting in the main
o f c i r c u m st a n t i a l ev i d e n c e , i s i n a d e q u a te t o e s t a b l i s h h e r
g u i l t b eyo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .
We p a r t l y d i s a g r e e .
Ar ticle III, Section 12 of the Constitution in par t
p r ov i d e s :
(1) A ny p e r s o n u n d e r
i nve s t i g a t i o n f o r t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f a n
o ff e n s e s h a l l h ave t h e r i g h t t o b e
informed of his right to remain silent
a n d t o h ave c o m p e te n t a n d
i n d e p e n d e n t c o u n s e l p r e fe r a b l y o f h i s
own choice. If the person cannot
17
a ff o r d t h e s e r v i c e s o f c o u n s e l , h e m u st
b e p r ov i d e d w i t h o n e . T h e s e r i g h t s
c a n n o t b e w a i ve d exc e p t i n w r i t i n g a n d
in the presence of counsel.
x x x x
(3) A ny c o n fe s s i o n o r
admission obtained in violation of this
Section or Section 17 hereof shall be
i n a d m i s s i b l e i n ev i d e n c e .
We h ave h e l d t h a t t h e a b ove q u o te d p r ov i s i o n
a p p l i e s t o t h e s t a g e o f c u st o d i a l i nve s t i g a t i o n w h e n t h e
i nve s t i g a t i o n i s n o l o n g e r a g e n e r a l i n q u i r y i n t o a n
u n s o l ve d c r i m e b u t st a r t s t o f o c u s o n a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n
a s a s u s p e c t . [ 4 1 ] S a i d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n te e h a s a l s o
b e e n ex t e n d e d t o s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h a n i n d i v i d u a l h a s n o t
b e e n f o r m a l l y a r r e s te d b u t h a s m e r e l y b e e n i nv i te d f o r
questioning.[42]
To b e a d m i s s i b l e i n ev i d e n c e a g a i n s t a n
a c c u s e d , t h e ex t r a j u d i c i a l c o n fe s s i o n s m a d e m u s t s a t i s f y
the following requirements:
(1) i t m u s t b e vo l u n t a r y;
(2) it must be made with the
a s s i s t a n c e o f c o m p e te n t a n d
independent counsel;
(3) i t m u s t b e ex p r e s s ; a n d
(4) it must be in writing. [43]
A r g u a b ly , t h e b a r a n g ay t a n o d s , i n c l u d i n g t h e
B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n , i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e , m ay b e
d e e m e d a s l aw e n f o r c e m e n t o ffi c e r f o r p u r p o s e s o f
applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
C o n s t i t u t i o n . W h e n a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t wa s b r o u g h t t o t h e
b a r a n g ay h a l l i n t h e m o r n i n g o f 2 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 1 , s h e w a s
a l r e a d y a s u s p e c t , a c t u a l l y t h e o n l y o n e , i n t h e fi r e t h a t
d e s t r o ye d s eve r a l h o u s e s a s w e l l a s k i l l e d t h e w h o l e f a m i ly
o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. S h e w a s , t h e r e f o r e , a l r e a d y u n d e r
c u s t o d i a l i nve s t i g a t i o n a n d t h e r i g h t s g u a r a n te e d by A r t i c l e
I I I , S e c t i o n 1 2 ( 1 ) , o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n s h o u l d h ave a l r e a d y
b e e n o b s e r v e d o r a p p l i e d t o h e r. Ac c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s
c o n fe s s i o n t o B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n R e m i g i o B e r n a r d o w a s
m a d e i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e i n te r r o g a t i o n m a d e by t h e l a t t e r
a d m i t te d l y c o n d u c te d w i t h o u t fi r s t i n f o r m i n g a c c u s e d -
appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in
t h e p r e s e n c e o f c o u n s e l . Fo r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e c o n fe s s i o n
o f a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t , g i ve n t o B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n R e m i g i o
B e r n a r d o , a s w e l l a s t h e l i g h t e r f o u n d by t h e l a t te r i n h e r
b a g a r e i n a d m i s s i b l e i n ev i d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r a s s u c h w e r e
obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.
B e t h a t a s i t m ay, t h e i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t s c o n fe s s i o n t o B a r a n g ay C h a i r m a n R e m i g i o
B e r n a r d o a n d t h e l i g h t e r a s ev i d e n c e d o n o t a u t o m a t i c a l ly
lead to her ac quittal. It should well be recalled that the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s a fe g u a r d s d u r i n g c u s t o d i a l i nve s t i g a t i o n s d o
n o t a p p l y t o t h o s e n o t e l i c i te d t h r o u g h q u e s t i o n i n g by t h e
p o l i c e o r t h e i r a g e n t s b u t g i ve n i n a n o r d i n a r y m a n n e r
w h e r e by t h e a c c u s e d ve r b a l l y a d m i t s t o h av i n g c o m m i t te d
t h e o ff e n s e a s w h a t h a p p e n e d i n t h e c a s e a t b a r w h e n
accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of
t h e n e i g h b o r s o f R o b e r t o S e p a r a , S r. , t o h av i n g s t a r t e d t h e
fi r e i n t h e S e p a r a s h o u s e . T h e te s t i m o ny o f M e r c e d i t a
M e n d o z a r e c o u n t i n g s a i d a d m i s s i o n i s , u n f o r t u n a te l y f o r

a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t , a d m i s s i b l e i n ev i d e n c e a g a i n s t h e r a n d
i s n o t c ove r e d by t h e a f o r e s a i d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n te e .
Ar ticle III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely
g ove r n s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e i n d i v i d u a l o n o n e
h a n d a n d t h e S t a te ( a n d i t s a g e n t s ) o n t h e o t h e r; i t d o e s
n o t c o n c e r n i t s e l f w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a p r i va te
i n d i v i d u a l a n d a n o t h e r p r i va te i n d i v i d u a l a s b o t h
accused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita
M e n d o z a u n d o u b te d l y a r e . [ 4 4 ] H e r e , t h e r e i s n o ev i d e n c e
on record to show that said witness was acting under
p o l i c e a u t h o r i t y, s o a p p r o p r i a t e l y, a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s
u n c o u n s e l l e d ex t r a j u d i c i a l c o n fe s s i o n t o s a i d w i t n e s s wa s
p r o p e r l y a d m i t te d by t h e RTC .
A c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t l i ke w i s e a s s a i l s t h e a d m i s s i o n
o f t h e te s t i m o ny o f S P O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n . C o n te n d i n g t h a t
[ w ] h e n S P O 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n te s t i fi e d i n c o u r t , h i s st o r y i s
m o r e o f ev e n t s , w h i c h a r e n o t w i t h i n h i s p e r s o n a l
knowledge but based from accounts of witnesses who
d e r i ve d i n f o r m a t i o n a l l e g e d l y f r o m t h e a c c u s e d o r s o m e
other persons x x x. In other words, she objects to the
te s t i m o ny f o r b e i n g m e r e l y h e a r s ay. W i t h t h i s i m p u t a t i o n
o f i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y, w e a g r e e w i t h w h a t t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s
h a d t o s ay:
A l t h o u g h t h i s te s t i m o ny o f
S FO 4 D a n i l o Ta l u s a n i s h e a r s ay
because he was not present when Gus
A b e l g a s i n te r v i e w e d a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t
E D N A , i t m ay n eve r t h e l e s s b e a d m i t te d
i n ev i d e n c e a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t l y
r e l eva n t s t a te m e n t t o e s t a b l i s h n o t t h e
t r u t h b u t t h e te n o r o f t h e st a te m e n t o r
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e st a te m e n t wa s m a d e
[ Pe o p l e v. M a l l a r i , G . R . N o . 1 0 3 5 4 7 ,
July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA 621 citing
Pe o p l e v. C u s i , J r. , G . R . N o . L- 2 0 9 8 6 ,
August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.]. In
Pe o p l e vs . Ve l a s q u e z , G . R . N o s .
1 3 2 6 3 5 & 1 4 3 8 7 2 - 7 5 , Fe b r u a r y 2 1 ,
2001, 352 SCRA 455, the Supreme
C o u r t r u l e d t h a t:
Under the doctrine of
i n d e p e n d e n t l y r e l eva n t st a t e m e n t s ,
r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r t r u t h o r f a l s i t y, t h e
f a c t t h a t s u c h s t a te m e n t s h ave b e e n
m a d e i s r e l eva n t . T h e h e a r s ay r u l e
d o e s n o t a p p l y, a n d t h e st a te m e n t s a r e
a d m i s s i b l e a s ev i d e n c e . E v i d e n c e a s
t o t h e m a k i n g o f s u c h st a t e m e n t i s n o t
s e c o n d a r y b u t p r i m a r y, f o r t h e
s t a te m e n t i t s e l f m ay c o n s t i t u te a f a c t
i n i s s u e o r b e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l l y r e l eva n t
a s t o t h e ex i s te n c e o f s u c h a f a c t . [ 4 5 ]
A s r e g a r d s t h e c o n fe s s i o n g i ve n by a c c u s e d -
appellant to the media, we need not discuss it fur ther for
t h e r e p o r t e r s w e r e n eve r p r e s e n te d t o te s t i f y i n c o u r t .
A s a fi n a l a t t e m p t a t exc u l p a t i o n , a c c u s e d -
appellant asserts that since the identities of the burned
b o d i e s w e r e n eve r c o n c l u s i ve l y e s t a b l i s h e d , s h e c a n n o t b e
responsible for their deaths.
Such asser tion is beref t of merit.
18
In the crime of arson, the identities of the
v i c t i m s a r e i m m a te r i a l i n t h a t i n te n t t o k i l l t h e m p a r t i c u l a r l y
i s n o t o n e o f t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e . A s w e h ave
c l a r i fi e d e a r l i e r, t h e k i l l i n g o f a p e r s o n i s a b s o r b e d i n t h e
c h a r g e o f a r s o n , s i m p l e o r d e s t r u c t i ve . T h e p r o s e c u t i o n
n e e d o n l y p r ove , t h a t t h e b u r n i n g w a s i n te n t i o n a l a n d t h a t
w h a t w a s i n te n t i o n a l l y b u r n e d i s a n i n h a b i t e d h o u s e o r
d w e l l i n g . A g a i n , i n t h e c a s e o f Pe o p l e v. S o r i a n o , [ 4 6 ] w e
ex p l a i n e d t h a t:
A l t h o u g h i n t e n t m ay b e a n i n g r e d i e n t o f
t h e c r i m e o f A r s o n , i t m ay b e i n fe r r e d f r o m t h e
acts of the accused. There is a presumption
t h a t o n e i n te n d s t h e n a t u r a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f
h i s a c t; a n d w h e n i t i s s h o w n t h a t o n e h a s
d e l i b e r a t e l y s e t fi r e t o a b u i l d i n g , t h e
prosecution is not bound to produce fur ther
ev i d e n c e o f h i s w r o n g f u l i n t e n t . [ 4 7 ]
T h e u l t i m a te q u e r y n o w i s w h i c h k i n d o f a r s o n i s
accused-appellant guilty of?
A s p r ev i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d , t h e r e a r e t w o ( 2 )
c a te g o r i e s o f t h e c r i m e o f a r s o n : 1 ) d e st r u c t i ve a r s o n ,
u n d e r A r t . 3 2 0 o f t h e R ev i s e d Pe n a l C o d e , a s a m e n d e d by
R e p u b l i c Ac t N o . 7 6 5 9 ; a n d 2 ) s i m p l e a r s o n , u n d e r
P r e s i d e n t i a l D e c r e e N o . 1 6 1 3 . S a i d c l a s s i fi c a t i o n i s b a s e d
o n t h e k i n d , c h a r a c te r a n d l o c a t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y b u r n e d ,
r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e va l u e o f t h e d a m a g e c a u s e d , [ 4 8 ] t o w i t:
A r t i c l e 3 2 0 o f T h e R ev i s e d Pe n a l C o d e , a s
a m e n d e d by R A 7 6 5 9 , c o n te m p l a t e s t h e m a l i c i o u s
b u r n i n g o f s t r u c t u r e s , b o t h p u b l i c a n d p r i va t e ,
h o t e l s , b u i l d i n g s , e d i fi c e s , t r a i n s , ve s s e l s ,
a i r c r a f t , f a c t o r i e s a n d o t h e r m i l i t a r y, g ove r n m e n t
o r c o m m e r c i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s by a ny p e r s o n o r
g r o u p o f p e r s o n s . [ [ 4 9 ] ] T h e c l a s s i fi c a t i o n o f t h i s
t y p e o f c r i m e i s k n o w n a s D e st r u c t i ve A r s o n , w h i c h i s
p u n i s h a b l e by re c l u s i o n p e r p et u a t o d e a t h . T h e
r e a s o n f o r t h e l a w i s s e l f - ev i d e n t: t o e ff e c t i ve l y
d i s c o u r a g e a n d d e te r t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h i s d a s t a r d l y
c r i m e , t o p r eve n t t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f p r o p e r t i e s a n d
p r o te c t t h e l i ve s o f i n n o c e n t p e o p l e . E x p o s u r e t o a
b r e w i n g c o n fl a g r a t i o n l e ave s o n l y d e s t r u c t i o n a n d
d e s p a i r i n i t s w a ke ; h e n c e , t h e S t a te m a n d a te s
greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime.
T h e exc e p t i o n a l l y s eve r e p u n i s h m e n t i m p o s e d f o r t h i s
c r i m e t a ke s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e ex t r e m e d a n g e r t o
h u m a n l i ve s ex p o s e d by t h e m a l i c i o u s b u r n i n g o f
these structures; the danger to proper ty resulting
f r o m t h e c o n fl a g r a t i o n ; t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s n o r m a l l y
d i ffi c u l t t o a d o p t p r e c a u t i o n s a g a i n s t i t s c o m m i s s i o n ,
a n d t h e d i ffi c u l t y i n p i n p o i n t i n g t h e p e r p e t r a t o r s ; a n d ,
t h e g r e a te r i m p a c t o n t h e s o c i a l , e c o n o m i c , s e c u r i t y
and political fabric of the nation. [Emphasis
supplied.]
I f a s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f a ny o f
the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should
result, the mandator y penalty of death shall be
imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Ar ts.
3 2 1 t o 3 2 6 - B o f T h e R ev i s e d Pe n a l C o d e r e m a i n s
t h e g ove r n i n g l aw f o r S i m p l e A r s o n . T h i s d e c r e e
c o n te m p l a te s t h e m a l i c i o u s b u r n i n g o f p u b l i c a n d
p r i va te s t r u c t u r e s , r e g a r d l e s s o f s i z e , n o t i n c l u d e d

i n A r t . 3 2 0 , a s a m e n d e d by R A 7 6 5 9 , a n d c l a s s i fi e d
as other cases of arson. These include houses,
d w e l l i n g s , g ove r n m e n t b u i l d i n g s , f a r m s , m i l l s ,
p l a n t a t i o n s , r a i l w a ys , b u s s t a t i o n s , a i r p o r t s ,
w h a r ve s a n d o t h e r i n d u s t r i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s .
[[50]] Although the purpose of the law on Simple
A r s o n i s t o p r ev e n t t h e h i g h i n c i d e n c e o f fi r e s a n d
o t h e r c r i m e s i nvo l v i n g d e s t r u c t i o n , p r o te c t t h e
n a t i o n a l e c o n o my a n d p r e s e r ve t h e s o c i a l , e c o n o m i c
and political stability of the nation, PD 1613
te m p e r s t h e p e n a l t y t o b e m e te d t o o ff e n d e r s . T h i s
s e p a r a te c l a s s i fi c a t i o n o f S i m p l e A r s o n r e c o g n i z e s
t h e n e e d t o l e s s e n t h e s eve r i t y o f p u n i s h m e n t
c o m m e n s u r a t e t o t h e a c t o r a c t s c o m m i t te d ,
depending on the par ticular facts and circumstances
of each case. [Emphasis supplied.]
To e m p h a s i z e :
T h e n a t u r e o f D e s t r u c t i ve A r s o n i s
d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m S i m p l e A r s o n by t h e d e g r e e o f
p e r v e r s i t y o r v i c i o u s n e s s o f t h e c r i m i n a l o ff e n d e r.
T h e a c t s c o m m i t te d u n d e r A r t . 3 2 0 o f t h e
R ev i s e d Pe n a l C o d e ( a s a m e n d e d ) c o n s t i t u t i n g
D e s t r u c t i ve A r s o n a r e c h a r a c te r i z e d a s h e i n o u s
c r i m e s f o r b e i n g g r i evo u s , o d i o u s a n d h a te f u l
o ff e n s e s a n d w h i c h , by r e a s o n o f t h e i r i n h e r e n t
o r m a n i fe s t w i c ke d n e s s , v i c i o u s n e s s , a t r o c i t y a n d
per versity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and
m o r a l i t y i n a j u s t , c i v i l i z e d a n d o r d e r e d s o c i e t y.
[ 5 1 ] O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a c t s c o m m i t te d u n d e r P D
1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a
l e s s e r d e g r e e o f p e r ve r s i t y a n d v i c i o u s n e s s t h a t
t h e l a w p u n i s h e s w i t h a l e s s e r p e n a l t y. I n o t h e r
w o r d s , S i m p l e A r s o n c o n te m p l a te s c r i m e s w i t h
l e s s s i g n i fi c a n t s o c i a l , e c o n o m i c , p o l i t i c a l a n d
n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a n D e s t r u c t i ve
A r s o n . H o w eve r, a c t s f a l l i n g u n d e r S i m p l e A r s o n
m ay n ev e r t h e l e s s b e c o nve r te d i n t o D e s t r u c t i ve
A r s o n d e p e n d i n g o n t h e q u a l i f y i n g c i r c u m st a n c e s
present. [Emphasis supplied.] [52]
P r e s c i n d i n g f r o m t h e a b ove c l a r i fi c a t i o n v i s - - v i s
t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c r i m e a s s t a te d i n t h e a c c u s a t o r y
p o r t i o n o f t h e I n f o r m a t i o n , i t i s q u i te ev i d e n t t h a t a c c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t wa s c h a r g e d w i t h t h e c r i m e o f S i m p l e A r s o n
f o r h av i n g d e l i b e r a te ly s et fi r e u p o n th e t wo - s to r ey
r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f RO B E RTO S E PA R A a n d fa m i ly x x x
k n o w i n g th e s a m e to b e a n i n h a b i te d h o u s e a n d s i t u a te d i n
a th i c k ly p o p u l a te d p l a c e a n d a s a c o n s e q u e n c e th e r e o f a
c o n fl a g r a t i o n e n s u e d a n d th e s a i d b u i l d i n g , to g et h e r w i t h
s o m e s eve n ( 7 ) a d j o i n i n g re s i d e n t i a l h o u s e s , we r e r a z e d
by fi re . [ E m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d . ]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar
t o t h e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e o f Pe o p l e v. S o r i a n o . [ 5 3 ] T h e
a c c u s e d i n t h e l a t te r c a s e c a u s e d t h e b u r n i n g o f a
p a r t i c u l a r h o u s e . U n f o r t u n a te l y, t h e b l a z e s p r e a d a n d
g u t t e d d o w n fi ve ( 5 ) n e i g h b o r i n g h o u s e s . T h e RTC t h e r e i n
f o u n d t h e a c c u s e d g u i l t y o f d e s t r u c t i ve a r s o n u n d e r
p a r a g r a p h 1 [ 5 4 ] o f A r t . 3 2 0 o f t h e R ev i s e d Pe n a l C o d e , a s
a m e n d e d by R e p u b l i c Ac t N o . 7 6 5 9 . T h i s C o u r t , t h r o u g h
M r. J u st i c e B e l l o s i l l o , h o w eve r, d e c l a r e d t h a t:
x x x [ T ] h e a p p l i c a b l e p r ov i s i o n o f l aw
19
s h o u l d b e S e c . 3 , p a r. 2 , o f P D 1 6 1 3 ,
which imposes a penalty of reclusion
te m p o r a l t o r e c l u s i o n p e r p e t u a f o r
other cases of arson as the proper ties
b u r n e d by a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t a r e
s p e c i fi c a l l y d e s c r i b e d a s h o u s e s ,
c o n te m p l a t i n g i n h a b i te d h o u s e s o r
d w e l l i n g s u n d e r t h e a f o r e s a i d l a w. T h e
descriptions as alleged in the second
A m e n d e d I n f o r m a t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y r e fe r
to the structures as houses rather than
a s b u i l d i n g s o r e d i fi c e s . T h e
a p p l i c a b l e l aw s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e
S e c . 3 , Pa r. 2 , o f P D 1 6 1 3 , a n d n o t
A r t . 3 2 0 , p a r. 1 o f t h e Pe n a l C o d e . I n
case of ambiguity in construction of
penal laws, it is well-settled that such
l aw s s h a l l b e c o n s t r u e d s t r i c t l y a g a i n s t
t h e g ove r n m e n t , a n d l i b e r a l l y i n f avo r
of the accused.
The elements of arson under
S e c . 3 , p a r. 2 , o f P D 1 6 1 3 a r e : ( a )
t h e r e i s i n te n t i o n a l b u r n i n g ; a n d ( b )
what is intentionally burned is an
i n h a b i te d h o u s e o r d w e l l i n g .
I n c i d e n t a l l y, t h e s e e l e m e n t s c o n c u r i n
t h e c a s e a t b a r. [ 5 5 ]
A s s t a te d i n t h e b o d y o f t h e I n f o r m a t i o n ,
a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t wa s c h a r g e d w i t h h av i n g i n te n t i o n a l l y
b u r n e d t h e t wo - s to r ey r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e o f R o b e r t
S e p a r a . S a i d c o n fl a g r a t i o n l i ke w i s e s p r e a d a n d d e s t r o ye d
s eve n ( 7 ) a d j o i n i n g h o u s e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y, i f p r ove d , a s i t
w a s p r ove d , a t t h e t r i a l , s h e m ay b e c o nv i c t e d , a n d
s e n te n c e d a c c o r d i n g l y, o f t h e c r i m e o f s i m p l e a r s o n .
Such is the case notwithstanding the error in the
d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e o ff e n s e i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n r e m a i n s e ff e c t i ve i n s o f a r a s i t s t a te s t h e f a c t s
c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e c r i m e a l l e g e d t h e r e i n . [ 5 6 ] W h a t i s
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e o ff e n s e c h a r g e d o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r l aw o r
p a r t t h e r e o f a l l e g e d l y v i o l a te , x x x , b u t t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f
the crime charged and the par ticular facts therein
r e c i te d . [ 5 7 ]
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty
i m p o s e d by t h e RTC a s S e c . 5 o f P D N o . 1 6 1 3
c a te g o r i c a l l y p r ov i d e s t h a t t h e p e n a l t y t o b e i m p o s e d f o r
simple arson is:
S E C . 5 . W h e r e D e a th R e s u l t s f ro m
A r s o n . - I f by r e a s o n o f o r o n t h e
occasion of arson death results, the
p e n a l t y o f r e c l u s i o n p e r p e t u a to d e a t h
shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
A c c o r d i n g l y, t h e r e b e i n g n o a g g r av a t i n g
circumstance alleged in the Information, the imposable
p e n a l t y o n a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t i s r e c l u s i o n p e r p et u a .
A p ro p o s t h e c i v i l l i a b i l i t i e s o f a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t ,
c u r r e n t j u r i s p r u d e n c e [ 5 8 ] d i c t a te t h a t t h e c i v i l i n d e m n i t y
due from accused-appellant is P50,000.00 for the death of

e a c h o f t h e v i c t i m s . [ 5 9 ] H o w e ve r, t h e m o n e t a r y a w a r d s f o r
m o r a l a n d exe m p l a r y d a m a g e s g i ve n by t h e C o u r t o f
Appeals, both in the amount of P50,000.00, due the heirs
o f t h e v i c t i m s , h ave t o b e d e l ete d f o r l a c k o f m a te r i a l
b a s i s . S i m i l a r l y, t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a w a r d o f exe m p l a r y
d a m a g e s t o R o d o l f o M ov i l l a i n t h e a m o u n t o f P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
f o r t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f h i s h o u s e , a l s o h a s t o b e d e l ete d ,
b u t i n t h i s i n s t a n c e f o r b e i n g i m p r o p e r. M o r a l d a m a g e s
c a n n o t b e a w a r d by t h i s C o u r t i n t h e a b s e n c e o f p r o o f o f
m e n t a l o r p hys i c a l s u ff e r i n g o n t h e p a r t o f t h e h e i r s o f t h e
v i c t i m s . [ 6 0 ] C o n c e r n i n g t h e a wa r d o f exe m p l a r y d a m a g e s ,
t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l e t i o n b e i n g t h a t n o a g g r ava t i n g
c i r c u m s t a n c e h a d b e e n a l l e g e d a n d p r ove d by t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n i n t h e c a s e a t b a r. [ 6 1 ]
To s u m m a r i z e , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s a l te r n a t i ve
p l e a t h a t s h e b e a c q u i t te d o f t h e c r i m e m u s t b e r e j e c te d .
W i t h t h e ev i d e n c e o n r e c o r d , w e fi n d n o c o g e n t r e a s o n t o
d i s t u r b t h e fi n d i n g s o f t h e RTC a n d t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s .
It is indubitable that accused-appellant is the author of the
c r i m e o f s i m p l e a r s o n . A l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ev i d e n c e
p r e s e n te d b e f o r e t h e RTC , v i e w e d i n i t s e n t i r e t y, i s a s
c o nv i n c i n g a s d i r e c t ev i d e n c e a n d , a s s u c h , n e g a te s
a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t s i n n o c e n c e , a n d w h e n c o n s i d e r e d
c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h h e r a d m i s s i o n g i ve n t o M e r c e d i t a
M e n d o z a , t h e f o r m e r s g u i l t b eyo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t i s
t w i c e a s ev i d e n t . H e n c e , h e r c o nv i c t i o n i s e ff e c t i ve l y
j u s t i fi e d . M o r e s o , a s i t i s p r o p i t i o u s t o n o te t h a t i n st a r k
c o n t r a s t t o t h e f a c t u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s p r e s e n te d by t h e
p r o s e c u t i o n , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t n e i t h e r m u s te r e d a d e n i a l
n o r a n a l i b i exc e p t f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t h e r g u i l t h a d n o t
b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d b eyo n d r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .
I N V I E W W H E R E O F, t h e D e c i s i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f
A p p e a l s d a t e d 2 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 5 , i n CA G . R . C R H C N o .
0 1 1 3 9 , i s h e r e by A F F I R M E D i n s o f a r a s t h e c o nv i c t i o n o f
a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t E D N A M A L N G A N Y M AYO i s c o n c e r n e d .
T h e s e n te n c e t o b e i m p o s e d a n d t h e a m o u n t o f d a m a g e s t o
b e a w a r d e d , h o w eve r, a r e M O D I F I E D . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h
Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, accused-appellant
i s h e r e by s e n t e n c e d t o R E C LU S I O N P E R P E T UA . Ac c u s e d -
a p p e l l a n t i s h e r e by o r d e r e d t o p ay t h e h e i r s o f e a c h o f t h e
v i c t i m s P 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a s c i v i l i n d e m n i t y.
SO ORDERED.
4 . T R E AC H E RY
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi
Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for
the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER
20
for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN
HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course of
the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was
amended to MURDER. 1
The Information for murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun,
with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
with and shoot with the said handgun Roland John Chapman who war hit
in the chest, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the
death of said Roland John Chapman.
Contrary to law. 2
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun,
with intent to kill and evident premeditation, and by means of treachery,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the
head, thereby inflicting moral wounds which directly caused the death of
the said Maureen Hultman.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-
4607 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent
to kill, treachery and evident premeditation did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino
on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would
have caused the death of said Jussi Olavi Leino, thereby performing all
the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or
causes independent of his will, that is, due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Jussi Olavi Leino which prevented his death.
Contrary to law. 4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against
accused, bail was set at twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No
bail was recommended for the murder of Roland John Chapman. A
petition for bail was thus filed by accused. Hearing was set on August 9,
1991, while his arraignment was scheduled on August 14, 1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution
manifested that it would present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify
on the killing of Chapman and on the circumstances resulting to the
wounding of the witness himself and Hultman. Defense counsel Atty.
Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the incident pending that day
was hearing of the evidence on the petition for bail relative to the murder
charge for the killing of Chapman only. He opined that Leino's testimony
on the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding of Leino
and Hultman would be irrelevant. 5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be
wasted if the testimony of Leino would be limited to the killing of Chapman

considering that the crimes for which accused were charged involved only
one continuing incident. He pleaded that Leino should be allowed to testify
on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and the inconvenience of recalling
him later to prove the two (2) frustrated murder charges. 6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution
wanted to present Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait
until after the arraignment of accused on August 14, 1991. The defense
pointed out that if accused did not file a petition for bail, the prosecution
would still have to wait until after accused had been arraigned before it
could present Leino. 7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail
until after arraignment of accused on the condition that there shall be trial
on the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. The
defense counsel acceded. 8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges.
The prosecution then started to adduce evidence relative to all three (3)
cases. No objection was made by the defense. 9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino
invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party
at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party started at about 8:30 p.m.
and ended at past midnight. They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where
students of International School hang out. 10 After an hour, they transferred
to Vintage, another pub in Makati, where they stayed until past 3:00 a.m.
of July 13, 1991. Their group returned to Roxy's to pick up a friend of
Maureen, then went back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla
Street, Dasmarias Village, Makati. Chapman tagged along. 12 When they
entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop along Mahogany Street,
about a block away from her house in Campanilla Street. She wanted to
walk the rest of the way for she did not like to create too much noise in
going back to her house. She did not want her parents to know that she
was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman
stayed in the car and listened to the radio. 13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany
Street. When they reached the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets,
a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of
the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked:
"Who are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino thought accused only wanted
to check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his plastic
wallet, and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB) I.D. 14
Accused did not bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet
and pocketed it. 15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind
Leino and inquired what was going on. He stepped down on the sidewalk
and asked accused: "Why are you bothering us?" Accused pushed
Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman
felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you
shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside
Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave
Chapman alone. 16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked:
"Do you want a trouble?" Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The
shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she
became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly
shouted: "Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will somebody
help us?"
21
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen,
warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the
sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused
stood 2-3 meters away from him. He knew he could not run far without
being shot by accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to
the side of accused's car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen
circled around accused's car, trying to put some distance between them.
The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught
Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside
Leino. 17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away
and directly in front of them stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused
turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino
was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside
him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused
return to his car and drive away. 19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least
three (3) people looking on and standing outside their houses along
Caballero Street. 20 The three were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a private
security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to secure his residence at #1357
Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE MANGUBAT, a
stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at #1352 Caballero Street,
corner Mahogany Street, Dasmarias Village; 22 and AGRIPINO
CADENAS, a private security guard assigned at the house of Rey
Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street,
Dasmarias Village. 23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of
their employer, while driver Mangubat was in his quarters, preparing to
return to his own house. These three (3) eyewitnesses heard the first
gunshot while at their respective posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see
what was happening, while Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the
fence of their employer's house and looked out to Caballero Street. Each
saw a man (Chapman) sprawled on the ground, another man (Leino)
sitting on the sidewalk, a third man standing up ad holding a gun and a
woman (Hultman). They saw the gunman shoot Leino and Hultman and
flee aboard his Lancer car. However, because of Florece's distance from
the scene of the crime, 24 he was not able to discern the face of the
gunman. He saw the control numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He
described the gateway car as a box-type Lancer, its color somewhat white
("medyo maputi"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the
getaway car and gave it as PDW 566. He described the car as silver
metallic gray. 26 Both Cadenas and Mangubat saw the gunman's face.
They had a good look at him. Cadenas was then a mere four (4) meters
away from the gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20)
meters away from the scene of the crime. 28 The three confirmed that the
corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the shooting took place
was adequately illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time of the
incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house
and went near the scene of the crime. He noticed security guard Florece
along Caballero Street. A man on a bike passed by and Mangubat
requested him to report the shooting incident to the security officers of
Dasmarias Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post and
narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas, what he saw. Mrs. Roxas
repaired to the crime scene while Florece noted the incident in his logbook
(Exhibit "B"). He also jotted down the license plate control number of the
gunman's car as 566. 31

The security guards of Dasmarias Village came after a few minutes.
They rushed Leino and Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for
treatment. 32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES
BALDADO of the Makati police, together with SPO3 ALBERTO
FERNANDEZ, investigated the incident. 33 Their initial investigation
disclosed that the gunman's car was a box-type Mitsubishi Lancer with
plate control number 566. They checked the list of vehicles registered with
the village Homeowners' Association and were able to track down two (2)
Lancer cars bearing plate control number 566. One was registered in the
name of JOSE MONTAO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmarias Village,
with plate number PKX 566, and another was traced to accused CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR., of 1339 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, with
plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the
NBI, was also tasked by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to
investigate the shooting. Ranin's team immediately proceeded to the
house of Jose Montao 35 where they found ahead of them the Makati
police and operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol. Ranin tried to
verify from Mrs. Montao whether the white Lancer car registered in the
name of Mr. Montao and bearing plate number 566 was the gunman's
car. Mrs. Montao denied and declared they had already sold the car to
Saldaa Enterprises. She averred the car was being used by one Ben
Conti, a comptroller in said company, who resides in Cubao, Quezon City.
Mrs. Montao called up her husband and informed him about the
investigation. She also called up Conti and asked him to bring the car to
the house. 36
Jose Montao came around noon. Conti followed with white Lancer car.
Ranin brought them to the NBI office for investigation, together with Lancer
car. At the NBI Ranin inquired from Montao the whereabouts of his car
on July 12 and 13, 1991. Montao informed him that the car was at the
residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E. Rodriguez Street, Cubao,
Quezon City, the night of July 12, 1991. In the morning of July 13, 1991,
Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaa Enterprises. Conti confirmed
this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from two (2) NBI
agents who made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request,
Montao left his car at the NBI parking lot pending identification by
possible witnesses. 37
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot
investigation and neighborhood inquiry of the shooting incident. They
interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him to report to their office the
next day for further investigation. 38 They also interviewed Agripino
Cadenas who was reluctant to divulge any information and even denied
having witnessed the incident. Sensing his reluctance, they returned to
Cadenas' post at Dasmarias Village that night and served him a
subpoena, inviting him to appear at the NBI office for investigation the next
day. 39 The NBI agents also talked with Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian
national residing at #1350 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, near the
scene of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's car
was not white but light gray. A foreign national, Asliami was afraid and
refused to give a statement about the incident. The agents exerted every
effort to convince Asliami to cooperate, assuring her of their protection.
Ranin even asked a representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax
Asliami to cooperate. They failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as
summoned. Florece readily executed a sworn statement. 41 Cadenas,
however, continued to feign ignorance and bridled his knowledge of the
incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI
agents informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding
information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in his office. Cadenas
confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the case. He was
apprehensive that the gunman would harass or harm him or his family.
22
After Ranin assured him of NBI protection, Cadenas relented. 42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He
described the gunman's car as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW
566. He was brought to the NBI parking lot where Montao's white Lancer
car was parked to identify the gunman's car. Ranin asked Cadenas if
Montao's was the gunman's car. Cadenas replied that its color was
different. Ranin directed him to look around the cars in the parking lot and
to point the color that most resembled the color of the gunman's car. He
pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he
pointed to was not white but light gray. 43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas
replied in the affirmative. Ranin led Cadenas to his office and showed him
ten (10) pictures of different men (Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC-10) taken from
the NBI files. One of the pictures belonged to accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's picture
(Exhibit "CC-7"), and identified him as the gunman. Cadenas wrote his
name and the date at the back of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the
NBI then took down Cadenas' statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial
Court to apply for a search warrant. After a searching examination of the
witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a search warrant (Exhibit
"RR"), authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver metallic gray,
1983 Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number
PDW 566. Ranin and his agents drove to accused's house at #1339
Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, to implement the warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of
accused, of their search warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that they
had orders from Director Lim to invite accused to the NBI office for
investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed them that accused was not in the
house at that time. She excused herself, went to the kitchen and called up
someone on the phone. 46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage and
secured accused's car. After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin
asked her for the car keys but she told him that the keys were with
accused. Upon Ranin's request, Mrs. Teehankee got in touch with
accused on the phone. Ranin conversed with accused and invited him to
the NBI for investigation. Accused assured Ranin that he would report to
the NBI later that day. The agents then towed the car of accused to the
NBI office. 47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the
NBI office and waited for accused. Accused came, escorted by three (3)
Makati policemen, after an hour. He informed them that he just came from
the Makati police station where he was also investigated. He told Lim that
he was given a statement to the Makati police and was brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for paraffin test. 48
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the
whereabouts of his Lancer car at the time of the shooting. Accused
claimed that his car was involved in an accident a few weeks back and
was no longer functioning. The car had been parked in his mother's house
at Dasmarias Village since then. Due to the lateness of the evening, the
group decided to continue the investigation the following day. 49
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim
pressed accused on what really happened at Dasmarias Village.
Accused said he did not see anything. Lim apprised accused that he
would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into silence.
50
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was

requested to join the lineup composed of seven (7) men and he acceded.
Cadenas was called from an adjoining room 51 and Ranin asked him to
identify the gunman from the lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to
accused. 52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas. 53
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two (2)
other agents brought accused to Forbes Park for further identification by
the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just been discharged from the
hospital the day before. Since Leino's parents were worried about his
safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the identification of the gunman
in Forbes Park where the Leinos also reside. The NBI agreed. 54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house
and escorted him and his father to a vacant house in Forbes Park, along
Narra Avenue. After a couple of minutes, Leino was brought out of the
house and placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. The car was
parked about five (5) meters away from the house. Inside the car with
Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino
was instructed to look at the men who would be coming out of the house
and identify the gunman from the lineup. 55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the
unoccupied house, into the street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of
them was wearing sunglasses. Since Leino could not yet speak at that
time due to the extensive injury on his tongue, he wrote down on a piece
of paper a request for one of the men in the lineup to remove his
sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father. The men in the
lineup were herded back inside the house. After a couple of minutes, they
again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup,
Leino identified accused as the gunman. 56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred
the cases of murder and double frustrated murder against accused to the
Department of Justice for appropriate action. At the inquest, Fiscal Dennis
Villa-Ignacio did not recommend bail insofar as the murder charge was
concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the NBI. 57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat.
Baldado went to see security guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the
residence of his employer in Dasmarias Village. Baldado interviewed
Mangubat and invited him to the Makati police station where his statement
(Exhibit "D") was taken. 58
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched
Mangubat from his house and brought him to the Makati police station. At
the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man who would be coming and
see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat was posted at the top of the
stairs at the second floor of the station. 59
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete.
He ascended the stairs, passed by Mangubat and proceeded to Major
Lovete's office at the second floor. While accused was going up the stairs,
Pat. Baldado inquired from Mangubat if accused was the gunman.
Mangubat initially declined to identify accused, saying that he wanted to
see the man again to be sure. He also confided to Pat. Baldado that he
was nervous and afraid for accused was accompanied by a police Major.
When accused came out from Major Lovete's office, Pat. Baldado again
asked Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head
in response. 60 Accused, together with Major Lovete and Pat. Baldado,
boarded a Mercedes Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his
post at Dasmarias Village by other Makatipolicemen. 61
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house
and asked him again if accused was really the gunman. Once more,
Mangubat answered in the affirmative. Pat. Baldado told Mangubat that he
would no longer ask him to sign a statement which he (Baldado) earlier
23
prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the
NBI agents. Director Lim asked Mangubat if he could recognize the
gunman. Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was shown twelve (12)
pictures (Exhibits "E" to "E-11) of different men and was asked to identify
the gun gunman from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit "E-10"), that of
accused, and identified him as the gunman. Mangubat's statement was
taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make a personal
identification. 64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the
presence of the media. At that time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez
and Malvar, were at the office of then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco
protesting to the submission of accused to identification. They pointed out
that since the cases against accused had already been filed in court and
they have secured a court order for the transfer of accused to the Makati
municipal jail, any identification of accused should be made in the
courtroom. Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was
part of their on-going investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels
acquiesced but requested that identification be made without the presence
of the media. Velasco turned them down and explained that if accused is
not identified n the lineup, the media coverage would favor accused. 65
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup
at Lim's office and remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the
SOG office the men composing the lineup and he asked them to go near
accused. Ranin then told Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat pointed
to accused as the gunman.
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its
investigation. 66
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
FINDINGS:
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm. in diameter,
located at the upper lip, mouth, along the medial line, directed backwards
and downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone and central and lateral
incisors, both sides, to the buccal cavity then lacerating the tongue with
fragments of the bullet lodged in the right palatine, tongue and tonsillar
region.
SKULLCHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322July 13, 1991
No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of radioopaque foreign body
(bullet fragments) along the superior alveolar border on the right. No
remarkable findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone fragments in the right
palatine, tongue and tonsillar regions with associated soft tissue swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.

xxx xxx xxx 67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino.
After entering Leino's head, it fractured his upper jaw and his front teeth.
Some of the bullet fragments pierced his palette and tongue. Brain
scanning revealed contusions on the temporal lobe and hemorrhage on
the covering of the brain. Physical deformity resulted as a consequence of
the gunshot wound because of the fractured upper jaw and the loss of the
front teeth. Sutures were performed on the upper portion of his tongue.
Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue caused him difficulty in
speaking. 68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman.
He opined that the muzzle of the gun, like in the case of Maureen, must
have been at a higher level than the victim's head. He concluded that the
gun must have been pointed above Leino's head considering the
acuteness and downward trajectory of the bullet. 69
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center,
operated on MAUREEN HULTMAN. He testified that when he first saw
Maureen, she was unconscious and her face was bloodied all over.
Maureen had a bullet hole on the left side of the forehead, above the
eyebrow. Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on the left side
of the forehead where the bullet entered. 70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She
was also given a CT scan. The examination revealed that she suffered
injuries on the skull and brain. There were several splintered bullets in her
brain and the major portion of the bullet, after it fragmented, was lodged
beneath her right jaw. 71
Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a
team who operated on her brain to arrest the bleeding inside her head,
remove devitalized brain tissues and retrieve the splintered bullets
embedded in her brain. Due to the extensive swelling of Maureen's brain
and her very unstable condition, he failed to patch the destroyed
undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After the surgery, Maureen's vital
signs continued to function but she remained unconscious. She was
wheeled to the ICU for further observation.
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of
Maureen's nostrils due to the unpatched undersurface covering of her
brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain exposed. A second surgery
was made on July 30, 1991 to repair Maureen's brain covering. He used
the fascia lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace the destroyed covering of
the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen remained unconscious. The trickle of
brain tissues through her nose was lessened but Maureen developed
infection as a result of the destruction of her brain covering. Maureen
developed brain abscess because of the infection. She underwent a third
operation to remove brain abscess and all possible focus of infection. 73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis
explained that Maureen was shot at the left side of the forehead. The
bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above the eyebrow. Upon entering the
forehead, the bullet fragmented into pieces and went from the left to the
right side of the temple, fracturing the frontal bone of the skull. The bullet
eventually settled behind the right jaw of Maureen. 74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital
parts of the body, the brain. When Maureen was subjected to CT scan,
they discovered hemorrhage in her brain. After the bullet hit her head, it
caused hemorrhagic lesion on the ventricles of the brain and the second
covering of the brain. 75
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling
underneath the forehead brought about by edema in the area. Scanning
24
also showed that Maureen's right jaw was affected by the fragmented
bullet. The whole interior portion of her nose was also swollen. 76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the
internal bleeding and remove the splintered bullets, small bone fragments
and dead tissues. The main bullet was recovered behind Maureen's right
jaw. There was also an acute downward trajectory of the bullet. Hence, it
was opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated. 77
With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if Maureen
survived, she would have led a vegetating life and she would have needed
assistance in the execution of normal and ordinary routines. 78 She would
have been completely blind on the left eye and there was possibility she
would have also lost her vision on the right eye. All her senses would have
been modified and the same would have affected her motor functions.
There was practically no possibility for Maureen to return to normal. 79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of
confinement in the hospital, she ceased to be a breathing soul on October
17, 1991.
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused claimed that on said date and time, he was not anywhere near
the scene of the crime. He alleged that he was then in his house at #53
San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept at around 1:00 a.m. on July
13, 1991 and woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that same morning.
Accused avowed his two (2) maids could attest to his presence in his
house that fateful day. 80
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the
Dasmarias shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it. He
denied knowing prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino Cadenas and Vicente
Mangubat before they identified him as the gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi
Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car
ceased to be in good running condition after its involvement in an accident
in February 1991. Since May 1991 until the day of the shooting, his Lancer
car had been parked in the garage of his mother's house in Dasmarias
Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused, however, conceded
that although the car was not in good running condition, it could still be
used. 82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at
around 5:00 p.m. upon invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac and
Major Lovete who wanted to ask him about the ownership of the Lancer
car parked in his mother's house. He readily gave a statement to the
Makati police denying complicity in the crime. He submitted himself to a
paraffin test. He was accompanied by the Makati police to the Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested negative for gunpowder
nitrates. 83 After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany
him to the NBI for he had earlier committed to his mother that he would
present himself to Director Lim. 84
He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He furnished
Lim with the statement he earlier gave to the Makati police. Thereafter,
Lim detained him at the NBI against his will. 85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the
Manila Hotel for breakfast. When they returned to the NBI, he was asked
to proceed to Lim's office. On his way, he saw a lineup formed inside Lim's
office. The NBI agents forced him to join the lineup and placed him in the
number seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was to identify him
was already in the room. As soon as he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas
identified him as the gunman. 86

A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes
Park. The NBI agents brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi
Leino who allegedly identified him as the gunman in a lineup. 87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated
at the office of Ranin for he refused to join another lineup. Despite his
protest, the NBI agents insisted on the conduct of the identification and
ordered a group of men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he
was identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he was
not assisted by counsel at any stage of said investigation. 88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. He testified that from May 1989 to February 1991,
he had been using his father's Lancer car bearing plate number PDW 566
in going to school. 89
In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit
a bicycle driver and two (2) trucks parked at the side of the road. The
accident resulted in the death of the bicycle driver and damage to his
father's car, 90 especially on its body. The timing of the engine became a
little off and the car was hard to start. They had the car repaired at
Reliable Shop located in Banawe Street, Quezon city. After a month, he
brought the car to the residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at
Dasmarias Village, Makati. He personally started the car's engine and
drove it to Makati from the shop in Quezon City. He did not bring the car to
their house in Pasig for it was still scheduled for further repairs and they
preferred to have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III
claimed that from that time on, he was prohibited by his father from using
the car because of his careless driving. He kept the keys to the car and
since he was busy in school, no further repair on said car had been made.
91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders
Hultman, adoptive father of deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He
capitalized on a newspaper report that the gunman may have been an
overprotective father. This theory was formed when an eyewitness
allegedly overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman: "Huwag Daddy.
Huwag, Daddy." The defense presented Anders Hultman as a hostile
witness.
ANDERS HULTMAN, testified that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian
Hultman were married in the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had two (2)
children by her previous marriage, one of whom was Maureen. He legally
adopted Vivian's two (2) daughters in 1991. He and Vivian had three (3)
children of their own. 92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the
initial stage of the investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overhead pleading
to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." Anders explained that
Maureen could not have uttered those words for Maureen never spoke
Tagalog. He also said that all his children call him "Papa," not "Daddy." 93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out
but instructed her to be home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received her first
salary in her first job and she wanted to celebrate with friends. At the time
of the shooting, he and his wife were sleeping in their house. He woke up
at around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a security guard came to their
house and informed them about the killings. 94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to
accused at the Makati municipal jail. On several occasions, he checked on
accused in jail and discovered that accused was not in his cell. The jail
guards even covered up accused's whereabouts. His complaint was
investigated by the Congressional Committee on Crime Prevention,
headed by Congressman Concepcion. 95
25
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F.
BALDADO and SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who investigated the
shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned
from Mr. Jose Montao that he sold his white Lancer car, with plate
number PKX 566, to Saldaa Lending Investors in February 1991. This
car was assigned to Ben Conti, Operations Manager of said company and
was in the residence of Conti at the time of the shooting. The other
witnesses he interviewed confirmed that Montao's white Lancer car was
not in the vicinity of Montao's residence at the time of the incident. 96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente
Mangubat. Mangubat saw the gunman and the get-away car but could not
give the central letters of the car's license plate. Fernandez went to one of
the houses at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero Streets and asked
the maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a call, the maid
told him that he saw the gunman and heard one of the victims say:
"Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez tried to get the maid's name
but the latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in court nor
asked the court to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged
statement of the maid included in the Progress Report (Exhibit "13")
prepared by the Makati police investigators. 97
SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he
and Baldado fetched the latter at Dasmarias Village for identification of
the gunman at the Makati police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the
lobby. After a few minutes, accused and company arrived. When accused
passed by them, they instructed Mangubat to look around and see if he
could identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify accused. Mangubat
told Fernandez that the gunman was younger and shorter than accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo
Florece (Exhibit "MM"). It was signed by Florece in his presence. In said
statement, Florece described the gunman's car as "medyo puti"
(somewhat white). 99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
testified on the paraffin test she conducted on July 17, 1991 on both hands
of accused. 100 As per Chemistry Report No. C 274-91, 101 the test yielded
a negative result of gunpowder nitrates on accused's hands. In said
Report, she noted that accused was subjected to paraffin test more than
seventy-two (72) hours after the shooting incident. She explained that 72
hours is the reasonable period within which nitrate residues may not be
removed by ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a person
who has fired a gun. 102
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also
took the stand for the defense. He testified that in the course of handling
the cases, he was able to confer with Ponferrada, Cadenas' supervisor at
the Security agency where Cadenas was employed. Ponferrada informed
him that Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured at the NBI and was
compelled to execute a statement. Ponferrada, allegedly, refused to testify.
Atty. Malvar, however, admitted the defense did not compel the attendance
of Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the
irregularities committed in the off-court identification of their client. When
asked what he did to remedy this perceived irregularity, Malvar said he
objected to the conduct of the lineup. When further pressed whether he
filed a petition for review raising this issue with the Department of Justice
upon the filing of the cases therewith, he said he did not. He offered the
excuse that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez, the principal counsel of accused
at that time. He also declared that although they knew that arraignment
 26
would mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the thereof, which were not written by Barrameda, 107
were lifted by the
investigation and preliminary investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez allowed defense and offered in evidence, viz:
accused to be arraigned. 103
Exhibit "2-a"
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the
progress in the investigation of the case. It presented seven (7) newspaper Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national capital
reporters as witnesses, viz: Nestor Barrameda of the Manila Times, Martin region, claims, however, that another security guard, Vic Mangubat, had
Marfil and Dave Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Nida Mendoza testified before the police that another man, not Teehankee, had fired at
of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan of the People's Journal and Chapman and his companions.
Elena Aben of the Manila Bulletin. The bulk of defense evidence consists
of newspaper clippings and the testimonies of the news reporters, thus: Exhibit "2-b"

NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times identified The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns on
two (2) news reports as having been partly written by him. One was a Teehankee's hands as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS laboratory
news item, entitled: "JUSTICE DEP'T ORDERS PROBE OF THREE indicated that he may not have fired the gun. 108
METRO KILLINGS" (Exhibit "1"), appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of
the Manila Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report is usually
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two
the product of collaborative work among several reporters. They follow the
(2) newspaper clippings which were partly written by him.
practice of pooling news reports where several reporters are tasked to
cover one subject matter. The news editor then compiles the different
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the
reports they file and summarizes them into one story. 105
Philippine Daily Inquirer, was entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE OF DASMA
SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in
evidence as follows:
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3",
thus:
Exhibit "1-A":

Exhibit "3-a"
Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over the
investigation of the murders of Roland Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25,
Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called "Daddy"
and three members of a family Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters,
shortly before Chapman's shooting.
Carmela, 19, and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7.

Exhibit "3-b"
Exhibit "1-B"

But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman was a
Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been angered when
dancer before she was adopted by her foster parent.
Hultman, a 10th grader at the International School in Makati was escorted
home by Chapman after going to a disco.
Exhibit "3-c"

Exhibit "1-C"
Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street inside
the village after the shooting and was believed to have proceeded toward
The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped Hultman.
Forbes Park using the Palm street gate.

