STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Part I: OVERVIEW
What is Statutory Construction?
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law. (Caltex v. PALOMAR)
Elements of Statutory Construction:
1. Art or Process
2. Determination of Legislative Intent
3. Ambiguity
4. Judicial Function

Statutory construction as an art or process

Why is it an art or process?
o There is no silver bullet (no one solution to construction).
Two types of aids of Construction:
o Intrinsic interpret what is in the law itself; words & phrases
o Extrinsic outside the law; i.e. legal history, other statute, factual circumstances,
deliberations
What should be considered in using the Intrinsic aids of Construction?
o Principle of effectiveness
! Statutes and provisions are construed in order to give it full effect. It is
the intention of the legislature to give full effect to a statute and its
provisions.
o Constitutionality
! Statutes should be consistent with the Constitution; as far as practicable,
statutes should not be construed as to make it inconsistent with the
Constitution. It should be clearly repugnant to the Constitution before it
should be stricken down. This is in relation to Art. 7 of the Civil Code on
the Hierarchy of Laws where if there is a conflict between a statute and
the Constitution, the former is void and the latter shall prevail.
o Avoid absurdity
! Statutes should not be construed as to make it absurd or result to
absurdity. This is in line with the task of the courts to feel in the gaps. It
is due to the presumption that the legislature, in enacting a law, wanted
just to prevail.
o Other presumptions
! See General Principle/Presumptions on the Interpretation of Certain
Statutes.
o Wholeness statutes should be construed as a whole
Why do we consider the factors abovementioned?
o It is important in order to resolve the conflicts.

Statutory Construction as a determination of legislative intent

What is legislative intent?
o It is the purpose of the law. It is the evil sought to be avoided by the authors of
the law.
How to determine legislative intent?
o VERBA LEGIS Letter of the Law
o RATIO LEGIS Spirit of the Law
In conflict, which would prevail? Why?
 o Ratio Legis. Because if spirit is not in the letter, we include it while if the letter is
not in the spirit, we exclude it.
o However, the Letter of the Law is an outward manifestation of the intention of
the lawmakers. Speech is the index of intention. Thus, even though the spirit
prevails in times of conflict, Ratio Legis cannot be used as an excuse not to look
at the Letter of the Law. Again, where the law is clear and unambiguous, there
is no room for interpretation, only application.
Can the judiciary legislate?
o No. In the determination of legislative intent, the Courts only determine what the
law is and not what the law ought to be. There is no room of judicial legislation
o However, Courts are tasked to feel in the gaps as to avoid absurdity or lapses
where the legislative intent is clear. This mandate is expressly provided by Art. 9
of the Civil Code.

Statutory Construction as resorted only when there is Ambiguity

What is Ambiguity?
o There is Ambiguity when the law is capable of two or more reasonable
interpretations.
What does reasonable mean?
o That a regular person on the street is capable of understanding it in that manner
on its face
Kinds of Ambiguity
o Patent the actual word of the law are ambiguous because the lawmakers
wanted it to be ambiguous. Example is Art. 26 of the Family Code on
Psychological Incapacity (ambiguity was resorted in order that ejusdem generis
would not restrict circumstances).
o Latent as applied to a set of facts

Statutory Construction as a Judicial Function

Why is it a Judicial Function?
o Because courts are tasked to interpret the laws. However, the recourse to
statutory construction can only be done if the following are present:
! An actual controversy
! Ambiguity in the statute
Why should there be an actual controversy for the courts to construe?
o If a person not affected would be permitted to assail the ambiguous statute, it
may prejudice those who are affected by the statute. A construction might result
to an adverse effect to which the unaffected person would not be subjected to
and that would result to a burden to those under the coverage of the statute.
Thus, only those whose rights are affected can assail the ambiguous statute.
o Also, the courts cannot rule on purely academic questions.
What is stare decisis?
o It is the doctrine that, when courts has once laid down a principle, and apply it to
all future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless whether the
parties and properties are the same (doctrine of precedence).
Does this mean that lawyers and the courts are restricted to only one interpretation and
that there is no room for change in the interpretation of the statute?
o No. As observed from the cases, the Supreme Court can change its mind. The job
of the lawyer therefore is to differentiate the situation from another in order that
stare decisis will render inapplicable such as in the case of De Castro v. JBC vis--
vis In re: Valenzuela. The lawyer is not only to follow rules but also to advocate.
As a judicial function, can the legislature and executive construe statutes?
 o For the legislature, strictly no. The reason for the prohibition is that it does away
with the requirement of deliberations within the Congress, i.e. three separate
readings, as it will unduly expand the statute and making it possible to approve
a statute without the required concurrence of Congress. An example would be
Navarro v. Executive Secretary where the Oversight Committee was composed
of the legislature in enacting the IRR. It encroaches not only the judiciary as well
as the executive.
o However, the executive can construe since it is necessary in the exercise of their
function to implement laws. This is likewise called contemporaneous
construction.
How does the executive exercise contemporaneous construction and is its bearing in the
courts?
o Contemporaneous construction can be done by the executive through: a)
Implementing Rules and Regulations; and b) Opinions, i.e. DOJ opinions. It is
not conclusive evidence of the legislative intent but it is merely persuasive to the
courts.

Steps in reconciling:
1. Special over general (with the exception that when a special provision in the general law,
as opposed to a general provisions in a special statute, and when the general statute is
broad enough to cover cases in the special law)
Example: tax exemption of GOCCs repealed by the Tax Code in NPC vs Cabanatuan

2. If you cant reconcile these, you look at which was enacted later (as it shows the more
recent intent of the legislature)

What is the codification of statutes?

