E.

Judicial Review of Administrative Action

1. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary/Prior Resort

Smart Communications (Supra)

Republic v Lacap (No Digest)

Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the Whole

FACTS:

On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the
Senate Ethics Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by
Senator Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to
name its representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter,
the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.

In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the
Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics
Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the
Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of
such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee
to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed
amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules
of the Senate Committee of the Whole.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an
indispensable party in this petition;

2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
or prior resort;

3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to
the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar's right to equal protection;

4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar's right to due process and of the majority
quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and

5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their
effectivity.

HELD:

REMEDIAL LAW

First issue: An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest. In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before
the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the
author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure
on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting
Senator Madrigal's interest.

Second issue: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues
presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent
for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are
within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Third issue: While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or
unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively
prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to
the Ethics Committee. The referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an
extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the
members of the Senate, and not violative of the right to equal protection.

Fourth issue: The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee does not violate Senator Villar's right to due process. The Constitutional right of
the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by
this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, which states: "Each House
shall determine the rules of its proceedings."

Fifth: The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or
Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to
the House or Senate, such rules need not be published,unless such rules expressly provide for
their publication before the rules can take effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the
Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution,
publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules
expressly mandate their publication.

PARTIALLY GRANTED

2. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Paat v CA (Natural Resources)

PAAT v CA
G.R. No. 111107
January 10, 1997

FACTS:

On May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to
Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver
could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the
truck.

LOWER COURTS:
* CENRO: Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the
truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why
the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required
explanation.

* RED- DENR: On June 22, 1989,i[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR
sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989
order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of
July 12, 1989.ii[2]

* DENR-SECRETARY (Pending resolution)

* RTC (action for replevin): denied motion to dismiss by Paat (DENR-RED)

* CA (review): denied, has legal questions involved.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

(1) Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for
replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines?

NO, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can
be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.

(2) Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

YES.

SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized

Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order
the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies
on the matter. (Underline ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in
violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the
same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter.

SECTION 68. xxx

xxx

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found. (Underline ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents'
thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include
conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due
to the fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the
clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A.

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to
confiscate, not only conveyances,' but forest products as well. On the other hand,
confiscation of forest products by the court' in a criminal action has long been provided for in
Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised
except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at
all.

it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject
truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to
Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended.

Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the
disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the
conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued
possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding
is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

OBITER DICTA:

(1) the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is

not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded

(1) when there is a violation of due process,

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

(2) the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development
and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
(3) The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What
is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.

Obiasca vs. Basallote

Antecedents
For purpose of this dissent, the background of this controversy is as follows.
On 26 May 2003, respondent Jeanne O. Basallote was appointed to the position of
Administrative Officer II, Item No. OSEC-DECSB-ADO2-390030-1998 of the Department of
Education (DepEd), Tabaco National High School in Albay Province by City Schools Division
Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso.

In a letter dated 4 June 2003 the new City Schools Division Superintendent, Ma. Amy O.
Oyardo (Oyardo), advised School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales (Gonzales) that the papers of
the applicants for the position of Administrative Officer II of the school, including those of the
respondent, were being returned; and that a school ranking should be accomplished and
submitted to her office for review.In addition, Gonzales was advised that only qualified
applicants should be indorsed.

The respondent assumed as Administrative Officer II on 19 June 2003.Thereafter, however,

she received a letter from Ma. Teresa U. Diaz (Diaz), Human Resource Management Officer I,
City Schools Division of Tabaco City, Albay, informing her that her appointment could not be
forwarded to the CSC because of her failure to submit the position description form (PDF) duly
signed by Gonzales.

The respondent sought to obtain Gonzales signature, but the latter refused to sign despite
repeated requests. When the respondent informed Oyardo of the situation, she was instead
advised to return to her former teaching position of Teacher I.The respondent followed the
advice.
In the meanwhile, on 25 August 2003, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin O. Obiasca to the
position of Administrative Officer II. The appointment was sent to and was properly attested by
the CSC.

The respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against
Oyardo, Gonzales, and Diaz.

In its decision, the Ombudsman found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for
withholding information from the respondent on the status of her appointment, and
suspended them from the service for three months; but Diaz was absolved of any wrongdoing.

The respondent also filed a protest with the CSC Regional Office V, docketed as Adm. Case No.
ND-ARU 04-290. The protest was dismissed on the ground that it should first be submitted to
the Grievance Committee of the DepEd for appropriate action.

On motion for reconsideration , the protest was reinstated, but it was eventually dismissed for
lack of merit. The respondent appealed the dismissal of her protest to the CSC Regional Office,
which dismissed the appeal for failure to show that her appointment had been received and
attested to by the CSC.
The respondent elevated the matter to the CSC, which granted the appeal by its 29 November
2005 resolution, approving the respondents appointment and recalling its approval of the
petitioners appointment.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming
that the CSC thereby acted without factual and legal bases in recalling his appointment, and
praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

Ruling of the CA
In its 26 September 2006 decision, the CA denied the petition for certiorari , and upheld the
respondents appointment effective immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority
on 26 May 2003, considering that the respondent had accepted the appointment upon her
assumption of the duties and responsibilities of the position.

The CA found that the respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for the position of Administrative Officer II; that due to the respondents valid
appointment, no other appointment to the sameposition could be made without the position
being first vacated; that the petitioners appointment to theposition was thus void; and that
contrary to the argument of the petitioner that he had been deprived of his right to due
process by not having been allowed to participate in the proceedings in the CSC, it was the
petitioner who had himself failed to exercise his right by failing to submit a single pleading
despite being furnished with copies of the pleadings in the proceedings in the CSC.

The CA opined that Diaz had unreasonably refused to affix her signature on the respondents
PDF and to submit the respondents appointment to the CSC on the ground of non-submission
of the respondents PDF, because the PDF had not been required to be submitted and
forwarded to the CSC.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration , but his motion was denied on 8 February
2007

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari .

Issues: The petitioner maintains that the respondent was not validly appointed to the
position of Administrative Officer II, because her appointment was never attested by the CSC;
that without the attestation, the respondents appointment as Administrative Officer II was not
completed and did not vest a permanent title upon the respondent; that for that reason, the
appointment might still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority; that under the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 ( Administrative Code of
1987), every appointment is required to be submitted to the CSC within30 days from the date
of issuance; otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective; that the respondents
appointment issued on 23 May 2003 should have been transmitted to the CSC not later than
22 June 2003 for proper attestation; and that because the respondents appointment had not
been sent to the CSC within the proper period, her appointment ceased to be effective and the
position of Administrative Officer II was already vacant when the petitioner was appointed to
it.

In her comment, the respondent, though admitting that her appointment was not submitted to
the CSC for attestation, points out that the reason given by Oyardo for the non-submission of
her appointment papers to the CSC the failure of the respondent to have her PDF duly signed
by Gonzales was not valid because the PDF was not even a requisite for the submission of her
appointment for attestation by the CSC.

Nazareno v CA (No Digest)

Pascual v Provincial Board (No Digest)

MAGLALANG vs PAGCOR

FACTS:
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, was operated by respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), a government-owned or controlled
corporation.

December 13, 2008, while he was performing his functions, a lady customer identified later as
one Cecilia Nakasato approached him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined
amount of cash of P50,000.00. Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the
spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of
five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for P10,000.00 each cluster
of cash and declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia. Cecilia asked petitioner why
the latter only dished out P40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and
requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the
others. Petitioner performed a recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of
P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error. Petitioner, however,
averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to
deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued
to berate and curse him. As a result, the two of them were invited to the casinos Internal
Security Office in order to air their respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file
an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day of the incident.

On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum7issued by the casinos Branch

Manager, informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino
customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum.
Petitioner submitted a letter-explanation8 dated January 10, 2009.

On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum, found him guilty of Discourtesy
towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense.
April 2, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for production seeking a
reversal of the boards decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he is indeed found
guilty as charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty.
April 20, 2009, praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the case
including the recommendation of the investigating committee.