Exhibit "l-D"
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a"
and "3-c". He just reiterated previous reports in other newspapers. They
The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they tried
were based on speculations.
to escape.

Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE

Exhibit "1-E"
SON HELD FOR DASMA SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991
issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:
Other angles

Exhibit "4-B"
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.

According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came when
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a "highly sensitive" the witness showed up and said that the gunman was on board a silver-
matter that might involve influential people. 106 metallic Lancer.

Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of Exhibit "4-C"
the news items marked as Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D". He just culled them
from previous news reports of other newspapers. He admitted that the
The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the car
only portion he wrote based on an actual interview with NBI Asst. Director
and was talking to Hultman, who was shouting "Huwag! Daddy!" several
Velasco was Exhibit "I-E."
times. 110

Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination,
Manila Times, entitled: "NBI INSISTS IT HAS "RIGHT" SUSPECT IN
Marfil admitted that the news reports marked as Exhibits "3" and "4" were
CHAPMAN SLAY" which was marked as Exhibit "2." Certain portions
written based on information available at that time. 111

NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report,
entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which
appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of Malaya. She testified that she
wrote a portion thereof, marked as Exhibit "5-c", and the sources of her
information were several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-c" reads:
Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that Teehankee was
arrested at his house.
They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate control
number 566 who had not been questioned, voluntarily went to police
headquarters upon invitation of Makati police chief Superintendent Remy
Macaspac. 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged
concerted effort of the investigators to implicate accused as the lone
gunman; (b) that there were other suspects aside from accused and that
someone whom Maureen called as "Daddy" was the actual gunman; (c)
that the initial police investigation showed that the gunman's car was a
white Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that after the NBI took over the
investigation, the white Lancer car of the gunman became a silver gray
Lancer of accused and thereafter, he became the gunman.
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the
portions she wrote in the news item, entitled: ''I WILL HOUND YOU",
which appeared on the October 24, 1991 issue of People's Journal
(Exhibit "6"). She identified the source of her information as Mr. Anders
Hultman himself. 114
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion," Hultman
said the day after his 17-year old daughter was cremated. 115
Exhibit "6-b"
The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the Hultman
family's request for permission to visit Teehankee in his cell "at anytime of
their choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding behind the
curtain," Hultman said, "Congress told me that I can take the curtain down
and jail authorities will pull him out." 116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item
marked as Exhibit "6". Specifically, he wrote Exhibits "6-d" and "6-e" 117
which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong was
quoted as telling Vergel de Dios.
Exhibit "6-e"
BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the Chapman-
Hultman, Vizconde and Eldon Maguan cases because he belongs to a
secret but very influential multi-sectoral group monitoring graft and
corruption and other crimes in high levels of government and society. 118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given
27
to him by BIR insiders for the latter refused to be identified. 119
Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged
blind and consuming personal rage and bias of Anders Hultman against
accused; and (b) the unwarranted pressure, prejudice and prejudgment by
some congressional leaders in favor of the Hultmans in violation of due
process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, identified
the news account which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the
Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7"). He
wrote a portion of said article (Exhibit "7-c") and the source of his
information was Camp Crame. 120 It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer with
plate number "566." The witnesses cannot tell the plate's control letters. 121
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July 1991
issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED, SECOND
WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8"). The portions of said news
item which he wrote were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who asked
not to be identified insisted that the NBI got the wrong man. The NBI has
taken over the case from the CIS.
Exhibit "8-c"
He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he described
as "resembling Teehankee but looks much younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified only as
Mangubat, saw everything that happened in the early morning of July 13.
The witness, however, failed to identify Teehankee as the gunman. 122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP
CHAPMAN SLAY CASE", which appeared on the July 26, 1991 issue of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit 9). 123 He wrote the entire news
account, 124 portions of which were marked by the defense in evidence,
thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called "surprise
witness" picked Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI lineup.
He gathered this information from his source but he was not able to
interview Mangubat himself. 125
Exhibit "9-b"
Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya si
Bobby (Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw ito ang suspect. Ngayon
bigla niyang ituturo, said a red-faced Makati investigator who, as usual, did
not want to be identified.
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article,
entitled: "US DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT DEAD", which appeared on the
July 14, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin (Exhibit "10"). 126 Two (2)

portions thereof were marked as evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
The victims were on their way home in Olanileino's Mercedez Benz with a
diplomat's plate number when a white Lancer with plate number PKX-566
blocked its path.
Exhibit "10-a-2"
US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a
communications specialist. He said the shooting could be the result of an
altercation on the street. 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the
news account he wrote which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the
Bulletin, entitled: "4 MURDER SUSPECTS FALL" (Exhibit "22"). Portions
of said news item were marked by the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
. . . He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of
Mahogany and Caballero Sts. in Dasmarias Village at past 4 a.m. Friday.
Exhibit "22-c"
The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman who
was killed in front of his friends on his way home from a party. The armed
men, on board a white Lancer car, blocked the path of the victim's
Mercedes Benz car inside the village before the shooting.
Exhibit "22-a-1"
The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered
Chapman to alight from the car. They shot Chapman several times in the
body, while his companions identified as Maureen Hultman, and Jussi
Olanileino, were seriously wounded when the gunmen sprayed the car
with bullets.
The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce later
the names of the detained suspects after their initial investigation. 128
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED"
(Exhibit "23"), which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Manila
Bulletin, was introduced by the defense in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"
The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked Chapman's
car on Mahogany St. in the subdivision.
Exhibit "23-a-2"
Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two
companions, Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olanileino, a Finn, to get out of
their car.
Exhibit "23-a-3"
They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer with plate
No. PDW 566. They added that they saw the same car in the garage of
the Teehankee family. 129
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (a) stories
was the NBI and they were based on information available to the NBI at
28
that time 130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT
as its rebuttal witness. Mangubat insisted that he was able to identify
accused when he saw the latter at the Makati police station. Her reiterated
that the next day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati police went to his place of
work in Dasmarias Village and asked him if he was sure about the
identity of the gunman. He told Baldado he was positive. Baldado then
said him he would no longer require him to sign the statement he prepared
for him earlier. 131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the
NBI, was also presented as a prosecution rebuttal witness. She testified
that extensive washing of hands or excessive perspiration can eliminate
gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin pores of the hands. Continued washing
with hot water can induce perspiration and remove nitrate residue
embedded in the skin pores. Application of vinegar on the hand can
register the same effect. 132
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a
suspect within 72 hours from the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during
which time, any possible trace of nitrate may still be found. 133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of
the paraffin test. She related that she once attended a training in Baguio
City where they tried to test the accuracy of a paraffin test. In said training,
two (2) NBI agents fired a .38 revolver. One of them washed his hands.
They then subjected both agents to a paraffin test using diphylamine
reagent. Both yielded a negative result. Thus, she opined, the result of a
paraffin test should merely be taken as a corroborative evidence and
evaluated together with other physical evidence. 134
The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992
for the presentation by the defense of sur-rebuttal evidence. However, a
day before the scheduled hearing, the defense filed a Constancia 135
manifesting that it shall waive its right to present sur-rebuttal evidence, the
same being unneccesary. The defense, however, declared that this is
without prejudice to the presentation of its evidence in the trial proper
should the same be necessary.
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear.
The prosecution moved in open court that the main cases and the petition
for bail be submitted for decision in view of the absence of defense
counsels who had manifested that they would no longer present their sur-
rebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the parties were given ten
(10) days from receipt of the Order within which to submit their
simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It does not appear that the defense
objected to this Order. The records show that the defense even filed a
motion asking for additional time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time,
both parties submitted their respective Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR. of the crimes charged. 138 The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:
(1) In criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the fatal shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing
said accused to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion perpetua, and to pay the
heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,
000.00), Philippine Currency, plus moderate or temperate and exemplary
damages in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00),
Philippine Currency;

(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the fatal shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay
the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus the sums of Two Million Three
Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three
Centavos (P2,350,461.83), Philippine Currency, as actual damages;
Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of
earning capacity of the said deceased; and One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4607, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Frustrated Murder,
qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the sum of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One
Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-
Four Centavos (P118,369.84), Philippine Currency, and another sum
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual
damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $40,000.00,
as loss of earning capacity of said offended party; and One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages.
(4) In all these three cases ordering said accused to pay all the offended
parties the sum of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan,
Jr. He filed a Motion for New Trial, 139 alleging for the first time that the trial
court erred in considering as submitted for decision not only the petition
for bail but also the case on the merits. He claimed that accused's right to
adduce further evidence was violated. His motion for new trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD
BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND
MANGUBAT AS THE ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND
MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT
WAS MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND PREJUDICIAL AS TO
EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL
TRIAL.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF
CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS
ATTENDED BY TREACHERY.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.
29
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF
THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00).
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE
MERITS AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE SAME TIME
WITHOUT GIVING THE ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE
CASE AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3)
eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. He vigorously
assails his out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone
surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification of him outside an unoccupied house in
Forbes Park was highly irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers
before he identified him.
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by
Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the
sketch must have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when
the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The
shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could
not have been fixed only on the gunman's face. His senses were also
dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by
the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness
identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the
success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is
significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of
identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some
authors even describe eyewitness evidence as "inherently suspect." 141
The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a
crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event
actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the
event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate
accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each
of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and
retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal human
fallibilities and suggestive influences. (Emphasis Supplied) 142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is
done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with
the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs
are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-
ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined
up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the
case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of

suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where
they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view
the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged
irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor
was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino's
identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The
records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for
security reasons. 144 The need for security even compelled that Leino be
fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy
security officials and brought to the house where he was to make the
identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification at the NBI
office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. 145 Leino's
fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been
shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in
the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the Special Operations
Group of the NBI, correctly testified that there is no hard and fast rule as to
the place where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may
be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and the
criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim. 146
Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio
and TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him.
Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991, while Leino was still in the
hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of different men by the
investigators. He identified appellant as the gunman from these pictures.
He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification,
he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any report relative to the
shooting incident. 147 The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot
identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-
court identification by Leino.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by
Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post.
Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The incident
happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely
testify against appellant. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He
was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels.
He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When asked how sure
he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently
replied: "I'm very sure. It could not have been somebody else." 148
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to
reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during his
hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that Leino's extensive
injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he
identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak.
He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. 149 There is also no
rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness
whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. Reliance by
appellant on the case of People v. Alindog 150 to erode Leino's credibility is
misplaced. In Alindog, accused was acquitted not solely on the basis of
delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the finding that the
prosecution evidence was, at best, circumstancial and "suspiciosly short in
important details," there being no investigation whatsoever conducted by
the police.
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch
prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino. There
is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was turned over by the
CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was
30
suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble appellant is
not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for
Leino to have remembered appellant's face when the incident happened
within a span of five (5) minutes. Five (5) minutes is not a short time for
Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience shows that
precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their
eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with
a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. 151 We have ruled that
the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the assailant
create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 152
In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to
impute a serious crime to appellant. The victims and appellant were
unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified
appellant, it must be because appellant was the real culprit.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that
Cadenas did not witness the crime. He stresses that when the
Dasmarias security force and the Makati police conducted an on-the-spot
investigation on the day of the incident, neither came across Cadenas.
The next day, in the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent interviewed
Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He merely replied: "Nakita ko
pero patay na." He did not volunteer information to anyone as to what he
supposedly witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for
investigation. He went to the NBI the next morning. It was only the next
day, July 16, 1991, that he gave his statement to the NBI. Cadenas
allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to
the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the
trial. He related that he feared for his and his family's safety. His fear was
not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless violence
perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential
family. It was only after consistent prodding and assurance of protection
from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the authorities. 153 The
Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get
involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and
limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has not considered the
initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as
an authorities as an indicium of credibility. 154 It will not depart from this
ruling.
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne
out by the records. Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his superior, a
certain Ponferrada, information about his torture. The allegation is an out
and out hearsay as Ponferrada was not presented in the witness stand.
Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation of torture. The claim of
torture is also belied by the fact that Cadenas' entire family was allowed to
stay with him at the NBI headquarters and likewise extended protection. 155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing
the testimony of defense witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati Police.
Pat. Baldado testified that Mangubat failed to identify appellant as the
gunman the first time he was brought to the Makati police station.
Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He declared he positively
identified appellant as the gunman at the Makati police station. He averred
that the day after he identified appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to his
place of work in Dasmarias and asked him again whether appellant was
the gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado
said he would no longer ask him to sign a statement (Exhibit "HHH") 156
earlier prepared by Baldado. In said statement previously prepared by
Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to state that appellant, whom he saw at
the Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We give more weight to
the testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to suspect that

Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court cannot be as generous to Pat.
Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati
police, including some of its jail officials, gave appellant favored treatment
while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than a
congressional investigation.
II
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial
court erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement
in previous shooting incidents for this contravenes the rule 157 that
evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing
at another time. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to
compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the
bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution
eyewitnesses described the gunman's car as white, but the trial court
found it to be silver mettalic gray. Fourth, appellant could not have been
the gunman for Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that
he overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus:
"Please, don't shoot me and don't kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy."
Appellant also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the
crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say:
"Daddy don't shoot. Don't." Fifth, the NBI towed accused's car from
Dasmarias Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was not
in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted
on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN,
since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having
overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b)
JOSE MONTAO, another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a
white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge
violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he considered his
involvement in previous shooting incidents. This stance is a specie of a
mid-1800 rule known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a
trial court's error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have
caused prejudice and therefore, almost automatically required a new trial."
158
The Exchequer rule has long been laid to rest for even English
appellate courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence
"unless in its opinion, some substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice)
has been occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this approach
especially after the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a
federal appellate court to "give judgment after an examination of the entire
record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 160 We
have likewise followed the harmless error rule in our jurisdiction. In dealing
with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging
quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact
is slight and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome the
weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. 161
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the
troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is
not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge
in convicting appellant. As aforestated, the appellant was convicted mainly
because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal
31
gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission,
however, cannot exculpate appellant. The omitted comparison cannot
nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was
not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the
NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it was parked to the NBI
office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that said
car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was
then in the possession of appellant. Clearly, the car was towed not
because it was not in running condition. Even appellant's evidence show
that said car could run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio
Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to
Dasmarias Village, in Makati, where it was parked. 162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses'
description of the color of the gunman's car. Leino described the car as
light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white ("medyo puti"); 163
Mangubat declared the car was white; 164 and Cadenas testified it was
silver metallic gray. 165 These alleged discrepancies amount to no more
than shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to
colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the
speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the
break of dawn, these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do
not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the
adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration.
Appellant cites a newspaper item 166 where Maureen was allegedly
overheard as saying to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The
evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could
not have been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could
not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not
speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not
"Daddy." 167 Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still
in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into
this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the
gunman. 168 Leino is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was
negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin
test has ". . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can
definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the
hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the
nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have
handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans,
and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite
deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products
of combustion of tobacco." 169 In numerous rulings, we have also
recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant
washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the
shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the
time of firing. 170 In the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora
Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of
hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder
nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin
test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting
may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have
already been removed by washing or perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on
the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth
Ayonon noted that when appellant was tested for the presence of nitrates,
more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the alleged
shooting.

III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction as
he contends that the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an
impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-
ranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the case
(as no less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and then Department of
Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon attended some of the hearings and,
President Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen Hultman while she
was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to
protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which
attended the prosecution of the cases. He claims there were placards
displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside the courtroom
clapped their hands and converted the proceedings into a carnival. In
another instance, he was allegedly given the "finger sign" by several
young people while he was leaving the courtroom on his way back to his
cell.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to
impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high
profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right
of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well
pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal
field . . . The press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism." 173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to
fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day,
gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For
one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-
trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of
the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight
to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of
our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of
a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the
world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly
protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against
the jury system are mounting and Mark Twain's wit and wisdom put them
all in better perspective when he observed: "When a gentleman of high
social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given
under the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper
reports based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will
swear to their own ignorance and stupidity . . . Why could not the jury law
be so altered as to give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with
fools and miscreants?" 174 Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does
not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of
the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et a1.,
175
we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test
of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality
of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a
fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
32
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they
do not disclose that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a
carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or
improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the
case at bar. The transcripts reveal the following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the
attention of the court to the visible display of a placard inside the
courtroom. Acting on the manifestation, the trial judge immediately
directed that the placard be hidden. Only then did he order the start of the
arraignment of accused. 176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of the
media after they had enough opportunity to take pictures. The court
granted defense's request, noting that the courtroom was also too
crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued
between the defense lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the audience
clapped their hands, the defense counsel invoked Rule 119, Section 13 of
the Rules of Court and moved for the exclusion of the public. Assistant
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the ground that the public was not
unruly. The trial judge noted that there were yet no guidelines drafted by
the Supreme Court regarding media coverage of the trial proceedings. 178
Collaborating defense counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the
outpouring of sympathy by spectators inside the courtroom has turned the
proceedings into a carnival. He also manifested that he personally saw
that when accused was being brought back to his cell from the courtroom,
a group of young people were pointing dirty fingers at accused in full view
of policemen. Forthwith, the trial judge declared that he could not be
dissuaded by public sentiments. He noted that the clapping of hands by
the public was just a reaction at the spur of the moment. He then
admonished the audience not to repeat it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the
coverage of the trial by the press. The defense alleged that the media
coverage will constitute mistrial and deny accused's constitutional right to
due process. It invoked the provision in the Rules of Court which allows
the accused to exclude everybody in the courtroom, except the organic
personnel. The prosecutor, however, argued that exclusion of the public
can be ordered only in prosecution of private offenses and does not apply
to murder cases. He added that the public is entitled to observe and
witness trial of public offenses. He quoted the U.S. case of Sheppard v.
Maxwell 180 where it was held: "A responsible press is always regarded as
the handmaiden of effective judicial administration especially in the
criminal field. The press does not simply publish information about trials
but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the
prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism. What transpires in the courtrooms public property." The trial
judge then ruled that the media should be given a chance to cover the
proceedings before the trial proper but, thereafter, he prohibited them from
taking pictures during the trial. They were allowed to remain inside the
courtroom but were ordered to desist from taking live coverage of the
proceedings. 181
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the trial
judge gave the media two (2) minutes to take video coverage and no
more. Trial then ensued. 182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the media
two (2) minutes to take pictures before the trial proper. Afterwards, the
reporters were duly admonished to remain silent, to quietly observe the
proceedings and just take down notes. 183

6 On September 10, 1992 before the start of the afternoon session, the
judge admonished the media people present in the courtroom to stop
taking pictures. 184
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against
the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he
presented in court no less than seven (7) newspaper reporters and relied
heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defense's
documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to
the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on
his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial judge
voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case at bar to
assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and partiality. 185 However, upon
elevation of the trial judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this Court, we
directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
administration of justice. 186 We found nothing in the conduct of the
proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge.
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not
present in the killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino
for it was not shown that the gunman consciously and deliberately adopted
particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime.
Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove
treachery.
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the
crimes at bar with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident
premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly, the
shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on
the street since the victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa It,
however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of
Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of events
leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent reason, appellant
suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman
who were then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned who they
were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman
appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on. Chapman
then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was
wrong. There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from
inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. "Why did
you shoot me?" was all Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him
with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on
record to prove that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his
mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without
risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of the
moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each
other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short
and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of
will. We have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the
victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. 187 Hence, absent any
qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for Homicide
for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we
hold that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The
evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant
ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and
33
wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her,
Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance between
them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to
sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for
mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant
purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position
before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between
the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period
which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly
appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of
Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant
posits that the awards of moral and exemplary damages and for loss of
earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland Chapman and Jussi Leino
were exorbitant. He likewise claims that the trial court's award of attorney's
fees was excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino end the heirs of
victims Hultman and Chapman the following damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was sentenced to
pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for death and the sum of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moderate or temperate and exemplary
damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was sentenced
to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of: Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of deceased; and, One
Million Pesos as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to pay:
Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity for the injury; One
Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three-Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and Eighty-
Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in Philippine pesos
of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount equivalent in
Philippine pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for loss of earning capacity of Jussi
Leino; and, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and
exemplary damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the
offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (or a total of three million
pesos) for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
5. Costs of litigation. 188
The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in
detail the matter of damages recoverable in case of death arising from a
felony, thus:
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations
arising therefrom are governed by penal laws, ". . . subject to the
provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,
Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book
IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." (Art.
100, Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves
death, includes indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104, id.)

and said consequential damages in turn include ". . . those suffered by his
family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since
these provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to certain
provisions of the Civil Code, (w)e will now turn to said provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen
or could have reasonably foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206
which provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least three thousand pesos even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court,
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions
of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the descendant's
inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support
from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years,
the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason
of the death of the deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been
increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil.
426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case of People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-
18793, promulgated October 11, 1968 190, and it must be stressed that this
amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated
even without proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral
damages being "left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability
when the crime has been committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, such damages being "separate and distinct from fines and
shall be paid to the offended party." (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages
cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide
whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity
for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and is cases wherein
exemplary damages are awarded precisely because of the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) ". . . damages to be adjudicated
may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances," (Art. 2204) "but the party suffering the loss or
injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize
the damages resulting from the act or omission in question." (Art. 2203)
"Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated
in the discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and
expenses of litigation, the same may be recovered only when exemplary
damages have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or . . . when there is a
separate civil action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of
34
the deceased are entitled to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense P12,000.00
(now P50,000.00), without the need of any evidence or proof of damages,
and even though there may have been mitigating circumstances attending
the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased an amount
to be fixed by the court according to the circumstances of the deceased
related to his actual income at the time of death and his probable life
expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the court
as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning capacity at said
time on account of permanent disability not caused by the accused. If the
deceased was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the
recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the accused for not
more than five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount to be fixed by the
court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more
aggravating circumstances, an amount to be fixed in the discretion of
the court, the same to be considered separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, the actual amount
thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to recover civil liability has
been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity
of the deceased and for moral damages are recoverable separately from
and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00)
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these
damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened according
to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items 1 and 4
above, for obvious reasons. 191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND JOHN
CHAPMAN in light of the law and the case law.
Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
pesos as moderate or temperate and exemplary damages to the heirs of
Roland John Chapman was baseless.
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped
together the awards for moderate or temperate and exemplary damages at
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), without specifying the
particular amount which corresponds to each, as they are of a different
kind. We shall, however, consider their propriety and reasonableness.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be
given as temperate or moderate damages for the records do not show any
basis for sustaining the award. Nor can it be given as exemplary damages.
The killing of Chapman was not attended by either evident premeditation
or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be considered as one for
moral damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil Code. 192 It states:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . . shall
be at least (fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence) . . . In
addition:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of

the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason
of the death of the deceased.
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed
by appellant, we increase the amount of moral damages to One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos for the death of Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of
MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be
awarded to her mother, Vivian Hultman, and her natural father. He
contends that under Article 352 of the New Civil Code, Anders Hultman as
adoptive father of Maureen, is not entitled to said award. Only the parents
by nature of Maureen should inherit from her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in
effect at the time of Maureen's death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father,
is entitled to the award made by the trial court. Article 190 of the Family
Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
descendants of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and
the other half, by the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate;
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her
natural father. During the trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders
Hultman testified on their claim of damages. Hence, we find that the award
of damages in their favor has sufficient factual and legal basis.
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages is
unjustified or, at the very least, exorbitant and should be reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply
justified by the circumstances. The records reveal that Maureen recovered
between life and death for ninety-seven (97) days. Her family experienced
the peaks and valleys of unspeakable suffering. During that time, she
underwent brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition was never stable
and remained critical. It was always touch and go with death. She could
not be left alone at the hospital. Her parents had to be perpetually by her
side at least six (6) to seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their
siblings had to be sent back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended,
her family's business took a downspin. Soon, her family's assets were
depleted, then wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23) doctors attended to
her and their bills ballooned without abatement. They were forced to rely
on the goodness of the gracious. Her family started receiving contributions
from other people to defray the medical expenses and hospital bills. 193
Maureen never regained consciousness until her demise on October 17,
1991, at the tender age of seventeen. Under the foregoing circumstances,
we thus find the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
damages to be reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the
circumstances of the case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, 194 in
addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages
may be adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the
future. The award for exemplary damages is designed to permit the courts
to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its
35
imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an
offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of
Maureen Hultman, a girl in the prime of her youth. Hultman and her
companions were gunned down by appellant in cold-blood, for no
apparent reason. Appellant's vicious criminality led to the suffering of his
victims and their families. Considering our soaring crime rate, the
imposition of exemplary damages against appellant to deter others from
taking the lives of people without any sense of sin is proper. Moreover,
since the killing of Hultman was attended by treachery and pursuant to
Article 2229 of the new Civil Code, 195 we impose an award of Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages against appellant for the
death of Maureen Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral,
moderate and exemplary damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered extensive
injuries as a result of the shooting. His upper jaw bone was shattered. He
would need a bone transplant operation to restore it. His tongue was also
injured. He partially lost his sense of taste for his taste buds were also
affected. When he was discharged from the hospital, he had difficulty in
speaking and had to be fed through a tube running down his nose. He lost
eight of his teeth. The roots of his teeth were cut off and the raw nerves
were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical injuries and
suffering. More devastating was the emotional strain that distressed Leino.
His parents were in Europe for a vacation at the time of the shooting. Only
a neighbor attended to him at the hospital. It took two (2) days for his
father to come and comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble sleeping in
peace at night. The traumatic event woke him up in the middle of the
night. Black memories of the incident kept coming back to mind. 196
Understably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family. Seppo
Leino, Jussi's father, was tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He had to
relocate his entire family to Europe where he felt they would be safe. 197
Under the foregoing circumstances, we find that an award of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral damages is
justified and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with
treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, 198 appellant
is additionally adjudged liable for the payment to Leino of Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and
MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that
the victim, at the time of injury or death, is gainfully employed.
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for
loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company, 199 we awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss
of his earning capacity although he was still a medical student at the time
of injury. However, the award was not without basis for Cariaga was then a
fourth year medical student at a reputable school; his scholastic record,
which was presented at the trial, justified an assumption that he would
have been able to finish his course and pass the board in due time; and a
doctor, presented as witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount of
income Cariaga would have earned had he finished his medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in
Philippine pesos, of Forty capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with
appellant that this amount is highly speculative and should be denied
considering that Leino had only earned a high school degree at the
International School, Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the
military and has just arrived in Manila in February 1991 to pursue his

ambition to become a pilot. At the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991,
he has just enrolled at the Manila Aero Club to become a professional
pilot. He was thus only on his first year, first semester, in said school and
was practically, a mere high school graduate. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we find the records wanting with substantial evidence to
justify a reasonable assumption that Leino would have been able to finish
his studies at the Manila Aero Club and ultimately become a professional
pilot.
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of deceased MAUREEN
HULTMAN. We find that the award is not supported by the records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial
court incorrectly used the monthly salary of a secretary working in
Sweden, computed at two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) a month, as per
the estimate given by Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the records does it
appear that, at the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the skills
needed for a secretarial job or that she intended to take a secretarial
course in preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman himself
testified that there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path,
thus:
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic) shot and she continued
her studies, what professional career would she (sic) like to pursue
considering her interests and inclinations?
WITNESS:
A That is very difficult to say. She has just turned 17 and our projection is
that, certainly she would have been an artist in the creative side. She
would have become an actress or a movie producer or probably she would
have been a college graduate.
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q But if you would just say based on the salary of a secretary in Sweden,
how much would she have much earned?
A. Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a month. 200
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million
(P13,000,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maureen far loss of earning
capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden.
In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high
school, Maureen took up a short personality development course at the
John Roberts Powers. Maureen was employed at the John Roberts
Powers at the time of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had just
received her first salary, for which reason she went out with her friends to
celebrate on that fateful day. However, neither the nature of her work nor
her salary in said company was disclosed at the trial. Thus, to compute
the award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to
use the minimum wage prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17,
1991), i.e., one hundred eighteen pesos (P118.00). 201 Allowing for
reasonable and necessary expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her net
income per annum would amount to P26,859.17. 202 Hence, using the
formula repeatedly adopted by this Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 age of victim at
time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which would have
been received by the heirs as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of
earning as capacity of deceased Maureen Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-
Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos
(P564,042.57).
36
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's
heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-settled that the award of damages
for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased,
and not the beneficiary. 205
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the
amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that the same is
exorbitant.
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the
ACCRA law firm, with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed
to pay the amount of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos each as
attorney's fees and for litigation expenses. The three criminal cases were
consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with some hearings
having both morning and afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for almost
one and a half years. More than forty (40) witnesses testified during the
hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight
(68) documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents
related to the trial of the cases came up to this Court for review at least
twice during the pendency of the trial. 206 Given these circumstances and
the evident effort exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the trial, the
trial court's award of a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) pesos as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears just and reasonable.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on
the cases, where no less than forty-one (41) witnesses were presented by
the parties, 207 were merely hearings on the petition for bail concerning the
murder charge for the killing of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on the
merits of all three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after the termination of
the hearing, he still had the right to adduce evidence at the trial proper. He
claims he was denied due process when the trial court considered all the
cases submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to present
its surrebuttal evidence.
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first
hearing of the cases on August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was
appellant's petition for bail for the murder of Chapman. It will be
remembered that, initially, there was only one murder charge against
appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during the course
of the proceedings on October 17, 1991.
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution
was appellant's petition for bail. The prosecution sought to present the
surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate
delay and inconvenience since all three (3) charges involved one
continuing incident. Appellant, through counsel, objected to the testimony
of Leino insofar as the two (2) frustrated murder charges (with respect to
the wounding of Leino and Hultman) were concerned. He argued that
since the pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the
killing of Chapman, any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in
which bail were recommended was irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would
present Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after
accused's arraingment on August 14, 1991. 208 The prosecution agreed on
the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time,
hearing on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed. 209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented
Jussi Leino as its first witness to testify on all three (3) cases. No objection
was made by the defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the

hearings conducted by the trial court were limited to the petition for bail,
viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary
evidence relative to the shooting incident, including evidence in support of
the claim for damages. These witnesses were extensively cross-examined
by the defense counsels. The defense never objected that evidence on
damages would be unnecessary if its intention was really to limit
presentation of evidence to appellant's petition for bail.
2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases, the trial court
issued an Order 211 directing the parties to submit their Memorandum, after
which "the main case as well as the petition for bail are respectively
submitted for Decision and Resolution." After receipt of this Order, the
defense counsel filed two (2) motions for extension of time to file the
defense Memorandum. In both Motions, the defense did not object to the
trial court's Order submitting for decision the main case and the petition for
bail. Neither did it move for a reconsideration of this Order and notify the
court that it still had witnesses to present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo
Jimenez, filed a Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum praying
for accused's acquittal. This is inconsistent with the defense's position that
the hearing conducted was only on the petition for bail. If the defense
insist that what was submitted for decision was only his petition for bail, he
would have only prayed that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the trial
court, the defense did not interpose any objection to the intended
promulgation. In fact, the defense attended the promulgation of the
Decision and manifested that they were ready therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail
were heard simultaneously and appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover,
appellant's right to present additional evidence was not abridged by the
trial court. On the contrary, the records disclose that the trial court afforded
the defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It took the defense
almost one and a half years to submit its evidence. The defense presented
more than twenty (20) witnesses and several documentary evidence. It
was only after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant that he
filed a motion for newtrial, 212 through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr.
For the first time, he alleged that the joint decision of the cases, both on
the merits and on the petition for bail, was irregular for he was not given a
chance to present further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note that in
his motion for new trial, 213 appellant did not even identify his alleged
additional witnesses and the substance of their testimonies. Nor was it
shown that he could not have produced these evidence at the trial with
reasonable diligence. Appellant's motion was a patent ploy to delay the
decision on his cases. His motion was properly denied by the trial court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the
Decision of the trial court, dated December 22, 1992, thus:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the
shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of
the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
pesos as indemnity for the victim's death; and, One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of
37
the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
pesos as indemnity for her death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand
Fourty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of
earning capacity of said deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as
moral damages; and Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary
damages.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder,
qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of
prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the
following amounts: (P30,000.00) pesos as Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
pesos as indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand
Three Hundred Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84)
and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual
damages; One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and,
Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three (3)
offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total
of Three Million [P3,000,000.00] pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
DIGEST
The facts:
In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at
Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman
went with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to
stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of
the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home
that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car
and listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-
type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from
behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted
from his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you? (Show me
your) I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and
pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked
accused: Why are you bothering us? Accused pushed Chapman, dug
into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper
body, staggered for a moment, and asked: Why did you shoot me?
Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to
assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone.
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked:
Do you want a trouble? Leino said no and took a step backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses,
she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly
shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun. Hes gonna kill us. Will somebody

help us? All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to
Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down
on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away.
Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued to be
hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accuseds
car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around
accuseds car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase
lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and
repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen
finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them
again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on
the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot
and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was
happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino
struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people
who saw the incident.
As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER
for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED
MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN
HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of
confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the
Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.
The defense:
Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that
during the shooting incident, he was not anywhere near the scene of the
crime, but in his house in Pasig. Accused averred that he only came to
know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the
newspaper reports about it. Accused admitted ownership of a box-type,
silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He,
however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition
after its involvement in an accident. Until the day of the shooting, his
Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mothers house in
Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused
conceded that although the car was not in good running condition, it could
still be used.
The ruling:
Eyewitness identification and out-of-court identification.
The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3
eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. However, he
vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino, the lone
surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges: First, that Leinos
identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was
highly irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the
newspapers before he identified him; Third, that Leinos interview at the
hospital was never put in writing; Fourth, that the sketch of appellant
based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was
suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been
among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed
jurisdiction over the investigation; and, lastly, that Leino could not have
remembered the face of the accused. The shooting lasted for only five (5)
minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on
the gunmans face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of
beer he imbibed that night.
It is understandable for the accused to assail his out-of-court identification
by the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness
38
identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the
success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is
significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of
identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some
authors even describe eyewitness evidence as inherently suspect. The
causes of misidentification are known, thus:
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a
crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event
actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the
event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate
accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each
of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and
retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal human
fallibilities and suggestive influences.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is
done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with
the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs
are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-
ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined
up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the
case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where
they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view
the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5)
the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities cited by
the accused did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due
process. There is nothing wrong in Leinos identification of the accused in
an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode
was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. The need for
security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from his
house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to
the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to
have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and
with high security risk. Leinos fear for his safety was not irrational. He and
his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive,
supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis.
There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are
identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often
done in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind
of the victim.
Accused cant also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and
TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. The
records show that while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown 3
pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified the accused as
the gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that,
before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of accused
or read any report relative to the shooting incident. The burden is on
accused to prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive.
Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about
the admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.
There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the accuseds identification
by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a lamp post. The
accused was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The incident
happened for a full 5 minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify

against the accusedt. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He
was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels.
He never wavered in his identification of the accused. When asked how
sure he was that the accused was responsible for the crime, he
confidently replied: Im very sure. It could not have been somebody else.
The accused cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators
to reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during
his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that Leinos extensive
injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he
identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak.
He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. There is also no
rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness
whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing.
The SC also rejected the accuseds contention that the NBI suppressed
the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by
Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was turned
over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the
sketch was suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble
the accused is not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was incredible
for Leino to have remembered the accuseds face when the incident
happened within a span of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a short time for
Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience shows
that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before
their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember
with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. The natural
reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of
their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most
often, the face end body movements of the assailant create an impression
which cannot be easily erased from their memory. In this case, there is
absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to the
accused. The victims and the accused were unknown to each other before
their chance encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must be because
the accused was the real culprit.
The SC also gave credence to the testimony of the other two witnesses.
As to the testimony of Cadenas, his initial reluctance to reveal to the
authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial
he feared for his and his familys safety. The Court has taken judicial
notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution
of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all
too real risks, the court has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-
gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an authorities as an
indicium of credibility. As to the testimony of Mangubat, the SC found
nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself.
2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
According to the the accused, the trial court erred in not holding that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. First, he
claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in
previous shooting incidents. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an
examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the
crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the
prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunmans car as white, but the
trial court found it to be silver metalic gray. Fourth, the accused could not
have been the gunman, for Mangubat said that he overheard the victim
Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: Please, dont shoot me and dont kill
me. I promise Mommy, Daddy. The accused also contends that a maid in
a house near the scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez
that she heard Maureen say: Daddy dont shoot. Dont. Fifth, the NBI Leino is a reliable witness.
towed accuseds car from Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which
proved that the same was not in good running condition. Lastly, the result
of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of
39
nitrates.
The accused points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN,
since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having
overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: Huwag, Daddy.; and, (b) JOSE
MONTAO, another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a white
Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.
The accused, however, cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because
the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he considered
his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This rule has long been
laid to rest. The harmless error rule is also followed in our jurisdiction. In
dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, the court examines its
damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If
the impact is slight and insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will
not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the
prejudiced party.
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the
troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is
not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge
in convicting the accused. As aforestated, the accused was convicted
mainly because of his identification by 3 eyewitnesses with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal
gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission,
however, cannot exculpate the accused. The omitted comparison cannot
nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of the accused.
There is also little to the contention of the accused that his Lancer car was
not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the
NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it was parked to the
NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that
said car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which
was then in the possession of the accused. Clearly, the car was towed not
because it was not in running condition. Even the accuseds evidence
show that said car could run. After its repairs, the accuseds son, Claudio
Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to
Dasmarinas Village, in Makati, where it was parked.
Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the
eyewitnesses description of the color of the gunmans car. Leino
described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat
white (medyo puti); Mangubat declared the car was white; and Cadenas
testified it was silver metallic gray. These alleged discrepancies amount to
no more than shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as
they do to colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray.
Considering the speed and shocking nature of the incident which
happened before the break of dawn, these slight discrepancies in the
description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy
of credence.
The accuseds attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the
adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration. The
accused cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly overheard
as saying to the gunman: Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy. The evidence
on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have
been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have
uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak
Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as Papa, not Daddy.
Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the
hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into this
possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman.
The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was
negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin

test has . . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can
definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the
hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the
nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have
handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans,
and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite
deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products
of combustion of tobacco. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized
several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates
on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after
firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction
of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In the case at
bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that
excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use of warm water or
vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise
opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two
(72) hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable result
for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been removed by
washing or perspiration. In the Report on the paraffin test conducted on
appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when the
accused was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has
already lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.
3. The right to an impartial trial.
The the accused blames the press for his conviction as he contends that
the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He
postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking
government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as no
less than then Vice-President Estrada and then DOJ Secretary Drilon
attended some of the hearings and, President Aquino even visited
Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the
trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive
influences which attended the prosecution of the cases.
The SC did not sustain the accuseds claim that he was denied the right to
impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. Its true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high
profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right
of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well
pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal
field . . . The press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to
fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day,
gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For
one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-
trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of
the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight
to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of
our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of
a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the
world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly
protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are
learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-
camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality.
40
At best, the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of
the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. The SC had previously rejected this
standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice
as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-
trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does
not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence
presented during the trial. The accused has the burden to prove this actual
bias and he has not discharged the burden. There is no evidence showing
that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did
he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper
behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at
bar.
Parenthetically, the accused should be the last person to complain against
the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he
presented in court no less than 7 newspaper reporters and relied heavily
on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defenses
documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to
the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on
his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that the trial judge voluntarily
inhibited himself from further hearing the case, but the SC, nothing in the
conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the
trial judge, directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
administration of justice.
4. The presence of treachery
The accused claims that treachery was not present in the killing of
Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown
that the gunman consciously and deliberately adopted particular means,
methods and forms in the execution of the crime. The accused asserts
that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
The 3 Informations charged the accused with having committed the crimes
with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was
correctly ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident
was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street since
the victims were unknown to the accused and vice-versa. It, however,
appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing
of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of
events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent reason,
the accused suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and
Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino
handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked
what was going on. Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and
inquired from appellant what was wrong. There and then, the accused
pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The
gun attack was unexpected. Why did you shoot me? was all Chapman
could utter. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly
and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no
evidence on record to prove that the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal
design without risk to himself. The accused acted on the spur of the
moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each
other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short

and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of the accused rather than a deliberate act
of will. Mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself,
constitute treachery. Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, the
accused should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and
killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, treachery clearly
attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after
shooting Chapman in cold blood, the accused ordered Leino to sit on the
pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of
appellants car. When the accused went after her, Maureen moved around
his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or
two, the accused got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on
the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two
were gunned down by the accused . Clearly, the accused purposely
placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before
shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing
of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which the
accused used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself.
Penalties:(Note: Mr. Teehankee was pardoned in 2008)
(1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the
shooting of Roland John Chapman. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following
amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for the victims death; and, P1,000,000 as
moral damages.
(2) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the
heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity
for her death; P2,350,461.83 as actual damages; P564,042.57 for loss of
earning capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and
P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.
(3) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder,
qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor as
minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum,
and to pay the said offended party the following amounts: P30,000 as
indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in Philippine Pesos
of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; P1,000,000 as moral
damages; and, P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of
P1,000,000, or a total of P3,000,000, for attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all 3 cases.
5. (Only 1 case, I cannot find the other..)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139542. June 21, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. INOCENCIO
41
GONZALEZ, JR., accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Many unfortunate tragedies would not have happened if the
improvident use of a firearm did not exacerbate a simple altercation over
traffic. This is one of them.
On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman
was shot to death in the course of her husbands altercation with the
accused-appellant and his son along the Garden of Remembrance within
the Loyola Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial court found the accused
guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder
and accordingly sentenced him to death. This case is before us on
automatic review.
The details of what actually transpired in the few seconds
immediately preceding the shooting are controverted by both parties but
the events leading to this tragedy are not disputed.
In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both the
families of the private complainant Noel Andres and that of the accused-
appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park. The appellant was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his
grandson and three housemaids, while the private complainant was
driving a maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his two
year old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar
Valdez. At the intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while the
accused-appellant Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and the
complainant Noel Andres was headed straight along the road to the exit
their two vehicles almost collided. Noel Andres was able to timely step on
the brakes. The appellant continued driving along his way while Noel
Andres drove behind the appellants vehicle for some time and cut him off
when he found the opportunity to do so.[1] Noel Andres then got out of his
vehicle and knocked on the appellants car window.[2] This is as far as
their versions of the incident coincide.
The prosecutions version of the incident is that Noel Andres
calmly told the appellant to be careful with his driving and informed the
latter that he, Andres, is with his family and to this Gonzalez allegedly
replied, Accidents are accidents, whats your problem. Andres stated
that he saw the appellant turning red in anger so he decided to go back to
his vehicle when he was blocked by the appellants son who said, Anong
problema mo sa erpat ko. Andres testified that he felt threatened and so
he immediately boarded his vehicle, sat at the drivers seat, closed the
door, and partially opened the car window just wide enough to talk back to
appellants son, Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers said Binaril
kami. He turned to his wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied and
unconscious. He turned around and saw his son Kenneth and nephew
Kevin were also wounded. Andres admitted in court that he and Dino
were shouting at each other so that he did not hear the shot. Andres then
got out of his vehicle to warn the appellant not to flee. He then took the
wounded members of his family to the exit where there was an ambulance
standing by. The three were then taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and
were later transferred to the Quezon City Medical Center.
The defenses version of the incident is that Andres cut the
appellants path by positioning his FX obliquely along the appellants lane
from the latters left side. Andres then got out of his vehicle, stood beside
the appellants car window, and repeatedly cursed the appellant, Putang
ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong magmaneho. Ang
bobo-bobo mo.[3] The appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly
replied, Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang.
The appellant Gonzalez and another witness for the defense, Quidic,
testified that Noel Andres went back to his vehicle to move it in such a way
that it is straight in front of the appellants car. Andres allegedly got out of
his vehicle again and continued shouting and cursing at the appellant.[4]

Dino, the appellants son, who rode in another vehicle decided to go back
when he did not see his fathers car behind him. When Dino arrived at the
scene he confronted Andres and the two had an altercation. Both Dino
and the appellant stated that Andres remained outside his vehicle during
the altercation with Dino. When Andres suddenly reached for something
inside his vehicle, Dino froze on the spot where he stood. This prompted
the appellant to get his gun from the glove compartment and feeling that
his son was threatened he got out of his car ready to shoot. When he saw
that Andres did not have a weapon he put down his hand holding the gun.
This is when the appellants daughter Trisha who was riding in Dinos car
arrived at the scene, walked past Dino and Andres, and pushed the
appellant away. She hugged her father and in the process held his hand
holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trishas
substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his balance
and the gun accidentally fired. The accused stated that he did not know
he shot somebody until the private complainants sister-in-law, Francar
Valdez, got out of the vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. The defense
claims that the appellant did not try to flee and even told the complainants
sister-in-law to take the wounded to the hospital.
On November 4, 1998 an Information for the complex crime of
Murder, Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder was filed against
herein accused-appellant:
That on or about the 31st day of October 1998, in the city of Marikina,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, attack, assault and employ personal violence by means of
treachery and abuse of superior strength upon the person of Noel Andres
y Tomas, by then and there shooting him with a Glock cal. 9mm pistol but
instead hitting one Feliber Andres y Ordoo, on the left back portion of her
head, thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wound which directly
caused her death, as well as hitting John Kenneth Andres y Ordoo and
Kevin Valdez y Ordoo physical injuries which ordinarily would have
caused their death, thus performing all the acts of execution which would
have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of some cause or causes, independent of
their will, that is, the timely and able medical assistance rendered to John
Kenneth Andres y Ordoo and Kevin Valdez y Ordoo to their damage
and prejudice as well as to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
Feliber Andres y Ordoo.
On arraignment the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged.
The case records show that Feliber Andres, the wife of Noel
Andres did not die instantaneously. She lived to give birth to a baby girl[5]
by caesarian section and died the following morning on November 1,
1998. The Autopsy Report[6] states:
FINDINGS: Fairly nourished, fairly developed female cadaver, with post
mortem lividity. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic.
Surgical incisions were noted at left tempero-parietal region. Surgical
incisions is also noted at the abdominal region secondary to a caesarian
section.
HEAD: (1) gunshot wound, point of entry, left fronto-temporal region,
measuring 1 by 0.9 cm, 9 cm from the anterior midline, with a uniform
abraided collar measuring 0.2 cm., directed posteriorwards, slightly
downwards, and medialwards, fracturing the frontal, and left temporal
bones, lacerating the left cerebral hemisphere, with a deformed slug
fragment embedded and recovered at the posterior lobe of the left cerebral
hemisphere. (2) hematoma, left orbital region, measuring 4.5 by 2 cm, 4
cm from the anterior midline. There are subdural and subarachnoidal
hemorrages. Stomach contains 1 glassful of partially digested food
particles mostly rice and meaty material.
CONCLUSION: Cause of death is gunshot wound on the head.
42
Kenneth and Kevin were treated for extraction of metallic
fragments on their faces. They were discharged from the hospital six days
later or on November 6, 1998.
On June 25, 1999 the trial court rendered judgement finding that
the shooting was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and
held the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder for the death of
Feliber Andres and for two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries
sustained by Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez and sentenced the
appellant to the maximum of the imposable penalty which is death. The
trial court held:
Beforehand, the Court takes note of the judicial admissions on the verbal
declarations of the accused that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the
case; that he owns the black Gluck 9 mm. automatic pistol; that the said
gun will never fire even if he drops it; that only one bullet was fired from his
gun; and that the victim Feliber Andres is already dead. With this
exegesis and the declarations in open court of the eyewitness of both the
prosecution and some of the defense, there is no real dispute on the
antecedent facts showing that the accused fired on Noel Andres but
instead hit and caused the fatal injuries to the victims John Kenneth
Andres, Kevin Valdez and Feliber Andres resulting to the ultimate death of
the latter. The court takes further judicial admissions of the accused made
in their memorandum demonstrating the existence of five (5) sequences of
events leading to the death of Feliber Andres and the wounding of John
Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez which are as follows: First is when Noel
Andres overtook the car driven of the accused and cut cross his path;
Second is when Noel Andres alighted from his vehicle and confronted
Inocencio; Third is when Noel had an argument with Dino Gonzalez, the
son of the accused; Forth is when, Inocencio seeing his son having
confrontation with Noel, got his gun to protect Dino; and Fifth is when
Inocencio had a struggle with his daughter. Trisha Gonzalez, who tried to
reach for the gun and as a result of which Inocencio lost his balance and
as he was falling backward to his side, his right arm holding the gun hit the
rear window of the Tamaraw FX van and the gun accidentally went off
hitting the victim, who were all then inside the van.
The court likewise take judicial notice on the feature of the automatic pistol
used in this case which is capable of unquestionable demonstration or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Practically, the stages before an automatic firearm would be capable of
firing are as follows: 1) the loading of a bullet into the chamber of the gun;
2) the cocking of the hammer, if uncocked; 3) the releasing of the safety
pin; 4) the pressing of the trigger to unleash the hammer so that the firing
pin will hit the cartridge to propel the bullet out to hit the target.
Realistically, it demonstrates that a gun will not fire even if the bullet is
loaded in its chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even if cocked if the
safety pin is engaged; or even if the safety pin is disengaged if the trigger
will not be pressed. However, even if the gun is fired if it is not aimed and
leveled to the target, the purpose of firing it shall not be achieved.
Contrarily, once a gun is drawn against a person, the means methods and
forms employed for its execution is already conceived. And once it is
tended directly and specifically to insure its execution, it consequently
produces the conscious and deliberate intention. Finally if all the acts of
execution had been effectively done without risk on the part of the offender
arising from any defense coming from the offended party, treachery
results. In brief, there is treachery when the offender commits any crime
against persons, employing means, methods and forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make (People vs. Mesa 276 SCRA 407; People vs. Carlos Patrolla, Jr. G.
R. No. 112445, March 7, 1996). To appreciate treachery two (2)
conditions must be present, to wit: 1) the employment of means of
execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or retaliate; and 2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted. (People vs. Azugue, 268 SCRA 711; People vs.
Pea, G. R. No. 116022, July 1, 1998, p. 1)