The term codification denotes the creation of codes, which are compilations of written
statutes, rules, and regulations that inform the public of acceptable and unacceptable
behavior. Normally, the special statutes are codified, jurisprudence on those special
statutes can be used in interpreting the Code.
What is a reenacment?
Reenactment rule is a principle of statutory construction that when reenacting a law, the
legislature implicitly adopts well-settled judicial or administrative interpretations of the
law.
Follow the intention. The reason we follow the language of the law is that it is presumed
that the language is supposed to express the intention.
Two kinds of implied repeals:
Irreconcilable conflict
Complete substitute

Part II: As Discussed on the Syllabus

Week 1: Introduction
Definition of Statutory Construction
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law, where that intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in its
language or of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

It is the drawing of warranted conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct
expression of the text, conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of the text.
Caltex v. Palomar, G.R. No.L-19650, 29 September 1966
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.

When Construction is necessary

It is said that a law which is ambiguous and deficient is a bad law. And a bad law makes
cases hard. Rules of statutory construction help the court resolve bad cases. Thus, where
there is ambiguity in the language of a statute, courts employ canons of statutory
construction to ascertain its true intent and meaning.
Canons of statutory construction do not, however, solve the special difficulties in
construing a particular statute. Hence, the courts may utilize, in construing a statue not
unambiguous, all the light relevantly shed upon the words and the clause of the statute
that express the purpose of the legislature.

People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, 30 August 1967

Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Alonzo v. IAC, G.R. No.72873, 28 May 1987

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the
letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter
but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is
within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and
a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the
intent of the lawmakers.

Endencia v. David, G.R. Nos. L-6355-56, 31 August 1953

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or
act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight
with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of
its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial
function in defining a term.
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the
task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true
with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within
the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law
means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts
have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision,
this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court
decisions.
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision,
validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be
so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.

Purpose of construction
 The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain, and give effect to, the
intent of the law. Hence, all rules of construction or interpretation have for their sole
object the ascertainment of the true intent of the legislature.

What is legislative intent?

Legislative intent is the vital part, the essence of the law. The intent of the legislature is
the law, and the key to, and the controlling factor in, its construction or interpretation.
Intent is the spirit which gives life to legislative. It must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not
follow the letter of the statute when it leads away from the true intent of the legislature
and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Hence, where a
statute can have more than one construction, that construction should be adopted which
will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the legislature.

Subject matter of construction

Constitution
Statutes An act of legislature as an organized body, expressed in the form, and passed
according to the procedure, required to constitute it as part of the law of the land.
Executive issuances
Ordinances
Related Legal Principles
o Separation of Powers
o Checks and balances
o Hierarchy of laws (Civil Code, Art. 7)
o Stare decisis (Civil Code, Art. 8) " Once the Supreme Court has once laid down
a principle of the law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the
same. This principle assures certainty and stability in the legal system.

WEEK 2
Parts of a Statute

Title
Art VI, Sec 26(1), 1987 Constitution
Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.

This provision is mandatory. This contains dual limitations upon the legislature.
1. The legislature is to refrain from the conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects.
2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and
the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Government of the Phil. Islands v HSBC

The title of an act must be comprehensive enough to include general object, which a
statute seeks to effect.

Preamble
A preamble is a pre-factory statement or explanation or a fining of facts, reciting the
purpose, reasons or occasion for making the law to which it is prefixed. It is usually
found after the enacting clause and before the body of the law.
 Presidential decrees and executive order generally have preambles. Preambles play an
important role in the construction of Presidential Decrees.

Eugenio v Drilon
The intent of the law culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.
In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the
legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes
in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.
In the case at bar, the law must favor the weak and the disadvantaged, including, in this
instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with no other
end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey
to the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers, and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its preamble.

Enacting Clause
Written immediately after the title, States the authority by which the act is enacted
Example: RAs from 1946-1972/1987-present: be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives in congress assembled

Body
The body of statute should embrace only one subject
Should only one subject matter, the provisions should be allied and germane to the
subject and purpose of the bill.
Contains the authoritative provisions of the law
Repealing Clause
A clause in a statute repealing a previous enactment
Example: All other laws, decrees, orders, issuances, rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified
accordingly.

Separability Clause
Creates presumption that legislature intended the law to be separable
Absence of a separability clause does not mean that the law is indivisible and inseparable
Laws are generally separable whether or not it is expressly stated in a separability clause
Example: If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, other
provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force and effect.

Antonio v Miranda
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations
for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole the
nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent,
conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be
carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if
some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or
connected must fall with them.

Tatad v DOE
R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason,
any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not
affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect."
 This separability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions of R.A.
No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The
provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal
props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil
industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these
provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition,
encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces.

Effectivity Clause
The effectivity clause is the provision when the law takes effect. Usually, the provision as
to the effectivity of the law states that is shall take effect 15 days from publication in the
OG or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Example: This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

Tanada v Tuvera, GR No. 63915, 24 April 1985

Effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Tanada v Tuvera, GR No. L-63915, 29 December 1986

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.

Limitation on the power of courts to construe

a. Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes

While statutory construction involves choice, the court should resist the temptation to roam at
will and rely on its predilections as to what policy should prevail. Common sense and good faith
are the leading stars that should guide judicial construction. Reasonable interpretation should be
the end result sought for.

Courts may not, in the guise of an interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. Courts are not authorized to insert the law
what they think should be in it or to supply what they think should be in it or to supply what
they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the omission.
Nor may they interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not prescribe. Where a statute
contains no limitations in its operation or scope, courts should not engraft any.
Courts should not also construe statutes which are perfectly vague. As a rule, a statute may be vague
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. This violates due process for failure to accord
persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid and leave law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions.

b. Courts not to be influenced by questions of wisdom

Courts do not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, for it is not
within their province to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and
common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.

While judges may regard a certain law as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend
to the authority or department concerned its amendment, modification or repeal, still, as long as
said law is in force, they must apply it and give it effect as decreed by the law-making body.