June 2, 2009, one Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. to represent PAGCOR, denied the said motion.
Petitioner received said letter-reply on June 17, 2009.
on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum13 informing petitioner that the Board of
Directors in its meeting on May 13, 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for
lack of merit.

On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA,averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the finding
of guilt against him. Petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which
is not within the CSCs appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the
performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only by
reprimand.

September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being
premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse
from the CA.
November 26, 2009. In denying the said motion. Petitioner claims that the CA clearly
overlooked the applicable laws and jurisprudence that provide that when the penalty involved
in an administrative case is suspension for not more than 30 days. Petitioner asserts that his
case, involving a 30-day suspension penalty, is not appealable to the CSC.

ISSUE: W or N CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE

SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PENALTY INVOLVED IS NOT
MORE THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS.

HELD: Yes. CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR.

PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on July 11,
1983. Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the
management of PAGCOR should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection
Board and the Civil Service Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 16(2) of the said Code
a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of the
Civil Service. Its decision shall be final except those involving dismissal or separation from the
service which may be appealed to the Commission.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him or her.

However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of

the following exceptions:

(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5)
when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7)
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it
would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and
unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative
review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14)
where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

The case falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered
by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than
30 days.
Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, provides for the unavailability of any appeal:

Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.

(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days , or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
Office.
(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in
case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and
finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the
penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
department head.
Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final
and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon
proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.

Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the
complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.

It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a
special civil action for certiorari scribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal
and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate
from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal
is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails
to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. Remand of this case to the CA for its judicious
resolution is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:
 On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately
six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA RH Law referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists
candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay
with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who
voted against it form Team Buhay.

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the
2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts power of review.
Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.
Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue
involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
 A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the
scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall
squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the

controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that something had
by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of
government before a court may come into the picture.

Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium,
had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening
the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of
this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC

suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position
that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these
provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither
do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this
case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,

being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for consideration by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more than propose
a commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject

matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court

has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be

substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. Only when
the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of
the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private

property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of
the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and
stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private
property. Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding
upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law
does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech
solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

 With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are
government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into account . . . to
exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose
religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.

Lemon test

A regulation is constitutional when:

It has a secular legislative purpose;

It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

PETITIONER: KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by ARMANDO REGINO

RESPONDENT: PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A.
GAMUROT and ELISSA BALADAD

DOCTRINE:
Khrsitine was prohibited from taking her final exams because she did not want to buy a ticket
to a dance by reason of religion and finances. She filed a case for damages to the RTC but the
RTC dismissed the case saying that there was no cause of action and that the CHED has
jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court ruled that it is not the CHED but the RTC
considering that Khristine is asking for damages and not for the reversal of the rule of the
school. Since students and their school have a contractual relationship between them, both of
them are expected to comply with their contractual obligations. Thus, it goes to show that
there is a breach of action on the side of the school.

Relevant Provisions:
Sections 5 (1) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. The State shall protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make
such declaration accessible to all.

Sections 5 (3) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. Every student has a right to select a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements.

Section 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights, and subject to the
limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the
following rights:
xxxxxxxxx
(2) The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of
disciplinary regulations.

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.

FACTS:
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at
Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST).
She comes from a very poor family and she was only able to go to school by means of
financial support from her relatives.
During her second semester of school year 2001-2002, she was enrolled in logic and
statistics subjects under Repondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad (her teachers)
It was in February 2002 that the college arranged a fund raising campaign called Rave
Party and Dance Revolution. The proceeds of this dance will be used to construct the schools
tennis and volleyball courts.
Everyone was required to buy at least two tickets priced at 100 pesos each. People who
bought the tickets will be given additional points in their test scores but those who did not buy
will not be allowed to take the final exams.
Khristine, having no money and religious restrictions, refused to buy the tickets.
Thus on the examination dates, she was not allowed by her two teachers, Gamurot and
Balalad, to take her final exam on statistics and logic.
The next day, the teacher announced to the whole class that khristine and another
student was not permitted to take the exam because of the failure to buy the tickets then
subsequently ejected the two from class.
Khristine continued to plead with the teachers to allow her but they kept their stand and
defended their position saying that they were complying with PCSTs policy.
Khristine filed in the RTC as a pauper litigant against PCST and her two teachers for
damages.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on the khristines failure to exhaust
administrative remedies as they are contending that the case shouldve been filed in the
CHED (commission of higher education) and not in the RTC
Khristine on the other hand says that prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was
unnecessary, because her action was not administrative in nature, but one purely for damages
arising from respondents breach of the laws on human relations
RTC
o The RTC dismissed the complaint for the lack of cause of action. It said that considering
the case was between a school, two teachers and a student, CHED has jurisdiction over the
case and not RTC. And it dismissed the case for the lack of cause of action without explaining
their ground.

ISSUE/s:
1. W/N the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable
2. W/N the Complaint stated sufficient cause(s) of action.

HELD:
1. Yes
The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no
bearing on the present case because the petitioner was not asking for the reversal of the
policies of the PCST neither was she demanding that the school allow her to take the final
examinations (considering that she was already enrolled in a different school). The acts of the
respondent can no longer be reversed and even if it was reversed, it would not be adequate to
redress her grievances
The Supreme Court also held that the doctrine can only be applied when there is competence
on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Thus in the case
at bar, the CHED does not have the power to award damages to the petitioner.

And lastly, the doctrine cannot be applied when the issue is purely legal and well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The petitioners action for damages calls for the application of
the Civil Code which falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.

2. Yes
a. Breach of Action
In the case of Alcuaz v. PSBA, the court characterized the relationship between the school and
the student as a contract, where the student, once admitted by the school is considered
enrolled for one semester. And in a succeeding case (Non v. Dames), the court ruled that it is
not merely for one semester but an entire period that the student is expected to complete it.
Thus it can be seen that when it comes to the court, the relationship between the school and
the student is contractual in nature.

Being that the relationship is reciprocal, where the school would be providing the education
while the student will be abiding by the rules and regulations of the school. The terms of the
contract are defined at the moment of its inception- upon enrollment of the student. Thus it is
in practice that the student makes a down payment at the beginning of the semester and
succeeding payments paid before every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their
failure to pay their financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the school to deny
them the opportunity to take these examinations.

In the present case, the PCST imposed a revenue raising measure in the middle of the
semester. It made the financial contribution of the student as a condition for the students to
take their final examinations which ultimately is translated to the recognition of their ability to
finish the course. Considering that the fee was not part of the student-school contract entered
into at the start of the year, it cannot be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.
It should be noted that the student-school contract is not an ordinary one and is imbued with
public interest considering that it is protected by the constitution and by a legislative act
called the Education Act of 1982.

b. Liability for Tort

In her complaint, Khristine wrote that she was inhumanly punished by reason only of their
poverty, religious practive or lowly station I life which inculcated feelings of guilt, disgrace and
unworthiness and as a result she was unable to finish her subjects for the second semester
and had to lag her studies for a full year. The acts caused her extreme humiliation and mental
agony and she asks for compensation as the respondents violated Article 19, 21, and 26 of the
Civil Code.

The court held that generally, tort arises only between partieis not otherwise bound by a
contract. But in the case of PSBA vs. CA an academic institution may be held liable for tort
even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract
may also be a tort.
The Respondent CANNOT use the right to academic freedom as a defense because According
to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic
institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall
teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders
REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the Complaint and, with all deliberate
speed, to continue the proceedings in Civil Case No. U-7541. No costs.