In the case at bar and guided with the above-quoted doctrinal cases,
logically, the accused is positive of the crime charged against him. When
he alighted with a drawn gun to protect his son and released all the safety
measures of his gun as he fired and missed at Noel who was then
unarmed, but instead hit Kevin Valdez, John Kenneth Andres and Feliber
Andres which resulted to the death of the latter, demonstrate that the
accused has executed the two (2) conditions to generate treachery
enough to qualify the crime committed to murder.
XXXX XXXXX XXXX
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused Inocencio
Gonzalez, Jr., y Esquivel is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder and
Attempted Murder penalized under Art. 248, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and is
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of Death by lethal injection.
The accused is further ordered to pay the following civil liabilities:
1. To the private complainant Noel Andres:
a) the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
Feliber Andres;
b) the amount of P3,363,663.60 as indemnity for the loss
of earning capacity of the deceased Feliber Andres;
c) the amount of P98,384.19 as funeral expenses;
d) the amount of P271,800.56 for the hospitalization
expenses incurred for the injuries sustained by the
deceased Feliber Andres and the amount of
P23,622.58 representing the expenses for the
untimely delivery of the child Ma. Clarisse Andres;
e) the amount of P51,566.00 representing the
hospitalization expenses for the injuries sustained by
the victim John Kenneth Andres;
f) the amount of P150,000.00 as moral damages suffered
for the untimely death of his wife Feliber Andres and
for the injuries caused to his son John Kenneth
Andres;
g) the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys
fees and a fee of P2,000.00 per appearance; and
h) the costs of the suit.
2. To the private complainant Nicasio Valdez:
a) the amount of P73,824.75 as actual damages for the
injuries sustained by the victim Kevin Valdez; and
b) the amount of P75,000.00 as and by way of moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.
In his appeal, Gonzalez submits the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court committed reversible error when it found that treachery
was present.
2. The trial court committed reversible error when it presumed that there
was treachery by taking judicial notice of the feature of the automatic pistol
involved in this case.
43
3. The trial court committed reversible error when it violated the
constitutional right of the accused-appellant to due process when it took
judicial notice of the feature of the automatic pistol involved in this case
without notice.
4. The trial court committed reversible error when it found Accused-
Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder
with Double Frustrated Murder.
5. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate
the mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation, lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong, provocation or threat on the part of the offended
party immediately preceded the act, incomplete defense of relative, and
voluntary surrender.
6. The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to find that the
shooting incident was accidental.
7. The trial court committed reversible error when it gave credence to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Elmer Ramos and Moises Castro.
8. The trial court committed reversible error when it disregarded the basic
principle that the accused is presumed innocent and his guilt must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
9. The trial court committed reversible error when it ordered Accused-
Appellant to pay for the civil liabilities.
The appellant seeks a reversal and prays that judgment be
rendered exempting him from criminal and civil liabilities. Appellant
declared that he had no intention to shoot Noel Andres much less his wife
nor the children. He lost his balance when his daughter Trisha
approached and pushed him backwards to stop him from joining Dino and
Noel Andres but the appellant tried to free his right hand holding the gun
and it accidentally fired. The single bullet fired hit the last window on the
left side of the Tamaraw FX. The appellant claims that he did not see the
passengers inside the vehicle at the time of the shooting. This is
corroborated by the testimony of two witnesses for the prosecution who
testified that the windows of Andres vehicle are heavily tinted so that a
person outside the vehicle would not be able to see if there are people
inside. It is also argued that had the appellant intended to shoot Noel
Andres he could have simply done so by shooting at him directly. The
defense asserts that the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish
the attendance of treachery and without the attendance of the said
qualifying circumstance the crime committed is homicide, not murder.
The appellant also points out that the trial court made the factual
finding that the shooting happened in a matter of seconds and that it was
preceded by a heated argument between the parties. Such being the
case, it is argued that the shooting could not have been attended by
treachery. There was no time for the appellant to consciously and
deliberately employ the mode of attack against Noel Andres, nor against
any one of the actual victims, to insure its execution and at the same time
to eliminate any form of retaliation from the alleged intended victim. And
yet, the trial court, contrary to the evidence on record, held that the loading
of the bullet into the chamber of the gun, the cocking of the hammer, the
release of the safety pin and the pulling of the trigger by the appellant of
his automatic pistol constitute conscious and deliberate effort to employ
the gun as a means of committing the crime and resultantly, qualified its
commission by treachery. Such a finding presupposes that the appellant
loaded the gun to shoot Noel Andres only that very moment when his son
Dino and Noel Andres were arguing. This conclusion has no basis on
record. The appellant testified that his gun was loaded before he left the
house and two witnesses for prosecution stated in court that a few
seconds after Noel Andres and Dino started shouting at each other, the
appellant got out of his car and shot at the last window on the left side of

the complainants vehicle. Further, the appellant assigns as error the
procedure adopted by the trial court in taking judicial notice that the gun
used by the appellant is an automatic pistol and as such, it will not fire
unless aimed at the intended target. The procedure taken by the trial
court is contrary to Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.[7] The trial
court should have given both parties the opportunity to present evidence,
expert evidence, if necessary, to inform the court on the subject matter.
The appellant argues that the factual finding borne by such erroneous
procedure is equally erroneous. The gun used by the appellant is a semi-
automatic and not an automatic pistol which means that the pistol used
has no external safety pin to be released and that the hammer need not
be cocked. The pulling of the trigger, intentional or not, will fire the gun.
The use of a semi-automatic pistol does not necessarily imply treachery.
Appellant also argues that the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Castro and Ramos were improperly given credence by the trial
court. The appellant contends that a reading of their testimonies would
show that their narration of the incident is rather absurd and would show
that they did not witness the actual shooting. Defense witnesses,
Gonzalez and his daughter, Trisha, on the other hand, testified that Castro
and Ramos arrived at the scene only after the shooting.
As regards the injuries sustained by Kevin and Kenneth, it is
argued that considering that there was no intent to kill and that they stayed
in the hospital only for six days, the crime committed is physical injuries. It
is argued that the trial court erred in awarding damages. The bunch of
receipts allegedly representing the medical expenses incurred for the
injuries sustained by the victims was erroneously admitted in evidence,
without first requiring the prosecution to establish the authenticity of the
receipts. The appellant also points out that the award for loss of earning
capacity has no basis as the deceased was unemployed at the time of the
incident.
Finally, the appellant assigns as error the trial courts rejection of
the mitigating circumstances pleaded by the defense which allegedly
attended the commission of the crime, i.e., lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative
and voluntary surrender. The appellant asserts that these mitigating
circumstances were duly proven during the trial and are supported by the
evidence on record. The private complainant Noel Andres testified that he
saw the appellant getting red in anger after they, Andres and the
appellant, had a heated argument immediately prior to the shooting.
These admitted circumstances show that the appellant was not in his
proper state of mind at the time of the shooting. First, he was angered by
Andres abusive language and later he got out of his car with a loaded gun
to protect his son from a perceived danger. The appellant clams that his
willingness to help the injured and his voluntary surrender to the police
should likewise be considered as mitigating circumstances in the
imposition of penalties.
The Solicitor-General agrees with the appellant that the crime was
not attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and hence the
crime committed by the appellant for the death of Feliber Andres is
homicide, not murder. The appellee takes into consideration that the
shooting was preceded by a heated argument and that the supposed
victim was placed on guard that attack was imminent. It also appears that
the shooting was done impulsively. There is no evidence that the
appellant deliberately employed the means of attack to insure execution of
the crime and at the same time eliminate the risk of retaliation from the
private complainant. The appellee also agrees with the appellant that the
trial court erred in equating the use of an automatic pistol with treachery.
The trial court made the factual finding that the appellants automatic pistol
would not fire unless aimed and the trigger is deliberately pulled and
hence treachery attended the shooting. The appellee submits that if we
follow the reasoning of the trial court it would appear that the appellant
intended to shoot at the complainants vehicle only as the shot was fired at
the last window on the left side of the FX away from where Andres was
allegedly seated. The fact that the gun was drawn and fired does not
mean that the mode of attack was consciously and deliberately employed.
44
However, with respect to the injuries sustained by Kevin and
Kenneth, the appellee disagrees with the contention that the appellant is
liable only for slight physical injuries. The injuries sustained by both
children are head injuries and could have caused their death if not for the
immediate medical attention given them. The number of days spent in the
hospital is not determinative of the severity of the wounds. Their nature
and location should instead be considered. The appellant cannot escape
liability for frustrated homicide for the injuries of the two children on the
ground that he fired a single shot at the vehicle of Noel Andres. He is
liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act even if the crime
committed is different from that intended.
As regards the pleaded mitigating circumstances, appellee asserts
that none can be considered in favor of the appellant. There is evidence
on record that the appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police and
it appears from the testimonies of witnesses that he entertained the
possibility of flight but his car was stuck in traffic along the exit of the
memorial park. His pretense of incomplete defense of a relative is belied
by his own admission that when he saw that Noel Andres did not have a
gun he lowered his hand holding the gun. There was allegedly no threat
on the life of his son at the time of the shooting, no uncontrollable fear nor
irresistible force that would mitigate the commission of the offense.
The Solicitor-General also seeks to uphold the pecuniary awards
granted by the trial court. The appellee alleges that it is not denied by the
appellant that Feliber Andres was a 38 year old registered nurse at the
time of the shooting. Although she was then unemployed on account of
her pregnancy, she still had earning capacity and the trial court properly
applied the salary of a government nurse under the salary standardization
scheme in the computation of damages for the loss of earning capacity.
The receipts presented in evidence by the prosecution to establish
hospitalization and other medical expenses incurred by the private
complainants by reason of the injuries suffered by the victims were duly
authenticated by the prosecution witnesses and there is no dispute that
they are exact copies of the original receipts presented in court. The
objections raised by the appellant in this regard were duly met by the
evidence presented by the private complainants.
In sum, the appellee asserts that considering that the appellant
fired a single shot and in the process committed four offenses the
appellant should be held liable for the complex crime of homicide for the
death of Feliber Andres, double frustrated homicide against Kevin and
Kenneth and attempted homicide against Noel Andres. Under the rules on
complex crimes the penalty for the gravest offense, i.e., reclusion temporal
for homicide, should be imposed in its maximum period.
The appeal has merit.
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is
defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods or forms in the
execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two
elements must concur: 1) the employment of means of execution that
would insure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the intended
victim and leaving the latter without an opportunity to defend himself and
2) the means employed were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender.[8] The suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from
behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the
attack was made or the fact that the victim was unarmed do not by
themselves render the attack as treacherous.[9] This is of particular
significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused
whereby he gained an advantageous position over the victim when the
latter accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless.[10] The means
employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be
shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to
insure the consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or
reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim.[11] Accordingly, it
has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse

killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were
preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery
for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous
mode of attack.[12] Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to
his infuriation by reason of the victims provocation was held to be without
treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and
insults by the victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the
rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to be without
treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal.[13] For the
rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been
preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without
provocation on the part of the latter.[14]
This Court has also had occasion to state that whether or not the
attack succeeds against its intended victim or injures another or whether
the crime committed is graver than that intended is immaterial, as long as
it is shown that the attack is attended by treachery, the said qualifying
circumstance may still be considered by the court.[15] Thus, the
determining factor on whether or not the commission of a crime is
attended by treachery is not the resulting crime committed but the mode of
attack employed in its execution.[16]
Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of
attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively
as the crime itself. [17]
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the
shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime
committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.
The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a
chance encounter. They were total strangers before their vehicles almost
collided at an intersection inside the memorial park. Unfortunately, heated
exchange of remarks that followed the near collision was fanned by a
short temper, which in the case of the appellant, was augmented by the
improvident use of a firearm.
From a reading of the transcript of the testimonies of the
witnesses, it would appear that Noel Andres, who had his pregnant wife
and child with him, among others, on board the Tamaraw FX provoked the
altercation. After the near collision of his vehicle with that of the appellant,
he tailed behind the latters car towards the exit until he had the chance to
cut him off to scold him for his failure to observe traffic rules.[18] Andres
stated in court that he calmly told the appellant to be careful with his
driving and denied that he was angry when he alighted from his vehicle to
confront the appellant.[19] His statement is belied by the witnesses, two
prosecution witnesses included, who uniformly testified that Andres
quarreled with or shouted and cursed at the appellant for the latters
recklessness at the intersection.[20] The appellant narrated in court that
Andres repeatedly shouted at him, Putang ina mo, ang tanda-tanda mo
na gago ka pa.[21] Andres hostile behavior towards the appellant is
evident from his statement in court that he noticed the appellant turning
red in anger.[22] It is highly improbable for Gonzalez to have turned red in
anger had Andres been polite, as he claims he was, in scolding
Gonzalez. Andres could have simply communicated to the appellant his
disgust for the latters bad driving when he overtook the appellants car
near the scene of the shooting but instead he chose to block the
appellants path, insult and virtually provoke the appellant to retaliate.
Andres stated in court that when he noticed Gonzalez infuriation
he immediately walked towards his vehicle, because according to him the
altercation was over. On his way to his FX he met another man, whom he
later found out to be the appellants son, Dino. It appears that the
altercation was far from over because again Andres had a shouting match
this time with Dino.[23] In a matter of seconds, the appellant alighted from
his car and fired a single shot at the last window on the left side of Andres
vehicle at an angle away from Noel Andres. The single bullet fired hit
Feliber Andres on the forehead near the temporal region above the left
eye and the two children with metallic fragments of the bullet on their
45
faces, one at the cheek and the other below his left eye.
The prosecution did not present evidence as to the exact seating
arrangement of the victims inside the vehicle; suffice it to say, that an
examination of the pictures of the vehicle[24] one of which shows a mass
of blood stains on the left side (towards the drivers seat) of the white seat
cover below the head rest[25], would show that the deceased Feliber must
have been seated at the front passengers seat and the children at the
middle row behind the drivers seat.[26] Another picture shows a bullet
hole on the last window on the left side of the vehicle[27] and another
shows that the front windshield appears undamaged.[28] A ballistics
expert appeared in court for the prosecution and testified that the bullet
fired at the FX came from the appellants gun, which fact was admitted by
the defense. The prosecution did not inquire from the ballistics expert
regarding the trajectory of the bullet or the approximate distance of the
appellant from the FX when he fired his gun to establish whether or not
the appellant aimed for Noel or Feliber or simply fired indiscriminately at
the latters vehicle.[29]
At first blush it would seem that the shooting of Feliber Andres was
attended by treachery as she was inside the FX witnessing her husbands
altercation, first, with the appellant then with the appellants son, totally
defenseless from the shot that came suddenly from her left side. Public
outrage over the death of Feliber was heightened by the fact that she was
then pregnant with her second child and her death left a new born baby
girl and a two year old boy motherless.
However, a meticulous review of the evidence prevents a
conclusive finding of treachery and any doubt must be resolved, like the
fact of the commission of an offense, in favor of the accused. The pictures
indicate that Gonzalez fired at the FX at an angle away from Noel Andres
and that Gonzalez was not aiming at anybody in particular. It is not
disputed that the appellants car was directly behind the complainants FX
and that Gonzalez who was then seated at the drivers seat alighted from
his car, took a few steps then fired at the left side of the FX. Whether Noel
Andres was seated at the drivers seat inside his vehicle when Gonzalez
fired at the FX, as the prosecution asserts, or was standing by the door of
the drivers seat outside his vehicle, as the defense submits, it is clear that
the shot was fired away from Noel Andres. The bullet hit Feliber near her
temple above the left eye indicating that she was facing left towards her
husband when the shot was fired.[30] The direct hit on Felibers head
shows that the angle of the shot was indeed away from Noel Andres.
Even the eyewitness for the prosecution testified that had the appellant
intended to kill Noel Andres he could have shot directly at him, considering
that Noel Andres was just a few steps away from him[31] and that Noel
Andres was visible from the outside because his window was partially
open.[32] The pictures show that the bullet hole was on the third window
on the left side of the Tamaraw FX[33] belying any attempt to shoot Noel
Andres. Two prosecution witnesses Ramos and Castro unequivocally
declared that nothing or no one prevented Gonzalez from shooting
directly at Noel Andres and that Gonzalez could have simply done so if he
wanted to. But after alighting from his car, Gonzalez took a few steps and
shot at the left side window of the FX.[34]
The fact that the appellant fired his gun from behind the victim
does not by itself amount to treachery. There is no evidence on record
that the appellant deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain
advantage over him when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence
before us reveals that the position of the appellants car was not of his own
doing but it became so when Noel Andres overtook his car and cut off his
path.
We note further, that the appellant did not act belligerently towards
Noel Andres even after the latter cut off the appellants path. Andres
stated in court that the appellant did not alight from his car nor opened his
window until he, Andres, tapped on it.[35] For his part Gonzalez
categorically stated in court that he did not point his gun nor threatened
Andres during their short spat.[36] Gonzalez, although he had his gun in
his car, did not react to Andres cursing until the latter was having an

altercation with the appellants son, Dino. Gonzalez claimed that he
perceived that his son was in imminent danger.[37] Whether he
overreacted or he shot at Andres vehicle out of rage over Andres
aggressive behavior, one thing appears clear to us, that the shooting was
not done in cold blood. It is undisputed that the windows of the FX are
heavily or darkly tinted so that a person outside would not see if anybody
was inside.[38] The pictures of the FX[39] on record confirm the
testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses that the other
passengers of the FX were not visible from the outside. Gonzalez
admitted in court that Noel Andres mentioned that he has passengers with
him while he was shouting and cursing at Gonzalez but there is no
indication that Gonzalez had any opportunity to see the passengers when
he fired the shot. The totality of the evidence on record fails to support a
conclusion that Gonzalez deliberately employed the mode of attack to gain
undue advantage over the intended nor the actual victim. Without any
decisive evidence to the contrary, treachery cannot be considered; thus
the crime committed is homicide.[40]
The trial courts finding that the loading of the gun, the cocking of
the hammer and finally the pulling of the trigger constitute a deliberate
effort on the part of appellant to use the gun as a means of a treacherous
attack is patently erroneous. A single and continuous attack cannot be
divided into stages to make it appear that treachery was involved.[41] The
entire incident happened in a matter of minutes, as testified to by
witnesses, and as noted by the trial court.[42] It was error to our mind for
the trial court to divide the assault in stages to arrive at the conclusion that
the mode of attack was consciously employed by the appellant. Contrary
to the finding of the trial court that the appellant prepared the gun before
getting out of his car, the appellant testified that he loaded his gun before
he left the house and that it was ready to fire when he alighted his car.
There was no time for him to reflect on the mode of attack since he just
picked up his gun and alighted from his car and shot at the FX a few
seconds after Dino and Noel Andres started shouting at each other.[43]
We note further that the trial court pointed out that from the fact that the
appellant prepared his gun to shoot, this was an indication of the
deliberate employment of the gun as a means to kill; i.e. that the use of an
automatic pistol shows that the shooting was attended by treachery.
We do not agree that the weapon used, by itself, is determinative
of treachery, unless it is shown, and it is not herein shown, that the
appellant deliberately used the gun to insure the commission of the crime
and to render the unarmed victim defenseless. As discussed above, the
encounter between the appellant and the Andresses was a chance
encounter and the appellants gun was in the glove compartment of his car
even before he left his house. The shooting was clearly a spur of the
moment or impulsive decision made by the appellant preceded by a
heated altercation at the instance of the private complainant.
Jurisprudence teaches us that under the circumstances, treachery is not
obtaining. In the case of People vs. Valles,[44] the accused, a security
guard, fired his Armalite and mortally wounded the victim when the latter
approached the accused four times insisting on entering the workplace
wearing improper uniform, then cursed and insulted and challenged the
accused to a fight. We held that the shooting was not attended by
treachery as the shooting was preceded by a heated altercation at the
instance of the victim. It is to be noted that the kind of weapon used
against an unarmed victim was not taken into consideration in determining
the attendance of treachery; it is the mode of attack employed by the
accused under the particular circumstances of a case that determines its
attendance in the commission of a crime. We find that the prosecution
has not discharged its burden to show that the shooting was attended by
treachery and we are convinced that the crime committed for the death of
Feliber Andres is homicide.
As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that
the crime committed are two counts of slight physical injuries. The intent
to kill determines whether the crime committed is physical injuries or
homicide and such intent is made manifest by the acts of the accused
which are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim.[45] In a case wherein the
accused did not know that a person was hiding behind a table who was hit
46
by a stray bullet causing superficial injuries requiring treatment for three
days, the crime committed is slight physical injuries.[46] In case of doubt
as to the homicidal intent of the accused, he should be convicted of the
lesser offense of physical injuries.[47] We have earlier pointed out that the
intent to kill is absent in this case. It was also found that one small
metallic fragment was extracted from Kenneth below his left eye while
another fragment was extracted from Kevin immediately below the level of
his skin before the cheek bone.[48] An examination of the testimonies of
the attending physicians, showed that the wounds sustained by the two
children from the metallic fragments are not in themselves fatal but may
cause death if left untreated. One of the attending physician testified in
court that the fragments themselves will not cause complication, it is the
entry of the fragment or the open wound that is susceptible to infection.
[49] Two small fragments were no longer extracted from the face of Kevin
Valdez, as the doctor deemed it to be without danger of complication.[50]
We note that the various sizes of the metallic fragments were not
established, at least to give an indication of the severity of the wounds
sustained. Both children were discharged after six days of treatment and
there is no showing that they required subsequent treatment or that they
were immobilized for a greater number of days by reason of the injuries
sustained. Considering the nature and location of their injuries and the
number of days required for their treatment, we find that the crime
committed for the injuries sustained by the children are two counts of slight
physical injuries under Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes
a penalty of arresto menor or imprisonment for 1 to 30 days for injuries
sustained that has incapacitated the victim for one to nine days or required
medical attendance for the same period. For evident lack of criminal
intent to kill the complainant, Noel Andres, as above stated, the
information for attempted homicide must fail.
The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and
obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly proved
and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony
of prosecution witness contradicts the appellants pretense of voluntary
surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the appellant drove away towards
the gate of the memorial park while he was questioning him after the
shooting and had not Noel Andres and onlookers blocked his path the
appellant could have fled the scene of the crime.[51]
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not
obtaining. For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be
shown that (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and
obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) that the crime was
committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of the
unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accuseds mind; and that
(3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not
from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge.[52] Noel Andres act of shouting
at the appellants son, who was then a nurse and of legal age, is not
sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation as it is claimed by the
accused. Besides, the appellants son, Dino was shouting back at Noel
Andres. It was not a case wherein the appellants son appeared helpless
and oppressed that the appellant lost his reason and shot at the FX of
Noel Andres. The same holds true for the appellants claim of provocation
on the part of Noel Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a
person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be
commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation
varies according to the circumstances of the case.[53] The aggressive
behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant and his son may be
demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the
complainants vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of
Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount
to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea
for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating
circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the

means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting
crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of
attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim.[54] The appellants
use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the
shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the
possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to
produce the resulting crimes committed.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any
mitigating circumstance, the appellant is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, in its
medium period, as minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of the slight
physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the
appellant is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor in its medium
period.
The rules on the imposition of penalties for complex crimes under
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable in this case. Art. 48
applies if a single act constitutes two or more grave and less grave
felonies or when an offense is a necessary means of committing another;
in such a case, the penalty for the most serious offense shall be imposed
in its maximum period. Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art.
25 defines grave felonies as those to which the law attaches the capital
punishment or afflictive penalties from reclusion perpetua to prision mayor;
less grave felonies are those to which the law attaches a penalty which in
its maximum period falls under correctional penalties; and light felonies
are those punishable by arresto menor or fine not exceeding two hundred
pesos. Considering that the offenses committed by the act of the
appellant of firing a single shot are one count of homicide, a grave felony,
and two counts of slight physical injuries, a light felony, the rules on the
imposition of penalties for complex crimes, which requires two or more
grave and/or less grave felonies, will not apply.
The pecuniary award granted by the trial court for actual damages
was duly established by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as
supported by the original receipts for hospitalization and other medical
expenses presented in evidence by the prosecution. The award for loss of
earning capacity is likewise sustained for the reason that while Feliber
Andres was pregnant and was unemployed at the time of death, it is not
disputed that she was a registered nurse and had earning capacity. Noel
Andres also testified that he and his wife had plans to go back to Saudi
Arabia to work after Feliber had given birth to their second baby. While
there is no evidence as to Felibers actual income at the time of her death,
in view of her temporary separation from work because of her pregnancy,
we do not consider it reversible error for the trial court to peg her earning
capacity to that of the salary of a government nurse under the salary
standardization law, as a fair estimate or reasonable assessment of her
earning capacity at the time of her death. It would be grossly inequitous to
deny her spouse and her minor children damages for the support that they
would have received, considering clear evidence on record that she did
have earning capacity at the time of her death.
The awards for moral damages for the death of Feliber Andres and
for the injuries sustained by the two children, which under the
circumstances are reasonable, are likewise sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED.
The appellant is hereby found guilty of homicide for the death of Feliber
Andres and is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed against
Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced to
20 days of arresto menor.
The pecuniary awards granted by the trial court are hereby
sustained.
47
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.
Pardo, J., see dissenting opinion.
Puno, Kapunan, and Panganiban, JJ., joins the dissenting opinion
of J. Pardo.
DIGEST
FACTS:
On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and
herein accused-appellant were both on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park. At the intersection point, the cars they were driving almost
collided. Later on, when Andres found an opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off,
disembarked from his car and went over to Gonzales. Altercation then
ensued. Meanwhile, Dino Gonzalez, son of Inocencio, entered the scene
in defense of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took
out the gun which was already in his car compartment. Upon seeing his
father, Gonzalezs daughter, Trisha, hugged her father and in the process
held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and
with Trishas substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant
lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noels wife,
was shot to death while their son, Kenneth and nephew Kevin were
wounded.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder
and two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to
death. Accused were also ordered to pay for civil liabilities to the heirs of
Mrs. Andres, and the parents of Kevin Valdez.
Hence, an automatic review or this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found
treachery was present in the commission of the crime.
2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to
appreciate voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete
defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong be
considered as mitigating circumstances.
RULINGS:
1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters,
impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were
preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery
for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous
mode of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his
infuriation by reason of the victims provocation was held to be without
treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and
insults by the victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the
rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to be without
treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. For the
rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been
preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without
provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the recommendation of the
Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and
accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is
homicide and not murder.
2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and
obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly proved
and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony
of prosecution witness contradicts the appellants pretense of voluntary
surrender.
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not

obtaining. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the
wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the
crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the
circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres
towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it
is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainants vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in
cursing and shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an
unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez.
Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance
of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit.
This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity
between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the
resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of
attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellants
use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the
shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the
possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to
produce the resulting crimes committed.
6. TREACHERY
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128900. July 14, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO S.
ANTONIO, SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO
CARTALLA, JR., accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156 in Criminal Case No.
111232-H, for Murder, the dispositive portion of which is quoted
hereunder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery as charged in the Information, and there being no mitigating or
any aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659
entitled An Act to Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes
and Art. 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the service of his sentence, accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @
Ambet shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
The guilt of both accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C.
CARTALLA, JR., as accessories, having also been established beyond
any reasonable doubt, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correcional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum.
48
Accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet is likewise hereby ordered to
pay, unto the heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, the following sums:
a. P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B.
Tuadles;
b. P226,298.36, as actual damages;
c. P7,200,000.00, representing compensable earnings lost
by reason of Arnulfo B. Tuadles death;
d. P3,000,000.00 or the stipulated P1,000,000.00 each for
the three (3) children of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, and
another P500,000.00 for the widow, Ma. Odyssa
Suzette Tecarro-Tuadles, as moral damages;
e. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
f. Costs.
In case of insolvency of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ Ambet,
accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR.,
shall be liable to pay, jointly and severally, one-third (1/3) of the above-
adjudicated sums or the amount of P3,675,432.78 unto the said heirs of
Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In any event, the foregoing civil liabilities shall all be without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Being instruments of the crime, let the caliber .9mm Beretta Mode 92F
with Serial Number BER-041965-Z, including its black magazine and five
(5) live bullets, which are presently under the custody of the Court, be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and turned over to the
Firearms and Explosives Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused ALBERTO
S. ANTONIO @ Ambet from the San Juan Municipal Jail to the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.[1]
On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have
been an amiable game of cards between two erstwhile friends turned into
a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of
the other. The victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former professional
basketball player, succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound
right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .
9mm caliber Beretta pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto
Ambet S. Antonio, a one-time chairman of the Games and Amusement
Board (GAB). It was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles became
socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became
reacquainted when they both started frequenting the International
Business Club (IBC), located along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro
Manila, which houses amenities such as a dining room, music bar and
gameroom. Often, the two would meet with other members and friends to
play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the club. Their
preferred games were poker or pusoy dos, ordinary poker or Russian
poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of thousands of pesos.
The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November
1, 1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president
of the IBC, had agreed to meet at the club for another poker session, their
third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at
around midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting for
sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play pusoy dos, a game for
two (2) players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only

when either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at
around 9:00 oclock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings
from the loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution
and the defense presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution
alleged and sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without
warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot
Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to
accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the
prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security
guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on
the testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their argument
was caused by Tuadles refusal to pay Antonios winnings. In the middle
of a heated altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly
grabbed Antonios gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio
claimed that he reached for Tuadles hand and they grappled for
possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell
face down to the floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who had
actually pulled the trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that the shooting was
accidental, and his only motivation was to defend himself. He also refuted
the testimony of the prosecutions eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis
could not have seen the actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused
SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who were alerted by Antonios yells, reached the
scene when Tuadles had already been shot and was lying on the floor.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an
ambulance or check if he was still alive. Instead, and there is no dispute
in these succeeding events, Antonio convinced the two (2) security
guards, prosecution eyewitness SG Bobis included, to accompany him to
his home in Greenmeadows Subdivision, Quezon City, after which they
proceeded to the San Juan Police Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a
member of the San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonios
residence for several hours, during which time Antonio made phone calls
and summoned his lawyer. At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon,
Antonio, accompanied by SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in the
custody of San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and the police authorities.
Later, the two security guards and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to the
club where they waited for the police investigators. Sometime thereafter,
SG Bobis narrated the events and executed his statement at the police
station, a statement which he would repudiate three (3) days later.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio
for the crime of murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto
and SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr. The Information alleged that:
On or about November 2, 1996, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Antonio, armed with a
gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill
and with treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, by then and there suddenly,
unexpectedly, deliberately and without provocation, shooting Arnulfo
Arnie Tuadles on his forehead, right between the eyes, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of
his death;
The accused Nieto, without having participated in said crime of murder,
either as principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with abuse of his
public functions and position as a public officer, by harboring or assisting
the accused Antonio, by then and there failing to arrest and surrender
immediately the said accused Antonio to the authorities and by giving false
information which tended to deceive the investigating authorities; and
The accused Cartalla, Jr., without having participated in said crime of
murder either as principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully,
49
unlawfully and feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with
abuse of his public functions and position as a public officer, by concealing
or destroying the effects or instruments of the body of the crime, in order
to prevent its discovery, by then and there removing the laser sight of the
gun used in shooting Tuadles, deliberately omitting to take steps to
preserve the evidence at the scene of the crime, and purposely failing to
call on the crime laboratory service of the proper agencies for appropriate
action.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, co-accused SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. entered a plea
of Not Guilty. Accused Antonio and SPO4 Nieto both refused to enter a
plea, and the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for both of them.
After trial on the merits, all three accused were found guilty as
charged, imposing on them the appropriate penalties and ordering them to
pay to the heirs of Tuadles various amounts as and for indemnity and
damages, set forth in the dispositive portion quoted above. All three
accused filed separate appeals assailing the trial courts findings and
disposition.
Appellant Antonio assails the trial courts judgment on the following
assigned errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF JOSE JIMMY BOBIS WHICH CONFLICTS
DRASTICALLY NOT ONLY WITH HIS INITIAL DECLARATIONS BUT
ALSO WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY EXECUTED STATEMENT, AND WHICH
TESTIMONY IS TAINTED WITH SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES,
INCREDIBILITIES, AND OMISSIONS ON SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY
ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
VERSION OF APPELLANT ALBERTO AMBET ANTONIO.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT
PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM ARNULFO ARNIE
TUADLES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE COMMISION OF THE
IMPUTED ACT, AND IN NOT APPRECIATING THIS MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE SUM OF P7,200,000.00
AS COMPENSABLE EARNINGS LOST BY REASON OF ARNIE
TUADLES DEATH, DESPITE INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
SUCH AWARD.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PALPABLY EXCESSIVE
MORAL DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF ARNIE TUADLES.

VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT ALBERTO
AMBET ANTONIO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER.[3]
Appellant SPO4 Nieto likewise questions the trial courts decision,
arguing that:
I testimony, on the one hand, contradicted what he previously narrated in
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING NIETO AS AN
ACCESSORY
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED BY THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED ANTONIO WAS
MURDER[4]
Appellant Cartalla, Jr. also challenged the said decision on the
following grounds:
I executed an earlier statement which was inconsistent with his testimony.
THE COURT OF ORIGIN HAS COMMITTED A BLATANT ERROR IN
CONVICTING SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. AS ACCESSORY TO
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RECORD IS
SO REPLETE WITH EVIDENCES THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE
DOUBTS TO HOLD HIM AS SUCH.
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR AND HAS NOT
SHOWN FAIRNESS IN NOT CONSIDERING FULLY THE GOOD FAITH,
DILIGENCE AND HARD WORK EXERTED BY SPO1 HONORIO
CARTALLA, JR. WHEN HE INVESTIGATED THE CASE ON HAND TILL
THE TIME HE DELIVERED THE SPECIMEN OR PIECES OF PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME TO THE PNP-CLS, CAMP CRAME,
QUEZON CITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT HAS COMMITTED A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN
DISREGARDING THE SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF ACTIVE POLICE
SERVICE OF SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. SHOWN WITH
DEDICATION AND LOYALTY THERETO SUSTAINING MORE HIS
INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED HEREIN.[5]
Considering that appellant Antonio is the principal accused, we
shall deal first with the issues raised in his appeal, foremost of which is the
credibility of the prosecutions sole eyewitness, SG Jose Jimmy Bobis.
Appellant Antonio challenges SG Bobis worth and credibility as an
eyewitness on two (2) grounds.
First, SG Bobis, in his first sworn statement before the San Juan
authorities averred that he did not see the actual shooting since he was
still ascending the stairs leading to the second floor where the crime took
place when he heard the gunshot. Days later, in a second statement
taken at the Eastern Police District (EPD) and in his testimony before the
trial court, SG Bobis negated his earlier statement, this time averring that
he had indeed seen appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind, and with
neither warning nor provocation, aim the gun at the head of Tuadles and
shoot the latter pointblank. This complete turnabout in SG Bobis
testimony, according to appellant Antonio, is a sure sign of the said
witness unreliability, incredibility, and unworthiness. He also points out
the contradictions and inconsistencies between SG Bobis first and second
statements and court testimony.
50
Second, appellant Antonio belittles SG Bobis reasons for giving
the San Juan Police investigators false information in his first statement,
saying that nobody threatened SG Bobis if he testified against appellant
Antonio. On the other hand, appellant Antonio suggests that it was
Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the EPD who coerced SG Bobis to change
his statement and testimony so that the murder charge against appellant
Antonio would be strengthened.
There is no question that SG Bobis second statement and court
his first statement, on the other hand. The question therefore is: Which is
more credible and of more value to the courts in ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the accused?
It is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements
taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus,
by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever there
is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in
court, the testimony commands greater weight.[6] Moreover,
inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in his sworn
statements and those in open court do not necessarily discredit said
witness.[7] Thus, the trial court followed precedents in giving more
credence to SG Bobis testimony given in open court despite his having
Besides, when confronted with his first contradictory statement, SG
Bobis explained the reasons why he was moved to give false information
in his first statement. He had testified that moments after he saw
appellant Antonio shoot Tuadles, the appellant warned him: Ikaw, wag
kang tumistigo, ha.[8] Later, he and the other security guard, SG Olac,
were allegedly coerced to go to the appellants house in Quezon City. He
also testified that while they were there, appellant Antonio and his lawyer
instructed him (Bobis), should the police investigator ask him who shot
Tuadles, to say that what happened was only an accident.[9]
At the police station, appellant SPO4 Nieto allegedly told SG Bobis
to say that they were both outside the club when the trouble started,
saying: kailangan ipalabas natin na nasa labas tayo ng club.[10] Bobis
stated that he was confused and afraid, and, therefore, told the police
investigator, appellant Cartalla, Jr., on November 2, 1996, that he did not
see appellant Antonio shoot Tuadles because he was still ascending the
stairs when the gun went off.
Apparently, it was not only fear that ruled his thoughts and actions
at that time, but also remorse and confusion. As found by the trial court:
He admits that he had acted contrary to the ethical standards and code of
conduct of private security guards when he did not make a formal report to
his superior about the shooting incident of November 2, 1996 at the Club
but countered that this was because accused Antonio had taken him to the
latters house. This being so, neither was he able to put said accused
Antonio under arrest.
Added to this was the fact that even accused Nieto, a policeman in active
service who was with them at the time and who should have done so, had
also failed to arrest accused Antonio, more so with him and SG Olac who
are just ordinary security guards. (Dahil po maam, si SPO4 Nieto, pulis
na po ang kasama namin, hindi niya po nagawa na arestuhin si Mr. Ambet
Antonio mas lalo po kami na ordinary guard lang po.)
True, he had his service .38 caliber in his possession at the time.
Nevertheless, because accused Antonio looked: parang galit pa sila sa
amin he can not, as in fact he did not, insist that instead of going to the
house of accused Antonio, he will effect the arrest.[11]
Nevertheless, Bobis stated that his conscience bothered him, and
seeing Tuadles widow crying on television, he gathered enough resolve
and courage to finally tell the truth to the police authorities at the EPD.

When he testified in open court, SG Bobis did not waver in his declaration
that he witnessed appellant Antonio suddenly pull his gun from behind and
shoot Tuadles three (3) feet away.
Rule 132, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at
other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times
and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he
made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them. (Underscoring ours).
Thus, this Court has uniformly held that:
Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility
of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies
and he was then given an opportunity to explain them. It is only when no
reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting
declarations that he should be deemed impeached.[12]
We find no reason to discredit the trial courts finding that the
reasons given by SG Bobis sufficiently explained the conflicting
declarations he made in his two (2) sworn statements and in his court
testimony. Therefore, he cannot be impeached as an eyewitness. This
Court also recognizes that the initial reticence of witnesses to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their aversion to be involved in
criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is not uncommon, and this
fact has been judicially declared not to adversely affect the credibility of
witnesses.[13]
Apart from the issue of SG Bobis having given an earlier
contradictory statement, his direct testimony and answers under cross-
examination appear clear and convincing. We agree with the trial court
when it held:
But it is SG Bobis whom the Court finds credible.
Why he had executed a first, then a second statement, totally in conflict
with each other, SG Bobis had fully explained to the satisfaction of the
Court. His lowly station in life had been taken advantage of by accused
Antonio and Nieto. These two (2) had thought that they had succeeded in
completely prevailing upon SG Bobis. For did not SG Bobis tell their lies?
Still, the conscience of a good man had won over.
SG Bobis had redeemed himself. He gave spontaneous and
straightforward answers to the gruelling questions propounded on him and
had stuck to his truth.
The Court had painstakingly, taken note of each of the witnesses
demeanor on the stand. While SG Bobis was steadfast with his words,
accused Antonio and Nieto were evidently recalling from a script. The
other prosecution witnesses, SG Olac and Romeo M. Solano were, like
SG Bobis, untainted in their testimonies.[14]
Finding nothing that would compel us to conclude otherwise, we
respect the findings of the trial court on the issue of the credibility of SG
Bobis as an eyewitness, especially considering that the trial court was in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witness himself
and observed his deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[15]
In the recent case of People v. Pili, this Court had occasion to rule
that:
It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses
51
and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court,
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and
to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the
trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion,
whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings
of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless
some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition
of the case.[16]
And in People v. Deleverio, this Court ruled that:
It is axiomatic to point out, furthermore, that in an appeal, where the
culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the
trial court are entitled to and given the highest degree of respect.[17]
Moreover, in People v. Reynaldo, we reiterated the principle that:
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates, can weigh the testimony of a witness in the light of his
demeanor, conduct and attitude as he testified, and is thereby placed in a
more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false.
[18]
There are other reasons why the eyewitness testimony of SG
Bobis was given full faith and credit. SG Bobis, a mere security guard,
realized he was no match to appellants Antonio and SPO4 Nieto. The
former, a wealthy businessman, is known as an intimate friend of people in
power. Appellant Antonio admitted in court that he surrendered himself
and his gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, who was his good friend. Hours
later, he went to see then Vice President Joseph Estrada in Tagaytay City
so he (Antonio) could tell his friend, the Vice President, what happened in
his own words.[19]
Appellant SPO4 Nieto was a member in active duty of the San
Juan Police Force who was close to appellant Antonio. Considering SG
Bobis lowly station in life, as compared to that of the said appellants, it is
understandable that his initial reaction to the shocking events would be
one of intimidation, if not fear. SG Bobis believed then, and no one can
fault him for thinking so, that going against the instructions and dictates of
appellant Antonio and SPO4 Nieto would make life very difficult for him,
knowing they were well-connected to the powers that be. This perceived
threat, whether real or imagined, compelled him to take the easy way out
and just repeat what appellants told him to say.
There is an oft-quoted adage that a person may be able to avoid
his enemies, but he can never run away from himself. SG Bobis may have
momentarily avoided incurring the wrath of the appellants by acceding to
their dictates, but he could not escape the proddings of his conscience.
He realized he had to right a wrong, and this he did with selflessness and
at great risk to himself.
Furthermore, appellants could not impute any ill motive on the part
of SG Bobis except the statement that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod
of the EPD who told him how to testify. Thus, his positive and categorical
declarations on the witness stand under solemn oath without convincing
evidence to the contrary deserve full faith and credence.[20]
Appellant Antonio, however, would seek to completely avoid
culpability by claiming that the shooting of Tuadles was caused by mere
accident without his fault or intention of causing it, or that he acted in self-
defense.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that where an

accused admits having killed the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, he assumes the burden of proof to establish his plea of
self-defense by clear, credible and convincing evidence.[21] To
successfully interpose self-defense, appellant Antonio must clearly and
convincingly prove: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
attack; and (3) the person defending himself must not have provoked the
victim into committing the act of aggression.[22]
Without granting that his testimony is an accurate narration of the
events that took place, we shall discuss the points raised by appellant
Antonio only for the purpose of determining whether the requisites of self-
defense were attendant as claimed. In his testimony appellant Antonio
alleged that Tuadles committed an act of aggression when he (Tuadles)
grabbed the gun which was on top of a sidetable. Appellant Antonio then
concluded that Tuadles had the sole intention of using the gun against him
(Antonio), so he grappled with Tuadles to prevent the latter from shooting
him. His bare testimony, uncorroborated as it is, does not convince us that
Tuadles would, so to speak, beat him to the draw. The testimony of Bobis
shows that Tuadles was calm in answering Appellant Antonios loud
invectives, and it would be hard to imagine Tuadles as the aggressor
under such a situation. And even if Tuadles had grabbed the gun, it could
very well have been that Tuadles intended to keep the gun away from
appellant Antonio to prevent the latter from using it against him
considering the state of mind and the foul mood appellant Antonio was in.
This would be a more believable scenario since even appellant Antonio
admitted that he was suffused with anger, his temper short due to three (3)
consecutive sleepless nights.
Appellant Antonio never said that Tuadles aimed or pointed the
gun at him. There is no evidence, apart from appellant Antonios
uncorroborated testimony, that Tuadles made an attempt to shoot him.
Hence, there is no convincing proof that there was unlawful aggression on
the part of Tuadles. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must
be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and
not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.[23] The burden of proving
unlawful aggression lay on appellant Antonio, but he has not presented
incontrovertible proof that would stand careful scrutiny before any court.
Lacking this requirement, appellant Antonios claim of self-defense cannot
be appreciated. He cannot even claim it as an extenuating circumstance.
[24]
Besides, it cannot be said that appellant Antonio did not provoke
Tuadles, if indeed the latter had grabbed the gun from the table. Antonio
himself admitted that he was shouting and cursing Tuadles while in a
furious rage. Such a threatening stance could be interpreted as a
provocation which could have prompted Tuadles to get the gun so that
appellant Antonio, in his anger, would not be able to use it against
Tuadles. If ever there was provocation, it was certainly coming from
appellant Antonio, not from Tuadles.
In the alternative, appellant Antonio claims that the shooting of
Tuadles was an accident. He further argues that Tuadles was killed while
he, Antonio, was performing a lawful act with due care, and without fault or
intention of causing it. Having ruled that appellant Antonio failed to prove
his claim of self-defense, (i.e., there was no unlawful aggression on the
part of Tuadles and provocation coming from Antonio himself), there is no
basis for us to argue with appellant Antonio that he was performing a
lawful act when he shot Tuadles.[25]
We note that appellant Antonios version of how the shooting took
place leaves much room for conjecture. It is true that there is no fixed
dictum on the reaction of a person under the circumstances of a sudden
death he may have caused. He could react in a variety of ways, some of
them even irrational. However, we respect the trial courts findings. The
trial court upheld the prosecutions version thus sustaining the theory that
if Antonio indeed shot Tuadles by accident, the natural reaction expected
of him would be to immediately see to it that Tuadles be brought to a
hospital or get medical attention at the quickest time possible. Instead,
52
appellant Antonio left Tuadles, who was supposed to be his good friend,
lying dead on the floor for several hours. If indeed he and Tuadles both
had their hands on the gun and there was no telling who actually pulled
the trigger, we agree that appellant Antonio should have seen to it that no
one else would touch the gun barehanded to preserve the fingerprints on
it. Instead, he gave the gun to SPO4 Nieto who had no concern for
preserving the fingerprints on the gun. Not only that, appellant Antonio
also handed the gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Thus, one tangible piece
of evidence that could have proven his claim of self-defense or accident
was unfortunately lost due to his lack of presence and due care.
Appellant Antonios ambivalence in his choice of defenses is clear
from the records. First, he denies that he pulled the trigger because it was
Tuadles who was holding the gun. Then he says that he cannot recall who
fired the gun so it could have very well been either him or Tuadles who did
it. Next, he admits firing the gun, but he did it in self-defense. Only, he
could not indubitably prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part
of Tuadles. Failing there, he again admitted shooting Tuadles, but that it
was an accident. Again, he failed to prove that he was in the process of
performing a lawful act when he shot Tuadles.
When an accused invokes self-defense or claims that it was an
accident to escape criminal liability, he admits having caused the death of
the victim. And when he fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence
the positiveness of that justifying circumstance, having admitted the killing,
conviction of the accused is inescapable.[26] Appellant Antonio had to rely
on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecutions evidence for, even if the latter were weak, his invoking self-
defense is already an open admission of responsibility for the killing.[27]
As it was, appellant Antonios testimony is not only uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence, but also doubtful by itself[28] for
being ambivalent and self-serving.[29]
Having admitted responsibility for the killing of Tuadles, appellant
Antonio claims the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On this
score, we find merit in his claim considering that all the elements in order
that voluntary surrender may be appreciated were attendant in his case.
First, he had not been actually arrested; Second, he surrendered himself
to a person in authority; and Third, his surrender was voluntary. It is of no
moment that appellant Antonio did not immediately surrender to the
authorities, but did so only after the lapse of about six (6) hours. In the
case of People v. Bautista,[30] the voluntary surrender of the accused to a
police authority four (4) days after the commission of the crime was
considered attenuating. There is no dispute that appellant Antonio
voluntarily surrendered to the mayor, a person in authority, before he was
arrested, hence the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should
be considered in appellant Antonios favor.[31]
Appellant Antonio also claims the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation on the part of Tuadles. To avail of this mitigating
circumstance, it must be shown that the provocation originated from the
offended party.[32] However, apart from his own testimony, appellant
Antonio has not proven by convincing evidence that he was provoked by
Tuadles. He claimed that Tuadles provoked him when the latter refused or
could not pay his winning. Refusal to pay cannot be a mitigating
provocation for appellant Antonio to kill Tuadles. An unpaid debt cannot,
and never will, be a reason to shoot the debtor dead. Besides, appellant
Antonio had no other proof that he won and that the argument arose from
Tuadles refusal to pay. His bare testimony is, at best, self-serving.
Accordingly, appellant Antonio is not entitled to the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation.[33]
There is, however, a significant and consequential aspect of the
case which the trial court overlooked and disregarded.
As earlier stated, we find no sufficient reason to disagree with the
trial court when it relied on the testimony of SG Bobis. However, we have
carefully examined said testimony, the records of this petition, and the
justifications of the trial court upon which it based its decision.