Tanada v Yulo (Liberal construction v. Judicial Legislation)

Courts are bound to follow the plain words of a statute as to which there is no room for
construction regardless of the consequences.
In this case, the counsel urges us to adopt a liberal construction of the statute. That in this
instance, as in the past, we aim to do.
But counsel in his memorandum concedes "that the language of the proviso in question is
somewhat defective and does not clearly convey the legislative intent", and at the hearing
in response to questions was finally forced to admit that what the Government desired
was for the court to insert words and phrases in the law in order to supply an intention
for the legislature. That we cannot do.
By liberal construction of statutes, courts are able to find their true meaning. Courts take
into account the language use, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing
them .There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the
act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone
believes ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and is a
legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the
tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive,
the legislative, and the judicial.

WEEK 3
Verba Legis v Ratio Legis

Tanada v Yulo (supra);

It is fundamental that the determination of the legislative intent is the primary
consideration. However, it is equally fundamental that that legislative intent must be
determined from the language of the statute itself.
This principle must be adhered to even though the court be convinced by extraneous
circumstances that the Legislature intended to enact something very different from that
which it did enact. An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up by construction and
hidden meanings at variance with the language used cannot be sought out.

Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio

Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
 employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude
the court from construing it differently.

Corporation v NLRC and Salazar GR No. L-42050-66, 3 March 1992

Alonzo v IAC (supra);

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the
letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter
but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is
within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and
a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the
intent of the lawmakers.

Salvacion v Central Bank (American who raped Karen Salvacion)

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail (Art. 10, Civil Code)

People v Purisima
The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree. This can be found among
others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which
justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption
that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence

Ambiguity
Del Mar v PAGCOR
The fact that the statute admits of different interpretations is the best evidence that the
statute is vague and ambiguous. It is widely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous
when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of
two or more senses.
o Reasonable
In the cases at bar, it is difficult to see how a literal reading of the statutory text would
unerringly reveal the legislative intent. Sutherland tells us that a statute is ambiguous,
and so open to explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract meaning or the
connotation of its terms is uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in its application to, or
effect upon, the fact-situation of the case at bar.

General Policies on Construction

1. Philippines American Drug Co., v. CIR
a. EJUSDEM GENERIS Where in a statue, general words follow a designation of
particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will
ordinarily be presumed to be restricted by the particular designation, class or
nature as those specifically enumerated

2. NAPOLCOM v. De Guzman
a. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted.
b. Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs
counter to the legislative intent.
 3. Tanada v. Tuvera
a. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
Thereby, this Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
4. City of Naga v. Agna
a. IN PARI MATERIA - Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to
the same person or thing, or have the same purpose or object.
b. When statutes are in pari materia, they should be construed together. In
construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be
compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction,
both should be so construed that effect be given to every provision of each.
c. When the new provision and the old relate to the same subject, and they cannot
be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter expression of the
legislative will.

General Principles / Presumptions on the Interpretation of Certain Statutes

1. Penal Laws
a. Centeno v. Villalon Pornillos
i. General rule: Penal laws are liberally construed in favor of the accused.
b. U.S. v. Go Chico
i. Although penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of the
accused, where the legislative intent is clear, the law should be applied.
Dura lex sed lex the law may be harsh but it is the law
2. Tax Laws
a. Marinduque Iron Mines v. Municipal Council
i. Imposition of tax is strictly construed in favor of the person imposed and
against the State. Otherwise stated, tax impositions are construed strictly
against the state.
b. NPC v. City of Cabanatuan
i. Tax exemption is construed strictly against the one who is granted the
exemption and in favor of the State. Otherwise stated, The burden of
proving a tax exemption lies with the one taxed.

3. Social Legislation
a. International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary
i. If a stringent application of procedural rules would hinder rather serve
the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter.
4. Rules of Court
a. Office of the Court Administrator v. Garong
i. General Rule: If a stringent application of procedural rules would hinder
rather serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to
the latter.
b. Provincial Sheriff of Rizal v. CA, et.al.
i. While the Rules of Procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied as they are deemed
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays

5. Law on adoption
a. Duncan v. Court of First Instance
 i. Laws on adoption are liberally construed in favor of the general welfare
of the child.
6. Local Government/ Local Autonomy
a. San Juan v. CSC
i. Laws are liberally construed in favor of local autonomy and against
national government. When in doubt, local autonomy!

7. Constitution
a. Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC
i. While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is
not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in
a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they
are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be
limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

b. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

i. A constitution is a system of fundamental law for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.
ii. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION If a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution, that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into
by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without
force and effect.

c. Francisco v. House of Representatives

i. If plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids
is available. (The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
is was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers
understanding thereof).
ii. Some principles of constitutional construction:
1. VERBA LEGIS whenever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except when
technical terms are employed
2. RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the
framers
3. UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole
d. de Castro v. JBC (read also resolution on the MR dated 20 April 2010)
i. ISSUE: Article 7, Section 15 v. Article 8, Section 4(1) Chief Justice
Punos resignation
ii. The Constitution specifically separates into different articles the three
branches of government, with each stating its own powers. If the framers
intended to extend the prohibitive period to judicial appointments, it
would have EXPLICITLY done so.
1. According to the records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, it is revealed that meticulous
planning was involved in the creation of the Constitution.
 iii. EFFECTIVENESS According to statutory construction, the court
should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by
endeavoring to harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be
effective. Construction which will leave every word operative will be
favored over one which leaves some word or provision meaningless
because of inconsistency. However, a word or provision should not be
given effect if it goes against the intent of the law.
e. Chavez v. JBC
i. Issue: Composition of JBC a representative of Congress
ii. From a simple reading of the provision in the Constitution, it is clear and
unambiguous Congress as a whole may designate only one
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention of the framers to
grant more than one representative into the JBC, it should have explicitly
been expressed.
iii. NOSCITUR ASOCIIS Correct Construction of ambiguous word or
phrase may be made clear and specific by considering the company of
words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
1. The tenor of Sec. 8, Art. 8 is to provide for only one
representative of each co-equal branch of the Government in the
JBC. They should all be given equal footing and thus, the
provision cannot be construed to provide for two representative
in Congress.