3. Modes of Judicial Review

Reyna v COA (No Digest)

ESTELITO V. REMOLONA
vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 137473
August 2, 2001

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:

Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher in
Kiborosa Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, the District Supervisor of
Infanta inquired about Nerys Civil Service eligibility who purportedly got a rating of 81.25%.
Mr. America also disclosed that he received information that Nery was campaigning for a fee
of 8,000 pesos per examinee for a passing mark in the board examination for teachers. It was
eventually revealed that Nery Remolonas name did not appear in the passing and failing
examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated in her report of rating belonged to a
certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of 65%.Estelito Remolona in his written statement of
facts said that he met a certain Atty. Salupadin in a bus, who offered to help his wife obtain
eligibility for a fee of 3,000 pesos. Mr. America however, informed Nery that there was no
vacancy when she presented her rating report, so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that
America asked for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-
1988, America was able to receive 6 checks at 2,600pesos each plus bonus of Nery Remolona.
Remolona admitted that he was responsible for the fake eligibility and that his wife had no
knowledge thereof. On recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan of the Civil Service,
the CSC found the spouses guilty of dishonesty and imposed a penalty of dismissal and all its
accessory penalties. On Motion for Reconsideration, only Nery was exonerated and reinstated.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and denied the motion for
reconsideration and new trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an
offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official
duty.

HELD:

Yes. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty
inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the
discipline and morale of the service. It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave
offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to
warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the
person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is
dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are
not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government
cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and
well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity
to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the
government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys
and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave
misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract
his evil acts and actuations. Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. REYES

[GR NO. 170512, OCTOBER 5, 2011]

Doctrine:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-
type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him
and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.

Facts:
Respondent Antonio Reyes being then the Head Office LTO was found guilty of grave abuse of
misconduct by the Office of the Ombudsman. Based on the affidavits and testimonies of
several witnesses (Penaloza, Amper and Valdehueza) it was said that Reyes would give the
flunkers of the drivers license examination the option of retaking the examination or to simply
pay an additional cost to have a passing grade without actually re-taking the same. It is
alleged that he illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange for the issuance of a driver's
license to the latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination
therefor.
On appeal, the CA reversed the said judgment and exonerated him from the administrative
charge for insufficiency of evidence.

Issue:
Whether Reyes was denied due process

Held:
Yes. The 5th requirement (the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected) on the
cardinal principles on due process in administrative proceedings as laid down in the case of
Ang Tibay v CIR was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence
offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioner's decision that found
him guilty of grave misconduct. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished
with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza,
whether before or after the petitioner issued its Decision.

Board of Commissioners (CID) v dela Rosa (1991)

Bidin, J.

FACTS:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the SolGen for the Board of Commissioners
of the Bureau of Immigration (formerly the CID) and Board of Special Inquiry to set aside two
orders issued by different judges of RTCs and to enjoin public respondent judges from acting
on the ff. civil cases:
o 1st case: filed by Gatchalian in the RTC of Manila. Judge dela Rosa issued an order that
denied the Motion to Dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or continuing with
any proceedings that will lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian
o 2nd case: filed by Gatchalians wife and minor children in the RTC of Valenzuela. Judge
Capulong issued an that enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges
against Gatchalian
July 12, 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William, was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino Citizen. He also testified that he had 5 children
with his wife Chu Gim Tee: Jose, Gloria, Francisco (Williams father), Elena, and Benjamin.
June 27, 1961: Then 12-year old William arrived in Manila from Hongkong with Gloria,
Francisco, and Johnson Gatchalian with Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the
Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
July 12, 1961: the Board of Special Inquiry admitted William and his companions as
Filipino Citizens.
July 6, 1962: Board of Commissioners, after reviewing the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of respondent
Gatchalian
o The 1967 case of Arocha v Vivo sustained the validity of said order.
1973: Gatchalian and others covered by the warrant of exclusion filed a motion for re-
hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry. Acting Commissioner Nituda later issued an order
recalling the warrant of arrest against Gatchalian.
1990: acting director of NBI wrote to the DOJ recommending that Gatchalian and others
covered by the warrant of exclusion be charged with violation of the Immigration act. The SOJ
indorsed the recommendation and a mission order was issued by Commissioner Domingo of
the CID ordering the arrest of Gatchalian.
o Gatchalian filed the present civil cases that are being assailed in the case at bar.
Petitioners arguments:
o The judges have no jurisdiction over petitioner and the subject matter;
o That assuming the judges had jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion by
hearing the deportation case and in effect determined Gatchalians citizenship;
o That respondent judges disregarded the cases of Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Acra which
put to finality the order of the Board of Commissioners
o Respondent committed forum-shopping
Private respondents arguments:
o Petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts
have resolved the issue of his citizenship;
o Petitioners cannot fairly and judiciously dispose of the deportation case;
o Ground for deportation has already prescribed

ISSUES + RULING:

WoN the RTCs had jurisdiction over the cases. YES.

Under 21 of BP 129, the RTC has concurrent jurisdiction with the SC and CA to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
While 9(3) of BP 129 vests the CA with exclusive jurisdiction over quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this
Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the same does not provide that the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction extends to all quasi-judicial agencies.
o The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of
Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are
specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals.
o RA 5434 does not include the Bureau of Immigration. The decisions of the Bureau of
Immigration are subject to judicial review in accordance with 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the
Administrative Code:
 Sec. 25. Judicial Review.(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in
accordance with this chapter and applicable laws.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence
thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of
the Rules of Court.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of
the RTC except those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of
Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be
reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).
While it is true that Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction
to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their
citizenship and that a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings, the Court carved out an
exception in Chua Hiong v Deportation Board:
o When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right
to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the
deportation proceedings.
Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the claim of
citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is
correct.
Hence, Gatchalians petitions before the RTCs contained a proper and ripe controversy
for the disposition of the courts. He also presented sufficient documents and other evidence to
his petitions.

WoN Arocha v Vivo and Vivo v Arca already settled the respondents alienage (i.e., res
judicata). NO.
The party to the case was Pedro Gatchalian (Williams uncle). Moreover, the cases did
not categorically make any statement that William Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen. Generally,
res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship except in the following case (stated in
Burca v Republic):
o A person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party;
o The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and
o The finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Such elements are not present in the case at bar.

WoN the arrest of respondent based on the warrant of exclusion is valid. NO.
Pursuant to 37(a) of the Immigration Act, an arrest can only be effected after a
determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien.
Moreover, the mission ordered issued by petitioner only for purposes of investigation.
The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a
final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.
Petitioners also omitted the fact that Acting Commissioner Nituda issued a
memorandum in 1973 that recommended the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of
the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board
of Special Inquiry No. 1 and the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against applicants.
Such was the last official act of the government that is the basis of which respondent
William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.
 Also took note that the basis for the warrant of exclusion is that the cablegram issued
by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was forged. Even if the applicants could have entered
illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the
country.

WoN the ground for deportation already prescribed. YES.

The warrant of arrest came 28 years after the alleged cause of action arose in 1962.
The warrant was issued by Commissioner Domingo only in 1990.
37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless
the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation arises."
In any case, the warrant of exclusion was already recalled by Acting Commissioner
Nituda in 1973.
45 of the Immigration Act imposes the penalty of a fine not more than one thousand
pesos, imprisonment for not more than two years, and deportation if he is an alien. For such
correctional penalties, the prescriptive period is 10 years.
The Court also cited 1 of Act No. 3326 that states:
o "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years
o No prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in
the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, it being a
special law.
Deportation actions are not imprescriptible. In Lao Gi v CA, the Court stated:
o Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting
the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process
should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly
on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.
o Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after
the lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory.
Since his entry into the country, Gatchalian also contributed to the economy by
providing jobs and investing.

WoN there is proof that Santiagos children were born out of wedlock. NO.
Following the principle of lex loci celebrationis: a marriage formally valid where it is
celebrated is valid everywhere.
Santiagos attestation that the marriage was valid is competent evidence as statements
or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (34, Rule 130
of the RoC).
Since the marriage is valid, it follows that Williams father Francisco (Santiagos son)
follows the Filipino citizenship of his father. And since William is also a legitimate child of
Francisco, he is a Filipino citizen.

DISPOSITION: Petitions dismissed.