There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion that accused
Antonio consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure
the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself.[34] It
ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The trial court did not
explain the basis for the qualification except for a terse citation that there
was a sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate. As stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71-page
decision, typed single space, the trial court devoted only a few sentences
to the issue of treachery.
There was no treachery in this case.
It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder.
There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack
for a specific purpose.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It
was a spur of the moment crime.
The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them:
Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where
accused made no preparation or employed no means, method and form of
execution tending directly and specially to insure the commission of a
crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense which the victim may
take.[35]
A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the
aggressor did not consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to
perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself.[36]
A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of alevosia
where it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a
mode of attack intended to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide
without risk to himself, as where the appellant followed the victims when
the latter refused appellant's invitation to have some more alcoholic
drinks.[37]
The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a finding of
alevosia if the mode adopted by the accused does not positively tend to
prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment
of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the
defense that might be offered.[38]
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision
to attack was arrived at on the spur of the moment.[39]
The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the
means, methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger
to the offender arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made
by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be
appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or
consciously adopted by the offender.[40] Such deliberate or conscious
choice was held non-existent where the attack was the product of an
impulse of the moment.[41]
The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack
makes the killing a murder because of treachery is not consistent with the
decisions of this Court.[42] Conscious deliberation or conscious adoption
of the mode of attack has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. For it is
likewise an established principle that the quantum of evidence to prove a
person's being guilty of a crime is also required to prove treachery. The
same degree of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before
any conclusion may also be reached respecting the attendance of
treachery, whether as qualifying or aggravating, in a criminal case.[43]
There is no such proof in this case.
There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio
53
and Tuadles spent several hours having fun playing "pusoy dos." The
situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles could not pay to appellant
Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument arose, with appellant Antonio
and Tuadles standing face to face three (3) feet away from each other, a
fact attested to by the defense and even by the prosecution eyewitness
himself.
Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were arguing.
Antonio even called out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just before the shooting,
Bobis heard Antonio saying: Putang ina ka kasi. The argument
precluded the presence of treachery. If Antonio had consciously adopted
means and methods to kill Tuadles, there was no reason to call for a
Sergeant or any eyewitness for that matter.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar,[44] where
we held that there was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from
a verbal altercation. More recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced
that:
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such
as when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was
standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not
have been unforseen.[45] (Underscoring Ours)
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still
be no treachery. In People v. Chua,[46] we reiterated our consistent view
that:
While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it
was preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper
that indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on
guard.
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was
forewarned and could have anticipated the aggression of the accused.
Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal
altercation between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both
prosecution and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting
was committed with treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill
Tuadles in the first place. His criminal act was an offshoot of their
argument which neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was no
treachery because treachery requires that the mode of attack must have
been thought of by the offender and must have sprung from an unforeseen
occurrence.[47]
In People v. Nitcha,[48] we held that:
To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made
some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the
execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person
attacked to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not
treacherous. (Underscoring ours)
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove
him to pull his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-
exist with treachery. In passion, the offender loses his reason and
control. In treachery, on the other hand, the means employed is adopted
consciously and deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion, loses his
reason and self-control, cannot consciously employ a particular means,
method or form of attack in the execution of the crime.[49] Thus, the killing
of Tuadles by appellant Antonio was not attended by treachery.
That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and
favorably considered by the trial court to elevate the killing to murder, was
not proven by convincing evidence[50] is advocated by the Solicitor
General in the Appellee's Brief. He agreed with Appellant Antonio's
contention on the matter:

On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to
agree with this particular submission of Antonio. Antonio and Tuadles
engaged in pusoy dos. In the beginning, they were heard laughing and
kidding each other (nagtatawanan at nagkakantiyawan). Later, the banter
turned into verbal altercation.
Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the incipient
violence. Hence, Tuadles could have braced himself with the aggression
of Antonio. There is no treachery when the killing results from a verbal
altercation or spat between the victim and the assailant such that the
victim must have been forewarned of the impending danger. In this case,
Bobis testified that he saw Antonio and Tuadles facing each other before
Antonio raised his hand and shot Tuadles on the forehead. The proximate
distance of three feet between Tuadles and Antonio immediately before
the fatal shooting allowed and gave Tuadles opportunity to defend himself.
[51]
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal code.
Having been found guilty of the crime of homicide, the penalty that
should be imposed on appellant Antonio should be reduced to reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being one
(1) mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty to be
imposed shall be the minimum period of reclusion temporal, that is, from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
penalty to be imposed shall be the penalty next lower which is prision
mayor in any of its periods.[52] Therefore, appellant Alberto Antonio is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Appellant Antonio challenges the award of compensatory and
moral damages to the heirs of Tuadles, arguing that said award was
unsupported by adequate evidence. In arriving at the amount of
P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages, the trial court relied completely
on the testimony of the victim's widow, Suzette Tuadles, who stated that at
the time of his death, Tuadles was earning P50,000.00 a month from his
construction business. Applying the formula laid down by this Court in the
cases of Villa Rey Transit v. CA,[53] and People v. Quilaton,[54] the trial
court arrived at the amount of P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages
for loss of earning capacity. Appellant Antonio argues that the trial court
cannot just rely on the sole testimony of Suzette Tuadles, otherwise, it
would be basing its computation on mere speculation, conjecture, or
guess work.
In People v. Silvestre[55] and People v. Verde,[56] we held that the
absence of documentary evidence to support the prosecution's claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude
recovery of said damages. There, we awarded damages for loss of
earning capacity computed on the basis of the testimonies of the victim's
wives. This was reiterated in People v. Dizon,[57] where we held that:
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. In People vs. Verde (G. R.
No. 119077, February 10, 1999), the non-presentation of documentary
evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity did
not prevent this Court from awarding said damages. The testimony of the
victim's wife as to the earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was
then 48 years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver,
sufficed to establish the basis for such an award. x x x As in People vs.
Verde, the Court is inclined to grant the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence.
(Underscoring ours)
In the case at bar, however, the award for compensatory damages
should be calculated as follows:
54
Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross annual income
- living expenses
(
50% of gross annual income)
x = 2(80-40) x [P600,000.00 - 300,000.00]
3
= 26.67 x P300,000.00
= P8,001,000.00
Considering that moral damages may be awarded without proof of
pecuniary loss, the Court shall take into account the circumstances
obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its discretion.[58]
We agree with appellant Antonio that the trial court's award of moral
damages was excessive. While there is no hard and fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, each
case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.[59] And though
moral damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation to compensate the
claimants for actual injury, they are not designed to enrich the
complainants at the expense of the accused.[60]
Applied to this case, we recognize that Tuadles was the sole
support of his family and they will also be deprived of his love and
companionship. No amount of money could ever compensate for their
loss. While the award of moral damages may help ease the emotional
and psychological trauma that they continue to suffer, this Court has not
granted so large an amount as moral damages. Accordingly, we find that
the amount of P3,000,000.00 granted by the trial court in this case is
excessive, and the same is therefore reduced to P500,000.00. Moreover,
there being no aggravating circumstances attendant in this case, the
award of exemplary damages should also be deleted.[61]
We now come to the errors assigned by appellant SPO4 Juanito
M. Nieto. He argues that the trial court erred in convicting him as an
accessory. The trial court's grounds for finding him guilty are: (1) he
failed to arrest appellant Antonio; and (2) he gave false information
tending to deceive the investigating authorities.[62]
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one
who has knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part
in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent
to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting
the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or
destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in
order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting
in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.[63]
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there
are two (2) classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who
harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public
officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime
committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony.
Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused his public
function when he failed to effect the immediate arrest of accused Antonio
and to conduct a speedy investigation of the crime committed.
The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto's
culpability is concerned, shows that in the middle of the argument between
appellant Antonio and the deceased, Antonio called Nieto by shouting,
Sarge! Sarge! Hearing this, SG Bobis woke Nieto up and the latter went
upstairs. Immediately thereafter, appellant Antonio shot Tuadles, and then
ordered Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards from the table, which
Nieto did. Antonio, Nieto and Bobis went downstairs. Antonio told guards
Bobis and Ernesto Olac to go with them, and they all boarded Antonio's
Mercedes Benz van, including Nieto. They arrived at Antonio's residence

in Greenmeadows Subdivision at around 11:30 o'clock in the morning.
There, they had coffee while Antonio made some telephone calls. Soon
after, a certain Atty. Abaya arrived and talked to the two security guards,
while Nieto was present. Nieto then told Bobis that in his statement, he
should say that the two of them, i.e., Bobis and Nieto, were seated outside
the entrance of the Club when the incident took place. At 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, Nieto, Bobis and Olac returned to the Club. They waited
outside until members of the San Juan police, together with Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada and Vice Mayor Philip Cezar, arrived at 6:00 o'clock in the
evening. After the police investigated the scene, they proceeded to the
police station. There, Nieto reiterated his instruction to Bobis to say that
the two of them were outside the club. While Bobis gave his statement to
the police, Nieto remained in front of him and dictated to him what he
should answer to the questions of the police investigator.[64]
The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG Bobis.
Appellant Nieto's actuations immediately after the commission of the
crime demonstrate his liability as an accessory. Being a police officer in
the active service, he had the duty to arrest appellant Antonio after the
latter committed a crime in his presence, and which he himself witnessed.
Unfortunately, he failed to do what was incumbent upon him to do.
Instead, he rode with the offender to the latter's house where they stayed
for more than five (5) hours. In the early case of U. S. v. Yacat, et al., it
was held:[65]
It is, however, unquestionable that Pedro Ureta, who was the local
president of the town of Cabiao at the time the crime was committed, has
incurred criminal liability. Abusing his public office, he refused to
prosecute the crime of homicide and those guilty thereof, and thus made it
possible for them to escape, as the defendant Pedro Lising did in fact.
This fact is sufficiently demonstrated in the records, and he has been
unable to explain his conduct in refusing to make an investigation of this
serious occurrence, of which complaint was made to him, and
consequently he should suffer a penalty two degrees inferior to that
designated by paragraph 2 of article 405 of the Code, by virtue of article
68 thereof.
Appellant Nieto knew of the commission of the crime. Right before
the shooting, appellant Antonio called him and he immediately went
upstairs. He saw that appellant shot Tuadles. Despite this knowledge, he
failed to arrest appellant and, instead, left the crime scene together with
the latter. To this extent, he assisted appellant Antonio in his escape.[66]
Furthermore, as correctly found by the trial court, appellant Nieto
provided false information to deceive the investigating authorities. He
instructed Bobis to answer falsely to the questions of the investigating
officer, in order to make it appear that there were no eyewitnesses to the
incident and thus make it more difficult for the police to solve the crime.
Accordingly, the court a quo was correct in convicting appellant as
an accessory to the crime, and he should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty prescribed by law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we
impose on appellant Nieto the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of prison correccional, as
maximum.
Finally, we come to appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s appeal.
After carefully reviewing the facts and issues raised therein, we find that
the trial court erred in finding said appellant guilty as an accessory.
The trial court's sole reason for convicting appellant SPO1
Cartalla, Jr. was his failure to produce the laser sight of the gun as
evidence during the trial. However, such omission does not amount to
concealing or destroying the body of the crime or effects or instruments
thereof to prevent its discovery. The laser sight had been surrendered to
the police authorities so there was no more need for discovery. Its loss
thereafter does not make appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. an accessory. At
most, as custodian thereof, he may be made answerable administratively.
55
In his testimony, he made clear that the loss was not intentional.
He further stated:
Q Finally, Mr. Cartalla, what can you say about the charge against
you as alleged in the information that you tried to conceal or
destroy the effects or body of the crime to prevent its
discovery?
A It's not true, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I did not conceal anything, I did not destroy anything on
the body of the crime and as far as I know, I did all my job as
investigator and I worked for it up to the wee hours of the
morning up to the next morning, I still did it and I gathered
evidence and I submitted it to the Crime Laboratory and even
when at the time, I have been hearing that I will not be the
one who will investigate, they got it from me without proper
notice, that they will take over the investigation, I still did my
job, and on the fifth, I was asked by Prosecutor Llorente to
retrieve the slug and what I did was even the investigation is
not with me, I still did it, I still went to the IBC and I still
worked hard, I even remember
Atty. Flaminiano
We want to make of record that the witness is now in tears at this
moment.
COURT
Continue.
A The companion of Inspector de Leon and PO2 Rojas even said
that this policeman is very hardworking, even the
investigation is not with him anymore, but still, he's working
and I answered him, whatever, whatever they will charge to
me, maybe it's just their job and so, I will also do my job.
Because as far as I know, I will not be implicated because I
have not done anything, I have not done the charges that
they filed against me, I was surprised when I was given a
confirmation that I was an accessory that is why my youngest
child even told me "kala ko Papa, Mabait ka?" and I told him
that it's not true. For me, I have not done anything like that.
Atty. Fernandez
That's all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT
The way I look at your case, you are indicted here as an accessory
because according to one of the witnesses, the gun together
with the laser sight was handled to you and when that gun
reached Crame, the laser sight was no longer there, answer
me, what happened?
A The truth, your Honor, is, when the gun was submitted to me by
Inspector Cabrera, the laser sight was there, I immediately
made the transmittal for the laboratory and I described what
is there, together with the laser and after that, I placed it in a
brown envelope, I placed it in my drawer. On the second day,
I was really busy on that day because I was the only one. I
was asking for assistance because I would go out, I will
investigate and then I just found out when I was about to
submit the laser to the laboratory, I gave the envelope
together with the transmittal and when it was being received,
he checked it and he said Sgt. Where is the laser sight? and
I said it's there, attached. And he said please look at it.
COURT

Who told you that?
A The person who received, your Honor.
COURT
But in your transmittal, you wrote there that there was a laser?
A Yes, your Honor. When I saw the envelope, there was no laser, I
was planning to go back right away but I just said, okay, I will
just cross it out and I did not erase because I want that I will
not hide anything. It has happened because maybe
somebody is interested or I might have left in my drawer.
Because I will not hide it. That's why I did not sno-pake it and
I just crossed it out so it can be read together with my initial
and when I came back, I asked them who touched my things.
COURT
What answer did you get?
A There was no answer. Nobody was answering me, nobody was
talking.[67]
From the foregoing, it is clear that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. did
not intentionally conceal or destroy the laser sight, and the prosecution
failed to prove that he did so with intent to derail the prosecution of the
principal accused. On the other hand, while the laser sight was an
accessory device attached to the gun, it was not essential to the
commission, investigation and prosecution of the crime. The gun itself,
which was the instrument of the crime, was surrendered to the authorities
and presented as evidence in court. The failure of appellant SPO1
Cartalla, Jr. to present the laser sight as part of the evidence did not in any
way affect the outcome of the trial, much less prevent the discovery of the
crime. Furthermore, there is no showing that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr.
profited by the non-presentation of the laser sight.
Thus, under the definition of an accessory under the Revised
Penal Code and jurisprudence, appellant Cartalla, Jr.'s omission does not
make him liable as an accessory to the crime committed by appellant
Antonio. Even the Solicitor General submits that there are no grounds to
convict appellant Cartalla, to wit:
At the time the laser sight was turned over to Cartalla, the crime or its
corpus delicti had been discovered. Hence, the loss of the laser sight
could not have prevented the discovery of the crime. The essential
instrument of the crime, namely, a caliber .9 mm Beretta Model 92F with
serial number BER-041965-7 and black magazine had been preserved
and presented as evidence.
Neither could Cartalla be said to have profited with the non-presentation of
the laser sight as this was not proved by the prosecution. Either way,
concealing or profiting, there is no convicting motive for Cartalla to have so
committed. More so, as Cartalla was the investigating officer on the case.
It is submitted that the non-production of the laser sight by Cartalla did not
make him an accessory to the crime committed by Antonio, although he
may be administratively liable for the loss of a part of the evidence for the
prosecution in this case.[68]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision
in Criminal Case No. 111232-H is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant
Alberto "Ambet" Antonio is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of HOMICIDE and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer is
likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the
crime of HOMICIDE, and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the
56
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
Accused-appellant Antonio is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of
Arnulfo B. Tuadles the following sums:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B.
Tuadles;
(2) P226,298.36 as actual damages;
(3) P8,001,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of
earning capacity;
(4) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(5) Costs.
For failure to prove accused-appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime, he is
ACQUITTED and absolved of all liability, both criminal or civil.
In case of insolvency of appellant Alberto S. Antonio @ Ambet,
appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer shall be liable to pay one-half (1/2) of the
above-adjudicated sums or the amount of P4,388,649.18 unto the said
heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), joins Justice Puno in his concurring &
dissenting opinion.
Puno, J., see concurring & dissenting opinion.
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTNG OPINION
PUNO, J.:
I agree with the majority decision except its finding that treachery
did not attend the killing of the victim, Arnulfo Tuadles, and the conclusion
that the accused-appellant, Alberto "Ambet" Antonio, should not be held
guilty of murder but only of homicide.
For proper perspective, I wish to relate the relevant facts on the
issue of treachery.
On November 2, 1996, at about 9:30 a.m., the victim, Arnulfo
"Arnie" Tuadles, 40 years old, a former professional basketball player and
a family man, was shot to death by accused-appellant Alberto "Ambet"
Antonio, 59 years old and former Chairman of the Games and Amusement
Board. The murder weapon was a 9mm Beretta Model 92F pistol, with a
laser sight.1 Tuadles sustained a single gunshot wound on the forehead,
between the eyes.2 The bullet hit the brain and exited at the right portion
of the back of the head.3 He died due to "intracranial hemmorhage."4
Dr. Jaime Leal, Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory,
conducted the autopsy examination on the Tuadles. His examination
showed that Tuadles was shot at close range, specifically at a distance
of less than 12 inches.5 The bullet's trajectory was directed backwards,
slightly upwards and to the right.6
The autopsy also revealed that Tuadles suffered five (5) abrasions
("gasgas"), located on his forehead, nose, tip of nose, cheek, and right
lower lip. He sustained these abrasions as he collapsed on the floor after
he was shot. There were also contusions on Tuadles' forehead and lower
lip that could have been sustained when his face hit a hard blunt object,
and hematomas on both eyes caused by the "pulling of the blood in the
spaces between the eyes." He had a lacerated wound on the cheek which
could have been caused by a forcible contact of the skin with a hard blunt

object, such as chairs or tables, when he was falling to the floor.7 All the
injuries were located on the head of the victim.
Security guard Jose Jimmy Bobis gave the eyewitness account of
the shooting. He reported at the IBC Club in Greenhills, San Juan, on
November 2, 1996 at 7:00 a.m. He relieved co-security guard Ernesto
Olac. At that time, there were only five (5) people inside the club:
Antonio, Tuadles, SP04 Juanito Nieto, Olac and Bobis. Antonio and
Tuadles were at the second floor playing "pusoy dos", SP04 Nieto and
Olac were sleeping in the dining area at the ground floor, while Bobis was
in the bar, also at the ground floor, keeping watch of the premises.
In the course of his duty, Bobis heard Antonio and Tuadles
laughing and teasing each other ("nagkakantiyawan") while playing "pusoy
dos". He recognized the voice of Antonio because it was loud in contrast
to Tuadles' voice which was soft. At past 9:00 a.m., he heard Antonio say
in a loud voice: "Di ba may usapan tayo na ang mag pa pass ay mag-ta-
tap ng dalawang beses sa ibabaw ng mesa?" Antonio then said "Sige ".
Tuadles' response was almost inaudible because he spoke in a soft, cool
voice (mahina at malamig ang boses).8 Again, Antonio spoke: "Barya lang
itong pinagla-laruan natin" (We are only playing for loose change).
Tuadles kept silent. Antonio then called: "Sarge, Sarge, Sarge!," referring
to SPO4 Nieto. Bobis walked to the sleeping Nieto and informed him that
Antonio was calling him. They went to the second floor and saw Antonio
and Tuadles standing between the billiard table and the "pusoy" table.
They were facing each other but at a certain angle, and about three feet of
space separated them. Antonio appeared, hiding his right hand behind his
back. He (Antonio) cursed "putang ina ka kasi". Tuadles uttered
something which Bobis could not understand because Tuadles' back was
turned on him. Antonio then quickly raised his right hand, pointed a gun at
the face of Tuadles and fired the gun ("Mabilis na inangat niya ang kanang
kamay niya at itinapat sa mukha ni Arnie Tuadles at ipinutok ang baril ").9
Tuadles twisted to the right and fell on the floor face down. Antonio
removed the gun's magazine, cocked it and replaced its magazine. The
gun had a laser light attached to its end.10 Antonio ordered SPO4
Nieto to get the score sheet and the cards laying on top of a table. SPO4
Nieto placed the cards on a paper, folded it several times, and placed it
inside the clutch bag of Antonio. Bobis was taken aback by the incident.
When he regained his composure, he asked Antonio: "Boss, bakit
nangyari ito." Antonio did not immediately respond but later pointed his
finger at Bobis and then warned: "Ikaw, huwag kang tumistigo, ha!" Bobis
kept quiet due to fear. They all went downstairs. Olac who heard the
gunfire inquired from Bobis what happened. He told him that Antonio shot
Tuadles. Antonio then commanded Bobis to get the key of Tuadles' car.
He did as he was told. Only two vehicles were parked in the premises of
the club: the Mercedes Benz van of Antonio and the car of Tuadles. They
boarded the van, with Antonio driving. Following them was the car of
Tuadles driven by Antonio's driver. The driver left Tuadles' car near Shaw
Blvd. and rode in the van. They headed to the house of Antonio. They left
the club at 10:00 a.m. and arrived at Antonio's house in Green Meadows
at 11:30 a.m. On instruction of Antonio, his driver burned the score
sheet and the cards. They stayed at Antonio's house for several hours
while Antonio conferred with his lawyer. Antonio's lawyer told Bobis
that he should say that the shooting was an accident. SPO4 Nieto
instructed Bobis to claim that he was outside the entrance of the
club when the shooting took place. Bobis, Nieto, Olac and Antonio's
driver returned to the club at 5:00 p.m. Thirty minutes later, a team of
policemen from San Juan arrived. They found the lifeless body of Tuadles
sprawled on the second floor.
Police investigator SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. took the statement of Bobis
that same day. In his statement, Bobis denied seeing the shooting
incident. On November 4, 1996, Bobis happened to watch the television
and he saw the crying Mrs. Tuadles while being interviewed. Bothered
by his conscience, he requested the operations manager of their security
agency to bring him to the Eastern Police District. On November 5, 1996,
he gave another statement to the EPD and revealed the truth that fateful
day of November 2, 1996.
57
Given these facts, the majority holds that treachery did not
attend the killing of Tuadles.
There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.11
The two elements that must be proved to establish treachery are:
(1) the employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety
of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the
victim no opportunity to defend himself, and (2) the means, method and
manner of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
offender.12
I respectfully submit that the killing of Tuadles was characterized
by treachery.
First. There is little doubt that the first element of treachery was
proved by the prosecution. The victim, Tuadles, had absolutely no
opportunity to defend himself from the aggression of Antonio. The
attack was sudden, coming as it did like a thunderbolt from a blue sky. It
was preceded by a not too serious argument about a rule of the "pusoy
dos" game which appeared to have been overlooked by Tuadles. The
little argument agitated Antonio but not Tuadles. Hence, the attack
was unexpected especially because Tuadles and Antonio did not have
any prior misunderstanding. Tuadles even endearingly called Antonio
"uncle". Likewise, Tuadles was a basketball player when Antonio served
as Chairman of the Games and Amusement Board.
Second. The prosecution also proved the second element of
treachery that "the means, method and manner of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender." This element
deals with the subjective aspect of treachery, hence, the more difficult
element to determine. We are not, however, without any established
jurisprudence in determining whether the accused-appellant deliberately
and consciously adopted the means, method and manner of killing the
victim. The authoritative La Fave and Scott, after a survey of court rulings,
tell us of the relevant evidence to consider, viz:13
"On the basis of events before and at the time of the killing, the trier of
fact will sometimes be entitled to infer that the defendant actually
premeditated and deliberated his intentional killing. Three categories of
evidence are important for this purpose: (1) facts about how and what the
defendant did prior to the actual killing which show he was engaged in
activity directed toward the killing, that is, planning activity; (2) facts
about the defendant's prior relationship and conduct with the victim from
which motive may be inferred; and (3) facts about the nature of the
killing from which it may be inferred that the manner of killing was so
particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed
according to a preconceived design. Illustrative of the first category are
such acts by the defendant as prior possession of the murder weapon,
surreptitious approach of the victim, or taking the prospective victim to a
place where others are unlikely to intrude. In the second category are
prior threats by the defendants to do violence to the victim, plans or
desires of the defendant which would be facilitated by the death of the
victim, and prior conduct of the victim known to have angered the
defendant. As to the third category, the manner of killing, what is required
is evidence (usually based upon examination of the victim's body) showing
that the wounds were deliberately placed at vital areas of the body.
The mere fact that the killing was attended by much violence or that a
great many wounds were inflicted is not relevant in this regard, as such a
killing is just as likely (or perhaps more likely) to have been on impulse.
Conduct by the defendant after the killing in an effort to avoid detection
and punishment is obviously not relevant for purposes of showing
premeditation and deliberation, as it only goes to show the defendant's
state of mind at the time and not before or during the killing." (emphasis
ours)
 58
The evidence proves the deliberateness of the attack made by Q: What did you hear from Mr. Tuadles?
Antonio. The attack was done with swiftness. It was motivated by the
failure of Tuadles to follow an agreement on the "pusoy" game. The A: I could not understand because his voice was soft and ...
deliberateness of the attack is also shown by the fact that Tuadles was
Prosecutor Llorente:
shot at close range, with the muzzle of the gun less than 12 inches
from Tuadles' forehead. Antonio aimed at Tuadles' forehead, between May we put on record the answer of the witness in Tagalog?
the eyes. The bullet penetrated Tuadles' brain, destroyed its right
hemisphere and caused Tuadles' instantaneous death. Clearly, Antonio COURT:
chose to shoot Tuadles at a vital part of his body. As a result, Tuadles
Granted.
became an instant statistic of the graveyard.

With due respect, I do not agree with the majority that the A: "Mahina at malamig ang boses."
case at bar involves a spur of the moment killing, hence, there is no
Despite the soft response from Tuadles, Antonio continued with his
treachery. The majority states that there was a prior heated altercation
outburst, thus:15
between Tuadles and Antonio. The heated altercation allegedly
forewarned Tuadles of the attack. The so-called heated altercation, "Q: Going back now to Mr. Antonio, did you hear him again
however, is not well-established by the evidence. A replay of the facts mentioned (sic) or say other things?
will reveal that eyewitness Bobis initially heard the two teasing each other
("nagkakantiyawan"). Later, an argument developed between them A: Yes, sir.
which cannot be characterized as a "heated altercation." Bobis
Q: What did you hear from Mr. Ambet Antonio?
testified as follows: 14
A: 'Barya lang and pinagla-laruan natin.' It's only a (sic) loose
"Q: Now, this matter of 'kantiyawan' and 'nagtatawanan' iyong
change that we are playing with here.
dalawa, how long did this continue during the period of time
you were there? Q: Did you hear any word from Mr. Tuadles?

A: A few seconds only. A: No more, sir."

xxx xxx xxx In sum, it was only Antonio who appeared agitated during the
alleged altercation. Tuadles spoke in a soft and cool voice that Bobis
Q: Would you be in a position to recognize the voices of Ambet
could hardly hear and understand him. The characterization of the
Antonio and Arnie Tuadles?
argument that preceded the shooting of is decisive of the issue of
A: Yes, sir. treachery. I submit that the argument between Antonio and Tuadles was
trivial for it merely concerned the inadvertence of Tuadles to tap the
Q: Why? table when making a pass. Nothing in the records shows that Tuadles
violated the rule intentionally. Nothing shows the degree of damage
A: Arnie Tuadles' voice is soft and Ambet Antonio's voice is
suffered by Antonio as a consequence of Tuadles' omission. It is thus my
loud.
submission that the argument appears to be slight and cannot justify the
Q: Let's focus on Mr. Antonio, you said his voice was loud, did you conclusion that Antonio acted in the heat of passion or on impulse in killing
hear him mentioned (sic) anything at that time? the victim.

Atty. Flaminiano: The case of People vs. Cruz 16 is apropos. In said case, the
accused and the victim were "compadres" for having stood as sponsors in
Leading, your Honor. the baptism of a common friend. The accused used to drive one of the
tricycles of the victim until the latter sold the tricycle the accused was
COURT: driving. It was claimed that the accused bore a grudge against the victim
because of the said incident. At any rate, while the victim was talking with
Answer.
a co-tricycle driver along the street while waiting for passengers, the
A: Yes, sir. accused appeared and approached the victim. Upon nearing the victim,
accused angrily uttered, "Pare, walang presidente presidente sa akin" as
Q: What did you hear? he simultaneously drew out a gun from the front portion of his waist and
shot the victim with it point blank, hitting the upper left eyebrow of the latter
xxx xxx xxx which caused him to fall on the ground. Thereafter, accused left. This
Court rejected the claim of the accused that the shooting was accidental
A: Di ba may usapan tayo na ang mag-pa-pass ay mag-ta-tap
and noted with approval the observation of the Solicitor General that "if the
ng dalawang beses sa ibabaw ng mesa?
shooting of the victim were accidental, accused would have come to his
xxx xxx xxx aid and taken him to a hospital, instead of abandoning him." The Court
further held that the accused was liable for murder. The victim was
Q: Before you heard this statement, did you hear other things from unarmed. He did not have the least suspicion of the accused's design to
Mr. Ambet Antonio apart from what you have said, before shoot him. In contrast, accused had a gun. The victim, therefore, had no
that? chance to defend himself against the latter's frontal attack. Treachery
qualified the killing to murder.
A: None, sir.
With due respect to the majority, I find the killing of the victim
xxx xxx xxx Tuadles qualified by treachery. I vote to convict accused-appellant
Antonio of murder as charged.
Q: Was there any comment that you heard from Mr. Tuadles?

A: Yes, sir.
DIGEST

Accused was convicted of murder. He questions credibility of witness
because the latters first statement differed with his succeeding statements
and his testimony in open court.
HELD:
Affidavits or statements taken ex-parte are generally considered
incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony
given in court and whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit
and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater
weight. Moreover, inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in
his sworn statements and those in open court do not necessarily discredit
said witness. Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching
the credibility of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the
discrepancies and he was then given an opportunity to explain them. It is
only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling
his conflicting declarations that he should be deemed impeached.
Further, in an appeal, where the culpability or innocence of an accused
would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of
their testimonies, findings of trial court are entitled to and given the highest
degree of respect. There was no treachery. It is not only the sudden
attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and
deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. All the
evidence shows was that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur
of the moment crime. A sudden and unexpected attack would not
constitute alevosia where the aggressor did not consciously adopt a mode
of attack intended to penetrate the homicide without risk to himself.
7. TREACHERY
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143935. June 4, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WILLIAM ANCHETA,
EDGARDO AREOLA, ANTOS DACANAY, LITO DE LA
CRUZ, FELIPE ULEP @ BOY ULEP AND ELY CALCALA,
accused.
FELIPE ULEP @ BOY ULEP, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] dated October 16, 1998 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, convicting the
appellant Felipe Boy Ulep of the crime of robbery with homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant, together with William Ancheta, Edgardo Liling Areola,
Antos Dacanay, Lito dela Cruz and Ely Calacala, was charged with the
crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated murder in an
Information dated November 2,1987:
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1987, at 12:00 oclock to 1:00
oclock in the afternoon, at Manggahan, Bicos, Rizal, Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, through force and
intimidation upon persons, take, rob and carry away thirty (30) cavans of
clean palay valued at P4,500.00 belonging to Alfredo Roca, to his damage
and prejudice, and in order to successfully carry out the robbery, the
above-named accused, pursuant to the same conspiracy, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and with treachery,
59
and with intent to kill, fired their guns at Marjune Roca, which caused his
death, shot at Benita Avendao Roca and Febe Roca and hurled a
grenade against them and both of them died as consequence of the
wounds they sustained; and also fired upon Alfredo Roca with their
firearms, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of the timely running for cover by the said Alfredo
Roca.
That in the commission of the crime, the generic aggravating
circumstances of treachery, disregard of the respect due the deceased
Febe Roca and Benita Avendao Roca on account of their age and sex
and that the crime was committed by a band.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
All of the accused remain at large to this day except for appellant
who was arrested on January 5, 1990. He pleaded not guilty during
arraignment on January 25, 1990. In order to expedite the hearing of his
case, appellant was granted a separate trial.
The prosecution presented Alfredo Roca, Virgilita Roca-Laureaga,
Dr. Aurora Belsa and Emilio Roca as its witnesses. The prosecution
anchored its case principally on the testimony of Alfredo Roca who saw
how appellant and his companions robbed them of 35 sacks of palay after
killing his son Marjun Roca, his wife Benita Roca and his mother Febe
Roca.
Alfredo Roca testified that between 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. of
March 20, 1987, he was in his farm in Manggahan, Rizal, Nueva Ecija to
thresh palay. With him at that time were Marjun Roca, Benita Roca, Febe
Roca and daughter Virgilita Roca-Laureaga. He, Benita and Febe were
about to take their lunch inside his hut. Marjun and Virgilita were done
eating and were standing outside. At this point, Alfredo noticed the arrival
of an owner-type jeep with trailer which stopped at a spot not far from his
hut. He recognized the occupants as accused Antos Dacanay, Edgardo
Liling Areola, William Ancheta, Lito de la Cruz, Ely Calacala and
appellant Felipe Boy Ulep who all alighted from the jeep. Dacanay,
Areola and Ancheta stood on one side of the irrigation canal facing Marjun
Roca who was standing on the other side. From a distance of 10 to 12
meters, Alfredo saw Dacanay suddenly pull out a gun and shoot Marjun on
the head, causing the latter to fall to the ground. As he lay on the ground,
Marjun was again shot, this time by Areola and Ancheta. Thereafter, Ulep,
de la Cruz and Calacala started firing at Alfredos hut. Alfredo was not hit,
however, because he was able to get out of the hut and dive into the
irrigation canal in the nick of time. However, Benita and Febe were fatally
hit by the initial volley of gunfire. The assailants fired at Alfredo in the
canal but they did not hit him. Ancheta then hurled a grenade which
exploded near the hut. When the group ran out of bullets, Alfredo emerged
from the canal and hid inside his hut. He saw the group load onto the
trailer 35 sacks of palay, each containing an average of 50 kilos valued at
P4.50 per kilo. Alfredo owned the stolen palay. Appellant Ulep and his
companions then boarded their jeep and left.
Virgilita Roca-Laureaga corroborated the eyewitness account of
her father Alfredo Roca. She declared that, from a distance of 10 meters,
she saw her brother Marjun fall to the ground after being shot by Dacanay.
Following the grenade explosion, Areola aimed his gun at her and pulled
the trigger but the gun did not fire because he had apparently run out of
bullets. She also saw appellant Ulep fire his gun at her fathers hut.
Dr. Aurora Belsa, assistant provincial health officer of Rizal, Nueva
Ecija, conducted the autopsy on the bodies of Marjun, Benita and Febe.
Her report showed that: (1) Marjun sustained gunshot wounds in the head,
stomach and chest; (2) Benita suffered gunshot wounds that punctured
her small and large intestines and (3) Febes gunshot wounds in her chest
damaged her lungs, heart and liver. Dr. Belsa declared that all the
gunshot wounds sustained by the victims were fatal, causing their

immediate death.
Emilio Roca, 81 years old and husband of Febe Roca, testified on
the civil aspect of the case. He stated that, as a result of the death of
Febe, Marjun and Benita, the family incurred expenses for the wake and
funeral in the amount of P85,000. Likewise, the death of his wife, sister-in-
law and grandson caused him to suffer a fit of depression. He lived in fear
and was forced to sell his house. He transferred residence because the
perpetrators might return to kill him.
The defense had a different story.
Appellant Ulep, a cogon-gatherer in the farm of Edgardo Areola,
alleged that at around 10:30 a.m. on March 20, 1987, he went to Areolas
farm to check whether the palay crops had adequate water. The farm was
located just beside Alfredo Rocas. When he saw that the crops were
almost withered, appellant diverted the flow of water from Alfredos farm to
that of Areolas. While he was beside the irrigation ditch, he noticed 10
male strangers in the vicinity of Alfredos hut. He saw Alfredo attempting to
throw a grenade at the other side of the canal but two women prevented
him from doing so by embracing him. As a result of the struggle, Alfredo
dropped the grenade. Whereupon Alfredo immediately jumped into the
irrigation canal to take cover. The grenade then exploded. He never saw
his co-accused in the vicinity nor did he hear any gunshots. After
witnessing these events, appellant walked away and continued irrigating
Areolas farm.
At about 1:00 p.m., he had lunch in the house of his in-laws in
Bicos, Rizal, Nueva Ecija and returned to the farm at 2:00 p.m. He worked
until 5:00 p.m. and spent the night in the house of his in-laws. The next
morning, he went home to Villa Paraiso, Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
Federico Catalan, appellants neighbor and a barangay captain,
testified that at around 11:00 a.m. on March 20, 1987, he went to his farm
which was about 100 meters away from Edgardo Areolas farm. Between
12:00 noon and 12:30 p.m., he saw appellant walking towards the
irrigation canal and joined him to go there. At 1:00 p.m., they both went
home to eat lunch and later returned to continue irrigating their farms up to
5:00 p.m. After work, they proceeded home to Villa Paraiso. He also
testified that the wife of appellant was his niece. On cross-examination,
he declared that he heard a gunshot at around 1:00 p.m.
On October 16, 1998, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive
portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration and finding that the
accused, FELIPE ULEP, is guilty of the special complex crime of
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify the heirs of
Marjun Roca, Benita Avendao-Roca and Febe Roca P50,000.00 each for
their deaths; to pay the sum of P50,000.00 for expenses incurred for the
burial of Marjun Roca and Benita Avedao-Roca; to pay the sum of
P50,000.00 to Emilio Roca for burial expenses incurred; and to pay the
heirs of Marjun Roca, Benita Avendao-Roca and Febe Roca, P50,000.00
each by way of moral damages; to pay Alfredo Roca the sum of P7,877.00
for the 35 cavans of palay taken on the occasion of the robbery; and to
pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, the instant appeal based on the following assignments of
error:
I witness and observed his deportment during trial, unless certain facts of
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AND
GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE THE FAILURE
60
OF THE PROSECUTION TO MAKE A FORMAL OFFER
BEFORE THEY (WITNESSES) TESTIFIED.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.[4]
In the first assignment of error, appellant alleges that the trial court
erred in admitting as evidence the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses despite the failure of the prosecution to make a formal offer
thereof in violation of Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 34. Offer of Evidence The Court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. xxx.
Corollarily, Section 35 of the same Rule 132 states that:
Sec. 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness,
the offer must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
This formal offer of testimonial evidence is necessary in order to
enable the court to rule intelligently on any objections to the questions
asked. As a general rule, the proponent must show its relevance,
materiality and competence. Where the proponent offers evidence
deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any
reason, the latter has the right to object. But such right can be waived.
Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest possible time lest
silence, when there is an opportunity to speak, operates as a waiver of the
objection.[5]
The records show that the prosecution failed to formally offer the
questioned testimonies of witnesses Alfredo Roca and Virgilita Roca-
Laureaga. However, appellant waived this procedural error by failing to
make a timely objection, i.e., when the ground for objection became
reasonably apparent the moment said witnesses were called to testify
without any prior offer having been made by the proponent. He even
impliedly acquiesced to the materiality, competence and relevance of the
prosecution witnesses testimonies by cross-examining them. Since
appellant failed to raise before the trial court the issue of the prosecutions
failure to formally offer the testimonies of its witnesses, an objection on
this score raised for the first time on appeal will not be entertained.
The second and third assignments of error, being interrelated, shall
be discussed jointly.
Appellant assails the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Alfredo
and Virgilita, for being unbelievable and contrary to human nature.
According to appellant, the natural tendency of a person being fired at is to
take cover. Thus, it was inconceivable for Alfredo to still attempt to take a
look at his assailants as he was at risk of being shot and killed. Besides,
he could not have witnessed the killing of Marjun if he himself was being
attacked at the same time.
It is apparent that appellants defense rests mainly on the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It is settled, however, that, when
the issue of credibility of a witness is involved, the appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the
latter was in a better position to resolve the matter, having heard the
value were plainly ignored, which if considered might affect the result of
the case.[6]
We find the trial courts evaluation of the facts and its conclusions

fully supported by the evidence. Alfredo and Virgilita were straightforward
and categorical in their narration of how appellant and his cohorts killed
Marjun, Febe and Benita, and thereafter took 35 cavans of palay from their
farm. Despite the grueling cross-examination, they never wavered in their
testimonies regarding the details of the crime.
What made their testimonies even more credible was the fact that
both Alfredo and Virgilita had no ill-motive to testify against appellant and
his co-accused. It has been our consistent ruling that a witness testimony
deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to show any
improper motive why he should testify falsely against the accused, or why
he should implicate the accused in a serious offense.[7] Further, the
relationship of Alfredo and Virgilita to the victims all the more bolstered
their credibility as they naturally wanted the real culprits to be punished. It
would be unnatural for the relatives of the victims in search of justice to
impute the crime to innocent persons and not those who were actually
responsible therefor.
Appellant also points out the glaring inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Alfredo and Virgilita. Appellant cites the testimony of
Virgilita that the assailants waited for about five minutes after they stopped
firing at Marjun before they started shooting at her father Alfredo. This,
according to appellant, contradicted Alfredos testimony that the
perpetrators started firing at him immediately after Marjun was killed.
Likewise, while Virgilita declared that Ancheta threw the grenade before
her father jumped into the irrigation canal, Alfredo testified that Ancheta
threw the grenade when he was already in the canal. Appellant insists that
these inconsistencies tainted the credibility of both Alfredo and Virgilita.
The alleged discrepancies in the testimonies of Alfredo and
Virgilita referred only to minor matters. There was no inconsistency as far
as the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailants
were concerned. Both Alfredo and Virgilita positively identified appellants
group as the persons who attacked and robbed them. The court a quo
correctly cited the case of People vs. Fabros[8] where we held that:
Inconsistencies among witnesses testifying on the same incident may be
expected because different persons may have different impressions or
recollections of the same incident. One may remember a detail more
clearly than another. Witnesses may have seen that same detail from
different angles or viewpoints. That same detail may be minimized by one
but considered important by another. Nevertheless, these disparities do
not necessarily taint the witnesses credibility as long as their separate
versions are substantially similar or agree on the material points. Thus,
although it may be conceded that there are some variations in the
separate testimonies xxx, these do not, in our view, detract from the
integrity of their declarations. On the contrary, they represent a believable
narration, made more so precisely because of their imperfections, of what
actually happened. xxx
Moreover, the testimonies of Alfredo and Virgilita were supported
by the medical findings of Dr. Belsa. The presence of gunshot wounds in
the bodies of the victims materially corroborated the prosecution
witnesses testimonies that appellant and his co-accused repeatedly fired
their guns at their hapless victims.
Appellant also interposes the defense of alibi. The time-tested rule
is that alibi cannot prevail over the positive assertions of prosecution
witnesses[9], more so in this case where appellant failed to prove that he
was at another place at the time of the commission of the crime and that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. Appellants
claim that he was in Edgardo Areolas farm from 10:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
did not negate the possibility that he had gone to Alfredos farm between
10:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. to commit the crime, considering the fact that
Areolas farm was just beside Alfredos farm, the scene of the crime.
It was, on the contrary, appellants alibi that was considerably
weakened by the major inconsistencies between his and Federico
Catalans supposedly corroborating testimony. While appellant testified
61
that he did not hear any gunshot the entire day on March 20, 1987,
Catalan contradicted this by attesting that he heard a gunshot at about
1:00 p.m. Likewise, appellant claimed that after working in the farm, he
proceeded to the house of his in-laws in Bicos and only went home to Villa
Paraiso the next day Catalan, on the other hand, stated that after work
that same day, they went home to Villa Paraiso together.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide. He insists that there was
no showing that the perpetrators killed the victims in order to steal the
palay.
There is robbery with homicide when there is a direct relation or an
intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the killing
takes place prior or subsequent to the robbery or whether both crimes are
committed at the same time.[10]
Based on the facts established, the Court is convinced that the
prosecution adequately proved the direct relation between the robbery and
the killing. Immediately after shooting the victims, the assailants loaded
the sacks of palay onto the trailer of the jeep. As they did so, no
conversation took place and there was no hesitation on their part,
indicating that they were proceeding from a common, preconceived plan.
In fact, why would they bring a trailer if their only purpose was to massacre
the Roca family? The series of overt acts executed by appellant and his
companions, in their totality, showed that their intention was not only to kill
but to rob as well. The group tried to kill all the members of the Roca
family to ensure lack of resistance to their plan to take Alfredos palay.
Whenever homicide is perpetrated with the sole purpose of removing
opposition to the robbery or suppressing evidence thereof, the crime
committed is robbery with homicide.[11]
Further, in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself.[12] A review of
the entire records of this case leads us to conclude that robbery was
established beyond reasonable doubt. As long as the killing is perpetrated
as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide is committed.
Of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information,[13]
only treachery and band were established.
There was treachery as the events narrated by the eyewitnesses
pointed to the fact that the victims could not have possibly been aware that
they would be attacked by appellant and his companions. There was no
opportunity for the victims to defend themselves as the assailants,
suddenly and without provocation, almost simultaneously fired their guns
at them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.[14]
We deem it necessary to reiterate the principle laid down by the
Court en banc in the case of People vs. Escote, Jr.[15] on the issue of
whether treachery may be appreciated in robbery with homicide which is
classified as a crime against property. This Court held:
xxx (t)reachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with
homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and
a single and indivisible crime. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating
circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent
crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the
constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery
is applied to the constituent crime of homicide and not to the constituent
crime of robbery of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a

crime against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible
crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic
mitigating circumstance.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery
with homicide when the victim of homicide is killed by treachery.
The offense was also proven to have been executed by a band. A
crime is committed by a band when at least four armed malefactors act
together in the commission thereof. In this case, all six accused were
armed with guns which they used on their victims. Clearly, all the armed
assailants, including appellant, took direct part in the execution of the
robbery with homicide.
Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Inasmuch as the crime was committed on March 20, 1987 which was prior
to the effectivity of RA 7659 on December 31, 1993, the penalty of death
cannot be imposed even if the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
band attended its commission. Only the single indivisible penalty of
reclusion perpetua is imposable on appellant.
With respect to damages, we affirm the award of P50,000 as civil
indemnity each for the death of Marjun, Febe and Benita Roca. In
addition, moral damages must be granted in the amount of P50,000 for
each of the deceased victims. The amount of P7,875 is also due to
Alfredo Roca as reparation for the 35 sacks of palay stolen from him, each
valued at P225. The heirs of the victims are likewise entitled to exemplary
damages in the sum of P20,000 for each of the three victims due to the
aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime.
However, the award of burial expenses cannot be sustained because no
receipts were presented to substantiate the same. Nonetheless, the
victims heirs are entitled to the sum of P25,000 as temperate damages in
lieu of actual damages, pursuant to the case of People vs. Abrazaldo.
[16]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, convicting appellant Felipe Boy Ulep of the
crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victims: (1) P50,000 as civil
indemnity for each of the three victims; (2) P50,000 as moral damages for
each of the three victims; (3) P7,875 as reparation for the 35 stolen sacks
of palay; (4) P20,000 as exemplary damages for each of the three victims
and (5) P25,000 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.
8. TREACHERY (HINDI AKO SURE DITO)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 140756. April 4, 2003]
62
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN
GONZALES ESCOTE, JR. @ Jun Mantika of Sta. Lucia,
Angat, Bulacan and VICTOR ACUYAN y OCHOVILLOS @
Vic Arroyo of Sto. Nio, Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan,
accused-appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property.
Nevertheless, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in said
crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously. The Supreme Court
of Spain so ruled. So does the Court rule in this case, as it had done for
decades.
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision[1] of Branch
11 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 443-M-97
convicting accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor
Acuyan of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, meting on each of
them the supreme penalty of death, and ordering them to pay the heirs of
the victim, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the total amount of P300,000.00 by
way of actual and moral damages and to pay to Five Star Bus, Inc., the
amount of P6,000.00 by way of actual damages.
The Facts
The antecedent facts as established by the prosecution are as
follows:
On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the
regular driver of Five Star Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. ABS-793,
drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its destination in Bolinao,
Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of
the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six
passengers boarded the bus, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales
Escote, Jr. who were wearing maong pants, rubber shoes, hats and
jackets.[2] Juan seated himself on the third seat near the aisle, in the
middle row of the passengers seats, while Victor stood by the door in the
mid-portion of the bus beside Romulo. Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C.
Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was seated at the rear portion of the
bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his waist was his service
gun bearing Serial Number 769806. Every now and then, Rodolfo looked
at the side view mirror as well as the rear view and center mirrors installed
atop the drivers seat to monitor any incoming and overtaking vehicles and
to observe the passengers of the bus.
The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers
slept. When the bus was travelling along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan,
Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped out their handguns and
announced a holdup. Petrified, Rodolfo glanced at the center mirror
towards the passengers seat and saw Juan and Victor armed with
handguns. Juan fired his gun upward to awaken and scare off the
passengers. Victor followed suit and fired his gun upward. Juan and
Victor then accosted the passengers and divested them of their money
and valuables. Juan divested Romulo of the fares he had collected from
the passengers. The felons then went to the place Manio, Jr. was seated
and demanded that he show them his identification card and wallet.
Manio, Jr. brought out his identification card bearing No. 00898.[3] Juan
and Victor took the identification card of the police officer as well as his
service gun and told him: Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril
mo rin and papatay sa iyo. The police officer pleaded for mercy: Pare
maawa ka sa akin. May pamilya ako. However, Victor and Juan ignored
the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest
and right side of his body. Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He
fell to the floor of the bus. Victor and Juan then moved towards the driver
Rodolfo, seated themselves beside him and ordered the latter to maintain

the speed of the bus. Rodolfo heard one of the felons saying: Ganyan
lang ang pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok. The other said:
Ayos na naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki ito. Victor and Juan further told
Rodolfo that after they (Victor and Juan) shall have alighted from the bus,
he (Rodolfo) should continue driving the bus and not report the incident
along the way. The robbers assured Rodolfo that if the latter will follow
their instructions, he will not be harmed. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo
to stop the bus along the overpass in Mexico, Pampanga where they
alighted from the bus. The robbery was over in 25 minutes.
When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and
Romulo forthwith reported the incident to the police authorities. The
cadaver of SPO1 Manio, Jr. was brought to the funeral parlor where Dr.
Alejandro D. Tolentino, the Municipal Health Officer of Mabalacat,
Pampanga, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the police officer. The
doctor prepared and signed an autopsy report detailing the wounds
sustained by the police officer and the cause of his death:
Body still flaccid (not in rigor mortis) bathed with his own blood. There
were 6 entrance wounds and 6 exit wounds. All the entrance were located
on his right side. An entrance (0.5 cm x 0.5 cm.) located infront of the
right ear exited at the left side just below the ear lobe. Another entrance
through the mouth exited at the back of the head fracturing the occiput
with an opening of (1.5 cm x 2 cm). Blood CSF and brain tissues came
out. Another fatal bullet entered at the upper right cornea of the sternum,
entered the chest cavity pierced the heart and left lung and exited at the
left axillary line. Severe hemorrhage in the chest cavity came from the
heart and left lung. The other 3 bullets entered the right side and exited
on the same side. One entrance at the top of the right shoulder exited at
the medial side of the right arm. The other entered above the right breast
and exited at the right lateral abdominal wall travelling below muscles and
subcutaneous tissues without entering the cavities. Lastly another bullet
entered above the right iliac crest travelled superficially and exited above
the right inguinal line.
Cause of Death:
Shock, massive internal and external hemorrhage, complete brain
destruction and injury to the heart and left lung caused by multiple
gunshot wounds.[4]
Rodolfo and Romulo proceeded to the police station of Plaridel,
Bulacan where they reported the robbery and gave their respective sworn
statements.[5] SPO1 Manio, Jr. was survived by his wife Rosario Manio
and their four young children. Rosario spent P20,000.00 for the coffin and
P10,000.00 for the burial lot of the slain police officer.[6] Manio, Jr. was 38
years old when he died and had a gross salary of P8,085.00 a month.[7]
Barely a month thereafter, or on October 25, 1996, at about
midnight, SPO3 Romeo Meneses, the team leader of Alert Team No. 1 of
Tarlac Police Station, and PO3 Florante S. Ferrer were at the police
checkpoint along the national highway in Tarlac, Tarlac. At the time, the
Bambang-Concepcion bridge was closed to traffic and the police officers
were tasked to divert traffic to the Sta. Rosa road. Momentarily, a white
colored taxi cab without any plate number on its front fender came to
view. Meneses stopped the cab and asked the driver, who turned out to
be the accused Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., for his identification card.
Juan told Meneses that he was a policeman and handed over to Meneses
the identification card of SPO1 Manio, Jr. and the money which Juan and
Victor took from Manio, Jr. during the heist on September 28, 1996.[8]
Meneses became suspicious when he noted that the identification card
had already expired on March 16, 1995. He asked Juan if the latter had a
new pay slip. Juan could not produce any. He finally confessed to
Meneses that he was not a policeman. Meneses brought Juan to the
police station. When police officers frisked Juan for any deadly weapon,
they found five live bullets of a 9 millimeter firearm in his pocket. The
police officers confiscated the ammunition. In the course of the
investigation, Juan admitted to the police investigators that he and Victor,
63
alias Victor Arroyo, staged the robbery on board Five Star Bus and are
responsible for the death of SPO1 Manio, Jr. in Plaridel, Bulacan.
Meneses and Ferrer executed their joint affiavit of arrest of Juan.[9] Juan
was subsequently turned over to the Plaridel Police Station where Romulo
identified him through the latters picture as one of those who robbed the
passengers of the Five Star Bus with Plate No. ABS-793 and killed SPO1
Manio, Jr. on September 28, 1996. In the course of their investigation, the
Plaridel Police Station Investigators learned that Victor was a native of
Laoang, Northern Samar.[10] On April 4, 1997, an Information charging
Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan with robbery with homicide
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The Information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of September 1996, in the municipality of
Plaridel, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping each other, armed with firearms, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, take, rob and carry away with
one (1) necklace and cash in [the] undetermine[d] amount of one SPO1
Jose C. Manio, Jr., to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
said undetermine[d] amount; that simultaneously or on the occassion (sic)
of said robbery, said accused by means of violence and intimidation and in
furtherance of their conspiracy attack, assault and shoot with the service
firearm of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., thereby inflicting serious
physical injuries which resulted (sic) the death of the said SPO1 Jose C.
Manio, Jr.
Contrary to law.[11]
On the strength of a warrant of arrest, the police officers arrested
Victor in Laoang, Northern Samar and had him incarcerated in the
Bulacan Provincial Jail. Assisted by Atty. Ramiro Osorio, their counsel de
parte, Juan and Victor were duly arraigned and entered their plea of not
guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution had
rested its case on August 26, 1998, Juan escaped from the provincial jail.
[12] The trial court issued a bench warrant on September 22, 1998 for the
arrest of said accused-appellant.[13] In the meantime, Victor adduced his
evidence.
Victor denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He
testified that in 1996, he worked as a tire man in the vulcanizing shop
located in Banga I, Plaridel, Bulacan owned by Tony Boy Negro. On one
occasion, Ilarde Victorino, a customer of Tony Boy Negro, ordered Victor
to sell a tire. Victor sold the tire but did not turn over the proceeds of the
sale to Ilarde. The latter hated Victor for his misdeed. The shop was later
demolished and after two months of employment, Victor returned to
Barangay Muwal-Buwal, Laoang, Northern Samar. On September 26,
1996, at 9:30 p.m., Victor was at the town fiesta in Laoang. Victor and his
friends, Joseph Iringco and Rickey Lorcio were having a drinking spree in
the house of Barangay Captain Ike Baluya. At 11:30 p.m., the three left
the house of the barangay captain and attended the public dance at the
town auditorium. Victor and his friends left the auditorium at 5:30 a.m. of
September 27, 1996. Victor likewise testified that he never met Juan until
his arrest and detention at the Bulacan Provincial Jail. One of the inmates
in said provincial jail was Ilarde Victorino. Victor learned that Ilarde
implicated him for the robbery of the Five Star Bus and the killing of SPO1
Manio, Jr. to hit back at him for his failure to turn over to Ilarde the
proceeds of the sale of the latters tire.
On January 14, 1999, Juan was rearrested in Daet, Camarines
Norte.[14] However, he no longer adduced any evidence in his behalf.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
On March 11, 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision judgment
finding Juan and Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, meted on each of them the penalty of death and ordered them to

pay P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages to the heirs of the victim
and to pay the Five Star Bus Company the amount of P6,000.00 as actual
damages. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused, Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr.
and Victor Acuyan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Homicide as penalized under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended and hereby sentences both to suffer the supreme penalty of
Death and to indemnify the heirs of the late SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the
amount of P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages and to pay the Five
Star Bus P6,000.00 as actual damage.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Assignment of Errors
Juan and Victor assail the Decision of the trial court and contend
that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RODOLFO CACATIAN
AND ROMULO DIGAP, DRIVER AND CONDUCTOR OF THE FIVE STAR
BUS, RESPECTIVELY, WERE ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE
TWO (2) MEN WHO HELD-UP THEIR BUS AND KILLED ONE
PASSENGER THEREOF AT AROUND 3:00 OCLOCK IN THE EARLY
MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1996.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO (2) ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.[16]
The Courts Verdict
Anent the first assignment of error, Juan and Victor contend that
the trial court committed a reversible error in relying on the testimony of
Rodolfo, the bus conductor, for convicting them of the crime charged.
They aver that although their counsel was able to initially cross-examine
Rodolfo, the former failed to continue with and terminate his cross-
examination of the said witness through no fault of his as the witness
failed to appear in subsequent proceedings. They assert that even if the
testimonies of Rodolfo and Romulo were to be considered, the two
witnesses were so petrified during the robbery that they were not able to
look at the felons and hence could not positively identify accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. They argue that the police
investigators never conducted a police line-up for the identification of the
authors of the crime.
The contentions of Juan and Victor are not meritorious. There is
no factual and legal basis for their claim that they were illegally deprived of
their constitutional and statutory right to fully cross-examine Rodolfo. The
Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional right
anchored on due process.[17] It is a statutory right found in Section 1(f),
Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that
the accused has the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the trial. However, the right has always been understood as
requiring not necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an
opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired.[18] What is
proscribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept is the absence of
the opportunity to cross-examine.[19] The right is a personal one and may
be waived expressly or impliedly. There is an implied waiver when the
party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an
opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable
64
to himself alone.[20] If by his actuations, the accused lost his opportunity
to cross-examine wholly or in part the witnesses against him, his right to
cross-examine is impliedly waived.[21] The testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
record.[22]
In this case, the original records show that after several resettings,
the initial trial for the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence-in-
chief was set on November 18, 1997 and December 5, 1997, both at 9:00
a.m.[23] Rodolfo testified on direct examination on November 18, 1997.
The counsel of Juan and Victor forthwith commenced his cross-
examination of the witness but because of the manifestation of said
counsel that he cannot finish his cross-examination, the court ordered the
continuation thereof to December 5, 1997.[24] On December 5, 1997,
Rodolfo did not appear before the court for the continuation of his cross-
examination but Rosemarie Manio, the widow of the victim did. The
prosecution presented her as witness. Her testimony was terminated.
The court ordered the continuation of the trial for the cross-examination of
Rodolfo on January 20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m.[25] During the trial on January
20, 1998, Rodolfo was present but accused-appellants counsel was
absent. The court issued an order declaring that for failure of said counsel
to appear before the court for his cross-examination of Rodolfo, Victor and
Juan waived their right to continue with the cross-examination of said
witness.[26] During the trial set for February 3, 1998, the counsel of Juan
and Victor appeared but did not move for a reconsideration of the courts
order dated January 20, 1998 and for the recall of Rodolfo Cacatian for
further cross-examination. It behooved counsel for Juan and Victor to file
said motion and pray that the trial court order the recall of Rodolfo on the
witness stand. Juan and Victor cannot just fold their arms and supinely
wait for the prosecution or for the trial court to initiate the recall of said
witness. Indeed, the Court held in Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, et al:
xxx
The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on
the party who wishes to exercise said right. This is so because the right,
being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it must be expressed.
Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof.
Thus, it should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move to
cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses. It is absurd for the plaintiff himself to
ask the court to schedule the cross-examination of his own witnesses
because it is not his obligation to ensure that his deponents are cross-
examined. Having presented his witnesses, the burden shifts to his
opponent who must now make the appropriate move. Indeed, the rule of
placing the burden of the case on plaintiffs shoulders can be construed to
extremes as what happened in the instant proceedings. [27]
The trial was reset to March 31, April 17 and 24, 1998, all at 8:30
a.m. because of the non-availability of the other witnesses of the
prosecution.[28] On March 31, 1998, the prosecution presented Dr.
Alejandro Tolentino, PO2 Rene de la Cruz and Romulo Digap. During the
trial on April 17, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor failed to appear.
The trial was reset to June 3, 19 and 26, 1998.[29] The trial scheduled on
June 3, 1998 was cancelled due to the absence of the counsel of Juan
and Victor. The court issued an order appointing Atty. Roberto Ramirez as
counsel for accused-appellants.[30]
During the trial on August 26, 1998, Atty. Ramirez appeared in
behalf of Juan and Victor. The prosecution rested its case after the
presentation of SPO2 Romeo Meneses and formally offered its
documentary evidence. The next trial was set on September 23, 1998 at
8:30 a.m.[31] On November 11, 1998, Juan and Victor commenced the
presentation of their evidence with the testimony of Victor.[32] They rested
their case on January 27, 1999 without any evidence adduced by Juan.
Juan and Victor did not even file any motion to reopen the case
before the trial court rendered its decision to allow them to cross-examine
Rodolfo. They remained mute after judgment was rendered against them
by the trial court. Neither did they file any petition for certiorari with the