Intrinsic Aids of Construction

1. Law construed as a whole and in relation to other laws
a. Caudal v. CA
i. Issue: Meaning of the word rental unit for purposes of judicial
ejectment
ii. Legislative intent must be ascertained from consideration of the whole
statute. Clauses and phrases of statutes should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
1. Section 5 of BP 877 regarding judicial ejectment merely mentions
a rental unit. Section 2 gives a definition of residential unit. From
this fact, the definition given in Section 2 should apply as well in
Section 5.
2. Title of the law
a. City of Baguio v. Marcos
i. Issue: RA 931. Does it contemplate the filing of petitions in cadastral
courts 40 years after a judicial decision or 40 years after judicial
proceedings?
1. The title mentions judicial decisions while section 1 speaks of
judicial proceedings.
ii. The title may be used in the ascertainment of congressional will in
interpreting an obscure interpretation in the law. Given two choices of
interpretation, the liberal one must be used. Thus in this case, RA 931
was construed to apply to judicial decisions so that more people could
avail of the reliefs granted in said law.
3. Preamble
a. People v. Purisima
i. Issue: PD 9. Does it penalize the public display of a deadly weapon as
contemplated by the prohibition on illegal possession deadly weapon?
 ii. The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a
statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the
decree. This can be found, among others, in the preamble or whereas
clauses.
iii. In the case at bar, the possession of the deadly weapon in public should
be coupled with the element of intent fro subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, etc. as enunciated in the
preamble of the decree.
4. Punctuation marks
a. Florentino v. PNB
i. Issue: Whether a qualifying clause in a provision refers to all antecedents
or only the last antecedent in the light of the position of the comma in the
provision.
ii. DOCTRINE OF LAST ANTECEDENT Grammatically, the qualifying
clause refers only to the last antecedent in light of the comma separating
the last antecedent from the preceding ones. Thus in this case, there is a
comma before words or to any citizen, etc which separates that
phrase from the preceding ones. Here, the effect is that the stipulation on
the private sector is effectively separated from those on the government.
1. Obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this
amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to
the Government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or
the corporations owned or controlled by the government, or to
any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who
may be willing to accept the same for such settlement.
5. Headnotes or epigraphs
a. People v. Yabut
i. Issue: Whether or not a recidivist already serving sentence, who commits
a crime similar to a crime he is charged with, will be covered by the
provisions of Art. 160 of the RPC.
ii. Art 160 of the RPC Commission of ANOTHER crime during service of
penalty imposed for ANOTHER previous offense
iii. Headnotes of erpigraphs, being nothing more than a convenient index to
the contents of the article of the Code, they cannot, in any event, have the
effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words of the text
iv. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove and not to create doubt
6. Conflicting provisions
a. Manila Railroad Co. v. Collector
i. Issue: Dust shield used by Manila Railroad. Covered under paragraph
141 (manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for) of Tariff Law or
paragraph 197 (detached parts) of the same law?
ii. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general
on embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative
and the general enactment must be taken to effect only in such cases
within its general language as are not within the provision with the
particular enactment.
1. In the case, paragraph 197 is the particular enactment.
7. Meaning of word qualified by purpose of the statute
a. David v. CA
i. Issue: Tenants in plantations for sugarcane production automatically
converting their relationship with the landowner from sharing to
leasehold system.
 ii. When the language of a statute is fairly susceptible to two or more
constructions, that which should be adopted is that which will most tend
to give effect to manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object
for which the statute was enacted. A construction should be rejected
which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and
to defeat the object which the legislator sought o attain by its enactment.
8. Words construed in their ordinary sense
a. Collector v. Manila Lodge No. 761
i. Issue: Whether Manila Lodge is exempt from paying privilege taxes
afforded to business in light of the non-proprietary nature of the
operations extended to their members
ii. Words in the law should be construed in their ordinary sense. No
construction may be made to restrict or enlarge the meaning of an Act
1. Emphasis on business and not retail liquor dealers. Manila
Lodge is clearly not involved in a business, thus the words in the
law should be understood in its ordinary sense
9. General words construed generally
a. Gatchalian v. COMELEC
i. Issue: COMELEC resolutions allowing donations, funds, and
contributions of billboards by foreigners (not covered by Sec. 56 of the
Revised Election Code)
ii. The term any election contemplated in Article X of the then
Constitution should apply ass well to elections into the Constitutional
Convention
iii. The term foreigner should apply to juridical persons as well
iv. General words should be construed generally. Thus any election
should contemplate all types of elections and foreigner should include
all those that fall within the term such as juridical persons
10. Use of generic words include things that arise after enactment of the law - progressive
interpretation
a. Geotina v. CA
i. Issue: The importation of apples is being questioned on the ground that
it is not one of those items prohibited in Central Bank Circulars
ii. The term prohibited merchandise is broad enough to include those
which could be considered prohibited after the enactment of the law.
Apples can this still be considered as prohibited merchandise
iii. This is a progressive interpretation of the provisions in the Circulars
11. Words and phrases construed in relation to other provisions
a. Claudio v. COMELEC
i. In this case, the Court construed Section 74 with Section 69 of the same
Code in order to conclude that recall actually means recall elections.
12. Where the law does not distinguish
a. Pilar v. COMELEC
i. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMOS
1. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. No distinction is to be made in the application of a
law where none is indicated.
13. Use of technical terms
a. Manila Herald Publishing v. Ramos
i. In interpreting technical terms, the meaning should be restricted in the
sense that it is used in a given rule or provision.
ii. In this case, the word action is construed to mean an action which
originates an entire proceeding and puts in motion the instruments of
 the court calling for summons, answer, etc, and not any intermediary
step taken in the course of the proceeding whether by the parties
themselves or by a stranger.
14. Use of associated words
a. Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier
i. NOSCITUR ASOCIIS = xyz where x y,z
1. Purpose is to limit
b. Mutuc v. COMELEC
i. EJUSDEM GENERIS = x, y, z, etc. where etc x,y,z
1. The purpose is to limit it to the words enumerated
c. Cagayan Valley Enterprises v. CA
i. WHEN EJUSDEM GENERIS CAN AND CANNOT BE APPLIED
1. Such rule of ejusdem generis is to be resorted to only for the
purpose of determining what the intent of the legislature was
in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from other
parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is
contrary to the result which would be reached by the
appreciation of the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give
way.
15. Express mention and implied exclusion
a. Sarmiento III v. Mison
i. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO, ALTERIUS
1. An express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated.
16. Necessary implication
a. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor
i. NECESSARY IMPLICAITON x,y,z necessarily includes a
1. Counters Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur Asociis: Even if not
similar to those enumerated
2. Purpose is to expand
17. Casus Omissus
a. People v. Manantan
i. CASUS OMISUS = x,y,z where a x,y, or z; like Expressio unius est
exclusio, alterius
1. Purpose is to limit
2. When a certain provision makes an enumeration of applicable
cases and there is an analogous case which stands upon the same
reason but have been omitted inadvertently or was overlooked,
the courts cannot supply those omissions.
18. Each to each
a. People v. Tamani
i. EACH TO EACH = x or y of a or b where x is to a while y is to b
19. Relative and qualifying terms
a. Mapa v. Arroyo
i. AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAT RELATIO NISI IMPEDIATUR
SENTENCIA
1. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be
prevented by the context.
20. Context and related clauses
a. Paras v. COMELEC
i. Statutes are construed with the context in mind. A clause should be
construed with other related clauses as to determine the legislative
intent.
 21. Use of punctuation marks
a. U.S. v. Hart
i. An argument on punctuations mark cannot stand by itself.
22. Words and Phrases:
a. Proviso
i. Mercado et.al. v. NLRC
1. The proviso outweighs the body of the provision.
b. Including
i. Sterling Selections Corporation v. LLDA
1. The word include means to take in or comprise as a part of a
whole.
c. Negative vs affirmative words
i. In re McGee v. Republic
1. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory
while those in the affirmative are merely directory
d. Mandatory v permissive
i. Bersabal v. Salvador
1. As a general rule, the word may when used in a statute is
permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the
word shall is imperative, operating to impose a duty which
may be enforced.
ii. Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp
1. The word shall is imperative. However, the rule is not
absolute; it may be construed as may when required by the
context or by the intention of the statute.
e. and/or
i. RMBSA v. HDMF
1. The term and/or means that the effect shall be given to both the
conjunctive and and the disjunctive or.