Feliciano, J. Dissenting Opinion:

The warrant of exclusion remains valid. Respondent and his co-applicants failed to
substantiate and prove their claim to Filipino citizenship.
Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by any mode of
entitlement subsequent to his application for entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e.,
by any act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and supposed filiation as a legitimate son
of Francisco Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines.
 The validity of Pedro Gatchalians citizenship, which was the controversy in Arocha v
Vivo, included that of his other co-applicants (William et al).
The Court in that decision upheld that validity of the July 6, 1962 order. Since
respondent William Gatchalian does not claim to have been naturalized as a Philippine citizen
after rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to be not a
Philippine citizen.
The prescriptive period does not apply. Deportation may be effected at any time after
entry. The NBI recommended the filing of charges in 1990.
Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the
country by the simple passage of time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to
admission as Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who,
after having been initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which
rendered them liable to deportation.
Reliance on Act. No. 3266 is also misplaced. The Act refers to criminal prosecutions
under special laws.
The recall of arrests in the memorandum issued by Nituda has no effect. The
Commissioner is not higher than the BOC itself, hence the appellate proceedings vested in the
BSI.
Respondents petition for rehearing was filed more than 10 years after the 1962 order.
In Arocha, the Court held that individual actions of members of the BOC are legally
ineffective:
o Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its
constitution as a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in
order that they should deliberate collectively and in order that their views and Ideas should be
exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion.

Davide, J. Dissenting Opinion:

The questioned acts of the Boards were done absolutely within their quasi-judicial
functions, hence 9(3) of BP 129 is applicable.
Gatchalian committed forum shopping. Since he is a resident of Valenzuela, there is no
reason for him to file the petition with the RTC of Manila.
Chua Hiong v Deportation Board is not applicable. The word courts should not now be
interpreted to mean or to include the regional trial courts because, as stated above, said
courts do not have any appellate jurisdiction over the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry. This case was
decided in 1955 yet, or twenty-six years before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The condition sine qua non then to an authorized judicial intervention is that the
evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, which is not the case in
the present petition.
The action taken by and the recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry of 14
March 1973 to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda for the reversal of the July 6, 1962
decision of the Board of Commissioners were not only highly anomalous, irregular and
improper, it was done without any semblance of authority.
o The Board of Special Inquiry did not have the power to review, modify or reverse a
Decision of the Board of Commissioners rendered about eleven years earlier.
o Then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda, acting alone, did not likewise have the power
or authority to approve the recommendation of said Board, to revive and/or reaffirm the July 6,
1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, to reverse, and nullify, the Decision of 6 July
1962 of the Board of Commissioners, and to order the admission of William Gatchalian as a
Filipino citizen. His order is void ab initio.

[G.R. No. 143403. January 22, 2003]

FILONILA O. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Dir. MARCELINO
HANOPOL, Auditor GLENDA MANLAPAZ, and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
While we commend the Commission on Audit for its diligence in safeguarding State properties,
we nonetheless rule that a government employee who has not been proven to be culpable or
negligent should not be held accountable for the loss of a cellular phone stolen from her while
she was riding the Light Railway Transit (LRT). On the other hand, the dogged persistence of
petitioner in fighting for her rights, honor, respect and dignity has not been lost on this Court.
She has been true to her calling as an educator and a role model for our young people.
The Case
For review on certiorari under Rule 64 is Decision No. 2000-1041[1] dated March 28, 2000,
issued by the Commission on Audit (COA), requiring Dr. Filonila O. Cruz to pay the book value
of a lost government-issued Nokia 909 analog cellular phone. The decretal portion of the
Decision reads as follows:
Premises considered, and conformably to the adverse recommendations of the Director,
NGAO
II and the Auditor, TESDA-NCR in the letter and 2nd Indorsement dated July 13, 1999 and
February 26, 1999, respectively, it is regretted that the instant request for relief is DENIED for
want of merit. This being so, the herein petitioner should be required to pay the book value of
the lost government-issued cellular phone.2[2]
The Facts
On Friday afternoon of January 15, 1999, petitioner went to the Regional Office of the
Technological Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) in Taguig, Metro Manila
for consultation with the regional director.3[3] After the meeting, petitioner went back to her
official station in Caloocan City, where she was the then Camanava district director of the
TESDA, by boarding the Light Railway Transit (LRT) from Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue to
Monumento. On board the LRT, her handbag was slashed and its contents stolen by an
unidentified person. Among the items taken from her were her wallet and the government-
issued
cellular phone, which is the subject of the instant case. That same day, she reported the
incident
to police authorities who immediately conducted an investigation. However, all efforts to
locate
the thief and to recover the phone proved futile.

Three days after, on January 18, 1999, petitioner reported the theft to the regional director of
TESDA-NCR. She did so through a Memorandum, in which she requested relief from
accountability of the subject property. In a 1st Indorsement dated January 19, 1999, the
regional
director, in turn, indorsed the request to the resident auditor.
Under a 2nd Indorsement dated February 26, 1999, the resident auditor4[4] denied the
request of
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the diligence required in the custody of
government
properties. Thus, petitioner was ordered to pay the purchase value of the cell phone (P3,988)
and
that of its case (P250), a total of P4,238. The auditors action was sustained by the director of
the National Government Audit Office II (NGAO II). The matter was then elevated to the
Commission on Audit.
Ruling of the Commission on Audit
On appeal, the COA found no sufficient justification to grant the request for relief from
accountability. It explained as follows:
x x x While it may be true that the loss of the cellular phone in question was due to robbery
(bag slashing), this however, cannot be made as the basis in granting the herein request for
relief
from accountability since the accountable officer, Dr. Cruz, failed to exercise that degree of
diligence required under the circumstances to prevent/avoid the loss. When Dr. Cruz opted to
take the LRT which undeniably, was almost always packed and overcrowded and considering
further the day and time she boarded said train which was at about 2:00 to 2:30 P.M. of Friday,
she exposed herself to the danger and the possibility of losing things such as the subject
cellular
phone to pickpockets. As an accountable officer, she was under obligation to exercise proper
degree of care and diligence in safeguarding the property, taking into account what a
reasonable
and prudent man would have done under the circumstances. Dr. Cruz could have reasonably
foreseen the danger that would befall her and took precautions against its mischievous result.
Therefore, having been remiss in her obligation in the keeping or use of the subject
government
issued cellular phone, she has to answer for its loss as required under Section 105 of PD 1445.
Additionally, to be exempt from liability because of fortuitous event as invoked by petitioner
Dr.
Cruz has no bearing to the case at bar considering that Article 1174 of the New Civil Code
which
supports said contention applies only if the actor is free from any negligence or misconduct by
which the loss/damage may have been occasioned. Further, in Nakpil vs. CA, 144 SCRA 596,
one who creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability although an act of God may
have
intervened. Thus, there being a positive showing of negligence on the part of the petitioner in
the keeping of the subject cellular phone, then, such negligence militates against the grant of
herein request for relief.5[5]
Hence, this Petition.6[6]

Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner faults the COA with the following alleged errors:
I.
The Commission Proper committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in finding that petitioner failed to exercise that degree of diligence required to
prevent the loss of the government-issued cellular phone when she opted to take the light
railway
transit (LRT) in going to her official station in CAMANAVA District, Caloocan City Hall,
Caloocan City[; and]
II.
The Commission Proper committed grave abuse of discretion when it applied the case of
Nakpil
vs. CA, 144 SCRA 596 and disregarded Article 1174 of the New Civil Code in denying
petitioners request for relief from accountability[.]7[7]
In the main, the issues in this case are: (1) whether petitioner was negligent in the care of the
government-issued cellular phone, and (2) whether she should be held accountable for its
loss.
We note that in its Manifestation and Motion dated October 24, 2000, reiterated in a similar
pleading dated March 28, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sided with petitioner
and prayed for the granting of the Petition. Hence, the COA was herein represented by its
general counsel, Atty. Santos M. Alquisalas.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Required Degree of Diligence
The crucial question to ask is whether petitioner should be deemed negligent when, on that
fateful afternoon, she opted to board the LRT where the cellular phone was stolen.
We answer in the negative. Riding the LRT cannot per se be denounced as a negligent act;
more
so under the circumstances in this case, in which petitioners mode of transit was influenced
by
time and money considerations.
Petitioner boarded the LRT to be able to arrive in Caloocan in time for her 3:00 p.m. meeting.
Any prudent or rational person under similar circumstances can reasonably be expected to do
the
same. Possession of a cellular phone would not and should not hinder one from boarding an
LRT coach as petitioner did. After all, whether she took a bus or a jeepney, the risk of theft