Court of Appeals for the nullification of the Order of the trial court dated
January 20, 1998 declaring that they had waived their right to cross-
examine Rodolfo. It was only on appeal to this Court that Juan and Victor
averred for the first time that they were deprived of their right to cross-
examine Rodolfo. It is now too late in the day for Juan and Victor to do so.
The doctrine of estoppel states that if one maintains silence when in
conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when
in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent when he
ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent.[33]
The contention of accused-appellants Juan and Victor that Rodolfo
and Romulo failed to identify them as the perpetrators of the crime
charged is disbelieved by the trial court, thus:
As can be gathered from the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution, on September 28, 1996, the accused boarded at around 3:00
a.m. a Five Star Bus driven by Rodolfo Cacatian, bound to Pangasinan, in
Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon City. Twenty (20) minutes or so later,
when the bus reached the vicinity of Nabuag, Plaridel, Bulacan, along the
North Espressway, the accused with guns in hand suddenly stood up and
announced a hold-up. Simultaneously with the announcement of a hold-
up, Escote fired his gun upwards. Acuyan, meanwhile, took the gun of a
man seated at the back. Both then went on to take the money and
valuables of the passengers, including the bus conductors collections in
the amount of P6,000.00. Thereafter, the duo approached the man at the
back telling him in the vernacular Pasensiya ka na pare, papatayin ka
namin. Baril mo rin ang papatay sa iyo. They pointed their guns at him
and fired several shots oblivious of the plea for mercy of their victim. After
the shooting, the latter collapsed on the floor. The two (2) then went back
at the front portion of the bus behind the drivers seat and were overheard
by the bus driver, Cacatian, talking how easy it was to kill a man. The
robbery and the killing were over in 25 minutes. Upon reaching the
Mexico overpass of the Expressway in Pampanga, the two (2) got off the
bus. The driver drove the bus to the Mabalacat Police Station and
reported the incident. During the investigation conducted by the police, it
was found out that the slain passenger was a policeman, SPO1 Jose C.
Manio, Jr. of the Caloocan City Police Department.
65
xxx
Q So, the announcement of hold-up was ahead of the
firing of the gun?
A Yes, sir.
Q And before the actual firing of the gun it was even still
said bad words before saying the hold-up?
A After they fired the gun they uttered bad words, sir.
Q Mr. Witness before the announcement of the hold-up
you do not have any idea that you will encounter
that nature which took place, is that correct?
A None, sir.
Q Within the two (2) year[s] period that you are plying the
route of Manila to Bolinao that was your first
experience of hold-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the speed of above 70 kilometers per hour your
total attention is focus in front of the road, correct,
Mr. witness?
A Once in a while the driver look at the side mirror and
the rear view mirror, sir.
Q Before the announcement there was no reason for you
to look at any at the rear mirror, correct, Mr.
witness?
Court:
Every now and then they usually look at the side
mirror and on the rear, that was his statement.
Atty. Osorio:

The above version came from Rodolfo Cacatian and Romulo Digap, bus (to the witness)
driver and conductor, respectively, of the ill-fated Five Star Bus.[34]
Q I am asking him if there was no reason for him....
The Court agrees with the trial court. It may be true that Romulo
Fiscal:
was frightened when Juan and Victor suddenly announced a holdup and
fired their guns upward, but it does not follow that he and Rodolfo failed to Before the announcement of hold-up, there was no
have a good look at Juan and Victor during the entire time the robbery mention.
was taking place. The Court has held in a catena of cases that it is the
most natural reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the appearance Court:
of the perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner in which the
crime was committed.[35] Rodolfo and Romulo had a good look at both Every now and then.
Juan and Victor before, during and after they staged the robbery and
Atty. Osorio:
before they alighted from the bus. The evidence on record shows that
when Juan and Victor boarded the bus and while the said vehicle was on (to the witness)
its way to its destination, Romulo stationed himself by the door of the bus
located in the mid-section of the vehicle. The lights inside the bus were Q When you said every now and then, how often is it, Mr.
on. Juan seated himself in the middle row of the passengers seat near witness?
the center aisle while Victor stood near the door of the bus about a meter
A I cannot tell how often but I used to look at the mirror
or so from Romulo.[36] Romulo, Juan and Victor were near each other.
once in a while, sir.
Moreover, Juan divested Romulo of his collection of the fares from the
passengers.[37] Romulo thus had a face-to-face encounter with Juan. Q How many mirror do you have, Mr. witness?
After shooting SPO1 Manio, Jr. at the rear portion of the bus, Juan and
Victor passed by where Romulo was standing and gave their instructions A Four (4), sir.
to him. Considering all the facts and circumstances, there is no iota of
doubt that Romulo saw and recognized Juan and Victor before, during and Q Where are these located?
after the heist.[38] Rodolfo looked many times on the rear, side and center
A Two (2) on the side mirror, center mirror and rear view
view mirrors to observe the center and rear portions of the bus before and
mirror, sir.
during the robbery. Rodolfo thus saw Juan and Victor stage the robbery
and kill SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity: Q The two side mirror protruding outside the bus?

A Yes, sir, they are in the side of the bus, sir.
Q One of them is located on the left and the other on the
right, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You only look at the side mirror when you are going to
over take, Mr. witness?
A No, sir.
Q Where is this center mirror located, Mr. witness?
A In the center, sir.
Q What is the purpose of that?
A So that I can see the passengers if they are already
settled so that I can start the engine, sir.
Q What about the remaining mirror?
A Rear view mirror, sir.
Q What is the purpose and where is it located?
A The rear view is located just above my head just to
check the passengers, sir.
Q So that the center mirror and the rear view mirror has
the same purpose?
A They are different, sir.
Q How do you differentiate of (sic) one from the other?
A The center mirror is used to check the center aisle
while the rear mirror is for the whole view of the
passengers, sir.
Q If you are going to look at any of your side mirrors, you
will never see any passengers, correct, Mr.
witness?
A None, sir.
Q If you will look at your center mirror you will only see
the aisle and you will never see any portion of the
body of your passengers?
A Yes, sir.
Q Seated passengers?
A It is only focus (sic) on the middle aisle sir.
Q If you look at your rear mirror, you will only see the top
portion of the head of your passengers, correct?
A Only the portion of their head because they have
different hight (sic), sir.
Q You will never see any head of your passengers if they
were seated from the rear mirror portion, correct,
Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before the announcement of hold-up, all of your
passengers were actually sleeping?
A Some of my passengers were sleeping, some were
not, sir.
66
Q But you will agree Mr. witness that when you said
every now and then you are using your mirror? It is
only a glance, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And by mere glancing, Mr. witness you were not able
to identify any person on the basis of any of your
mirror, correct?
A If only a glance but when I look at him I can recognize
him, sir.
Q You agree a while ago by every now and then it is by
glancing, as a driver, Mr. witness by your side
mirror?
A Not all glancing, there are times when you want to
recognize a person you look at him intently, sir.
Q The purposes of your mirror inside your Bus is mainly
of the safety of your passengers on board, Mr.
witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as a driver, Mr. witness, you do not used (sic) your
mirror to identify the person particularly when you
are crossing (sic) at a speed of 70 kilometers per
hour?
A I do that, sir.
Q How long Mr. witness can you focus your eyes on any
of these mirror before getting back your eyes into
the main road?
A Seconds only, sir.
Q When you said seconds, for how long the most Mr.
witness that you can do to fix your eyes on any of
your mirrors and the return back of (sic) your eyes
into the main road?
A Two seconds, sir.
Q At that time Mr. witness, that you were travelling at
about 70 kilometers you were glancing every now
and then on any of your mirrors at about two
seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you heard the announcement of hold-up
your natural reaction is to look either at the center
mirror or rear mirror for two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were instructed Mr. witness to even accelerate
your speed upon the announcement of hold-up?
A No sir, they just told me to continue my driving, sir.
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular alalay ka lang, steady
ka lang.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q Steady at what speed?

A 70 to 80, sir.
Q What is the minimum speed, Mr. witness for Buses
along North Expressway?
A 60 kilometers, sir.
Q Are you sure of that 60 kilometers, minimum? Are you
sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is what you know within the two (2) years that you
are driving? Along the North Expressway?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were at the precise moment, Mr.
witness, you were being instructed to continue
driving, you were not looking to anybody except
focus yours eyes in front of the road?
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular. Nakikiramdam ako.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q Thats what you are doing?
A During the time they were gathering the money from
my passengers, that is the time when I look at
them, sir.
Q For two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which of the four (4) mirrors that you are looking at
within two seconds, Mr. witness you said you are
nakikiramdam?
A The rear view mirror, sir.
Q The Bus that you were driving is not an air con bus?
A Ordinary bus, sir.
Q And at what time your passengers, most of your
passengers were already sleep (sic), Mr. witness?
A Most of my passengers, sir. Some of my passengers
were still sleep (sic), sir.
Q And the lights inside the Bus are off, correct Mr.
witness?
A The lights were on, sir.
Q While the passengers were sleep (sic) the light was
still on, Mr. witness, at the time of the trip.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, Mr. witness when the hold-up was announced
and then when you look for two seconds in the rear
mirror you were not able to see any one, you were
only sensing what is happening inside your bus?
A I saw something, sir.
67
Q You saw something in front of your Bus? You can only
see inside when you are going to look at the mirror?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is the only thing that you see every now and then,
you said you were looking at the mirror?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times, Mr. witness did you look Mr. witness
at the rear mirror during the entire occurance (sic)
of the alleged hold-up?
A There were many times, sir.
Q The most that you can remember, please inform the
Honorable Court? During the occurance (sic) of the
alleged hold-up, Mr. witness?
A I cannot estimate, sir.
Q How long did the alleged hold-up took place?
A More or less 25 minutes, sir.[39]
When Rodolfo gave his sworn statement to the police investigators
in Plaridel, Bulacan after the robbery, he described the felons. When
asked by the police investigators if he could identify the robbers if he see
them again, Rodolfo declared that he would be able to identify them:
8. T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang itsura ng
dalawang lalaki na nanghold-up sa minamaneho
mong bus?
S: Halos magkasing taas, 54 o 55 katam-taman
ang pangangatawan, parehong nakapantalon ng
maong naka-suot ng jacket na maong, parehong
naka rubber shoes at pareho ring naka sumbrero.
9. T: Kung sakali bang makikita mo pa ang mga ito ay
makikilala mo pa sila?
S: Makikilala ko po sila.[40]
When asked to identify the robbers during the trial, Rodolfo
spontaneously pointed to and identified Juan and Victor:
QFiscal:
(to the witness)
xxx
Q Those two man (sic) who stated that it was a hold-up
inside the bus and who fired the gun are they inside
the Court room (sic) today?
A Yes, maam.
Q Point to us?
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing red T-shirt and
when asked his name answered Victor Acuyan and
the man wearing green T-shirt and when asked his
name answered Juan Gonzales.[41]
For his part, Romulo likewise spontaneously pointed to and
identified Juan and Victor as the culprits when asked by the prosecutor to
identify the robbers from among those in the courtroom:
xxx

Q You said that you were robbed inside the bus, how
does (sic) the robbing took place?
A They announced a hold up maam, afterwards, they
confiscated the money of the passengers including
my collections.
Q You said they who announced the hold up, whose
(sic) these they you are referring to?
A Those two (2), maam.
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to the two accused.
Public Pros.:
May we request that the accused be identified, Your
Honor.
Court:
(to both accused)
What are your names?
A Juan Escote, Your Honor. Victor Acuyan, Your Honor.
Public Pros.:
May we know from the accused if his name is Juan
Escote Gonzales because he just said Juan
Escote. In the Information, it is one Juan Gonzales,
Jr., so, we can change, Your Honor.[42]
Moreover, when he was accosted by SPO3 Romeo Meneses on
October 25, 1997 in Tarlac, Tarlac, Juan was in possession of the
identification card[43] of the slain police officer. Juan failed to explain to
the trial court how and under what circumstances he came into
possession of said identification card. Juan must necessarily be
considered the author of the robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. In
People v. Mantung,[44] we held:
xxx [T]he recovery of part of the loot from Mantung or the time of his
arrest gave rise to a legal presumption of his guilt. As this Court has held,
[I]n the absence of an explanation of how one has come into possession
of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed,
he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death
of the said person and of the robbery committed on him.
While police investigators did not place Juan and Victor in a police
line-up for proper identification by Rodolfo and Romulo, it cannot thereby
be concluded that absent such line-up, their identification by Romulo and
Rodolfo as the authors of the robbery with homicide was unreliable. There
is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper
identification in every case. Even if there was no police line-up, there
could still be proper and reliable identification as long as such
identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the police.
[45] In this case, there is no evidence that the police officers had supplied
or even suggested to Rodolfo and Romulo the identities of Juan and Victor
as the perpetrators of the robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr.
The Felony Committed by Juan and Victor
The Court finds that the trial court committed no error in convicting
Juan and Victor of robbery with homicide. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, reads:
Art. 294. - Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. -
Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against
68
or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed,
or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
To warrant the conviction of Juan and Victor for the said charge,
the prosecution was burdened to prove the confluence of the following
essential elements:
xxx (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to
another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi
and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.
xxx[46]
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life.[47] In
robbery with homicide, so long as the intention of the felons was to rob,
the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. In People v.
Barut,[48] the Court held that:
In the controlling Spanish version of article 294, it is provided that there is
robbery with homicide cuando con motivo o con ocasin del robo
resultare homicidio. Basta que entre aquel este exista una relacin
meramente ocasional. No se requiere que el homicidio se cometa como
medio de ejecucin del robo, ni que el culpable tenga intencin de matar,
el delito existe segn constanta jurisprudencia, aun cuando no concurra
animo homicida. Incluso si la muerte sobreviniere por mero accidente,
siempre que el homicidio se produzca con motivo con ocasin del robo,
siendo indiferente que la muerte sea anterior, coetnea o posterior a ste
(2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 14th Ed. P. 872).
Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the
homicide committed on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery,
nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. All the crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain
on September 9, 1886, et sequitur cited by this Court in People v.
Mangulabnan, et al.[49]
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of
robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason
or on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgos Penal
Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of
the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has
also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30,
1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes,
modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to
be taken into consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889 see Cuello
Calons Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).
Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of robbery
with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it
appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.[50]
In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
Juan and Victor conspired and confabulated together in robbing the
passengers of the Five Star Bus of their money and valuables and Romulo

of his collections of the fares of the passengers and in killing SPO1 Manio,
Jr. with impunity on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and
Victor are guilty as principals by direct participation of the felony of robbery
with homicide under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. 7659, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The Proper Penalty
The trial court imposed the supreme penalty of death on Juan and
Victor for robbery with homicide, defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, punishable with reclusion perpetua. Under Article
63, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the felons should be meted
the supreme penalty of death when the crime is committed with an
aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime absent
any mitigating circumstance. The trial court did not specify in the decretal
portion of its decision the aggravating circumstances attendant in the
commission of the crime mandating the imposition of the death penalty.
However, it is evident from the findings of facts contained in the body of
the decision of the trial court that it imposed the death penalty on Juan
and Victor on its finding that they shot SPO1 Manio, Jr. treacherously on
the occasion of or by reason of the robbery:
xxx
The two (2) accused are incomparable in their ruthlessness and base
regard for human life. After stripping the passengers of their money and
valuables, including the firearm of the victim, they came to decide to
execute the latter seemingly because he was a police officer. They lost no
time pouncing him at the rear section of the bus, aimed their firearms at
him and, in a derisive and humiliating tone, told him, before pulling the
trigger, that they were rather sorry but they are going to kill him with his
own gun; and thereafter, they simultaneously fired point blank at the
hapless policeman who was practically on his knees begging for his life.
Afterwhich, they calmly positioned themselves at the front boasting for all
to hear, that killing a man is like killing a chicken (Parang pumapatay ng
manok). Escote, in particular, is a class by himself in callousness. xxx.
[51]
The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant
in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the following
essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack
employed by him.[52] The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving
the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its
commission without risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated
even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was
defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de
grace.[53] In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the
mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right
breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the
right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first
disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for dear
life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close
range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his
family after a hard days work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death,
leaving his family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim
example of the utter inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.
The issues that now come to fore are (1) whether or not treachery
is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide; and if in
the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be appreciated against Juan
and Victor. On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. This Court has
ruled over the years[54] that treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in the felony of robbery with homicide, a special complex
crime (un delito especial complejo) and at the same time a single and
69
indivisible offense (uno solo indivisible).[55] However, this Court in two
cases has held that robbery with homicide is a crime against property and
hence treachery which is appreciated only to crimes against persons
should not be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.[56] It
held in another case that treachery is not appreciated in robbery with rape
precisely because robbery with rape is a crime against property.[57]
These rulings of the Court find support in case law that in robbery with
homicide or robbery with rape, homicide or rape are merely incidents of
the robbery, with robbery being the main purpose and object of the
criminal.[58] Indeed, in People vs. Cando,[59] two distinguished members
of this Court advocated a review of the doctrine that treachery is a generic
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide. They opined that
treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. After all, in People
vs. Bariquit,[60] this Court in a per curiam decision promulgated in year
2000 declared that treachery is applicable only to crimes against
persons. However, this Court held in People vs. Cando that treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, citing its prior
rulings that in robbery with homicide, treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. This
Court opted not to apply its ruling earlier that year in People vs. Bariquit.
Legal Luminaries in criminal law and eminent commentators of the
Revised Penal Code are not in full accord either. Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino (Retired) says that treachery is appreciated only in crimes against
persons as defined in Title 10, Book Two of the Code.[61] Chief Justice
Luis B. Reyes (Retired) also is of the opinion that treachery is applicable
only to crimes against persons.[62] However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado
(Retired) is of a different view.[63] He says that treachery cannot be
considered in robbery but can be appreciated insofar as the killing is
concerned, citing the decisions of this Court in People vs. Balagtas[64] for
the purpose of determining the penalty to be meted on the felon when the
victim of homicide is killed with treachery.
It must be recalled that by Royal Order of December 17, 1886 the
1850 Penal Code in force in Spain, as amended by the Codigo Penal
Reformado de 1870 was applied in the Philippines. The Penal Code of
1887 in the Philippines was amended by Act 3815, now known as the
Revised Penal Code, which was enacted and published in Spanish. In
construing the Old Penal Code and the Revised Penal Code, this Court
had accorded respect and persuasive, if not conclusive effect to the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and construing the
1850 Penal Code of Spain, as amended by Codigo Penal Reformado de
1870.[65]
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are aggravating
circumstances:
xxx
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The law was taken from Chapter IV, Article 10, paragraph 2 of the
1860 Penal Code and the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 of Spain
which reads:
Art. 10 ...2. Ejecutar el hecho con alevosia. Hay alevosia cuando el
culpable comete cualquiera de los delitos contra las personas empleando
medios, modos o for mas en la ejecucion que tiendan directa y
especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para su persona, que proceda de la
defensa que pudiera hacer el ofendido. xxx
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code is a

reproduction of the 1850 Penal Code of Spain and the Codigo Penal
Reformado de 1870 with a slight difference. In the latter law, the words
las personas (the persons) are used, whereas in Article 14, paragraph 6,
of the Revised Penal Code, the words the person are used.
Going by the letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes
against persons as enumerated in Title Eight, Chapters One and Two,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code. However, the Supreme Court of Spain
has consistently applied treachery to robbery with homicide, classified as
a crime against property. Citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
Cuello Calon, a noted commentator of the Spanish Penal Code says that
despite the strict and express reference of the penal code to treachery
being applicable to persons, treachery also applies to other crimes such
as robbery with homicide:[66]
Aun cuando el Codigo solo se refiere a los delitos contra las personas,
cabe estimarla en los que no perteneciendo a este titulo se determinan
por muerte o lesiones, como, en el robo con homicidio, y en el homicidio
del Jefe del Estado que es un delito contra la seguridad interior del
Estado, y no obstante la referencia estricta del texto legal a los delitos
contra las personas no es la alevosia aplicable a la mayoria de ellos, no lo
es en el homicidio, pues como su concurrencia lo cualifica lo transforma
en delito distinto, en asesinato, ni en el homicidio consentido (art. 409), ni
en la ria tumultuaria (art. 408) ni en el infanticidio (art. 410). xxx. [67]
Viada also says that treachery is appreciated in crimes against
persons (delitos contra personas) and also in robbery with homicide (robo
con homicidio).[68]
Contra las personas. - Luego la circunstancia de alevosia solo puede
apreciarse en los delitos provistos desde el art. 417 al 447, y en algun
otro, como el de robo con homicidio, atentario, a la vez que contra la
propriedad, contra la persona.
Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery
with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property
and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a qualifying
circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its
decision dated September 11, 1878, the word homicide is used in its
broadest and most generic sense.[69]
Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in
diminishing or increasing the penalty for a crime, aggravating
circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating
circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable
by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing
a penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of
increasing the penalty.[70] Under paragraph 2 of the law, the same rule
shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the
crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the
commission thereof.
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime
specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a
crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account
for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
xxx
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating
circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must be of
necessity accompany the commission thereof.
Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither
does it constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by
the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the
penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery
with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic
70
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of
the proper penalty for the crime.
In its Sentencia dated March 14, 1877, the Supreme Court of
Spain declared that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance not
only in crimes against persons but also in robbery with homicide. The
high court of Spain applied Article 79 of the Spanish Penal Code (Article
62 of the Revised Penal Code) and ruled that since treachery is not a
constitutive element of the crime of robbery with homicide nor is it inherent
in said crime, without which it cannot be committed, treachery is an
aggravating circumstance to said crime. The high court of Spain was not
impervious of the fact that robbery with homicide is classified as a crime
against property. Indeed, it specifically declared that the classification of
robbery with homicide as a crime against property is irrelevant and
inconsequential in the application of treachery. It further declared that it
would be futile to argue that in crimes against property such as robbery
with homicide, treachery would have no application. This is so, the high
tribunal ruled, because when robbery is coupled with crimes committed
against persons, the crime is not only an assault (ataca) on the property of
the victims but also of the victims themselves (ofende):
xxx que la circunstancia agravante de alevosia ni es constitutiva del delito
complejo de robo y homicidio, ni de tal modo inherente que sin ella no
pueda cometerse, sin que quepa arguir que en los delitos contra la
propiedad no debe aquella tener aplicacion, porque cuando estos son
complejos de los que se cometen contra las personas, no solo se ataca a
la propiedad, sino que se ofende a estas. xxx[71]
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at
the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons
and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against
property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of
homicide and not to the constituent crime of robbery of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its
classification as a crime against property or as a special complex
and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery
merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating
circumstance.
In its Sentencia, dated July 9, 1877, the high tribunal of Spain also
ruled that when the victim of robbery is killed with treachery, the said
circumstance should be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide:
xxx que si aparece probado que el procesado y su co-reo convinieron en
matar a un conocido suyo, compaero de viaje, para lo cual desviaron
cautelosamente los carros que guiaban, en uno de los cuales iba el
interfecto, dirigiendolos por otro camino que conducia a un aljibon, y al
llegar a este, valiendose de engao para hacer bajar a dicho interfecto, se
lanzaron de improviso sobre el, tirandolo en tierra, robandole el dinero, la
manta y los talegos que llevaba, y atandole al pie una piedra de mucho
peso, le arrojaron con ella a dicho aljibon, dados estos hechos, no cabe
duda que constituyen el delito complejo del art. 516, num. I, con la
circunstancia agravante de alevosia, puesto que los medios, forma y
modos empleados en la ejecucion del crimen tendieron directa y
especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para sus autores, procedente de la
defensa del ofendido.[72]
In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in
robbery with homicide when the victim of homicide is killed by treachery.
On the second issue, we also rule in the affirmative. Article 62,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which was taken from Article 80 of
the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870,[73] provides that circumstances

which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means
employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability
of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the
execution of the act or their cooperation therein. The circumstances
attending the commission of a crime either relate to the persons
participating in the crime or into its manner of execution or to the means
employed. The latter has a direct bearing upon the criminal liability of all
the accused who have knowledge thereof at the time of the commission of
the crime or of their cooperation thereon.[74] Accordingly, the Spanish
Supreme Court held in its Sentencia dated December 17, 1875 that where
two or more persons perpetrate the crime of robbery with homicide, the
generic aggravating circumstance of treachery shall be appreciated
against all of the felons who had knowledge of the manner of the killing of
victims of homicide, with the ratiocination that:
xxx si por la Ley basta haberse ejecutado un homicidio simple con motivo
ocasin del robo para la imposicion de la pena del art. 516, num. I, no
puede sere ni aun discutible que, concurriendo la agravante de alevosia,
se aumente la criminalidad de los delincuentes; siendo aplicable a todos
los autores del hecho indivisible, porque no es circunstancia que afecte a
la personalidad del delincuente, de las que habla el art. 80 del Codigo
penal en su primera parte, sino que consiste en la ejecusion material del
hecho y en los medios empleados para llevarle a cabo, cuando de ellos
tuvieron conocimiento todos los participantes en el mismo por el concierto
previo y con las condiciones establecidad en la segunda parte del citado
articulo.[75]
Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan
and Victor in the case at bar because the same was not alleged in the
Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedures which reads:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.
Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating
circumstance need not be alleged in the Information, however, the general
rule had been applied retroactively because if it is more favorable to the
accused.[76] Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the
information, treachery cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime.
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the
felony of robbery with homicide, Juan and Victor should each be meted
the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liability of Juan and Victor
The trial court awarded the total amount of P300,000.00 to the
heirs of SPO1 Manio, Jr. The court did not specify whether the said
amounts included civil indemnity for the death of the victim, moral
damages and the lost earnings of the victim as a police officer of the PNP.
The Court shall thus modify the awards granted by the trial court.
Since the penalty imposed on Juan and Victor is reclusion
perpetua, the heirs of the victim are entitled to civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00. The heirs are also entitled to moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, Rosemarie Manio having testified on the
factual basis thereof.[77] Considering that treachery aggravated the crime,
the heirs are also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00. This Court held in People vs. Catubig[78] that the retroactive
application of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should not impair the right of the heirs to exemplary damages
71
which had already accrued when the crime was committed prior to the
effectivity of the said rule. Juan and Victor are also jointly and severally
liable to the said heirs in the total amount of P30,000.00 as actual
damages, the prosecution having adduced evidence receipts for said
amounts. The heirs are not entitled to expenses allegedly incurred by
them during the wake as such expenses are not supported by receipts.[79]
However, in lieu thereof, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the
amount of P20,000.00.[80] The service firearm of the victim was turned
over to the Evidence Custodian of the Caloocan City Police Station per
order of the trial court on October 22, 1997.[81] The prosecution failed to
adduce documentary evidence to prove the claim of Five Star Bus, Inc. in
the amount of P6,000.00. Hence, the award should be deleted. However,
in lieu of actual damages, the bus company is entitled to temperate
damages in the amount of P3,000.00.[82]
The heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the lost earnings of
the victim. The evidence on record shows that SPO1 Manio, Jr. was born
on August 25, 1958. He was killed on September 28, 1996 at the age of
38. He had a gross monthly salary as a member of the Philippine National
Police of P8,065.00 or a gross annual salary of P96,780.00. Hence, the
heirs are entitled to the amount of P1,354,920.00 by way of lost earnings
of the victim computed, thus:
Age of the victim = 38 years old
Life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 age of the victim at the time of death)
= 2/3 x (80-38)
= 2/3 x 42
= 28 years
Gross Annual Income = gross monthly income x 12 months
= P8,065.00 x 12
= P96,780.00
Living Expenses = 50% of Gross Annual Income
= P96,780.00 x 0.5
= P48,390.00
Lost Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income-
Livin
= 28 x [P96,780.00 P48,390.00]
= 28 x P48,390.00
= P1,354,920.00
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and
Victor Acuyan are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of robbery with homicide defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances in the
commission of the felony, hereby metes on each of them the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Said accused-appellants are hereby ordered
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr.

the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P1,349,920.00 for lost earnings, P30,000.00 as actual damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of P6,000.00 to the
Five Star Bus, Inc. is deleted. However, the said corporation is awarded
the amount of P3,000.00 as temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug J., please see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join J. Vitugs separate
opinion.
9. TREACHERY
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 100801-02. August 25, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DONATO B.
CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, JOHN DOE, PETER
DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL DOE and SEVERAL OTHER
DOES (at large), accused, DONATO B. CONTINENTE and
JUANITO T. ITAAS, accused-appellants.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] dated February 27, 1991 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 89-4843 and 89-4844 finding herein appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder,
respectively for the killing of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe and for seriously
wounding Joaquin Vinuya.
It appears that appellant Donato Continente and several other
John Does were initially charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated
murder in two (2) separate Informations dated June 20, 1989 in
connection with the shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the corner of
Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City which caused the
death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding his driver,
Joaquin Vinuya. After the arrest of another suspect, Juanito Itaas, on
August 27, 1989 in Davao City, the prosecution, with prior leave of court,
filed two (2) separate amended Informations for murder and frustrated
murder to include Juanito T. Itaas, among the other accused. The
amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-4843 and 89-4844 read:
Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843 for Murder:
"That on or about the 21st day of April, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and
with the use of armalite rifles and motor vehicles, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal
violence upon the person of COL. JAMES N. ROWE, a U.S. Army Officer,
by then and there firing at him while then on board a Toyota car, hitting
him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious
and mortal gunshot wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause
of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Col. James
N. Rowe in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the
72
Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844 for Frustrated Murder:
"That on or about the 21st day of April 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and
with the use of armalite rifles and motor vehicles, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of JOAQUIN BINUYA, by then and there firing at
him while then on board a Toyota car, hitting him on the scalp and body,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime
of murder, but nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of causes
independent of their own will, that is the timely intervention of medical
assistance, to the damage and prejudice of said Joaquin Binuya in such
amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Upon being arraigned on August 31, 1989, appellant Donato B.
Continente, assisted by his counsel of choice, pleaded "Not guilty" to each
of the amended Informations in both criminal cases. On the scheduled
arraignment of appellant Juanito Itaas on October 31, 1989, appellant
Itaas, upon the advice of his counsel, refused to enter any plea. Hence,
the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not guilty" be entered in each of the
amended Informations in both criminal cases for the said appellant.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that on
April 21, 1989 at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, the car of U.S. Col.
James N. Rowe, Deputy Commander, Joint U. S. Military Assistance
Group (JUSMAG for brevity), was ambushed at the corner of Tomas
Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Initial investigation by
the Central Intelligence Service (CIS for brevity), National Capital District
Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City which was led by Capt. Gil
Meneses, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch, CIS, shows
that on the date and time of the ambush, Col. James Rowe, was on board
his gray Mitsubishi Galant car which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya;
and that they were at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog
Avenue in Quezon City on their way to the JUSMAG Compound along
Tomas Morato Street when gunmen who were on board an old model
Toyota Corolla car suddenly fired at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and
seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car that was used by
the gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car when it sped away
from the site of the ambush.[2] The same Toyota Corolla car was later
recovered on the same day by a team from the Philippine Constabulary
(PC), North Sector Command, led by PC/Sgt. Fermin Garma, at No. 4
Windsor Street, San Francisco Del Monte in Quezon City.[3]
Upon further investigation of the case, the CIS agents established
through a confidential intelligence information the involvement of appellant
Donato Continente, an employee of the U.P. Collegian in U.P. Diliman,
Quezon City, in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver.
Accordingly, on June 16, 1989, the CIS investigation team proceeded to
the U.P. campus in Diliman, Quezon City to conduct a surveillance on
appellant Donato Continente. After accosting appellant Continente inside
the said U.P. campus, the CIS team took him to Camp Crame in Quezon
City for questioning.[4] During the interrogation which was conducted by
CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico in the presence of Atty. Bonifacio
Manansala in Camp Crame on June 17, 1989, appellant Continente
admitted to his participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his
driver as a member of the surveillance unit under the Political
Assassination Team of the CPP-NPA.[5] Among the documents
confiscated from appellant Continente by the CIS agents, and for which a

receipt dated June 16, 1989 was prepared and issued by Sgt. Reynaldo
dela Cruz, was a letter addressed to "Sa Kinauukulan". At the dorsal right
hand side of the letter appear the acronyms "STR PATRC" which allegedly
mean "Sa Tagumpay ng Rebolusyon" and "Political Assassination Team,
Regional Command".[6]
Another confidential intelligence information established the
participation of appellant Juanito Itaas in the said ambush of Col. James
Rowe and his driver on April 21, 1989. Appellant Itaas, who was a known
member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City was arrested
in Davao City and was brought to Manila by Capt. Gil Meneses for
investigation.[7] CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico investigated and took
down the statements of appellant Itaas who disclosed during the
investigation that he was an active member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA
based in Davao City and confessed, in the presence of Atty. Filemon
Corpuz who apprised and explained to him his constitutional rights, that he
was one of those who fired at the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. James
Rowe at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue on April
21, 1989.[8] The said appellant identified the Toyota Corolla car that the
assailants rode on April 21, 1989 and the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of
Col. Rowe.[9]
Meanwhile, it appears that the ambush on Col. James Rowe and
his driver was witnessed by a certain Meriam Zulueta. The testimony of
prosecution eyewitness Meriam R. Zulueta reveals that at around 7:00
o'clock in the morning of April 21, 1989, she was about to cross the Tomas
Morato Street on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to
attend a practicum in the JUSMAG Mess Hall when she heard several
gunshots. Upon looking at the direction where the gunshots emanated,
she saw persons on board a maroon car firing at a gray car at a distance
of more or less one (1) meter at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and
Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Zulueta returned to the side of the street to
seek for cover but could not find any so she docked and covered her head
with her bag while continuously looking at the persons who were firing at
the gray car.[10] She recognized appellant Juanito Itaas when the latter
was presented for identification in Camp Crame as the person, directly
behind the driver of the maroon car, whose body was half exposed while
he was firing at the gray car with the use of along firearm.[11] The
shooting incident lasted for about five (5) seconds only after which the
maroon car made a U-turn to Timog Avenue toward the direction of
Quezon Boulevard while being followed by a white Mitsubishi Lancer car.
[12]
Prosecution eyewitness Zulueta likewise recognized the driver of
the white Mitsubishi Lancer car as the same person whom she had
encountered on two occasions. Zulueta disclosed that in the morning of
April 19, 1989, the white Mitsubishi Lancer car was parked along the side
of Tomas Morato Street which was near the corner of Scout Madrinas
Street. Her attention was caught by the driver of the car, who was then
reading a newspaper, when the latter remarked "Hoy pare, ang sexy. She-
boom!" as she was walking along the street toward the JUSMAG
Compound. On April 20, 1989, she saw the same person inside the white
Mitsubishi Lancer car which was then parked along the side of Tomas
Morato Street while she was again on her way to attend practicum in the
JUSMAG Compound. She learned of the identity of the driver as a certain
Raymond Navarro, who is allegedly a member of the NPA, from the
pictures shown her by the CIS investigators in Camp Crame.[13]
Prosecution witness Zulueta also recognized appellant Donato
Continente whom she had encountered on at least three (3) occasions at
a carinderia outside the JUSMAG Compound. Her first encounter with
appellant Continente was at around three o'clock in the afternoon on April
17, 1989 when she went out of the JUSMAG Compound to a carinderia
nearby. She mistook the said appellant for a tricycle driver who was
simply walking around the premises. She saw appellant Continente in the
same carinderia again on the following day, April 18, 1989, and she was
even teased by her companions that he was her escort. On April 19,
1989, Zulueta saw appellant Continente for the third time inside the same
carinderia while the latter was merely standing. She came to know the
73
identity of appellant Continente when Continente was presented to her in
Camp Crame for identification. She thought that he was the tricycle driver
whom she had seen in the carinderia near the JUSMAG Compound.[14]
Joaquin Vinuya testified that he was employed by the JUSMAG, as
driver, and assigned to Col. James Rowe. On April 21, 1989, he fetched
Col. Rowe from his house in Potsdam Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong to
report for work in JUSMAG, Quezon City. He drove along EDSA and
turned left upon reaching Timog Avenue in Quezon City. While he was
making a right turn at the intersection of Timog Avenue toward Tomas
Morato Street, he noticed four (4) people on board a red car, two (2) of
whom suddenly opened fire at the car that he was driving hitting him in the
process. The shooting incident happened very fast and that he had no
opportunity to recognize the persons inside the red car. Despite the
incident, Vinuya managed to drive the car to the JUSMAG Compound.
Upon arrival at the JUSMAG Compound, he found out that Col. James
Rowe, who was sitting at the back seat of the car, was also hit during the
shooting incident.[15]
Col. James Rowe and Joaquin Vinuya were initially brought to the
V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City for treatment. Subsequently, they were
transferred to the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga. It was only then
that Vinuya learned of Col. James Rowe's death whose body was already
wrapped in a blanket. Vinuya was treated in the Clark Air Base Hospital in
Pampanga for four (4) days for the injuries he sustained on his head,
shoulder, and on the back portion of his left hand. Thereafter, he was
taken back to JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to recuperate.[16]
Prosecution witnesses Dr. Walter Divers and Dr. Jose Santiago
testified on their respective medical findings[17] on the victims. Dr. Divers
confirmed in court the contents of his medical report dated April 21, 1989
which shows that Col. Rowe sustained a gunshot wound on the left side of
his head and abrasions on other parts of his body and that he was
pronounced dead upon arrival at the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City.[18]
On the other hand, Dr. Santiago identified the medical report dated April
25, 1989 that he prepared relative to the treatment that he administered on
Joaquin Vinuya. The report shows that Vinuya sustained three (3)
superficial injuries on the scalp, on the left shoulder, and on the back of
the left hand which could have been caused by bullets that came from a
gun; and that the wounds could have caused the death of Vinuya without
the medical treatment that lasted for four (4) days.[19]
For the defense, appellant Juanito Itaas testified and denied the
truth of the contents of his sworn statements which are respectively dated
August 29, 1989 and August 30, 1989, insofar as the same establish his
participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver on April 21,
1989. Appellant Itaas testified that he was allegedly tortured by his
captors on August 27 and 28, 1989 in Davao City; that he was blindfolded
and a masking tape was placed on his mouth; and that subsequently, he
was hit and mauled while a cellophane was placed on his head thus,
causing him to loss consciousness.[20]
Appellant Itaas further testified that he affixed his signatures on his
sworn statements dated August 29 and 30, 1989 in the presence of the
CIS officers and that Atty. Filemon Corpus was not present during those
two occasions. The said appellant admitted having sworn to the truth of
the contents of his said sworn statements before the administering fiscal,
but he disclosed that the CIS officers previously threatened him to admit
the contents of the two sworn statements.[21]
Appellant Donato Continente testified that he was working as
messenger with the U.P. Collegian, an official monthly publication of the
University of the Philippines. He was walking on his way home inside the
U.P. campus in Diliman, Quezon City from his workplace in Vinzon's Hall
in the late afternoon of June 16, 1989 when four (4) persons blocked his
way and simultaneously held his body and covered his mouth. He asked if
they had any warrant of arrest but the persons simply boarded him inside
a waiting car where he was handcuffed and blindfolded. Thereafter, they
took his wallet that contained his NBI clearance, SSS, tax account number

(TAN), identification card, two (2) pictures, and a typewritten certification
from "SINAG" where he used to work.[22]
Appellant Continente learned that he was taken to Camp Crame in
Quezon City only in the following morning when his blindfold was removed
so that he could give his statement in connection with the killing of Col.
James Rowe before a CIS Investigator whom he later identified during the
trial as Virgilio Pablico. Appellant Continente affirmed the truth of his
personal circumstances only which appear on his sworn statement dated
June 17, 1989 but denied having made the rest of the statements
embodied therein. The said appellant claimed that he initially denied any
knowledge in the killing of Col. James Rowe but CIS Investigator Pablico
maintained that he (Continente) knew something about it; that appellant
Continente was alone with Investigator Pablico during the investigation;
that he signed his sworn statement in the presence of Pablico and swore
to the truth thereof before the administering fiscal for fear that something
might happen to him while he was alone; that he signed the last page of
his sworn statement first before signing the waiver of his constitutional
rights upon arrival of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala whose legal services was
engaged by the CIS Investigators; and that he had no opportunity to talk
with Atty. Manansala who left after he (Atty. Manansala) signed, merely as
witness, the first page of his sworn statement, which is the waiver of his
constitutional rights.[23]
On rebuttal, prosecution witness Sgt. Reynaldo dela Cruz testified
that he prepared and issued the receipt for the documents which he
confiscated from appellant Continente on June 16, 1989; and that it is the
standard operating procedure in the CIS to put a blindfold on an arrested
suspected NPA member in order to withhold from him the view and
location of the entrance, the exit and the terrain in the camp.[24]
The testimony of CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico on rebuttal
reveals that during the investigation of appellants Donato Continente and
Juanito Itaas, their respective lawyers namely, Atty. Bonifacio Manansala
and Atty. Filemon Corpuz, were present; that appellants Continente and
Itaas conferred with their lawyers before they gave their statements to the
CIS investigator; that the CIS investigator typed only the statements that
the appellants had given him in response to his questions during the
investigation; that both appellants were accompanied by their respective
lawyers when they were brought to the fiscal for inquest; and that said
appellants were never tortured nor threatened during the investigations of
these cases.[25]
The trial court rendered its decision[26] in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
89-4843 to 44 on February 28, 1991 finding both appellants Juanito Itaas
and Donato Continente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder. It ruled, thus:
"In assessing the evidence against co-accused Continente, it is
undeniable that the yardstick of his culpability hangs in the validity of the
extra-judicial confession he had executed. A close scrutiny of the
document would reveal that the confession is free from any taint of
illegality and thus serves as a basis for his conviction.
The presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed has
not been satisfactorily controverted by the accused.
Circumstances show that Continente's waiver was done with the
assistance of a counsel of his choice. The records indicate that Atty.
Bonifacio Manansala was accused's counsel during his custodial
investigation and his arraignment and that his counsel during the trial was
a relative of the aforementioned lawyer. These factors are undeniable
evidence of trust reposed upon Atty. Bonifacio Manansala by the accused.
Continente also admitted on cross-examination that he had read his
statement which included the PAGPAPATUNAY containing his waiver of
constitutional rights (TSN 29 August 1990 p. 29). Accused was raised in
Metro Manila and spoke Tagalog, thus would not have any difficulty in
74
comprehending the questions addressed to him and the information
relayed to him with respect to his rights. The court can not equate that
whenever a suspect is taken into custody and is fearful of his safety, the
police authorities had exercised pressure or had threatened if not
subjected them to physical abuse. Moreover, the fact that the accused
admitted that his answers were typed as he spoke them (TSN August 30
1990 p.4) leaves no room for Pablico to fabricate an answer.
xxx xxx xxx.
The prosecution evidence gathered against accused Itaas cradles on two
incriminating points. The Zulueta testimony and his extra judicial
confession working independently, one without the other, have the force
capable of convicting the accused. The interplay of these two valuable
evidence solidifies a ruling of guilt against accused Itaas.
The defense raised by the accused is not sufficient to overrule this Court's
determination of guilt against Itaas.
The testimony of Zulueta has been candid and straightforward, devoid of
any material contradiction. No motive has been imputed to assail the
credibility of her testimony. xxx
xxx xxx xxx.
With respect to the extra-judicial confession executed by accused Itaas,
the Court finds that such was made pursuant to the Constitution.
Although it may be argued that accused resides in Davao, the fact that he
could understand Tagalog as admitted by him in his testimony and proven
by the proceedings in court where he was answering questions addressed
to him in Tagalog militates against his inability to comprehend his right and
its subsequent waiver. Counsel for accused contests the independence
and competence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz on the ground that said lawyer
was a military lawyer. Although the military background of Atty. Corpuz is
admitted, this does not automatically disqualify him to act as lawyer for the
accused. Proof of the fact that he failed to render his duty to safeguard
the rights of the accused must be shown before this court nullifies the
weight of Itaas' extra-judicial confession. The allegation of torture similarly
rings hollow. No medical certificate had been shown by the accused that
he had indeed suffered brutal treatment from his jailers specially since he
had alleged to have been treated by a doctor for his injuries."
Thereafter, the trial court meted out the following penalties on the
appellants:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused
DONATO CONTINENTE y BUENVENIDA and JUANITO ITAAS y TURA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of MURDER and
FRUSTRATED MURDER, and each is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the killing of Col. James
Rowe, to pay P30,000.00 to the heirs; and an imprisonment from Ten (10)
Years and One (1) Day of PRISION MAYOR as MINIMUM to Seventeen
(17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL
as MAXIMUM for the crime committed against Joaquin Vinuya, and to pay
the cost.
SO ORDERED."
From the foregoing judgment of the trial court, appellants Donato
Continente and Juanito Itaas separately instituted the instant appeal.
On March 15, 1993, appellant Donato Continente filed his
Appellant's Brief[27] while appellant Juanito Itaas filed his Appellant's
Brief[28] on March 5, 1993. The Office of the Solicitor General filed the
Appellee's Brief[29] for the People on October 4, 1993. Appellant Itaas
filed a Reply Brief[30] on December 3, 1993.

Appellant Continente raised the following assignments of error by
the trial court:
I
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND
GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONTINENTE.
II
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT CONTINENTE BY THE PROSECUTION'S LONE
WITNESS.
III
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONTINENTE GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
On the other hand, appellant Itaas interposed the following
assignments of error:
I
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ADMITTING AND APPRECIATING THE EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY OF MERIAM ZULUETA.
II
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ADMITTING AND APPRECIATING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-
JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ITAAS.
III
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ADMITTING TESTIMONIAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
SHOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT POSING BESIDE THE
AMBUSHER'S AND THE VICTIM'S ALLEGED CARS.
IV
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE
ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
V
THE EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY BY THE AUTHORITIES
DEPICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ITAAS AS "THE ROWE
KILLER", A "COMMUNIST" AND A MEMBER OF THE
CPP/NPA/NDF/ABB INFLUENCED MERIAM ZULUETA'S
IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE LOWER
COURT'S JUDGMENT.
The principal issues are:
1. Whether or not the waivers of the constitutional rights
during custodial investigation by the appellants were
valid; and
2. Whether or not the testimony of prosecution eyewitness
Meriam Zulueta was credible.
75
The rights of the accused during custodial investigation are
enshrined in Article III, Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel."
The rights to remain silent and to counsel may be waived by the
accused provided that the constitutional requirements are complied with.
It must appear clear that the accused was initially accorded his right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. In addition, the waiver
must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. If the waiver complies
with the constitutional requirements, then the extrajudicial confession will
be tested for voluntariness,[31] i. e., if it was given freely-without coercion,
intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility,[32] i.e., if it
was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.
In assailing the validity of their written statements, appellants
Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas contend that they were not properly
informed of their custodial rights under the constitution as to enable them
to make a valid waiver. The pertinent portion of appellant Donato
Continente's written statement dated June 17, 1989 is quoted hereunder,
to wit:
PALIWANAG: G. Donato Continente, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay
may kinalaman sa pagkaka-ambush at pagpatay kay U.S. Army
Colonel James Rowe ng JUSMAG.
Bago kita simulang tanungin ay nais ko munang ipabatid sa iyo
ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod sa ating umiiral na Saligang
Batas. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
Una, ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag magbigay ng
salaysay. Kung ikaw ay magbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa
iyo na anumang sasabihin mo sa salaysay mong ito ay maaaring
gamiting ebidensiya pabor o laban sa iyo sa anumang hukuman
dito sa Pilipinas.
Ikalawa, karapatan mong magkaroon ng abogado ayon sa iyong
sariling pili habang ikaw ay aking tinatanong. Kung ikaw ay
walang kakayanang umupa ng abogado, ikaw ay bibigyan namin
ng isang abogado ng gobyerno bilang tumayo na iyong tagapayo
at ng sa gayon ay maprotektahan ang iyong mga karapatan.
Ikatlo, karapatan mong malaman at mapagpaliwanagan ng mga
karapatan mong ito.
TANONG: Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo. Nauunawaan ko po.
TANONG: Mayroon ka bang abogado na naririto sa ngayon upang
siya mong maging tagapayo?
SAGOT: Wala po pero nakapagdesisyon na po ako na ako ay
magbibigay ng salaysay kahit na wala akong nakaharap na
abogado.
TANONG: G. Continente, ang pagsusuko ng mga karapatan, ayon
narin sa batas, ay kinakailangang gawin sa harap ng isang
abogado. Payag ka bang magsuko ng iyong mga karapatan
sa harap ng isang abogado ng gobyerno?