Extrinsic Aids of Construction

1. Contemporaneous Circumstances
a. Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. GAB
i. Intention of the author must not only be ascertained but it is necessary
that such intention has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal
effect.
ii. The legal act is made up of two elements an internal and external one;
it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the
latter may defeat the former.
iii. On the principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage and
practice under the statute, or a course of conduct indicating a particular
undertaking of it, will frequently be of great value in determining its real
meaning, especially where the usage has been acquired in by all parties
concerned and has extended over a long period of time.
2. Legislative History
a. Commissioner v. Esso
i. Where a statute is ambiguous, courts may examine both the printed
pages of the published Act as well as the extrinsic matters that may aid
in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its
enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill and purposes to be
accomplished by the measure.
 ii. The courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the
statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of
facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation.
b. Filipinas Life Assurance Company v. Court of Tax Appeals
i. The position of a proviso, although possessed of considerable influence,
is not necessarily controlling, as the proviso may apply to sections or
portions thereof which follows it or even to the entire statute. In the
ascertainment of intention, the legislative history is extremely important
than position.
3. Legislative Debates and Committee Reports
a. Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. GAB
i. Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual
members and are not safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body. It is
impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon
an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by
resorting to the speeches of the members thereof. Those who did not
speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke,
might differ from each other.
b. Astorga v. Villegas
i. ENROLLED BILL THEORY
ii. The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal
and independent departments, which requires the judicial department
to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated.
c. Gaanan v. IAC
i. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary
rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. In this
case, the court resorted to the Senate Congressional Records.
d. League of Cities v. COMELEC
i. Factual circumstances

4. Executive/Contemporaneous Construction
a. Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
i. While contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, yet
where a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative
department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive, it is
entitled to great respect.
b. Navarro et.al., v. Executive Secretary (legislative construction)
i. It must be remembered that the Oversight Committee is composed of
both the executive and legislative department. The Oversight Committee
which formulated the IRR, amounted not only to an executive
construction, entitled to great weight and respect from the Court, but to
legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of
representatives from the four leagues of local government units as
members of the Oversight Committee.
c. Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova
i. The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the
executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is
entitled with great respect, and should ordinarily control the
construction of a statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.
 ii. Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed
upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it,a nd
unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be
controlled thereby.
5. Reference to other statutes
a. Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
i. However with reference to other laws such as R.A 679, R.A 843, and
Article 1695 of the Civil Code which simply states that employer shall
grant pay to the employee, the phrase to pay is normally construed to
mean full payment.
ii. When the law uses a term in one statute, the courts may look into other
statutes using the same term to ascertain the legislative intent. It is
presumed that the legislators use the terms similarly across different
statutes.
6. Statutes borrowed from foreign jurisdictions
a. United States v. De Guzman
i. Courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes
which they are called upon to construe and administer and of the facts
which affect their derivation, validity and operation.
A. CLERICAL ERROR
1. Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals
a. Can the courts correct a clerical error? Is it a form of judicial legislation?
i. a) Where the clerical error is plain and obvious and b) where the
legislative intent can be ascertained and c) where a literal interpretation
of a statute would lead to an absurd result, it is within the province of
the courts to correct said error.
ii. However, if the following do not concur, then the Enrolled Bill Theory
applies.