would have also been present. Because of her relatively low position and pay, she was not
expected to have her own vehicle or to ride a taxicab. Neither had the government granted
her
the use of any vehicle.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of
something which a prudent man and reasonable man would not do.8[8]
Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances.9[9]
The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct
varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed, and the importance of the act
which he is to perform.10[10] (Emphasis supplied)
The Rules11[11] provide that property for official use and purpose shall be utilized with the
diligence of a good father of a family. Extra-ordinary measures are not called for in taking care
of a cellular phone while in transit. Placing it in a bag away from covetous eyes and holding on
to that bag, as done by petitioner, is ordinarily sufficient care of a cellular phone while
travelling
on board the LRT. The records do not show any specific act of negligence on her part. It is a
settled rule that negligence cannot be presumed;12[12] it has to be proven. In the absence of
any
shred of evidence thereof, respondents gravely abused their discretion in finding petitioner
negligent.
Granting that the presence or the absence of negligence is a factual matter, the consistent
ruling
of this Court is that findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence.13[13] But lacking support, the factual finding of
the
COA on the existence of negligence cannot stand on its own and is therefore not binding on
the
Court.
While we commend the Commission on Audit for its diligence in safeguarding State properties,
we nonetheless hold that a government employee who has not been proven to be culpable or
negligent should not be held accountable for the loss of a cellular phone, which was stolen
from
her while she was riding on the LRT.
Second Issue:
Accountability
The assailed COA Decision directly attributed the loss of the cellular phone to a robbery (bag
slashing). However, it denies the request of petitioner for relief from accountability, because
it
found her to be negligent. Earlier, we have already ruled that the finding of negligence had no
factual or legal basis and was therefore invalid. What now remains to be resolved is whether
petitioner observed the proper procedure for notifying the government of the loss.
Within thirty days of the loss,14[14] petitioner applied for relief from accountability. We hold
that
such application be deemed as the notification of the loss of the subject cellular phone. She
has
also done her part in proving that the loss was due to theft or robbery. The resident
auditor15[15]
concerned and the COA itself have accepted that the robbery or theft had actually taken
place.
Necessarily, in the absence of evidence showing negligence on her part, credit for the loss of
the
cellular phone is proper under the law.16[16] It also stands to reason that P4,238 should now
be
refunded to her. That was the amount she had to pay on June 3, 1999, upon her retirement
from
government service at age 65.
Her dogged persistence in pursuing this appeal has not been lost on this Court. We agree that,
in
fighting for her rights, she must have spent more than the value of the lost cellular phone.
Hence, we can only applaud her for being true to her calling as an educator and a role model
for
our young people. Honor, respect and dignity are the values she has pursued. May her tribe
increase!
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Commission on Audit
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The request of Petitioner Filonila O. Cruz for relief from
accountability for the lost Nokia 909 analog cellular phone is GRANTED, and the amount of
P4,238 paid under Official Receipt No. 6606743 is ordered to be REFUNDED to her upon
finality of this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.
Mendoza, J., in the result.

Human and Cultural Minority Rights

Case Digests

Cario vs CHR (G.R. No. 96681 Dec 2, 1991)

Commission on Human Rights has no jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to
try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights

On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among
them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's
attention. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives,
the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the
DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply
and to hire their replacements. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR
complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the
principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively
suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced.
The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990,
rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents
submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and
the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.
Issue: WoN the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or
the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged
human rights violations involving civil or political rights
Held: No, CHR have no power to do so. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in
the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.
To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Hence it is that the Commission on
Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and
resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-
775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in
the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.
More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a)
whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking
part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return
to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions,
or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular
acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for
said acts or omissions. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this
scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the
Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same
ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This
would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to
abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases
against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them. This cannot be done. It will
not be permitted to be done. In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human
Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary
to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the
Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission
and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary
Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal
for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself
the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Simon vs. CHR (G.R. No. 100150 Jan 5, 1994)

CHRs power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to violations of its
adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers.

A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in
his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private
respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up
to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior to their
receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo
that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the
group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang
Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary
Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon
City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia
along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July 1990,
the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. In an Order, dated 25
September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of
P500.00 on each of them.

Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents
whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the
Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners for contempt;

Held: a) Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily

apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its
attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of
prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances,
(5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While
the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just
expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any
event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive
delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that
should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." In
the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private
respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than
that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice
of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be
likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been
violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that
as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances
obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.
b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational
guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance
with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its
revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to
impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for
in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to
apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential
to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be
exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold
relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the
instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess.

Marcos vs. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211 Oct 27, 1989)

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill
of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

Issue: WON the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and
family to the Philippines?

Held: Yes, President Aquino has the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and
family to the Philippines. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what
the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return
to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the
right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as
a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the
law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon
whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in
the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. The
Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged
from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao,
rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men,
police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the
efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this
ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos. As
divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military
establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular
groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the
proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President
cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that
the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return. It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for
the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the
Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence
if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of
the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition
of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to
preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk
from that responsibility. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in
compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare
of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of
Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this
bounden duty. The return of the deposed President, his wife and children cannot but pose a
clear and present danger to public order and safety.

Gutierrez (dissenting): There is only one Bill of Rights with the same interpretation of liberty
and the same guarantee of freedom for both unloved and despised persons on one hand and
the rest who are not so stigmatized on the other. I am, therefore, disturbed by the majority
ruling which declares that it should not be a precedent. We are interpreting the Constitution
for only one person and constituting him into a class by himself. The Constitution is a law for
all classes of men at all times. To have a person as one class by himself smacks of unequal
protection of the laws. With all due respect for the majority in the Court, I believe that the
issue before us is one of rights and not of power. Mr. Marcos is insensate and would not live if
separated from the machines which have taken over the functions of his kidneys and other
organs. To treat him at this point as one with full panoply of power against whom the forces of
Government should be marshalled is totally unrealistic. The Government has the power to
arrest and punish him. But does it have the power to deny him his right to come home and die
among familiar surroundings? Hence, this dissent. The Bill of Rights provides:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied, Section 6, Art. 111, Constitution) With all due respect for
the majority opinion, I disagree with its dictum on the right to travel. I do not think we should
differentiate the right to return home from the right to go abroad or to move around in the
Philippines. If at all, the right to come home must be more preferred than any other aspect of
the right to travel.

Cruz(dissenting): It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to

return to and live and die in his own country. I say this with a heavy heart but say it
nonetheless. That conviction is not diminished one whit simply because many believe Marcos
to be beneath contempt and undeserving of the very liberties he flounted when he was the
absolute ruler of this land.

Paras(dissenting): There is no dispute that the former President is still a Filipino citizen and
both under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines, he has the right to return to his own country except only if prevented by the
demands of national safety and national security. Our Armed Forces have failed to prove this
danger. They are bereft of hard evidence, and all they can rely on is sheer speculation. True,
there is some danger but there is no showing as to the extent. It is incredible that one man
alone together with his family, who had been ousted from this country by popular will, can
arouse an entire country to rise in morbid sympathy for the cause he once espoused.

Sarmiento (dissenting): The only issue that saddles the Court is simply: "whether or not, in the
exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines." I therefore take exception to allusions anent "the capacity
of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar." I have legitimate reason to fear that my
brethren, in passing judgment on the Marcoses (insofar as their "capacity to stir trouble" is
concerned), have overstepped the bounds of judicial restraint, or even worse, convicted them
without trial. I also find quite strained what the majority would have as the "real issues" facing
the Court: "The right to return to one's country," pitted against "the right of travel and
freedom of abode", and their supposed distinctions under international law, as if such
distinctions, under international law in truth and in fact exist. There is only one right involved
here, whether under municipal or international law: the light of travel, whether within one's
own country, or to another, and the right to return thereto. The Constitution itself makes no
distinctions; let then, no one make a distinction. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere
debemus.

