MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC.

, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS,

learly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a

necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of
Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau
liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without
necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end,
should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.

From the provision authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre operations
to private parties, We see no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances
where it undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting
as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre
service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its
prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the
contrary.

CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each

widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute
theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or

restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is

recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,
but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

The doctrine of state immunity from suit has

undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a
contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in
local courts. The complexity of relationships between sovereign states, brought
about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive
application of the doctrine.

As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity

from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure
imperii). The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis
 the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular
course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act
is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a

local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the
Constitution, which states that "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Who or what consists of "the State"? For one, the doctrine is available to foreign
States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State,
necessary as it is to avoid "unduly vexing the peace of nations."

If the instant suit had been brought directly against the Federal Republic of
Germany, there would be no doubt that it is a suit brought against a State, and the
only necessary inquiry is whether said State had consented to be sued.

[A]n international agreement concluded between States in written form and

governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation.

In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, this Court held that an executive agreement is similar to a treaty,
except that the former (a) does not require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and
(c) deals with a narrower range of subject matters.50

Despite these differences, to be considered an executive agreement, the following three requisites
provided under the Vienna Convention must nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement must be
between states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it must governed by international law. The first and
the third requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner

vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME

The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the
Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."

Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives
consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.

Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing
consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts
is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government
for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts,
thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the
State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. (Ibid)

Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State
when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such
functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)

A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on
the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the
other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive
its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the
defendant is liable." (United States of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660)

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their

functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right
springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of
the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and
governmental. Their offi cers and agents in such capacity,
though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public
functionaries performing a public service, and as such they
are offi cers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other
capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or
corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons
and not as public agencies. Their offi cers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in behalf of the
municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and
not for the state or sovereign power.