B. CONSTRUCTION OF CONFLICTING STATUTES/ CONFLICTING PROVISIONS

1. Gordon v. Veridiano II (general rule)
a. Courts should endeavor to reconcile the conflicting statutes instead of declaring
outright of one as against the other.
2. Lopez Jr. v. Civil Service Commission (special law vs. general law)
a. A special law prevails over a general law. For a general law to repeal a special
law, it must be expressly repealed. Repeal by implication is not favored.
3. Philippine National Bank v. Asuncion (substantive v. procedural law)
a. Substantive law prevails over procedural law. Furthermore, Art. 10, Sec. 5 of the
Constitution prohibits the Supreme Court from promulgating procedural rules
that diminishes substantive rights.
4. Philippine National Bank v. Cruz (Latter statute prevails)
a. Statutes of equal theoretical application (meaning equal standing, i.e. two general
laws), the one enacted in a later date must prevail being a later expression of the
legislative will.
5. People v. Palma (general law cannot impliedly repeal a special law); however, see contra
Bagatsing v. Ramirez
a. A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must
be express and specific. However, in the latter case, a general provision must
give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs.
6. City of Manila v. Teotico (general provision in a special law vs. special provision in a
general law)
a. A special provision in a general law prevails over a general provision in a special
law.
 7. Arenas v. City of San Carlos (proviso vs. body of a statute)
a. The proviso prevails over the body of a statute, the proviso being the latest
expression of legislative will.

x----------------------------------x
Amendment and Repeal
*Notes on effects of repeals:
Law 1 Ex Law 2 Ex/Im Law 3 = Law 1 is not revived
Law 1 Im Law 2 Im = Law 1 is not revived
Law 1 Im Law 2 Ex Law 3 = Law 1 is revived

1. Mecano v. COA
a. Repeal by implications are not favored. The legislature is presumed to know the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting
statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.

2. LLDA v. CA
a. Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA,
RA 4850, as amended.
b. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter
should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general
statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the
absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals
are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments
of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication.

3. Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola

a. If Congress amends a statute, that indicates that the Congress wants to change
the interpretation.

4. U.S. v. Soliman
a. The enactment of new penal laws, notwithstanding the fact that they contain
general repealing clauses, does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the
date when the repealing law goes into effect, unless the new law wholly fails to
penalties the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the
repealed law.

Prospectivity and Retroactivity

1. Universal Corn Products, Inc. et.al. v. Rice and Corn Board
a. It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as having
only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature
to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved
against the retrospective effect.
2. Senarillos v. Hermosisima
a. It is elementary that the interpretation placed by the Court upon RA 557
constitutes part of the law of as of the date it was originally passed, since this
Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
that the interpreted law carried into effect.

3. People v. Lucero; People v. Macarandang; People v. Mapa; People v. Jabinal

 Charged Decision Result
1. Lucero Before 1958 1958 Acquit; we are acquitting you
because of the circumstances of the
case; Admin code did not include in
the enumeration of a confidential
agent
2. Macarandang Before 1959 1959 Acquit; the secret agent is within
(1954) the interpretation of the term peace
officer
3. Mapa After 1959 and 1967 Convicted; the ruling in
before 1967 - Macarandang is misplaced because
(1962) the RAC states the enumration and
it does not say anything about a
secret agent therefore, Mapa is
guilty, he went to jail
4. Jabinal 1964 1974 (After Acquit; He was appointed both as a
the decision confidential (to maintain peace and
in Mapa) order) and secret agent (to furnish
info about things that would affect
peace and order); in 1964 the
prevailing doctrine doctrine during
the time Jabinal was charged is that
a secret agent is exempt from illegal
possession of fire arm
DISCUSSION:
Exception to the General Rule: The Doctrine of Mapa cannot be applied to Jabinal
because it was not the doctrine during the time he was charged. Mapa cannot be applied
retroactively.
Note also that this is a penal law. There is no crime when there is no law punishing the
act. The Supreme Court should have overturned their ruling in Mapa but acquitted him
instead.

Interpretation of Contracts
NOTES:
Difference of law and contract:
o LAW enacted by one body, by one Congress; it is unilateral.
o CONTRACT bilateral; in interpreting contracts, one is trying to find where the
parties minds meet; more or less statutory construction for statutes are also
applicable.
DOCTRINE OF CONTRA PROFERENTEM construe the contract against the party
who created the ambiguous provision in the contract; against the offeror; also known
as "interpretation against the draftsman"; is a doctrine of contractual interpretation
providing that, where a promise, agreement or term is ambiguous, the preferred
meaning should be the one that works against the interests of the party who provided the
wording.

ARTS. 1370 TO 1379 OF THE CIVIL CODE (RULES ON INTERPRETATION OF

CONTRACTS); RULE 130, SECS. 10 TO 19 OF THE RULES OF COURT
Art.% 1370.! If! the! terms! of! a! contract! are! clear! and! leave! no! doubt! upon! the! intention! of! the!
contracting!parties,!the!literal!meaning!of!its!stipulations!shall!control.!
If!the!words!appear!to!be!contrary!to!the!evident!intention!of!the!parties,!the!latter!shall!prevail!over!
the!former.!(1281)!
Art.% 1371.! In! order! to! judge! the! intention! of! the! contracting! parties,! their! contemporaneous! and!
subsequent!acts!shall!be!principally!considered.!(1282)!
Art.% 1372.! However! general! the! terms! of! a! contract! may! be,! they! shall! not! be! understood! to!
comprehend!things!that!are!distinct!and!cases!that!are!different!from!those!upon!which!the!parties!
intended!to!agree.!(1283)!
Art.% 1373.! If! some! stipulation! of! any! contract! should! admit! of! several! meanings,! it! shall! be!
understood!as!bearing!that!import!which!is!most!adequate!to!render!it!effectual.!(1284)!
Art.% 1374.! The! various! stipulations! of! a! contract! shall! be! interpreted! together,! attributing! to! the!
doubtful!ones!that!sense!which!may!result!from!all!of!them!taken!jointly.!(1285)!
Art.% 1375.!Words!which!may!have!different!significations!shall!be!understood!in!that!which!is!most!
in!keeping!with!the!nature!and!object!of!the!contract.!(1286)!
Art.% 1376.! The! usage! or! custom! of! the! place! shall! be! borne! in! mind! in! the! interpretation! of! the!
ambiguities!of!a!contract,!and!shall!fill!the!omission!of!stipulations!which!are!ordinarily!established.!
(1287)!
Art.%1377.!The!interpretation!of!obscure!words!or!stipulations!in!a!contract!shall!not!favor!the!party!
who!caused!the!obscurity.!(1288)!
Art.%1378.!When!it!is!absolutely!impossible!to!settle!doubts!by!the!rules!established!in!the!preceding!
articles,! and! the! doubts! refer! to! incidental! circumstances! of! a! gratuitous! contract,! the! least!
transmission!of!rights!and!interests!shall!prevail.!If!the!contract!is!onerous,!the!doubt!shall!be!settled!
in!favor!of!the!greatest!reciprocity!of!interests.!
If!the!doubts!are!cast!upon!the!principal!object!of!the!contract!in!such!a!way!that!it!cannot!be!known!
what!may!have!been!the!intention!or!will!of!the!parties,!the!contract!shall!be!null!and!void.!(1289)!
Art.%1379.!The!principles!of!interpretation!stated!in!Rule!123!of!the!Rules!of!Court!shall!likewise!be!
observed!in!the!construction!of!contracts.!(n)%