SAGOT: Pumapayag po ako.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka rin bang lumagda sa isang pagpapatunay
na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan ng iyong mga karapatan, at
nauunawaan mo ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.[33]
On the other hand, the pertinent portion of appellant Itaas' written
statement dated August 29, 1989 is quoted, to wit:
01. PALIWANAG: G. Juanito Itaas, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may
kinalaman sa pagkakaambush at pagpatay kay Colonel
James Rowe ng JUSMAG at pagkasugat ng kanyang driver.
Bago kita simulang tanungin ay nais ko munang ipabatid sa
iyo ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod sa ating Bagong
Saligang Batas. Ito ay mga sumusunod. Una, ikaw ay may
karapatang manahimik o huwag magbigay ng salaysay.
Kung ikaw ay magbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo
na anumang sabihin mo sa salaysay mong ito ay maaaring
gamiting ebidensiya pabor o laban sa iyo sa anumang
hukuman dito sa Pilipinas. Ikalawa, karapatan mong
magkaroon ng pili at sarili mong abogado habang ikaw ay
aking tinatanong. Kung ikaw ay walang pambayad ng
abogado, ikaw ay bibigyan ng gobyerno ng abogado na wala
kang aalalahaning anumang kabayaran. Ikatlo, karapatan
mong malaman at mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan
mong ito.
TANONG: Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Mayroon ka bang abogado na naririto sa ngayon upang
ikaw ay patnubayan?
SAGOT: Wala po pero ako ay nakahandang magbigay ng
salaysay kahit na wala akong nakaharap na abogado.
TANONG: G. Itaas, ayon din sa batas, ang pagsusuko ng mga
karapatan ay kailangan ding pagtibayin sa harap ng isang
abogado, nakahanda ka bang magsuko ng iyong mga
karapatan sa harap ng isang abogado na bigay sa iyo ng
gobyerno?
SAGOT: Opo. Nakahanda po ako.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka rin bang lumagda sa isang pagpapatunay
na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan ng iyong mga karapatan at
nauunawaan mo naman ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.[34]
Also, the pertinent portion of his (Itaas) supplemental written
statement dated August 30, 1989 is quoted hereunder, to wit:
PALIWANAG: G. Itaas, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may
kinalaman pa rin sa pagkaka-ambush at pagpatay kay U.S.
Colonel James Rowe. Tulad sa nauna mong pagbibigay ng
salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na muli ang iyong mga
karapatang manahimik, magkaroon ng pili at sariling abogado
at karapatang mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong
ito. Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka pa rin bang magbigay ng salaysay at
ipapatuloy ang pagbibigay mo ng salaysay?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka bang lumagdang muli ng isang
76
pagpapatunay na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan ng iyong mga
karapatan at handa ka ring isuko ang mga karapatan mo?
SAGOT: Opo.[35]
We have consistently declared in a string of cases that the advice
or Paliwanag found at the beginning of extrajudicial confessions that
merely enumerate to the accused his custodial rights do not meet the
standard provided by law. They are terse and perfunctory statements that
do not evince a clear and sufficient effort to inform and explain to the
appellant his constitutional rights.[36] We emphasized that when the
constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his
rights to remain silent and to have an independent and competent counsel
preferably of his own choice, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.[37] In other
words, the right of a person under investigation "to be informed" implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and
contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding of
what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right.[38]
In the case of People vs. Jara,[39] we declared that:
"This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal
form" or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together
with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even
copy it in their own handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially
stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous,
free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing."
It must be noted however, that far from being a mere enumeration
of the custodial rights of an accused, the aforequoted portions
("Paliwanag") of the written statements contain an explanation as to the
nature of the investigation that is, regarding the respective participations of
the appellants in the ambush on April 21, 1989 that resulted in the killing
of U.S. Col. James Rowe while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin
Vinuya. They also include an advice that the appellants may choose not
to give any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement
obtained from the appellants may be used in favor or against them in
court. In addition, they contain an advice that the appellants may engage
the services of a lawyer of their own choice. If they cannot afford the
services of a lawyer, they will be provided with one by the government for
free. Thereafter, both appellants manifested to CIS Investigator Virgilio
Pablico their intentions to give their statements even in the absence of
counsel.
Despite the manifestations of the appellants, Investigator Pablico
requested for the legal services of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala to act as
counsel for appellant Continente and Atty. Felimon Corpuz for appellant
Itaas. Significantly, Investigator Pablico disclosed that appellant
Continente conferred with Atty. Manansala in his presence for about half
an hour before the investigation started.[40] Nevertheless, the appellant
(Continente) maintained his decision to give a statement even in the
absence of counsel. As proof thereof, the appellant signed[41] the
"Pagpapatunay" that contains an express waiver of his constitutional rights
in the presence of Atty. Manansala who also signed the same as counsel
of the appellant.
With respect to appellant Itaas, Atty. Felimon Corpuz testified that
his legal services were requested on two (2) occasions to act as counsel
for appellant Itaas after the latter purportedly manifested his intention to
waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the investigation.
Atty. Corpuz stated that he conferred with the appellant before the
investigations and explained to him his rights under the constitution and
the consequences of waiving said rights. After the explanation, appellant
Itaas decided to sign the "Pagpapatunay", which are entirely written in
Tagalog, a dialect which he understands, in his written confessions

respectively dated August 29, 1989 and August 30, 1989 stating that his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel were explained to him;
that he fully understood the same; and that he was willing to give a written
confession even without the assistance of counsel.[42]
Appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas likewise impugn
their respective written statements. They allege that the statements
appearing therein were supplied by the CIS investigator. CIS Investigator
Pablico however, categorically denied on rebuttal the allegations of the
appellants. Pablico disclosed that during his investigations of the
appellants on separate occasions he simultaneously typewrote his
questions to the appellants including their answers thereto which are done
entirely in Tagalog, thus leaving no room for Pablico to fabricate an
answer. After the investigation, he allowed the appellants to read their
respective confessions,[43] a fact that was admitted by appellant
Continente.[44] Thereafter, the appellants voluntarily affixed their
signatures on every page of their written confessions.
On July 18, 1989 appellant Continente appeared before City
Prosecutor Galicano of Quezon City and affirmed under oath the truth of
his statements by affixing his signature on the left hand portion of every
page of his written confession.[45] Likewise, appellant Itaas, accompanied
by Atty. Corpuz, affirmed under oath the truth of his statements in his
written confessions by affixing his signature on every page thereof before
the administering officer.[46]
In a desperate attempt to cast doubt on the voluntariness of his
confessions, appellant Continente claims that he was under pressure to
read entirely his written confession before he affixed his signature
thereon. The unsubstantiated claim of the appellant is belied by his own
admission that he was treated fairly during the investigation, thus:
Court: Proceed.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, since the time you were arrested on June 16,
1989 until this time, you said you were staying in Camp
Crame, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And from the time you were arrested up to this time, you were
never harmed by anybody in Camp Crame, that is also
correct?
A: No, sir.
Q: In fact, from the time you were arrested when that blindfold was
removed, you were treated fairly, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.[47]
There is also no basis to support the claim of appellant Itaas that
he was tortured into giving a confession and was threatened by the CIS
agents to admit the truth of the same before the administering officer. This
Court held that where the appellants did not present evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to
complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of
violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should
be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.[48]
It has been established by the evidence that Atty. Filemon Corpuz
was present during both occasions that appellant Itaas was being
investigated by Investigator Virgilio Pablico in Camp Crame and even
accompanied the said appellant before the administering officer. Appellant
Itaas did not present any evidence in court to buttress his bare claim
despite the fact that a doctor was summoned for his check up immediately
upon his arrival in Manila after he was previously arrested in Davao City.
[49] He did not complain to the administering officer about the threats and
77
torture he allegedly suffered in the hands of the CIS agents. Neither did
he file any criminal nor administrative complaint against said agents for
maltreatment. The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing
officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him,
although he had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the
execution of his confessions.[50] To hold otherwise is to facilitate the
retraction of his solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of
torture, without any proof whatsoever.[51]
The Court also notes that the respective written confessions of
appellants are replete with details which could be supplied only by
someone in the know so to speak.[52] They reflect spontaneity and
coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to
which violence and torture have been applied.[53]
In particular, appellant Juanito Itaas admitted in his written
confession[54] dated August 29, 1989 that he was an active member of
the New People's Army (NPA) and performed different functions mainly in
the province of Davao; that he was one of the two other members of the
NPA who were sent to Manila sometime in March 1989; that appellant
stayed in Merville, Paranaque before moving to an apartment in Santolan,
Pasig together with certain Vicky and her husband Ronnie, Onie, Bosyo
and Bernie; that one day before the ambush on Col. Rowe he (Itaas) was
told by Ronnie to take part in a major operation by the NPA; that he (Itaas)
was not informed by Ronnie about the identity of their supposed target;
that on the following day, Ronnie and the appellant boarded a dark brown
Toyota car together with certain Edgar and James; that he (Itaas) was
seated directly behind the driver beside Edgar and James while Ronnie
sat beside the driver; that they were armed with M-16 rifles while Ronnie
was armed with an ultimax; that after several minutes their car reached a
junction (circle) and was running alongside a dark gray car; that he fired
automatic shots toward the dark gray car only after his companions
started firing at the said car; and that after the ambush they drove back to
their apartment in Santolan, Pasig while they were being followed by a
back up car allegedly being occupied by certain Liway, Fred and Eddie.
Appellant Itaas also identified in his written confession[55] dated August
30, 1989 the gray Mitsubishi car that they ambushed on April 21, 1989
and the car that they used on the same date of ambush.
On the other hand, the written statement[56] dated June 17, 1989
of appellant Donato Continente reveals that he had been a member of
several revolutionary groups before becoming a full fledged member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) under the Political
Assassination Team (PAT) headed by a certain Kit; that the objective of
their team was primarily to conduct surveillance on foreigners and
diplomats; that he did not know Col. James Rowe prior to the shooting
incident on April 21, 1989; that his participation in the ambush was merely
for having conducted a surveillance of the vicinity of the JUSMAG in
Tomas Morato Avenue in Quezon City; that he gathered certain data,
specifically: the number of people and volume of vehicles around the area,
the measurement of the streets, as well as the distance of the JUSMAG
Compound from Tomas Morato Avenue; that his surveillance activity was
continued by certain Freddie Abella and Taddy who are also members of
the PAT; and that he came to know the identity of the victim of the ambush
on April 21, 1989, through Freddie Abella who informed him two days after
the incident.
Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly repudiate the
counsels who rendered them legal assistance during their respective
investigations as biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized that
both appellants never signified their desire to have lawyers of their own
choice. In any case, it has been ruled that while the initial choice of the
lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford
the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators,
the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised
any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his

statement before the swearing officer.[57]
If Atty. Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against advising the
appellants not to give their statements involving the ambush, the said
lawyers were merely complying with their oaths to abide by the truth. The
counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling
the truth.[58] Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open
court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.[59] What is sought
to be protected with the constitutional right to counsel is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to provide him with the best defense.[60]
We agree with the trial court's observation that the retention by
appellant Continente of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala as his counsel until the
early stages of his case in the lower court and his subsequent decision to
engage the legal services of Atty. Manansala's relative, Atty. Ceferino
Manansala, who represented the said appellant throughout the
proceedings in the absence of the former bespeaks of the trust he had for
the said lawyer. On the other hand, while it is admitted that Atty. Felimon
Corpuz served in the military as prosecutor in the Efficiency and
Separation Board of the armed forces, such fact is not sufficient to
adjudge the said lawyer as biased against the appellant (Itaas) in the
absence of any concrete evidence to that effect. The defense also failed
to adduce substantial evidence to support a finding that Atty. Corpuz was
short of being a vigilant and effective counsel for the said appellant.
Moreover, the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta
confirms to a large extent the statements made by the appellants in their
written confessions. Zulueta positively identified appellant Juanito Itaas as
among the persons on board a car, directly behind the driver, whose body
was half exposed, while firing at the car of Col. James Rowe at the corner
of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. She also
testified that she had seen appellant Donato Continente on at least three
(3) occasions at the carinderia outside the JUSMAG compound. She
mistook appellant Continente for a tricycle driver on April 17, 1989 while
the latter was simply walking around the premises. The second and third
encounters with the appellant (Continente) took place on April 18 and 19,
1989 while the said appellant was standing inside the same carinderia.
The defense assails the propriety of the pre-trial identification by
Meriam Zulueta of appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas as
pointedly suggestive. However, there is no sufficient evidence on record
to show that the appellants were previously indicated by the CIS
investigators to Zulueta that they were the perpetrators of the crime.[61]
Besides, a police line-up is not essential to a proper identification of the
appellants.[62]
The defense for appellant Itaas further argues that the so-called
"positive identification" of appellant Itaas by Meriam Zulueta cannot be
considered reliable inasmuch as the same was based on a fleeting
glimpse of a stranger. To support its argument, the defense cited
cases[63] where the Court rejected the testimonies of prosecution
eyewitnesses for not being credible, such as: where the identification of a
stranger is based upon a single brief observation made during a startling
occurrence; where the testimony of the witness defies human nature and
reason; where there are serious inconsistencies and glaring omissions in
the testimony of the eyewitness; and where the witness only identified the
suspect after he was arrested and the witness was informed by the police
that the suspect was one of the killers.
It should be pointed out that the above rulings of the Court are
based on the circumstances peculiar to each of the abovecited cases that
do not exactly obtain in the cases at bench. It is accepted legal precept
that persons react differently to a given situation.[64] In the same way,
certain witnesses to an unfolding crime may run or scamper to safety
while others would remain transfixed and strive to identify the perpetrators
thereof. As found by the trial court, Zulueta testified in an honest and
straightforward manner that she was about to cross the Tomas Morato
78
Street on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend a
practicum in the JUSMAG Mess Hall when she heard several gunshots.
Upon looking at the direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw
persons on board a maroon car firing at a gray car. Zulueta returned to
the sidewalk to seek for cover but could not find any so she docked and
covered her head with her bag while continuously looking at the persons
who were firing at the gray car. In acting the way she did, Meriam Zulueta
was merely reacting naturally to the crime that was unfolding before her.
And while the shooting incident lasted for only about five (5) seconds, that
was all that Zulueta needed under the situation to recognize appellant
Itaas whose body was incidentally half exposed.
The testimony of Meriam Zulueta does not suffer from any serious
and material contradictions that can detract from her credibility. The trial
court accorded full faith and credence to her said testimony. The defense
failed to adduce any evidence to establish any improper motive that may
have impelled the same witness to falsely testify against the appellants. It
is well-settled rule that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by
the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because such
court has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and
determine if they are telling the truth or not.[65]
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 248. Murder.-- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of
a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other
public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting
the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at
his person or corpse."
The trial court erroneously found that the appellants allegedly
conspired in the commission of the crimes charged in the instant criminal
cases. While it is clear that the appellants did not even know each other,
the lower court opined that the Alex Boncayao Brigade is such a large
organization that there is great likelihood that the participants of the
various stages of the crime are unknown to each other. To justify its
position, it cited the ruling in the case of People vs. Geronimo[66], thus:
When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and the other performing another part as to complete
it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating
closeness of personal associations, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments, the Court will be justified in concluding that said defendants
were engaged in a conspiracy.
We disagree. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a

conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To prove
conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three (3)
requisites: (1) that two or more persons come to an agreement; (2) that
the agreement concerned the commission of a crime; and (3) that the
execution of the felony was decided upon.[67] While conspiracy must be
proven just like any criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond
reasonable doubt,[68] the same need not be proved by direct evidence
and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and
after the commission of the crime.[69]
The case against appellant Donato Continente is primarily
anchored on the written statement[70] that he gave during the
investigation of these cases. The pertinent portions of his written
statements are quoted hereunder, to wit:
T: Ikaw ba'y naging full fledged member ng Partido?
S: Nito pong Oktubre 1988.
T: Sino naman ang iyong kinikilalang puno sa inyong Partido?
S: Ganito po iyon. Mayroon kaming sariling grupo na kung tawagin
ay PAT. Ang ibig sabihin nito ay POLITICAL
ASSASSINATION TEAM. Ang aming puno ay tinatawag
naming PO o Political Officer. Ang susunod sa kanya ay ang
TL o Team Leader; tapos po ay ang Vice Team Leader; at
mga miembro na nagsasagawa ng activities tulad ng gawaing
edukasyon, surveillance at intelligence.
x x x charged as accomplice.[72]
T: Ano ang mga alam mong objectives ng inyong team?
S: , Ang mga objectives po namin ay magsagawa ng surveillance sa
mga foreigner o diplomat. Kinukuha namin ang plate number
ng kanilang mga sasakyan, make, model at kulay nito at ito
ay aming tinitipon.
x x x was merely assigned to the vicinity of the JUSMAG Compound in Tomas
T: Nakikilala mo ba itong si Col. James Rowe ng U.S. Army na
nagtrabaho sa JUSMAG?
S: Nakilala ko po lamang siya ng mapabalitang patay siya sa
ambush sa may malapit sa JUSMAG noong buwan ng Abril
1989.
x x x The error of the trial court in its appreciation of appellant
T: Ano ang iyong naging partisipasyon sa pagkakapatay nitong si
Col. Rowe?
S: Surveillance po lamang ang aking naging papel dito.
T: Paano mo naman isinagawa itong pag-surveillance kay Colonel
Rowe?
S: Nagpunta po ako sa area ng JUSMAG doon sa Tomas Morato
Avenue, Q. C. at nagmanman doon tungkol sa dami ng tao at
sasakyang dumadaan tuwing tanghali. Inalaman ko din ang
lawak ng kalsada at layo ng Timog Avenue sa gate ng
JUSMAG. Sa report ko ay sinabi ko na mga anim (6) na
hakbang ang luwag ng Tomas Morato Avenue, madalang ang
daan ng tao at sasakyan at ang layo ng Timog Avenue sa
gate ng JUSMAG ay may tatlong poste o apat na poste
lamang.
T: Ang pagrereport mo bang ito ay ginawa mo ng verbal lamang?
S: Verbal lamang po.
T: Kanino ka naman nagreport?
79
S: Kay Ka Freddie Abella po.
x x x
T: Bakit mo natiyak na ang ABB ang nagsagawa ng pag-ambush
kay Colonel Rowe?
S: Dalawang (2) araw po matapos ang pag-ambush kay Col. Rowe
ay nagkita kaming dalawa ni Freddie sa aming bahay. Sa
pagkikita naming iyon ay ikinuwento niya sa akin ang mga
pangyayari. xxx
It should be emphasized that conspirators are the authors of the
crime, being the ones who decide that a crime should be committed.
Strictly speaking, a person may not be considered a conspirator by his
mere subsequent assent or cooperation in the commission of a crime
absent a clear showing, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that
he participated in the decision to commit the same;[71] in which case, his
culpability will be judged based on the extent of his participation in the
commission of the crime.
In the case at bench, appellant Donato Continente is liable for the
crimes charged in these criminal cases only as an accomplice under
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code. In order that a person may be
considered an accomplice in the commission of a criminal offense, the
following requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing
the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with
the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense
by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) there must be a relation
between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
The prosecution failed to establish, either directly or by
circumstantial evidence, that appellant Donato Continente was privy to any
conspiracy to carry out the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver on
that fateful morning of April 21, 1989. The evidence adduced disclose that
the participation of appellant Continente was made only after the plan or
decision to ambush Col. Rowe was already a fait accompli. Continente
Morato Street, Quezon City, before the shooting incident to gather certain
data, specifically the number of people and volume of vehicles in the area,
the measurement of the streets, and the distance of the JUSMAG
Compound from Tomas Morato Street. Subsequently, Continente reported
his findings to Freddie Abella and that thereafter the latter had taken over
the activity. Significantly, appellant Continente was not even present at
the scene of the crime on April 21, 1989.
Continente's participation in the crimes charged lies in its apparent
confusion regarding the distinction between a conspirator and an
accomplice. In view of its effect on the liability of appellant Continente, the
distinction between the two concepts as laid down by this Court in the
case of People vs. de Vera, et al.[73] needs to be reiterated, thus:
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and
agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal
intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of
action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have
reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed;
accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the
crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate
in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of the crime;
accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential
to the perpetration of the offense.
With respect to appellant Juanito Itaas, however, the trial court
correctly found that the evidence against him which consist of his written
confession and the straightforward and credible testimony of prosecution
eyewitness Meriam Zulueta, even if taken independently, are sufficient to

convict him. Appellant Itaas categorically admitted in his written
confession that he and his companions fired at the gray Mitsubishi car of
Col. James Rowe at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato
Street in Quezon City. Moreover, prosecution witness Meriam Zulueta
positively identified appellant Itaas as one of the persons she saw on
board a car who fired at a gray car at the same time and place where Col.
Rowe and his driver were ambushed.
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya,
was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the
offended party might make.[74] The evidence clearly shows that the mode
of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the
commission of the crime without the least danger unto themselves arising
from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his
companions, who were all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the car
of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of
Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any
warning, appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the said car
upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing
of Col. James Rowe during the said ambush is murder.
With respect to the liability of appellant Itaas for the wounding of
Joaquin Vinuya, it appears that the said victim sustained injuries on his
scalp, on the left shoulder and on the back portion of the left hand from
the ambush. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a
felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator. The evidence adduced by the prosecution,
particularly the opinion of Dr. Jose Santiago in his testimony, is not
sufficient to establish the crime of frustrated murder. This Court notes that
the wounds sustained by the victim are not fatal wounds but merely
superficial wounds.[75] The records disclose that Joaquin Vinuya
managed to drive the car of Col. Rowe toward the JUSMAG Compound
which is 200 meters away from the site of the ambush.[76] It also appears
that Vinuya was treated for his wounds for only four (4) days at the Clark
Air Base Hospital in Pampanga after which he was brought back to the
JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to recuperate. Hence, the crime
committed as against him is only attempted murder.
In view of the foregoing, appellant Juanito Itaas should be held
liable for the crimes of murder and attempted murder for his direct
participation in the killing of Col. James Rowe and in the wounding of his
driver Joaquin Vinuya, respectively. Due to the absence of any mitigating
nor aggravating circumstance in both cases, the penalty to be imposed on
appellant Itaas is reclusion perpetua for the murder of Col. James Rowe
and the medium period of prision mayor for the attempt on the life of
Joaquin Vinuya. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the latter
case, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on appellant Itaas is the
medium period of prision mayor and the minimum shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the offense, that is, prision correccional.
On the other hand, being an accomplice to the crimes of murder
and attempted murder, the penalty to be imposed on appellant Donato
Continente shall be the medium periods of reclusion temporal and prision
correccional, respectively. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in
both cases, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on appellant
Continente as an accomplice to the crime of murder is the medium period
of reclusion temporal and the minimum shall be prision mayor, while the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the said appellant as an
accomplice to the crime of attempted murder is the medium period of
prision correccional and the minimum shall be arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 88, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-89-4843 and Q-89-4844 is hereby
80
MODIFIED, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843, appellants Juanito Itaas and
Donato Continente are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, as principal and as accomplice, respectively. Appellant
Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant Continente as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Both appellants Itaas and Continente are ORDERED to pay
jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim,
Col. James Rowe, by way of civil indemnity.
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844, appellants Juanito Itaas and
Donato Continente are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted murder, as principal and as accomplice, respectively.
Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
for six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and
six (6) months of prision mayor, as maximum. Appellant Continente, as
accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ.,
concur.
10. IGNOMINY
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126021. March 3, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENE SIAO,
accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Accused-appellant Rene Siao together with Reylan Gimena were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu with the crime of rape
committed as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1994, about 3:00 P.M., in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent and
with force and intimidation upon person, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned, Estrella Raymundo, a minor, 14 years old, against the
latters will."[1]
Accused-appellant Rene Siao and Reylan Gimena pleaded "not guilty" to
the charge. Hence, trial proceeded in due course. After trial, the Regional
Trial Court of the City of Cebu convicted accused-appellant Rene Siao of
the crime of rape as principal by induction and acquitted Reylan Gimena.
The dispositive portion of the decision rendered on March 29, 1996 reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused Rene Siao GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal by induction in the crime of rape committed

against the person of Ester Raymundo and imposes upon him the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is, likewise, directed to
indemnify private complainant Ester Raymundo the sum of
P50,000.00 as and for moral damages.
Accused Reylan Gimena is hereby ACQUITTED because he acted
under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal, if not greater
injury.
For want of evidence, his cross-claim against Rene Siao should be,
as it is hereby ordered, DISMISSED."[2]
Hence, this appeal by Rene Siao.
The Office of the Solicitor General[3] summarized the evidence for the
prosecution in this wise:
Joy Raymundo and private complainant Estrella Raymundo are
cousins. They worked as house maids of appellants family. Reylan
Gimena was also a helper of appellants family. Estrella was then a
14-year old "probinsiyana" from Palompon, Leyte (p. 5, TSN,
September 16, 1994).
On May 27, 1994, at about 3:00 p.m., in the Siao residence located
at 417-A Basak Brotherhood, Cebu City, appellant ordered Reylan
Gimena, a houseboy of the Siaos, to pull Estrella to the room of the
women. Gimena dragged her toward the womens quarters and once
inside, appellant pushed her to the wooden bed (naomog). Appellant
pointed a pistol colored white at Gimena and the face of Estrella (pp.
7-8, TSN, September 16, 1994).
Producing a candle and a bottle of sprite, appellant asked Estrella to
choose one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite. He also told
Gimena "Reylan, birahi si Ester." (Reylan do something to Ester.)
Appellant lighted the candle and dropped the melting candle on her
chest (p. 7, TSN, September 20, 1994). Estrella chose a bottle of
sprite because she was afraid of the pistol. She was made to lie
down on her back on the bed with her head hanging over one end.
Whereupon, appellant poured sprite into her nostrils as she was
made to spread her arms. While appellant dropped the bottle of
sprite into her nostrils, he pointed the gun at her face. Estrella felt
dizzy and her eyesight became blurred (p. 6, TSN, September 20,
1994). She tried to fold her arms to cover her breasts but appellant
ordered Gimena to hold her hands (p. 10-15, TSN, September 16,
1994).
Appellant then tied her feet and hands with an electric cord or wire
as she was made to lie face down on the bed. After that, appellant
untied her hands and feet but tied her back with the same wire (p.
17, TSN, September 16, 1994).
As appellant pointed his pistol at her, he ordered Estrella to remove
her pants and T-shirt, she sat on the bed and did as she was told
and when she was naked, appellant commanded her to take the
initiative (ikaw ang mauna sa lalaki.) She did not understand what
appellant meant. At this point, appellant poked the gun at her temple
(pp. 19-20, TSN, September 16, 1994).
Appellant then commanded Gimena to remove his shorts. But
Gimena refused. Gimena did not remove his shorts but let his penis
out (p. 21, TSN, September 1, 1994; p. 11, TSN, September 20,
1994).
Appellant spread the arms of Estrella and made her lie down spread-
81
eagled (pp. 4-5, TSN, September 29, 1994). She felt dizzy and
shouted for help twice. Appellant ordered Gimena to rape Estrella. At
first Gimena refused to heed the command of appellant to rape
Estrella (birahi) because, according to Gimena, he has a sister.
Appellant said that if they would not obey, he would kill both of them
(pp. 4-10, TSN, September 20, 1994.
Appellant told Gimena, "Reylan, do something (birahi) to Ester!"
Estrella was made to suck the penis of Gimena at gunpoint. She
complied with the order of appellant and when the penis of Gimena
was inside her mouth, appellant kept looking and pointing his
handgun at them (pp. 11-14, TSN, September 20, 1994; pp. 19-20,
TSN, September 21, 1994).
Thereafter, Gimena got on top of Estrella (gisakyan) and did the
sexual act (kayatan). She felt excruciating pain. Gimena made push-
and-pull movements for around 10 minutes. Appellant looked on and
said, "why did it take you long to penetrate?" While Gimena was
making the push-and-pull movements, appellant held the legs of
Estrella to keep them apart (pp. 21-24, TSN, September 20, 1994).
After Gimena had sexual intercourse with Estrella, she sat down. Not
long after, appellant said: "You do it again." Gimena said that he
could not do it again because he was already very tired. But
appellant pointed the pistol at Gimenas temple. Gimena obeyed the
order of appellant because the pistol was pointed at him (pp. 25-26,
TSN, September 20, 1994). They were made to lay side by side
while appellant kept on pointing the pistol at them. Gimena, who was
behind Estrella made a push-and-pull movements so that his organ
would reach her private part (pp. 27-29, TSN, September 20, 1994).
After the side by side position, they were made to assume the dog
position (patuwad). Appellant commanded her to do it but she
refused because she was already tired. Appellant pointed the pistol
at her, so she obeyed his order. Gimena said: "I will not do that
because I am already tired." At that, appellant pointed the pistol at
Gimena. Thus, Gimena copulated with Estrella in the manner dogs
perform the sexual intercourse. Gimena shouted for help. Somebody
knocked on the door and they heard the voice of Teresita Paares,
the older sister of appellant. Appellant ignored Paares and kept on
pointing the pistol at Estrella and Gimena, as he looked at them with
wide-open eyes (siga) (pp. 30-31, TSN, September 20, 1994).
Shortly, appellant told them to go to the boys room. They complied
with his order tearfully, after he followed them laughing all the while.
Appellant then warned them: "If you will tell the police, I will kill your
mothers." (pp. 33-34, TSN, September 20, 1994).
At around 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, Estrella and
Joy Raymundo sought permission to go home. On their way home,
they met an old man who saw Estrella crying. The old man took
them to his house. After the incident was reported to the police,
Senior Police Officer Reynaldo Omaa conducted the investigation
and arrested Gimena, who was identified by Esrtrella as the one who
raped her on orders of appellant. The police officers looked for
appellant to shed light on the reported rape. But they could not
locate him (Exhibit "B"; pp. 5-7, TSN, December 13, 1994).[4]
Accused-appellant Rene Siao, anchoring his defense mainly on denial,
presents a different version of the case; his story -
"Private complainant Ester or "Estrella" Raymundo, together with her
cousin Joy Raymundo, was employed as a maid by the Siao family
on May 9, 1994.
In the morning of May 27, 1997, a commotion in the household of

Jose Siao awakened Teresita Paares, a sister of accused-
appellant. Ms. Paares learned that accused Reylan Gimena, one of
the houseboys of the Siao family, was accusing private complainant
of stealing his wristwatch. This was not the first time accused
Gimena confronted private complainant with the loss of his watch.
Earlier in the week, Teresita had also lost money in the amount of
P1,300.00, while her daughter Jan Bianca Abellana lost a necklace.
It would turn out that the other househelpers of the Siaos had
likewise lost personal articles. Marilyn Resujent, a maid, lost a brand
new panty and sleeveless blouse. Simeon Siroy Jr., a houseboy, lost
two T-shirts. Until the employment of the Raymundo cousins, the
household of the Siaos had not fallen victim to thievery.
At around noontime of the same day, upon his return from his
morning chores, accused Gimena inquired from Ms. Paares
whether his watch had been found. When informed that his watch
had not been recovered, he confronted private complainant, who
offered to pay for the value of the watch instead. Joy Raymundo
agreed to accompany accused Gimena to the house of an aunt (of
Joy and private complainant) for financial assistance. An hour later,
accused Gimena and Joy Raymundo returned to the Siao compound
and reported to Ms. Paares that the aunt was unable willing (sic) to
help.
In the meantime, private complainant admitted to Ms. Paares that
she stole the P1,300.00 but denied having taken the necklace.
Private complainant initially returned the sum of P600.00 to Ms.
Paares. When Ms. Paares stated that what she lost was
P1,300.00, private complainant went to her quarters and returned
with an additional P200.00. Private complainant explained that she
could no longer produce the remaining money because she had
already purchased a number of personal effects (pail, basin, pants,
shorts) for herself with it.
A little while after accused Gimena and Joy returned from the
house of Joy and Esters aunt, accused Gimena and private
complainant went to the males quarters. Sometime thereafter,
accused Gimena emerged from the males quarters and
announced the recovery of his watch. Private complainant had
revealed to accused Gimena the hiding place of his watch, which
was under the ironing board.
In the afternoon of May 24, 1994,[5] many people were present in
the household of Jose Siao, father of accused-appellant. Ms.
Beatriz Baricuatro was in the sala praying the rosary as was were
habit. Joy Raymundo was in the kitchen. Ms. Paares was likewise
downstairs going about her daily business. The grandchildren of
Jose Siao were running in and out of the house.
At about 3:00 p.m., Ms. Paares left their residence to seek the
assistance of the barangay with respect to the lost necklace of her
daughter. (Until this time, private complainant would not admit to
stealing the necklace). Within an hour, Ms. Paares returned to the
compound accompanied by Barangay Tanod Arturo Jabines.
Private complainant was inside the males quarters when the two
arrived. Accused had earlier reported for work at the retail store
owned by Jose Siao. When Barangay Tanod Jabinez introduced
himself, private complainant immediately begged for his
forgiveness and promised not to do it again. Barangay Tanod
Jabinez instructed the private complainant to address her pleas to
her victims and not to him. Before the barangay tanod, private
complainant admitted to stealing the necklace.
Dissatisfied with the piece-meal confession of the private
complainant, Ms. Paares decided to bring her to the barangay
hall where she could report the theft. On the way to the barangay
82
hall, private complainant confessed to selling the necklace and
begged for forgiveness. At the last minute Ms. Paares relented
and decided to give the private complainant a second chance.
Upon their return to the Siao compound, private complainant and
Joy Raymundo sought permission from Ms. Baricuatro to just
return to their home in Leyte. Ms. Beatriz gave her consent and
even handed them money for boat fare. At about 6:00 p.m., both
housemaids left the Siao residence, bringing with them all their
personal belongings. An hour later, some people came to the
house of Jose Siao looking for private complainant and her cousin.
At this time, accused-appellant Rene Siao remained unaware of
the developments that unraveled in the residence of Jose Siao. In
the morning of May 24, 1994,[6] accused-appellant made his usual
rounds ]collecting the obligations of his fathers creditors. At
noontime, accused-appellant went directly to the retail store of his
father where he had lunch with his wife Gina, as was his habit.
This was the usual hour of his fathers siesta and he would tend to
the store in his fathers absence, as was his custom.
At about 9:00 p.m. of the same evening, a barangay tanod came to
the retail store and invited accused Gimena to the barangay hall.
Jose Siao and Ms. Paares would follow.
At the barangay hall, upon the complaint of a certain Rosalie
Sallentes (who claimed to be related to the Raymundo cousins),
Barangay Captain George Rama asked accused Gimena of the
whereabouts of Ester and Joy Raymundo. Accused Gimena
answered that he did not know. During the course of the
investigation, and under threat by the Barangay Captain that his
head would be broken if he did not tell the truth, accused Gimena
confessed to tying up the private complainant to force her to reveal
the place where his watch was being kept. He untied her after he
recovered his watch from under the ironing board.
The following evening, on May 28, 1994, accused Gimena was
picked up by policemen at the retail store of Jose Siao and brought
to the Tabo-an Police Station.
Neither the police nor the barangay tanod looked for accused-
appellant on the evenings of May 27 and 28, 1994.
Private complainant would file a complaint against accused-
appellant and accused Gimena on June 21, 1994.
After the case was filed but before trial commenced, a person who
presented himself as the father of private complainant set a
meeting with the Siaos. The father of private complainant
demanded 1 Million Pesos from the Siaos to drop the rape
case."[7]
As stated earlier, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-
appellant Rene Siao guilty of the crime of rape as principal by induction in
accordance with Article 17(2) of the Revised Penal Code.[8]
Insisting on his innocence, accused-appellant assigns to the trial court the
following alleged errors:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT SIAO GUILTY BY INDUCEMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHARACTERIZING THE
INCONSISTENCIES AS MINOR AND IMMATERIAL
 83
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE Q: And all the time Rene Siao was holding both of your legs?
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES"[9]
ATTY. SENINING
The Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and has found
accused-appellants contentions to be without merit. Against the victims One of the . . .
story, accused-appellant urges us to accept his own version. But we
cannot do so, for we agree with the trial courts observation that a 14-year
COURT
old girl from the province, nave and innocent to the ways of the world, is
incapable of concocting serious charges against her employer and
fabricating a story of aberrant sexual behavior as can only be told by one Sustained. That is very leading.
who has been subjected to it.
Q: Now, what did you feel when Reylan penetrated you?
First, accused-appellants assertion that the failure of the prosecution to
present the gun used by him to force and intimidate Ester Raymundo and A: I felt excruciating pain.
Reylan Gimena to perform sexual intercourse is fatal to the prosecutions
cause is clearly untenable. This Court has held in People vs. Travero, that
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
"[t]he non-presentation of the weapon used in the commission of the rape
is not essential to the conviction of the accused. It suffices that the
testimony of the rape victim is credible because the established rule is that Q: So, what did you do because of that pain?
the sole testimony of the offended party is sufficient to sustain the
accuseds conviction if it rings the truth or is otherwise credible."[10] WITNESS

As to fact that accused-appellant Rene Siao forced and intimidated at
gunpoint Ester Raymundo and Reylan Gimena to have carnal knowledge
of each other, we are convinced that the same has been adequately
proved by the prosecutions evidence. Even as under settled
jurisprudence, the evidence for conviction must be clear and convincing to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence, we find the
straightforward, consistent and candid manner in which Ester Raymundo
related her harrowing experience in the hands of accused-appellant as
bearing all the earmarks of verity. Not only that, the corroborative
testimony of Reylan Gimena was consistent in material respects with that
of Ester Raymundo.
Ester Raymundo testified as follows:
A: I sat down when it was finished.
Q: How many minutes was Reylan doing the sexual act, the push-
and-pull above you?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
Your Honor, I would suggest, because there is no testimony to the
effect that there was a push and pull. There was no establishment,
Your Honor, the penetration was established but whether there was
a push and pull after the first penetration. Just for justice in this
matter it must be established by simple questions.

Q: Now, in your position which you have stated awhile ago, what COURT
did Reylan do with his penis?
Okay, ask simple questions.
COURT
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
"If he did anything?" To avoid any leading question. You can ask,
"What happened next?" "What did he do?" But to ask what did he do Q: Did Reylan make a push-and-pull?
with his penis . . .

ATTY. SENINING
FISCAL BUENVIAJE

That is leading also.

My questions are personal and very . . .

FISCAL BUENVIAJE
COURT

That is natural, that necessarily follows:

You can frame your question by just adding a few words "if he did
anything."
COURT

WITNESS
Let the Court ask the question:

A: We did the sexual act (kayatan).

Q: What was the body movement of Reylan when he had a
sexual intercourse with you?
FISCAL BUENVIAJE

A: He kept on push . . .
Q: Was he successful in penetrating you?

COURT
A: Yes.
 84
"He made a push-and-pull movement." That is a matter of law and interpretation.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ COURT

Making pumping action. Sustained. Anyway, you have the medical certificate. Next question.

FISCAL BUENVIAJE FISCAL BUENVIAJE

That is push-and-pull. I object that "pumping." This is not an artesian Q: Now, after that 10 minutes wherein Gimena raped you while
well. Rene Siao was holding both of your legs, what happened next?

COURT ATTY. SENINING

You will just Americanize "pumping." I would just like to correct the word "rape."

FISCAL BUENVIAJE ATTY. FERNANDEZ

Q: For how many minutes was Reylan doing the sexual act of I would also . .
push-and-pull?
ATTY. SENINING
WITNESS
I would suggest . . . (not finished)
A: Ten (10) minutes, more or less.
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
Q: Now, while Reylan was doing the push-and-pull for about 10
minutes, what was Rene Siao doing all the time? "Sexual act."

A: Rene Siao kept on looking and said, "Why did it take long to ATTY. SENINING
penetrate?

All right.
Q: Now, what was the position of both of the hands of Rene
Siao?
WITNESS

COURT INTERPRETER
A: Rene Siao then said that "You do it again."

Witness demonstrating that Rene Siao held her both legs in order to
COURT
spread it apart.

Then continue.
FISCAL BUENVIAJE

WTNESS
I would like to add some comments to the interpretation. According
to the witness, while Reylan Gimena was doing the sexual act, all
the time Rene Siao was holding both her legs. That is precisely the A: Then Reylan Gimena answered that he cannot do it because
meaning. he is already very tired.

Another question. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Q: Did Reylan Gimena reach that climax wherein he was like Q: Did Rene Siao allow Gimena to take a rest?
being electrocuted?
ATTY. SENINING
COURT
Again, Your Honor, please.
Sustained; she does not even know what is a climax.
COURT
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
What is your ground?
Q: Was Gimena able to consummate the act of rape on you?
ATTY. SENINING
ATTY. SENINING
Leading.
 85
COURT A: He kept on pointing the handgun.

Reform. Q: To whom?

FISCAL BUENVIAJE A: Me.

Q: What did Rene Siao do when at first Gimena refused because FISCAL BUENVIAJE
he was tired?
Q: Was Gimena able to successfully penetrate you this second
A: He pointed the handgun to Reylan Gimena. time around?

Q: What portion of the body of Gimena was pointed with a gun by ATTY. SENINING
Rene Siao?
May I just request, Your Honor, that the . . . (not finished)
A: At the left temple.
COURT
Q: So, what did Reylan do when Siao pointed the pistol on his
temple? Reform.

A: He obeyed the order because he was afraid of the handgun. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

FISCAL BUENVIAJE Q: You said Gimena also . . . (not finished)

Q: So, what did Reylan do to you for the second sexual act? COURT

ATTY. FERNANDEZ Just ask, "What happened next?"

Your Honor, please, I would object, I would rather suggest that the WITNESS
question, "What did Reylan do after?"

A: He kept on push-and-pull toward my private part.

FISCAL BUENVIAJE:

Q: Where did Gimena position himself in relation to you?

After the statement.

COURT INTERPRETER
COURT

The witness demonstrated by pointing at her left back.

Sustained. You already assumed that there was a second.

COURT
FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Q: Were you face-to-face or was he behind you?

Okay, I will reform.

A: He is behind.
Q: What did Reylan Gimena do when Siao pointed his gun on his
temple?
FISCAL BUENVIAJE

WITNESS
Q: And what did he do?

A: He obeyed the order because he is pointed with a handgun.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

Q: What position this time?

I think that has been answered that he made push-and-pull.

A: He was made to lie at my side.

Q: Was he able to penetrate you the second time?

Q: As you were now on your side, what did Reylan Gimena do?
WITNESS

A: Reylan Gimena also laid at his side.

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: What did Rene Siao do, if any?

Q: For how many minutes, if you still remember, did Gimena do
the push-and-pull action from your behind?
 86
A: Ten (10) minutes. Q: What did Rene Siao do upon hearing the statement of Reylan
that he would not comply?
Q: Was he able to accomplish his act?
A: He again pointed his handgun.
ATTY. SENINING
Q: Did Reylan comply wen Rene Siao pointed the gun to him?
What act?
A: Yes, because he was afraid.
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
Q: And what did Reylan do to you?
Sexual act.
A: Reylan made a push-and-pull because I was made by Rene
ATTY. SENINING Siao to assume the dog position (patuwad).

Already answered, penetrated. Q: Was Reylan able to penetrate you this time?

FISCAL BUENVIAJE A: Yes, and I even shouted.

But there is still climax that is why I am asking. Q: What did you shout?

ATTY. FERNANDEZ A: "Tabang!" I asked for help "Tabang!" and then there was
somebody who knocked. There was a knock made by my Ate and
she asked, "What are you doing there?" And Rene Siao did not
I think I have no objection to the question whether Reylan Gimena
listen.
ejaculated.

FISCAL BUENVIAJE
ATTY. SENINING

Q: According to you Rene Siao did not listen. In effect, did he

In fact that will be part of my cross-examination.
order you and Reylan to continue the act?

WITNESS
WITNESS

A: Maybe.
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Now, after that 10 minutes, what happened next?

Q: While Reylan Gimena was doing the sexual act on you, what
was Rene Siao doing all the time?
A: After the 10 minutes he let me assume a dog position
(patuwad).
A: He kept on pointing the handgun and kept on looking with
wide eyes (siga).
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
Q: For about how many minutes was that dog position continued
Q: Who ordered you to do the dog position? until termination?

A: Rene Siao. A: Five (5) minutes.

Q: What did he do to you? Q: After that, what happened next?

A: He told me to do it again but I was already tired and he A: Then Rene Siao told us to do the act in the room of the
pointed the handgun to me. boys."[11]

Q: Did you assume the dog position upon the order of Rene Corroborating the foregoing, Reylan Gimena testified as follows:
Siao?
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
A: Yes, because I was afraid of the handgun.
Q: After the sucking incident, what happened next?
Q: And what did Reylan do this time, if any?
A: The woman was ordered to lie down.
A: Reylan answered that "I will not do that because I am already
very tired."
COURT
 87
The Court would like to ask one question. Leading.

Q: When Ester was sucking your penis, did you ejaculate or did COURT
you feel warm liquid coming out of your penis?
Your just reform.
A: No, Your Honor.
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
Continue, Fiscal.
Q: What did you do?
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
A: I got on top of the woman.
Q: Now, you said Rene Siao ordered Ester to lie down, did she
comply? Q: Did you make a push and pull action on the vagina of Ester?

A: Yes, because he pointed a firearm to her. ATTY. SENINING

Q: Where did she lie down? Leading, Your Honor.

A: On the bed, sir. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Q: What was the position of Ester as she was lying down? Naturally, it follows. In the interest of justice, Your Honor.

A: She was lying face upward. COURT

Q: What was the position of her legs? Let the Court ask the question.

A: Straight, sir. Q: Were you able to penetrate or not?

FISCAL BUENVIAJE A: I was not able to penetrate yet.

Q: Now, as Ester was already lying down straight upon order of FISCAL BUENVIAJE
Rene Siao, what happened then?

Q: When you were not able to penetrate Ester, what was the
A: I was told by him to go on top of the woman. reaction of Rene?

Q: What was the exact word of Rene Siao in ordering you so? A: He said, "How is that?" Is it not inserted yet?" And I answered
back, "Not yet, Pard, because it is hard." And he said, "If it is hard
A: He said go on top of the woman so that you can deflower her. we will separate her legs."

Q: Did you understand what Rene Siao told you? Q: In effect, did Rene fulfill his words of spreading the legs of
Ester?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. SENINING
Q: What was your understanding?
Leading, Your Honor, because the word is "we." "We will spread her
A: He wants the woman to be raped. legs."

COURT COURT

Q: I think you have not answered the question of the prosecuting You just reform.
fiscal. If you can still recall, what were the words uttered or used by
Rene Siao? Q: What, if anything, did Rene do?

A: He said that he wants me to fuck the woman and he wants it FISCAL BUENVIAJE
fast.
Q: After uttering those words that we will separate her legs?
Q: And did you lie on top of the woman of Ester?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
ATTY. SENINING
 88
No. He answered "bilangkad," Your Honor. Leading again, Your Honor, please.

COURT FISCAL BUENVIAJE

No, Its on tape. This is cross-examination.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ COURT

After he said "kuan, he said "bilangkad." I will allow.

COURT FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Although you put it on record. No. How can we . . .

COURT INTERPRETER COURT

Witness motioning as if he was spreading. Never mind. I will allow.

COURT WITNESS

To satisfy Atty. Fernandez. You rewind. A: Yes, that was the time I penetrated.

(The tape was rewinded and played by the stenographer.) COURT

COURT Q: So your penis was stiff?

What is audible is the use of the word "kuan." A: Yes, Your Honor.

You clarify this point. Q: Did you like what you do?

FISCAL BUENVIAJE A: No, Your Honor.

We have the prerogative to ask. Next question.

COURT FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Never mind. You ask. Q: Did you ejaculate?

FISCAL BUENVIAJE A: Yes, sir.

Please do not refrain us from clarifying. COURT

COURT Q: What did you feel when you ejaculated?

Clarify. A: I do not know because that was my first time, Your Honor, with
a woman.
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
Because we will clarify what is not clarified.
Q: You said you were able to penetrate Ester while Rene Siao
Q: After uttering those words, what did Rene do, if any? was holding both of her thighs, then spreading it, and you said you
ejaculated. After that, what happened next?

A: He held the woman and spread her legs.

A: He told the woman to lie on her side.

Q: At this juncture wherein Rene Siao was already holding the

legs of Ester in order to spread it, were you able to penetrate Ester? Q: Did Ester comply to lie on her side?

ATTY. SENINING A: Yes, because a firearm was pointed at her.

 89
COURT ATTY. SENINING

Q: Did you notice if Ester was bleeding? Leading, Your Honor.

A: No, Your Honor. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Q: In her vagina? That is precisely the consequence.

A: Yes, Your Honor. COURT

FISCAL BUENVIAJE Let the Court ask the question.

Q: At that position wherein Ester was lying on her side, what did Q: Why did you fuck her on that position?
Rene do?
A: Because it was the order of Rene, Your Honor.
A: He ordered another position.
Sometimes it is the way you phrase the question. Okay, continue.
Q: Did you comply to fuck Ester in that position as ordered by
Rene FISCAL BUENVIAJE

ATTY. SENINING Q: After this side position, what happened next?

There is no basis yet. A: He ordered the woman to assume the doggy position.

COURT COURT

There was no question yet. There was no evidence that he was Lets just understand. "Gipatuwad." Lets just assume.
commanded to have sexual intercourse.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ
ATTY. SENINING

Crouching position.
He told . . .

COURT
COURT

Crouching.
Not yet. He only testified that Ester was made to lie sideways.

FISCAL BUENVIAJE
FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Q: In effect, did Ester comply to pose in a doggy position?

Q: After Ester complied to the order of Rene to lie on her side,
what more happened?
A: Yes, because a firearm was pointed to her.

A: That was the time that mine penetrated.

COURT

Q: Was that upon order of Rene?

You just put there parenthesis (gipatuwad).

ATTY. SENINING
FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Leading again, Your Honor.

Q: As Ester was in a dog position, did Rene utter anything to
you?
COURT

ATTY. SENINING
Sustained.

Hearsay again, Your Honor. Leading, Your Honor.

FISCAL BUENVIAJE

COURT
Q: You said you were able to penetrate Ester as she was on her
side, is that your own volition to fuck her on that position?
You just reform.
 90
FISCAL BUENVIAJE A: He ordered me to fuck the woman, sir.

Q: After Ester assumed that dog position, what did Rene do, if Q: Did you comply with the order to fuck Ester?
any?
A: Yes, because I was afraid as he kept on pointing his firearm to
A: He ordered me. me.

Q: What was the order? Q: And you were able to penetrate Ester on that position?

ATTY. SENINING A: Yes, sir.

I only request that the DSWD at my back, Your Honor, should not be COURT
allowed to coach the witness. I have no objection . . .
Q: By the way, at this juncture your penis was still stiff after the
COURT third position?