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public
officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay
and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality
and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the
cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. Where
the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely
affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures
as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed
water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility
of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own
expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall
undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such
pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought
to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in
the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated
to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of
general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution
of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to
draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial
discipline describes as continuing mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary
circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would
not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the
rules of procedure for environmental cases.

20 days Temporary restraining order

Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs Liwag

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed by Lucien Tran Van Nghia
alleging that he was arrested without warrant and deprived of his liberty by respondent
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation (CID) and his agents.
Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national admitted to the Philippines as temporary
visitor and whose status was latter changed to that of an immigrant based on his
representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines. However,
petitioner has not made any investment and has engaged only in French tutoring and practice
of acupressure.
Respondent received a sworn complaint accusing the petitioner of being an undesirable alien
for "committing acts inimical to public safety and progress. On June 1, 1987, Respondent
issued a mission order to a team of seven (7) agents for them "to locate and bring subject to
Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and "submit report." On June 2, 19987, the
aforementioned CID agents went to petitioner's residence to invite him to the CID
headquarters for verification of his status but petitioner and his companion reportedly locked
themselves inside their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents. Immigration agents sought
the help of the police, still refusing to talk and to be taken, a struggle ensued and the
petitioner was subdued.
By reason of the injuries he allegedly sustained when he was "brutally seized" by the CID
agents, petitioner, upon request of the French consul, was transferred from his detention cell
at the immigration office to the Philippine General Hospital for urgent medical treatment.
Petitioner's counsel also filed the instant petition for habeas corpus to avert the "threatened
removal" of petitioner from PGH and to question the validity of his detention by respondent
Commissioner.
ISSUE: the legality of the arrest and detention of petitioner by the Immigration Commissioner
preparatory to deportation proceedings.
RULING: The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have seriously placed on
doubt the legality and propriety of petitioner's apprehension by respondent Commissioner. For
unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two suspected alien pedophiles
was based on probable cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a three-month
period during which their activities were monitored, herein petitioner was "invited" by a
combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a
mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a
single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent.
But even assuming that the arrest of petitioner was not legal at the beginning, certain events
have supervened to render his petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever
defect there was at the inception of his arrest. Firstly, petitioner is no longer under
confinement. Petitioner was released upon the posting and approval of a personal bailbond.
The general rule in a number of cases is that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of
a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are
restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which case the Court
can still inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint. Where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial
of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary,
and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may
still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is not similarly restrained. The only condition in his bailbond
is that ordinarily found in any other analogous undertaking, which is "to appear and answer
the complaint; will at all times hold himself ... amenable to the orders and processes of the
Court; and after conviction, he will surrender himself ... in execution of such judgment ... ."
Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against
petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. 10 The restraint (if any) against
petitioner's person has therefore become legal. The writ of habeas corpus has served its
purpose. 11
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Lozada v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 184379-80 April 24, 2012 Sereno, J. Tan de Guzman
petitioners RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA
respondents PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON,
ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO
summary Lozada was issued a subpoena by Senate with regards to the NBN-ZTE scandal.
He did not appear during the hearing and instead flew to London on official business. Upon
his return, he was escorted by several men and was told by Sec. Atienza that Atienza was
talking to ES and Mam, whom Lozada assumed to be ES Recto and the President. Lozada was
brought to LSGH where he was purportedly harassed and threatened by the police. His brother
filed for a writ of amparo. The court held that the Writ of Amparo was properly denied by the
CA because the petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial evidence and that they
failed to prove the existence of a continuing threat.

facts of the case

The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction
between the Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN),
and ZTE Corporation, a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. Former
NEDA Secretary Neri sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN
deal. The latter avers that during the course of his engagement, he discovered several
anomalies in the said transaction involving certain public officials. These events impelled the
Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation thereon, for
which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January 2008.
Lozada did not appear at the Blue Ribbon Committee. DENR Sec. Atienza announced that
Lozada was in an official trip to London. Because of this, Senate issued an order (1) citing
Lozada in contempt; (2) ordering his arrest and detention; (3) directing the sergeant-at-arms
to implement such order and make a return.
Lozada asked Sec. Atienza if he can go back to the Philippines. Upon approval, he informed his
family that he would be arriving in Manila, Feb 5 at 4 pm.
In his petition, Lozada claims that upon disembarking, several men held his arms and took his
bag. He allegedly insisted on joining his family but realized that it would be wiser to go with
the men when he heard them say in their handheld radio [H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir
nandyan ang mga taga senado.
Lozada asked to go to the comfort room and while there, called his brother, Arturo and
informed him of his situation. He observed that there were several cars tailing their car. Sec.
Atienza called him and assured him that he was with government people and that Sec. Atienza
would confer with ES and Mam. Lozada surmised them to be ES Ermita and the President. He
was also told to pacify his wife, Violeta, who was making public statements asking for her
husbands return. Along the way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter
requesting police protection. Lozada asked to be brought to his home in Pasig, but was refused
due to security risks. They stopped at Outback restaurant to meet with Atty. Antonio Bautista
and Col. Mascarinas, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of an affidavit. He
was then brought to LSGH per his request. He observed that policemen, purportedly
restraining his liberty and threatening the security of his, his family and the LS brothers,
guarded the perimeter of LSGH.
On Feb 6, Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize
and sign an affidavit. On the same day his wife petitioned for Habeas Corpus and his brother
petitioned for a Writ of Amparo with the Supreme Court, and prayed for the issuance of (a) the
writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production
Orders as regards documents related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as
any other document that would show responsibility for his alleged abduction.
Lozada alleged that he was made to sign a letter requesting police protection. On 7 February
2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms,
who served the warrant of arrest on him. He claimed that after his press conference and
testimony in the Senate, he and his family were since then harassed, stalked and threatened.
Respondents: Lozada had knowledge and control of what happened from the time of his
arrival, he voluntarily entrusted himself to their company and was never deprived of his liberty
and that since Feb 8, Lozada has been in the custody of the Senate.
CAs decisions:
1. Habeas Corpus case moot.
2. Denied issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and
Adverse Parties irrelevant to Amparo Case, to require them to testify would be a fishing
expedition.
3. Dropped Pres. Arroyo as a respondent because she enjoys immunity from suit as president.
4. Dismissed Writ of Amparo. Petitioners unable to prove through substantial evidence that
respondents violated Lozadas right to life, liberty and security.

issue
Whether circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him
to the protection of the writ of amparo? NO.

ratio

Definition: Writ of Amparo (courts lecture)

The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief
to protect the peoples right to life, liberty and security. Having been originally intended as a
response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the
country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights
violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing
these serious violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be
issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased
and is no longer imminent or continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to
dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus: The privilege of the writ of
amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security
of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary
writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal
killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and
granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by
the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure
amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

Writ of Amparo Denied

In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is
necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the
threshold of substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented,
the crux of the case boils down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the parties
diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court
is in agreement with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally
deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he
was led to the departure area of the airport, as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody
of respondents.
He was able to go to the mens bathroom and call his brother
He was avoiding the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, detour
appears to explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where [Lozada] could have
passed through immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped
No evidence on record that Lozada struggled or made an outcry for help
He testified that nobody held, shouted, or was hostile to him
He knew and agreed with the plan that he would be fetched at the airport because at
that time, it was his decision not to testify before the Senate
it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so
that his right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint
had already ceased and has consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ
ofamparo moot.
The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the
custody of the PNP can neither be construed as a threat to [Lozadas] life, liberty and security.
Certainly, no person in his right mind would make that kind of media announcement if his
intent was indeed to threaten somebodys life, liberty and security
Presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the LSGH premises where
he and his family are staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him at places
where he went to. Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence at all, as
having originated from any of the respondents
Installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as
indirect threat to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that these are spy cameras.
However, save for [Lozadas] self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were
installed or ordered installed by the respondents for the purpose of threatening his right to
life, liberty and security
No evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the respondents or done
upon their instigation.
He did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name was actually in
the official watch list of the Bureau
[Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any of the
respondents ordered the filing of these frivolous cases against him. In any event, said
purported cases are to be determined based on their own merits and are clearly beyond the
realm of the instant amparo petition filed against the respondents
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ.
It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence
(Yano v. Sanchez)
Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action
have, in the meanwhile, been commenced.
Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a
petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the
Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule.