Section% 10.!Interpretation*of*a*writing*according*to*its*legal*meaning.!!The!language!of!a!writing!is!
to! be! interpreted! according! to! the! legal! meaning! it! bears! in! the! place! of! its! execution,! unless! the!
parties!intended!otherwise.!(8)!
Section% 11.! Instrument* construed* so* as* to* give* effect* to* all* provisions.! ! In! the! construction! of! an!
instrument,!where!there!are!several!provisions!or!particulars,!such!a!construction!is,!if!possible,!to!be!
adopted!as!will!give!effect!to!all.!(9)!
Section% 12.! Interpretation* according* to* intention;!general* and* particular* provisions.! ! In! the!
construction!of!an!instrument,!the!intention!of!the!parties!is!to!be!pursued;!and!when!a!general!and!a!
particular!provision!are!inconsistent,!the!latter!is!paramount!to!the!former.!So!a!particular!intent!will!
control!a!general!one!that!is!inconsistent!with!it.!(10)!
Section% 13.! Interpretation* according* to* circumstances.! ! For! the! proper! construction! of! an!
instrument,!the!circumstances!under!which!it!was!made,!including!the!situation!of!the!subject!thereof!
and!of!the!parties!to!it,!may!be!shown,!so!that!the!judge!may!be!placed!in!the!position!of!those!who!
language!he!is!to!interpret.!(11)!
Section%14.!Peculiar*signification*of*terms.!!The!terms!of!a!writing!are!presumed!to!have!been!used!
in!their!primary!and!general!acceptation,!but!evidence!is!admissible!to!show!that!they!have!a!local,!
technical,! or! otherwise! peculiar! signification,! and! were! so! used! and! understood! in! the! particular!
instance,!in!which!case!the!agreement!must!be!construed!accordingly.!(12)!
Section! 15.! Written*words*control*printed.! ! When! an! instrument! consists! partly! of! written! words!
and!partly!of!a!printed!form,!and!the!two!are!inconsistent,!the!former!controls!the!latter.!(13)!
Section%16.!Experts*and*interpreters*to*be*used*in*explaining*certain*writings.!!When!the!characters!
in!which!an!instrument!is!written!are!difficult!to!be!deciphered,!or!the!language!is!not!understood!by!
the! court,! the! evidence! of! persons! skilled! in! deciphering! the! characters,! or! who! understand! the!
language,!is!admissible!to!declare!the!characters!or!the!meaning!of!the!language.!(14)!
Section% 17.! Of* Two* constructions,* which* preferred.! ! When! the! terms! of! an! agreement! have! been!
intended!in!a!different!sense!by!the!different!parties!to!it,!that!sense!is!to!prevail!against!either!party!
in! which! he! supposed! the! other! understood! it,! and! when! different! constructions! of! a! provision! are!
otherwise!equally!proper,!that!is!to!be!taken!which!is!the!most!favorable!to!the!party!in!whose!favor!
the!provision!was!made.!(15)!
Section% 18.! Construction*in*favor*of*natural*right.! ! When! an! instrument! is! equally! susceptible! of!
two!interpretations,!one!in!favor!of!natural!right!and!the!other!against!it,!the!former!is!to!be!adopted.!
(16)!
Section% 19.! Interpretation* according* to* usage.! ! An! instrument! may! be! construed! according! to!
usage,!in!order!to!determine!its!true!character.!(17)!

1. Lambert v. Fox
a. VERBA LEGIS The intention of parties to a contract must be determined, in
the first instance, from the words of the contract itself. It is to be presumed that
persons mean what they say when they speak plain English. Interpretation and
construction should by the instruments last resorted to by a court in determining
what the parties agreed to. Where the language used by the parties is plain, then
construction and interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in making a
contract for the parties.
2. Manila Banking Corp. v. Teodoro
a. ISSUE: Does the deed of assignment of receivables constitute a transfer of the
ownership of the said receivables from Teodoro to Manila Banking in light of
Teodoros failure to pay their loans to Manila Banking.
b. The character of transactions between parties is not determined by the language
used in the document but by their intention. This is especially true when the
language in the document is unclear.
c. There may be instances when the wording of certain provisions in a contract
make it appear as one thing but the intention is that of another. It is in this cases
where one looks over the language of the document and ascertains the intention.
3. Abad v. Goldloop
a. Where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract
must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some
good reason can be assigned to show that the words should be understood in a
different sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, or rewrite
contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or
alter them for the benefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or by
construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily
consented to, or impose on him those which he did not.