I am warning the representative of the DSWD to leave the interpreter ATTY. SENINING
alone.
Fourth.
ATTY. SENINING
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
Are you interested in this case?
Third, Your Honor.
COURT
COURT
Never mind, Compaero. There is a warning already.
Third. The sexual intercourse. Oral sex first. After the third sexual
(The last question of Fiscal Buenviaje was interpreted and answered intercourse.
by the witness).
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
COURT
Third penetration, Your Honor.
I understand because he is not used to using obscene words.
WITNESS
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
A: Yes, Your Honor.
He is not accustomed.
COURT
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
Q: Were you afraid at that juncture or point of time?
We just would like to manifest that the witness is not familiar in using
obscene words. A: I was still afraid, Your Honor, because he kept on pointing his
firearm to me.
COURT
Q: Did you like what did the third time, that is, penetrating Ester in
We do not know. The understanding of the court is he is hesitant to a doggy position?
use obscene words.
A: No, Your Honor.
ATTY. SENINING
Q: But you insist that your penis was still stiff?
Not because that . . .
A: Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
Q: Did you easily penetrate the vagina of Ester?
I would like to manifest that the witness is hesitant to use obscene
words. A: Not so easy, Your Honor."[12]

FISCAL BUENVIAJE To sum up, Ester Raymundo and Reylan Gimena were forced and
intimidated at gunpoint by accused-appellant Rene Siao to have carnal
Q: What did you do upon that order of Rene? knowledge of each other. Rene Siao called Reylan Gimena inside the

womens quarter. After Rene Siao closed the door, he told Reylan,
"Reylan, birahi si Ester". Since Reylan was at a loss as to what to do,
Rene Siao commanded Ester at gunpoint to "suck (um-um) the penis" of
Reylan Gimena.[13] Both Reylan and Ester performed the sexual act
because they were afraid they will be killed. Thereafter, accused-appellant
commanded Reylan to rape Ester in three (3) different positions, pointing
the handgun at them the whole time.
The testimony of Ester and Reylan were assessed by the trial court to be
credible. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment
must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they are lying.[14]
We find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court. If their
story had only been contrived, Ester and Reylan would not have been
composed and consistent in the face of such intense and lengthy
interrogation.
Second, accused-appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to the
testimonies of Ester Raymundo and Reylan Gimena despite being fraught
with substantial inconsistencies with regard to the following points: 1. Ester
testified that Reylan pulled her to the womens quarter, while Reylan
testified that when he entered the room Ester was already tied up in the
bed; 2. Ester testified that she was lying "face down" on the bed, while
Reylan testified that she was lying "face upward"; 3. Ester testified that
before being made to undress, accused-appellant Rene Siao wound
electrical wire around her neck and Gimena made no mention of this; 4.
Ester testified that Gimena ejaculated while performing the sexual acts
while Gimena testified that he did not ejaculate; and lastly, 5. Ester
testified that she had sought help from her cousin Joy Raymundo on the
way out from the womens quarter while Reylan testified that she just
walked slowly towards the mens quarters as ordered by accused-
appellant.
It can readily be seen that the alleged inconsistencies are inconsequential
considering that they refer to trivial matters which have nothing to do with
the essential fact of the commission of rape, that is carnal knowledge
through force and intimidation. This Court has consistently adhered to the
rule that inconsistencies on minor details of the testimonies of witnesses
serve to strengthen their credibility as they are badges of truth rather than
an indicia of falsehood.[15] If at all, they serve as proof that the witnesses
were not coached and rehearsed.
Third, accused-appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses do not conform to common experience due to the following
reasons: Reylan Gimena ejaculated three times in a span of less than 30
minutes; the rape took place within earshot and near the presence of other
people; Ester and Reylan did not make a dash for freedom during the ten
minutes it took Rene Siao to follow them from the womens quarter to the
males quarter where the latter wanted them to resume their copulation; a
barangay tanod was present at the place of the alleged rape at about 4:00
p.m.; the private complainant reported the incident to an old man she
chanced upon on her way home.
Again, the points raised by accused-appellant are trite and of no
consequence. First of all, the important consideration in rape is not the
emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male
organ.[16] Well-settled is the rule that penetration, however slight, and not
ejaculation, is what constitutes rape.[17] Thus, this factor could not affect
the case for the prosecution. Second, accused-appellants argument that it
is impossible to commit a rape in house where there are many occupants
is untenable. We have held in a number of cases that lust is no respecter
of time and place.[18] It is not impossible to perpetrate a rape even in a
small room. Rape can be committed in a house where there are many
other occupants.[19] Third, Ester and Reylan could not be expected to flee
or even to attempt to flee under the circumstances. Undoubtedly,
91
considering that Ester was only fourteen-years old and a newly employed
housemaid, while Reylan Gimena a seventeen-year old houseboy, they
were easily intimidated and cowed into submission by accused-appellant,
who aside from being their "amo" or employer, was menacingly
threatening to kill them or their family with a gun if they did not do as he
commanded them to do. Thus, it was not improbable for them not to
attempt to escape when as accused-appellant perceived they had an
opportunity to do so. Moreover, while most victims will immediately flee
from their aggressors, others become virtually catatatonic because of the
mental shock they experience.[20] It was also not improbable for them to
report the incident to an old man they met on the road as there was no on
else to turn to.
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different
version of the story. Accused-appellant sought to establish by his story
that since Ester was caught stealing money and the personal belongings
of the people in the household she had motive to implicate accused-
appellant in such a serious charge. We cannot see how a 14-year old girl
from the rural area could fabricate such charges borne out of a desire for
revenge. We agree with the following explanation by the trial court:
"The court cannot believe that a 14-year-old girl who is a
stranger in the city will vent her ire on Rene Siao. If Rene Siao
were to be believed that he did not confront Ester about the
latters act of committing the crime of theft, why would Ester take
revenge on Rene Siao? The court cannot believe that this 14-
year-old probinsyana will concoct a story so as to do damage
against business men like Jose Siao, Beatriz Baricuatro and
Rene Siao. As a matter of fact, filing a case in court would mean
untold misery and inconvenience. It will expose her to shame.
She mustered enough courage if only to make the truth prevail.
She ventured to assume the role of David against Goliath."[21]
On the contrary, this theory of accused-appellant backfires on him
because it appears that due to the thefts allegedly committed by Ester,
Rene Siao decided to vent his ire by subjecting her to a perverted form of
punishment and using Reylan as an instrument thereof. As to the charge
of accused-appellant that the father of Ester tried to extort a huge sum of
money from the accused-appellants family so that the case against him
will be dropped, we agree with the trial court that this contention is largely
self-serving as it is uncorroborated.
All told, we agree with the trial court that the testimony of Ester Raymundo
as well as the testimony of Reylan Gimena corroborating the same
support the prosecutions version of the fateful incident.
The rape was committed on May 27, 1994 or after the effectivity of R.A.
7659 on December 31, 1993.[22] The governing law, Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No 7659 imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon.
It reads:
"When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18)years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent,
any of the children or other relative within the third degree of
consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or child below seven (7) years
old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation.
Accused-appellant was held guilty of rape with the use of a deadly
weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.[23] But the
trial court overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating
circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the
accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary position, i.e.
male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e.
entry from behind, as was proven like the crime itself in the instant case,
the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the commission
thereof.[24]
However, the use of a weapon serves to increase the penalty.[25] Since
the use of a deadly weapon increases the penalty as opposed to a generic
aggravating circumstance which only affects the period of the penalty, said
fact should be alleged in the information, because of the accuseds right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[26]
Considering that the complaint (which was later converted into the
Information) failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon, specifically, that
herein accused-appellant was armed with a gun, the penalty to be
reckoned with in determining the penalty for rape would be reclusion
perpetua, the penalty prescribed for simple rape under Article 335, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659. Simple rape is punishable by the single
92
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, which must be applied regardless
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance which may have attended
the commission of the deed.[27] Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
imposed by the trial court is correct.
As a final matter, the trial court erred in ordering accused-appellant Rene
Siao to pay the complainant only the civil liability arising from the offense
in the amount of P50,000.00. In addition, it should have ordered accused-
appellant to pay the offended party moral damages, which is automatically
granted in rape cases without need of any proof.[28] Currently, the amount
of moral damages for rape is fixed at P50,000.00.[29] Moreover, the
presence of one aggravating circumstance justifies the award of
exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines[30] We find the amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages
reasonable on account of the fact that the aggravating circumstance of
ignominy attended the commission of the crime of rape.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Cebu
City, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant Rene Siao is ordered to pay P50,000.00 to Ester Raymundo by
way of moral damages, and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages in
addition to the amount of P50,000.00 which the trial court ordered him to
pay as indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
11. IGNOMINY
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JAIME JOSE
Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO
PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and
ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M.
Amores for plaintiff-appellee.
Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota,
Paraiso, Garcia and Dueas for defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose.
Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda,
Jr.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant
Edgardo P. Aquino.
Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-
appellant Rogelio S. Canial.
PER CURIAM:
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as
follows:
The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO
PINEDA, JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE"

and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG
LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y
ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with
rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named principal
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
design, forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against her will, and
did, then and there take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to
the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by
means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon,
have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to
her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her
under the provisions of the civil code.
That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and
JESSIE GUION y ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the
execution of the offense either by forcing, inducing the principal accused
to execute, or cooperating in its execution by an indispensable act, did,
then and there cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting
the principal accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in one
of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under the control of the accused
Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y
Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of
the offense.
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following
aggravating circumstances:
1. Use of a motor vehicle.
2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime
and to make its discovery difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which
added ignominy to the natural effects of the act; and
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for the commission.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed
in the above-quoted amended complaint; however, in an order dated July
11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until such time as the prosecution
shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other hand,
the rest of the defendants went to trial on their respective pleas of not
guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2,
1967, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Caal,
Eduardo Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of forcible abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of
them to the death penalty to be executed at a date to be set and in the
manner provided for by law; and each to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of ten thousand pesos. On the ground that the prosecution has
failed to establish a prima facie case against the accomplices Wong Lay
Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the
Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the
93
case dismissed against the aforementioned accused.
Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose
identified by pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of
which were submitted and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which
Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45
of the Revised Penal Code, which requires the confiscation and forfeiture
of the proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby orders its
confiscation.
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio
Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as
regards Rogelio Caal. However, for practical purposes all of them shall
hereafter be referred to as appellants.
The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the
incident, 25 years old and single; she graduated from high school in 1958
at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St.
Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving
P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her work to perform in radio
broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month
in permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows, and
from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss
De la Riva, homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay
City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen
Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th
Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her destination
when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard (later
identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to
bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed
on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was
already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car
(Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost
collided for the second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was
justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car
which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the
horn of her car continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss
De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on
tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, started
to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who
succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her mistress' predicament,
the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right
arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was
able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose
motor was all the while running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near
the Pontiac car, the three men inside started to assist their friend: one of
them held her by the neck, while the two others held her arms and legs.
All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was
completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped
away in the direction of Broadway Street. The maid was left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo
Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while
Rogelio Caal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the
appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive
and impolite language that the appellants and threats that the appellants
would finish her with their Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did
not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss
De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the
complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms
on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She

continuously implored her captors to release her, telling them that she was
the only breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone at home
and needed her company because her father was already dead. Upon
learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that
the situation was much better than he thought since no one could take
revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize
the futility of her pleas. She made the sign of the cross and started to pray.
The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino
would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two
would exchange knowing glances with Caal and Jose.
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and
headed towards Victoria Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta
Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a
handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss
De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed
or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the
Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to
one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold
was removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and
Jose and Caal sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. Pineda
told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three
expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The
complainant ignored the command. One of the appellants suggested
putting off the light so that the complainant would not be ashamed. The
idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be more
pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to
remove her stocking in order, according to them, to make the proceedings
more exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she
proceed with the assigned task that the appellants cursed her and
threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid. They started
pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of
her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her
dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her
dress, together with her brassiere, fell on the floor.
The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who
were kneeling in front of her and feasting their eyes on her private parts.
This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the complainant, in
all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda
picked up her clothes and left the room with his other companions. The
complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover herself, but she
could not find one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss
De la Riva, who was sitting on the bed trying to cover her bareness with
her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of
answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed.
Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and because the
complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her
several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The
complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force
them open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the
complainant. He then left the room.
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle
ensued between him and Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on
different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the
complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the
others into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to
revive her. Afterwards, three of the accused left the room, leaving Pineda
and the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the
former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the
complainant went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other
94
men went into the room again poured water on the complainant's face and
slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say that they had
to revive her so she would know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and
Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant Canal's turn. There was a
struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants
before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and
succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be
made the four appellants was struggling with the complainant, the other
three were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening the
complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she could not,
after all, escape what with their presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave
Miss De la Riva her clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her
stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression
that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she
was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group
found out that she was a movie actress, she was released without being
harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they
were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and
disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la
Riva again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was
stumbling, she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant
Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position during the
trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to
drop Miss De la Riva. They finally decided on a spot in front of the Free
Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5
to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come
from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to
choose one which did not come from a well-known company. Jose did as
requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab.
After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had
happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the taxicab. The
time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already
inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke
down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car was following them;
and each time the driver answered her in the negative.
It was 6:30 o'clock or some two hours after the abduction when Miss
De la Riva reached home. Her mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as
well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house.
Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and said,
"Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." The
mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's instruction, the
complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman also
instructed her daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a
strong solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who
was afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external physical
injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults.
Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by
the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence when the latter
received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la
Riva arrived home from her harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted
to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation
until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still
undecided on what to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to
discuss what steps, if any, should be taken. After some agonizing
moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed.
Thus, early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the
incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O.
Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the Quezon City

Police Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a
statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave
descriptions of the four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same
day, the complainant submitted herself ito a medico-internal examination
by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief Medico-Legal Officer.
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June
29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also at the NBI office. There he received a
telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect that one of the
suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat.
Pascual proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified
appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons inside the Office of
the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men he abducted
and raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she
made a formal identification of Jose and related the role played by him.
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a
statement (Exh. "I") before Pat. Marcos G. Vias. In his statement, which
was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he knew about, and was involved in,
the June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as his
companions. Jose stated, among other things, that upon the initiative of
Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of
the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that it
was Pineda who blindfolded her and that only Pineda and Aquino
criminally assaulted the complainant.
After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas
with a picture of appellant Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to
Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the
man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture
was shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified
the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of
the authorities: Pineda and Caal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino
on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1,
1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Caal as among the four
persons who abducted and raped her. She picked them out from among
several person in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in
the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. B-
2)wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants from
among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective
Bureau, adding that appellant Caal had tattoo marks on his right hip.
After the identification, one of the policemen took appellant Caal
downstairs and undressed him, and he saw, imprinted on the said
appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Caal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements
on the day of their arrest. In his statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Caal
confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of them
waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that
they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Caal admitted that all
four of them participated in the commission of the crime, but he would
make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded
her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a
statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions wept
to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there,
they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his
group followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky
Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily
acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple
contusions and bruises on different parts of the complainant's body, as
well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the doctor was shown
several photographs of the complainant taken in his presence and under
his supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical reports,
95
the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or bruises on
the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right arm index
finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was
examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around
the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital
physical injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh
of pain or tenderness on the part of the subject. The injuries, according to
Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows administered by a closed fist or
by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while
she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they could have been
sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital
examination, the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's
genitalia which could have been produced by sexual intercourse
committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa.
He explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the
vagina after the lapse of three days from the last intercourse, not to
mention the possibility that the subject might have douched herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Caal)
took the witness stand. We quote hereunder the portions of the decision
under review relative to the theory of the defense:
Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog
Cocktail Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed
time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until closing time, which was
about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they
had listened to the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them they
had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much so that at least Aquino
became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had been joined at
their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come time
to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in
Cubao. The five men piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door
convertible Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the
wheel repaired to Cubao After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered
the car to Espaa Extension to bring Aquino to his home in Mayon Street.
But somewhere in Espaa Extension before the Rotonda a small car
whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a
woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the small car he
shouted, "Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman
continued on her way. Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson,"
sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda
stopped his car behind being hurriedly got down, striding to the small car,
opened the door and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino
confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped
the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted
about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into
the red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid
Pineda: but they also admit that they did nothing to stop him.
Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the
area just to scare the girl who was in truth so scared that she begged them
to let her be and return her to her home. She turned to Jose in appeal, but
this one told her he could net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda.
Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you not have a sister yourself?" but
did not bear the other plea 'do you not have a mother?' Then Pineda
stopped at the corner of the street where he had forcibly snatched the girl
presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he said,
'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl
taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the
performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the
spectators were limited to the four of them.
Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie
alighted first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from
one of them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel. The three
followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught
up. All the three accused testify that as soon as they got into the room,

Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows before she.
undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed their clothing.
Two of them removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda
and Caal stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused
declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they
heard him promise her that he would pay the balance of P900.00 later.
Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10 minutes began with the
naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This
accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused
(Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Caal) left the room to wait in
the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still
discussing the mode of payment of the balance. Three minutes later
Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of how
and where to drop Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused
that it was Maggie's idea that they should drop her near the ABS Studio so
that it would appear as if she had just come from her work.
Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along
Buendia Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him
with a problem. He did not have the P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the
balance of her "show" and he was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie
would have her goons after him. He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa
City where he had relatives and where he could help raise the money.
Aquino readily obliged, and to make the company complete they invited
Caal to join them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from
the one they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached himself
from his compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit
his relatives. In the meantime his two companions had remained in the
City and had, according to Canal, gone to live in a house very close to the
municipal hall building. They later moved to another house where the PC
and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the
last to be apprehended, when having read in the newspapers that he was
wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the
governor of Batangas.
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is
anchored, defies one's credulity and reason, and had utterly to counteract
the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant's testimony
and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the
able dissertion of the trial judge on this point:
As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the
proposition that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease
exhibition which the complaint agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00,
P100.00 down and the balance to be paid "later." The flaw in this
connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that
any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind of
entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who
would consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to do a
performance, not even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling
she experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered
for a show. There is no fury to match a woman stirred to indignation. A
woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for money, and her revenge
much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness and
meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of
time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral
curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's
hankering as a weapon of revenge by denying them their pleasure.
Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again
something beyond even the wildest expectations. Assuming that the
woman whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of trade
assuming that the price offered was to her satisfaction, whom woman
would be willing to perform first and be paid later? It is simply
preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent to do
a striptease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to
be paid God knows when. Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on
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the installment basis? By the very precautious nature of their pitiful calling,
women who sell their attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be
expected that they could demand full payment before curtain call. How
was Maggie to collect later when she did not even know who these man
were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted with a promise to
pay later (!) whether she could ever find them again? If there is anything
that had struck the Court about the complaint, it is her courage, her
intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid
one that, could have been persuaded to do what the defense want this
Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.
Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this
circumstances during their interview with anyone, either the press, their
police interrogator, the person who negotiated their surrender (as in the
case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong
suspicion that this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day
for the accused. It truly underscores the hopelessness of their stand and
projects all the more clearly their guilt.
Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was
there need for this? The Court realizes that in its desperate need of an
explanation for Maggie's positive identification of Caal as the man with
the tattoo mark on his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly
incident story that the four men removed their underclothing in the
presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of men were
these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought
nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a strip
before them, but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience? And
then they have gall to argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold
and phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men
of torrid regions like ours where quick passions and hot tempers are the
rule rather than the exception!
All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious
that the version of the defense has not been able to explain away a very
vital piece of evidence of prosecution which, if unexplained, cannot but
reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and
internal) examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the
afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings of which quoted earlier in this
decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva
was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.
The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of
the following: (1) the insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy
Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the bruises and the sexual
attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense itself says that
these two persons rejoined the three after three or four minutes! It is
physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy Pineda to have
attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was
suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of
those injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused.
The examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it
does not take much stretch of the imagination to see how utterly
impossible this would be, and for what purpose? Was P900.00 which she
had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about all the
shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did)
expose herself to? If she really had not been raped would she have gone
thru all of these tribulation?
A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more
to lose in the notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and that of her
family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A.
1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666;
Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it could also be argued that the
contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie during her
struggle with Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red
convertible car. The telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for

the location in which many of the bruises and traumas were located
(particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause
by any struggle save by those of a woman trying to resists the brutal and
bestial attack on her honor.
In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and
uncorroborated testimony should not be rated any credence at all as
against the concerted declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it is
not correct to say that Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated she
has for corroboration nothing less than the written extra-judicial statements
of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stood alone in her
statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum
notwithstanding which the Court does not consider in point anyway,
jurisprudence has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital
element in gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is
which of the declarations is the more credible, the more logical, the more
reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted. (Ricarte 44 OG
2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should be
borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man is
at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the only one
available to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other
eyewitnesses would in certain cases place a serious doubt as to the
probability of its commission, so trial courts of justice are most often
placed in a position of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if
the same is in regards conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII
ACR 530).
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Caal deny having had anything to do with
the abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a
plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that
even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the
complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee,
a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of the element
of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg no to stand on. The
evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in
the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as
well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging
her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally;
that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was
seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the
latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and
knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged among the four;
and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel.
This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been
overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes
charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants'
protestation that they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected
as absolutely without factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the
court below, likewise been clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal
contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves
the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who
testified as an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the
vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject
has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the
examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the
complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy.
Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the
consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the
emission of semen, but penetration (People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980).
Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused by the
tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen
her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to
imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning as much Miss
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Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital organ by puncturing the
same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four
strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for
a striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an
instrument in the genital organ would not result in the kind of injuries he
found in the mucosa of the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the
commission of successive rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la
Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she
immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four
of them raped me." This utterance, which is part of the res gestae,
commands strong probative value, considering that it was made by the
complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature was the most
logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and
Canal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the
reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her
statement to the press is understandable. At that time the complainant,
who had not yet consulted her family on a matter which concerned her
reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not then in a
position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason
why the complainant did not immediately inform the authorities of the
tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with
disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on
different parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been self-
inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by
appellant Pineda alone, when the story given by the other three is that
Pineda and the complainant were left in the hotel room for only three or
four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would
picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly
suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably
presume her to have come from a studio? Equally important is the
complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the
examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future public
ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings as a movie actress.
4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from
the mass of evidence on the grounds that they were secured from them by
force and intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were
supplied by the police investigators. We are not convinced that the
statements were involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were
concocted by the authorities. The statements were given in the presence
of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of
Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the
use of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with details
which could hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested
that the authorities could have secured such details from their various
informers, no evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of such
allegation. While in their statements Jose and Canal admitted having
waited together with the two other appellants for Miss De la Riva at
the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the same statements to
exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino
criminally abused the complainant; while appellant Canal would make it
appear that the complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual
intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by the authorities,
they would hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed
to exculpate the affiants. It is significant, too, that the said two appellants
did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the alleged use
of force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon
City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter
made his statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said
appellant's body in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach
and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the
circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who took
down their statements categorically denied on the witness stand that the
two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was
supplied by them or by anyone other than the affiants themselves, We see

no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered conclusion that
the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-
custody statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence
for the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the conviction of the
two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being
questioned by Jose on the other ground that he was not assisted by
counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201),
Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S.
436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill
of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in the
Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal
prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil.,
258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of
Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings
before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment.
Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have provided in
Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions
the defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person
and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from the
arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so
requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation
(Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The
rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this
jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also
because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the meaning
attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered.
And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced
from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of the United
States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases.
5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a
mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage of justice. He contends that because
the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the
amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved,
would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his
presence during all stages of the trial. The contention is untenable. While
a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission
of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the
aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital,
for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant
circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles,
et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29,
1961, and People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the
aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon
the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence in
court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to
allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better
part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf.
People vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs.
Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court
ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the accused, who had
pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit that he committed the offense with
the aggravating circumstances" mentioned in the information. We are not
in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of the
proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty.
Lota prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement that .
I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple
language of the contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised him
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of the penalty he would get, and we have given said accused time to think.
After a while I consulted him for three times and his decision was still
the same.
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he
had always been averse to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I
know the circumstances called for the imposition of the maximum penalty
considering the aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his
client's wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would recommend to
the court the imposition of life imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any
such recommendation does not bind the Court. The situation here,
therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants Jose and Caal bewail the enormous
publicity that attended the case from the start of investigation to the trial. In
spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court a quo was
able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven
(7) original accused were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself
admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by
adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the rights of the
accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together
to commit the crimes imputed to them in the amended information quoted
at the beginning of this decision. There is no doubt at all that the forcible
abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City,
was a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to
commit the various and the successive acts of rape upon her person. It
bears noting, however, that even while the first act of rape was being
performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been
consummated, so that each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same
nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction
in other words, they should be detached from, and considered
independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can
no longer be complexed with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is
punishable by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph
3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on
June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape committed.Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of
the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall
be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed,
the penalty shall be death.

As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape,
the first of the crimes committed, the latter is definitely the more serious;
hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently,
the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard,
there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be
imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the
purpose of determining the proper penalty to be imposed in each of the
other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite
finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes
was attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime,
appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the
commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime
having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one
another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c)
ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to
them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her,
brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the
crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to
appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca__al, none of these aggravating
circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant
Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the
nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there
would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result,
appellants should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death
in each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised
Penal Code.)
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses
committed, the trial court applied by analogy Article 70 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the
penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than
threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty
years." The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life
to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society and
the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one death penalty were
imposed on each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code
can only be taken into account in connection with the service of the
sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs.
Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should
be imposed because man has only one life, the trial court ignored the
principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37
Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court,
found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed
upon him two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for the
homicide. In not applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the
case of Balaba is different from the present case, for while in the former
case the accused was found to have committed three distinct offenses,
here only one offense is charged, even if complex. As We have explained
earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is,
therefore, no substantial difference between the two cases insofar as the
basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the
case of Balaba this Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death
sentences imposed on the accused by the trial court. In People vs.
Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on
each of the six accused three death penalties for three distinct and
separate crimes of murder, We said that "since it is the settled rule that
once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to
all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts
committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and
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severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said case
(which was promulgated after the decision of the court a quo had been
handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length the legality and
practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless
formality, an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a
death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of
this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the
imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because
after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the
death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing
opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four
basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital
penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and
service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences
could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of
imposing multiple death penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct,
though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties
is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and
proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and
character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the
proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the
possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual
service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the successful
escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the
prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties,
to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged
and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will
have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will
show that there are only two moves of serving two or more (multiple)
penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more
penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will
so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal
sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous
service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless
formality, has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to
several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal
perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only
one death sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which
he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its
real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is
justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple
death penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant
of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a
convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious
restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his
constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which
is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death
penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the
convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of multiple life
sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to
life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty
years corresponding to a single life sentence.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy
among them and of our finding as regards the nature and number of the
crimes committed, as well as of the presence of aggravating
circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the premises.

the latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case to that effect;
Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment &
Finance Corporation asking for reversal of that portion of the judgment of
the court below ordering the confiscation of the car used by the appellants
in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door
Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777,
Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in
the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police
Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G.
Jose, bought the car from the Malayan Motors Corporation and
simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of
the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24
monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969.
The mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation
Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The
mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April
17, 1967, for value received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan
Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the
chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered
with the Land Transportation Commission and annotated on the
registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the
intervenor filed on July 5, 1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil
Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an
order for the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not enforce the
writ of replevin because the car was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the
same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together
with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva,
as a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and
placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender it to
the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of
the criminal case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July
26, 1967, the intervenor filed with the said court a petition for intervention.
The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the
trial court rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's
confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the
said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for
reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on
October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction
over the case in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The
intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgement, but the same was
also denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case
ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car to the intervenor so that the chattel
mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the
intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum
from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of
suit. The judgment became final and executory. Attempts to execute the
judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of
execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the
present petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the
intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among
others, that the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner
of the car, the order of confiscation is correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs.
Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary,
must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the
court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were
100
that the said statement were not, however, intended to be, nor could
constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but
were made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole
purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car
used by the appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel
mortgage on the car and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were
made several months before the date of commission of the crimes
charged, which circumstance forecloses the possibility of collusion to
prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final judgement in the
replevin case can only be executed by delivering the possession of the car
to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45
of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an
instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such "be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this
Court that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in
question should be set aside and that the said car should be ordered
delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No.
69993.
Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a
formal manifestation on the part of the Solicitor General to the effect that
Rogelio Caal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December
28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as
to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with
one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows:
appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are
pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape,
and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other
crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby
sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and
severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of
the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4)
of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the
order of the court a quo for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and
whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to
intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
69993 thereof.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.
DIGEST
Nature: Appeal from and automatic revue of a decision of Rizal CFI
? June 26, 1967 Magdalena de la Riva was abducted outside her
own by Jaime Jose, Edgardo Aquino, Basilio Pineda and Rogelio Canal.
They brought Maggie to Swanky Hotel. Jose, Aquino, Pineda and Canal
took turns raping Maggie.
? They decided to leave her on a spot in front of the Free Press
Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to
make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come
from the studio.
? They threatened that she would be doused with acid if she would
inform anyone of the incident.
? When she was inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F.
Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car

was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative
? When she reached home she informed her mother of the incident
? Appellant Canal and Pineda executed swore to separate
statements on the day of their arrest
1. Caal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the
four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS
Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Caal
admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the crime,
but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the
complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release
her
2. Pineda executed a statement stating that he and his other three
companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la
Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He
admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her and took her to
the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the
complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.
? Jose, Aquino, Canal pleaded not guilty while Pineda pleaded
guilty.
Issues
1. WON the accused were motivated by lewd designs. YES
? YES. Jose, Aquino and Caal deny having had anything to do with
the abduction of Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a
plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that
even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the
complainants subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee,
a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of the element
of lewd design.
? This testimony of Ms. De la Riva, whose evidentiary weight has not
in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to
establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. The claims of the
accused that they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as
absolutely without factual basis.
2. WON the accused rape Ms. de la Riva.
? YES. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen
in the complainants vagina disproves the fact of rape.
? Dr. Brion stated that semen is not usually found in the vagina after
three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched
herself within that period
? The absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation
of rape, the important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but
penetration.
? When the victim got home she immediately told her mother that
the four raped her. The statement was made by the complainant to her
mother who, in cases of this nature was the most logical person in whom a
daughter would confide the truth.
3. WON the extrajudicial statements is admissible.
? YES. The accused contends that secured from them by force and
intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were supplied by the
police investigators.
? The statements were given in the presence of several people &
subscribed & sworn to before the City Fiscal of QC, to whom neither of the
aforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police.
They are replete w/ details which could hardly be known to the police; &
although it is suggested that the authorities could have secured such
details from their various informers, no evidence at all was presented to
establish the truth of such allegation.
? Even disregarding the in-custody statements of Jose and Canal,
We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice
to secure the conviction of the two.
4. WON there was a mistrial for Pineda.
? NO. Pineda contends that there was a mistrial resulting in gross
miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against him
and his co-appellants is a capital offense & the amended complaint cited
aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the penalty to
death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all
stages of the trial.
? The court held that plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it
101
constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information,
including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the
offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime
and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime it
was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less
to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda
requested the court to allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for
then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the trial court to
grant his request.
5. WON the enormous publicity of the case affected the decision of
the trial court.
? NO. The appellants took notice of the enormous publicity that
attended the case from the start of investigation to the trial.
? Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge had not been
influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the
rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial.
6. WON aggravating circumstances were present.
? YES. Nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such
circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes
? Abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by
the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De
Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113)
? Ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to
exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before
raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating
? use of a motor vehicle.
7. WON the imposition of four death penalty is valid.
? YES. The Supreme Court held that in view of the existence of
conspiracy among the accused and of its finding regards the nature and
number of crimes committed, as well as the presence of aggravating
circumstances, four death penalties can be imposed.
12. AID OF MINOR OR BY MEANS OF MOTOR VEHICLES
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 145993. June 17, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RUFINO MALLARI y
ILAG, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In its decision of 16 June 2000, in Criminal Case No. 9621-B, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, of Bian, Laguna, convicted appellant
RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG of murder and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death for having fatally bumped Joseph Galang with an Isuzu
Canter Elf truck.
On 12 December 1996, an information[1] for Murder was filed
against Rufino, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about July 7, 1996, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province
of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Rufino Mallari y Ilag, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation, treachery and with the use of motor vehicle, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously hit and bump with his driven
Brand New Isuzu Canter Elf with conduction sticker number 33 LAB one
Joseph Galang, thereby inflicting [on] him mortal wounds on the head
which directly cause[d] his death, to the damage and prejudice of his
surviving heirs.

That the crime was committed by means of a motor vehicle as a qualifying
circumstance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment, Rufino pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented as witnesses Liza
Galang, Edgar Bawar, and Dr. Erwin Escal; while the defense presented
Rufino himself, Myrna Mallari, Dr. Divina Palarca, and Dr. Escal.
Liza Galang testified that on 7 July 1996 at around 4:00 p.m., her
common-law husband Joseph admonished Rufino and his brothers Ino
and Felix Mallari not to drive fast while passing by Josephs house. Rufino
and his brothers, who were then hot-tempered, challenged Joseph to a
fight. The latter just ignored the challenge; and, instead he and his own
brothers Radi and Manny asked apology from Rufino.[2]
Later that afternoon, while Joseph and Liza were watching a
basketball game at the barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers,
who were then carrying bladed weapons, arrived and attempted to stab
Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they were not able to
catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near the
basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the
latter, which caused his instantaneous death.[3]
Liza further testified that at the time of his death, Joseph was 37
years old. He was a foreman in a construction firm with a daily income of
P350 and also a carpenter and mason with a daily income of P250. She
spent less than P20,000 for the coffin, tomb, funeral, and other expenses
during the wake of Joseph.[4]
Edgar Bawar, a friend of Joseph, testified that at 6:24 p.m. on 7
July 1996, while Joseph was watching a basketball game, Rufino and his
brothers Ino and Felix, who were carrying bladed weapons, arrived and
chased Joseph. Joseph ran away, and Rufino pursued him with the truck.
Upon catching up with him, Rufino bumped Joseph, as a result of which
the latter died on the spot.[5]
Dr. Erwin Escal testified that the cause of death of Joseph, as
stated in the Medico-Legal Report,[6] was [c]rushing injury on the head
secondary to vehicular accident. Josephs head was deformed with
multiple skull fractures and lacerations and brain tissue evisceration.[7]
The defense had a different story. Rufino testified that on 7 July
1996 at around 6:30 p.m., while he was driving a truck at a speed of
eighty kilometers per hour, with his wife Myrna seated on the passenger
side, he saw Joseph on the road about four meters away from him.
Rufino, who was then on his way to the garage to park the truck, blew
thrice the horn. But Joseph went to the middle of the road and threw
stones, which went through the windshield and hit Rufino on the chest. As
a result thereof, Rufino lost control of the truck, and ran over Joseph.
Because of fear, Rufino did not alight from the truck; instead, he
proceeded to the municipal hall of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where he
surrendered and was immediately detained.[8]
Myrna Mallari testified that prior to the incident in question, she
saw Joseph at the basketball court. He was apparently drunk and was
carrying a balisong. Much to her consternation, he gave a dagger look.
Myrna reacted by simply crying and going inside her house. She
corroborated Rufinos testimony that while Rufino was driving the truck,
Joseph threw stones, which went through the windshield and hit the chest
of Rufino.[9] As a result of which, Rufino had chest pains and vomited
blood while in detention.
Dr. Divina Palarca testified that she examined Rufino on 29
October 1996 and found him to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis,
which possibly could have afflicted him six months prior to its discovery.
[10] Dr. Escal confirmed the testimony of Dr. Palarca, as in fact, it was he
who diagnosed the illness of Rufino.[11]
102
The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Liza Galang and Edgar Bawar that Rufino deliberately bumped
Joseph. Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle,
it convicted Rufino of murder and sentenced him to suffer the death
penalty and to pay the victims heirs P100,000 as compensatory damages;
P75,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as exemplary damages; and costs.
[12]
The case is now before us on automatic review pursuant to Article
47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In his Appellants Brief, Rufino imputes to the trial court the
following errors:
I
IN FINDING THAT THE INCIDENT WHICH KILLED JOSEPH
GALANG WAS DONE BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITH CRIMINAL
INTENT AND MALICE.
II
IN CONSIDERING THE USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE AS A
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY.
III
IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.[13]
We note that in his prayer in the Appellants Brief, Rufino seeks his
acquittal of the crime of murder, or in the alternative, his conviction for
homicide only. In his discussion of his first and second assignments of
error, however, Rufino does not seek his acquittal but merely the
downgrading of his crime from murder to homicide on the grounds that
no evident premeditation was proved and that the motor vehicle was
merely incidental to the commission of the crime. In his third assignment
of error, Rufino argues that voluntary surrender should have been
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in his favor, considering that
after the bumping incident, he proceeded to the municipal hall of Sta.
Rosa, Laguna, where he was immediately detained.
In its Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
seeks the affirmance of Rufinos conviction but argues that the penalty to
be imposed on him should be reclusion perpetua only because of the
presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
In view of the diametrically opposed versions of the prosecution
and the defense, the resolution of the present case hinges on the
credibility of the witnesses who had come forward to testify. We have long
recognized that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies lies within the province and competence of the trial court
because it has the direct opportunity to observe the witness attitude,
demeanor, deportment, and manner of testifying,[14] all of which aid in
determining whether the witness is telling the truth or merely
prevaricating. Thus, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is accorded great weight and respect and even finality by
appellate courts[15] unless some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance which could affect the result or disposition of the case was
ignored, misapplied, misunderstood, or overlooked by the trial court or
when the finding of fact was reached arbitrarily or capriciously.[16] We
find no cogent reason to disturb the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses and its factual findings as to what actually
happened, the same being amply supported by evidence.
Neither the prosecution nor the defense disputes two important

facts: one, Joseph died instantly after he was hit by the truck; and second,
the truck was driven by Rufino. There being no question on the identity of
the person responsible for Josephs death, what is left to be resolved is
whether Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph with the truck he was driving.
The antecedent events show that, indeed, Rufino deliberately ran
over Joseph. At around 4:00 p.m. of 7 July 1996, when Rufino passed by
Josephs house while driving the truck, he got angry when Joseph
admonished him not to drive at high speed in front of Josephs house.
Rufino, already in a fighting mood, challenged Joseph to a fight, but the
latter just ignored it. To put an end to the argument, Joseph and his
brothers apologized to Rufino.
Apparently, Rufino was not appeased by the apology and
continued to harbor ill-feelings against Joseph. Rufino got the chance to
vent his anger not long thereafter. At around 5:30 p.m., while Joseph was
watching a basketball game at the basketball court located beside Rufinos
house, Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix, carrying with them bladed
weapons, attempted to stab Joseph. But before they could do it, Joseph
was able to run away. They chased Joseph, but were unable to catch up
with him. Instead of giving up on his evil design, Rufino went back to the
basketball court, boarded the truck parked nearby, and resumed his
pursuit of Joseph. Upon seeing Joseph on the road, Rufino hit him with
the truck.
We note that the testimonies of Liza and Edgar were consistent
with their respective sworn statements,[17] which they gave to the police
investigator in the morning of 8 July 1996. Considering that less than
twenty-four hours had elapsed from the time of the bumping incident, Liza
and Edgar could not have concocted a story to pin down Rufino for the
death of Joseph. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the
sworn statements and the testimonies of Liza and Edgar.
Moreover, the defense has not shown any reason why Edgar, who
corroborated Lizas testimony about the incident, would perjure himself to
pin down Rufino. Absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for
the prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith
and credit.[18]
In comparison, Rufino and Myrna gave inconsistent testimonies.
Myrna wanted the court to believe that her husband was in no way at fault
by stating that Rufino was driving at a slow pace,[19] while Rufino himself
declared that he was driving at a speed of eighty kilometers per hour.[20]
Myrnas attempt to cover up the misdeed of her husband is obvious;
hence, the integrity of her declarations becomes questionable.
Rufino himself made inconsistent statements. At first, in the course
of the direct examination, Rufino declared that prior to the bumping
incident he saw Joseph pass by his house, walking in a zigzag manner.
[21] This testimony was an attempt to give credence to his allegation that
Joseph was drunk, which was why he threw stones at the truck for no
reason at all. But when he was asked during his cross-examination about
his altercation with Joseph earlier that fateful day, Rufino made a complete
turnaround and declared that he saw Joseph for the first time at the place
where he was run over.[22]
Moreover, the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna do not inspire belief
for being improbable and not in accord with human experience. It is
axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be credible, it should come not
only from the mouth of a credible witness, but should also be credible,
reasonable, and in accord with human experience.[23]
According to Rufino, he saw Joseph when the truck was four
meters away from the latter and he blew his horn three times. This is
altogether unbelievable. At a speed of eighty kilometers per hour, a four-
meter distance could easily be covered by the truck in a split second, and
there would be no time for the driver to blow the horn before the impact.
Much less could there be time for a person on the road to pick up a stone
and hurl the same to an oncoming truck. Thus, it is simply impossible that
103
Joseph was able to hurl a stone at the truck before he was run over.
Neither can we believe Rufinos testimony that he first saw Joseph
on the road when the truck was just four meters away from him. According
to Rufino, the road was clear because only Joseph and the truck he was
driving were on the road. He testified as follows:
Q Mr. Witness, when you saw for the first time Joseph
Galang along the road, there was no other vehicle
from [the] opposite direction where you were
heading?
A None, sir.
Q So that your driven vehicle and Joseph Galang were
the only [ones] in that road?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the road could accommodate two (2) ten wheeler
trucks?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said likewise that when you first saw Joseph
Galang, he was about four (4) meters away from
your driven vehicle?
A Yes, sir.[24]
From Rufinos own testimony, it appears that his view was
unobstructed. He could have seen Joseph from afar and could therefore
have avoided bumping the latter had he really wanted to.
Obviously, the stone-throwing incident was concocted by the
defense as a last ditch effort to have Rufino absolved from his criminal
act. Unlike the prosecution witnesses who executed their sworn
statements on the morning after the subject incident, Rufinos sworn
statement[25] was executed only on 15 August 1996, or more than one
month after the incident. Thus, Rufino had enough time to reflect and
come up with a plot. Unfortunately for him, the story he concocted is so
incredible that we are not inclined to believe it.
To prove that Rufinos driving ability was adversely affected by his
illness, the defense presented a medical certificate[26] stating that Rufino
was treated at the Sta. Rosa Community Hospital for Minimal PTB,
Bilateral with partial collapse of Right Upper Lobe on 1 November 1996,
or almost four months after the bumping incident. That certificate is not
competent evidence to prove that at the time, Rufino was already suffering
from pulmonary tuberculosis. But even granting arguendo that Rufino was
already suffering from said illness at the time of the incident, there is no
evidence that it had affected his driving ability to the extent that Rufino was
no longer able to control the vehicle he was driving.
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the trial courts finding that
Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph with the truck he was driving.
Rufinos culpability having been resolved, we now come to the
penalty to be imposed. The trial court imposed the death penalty on the
ground that the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle is present.
Rufino, however, argues that the use of a motor vehicle was only
incidental, considering that he resorted to it only to enable him to go after
Joseph after he failed to catch up with the latter. The fallacy of this
argument is obvious.
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in
pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the
truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that
the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of
Joseph.
The case of People v. Muoz[27] cited by Rufino finds no
application to the present case. In the said case, the police patrol jeep
was merely used by the accused therein in looking for the victim and in
carrying the body of the victim to the place where it was dumped. The

accused therein shot the victim, which caused the latters death. In the
present case, the truck itself was used to kill the victim by running over
him.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills
another by means of a motor vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of
motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder.[28] The penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. Since the penalty is composed of two
indivisible penalties, we shall apply Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads:
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
In the present case, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery, which were alleged in the information, were
not proved. What was proved was the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender through the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which were not
rebutted by the prosecution.
We have held that for voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and
(3) the surrender was voluntary.[29] A surrender is considered voluntary if
it is spontaneous and shows the intention of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities because he either acknowledges his guilt
or wishes to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily
included for his search and capture.[30] All these requisites are present in
this case.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the
presence of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death,
should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
We now discuss the damages to be awarded.
The trial courts award of P100,000 compensatory damages is
erroneous because it was without basis. The records show that the
prosecution presented only two receipts, for the amounts of P9,000[31]
and P200[32] representing payment for the casket and funeral services,
and the niche, respectively, or a total of P9,200. Only expenses supported
by receipts and which appear to have actually been expended in
connection with the death of the victim should be allowed for actual
damages.[33] Hence, the award of P100,000 should be reduced to
P9,200.
We sustain the courts award of moral damages but at a reduced
rate of P50,000, consistent with recent jurisprudence. In cases of violent
death, moral damages is awarded even in the absence of proof because
an untimely and violent death invariably brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family.[34] In addition, the amount of
P50,000[35] as indemnity for the death of Joseph should be awarded to
his heirs.
The award of exemplary damages is proper in view of the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle. However,
the amount of P50,000 awarded by the trial court should be reduced to
P25,000 pursuant to current case law.
Finally, we note that the prosecution offered the testimony of the
victims widow on the age and daily income of her husband, without
supporting the same with documentary evidence.
The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence provided that there is testimony that the victim was
either (1) self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under
104
current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
victims line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.[36]
There is no showing that the victim was self-employed or employed
as a daily-wage worker with an average daily income of less than the
minimum wage provided under the labor laws in force at the time of his
death. In the absence of such proof, the exception cannot be applied to
this case. Hence, no award for loss of earning capacity can be granted in
favor of the victims heirs.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, of Bian, Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 9621-B convicting
appellant RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG of the crime of murder is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. The penalty is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua;
2. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000 is
reduced to P25,000, and the awards of actual and moral
damages are reduced to P9,200 and P50,000, respectively;
and
3. Appellant Rufino Mallari y Ilag is further ordered to pay the
heirs of Joseph Galang an indemnity ex delicto in the amount
of P50,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
DIGEST
June 17, 2003, Criminal Law
Aggravating Circumstance Use of Motor Vehicle
On July 7, 1996 at 4 pm, Joseph Galang admonished Mallari for driving so
fast in front of the farmers house. Mallari got irked and challenged Galang
into a fist fight. Galang did not accede and apologized instead. At about
6:30 pm, Mallari returned and tried to stab Galang but Galang was able to
run. Mallari boarded his truck and drove after Galang until he was able to
catch up with him. He bumped him and crushed Galangs head. Galang
voluntarily surrendered. He was convicted for murder and was sentenced
to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not evident premeditation is attendant.
HELD: No. Evident premeditation and treachery was not proven to be
present. However, Mallaris use of a motor vehicle which is his truck
qualifies him for the crime of murder. He used his truck in killing Galang.
Voluntary surrender is to be appreciated in favor of Mallari. He is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
13. MOTOR VEHICLE
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128812. February 28, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THADEOS
ENGUITO, defendant-appellant.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This case was certified for review pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure by the Court of Appeals[1] which found
accused-appellant Thadeos Enguito guilty beyond reasonable of the crime
of murder with less serious physical injuries and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Thadeos Enguito was charged with the crime of Murder with Multiple Less
Serious Physical Injuries under the following Information: Ky-calr
"That on September 22, 1991 at about 3:00 o'clock early dawn at
Marcos Bridge, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
intent to kill and with treachery and with evident premeditation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously chased, bumped and
hit the motorela which Wilfredo S. Achumbre was riding with his Ceres
Kia automobile bearing Plate No. 722 and as a consequence thereof,
the motorela was dragged and fell on the road causing the driver
(Felipe Requerme) and its passenger Rosita Requerme to sustain
serious bodily injuries while the deceased Wilfredo S. Achumbre was
able to run towards the railings at Marcos Bridge but accused with
intent to kill him hit instantaneously immediately rammed and hit him
with his driven vehicle cutting his right leg and thereafter ran over him
thereby causing mortal harm on his body which was the direct and
immediate cause of his instantaneous death.
That the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
paragraphs 13 and 21 of Article 14 thereof."[2]
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.[3]
Trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Felipe
Requerme, Rosita Requerme, PO3 Ricardo Catiil, SPO1 Albert
Calingasan, PO3 Virgilio Maquiling, SPO1 Franklin Alamban, Sr., Georgita
Achumbre, Dr. Sofronio Sescon and Dr. Apolinar Vacalares. The defense
presented Alberto Chaves, Anita Enguito and the accused himself.
In his brief, accused-appellant states that he is in conformity with the
findings of facts of the court a quo[4] which we quote hereunder:
"Prosecution's Evidence: Ms-esm
From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Felipe Requerme,
Rosita Requerme, PO3 Ricardo Catiil, SPO1 Albert Calingasan,
PO3 Virgilio Maquiling, SPO1 Franklin Alamban, Sr., complainant
Georgita Achumbre, wife of the deceased, Dr. Sofronio Sescon and
Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, it was established that at about 3:00 o'clock
dawn of September 22, 1991, Felipe Requerme, a motorela driver
who while driving his motorela with his wife on board, from Lapasan
towards Poblacion, Cagayan de Oro City, picked up a passenger
near the Nazareno church. The passenger was later identified as the
deceased, Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre. Achumbre asked him to bring
him across the Marcos bridge towards his home. After travelling a
distance of 300 meters more or less and near the Sacred Heart of
Jesus Montessori School, Requerme's motorela was bumped by a
white motor vehicle. The vehicle kept pushing the motorela causing it
to run very fast for the next 400 meters until it reached the area in
105
front of Wheels Marketing. Because of the violent push the motorela
turned around facing the direction from where it came from and fell
on its right side.
Felipe Requerme screamed for help thinking that his wife was
pinned underneath. A tamaraw pick-up stopped near them and he
immediately informed that they were intentionally hit by the white
vehicle. A short time later a police mobile patrol arrived and with the
assistance of the people around, they pushed the motorela to return
it to its natural position. Requerme and his wife were brought to the
Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw (OKK), a 24-hour police station
where all victims of crimes report in Cagayan de Oro. At the OKK the
driver of the white service pick-up who bumped his motorela arrived.
Requerme identified the driver as Thadeos Enguito whom he pointed
inside the courtroom. Later, Requerme and his wife were brought to
the city hospital for medical check-up. They were also brought to the
Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital to identify the
deceased. The following day the Requerme spouses went to the
police station and executed their affidavits which are attached to the
record.
Felipe Requerme presented a medical certificate issued by the
examining physician to establish the injuries he suffered (Exh. "A").
Likewise, he presented prescription for medicines and he said that
he spent a total amount of P1,000.00 (Exhs. "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-
3").E-xsm
Rosita Requerme was riding along with her husband and she
noticed that when they were near the Sacred Heart of Jesus
Montessori School their motorela was bumped by a white motor
vehicle. She observed that the face of the driver of the vehicle
bumping them was bloody. Mrs. Requerme shouted and waved her
hand signalling the driver to stop but the driver kept pushing the
motorela violently. The push was so fast and strong that the motorela
was already uncontrolled and running very fast. Their passenger
jumped out when they were already at the Marcos bridge near the
Wheels Marketing. Then the motorela made a 180 degrees turn
facing the direction where they came from and fell on its right side.
Struggling out of the motorela she noticed that the white vehicle went
up the elevated catwalk or pathway pursuing Achumbre who was hit
when he was already at the railing (barandilla). Then she observed
that the white vehicle drove across the bridge towards Iligan City. At
the OKK she saw the accused brought by policemen and she asked
him why he bumped them and the accused answered "I have to do it
Manang because look at me now" (TSN, Dec. 16, 1991). She also
observed that the face of the accused was bleeding. She identified
the accused in court, as the same person she saw at the OKK. She
was treated at the hospital and was issued a medical certificate
(Exh. "C"). Together with her husband, they spent P1,000.00 for
medicines.
PO3 Ricardo Catiil was assigned as driver of the mobile division
patrol no. 07 on September 22, 1991 together with SPO1 Albert
Calingasan and Armando Mana. They parked the mobile car at the
other end of the Marcos bridge along C. M. Recto Avenue at about
2:30 in the morning. Shortly thereafter, he saw a car coming from
Cagayan de Oro poblacion crossing the bridge running fast with a
damage on its right portion. He estimated the speed at 80 kph.
Observing something unusual they pursued the vehicle, switched on
their siren and caught up with the vehicle at Km. 3, 2.6 kilometers
from the place of incident. Catiil and the other two policemen
alighted from the car and accosted the driver and brought him to the
OKK. He noticed that the face of the driver was bleeding which he
believed may have been caused by the splintered windshield.
Examining the vehicle, they noticed that in addition to the broken
windshield, the right portion of the signal light and the head light
were also damaged. The right front tire was flat. When asked, the
 106
driver admitted that he bumped someone at the Marcos bridge. o'clock dawn of Sept. 22, 1991 and he issued a medical certificate
(Exh. "C") indicating the following injuries:
SPO1 Albert Calingasan, supporting the testimony of Ricardo Catiil
who was the driver of the mobile patrol car 07, declared that they "October 19, 1991
were at the middle of the Marcos bridge when they saw a Ceres Kia
car running fast and they pursued it until it stopped at Km. 3. After MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
delivering the accused at the OKK, Calingasan together with his two
companions drove back to the place of incident. They saw blood on
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
the street. There were also bits of human flesh found on the
cemented road and the right leg was completely severed.
Calingasan explained that when they followed at the hospital and THIS IS TO CERTIFY that MRS. ROSITA REQU(I) ERME, 41 years
viewed the body of the victim, they saw that the right leg was old, of Consolacion, Cagayan de Oro City was examined by the
severed from the body. Calr-ky undersigned in this hospital on September 22, 1991 at about 3:12
a.m. for:
PO3 Virgilio Maquiling was assigned with mobile patrol 05 of the
Cagayan de Oro Police Station at about 2:00 o'clock dawn of -.....Contusion 2.0 x 6.0 cm. Right arm, M/3, medial;
September 22, 1991. They were on patrol near the Golez residence
almost near the foot of the Marcos bridge facing Iligan City. -.....Contusion 3.0 x 4.0 cm. Right leg, P/3, anterior
Maquiling and his companions saw a Ceres Kia coming from Liceo
de Cagayan and turned right at the bridge and went towards the
===================================
place where the incident occurred. Maquiling observed that the way
====
the vehicle was driven, the driver may have been drunk. Twenty
minutes later, the same vehicle came back with its right portion
damaged. Suspecting that something untoward may have occurred, HEALING PERIOD: Three to Five (3-5) days barring complications.
he called mobile patrol 101 to intercept the vehicle. Not long after a
PU driver informed Maquiling and his companions that a motorela This certificate is issued for whatever purpose it may serve.
was involved in a traffic accident at the other end of the bridge near
Licoan Bakery and Restaurant. Proceeding to the place of incident,
(SGD.) ROGELIO R. GANNABAN, M. D.Medical Officer IV"
he saw a body of a person at Abellanosa Street which is located
immediately below the bridge about 10 feet high. He also saw that
the right leg of the person was hanging at the Marcos bridge railing Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, chief of the Pathology Department of the
about seven meters away from the body. Maquiling, using his radio, NMRTH identified the death certificate of Wilfredo Achumbre (Exh.
called the paramedic. They immediately brought the body of the "D", "D-1"). He conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Wilfredo
victim to the NMRTH. Maquiling inspected the crime scene and he Achumbre and the following are his external findings:
observed that the latex paint of the railing was scraped and the
trailing was dented. "x x x

Dr. Sofronio Sescon identified the medical certificate and he Prosecutor Gamotin: Rtc-spped
described his findings as follows:

Q.....Now, you made mention that you were the one who conducted
"October 19, 1991 on the cause of death of the victim on this particular case - will you
please tell the honorable court what was your findings on the victim?
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
A.....On the autopsy table the external findings are - 1) There was a
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: laceration of the forehead and contusions on the left forehead, and
2) Multiple injuries on the head and right extremity, traumatic." (TSN,
Dec. 19, 1991, p.9)
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that MR. FELIPE REQU(I)ERME, 42 years
old, of Consolacion, Cagayan de Oro City was examined by the
undersigned in this hospital on September 22, 1991 at about 3:12 x x x"
A.M. for:
He also presented an autopsy table showing a diagram of the
"Abrasions, about 2 x 4 cm. and 0.5 x 2 cm., with hematoma, Right human body showing therein the injuries suffered by the victim (Exh.
lumbar area." Sd-aad-sc "E", "E-1", "E-2"). In examining the body he saw that the right leg
was cut at the upper third just below the knee. In the diagram of the
human body he identified the injuries on the brain (Exh. "E-5", "E-6,
===================================
"E-7", "E-8"). The complete findings of Dr. Vacalares are as follow:
====

"x x x
Healing Period: Two (2) weeks barring complications.