In Rubrico v. Arroyo the Court interprets the above sections as follows: (1) the consolidation of
the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal
complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the
allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB
should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation
and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access
to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes,
as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic
criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective.

APPLIED: if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case,
then the latter action can more adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners.
After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of amparo as a curative remedy is to
facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators. On the other hand, if there is no actual
criminal case lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition is without prejudice to
the filing of the appropriate administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against those
individuals whom Lozada deems to have unduly restrained his liberty.

No basis for interim reliefs since writ of amparo denied

In Yano v. Sanchez, this court declined to grant the prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as
Inspection and Production Orders, upon a finding that the implicated public officials were not
accountable for the disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it would be incongruous
to grant herein petitioners prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and at the
same time rule that there no longer exists any imminent or continuing threat to Lozadas right
to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these
interim reliefs can be anchored.

Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum proper - for a subpoena to issue, it

must first appear that the person or documents sought to be presented are prima facie
relevant to the issue subject of the controversy
CA correctly denied petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the
ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to be presented during trial were prima
facie irrelevant to the issues of the case. The court has repeatedly reminded the parties, in the
course of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition does not involve the investigation
of the ZTE-NBN contract.

President Arroyo was not proven to be involved in the alleged violation of life, liberty and
security of Lozada
President Arroyos term as president has ended, therefore she no longer enjoys immunity, but
an examination of Petitioners evidence reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any
unlawful act or omission on her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the right to
life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned
a certain Ma[a]m, whom Lozada speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor
told Lozada that the President was hurting from all the media frenzy, there is nothing in the
records that would sufficiently establish the link of former President Arroyo to the events that
transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that Lozada and his
family purportedly received.
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

31
JUL
FACTS

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as
someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zearosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to
privacy is invoked as opposed to the states interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or
security.

RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there
must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty
or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence
that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents
sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection
and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

GSIS V. CIVIL SERVICE

FACTS

The GSIS dismissed six government employees on account of irregularities in the canvassing
of supplies. The employees appealed to the Merit Board. Said board found for the employees
and declared the dismissal as illegal because no hearing took place. The GSIS took the issue
to the Civil Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed illegal. The CSC thereafter
ordered the reinstatement of the employees and demanded the payment of backwages. The
replacements of the dismissed employees should then be released from service.
The GSIS remained unconvinced and raised the issue to the SC. SC affirmed the Civil Service
ruling saying o The CSC acted within its authority o Reinstatement was proper o However, the
SC modified the requirement of backpay. Said backpay should be made after the outcome of
the disciplinary proceedings.
Heirs of the dismissed employees filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service resolution so
that backwages can be paid. GSIS however denied the motion saying that the SC modified
that part of the ruling.
CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the motion. GSIS was made to
pay. Backed against the wall, GSIS filed certiorari with the SC asking that the CSC order be
nullified. The GSIS contends that the CSC has no power to execute its judgments.

ISSUE

Whether the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments

HELD

YES. The Civil Service Commission is a consitutional commission invested by the Constitution
and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-
judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases
instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to
promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to
deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its
decisions, resolutions or orders. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases
is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried
out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear
and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority
to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
Therefore, the GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC.

Felipe Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990
F: Soon after the change in government in 1986, Petitioner a letter to the Office of the
President, and to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking:
(1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled during the Marcos
administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development
and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and
regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs
found in the concession area.

P alleged: it entered into a timber license agreement with the DENR, wherein it was issued an
exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a
specified portion of public forest land located in the municipality of Maddela, province of
Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;

That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter
referred to as "Bureau"], issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva
Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine
other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order
of the Minister of Natural Resources
That on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, requesting him to
stop all logging operations and to pull out logging machineries and equipment in order to
conserve remaining forests.

That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter
addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's
directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it
was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operation,
but no favorable action was taken on this letter;

That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area
formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half
was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or
license; and,

That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos.

The MNR issued an order denying petitioner's request. It ruled that a timber license was not a
contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be
withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not
discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses
were revoked in 1983. Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in
the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao reasoning that the Ministry
imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forests. It
considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the availability of
forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos. Ps MR
denied.

Meanwhile, MNR issued an administrative order lifting the logging ban in the province of
Quirino. P then appealed to the Office of the President which however denied it on the ground
of lack of merit. It ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not
having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

I: WON public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and WON TLA are contracts.

H: NO. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as
conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a
court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter
once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

As gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section
8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions
until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly
appointed Minister of the MNR, requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these
were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned.

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to
develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department
evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under
the previous dispensation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and

growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their
crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can
hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the
profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the
irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more
disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature having been
upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and
energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's
immediate financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of
Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action
from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands.
Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution. A
long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies

Petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case
because he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and
1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of
the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its
delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly,
the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.

A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the
MNR, which were affirmed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy
considerations which effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar.

Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by
the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause

Dismissed.

Cornejo v Gabriel (No Digest)

Morfe v. Mutuc
22 SCRA 424, January 31, 1968
J. Fernando

Facts: Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), provides that every public officer,
...after his assumption to office and within the month of January of every other year thereafter,
as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the
office to which he belongs, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal
and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year...
Jesus Morfe, disputing that such requirement is violative of due process as an
oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to
privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with
the prohibition against self-incrimination, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan. After the submission of pleadings and stipulation of facts,
the CFI found for Morfe, affirming that the requirement of periodical submission of such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus
offensive to the due process clause hence, Section 7 of R.A. 3019 is unconstitutional.
Aggrieved, Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc appealed the decision of the CFI before
the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not, the requirement of periodical submission of the sworn statement of
assets and liabilities, pursuant to R.A. 3019, exceeds the permissible limit of the States police
power and is thus offensive to the due process clause?

Ruling: No. Nothing can be clearer than that R.A. 3019 was precisely aimed at curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in
the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public
office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued
commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character.
The times demanded such a remedial device.
In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption of a statutes validity must prevail
over mere pleadings and stipulation of facts (Ermita-Malate Hotel, et. al. v. Mayor of Manila).
While in the attainment of attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional
rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable that what
the Constitution condemns, the statute allows.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not
amounting to property in its usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the
proposition that from the standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution
the mantle of protection afforded by due process could rightfully be invoked.

VICENTE SEGOVIA vs. PEDRO NOEL

G.R. No. L-23226
March 4, 1925

MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS:
Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu. He continuously
occupied this position until having passed sixty-five mile- stones, he was ordered by the
Secretary of Justice to vacate the office. Since that date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of
the peace has acted as justice of the peace for the municipality of Dumanjug.
Mr. Segovia being desirous of avoiding a public scandal and of opposing physical resistance to
the occupancy of the office of justice of the peace by the auxiliary justice of the peace,
instituted friendly quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to inquire
into the right of Pedro Noel to occupy the office of justice of the peace, to oust the latter
therefrom, and to procure reinstatement as justice of the peace of Dumanjug. To this
complaint, Pedro Noel interposed a demurrer on the ground that it did not allege facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because Act No. 3107 was constitutional and
because Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years old had automatically ceased to be justice of the
peace.
Petitioner avers that section 1 of Act No. 3107, which amends section 203 of the
Administrative Code, is unconstitutional in that it impairs the contractual right of the petitioner
to an office. Act No. 3107 provides that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years. On the other hand,
section 206 of the Administrative Code, which provides that "a justice of the peace having the
requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be lawfully
abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice," was left unchanged by Act No.
3107.