Part III: LATIN MAXIMS AND MEANINGS

ABSOLUTA SENTENTIA When the language of law is clear, no explanation of it is
EXPOSITORE NON INDIGET required
ACTUS ME INVITO FACTUS An act done by me against my will is not my act
NON EST MEUS ACTUS
ACTUS NON FACIT REUM, The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his
NISI MENS SIT REA intention were so
AD PROXIMUM Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the
ANTECEDENS FIAT context otherwise requires
RELATION NISI IMPEDIATUR
SENTENTIA
AUGMENTUM A CONTRARIO Negative-opposite doctrine
CASUS OMISSUS PRO A person, object or thing omitted from enumeration must
OMISSO HABENDUS EST be held to have been omitted intentionally
CESSANTE RATIONE LEGIS, When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases
CESSAT ET IPSA LEX
CONTEMPORANEA The contemporary construction is strongest in law
EXPOSITIO EST OPTIMA ET
FORTISSIMA IN LEGE
DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET Distinguish times and you will harmonize
CONCORDABIS JURA
DURA LEX SED LEX The law may be harsh, but that is the law
EJUSDEM GENERIS Of the same kind or specie
EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM A thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming
IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS within the purview of the general rule
EX DOLO MALO NON No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own
ORITUR ACTIO wrongdoing
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST The express mention of one person, thing or consequence
EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS implies the exclusion of all others
LEGIS INTERPRETATIO The authoritative interpretation of the court of a statute
LEGIS VIM OBTINET acquires the force of law by becoming a part thereof
LEGES POSTERIORES A later law repeals a prior law on the same subject which is
PRIORES CONTRARIAS repugnant thereto
ABROGANT
LEX DE FUTURO, JUDEX DE The law looks forward, not backward
PRATERITO
LEX PROSPICIT, NON The law looks forward, not backward
RESPICIT
MALEDICTA EST EXPOSITIO It is dangerous construction which is against the text
QUAE CORRUMPIT TEXTUM
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS Words construed with reference to accompanying or
associated words
NOVA CONSTITUTIO A new statute should affect the future, not the past
FUTURIS FORMAM
IMPONERE DEBET NON
PRAETERITIS
NULLUS COMMODUM No man should be allowed to take advantage of his own
POTEST DE INJURIA wrong
PROPRIASUA
NULLUM CRIMEN SINE There is no crime without penalty, and there is no penalty
POENA, NULLA POENA SINE without a law
LEGE
NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURIT There can be no legal right as against the authority that
REGI makes the law on which the right depends
OPTIMA STATUTI The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself
INTERPRETATRIX EST IPSUM
STATUTUM
OPTIMUS INTERPRES RERUM The best interpreter of the law is usage
USUS
PARI MATERIA Relating to same matter
PRIVILEGIA RECIPRINT Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will
LARGAN of him who grants them
INTERPRETATIONEM
VOLUNTATE CONSONAN
CONCEDENTIS
POTIOR EST IN TEMPORE, He who is first in time is preferred in right
POTIOR EST IN JURE
QUANDO ALIQUID What is prohibited directly is prohibited indirectly
PROHIBITEUR EX DIRECTO,
PROHIBETUR ET PER
OBLIQUUM
RATIHABITO MANDATO Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate
AQUIPARATUR
EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE What is expressed puts and end to that which is implied. Ex
TACITUM necessitate legis By necessary implication of law
FALSA DEMONSTRATIO False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate
NON NOCET, CUM DE the meaning of the statute
CORPORE CONSTAT
FAVORES AMPLIANDI SUNT; Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given
ODIA RESTRINGENDA retroactive effect
GENERALE DICTUM A general statement is understood in a general sense
GENERALITER EST
INTERPRETANDUM
GENERALIA VERBA SUNT What is generally spoken shall be generally understood
GENERALITER
INTELLIGENDA
GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS A general law does not nullify a specific or special law
NON DEROGANT
HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM It is exceedingly hard but so the law is written
DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX
SCRIPTA EST
IMPOSSIBILIUM NULLA There is no obligation to do an impossible thing
OBLIGATIO EST
INDEX ANIMI SERMO EST Speech is the index of intention
IN EO QUOD PLUS SIT, The greater includes the lesser
SEMPER INEST ET MINUS
INTEREST REIPUBLICAE UT Public interest requires that by the very nature of things
SIT FINIS LITIUM there must be an end to a legal controversy
INTERPOTARE ET Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with
CONCORDARE LEGIBUS EST other statutes as to form uniform system of law
OPTIMUS INTERPOTANDI
MODUS
INTERPRETATIO FIENDA EST A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding
UT RES MAGIS VALEAT rather than destroying
QUAM PEREAT
INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
AMBIGUIS SEMPER FIENDA inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted
EST UT EVITETUR
INCONVENIENS ET
ABSURDUM
RATIO LEGIS Interpretation according to spirit
RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA The reason of the law is its soul
LEGIS
REDDENDO SINGULA Referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression
SINGULIS to its appropriate object; or let each be put in its proper
place.
SALUS POPULI EST SUPREMA The voice of the people is the supreme law
LEX
SURPLUSAGIUM NON Surplusage does not vitiate a statute
NOCET
STARE DECISIS ET NON Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
QUIETA MOVERE settled
UBI JUS, IBI REMEDIUM Where there is a right, there is a remedy
UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT, Where the law does not distinguish. Utile per inutile non
NEC NOS DISTINGUIRE vitiatur- The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful
DEBEMUS
UT RES MAGIS VALEAT The construction is to be sought which gives effect to the
QUAM PEREAT whole statute- its every word
VERBA ACCIPIENDA SUNT A word is to be understood in the context in which it is
SECUNDUM SUBJECTAM used
MATERIAM
VERBA INTENTIONI, NON E Words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not
CONTRA, DEBENT the intent to the words
INSERVIRE
VERBA LEGIS Plain-meaning rule
VIGILANTIBUS ET NON The laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their
DORMIENTUBUS JURA rights
SUBVENIUNT
VERBA LEGIS NON EST From the words of the statute there should be no departure
RECEDENDUM

Oooo..kay Goodluck guys!