Prosecutor Gamotin:
This certificate is issued for whatever purpose it may serve.

Q.....Now, what was your findings on the brain of the victim in this
(SGD.) SOFRONIO C. SESCON, M.D.Medical Officer"
case?

Dr. Rogelio Gannaban examined Rosita Requerme at about 3:00


A.....In opening the brain or the skull, there were blood clots on the
external portion of the covering portion and below the distal portion
or surface, again there was a blood clot and then the thin membrane
that covers the brain is also covered with blood.
Q.....You mean to tell this honorable court hemorrhage on the brain?
A.....There was a massive hemorrhage." (TSN, Dec. 19, 1991, p. 12)
When asked by the defense counsel regarding a fall from a certain height
which would result to a damage of the brain, Dr. Vacalares answered:
"x x x
A.....With this drawing with multiple injuries on the leg, it could have
fall from a certain height fifty feet or twenty feet but not from five feet
height or even ten feet height." (TSN, Dec. 19, 1991, p. 21) Scl-aw
Dr. Vacalares declared that the victim suffered massive hemorrhage
and, in fact, it was impossible for the victim to survive even with the
most modern medical attendance. There was massive accumulation
of clot and no amount of surgery could have saved the victim. Death
was almost instantaneous.
Georgita Achumbre, wife of the deceased, declared that her
husband used to receive P5,000.00 monthly salary and with other
incentives, giving him a total income of P10,000.00 a month. They
have 5 children namely: Charles Ian (9 yrs. old.), Lou Aiza (6 yrs.
old), Charmie Aimee (3 yrs. old), Charlene Irene (1 yr. and 10 mos.
old), and Christine Ivy Lou (6 mos. old).
Georgita Achumbre knows the accused because he used to come to
their house and he and her husband were both employed with G & P
Builders and they used to play basketball together. At 5:00 o'clock in
the morning of September 22, 1991 she received news of her
husband's death. Together with her brother-in-law she proceeded to
the NMRTH and saw the body of her husband lying on a table and
covered with white cloth. She was informed that her husband was
dead on arrival. From the hospital she went to the police station to
retrieve the wallet of her husband which contained P3,000.00. When
she confronted the accused at the police station why he killed her
husband, Thadeos Enguito answered that he was mauled by her
husband and it was an act of revenge. The accused explained that
the victim became angry when he was made to pay the bills of
Enguito's friend who was seated on the other table.
Expenses she incurred as a result of her husband's death are the
following:
1) P 7,000.00 for the Greenhills Funeral Homes;2) P 9,000.00
for Divine Shepherd Memorial Park;3) P 5,000.00 for vigil and
prayers for 10 days;4) P 2,000.00 for the 40th day prayer; and
5) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
She leaves to the discretion of the Court the
moral and exemplary damages.
Defendant's Evidence: Sc-lex
Maintaining that the death of the victim was purely an accident,
accused Thadeos Enguito, a co-employee of the victim, declared
that he and the deceased Wilfredo Achumbre were close friends
and they used to play basketball together. He is also acquainted
with the wife of the victim because he used to go to their
107
residence. Enguito maintained that on September 22 at about 3:00
o'clock in the morning he was about to bring Achumbre to his
house located at Kauswagan near Kong Hua School. Enguito was
driving a Ceres Kia pick-up owned by G & P Builders Construction.
At the crossroad going to the house of Achumbre, he (Achumbre)
refused to step down, compelling Enguito to go back to where they
came from at Divisoria. Enguito observed that Achumbre was
already drunk. Achumbre invited Enguito to eat bulalo but the latter
refused and because Achumbre still refused to alight from the pick-
up, Enguito decided to go home to his residence at Gaabucayan-
Osmea Extension passing by the Coca-Cola plant. Nearing the
house of Enguito, Achumbre suddenly stepped on the brakes and
attempted to take over the vehicle. The Ceres Kia stopped and
Enguito quickly jumped out and ran towards his house with
Achumbre pursuing him. After a short while Achumbre was able to
catch up with Enguito and he (Achumbre) said, "You are a
braggart" (TSN, May 18, 1992, p. 17) and mauled him. Enguito
failed to put up a fight because Achumbre was very much bigger
having a height of approximately 5'11". Achumbre's blows resulted
to Enguito's dizziness and when his mind was cleared, he noticed
that Achumbre already left. The Ceres Kia pick-up which
Achumbre wanted to take away from him was left parked near
Enguito. xl-aw
Accused Enguito drove back the Ceres Kia in order to report the
incident to the police authorities. Turning towards Recto Avenue he
saw a motorela which had Achumbre as passenger cruising along
Recto Avenue a little beyond the Nazareno Church. Enguito
followed the motorela with intentions of compelling Achumbre to
surrender to the police having observed earlier that a police mobile
patrol was parked at the other end of the Marcos bridge. Still very
closely following the motorela, Achumbre suddenly jumped
towards the right of the Ceres Kia and when he attempted to cross
the road towards Wheels Marketing he was hit (TSN, May 18,
1992, p. 23-24). Enguito attempted to apply the brakes but it was
so sudden and Achumbre was too near. Without verifying what
happened to Achumbre, Enguito drove on across the bridge
passing by a patrol car and stopping near the Km. 3 at a distance
of 1.7 kilometers beyond the mobile patrol parked at the foot of the
other side of the bridge towards Iligan City.
In trying to avoid hitting Achumbre, the Ceres Kia hit the railings
damaging the windshield, the right front headlight and the right
siding of the vehicle. Noticing the police car pursuing him, Enguito
stopped his vehicle and approached the policemen. He was
brought to the OKK where he was informed that Achumbre was
killed. On September 23 at the police station during the
confrontation, Mrs. Achumbre asked Enguito why he killed her
husband and he explained that it was not intentional (TSN, May
18, 19, p. 26-27).
On Cross examination the accused claimed that the bumper of the
Ceres Kia hit the back portion of the motorela. He also maintained
that other than the driver there was a woman passenger together
with Achumbre. He affirmed that Achumbre having mauled him
and bloodied his face he was very angry with the latter.
Enguito saw the woman waiving at him to stop but he still
continued to very closely follow even hitting the motorela. The
accused did not apply the brake because he was afraid that his
vehicle might turn turtle. Asked why he did not stop his vehicle
after hitting the deceased he explained that there were people
gathered from the distance and he was afraid that he might be
harmed by them. When again asked why he did not stop at the
middle of the bridge, he said that he already saw the mobile patrol
and he directly went to them. Scx

As character witness the accused presented Alberto Chaves, 76
years old, former mayor of Kalilangan, Bukidnon where the
accused grew up. Mr. Chaves was former superintendent of the
defunct NARRA and in 1964 he was municipal mayor of
Pangantucan, an adjoining municipality of Kalilangan. He was also
elected municipal mayor of Kalilangan in 1968 up to 1986. He
knew very well the accused Thadeos Enguito as a young boy. The
father of the accused was a construction foreman in the municipal
government where he was mayor and the wife was employed with
the NARRA assigned under the health services. During all the
years when the accused was residing in Kalilangan, Bukidnon he
was never involved in any crime. As far as he knows, he is a good
boy and this charge against him (Enguito) is a complete surprise to
him.
Anita Enguito, wife of the accused, testified that they have been
married for nine years and they have four children, the eldest being
9 years old and the youngest 3 years old. As far as she can
remember the deceased Wilfredo Achumbra and her husband
were good friends and she did not know of any quarrel that
transpired between them."[5]
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment on October 5, 1992 finding
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with
Less Serious Physical Injuries. The dispositive portion[6] of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court is of the considered
opinion and so holds that the prosecution clearly established
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of homicide with less
serious physical injuries was committed by the accused Thadeos
Enguito with the aggravating circumstance of the use of motor
vehicle (Art. 14, par. 20, RPC) without any mitigating circumstance
and hereby sentences him to an indeterminate sentence ranging
from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum penalty.
On the civil liability, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the
following:
1) P 50,000.00 representing death compensation;2) P
23,000.00 representing funeral expenses; x-sc3)
P200,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages;4)
P 20,000.00 attorney's fee.
The accused is likewise ordered to pay spouses Felipe and Rosita
Requerme the following:
1) P 1,000.00 representing medical expenses;2)
P30,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that since the prosecution's
evidence showed that accused killed the victim by means of motor vehicle,
he should be guilty of the crime of murder and not of homicide. The
dispositive portion[7] of the Decision dated October 17, 1996 reads:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following modification: appellant Thadeos Enguito is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER WITH LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Pursuant to Section 13 (par. 2) of Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, let this case be certified and the
entire records thereof be elevated to the Supreme Court for
review. Costs against the appellant."
108
Accused-appellant filed his brief raising the following assignment of errors:
"1. The Honorable Third Division of the Court of Appeals
committed error in finding that accused is guilty of less serious
physical injuries suffered by Felipe Requerme.
"2. The Honorable Third Division of the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the conviction of
accused for the Crime of Murder with the use of motor vehicle."
In the first assigned error, accused-appellant avers that no evidence was
presented by the prosecution to show that the motorela driven by Felipe
Requerme suffered any damage as a result of the alleged bumping.
Appellant argues that the motorela turned on its left side in a reverse
direction because of the act of Felipe who was not able to balance the
motorela when the deceased Achumbre jumped out from the rear.
Appellant contends that he could not be guilty of any physical injuries
suffered by the spouses Requerme because the direct cause of the
motorela turning on its left side was the act of Felipe in guiding the vehicle
while the proximate cause is the thrust which resulted when Achumbre
suddenly jumped out of the motorela. Spped
The argument is devoid of merit. The defense disregards the basic rule in
criminal law that a person is responsible for all the consequences of his
unlawful or wrongful act although such consequences were different from
those which he originally intended.[8] Even if it be assumed that the real
intention of accused-appellant was to surrender the victim to the police for
mauling him, his act of pursuing the victim, who was a passenger of the
motorela, resulted in the injuries of the driver and the other passenger of
the motorela. Appellant himself testified[9] that when he followed the
motorela, he was "very near"[10] and that he saw the deceased Achumbre
jump out on the right side of the motorela but he went ahead; he allegedly
"tried to evade, but he was so near."[11] Upon seeing that Achumbre was
trying to jump out of the motorela, accused-appellant should have known
that by closely following, pushing and bumping the motorela, he could
injure the passengers, which is what happened in this case. Moreover,
accused-appellant ignored the pleas of Rosita Requerme, the other
passenger and wife of the driver of the motorela, for him to stop bumping
and pushing the motorela.[12] Instead, he persisted resulting in the
motorela turning on its side and in the opposite direction. Verily, the act of
accused-appellant in relentlessly pursuing the motorela is a manifestation
of his intention to perpetrate the crime.
Appellant further contends that he did not intentionally choose the motor
vehicle he was driving as a means of committing the offense, and that at
most, the vehicle was the only available means to stop the deceased from
escaping. He argues that it was his intention to apprehend and surrender
the deceased to the police for his previous act of mauling him but in the
process, he killed the deceased. Misspped
The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the use
of motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder
if the same was perpetrated by means thereof.[13] Appellant's claim that
he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from
escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he testified
that there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing.[14] Accused-
appellant could have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of
taking the law into his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already
noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela[15] but he still
continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the
deceased[16] who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the
Marcos bridge.[17] Accused-appellant further used the vehicle in his
attempt to escape. He was already more than one (1) kilometer away from
the place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police
mobile patrol which was following him.[18]

Appellant contends that he should have been convicted of the crime of
homicide with two (2) mitigating circumstances of acting in passion and
voluntary surrender; and had the charge been homicide he could have
pleaded guilty. We find that these mitigating circumstances cannot be
appreciated in his favor. Accused-appellant was allegedly "still very
angry"[19] while he was following, bumping and pushing the motorela
which was in front of him. He was previously mauled by the deceased and
he was allegedly rendered unconscious by the blows inflicted on him.
When he regained consciousness, he claims that he wanted to look for a
policeman to report that he was mauled.[20] Clearly, accused-appellant's
state of mind after he was mauled and before he crushed Achumbre to
death was such that he was still able to act reasonably. In fact, he
admitted having seen a police mobile patrol nearby but instead, he chose
to resort to the dastardly act which resulted in the death of Achumbre and
in the injuries of the spouses Requerme. For passion to be considered as
a mitigating circumstance, facts must be proved to show causes sufficient
to produce loss of self-control and to overcome reason.[21] The turmoil
and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be
confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured
or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-
control.[22]
109
enrich them.[31] Scmis
As to the award of actual damages, the same cannot be based on the
allegation of a witness without any competent document to support such
claim.[32] Proof is required to be adequately supported by receipts.[33]
The amount of P23,000.00 awarded by the trial court as funeral expenses
should be reduced. Georgita Achumbre, widow of the deceased-victim,
testified that she spent P7,000.00 for embalming and funeral cortege as
evidenced by a receipt issued by the Green Hills Memorial Homes which
is marked as Exhibit "H"[34] and another P9,300.00 as internment fee as
shown in the receipt issued by the Divine Shepherd Memorial Gardens,
Inc. which is marked as Exhibit "I".[35] She also spent "about P5,000.00 or
more" for a one (1) week vigil, but no receipt was presented;[36] hence,
the same cannot be included in the award for actual damages.[37] A party
is entitled to compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
he has duly proved.[38] The amount of "not less than P2,000.00" allegedly
spent during the 40th day[39] cannot likewise be considered as the same
was incurred after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the
victim.[40] Hence, only the total amount of P16,300.00 as actual damages
should be awarded to the heirs of the deceased.

The lower courts failed to consider the fact that under Article 2206 of the
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. Civil Code, in addition to civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of the
Evidence shows that accused-appellant was further pursued by the police. victim, the accused-appellant is liable for the loss of earning capacity of
Appellant himself testified that he stopped his vehicle just after the police the deceased and such indemnity should be paid to the heirs of the latter.
mobile stopped but admitted having "stopped farther than the police The widow of deceased Achumbre testified that before her husband died,
mobile".[23] SPO3 Catiil further testified that appellant did not surrender he was working with G & P Builders as a licensed civil engineer receiving
but only stopped his vehicle when its right tire was already flat.[24] His salary and other incentives in the amount of "more or less, a total of
testimony was corroborated by PO3 Makiling who was patrolling the P10,000.00 a month" or a gross annual income of P120,000.00. They had
portion of Marcos Bridge. He testified that he saw the vehicle being driven five (5) children.[41] At the time Achumbre died, he was 38 years old.[42]
by accused-appellant already destroyed and the right portion of the The deceased's loss of earning capacity is computed as follows: Josp-ped
vehicle a little bit lower as it was running flat.[25] Clearly, accused-
appellant could have eluded arrest but his situation became futile when his
vehicle suffered a flat tire. Missc net life expectancy gross annual income less
earni (GAI) living
The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a ng expense
= x
mitigating circumstance in the case at bar will not affect the penalty to be capa s (50%
imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime city of GAI)
committed by accused-appellant is the complex crime of murder with less (x)
serious physical injuries. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for a complex crime shall be the maximum period of the penalty
for the most serious crime. The crime was committed in 1992 where the X 2 (80 - age at (GAI - 50% of
penalty for the crime of murder, which is the most serious crime, was = x
time of death3 GAI)
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. The death penalty being the maximum period of the
penalty for murder should be imposed for the complex crime of murder
with less serious physical injuries considering that under Article 63, an 2 (80 - 38)3 (P 120,000.00 -P
indivisible penalty cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or = x 60,000.
aggravating circumstance.[26] And, consonant with the ruling in People vs. 00)
Muoz[27] that Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution[28] did
not change the period of the penalty for murder except only insofar as it
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion = 28 x P 60,000.00
perpetua, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

There is a need to modify the award of damages to the heirs of the victim
Achumbre. We affirm the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death
to the heirs of the deceased Achumbre. There is, however, no justification
for the award of exemplary damages there being no aggravating
circumstance;[29] hence, the same should be deleted.
Anent the award of moral damages, his widow testified that she was sad
and worried for the children and their future and that there were nights that
she cannot sleep.[30] The award of moral damages in favor of the heirs of
the deceased Achumbre is in order, however, the amount should be
reduced to P50,000.00 in light of the purpose for making such award,
which is to compensate the heirs for injuries to their feelings and not to
P
=
1,680,000.00
Pursuant to Article 2202 of the Civil Code, accused-appellant is liable for
all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of. Moral damages are recoverable since the
criminal offense resulted in physical injuries[43] of the spouses Requerme.
The total amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the spouses
Requerme is believed to be reasonable.
Anent the amount of P1,000.00 representing medical expenses awarded

to the spouses Felipe and Rosita Requerme, the prosecution presented
the doctor's prescription marked as Exhibits "B" to "B-3"[44] but no
receipts were presented. Medical expenses are in the nature of actual
damages which should be duly proved and the award for actual damages
cannot be made on the basis of the doctor's prescriptions alone. There
must be evidence of the actual amount thereof. Likewise the award of
exemplary damages to the spouses Requerme should be deleted for lack
of basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision convicting accused-appellant Thadeos
Enguito of the complex crime of Murder with Less Serious Physical
Injuries and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to
pay the heirs of deceased Wilfredo Achumbre the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity; P1,680,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; P 16,300.00
as actual damages; P 50,000.00 as moral damages; and to further pay the
spouses Felipe and Rosita Requerme the amount of P20,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED. Spp-edjo
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
14. CRUELTY
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123819. November 14, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. STEPHEN
MARK WHISENHUNT, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 152, in Criminal Case No. 102687, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Stephen Mark Whisenhunt guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder defined and penalized under Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to
pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P100,000.00 representing
actual expenses for the funeral services and wake for 5 days,
P3,000,000.00 by way of moral damages, exemplary damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of
P150,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally charged
with the murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo, under an Information which read:
That on or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior
strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
one Elsa Elsie Santos Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a
bladed weapon in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death
110
and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by then and there chopping
off her head and different parts of her body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and
was raffled to Branch 152. On January 6, 1994, accused-appellant was
arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte. He entered a plea of
not guilty.[4]
The evidence shows that accused-appellant and the deceased,
Elsa Santos-Castillo, also known as Elsie, were lovers. They met at the
Apex Motor Corporation where accused-appellant was the Manager while
Elsa was the Assistant Personnel Manager. Both accused-appellant and
Elsa were married, but they were estranged from their respective
spouses. In April 1993, Elsa resigned from Apex presumably to avoid the
nasty rumors about her illicit affair with accused-appellant.[5] It appears,
however, that she continued her affair with accused-appellant even after
she resigned from Apex Motor Corporation.
On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, an Apex employee
assigned to drive for accused-appellant, reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at
the latters condominium unit at the Platinum Condominium, Annapolis
Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.[6] Accused-appellant ordered
him to fetch Elsa at her parents house in Blumentritt, Manila at 10:30
a.m. He found Elsa standing at a corner near her parents house, wearing
a violet-colored blouse with floral prints, and was carrying three bags --- a
paper bag, a violet Giordano bag and a thick brown leather bag with the
trademark of Mitsubishi. He brought Elsa to accused-appellants
condominium unit.[7]
At 2:00 p.m., Elsa told Demetrio to go to the Apex office in
Mandaluyong to deliver a paper bag to Amy Serrano, the Personnel
Manager. He proceeded to the Apex office, and then returned to
Platinum. Accused-appellant asked him to stay because he had to drive
Elsa home at 10:00 p.m. He waited until a little past 10:00 p.m. When he
had not heard from accused-appellant, he told Lucy, the housemaid, that
he was going home.[8]
The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-appellants
unit. At around noon, Lucy asked if he had seen a kitchen knife which
was missing. He then overheard Lucy ask accused-appellant who told her
that the kitchen knife was in his bedroom. Demetrio saw accused-
appellant go inside the room and, shortly thereafter, hand the knife to
Lucy.[9]
At 3:40 p.m., Lucy told Demetrio to buy cigarettes for accused-
appellant. He went out to buy the cigarettes and gave them to Lucy. At
5:00 p.m., accused-appellant told Demetrio to go home.[10]
On September 25, 1993, Demetrio reported at the Platinum
Condominium at around 8:00 a.m. He was allowed by accused-appellant
to go to Apex to follow up his salary. While he was there, Amy Serrano
asked him if Elsa was still in accused-appellants condominium unit.
Although Demetrio did not see Elsa there, he answered yes. Amy gave
him black plastic garbage bags which he turned over to accused-appellant
upon his return to the condominium. The latter then ordered him to drive
Lucy to Cubao and to go home to get some clothes, since they were
leaving for Bagac, Bataan. On the way to Cubao, Lucy told Demetrio that
she was going home. He dropped her off in front of the Farmers Market.
Thereafter, he proceeded to his house in Fairview, Quezon City, to pick up
some clothes, then returned to the condominium at around 10:00 a.m.[11]
Accused-appellant asked him to check the fuel gauge of the car.
He was told to go to Apex to get a gas slip and then to gas up. At around
noon, he went back to the condominium. He had lunch outside at
Goodah, then returned to accused-appellants unit and stayed in the

servants quarters.[12]
While Demetrio was in the servants quarters watching television,
accused-appellant came in. He asked Demetrio how long he wanted to
work for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for him forever,
and expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this, accused-appellant
shed tears and embraced Demetrio. Then accused-appellant said, May
problema ako, Rio. Demetrio asked what it was, and accused-appellant
told him that Elsa was dead. Demetrio asked, Bakit mo siya pinatay?[13]
Accused-appellant answered that he did not kill Elsa, rather she died of
bangungot.[14]
Demetrio suggested that Elsas body be autopsied, but accused-
appellant said that he had already beheaded her. He asked Demetrio if he
wanted to see the decapitated body, but the latter refused. The two of
them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping Center and bought
a big bag with a zipper and rollers, colored black and gray.[15] Demetrio
noticed that accused-appellant seemed nervous and his eyes were teary
and bloodshot.
When they returned to the condominium, accused-appellant asked
Demetrio to help him wrap the body in the black garbage bags. Demetrio
entered accused-appellants bathroom and found the dismembered
hands, feet, trunk and head of a woman. He lifted the severed head by
the hair and, when he lifted it, he saw Elsas face. He placed this in a
black trash bag. He helped accused-appellant place the other body parts
in three separate garbage bags. They packed all the garbage bags in the
bag with the zipper and rollers, which they had bought in Shoppesville.
Then, they brought the bag down and loaded it in the trunk of accused-
appellants car. After that, they boarded the car. Demetrio took the wheel
and accused-appellant sat beside him in front.[16]
It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant left
the condominium. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to drive around
Batangas and Tagaytay City. After leaving Tagaytay, they entered the
South Luzon Expressway and headed towards Sta. Rosa, Laguna. When
they were near Puting Kahoy and Silangan, accused-appellant told
Demetrio to turn into a narrow road. Somewhere along that road,
accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop the car.[17]
Accused-appellant alighted and told Demetrio to get the bag in the
trunk. Accused-appellant took the plastic bags inside the bag and
dumped them by the roadside. Then, accused-appellant returned the
empty bag in the trunk and boarded the car. He called Demetrio and said,
Tayo na Rio, tuloy na tayo sa Bataan. It was already 6:30 p.m.[18]
Demetrio drove to the Sta. Rosa exit gate, along the South Luzon
Expressway, through EDSA and towards the North Luzon Expressway.
They stopped at a gasoline station to refuel. They then took the San
Fernando, Pampanga exit, and were soon en route to the Whisenhunt
family mansion in Bagac, Bataan.[19]
Before reaching Bagac, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to
stop the car on top of a bridge. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to get off
and to throw a bag into the river. Later, they passed another bridge and
accused-appellant again told Demetrio to pull over. Accused-appellant
alighted and threw Elsas clothes over the bridge. On the way, Demetrio
noticed that accused-appellant took something from a bag, tore it to
pieces and threw it out of the window. When they passed Pilar, Bataan,
accused-appellant threw Elsas violet Giordano bag. As they reached the
road boundary of Bagac, accused-appellant wrung a short-sleeved dress
with violet and green stripes, and threw it on a grassy lot.[20]
It was about midnight when accused-appellant and Demetrio
arrived at the mansion. Demetrio was unable to sleep that night, as he
was scared that he might be the next victim.[21]
The next morning, at 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant ordered
Demetrio to clean the trunk of the car, saying, Rio, linisan mo ang
sasakyan para ang compartment hindi babaho.[22] At 1:00 p.m.,
111
accused-appellant and Demetrio started off for Manila. As they passed a
place called Kabog-kabog, he saw accused-appellant take out an ATM
card. Accused-appellant burned the middle of the card, twisted it and
threw it out of the window. They arrived at the corner of EDSA and
Quezon Avenue at 2:30 p.m. Demetrio asked accused-appellant if he can
get off since he wanted to go home to Fairview. Before Demetrio left,
accused-appellant told him, Rio, you and your family can go on a
vacation. I will give you money. Accused-appellant then gave Demetrio
P50.00 for his transportation going to Fairview.[23]
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what
happened. His wife told him to report the incident to Fiscal Joey Diaz.
Demetrio and his wife went to the house of Fiscal Diaz in Fairview to talk
to him.[24]
The following morning, September 27, 1993, Fiscal Diaz,
Demetrio, his wife and his brothers went to the Department of Justice.
They were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation, where
Demetrio gave his statement before Atty. Artemio Sacaquing, head of the
Anti-Organized Crime Division.[25]
Initially, Atty. Sacaguing could not believe what he heard and
thought Demetrio was exaggerating. He dispatched a team of NBI agents,
headed by Marianito Panganiban, to verify Demetrios report.[26]
Accompanied by Demetrio, the team proceeded to Barangay Polong, Sta.
Cruz, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. There, they found a crowd of people gathered
around the mutilated parts of a human body along the road.[27] The body
parts had been discovered by tricycle drivers. The Sta. Rosa Police,
under Chief Investigator SPO3 Alipio Quintos, was already conducting an
investigation. Agent Panganiban radioed Atty. Sacaguing in Manila that
Demetrios report was positive.[28]
The mutilated body parts were brought to the Lim de Mesa Funeral
Parlor in Sta. Rosa. Two NBI agents, together with Demetrio, went to the
house of Elsas family to inform them of her death. The NBI agents
accompanied Elsas two sisters, Amelia Villadiego and Elida Santos, to the
funeral parlor, where they identified the body parts as belonging to Elsa.
In the morning of September 28, 1993, accused-appellant was
arrested by operatives of the NBI as he drove up to his parking space at
Apex Motor Corporation.[29] When Atty. Sacaguing approached and
introduced himself, accused-appellant became nervous and started to
tremble.[30]
Accused-appellant was brought to the NBI in his car. When he
arrived there, Atty. Sacaguing informed him that it may be necessary to
impound the car since, based on Demetrios statement, the same was
used in the commission of the crime. Accused-appellant asked
permission to retrieve personal belongings from the car. After getting his
things from the car, accused-appellant opened the trunk to place some
items inside. When he opened the compartment, the people around the
car moved away because of the foul stench that emanated from inside.
Atty. Sacaguing inspected the interior of the trunk and found stains on the
lawanit board lying flat inside the compartment, which he suspected to be
blood. Thus, he instructed his agents to fetch a technician from the NBI
Chemistry Division to examine the stain.[31]
During Atty. Sacaguings interview of accused-appellant, he
noticed contusions on accused-appellants lower lip and cheek. As
standard procedure, and in order to rule out any accusation of violence on
accused-appellant on the part of the NBI agents, Atty. Sacaguing ordered
a medical examination of accused-appellant.[32]
The Medico-Legal Officer found contusions on accused-appellants
left periumbilical region, right elbow, left and right forearms and right leg.
[33]
That same afternoon, before the close of office hours, accused-
appellant was brought to the Department of Justice for inquest.[34]
However, accused-appellant moved that a preliminary investigation be

conducted, and signed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, he was detained at the NBI.[35]
On September 29, 1993, armed with a search warrant,[36] the NBI
agents conducted a search of the condominium unit of accused-
appellant. They recovered hair strands from underneath the rubber mat
and rugs inside accused-appellants bathroom.[37] In accused-appellants
bedroom, they found bloodstains on the bedspread and covers. They also
found a pair of Topsider shoes with bloodstains, a bottle of Vicks Formula
44 cough syrup, and some more hair strands on the lampshade.[38]
Later that day, Demetrio Ravelo accompanied some NBI agents to
retrace the route he took with accused-appellant going to Bataan, with the
objective of retrieving the items thrown away by accused-appellant. They
were able to recover a violet bag, one brown sandal and a shirt with violet
and green floral prints,[39] which were brought to the NBI office. Amelia
Santos Villadiego, Elsas sister, was summoned to identify the items.[40]
In the meantime, Caroline Y. Custodio, Supervising Forensic
Biologist of the NBI, who conducted comparative examinations between
the hair specimens found in accused-appellants bathroom and hair
samples taken from the victim while she lay in state, found that the
questioned hair specimen showed similarities to the hair taken from the
victim.[41]
Custodio further reported that the bloodstains on the bed cushion
cover, bedspread and Topsider shoes, all found inside accused-appellants
bedroom, gave positive results for human blood, showing reactions of
Group B.[42] The bloodstains on the plywood board taken from accused-
appellants vehicle were also examined and found to give positive results
for human blood showing reactions of Group B.[43] On the other hand,
the examination of blood taken from the victim likewise showed reactions
of Group B.[44]
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted
the autopsy, concluded that the cause of death of Elsa Santos Castillo
were stab wounds.[45] Dr. Mendez found one stab wound on the right
breast which penetrated the right lung. He also found two stab wounds
under the left breast which penetrated the diaphragm and abdominal
cavity, and also penetrated the right portion of the liver.[46] More
particularly, the autopsy yielded the following postmortem findings:
Body in moderately advanced stage of decomposition.
Head, decapitated, level above 4th cervical vertebra; both hands severed
cutting completely the lower ends of both radius and ulna; both legs,
disarticulated at knee joints and cut-off with both patellar bones, missing;
both feet, disarticulated at the ankle joints and cut-off; all soft tissues of
both thighs and perineum, removed, exposing completely the femoral
bones and partially the pelvic bone,
Incised wounds: 19.5 cms., left axillary area; 55.0 cms., thoraco-
abdominal area, along median line, with the abdominal incision involving
the whole thickness and the thoracic incision involving the soft tissues and
cutting the sternum from the xiphoid process up to the level of the third
cartilage; from the 3rd cartilage up to the lower border of the neck.
Abdominal organs, removed from the abdominal cavity.
Contusions: 26.0 x 16.5 cms., face, more on the left side involving the
forehead, temporal, nasal, orbital and maxillary areas; 25.0 x 11.0 cms.,
deltoid area, extending down to the upper 2/3, arm, left.
Incised Wound, 3.0 cms., neck area, along anterior median line.
Hematoma, scalp, massive, temporo-parietal, left.
112
STAB WOUNDS:
1. 1.8 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely with sharp
infero-lateral extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the
mammary area, right; 3.0 cms., from the anterior median line, directed
backwards, downwards and laterally, involving the soft tissues, cutting
completely the 4th cartilage, right side, into the right thoracic cavity,
penetrating the lower of the right lung with an approximate depth 8.5 cms.
2. 0.8 cm., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented almost vertically, with
sharp inferior extremity and blunt superior extremity, located at the
inframammary area, left, 1.1 cms., from the anterior median line, directed
backwards, downwards and medially, involving the soft tissues only with
an approximate depth of 2.0 cms.
3. 2.0 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely, with sharp
infero-lateral extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the
inframammary area, left, 2.2 cms., from the anterior median line, directed
backwards, downwards, and from left to right, involving the soft tissues,
into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the diaphragm, into the abdominal
cavity, penetrating the right lobe of the liver with an approximate depth
10.0 cms.
Brain, markedly softened and reduced to grayish white, pultaceous mass.
Other visceral organs, putrified,
Stomach is almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: --- STAB WOUNDS.[47]
In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that he stayed home on
September 23, 1993 because he was not feeling well. He denied that he
asked Demetrio Ravelo to fetch Elsa. He refuted Demetrios testimony
that accused-appellant asked him to buy cigarettes, or that accused-
appellant told him to go home at 5:00 p.m.. Rather, accused-appellant
maintained that he did not see Demetrio at any time in the afternoon of
September 24, 1993.[48]
On September 25, 1993, accused-appellant alleged that he was
feeling better, hence, told Demetrio that they were to leave for Bagac,
Bataan that afternoon. They left the condominium at about 1:00 to 1:30
p.m. and proceeded straight to Bagac. When they arrived at Bagac,
accused-appellant went straight to the kitchen and met his mother, father,
aunt and grandmother. Demetrio got the things out of the car and then
asked accused-appellants permission to take the car to go to the town.
[49]
Accused-appellants mother, Mrs. Nieves Whisenhunt, testified that
accused-appellant arrived at their beach house in Bagac, Bataan on
September 25, 1993 at 5:00 p.m. At 7:00 the next morning, she saw
accused-appellant clad in beach attire. Later that day, she and her
husband had lunch at the clubhouse, which was about three to four
minutes drive from their house. When they returned home at 2:00 p.m.,
accused-appellant and his driver, Demetrio, had already left.[50] This was
corroborated by accused-appellants aunt, Ms. Frances Sison.[51]
Accused-appellant claimed that he went jet-skiing in the morning of
September 25, 1993. He alleged that the water was choppy and caused
his jet-ski to lose control. As a result, he suffered bruises on his chest and
legs. Thereafter, he went home, cleaned up, changed clothes and rested.
Later, as he was going down the stairs, he slipped and extended his arm
to stop his fall. He had lunch with this family. At 1:30 p.m., he and
Demetrio left Bagac for Manila.[52]
According to accused-appellant, he first learned of Elsas death

when he was arrested by the NBI on September 28, 1993.[53] He denied
having anything to do with her death, saying that he had no reason to kill
her since he was in love with her.[54] Sometime during his relationship
with Elsa, he claimed having received in the mails two anonymous letters.
The first one reads:
Salamat sa pagpapahiram mo ng sasakyan at driver. Pero masyado kang
pakialamero, Steve. Walanghiya ka. Para kang demonyo. Pinakialaman
mo ang di sa yo. Lintik lang ang walang ganti. Matitiyempuhan din kita.
Putang ina mo.[55]
The second letter says:
Steve,
Ang kay Pedro kay Pedro. Kapag pinakialaman ay kay San Pedro ang
tungo. Mahal mo ba ang pamilya mo? Iniingatan mo ba ang pangalan
mo? Nakakasagasa ka na.[56]
At first, accused-appellant ignored the letters. But when he told
Elsa about them, she got very upset and worried. She said the letters
came from Fred, her estranged husband.[57]
Ms. Frances Sison, accused-appellants aunt, testified that she and
her mother visited accused-appellant at 3:00 p.m. on September 23,
1993. She went inside the bedroom and talked to accused-appellant for
about 30 minutes. While they were there, Ms. Sison testified that she did
not see anyone else in the bedroom. She also said the door of the
bathroom inside the room was open, and there was nobody inside. The
next day, at 4:00 p.m., she went back to visit accused-appellant. Again,
they went inside accused-appellants bedroom and stayed there for one
hour. The door of the bathroom was open, and she saw that there was
nobody inside. The following morning, they passed by the condominium
before proceeding to Bagac, Bataan. They went inside accused-
appellants bedroom and talked to him. As in the last two occasions, Ms.
Sison saw through the open door of the bathroom that there was no one
inside.[58]
Theresa Whisenhunt, accused-appellants sister-in-law, testified
that between December 21, 1991 and January 15, 1992, and again from
the middle of April, 1992 to May 15, 1992, she slept in the bedroom
subsequently occupied by accused-appellant in the Platinum
Condominium; that she regularly has her menstruation around the end of
every month; and that her blood type is B.[59]
On January 31, 1996, the trial court promulgated the appealed
judgment, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the
heirs of the deceased actual damage, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.[60]
Accused-appellant interposed an appeal from the adverse decision
of the trial court, alleging that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PRESENT ENOUGH
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSION THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REJECTING,
DISREGARDING AND/OR NOT GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.[61]
Much of the evidence on accused-appellants complicity was
elicited from Demetrio Ravelo, the so-called prosecution star witness.[62]
On the premise that accused-appellants guilt or innocence depends
113
largely on the weight of his testimony, this Court has carefully scrutinized
and examined his version of the events, and has found that Demetrio
Ravelos narrative is both convincing and consistent in all material points.
Before accused-appellant confessed to Demetrio Ravelo what had
happened to Elsa Castillo, he first asked the latter how long he was willing
to work for him, and how far his loyalty will go. This was logical if
accused-appellant wanted to ensure that Demetrio would stand by his side
after learning what he was about to reveal. More importantly, Demetrios
description of Elsas dismembered body, as he found it in accused-
appellants bathroom, perfectly jibed with the appearance of the mutilated
body parts, as shown in the photographs presented by the prosecution.
[63]
Likewise, the mutilated body parts, as well as the other items
thrown by accused-appellant along the road to Bataan, were found by the
NBI agents as Demetrio pointed, which confirms that, indeed, the latter
witnessed how accused-appellant disposed of Elsas body and personal
belongings one by one.
All in all, the testimony of Demetrio Ravelo bears the ring of truth
and sincerity. The records show that he did not waver even during lengthy
and rigorous cross-examination. In fact, the trial court gave full faith and
credit to his testimony, stating:
The Court had opportunity to observe the demeanor of Demetrio Ravelo
when he took the witness stand on several occasions. He was extensively
cross-examined by one of the defense counsel and he withstood the same
creditably. Demetrio Ravelo is a very credible witness and his testimony is
likewise credible.[64]
This Court has consistently ruled that factual findings of the trial
court deserve the highest respect. This is based on the fact that the trial
judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses who
appeared before his sala as he had personally heard them and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[65] Especially,
where issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses, the trial courts
findings thereon will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing
that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts, or
circumstances of weight or substance, which could have affected the
result of the case.[66] Succinctly put, findings of fact of the trial court
pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great weight and
respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they
testified in court.[67]
Perhaps more damning to accused-appellant is the physical
evidence against him. The findings of the forensic biologist on the
examination of the hair samples and bloodstains all confirm Elsas death
inside accused-appellants bedroom. On the other hand, the autopsy
report revealed that Elsa was stabbed at least three times on the chest.
This, taken together with Demetrios testimony that accused-appellant kept
the kitchen knife inside his bedroom on September 24, 1993, leads to the
inescapable fact that accused-appellant stabbed Elsa inside the bedroom
or bathroom.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth,
and it ranks high in the hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence.[68] For this
reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses.[69]
While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death of
Elsa, the confluence of the testimonial and physical evidence against
accused-appellant creates an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence
that naturally leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-
appellant was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others.
Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to in proving the identity of the
accused when direct evidence is not available, otherwise felons would go
scot-free and the community would be denied proper protection. The
rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused

through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1)
there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be
based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances
produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.[70]
In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully
proven by the prosecution without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa
Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants condominium unit on
September 23, 1993; that on September 24, 1993, accused-appellants
housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-appellant gave it
to her, saying that it was in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993,
accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body
parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellants bedroom; that
accused-appellant disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in
San Pedro, Laguna; that accused-appellant also disposed of Elsas
personal belongings along the road going to Bagac, Bataan; that the
mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as
Elsa, were found by the police and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio
pointed; that hair specimens found inside accused-appellants bathroom
and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from Elsas head; and
that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants bedspread, covers and
in the trunk of his car, all matched Elsas blood type.
Accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that the Medico-Legal
Officer, Dr. Mendez, did not examine the pancreas of the deceased
notwithstanding Demetrios statement that, according to accused-
appellant, Elsa died of bangungot, or hemorrhage of the pancreas.
Because of this, accused-appellant insists that the cause of death was not
adequately established. Then, he relied on the controverting testimony of
his witness, lawyer-doctor Ernesto Brion, who was himself a Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI for several years, to the effect that the autopsy report
prepared by Dr. Mendez was unreliable and inconclusive. The trial court
noted, however, that Dr. Brion was a biased witness whose testimony
cannot be relied upon because he entered his appearance as one of the
counsel for accused-appellant and, in such capacity, extensively cross-
examined Dr. Mendez. Accused-appellant counters that there is no
prohibition against lawyers giving testimony. Moreover, the trial courts
ruling would imply that lawyers who testify on behalf of their clients are
presumed to be lying.
By rejecting the testimony of Dr. Brion, the trial court did not mean
that he perjured himself on the witness stand. Notably, Dr. Brion was
presented as expert witness. His testimony and the questions
propounded on him dealt with his opinion on the probable cause of death
of the victim. Indeed, the presentation of expert testimony is one of the
well-known exceptions to the rule against admissibility of opinions in
evidence.[71] In like manner, Dr. Mendez was presented on the stand to
give his own opinion on the same subject. His opinion differed from that of
Dr. Brion, which is not at all unusual. What the trial court simply did was
to choose which --- between two conflicting medico-legal opinions --- was
the more plausible. The trial court correctly lent more credence to Dr.
Mendezs testimony, not only because Dr. Brion was a biased witness, but
more importantly, because it was Dr. Mendez who conducted the autopsy
and personally examined Elsas corpse up close.
In any event, the foregoing does not detract from the established
fact that Elsas body was found mutilated inside accused-appellants
bathroom. This clearly indicated that it was accused-appellant who cut up
Elsas body to pieces. Naturally, accused-appellant would be the only
suspect to her killing. Otherwise, why else would he cut up Elsas body as
if to conceal the real cause of her death?
As already stated above, Demetrios testimony was convincing.
Accused-appellant attempts to refute Demetrios statements by saying that
he had repeatedly reprimanded the latter for discourteous and reckless
driving, and that he had already asked the latter to tender his resignation.
Thus, accused-appellant claims that Demetrio imputed Elsas death on
him in order to get back at him. This Court finds the cruel treatment by an
employer too flimsy a motive for the employee to implicate him in such a
114
gruesome and hideous crime. Rather than entertain an accusation of ill-
motive and bad faith on Demetrio Ravelo, this Court views his act of
promptly reporting the incident to his family and, later, to the authorities, as
a genuine desire to bring justice to the cruel and senseless slaying of Elsa
Santos Castillo, whom he knew well.
Accused-appellant also argues that his arrest was without a
warrant and, therefore, illegal. In this regard, the rule is settled that any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by
the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[72]
In other words, it is too late in the day for accused-appellant to raise an
issue about his warrantless arrest after he pleaded to a valid information
and after a judgment of conviction was rendered against him after a full-
blown trial.
Accused-appellant presented in evidence two supposedly
threatening letters which, according to Elsa, were written by the latters
husband. There is nothing in these letters which will exculpate accused-
appellant from criminal liability. The threats were directed at accused-
appellant, not Elsa. The fact remains that Elsa was last seen alive in
accused-appellants condominium unit, and subsequently discovered dead
in accused-appellants bathroom. Surely, the place where her dead body
was found does not support the theory that it was Fred Castillo who was
probably responsible for her death.
We do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently
proved the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse
of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.[73] The fact that the
victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant
committed the crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be
enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim.[74]
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established
as the crime itself.[75] In this case, nobody witnessed the actual killing.
Nowhere in Demetrios testimony, and it is not indicated in any of the
pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately took
advantage of his superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary,
this Court observed from viewing the photograph of accused-appellant[76]
that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not adequately proved
and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the
corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere
decapitation of the victims head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the
corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder.[77] In this case,
accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body
like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body
in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground.
The sight of Elsas severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in
the photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At
the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human
manner of disposing of her remains.
In a case with strikingly similar facts, we ruled:
Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be
murder because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One of the
qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the
Revised Penal Code is outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse of
the victim. There is no question that the corpse of Billy Agotano was
outraged when it was dismembered with the cutting off of the head and
limbs and the opening up of the body to remove the intestines, lungs and
liver. The killer scoffed at the dead when the intestines were removed and
hung around Victorianos neck as a necklace, and the lungs and liver were
facetiously described as pulutan.[78]

Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant
of the crime of murder, qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victims
person or corpse.[79] This circumstance was both alleged in the
information and proved during the trial. At the time of its commission, the
penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death.[80] No
aggravating or mitigating circumstance was alleged or proved; hence, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.[81] Therefore, the trial
courts imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correct, and
need not be modified.
However, the damages awarded by trial court should be modified.
Elida Santos, Elsas sister, testified that the funeral expenses was only
P50,000.00.[82] Hence, the trial court erred when it awarded the amount
of P100,000.00. Basic is the jurisprudential principle that in determining
actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the
best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of the loss. Actual
damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable
certainty.[83]
The award of moral damages in murder cases is justified because
of the physical suffering and mental anguish brought about by the
felonious acts, and is thus recoverable in criminal offenses resulting in
death.[84] It is true that moral damages are not intended to enrich the
victims heirs or to penalize the convict, but to obviate the spiritual
sufferings of the heirs.[85] Considering, however, the extraordinary
circumstances in the case at bar, more particularly the unusual grief and
outrage suffered by her bereaved family as a result of the brutal and
indecent mutilation and disposal of Elsas body, the moral damages to be
awarded to them should be more than the normal amount dictated by
jurisprudence. However, the amount of P3,000,000.00 awarded by the
trial court as moral damages is rather excessive. The reasonable amount
is P1,000,000.00 considering the immense sorrow and shock suffered by
Elsas heirs.
The award of attorneys fees of P150,000.00 was duly proved,[86]
and thus should be affirmed.
Finally, the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo should be indemnified for
her death. In murder, the civil indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence
at P50,000.00. The grant of civil indemnity in murder requires no proof
other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of accused-
appellants responsibility therefor.[87]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 152, in Criminal Case No. 102687, finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Elsa Santos Castillo actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00; civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; and
attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00. Costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ.,
115
concur.
D I G E S T (INCOMPLETE)
FACTS: On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally charged
withthe murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo. During the trial the following
circumstanceswere successfully proven by the prosecution without a
shadow of doubt, to wit:that Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-
appellants condominium unit
on September 23, 1993; that on September 24, 1993, accused-
appellants
housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-appellant gave it
toher, saying that it was in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993,
accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body
parts of Elsafrom the bathroom inside accused-
appellants bedroom; that accused
-appellant disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in San
Pedro,Laguna; that accused-
appellant also disposed of Elsas personal belongings
along the road going to Bagac, Bataan; that the mutilated body parts of
afemale cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were found by the
policeand NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio pointed; that hair
specimens foundinside accused-
appellants bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken
from Elsas hea
d; and that the bloodstains found on accused-
appellantsbedspread, covers and in the trunk of his car, all matched
Elsas blood type.
OnJanuary 31, 1996, the trial court promulgated the appealed
judgment,convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua
, and ordering him to pay the heirs of thedeceased actual damage, moral
damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees
.ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in appreciating the crime
to bemurder with qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength
andoutraging and scoffing a
t the victims person or corpse?
HELD: Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of
forcesbetween the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority ofstrength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and
selected or takenadvantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The
fact that the victimwas a woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-
appellant committedthe crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought
to be enough proof of therelative strength of the aggressor and the victim.
Abuse of superior strength mustbe shown and clearly established as the
crime itself. In this case, nobodywitnessed the actual killing. N
owhere in Demetrios testimony,
and it is notindicated in any of the pieces of physical evidence, that
accused-appellantdeliberately took advantage of his superior strength in
overpowering Elsa. Onthe contrary, this Court observed from viewing the
photograph of accused-appellant that he has a rather small frame. Hence,
the attendance of the