ISSUE:
Whether that portion of Act No. 3107 which provides, that justices of the peace and auxiliary
justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty- five
years, should not be given retroactive effect.
[If in the affirmative, then it may be said that petitioner has a right to his office.]

HELD:
Yes. A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent
to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary
implication. The same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public offices. Though
there is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the
incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken away by statute, the
terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated.
The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the Administrative Code, gives no
indication of retroactive effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating upon existing rights.
In the absence of provisions expressly making the law applicable to justices of the peace then
in office, and in the absence of provisions impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the
courts would not be justified in giving the law an interpretation which would legislate faithful
public servants out of office.
The proviso added to section 203 of the Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107,
providing that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until
they have reached the age of sixty-five years, should be given prospective effect only, and so
is not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed before
Act No. 3107 went into force.

SPS. Mathay vs. CA, SPS. Atangan, SPS. Poblete, SPS Tirona (GR No. 115788)

FACTS:
A. Civil Case No. TM-175 (Spouses Atangan vs. Spouses Mathay and Register Deeds of Cavite)
- Involves two parcels of land (Lot No 2186-A and Lot No. 2186-C) covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT No. T-195350 and TCT No. 195351) issued in the name of Spouses
Atangan
- Sps. Atangan alleges that they are owners of two (2) parcels of land purchased from
Spouses Tomas Lucido and Eustaquia Villanueva as evidenced by the deed of sale and by the
Transfer Certificates issued. They immediately took possession of the same and paid the
corresponding realty taxes.
- Atagan alleges that the vendees titles were transferred to them by virtue of a decision
on the Civil case (Lucido vs Batallones and Petronilla Quimio, Director of Lands, and Registers
of Deeds of Cavite). Batallones and Quimio, on the other hand are the vendees of the lands
from the Bureau of Lands.
- Sale of the parcel of lands in favor of the heirs of Batallones and Quimio was evidenced
by Deed of Conveyance duly issued by the Bureau of Lands
- Sps. Atagan further alleges that Mathays (defendant) have enclosed a portion of said
property with a fence without their consent.
- The defendants (Spouses Mathay) declare that they were also issued with a title
covering the said land. Spouses Atagan asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was a
product of forgery because it was based on an alleged transferred certificate in favor of Pedro
Banayo and Pablo Pugay who have no right whatsoever on the real estate in question. Upon
investigation, it was certified by the Bureau of Lands that the said titles were falsified and
forged.
- Atagan therefore prays that since the title of the Mathays have no basis in law and that
the same was illegally procured on the basis of forgery, the same should be cancelled and the
Mathays have no right to take possession of the property in question. They also demand
moral, irreparable damages and attorneys fee for the same.

B. Civil Case No. TM-180 (Spouses Poblete vs. Spouses Mathay and the Register of Deeds of
Cavite)
- Involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Juana Batallones and Gaudencio
Quimio which was allegedly sold to Spouses Poblete as per Deed of Conditional Sale.
- Spouses Poblete alleges that they are registered owners of a parcel of land having
purchased the same from Juan Battallones and Gaudencio for themselves and on behalf of
their co-heirs as evidenced by Deed of Sale. The spouses took possession of the land and
alleges that the defendants (Spouses Mathay) have enclosed a portion of the said property
with a fence without the consent and against the will of the plaintiffs.
- The vendees whose titles were transferred in favor of the plaintiffs have obtained the
title by virtue of the decision by the court on the civil case (Tomas Lucido vs. Juana Onate
Batallones and Petronilla Q. Quimio, Director of Lands, the Register of Deeds of Cavite). The
heirs of Onofre Batallones and Modesta Quimio are the vendees of the land from the Bureau of
Lands as evidenced by a Certification issued by the Record Officer of the District Land Office.
- The sale of the subject parcel of land from the Bureau of Lands in favor of the heirs of
Batallones and Quimio was also evidenced by a Deed of Conveyance duly issued by the
Bureau of Lands.
- The defendants (Spouses Mathay) declare that they were also issued with a title
covering the said land. Spouses Poblete asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was a
product of forgery because it was based on an alleged transferred certificate in favor of Pedro
Banayo and Pablo Pugay who have no right whatsoever on the real estate in question. Upon
investigation, it was certified by the Bureau of Lands that the said titles were falsified and
forged.
- Spouses Poblete therefore prays that since the title of the Mathays have no basis in law
and that the same was illegally procured on the basis of forgery, the same should be cancelled
and the Mathays have no right to take possession of the property in question. They also
demand moral, irreparable damages and attorneys fee for the same.

B. Civil Case No. TM-206 (Spouses Tirona vs. Spouses Mathay, et. al)
- Spouses Motas bought a parcel of land (Lot 2186-B) covered by a Transfer of Certificate
of Title of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite from David Quimio as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. They were issued by a Transfer Certificate (TCT No. T-203730).
- Vendors David Quimio, Sr., et. al, are the previous registered owners of the said land as
evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. T-192530). They obtained rights and
interest thereon from their predecessors who were vendees from the Bureau of Lands which
was then confirmed in a decision on a Civil case (Tomas Lucido vs. Juana Batallones and
Petonila Quimio)
- The subject land was subdivided into eight lots as evidenced by a Subdivision Plans.
The subdivided lots were bought by the Spouses from Motas in good faith, and were therefore
issued with Transfer Certificates of Title.
- Spouses Tirona are the one paying the corresponding real property taxes thereon and
were issued with corresponding tax declaration. They allege that the defendants (Spouses
Mathay) have enclosed among others the property in question with a fence and took physical
possession thereof without their knowledge and consent
- The defendants (Spouses Mathay) declare that they were also issued with a title
covering the said land. Spouses Tirona asserts that the said title issued to Mathays was a
product of forgery and falsification because it was based on an alleged transferred certificate
in favor of Pedro Banayo and Pablo Pugay who have no right whatsoever on the real estate in
question. Upon investigation, it was certified by the Bureau of Lands that the said titles were
falsified and forged.
- Spouses Tirona therefore prays that since the title of the Mathays have no basis in law
and that the same was illegally procured on the basis of forgery, the same should be cancelled
and the Mathays have no right to take possession of the property in question. They also
demand moral, irreparable damages and attorneys fee for the same.

The lower court decided for the defendant spouses Mathay and against the plaintiffs in the
three consolidated cases. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the plaintiff-
appellants. Thus, the appeal.

ISSUES:
1. WON Spouses Mathay can be considered buyers in good faith
2. WON Spouses-private respondents own the individual properties in question

HELD:
1. Spouses Mathay cannot be considered as purchasers in good faith because prior to the
fencing of the subject land, neither they nor their predecesssors-in-interest (Banayo and
Pugay) ever possessed the same. At the same time the property was sold to petitioners
(Mathays), the private respondents were not only in actual possession of the same but also
built their houses thereon, cultivated it and were in full enjoyment of the produce and fruits
gathered therefrom. Although it is a well settled principle that the person dealing on a
registered land need not go beyond the certificate of title, there are still circumstances which
would put party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to
him. It is expected from the purchaser of a valued price of a land to inquire first into the status
or nature of possession of the occupants, in concept of owner. Failure of a prospective buyer to
take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude
him from claiming or invoking the rights of a purchaser in good faith. In addition, before the
fence around subject property was erected, private respondent communicated their objection
to the fencing of the area by petitioners but they were ignored by the Mathays, who continued
enclosing the premises under controversy in the present of armed men employed by them.
2. The Spouses-Private respondents are the valid owners of the individual properties in
question because all the subsequent certificates of title including the petitioners titles are
void for the same were forged and falsified. It was further proved that the titles issued to
Mathays are void for the allegedly Sales Certifcate executed by Tomas Lucido in favor of Pedro
Pugay was not signed by the said Tomas Lucido. Neither does it bear the signature of the
latter. It further proved that the deeds showed by Banayo and Pugay were not for the
individual property in question. The circumstances surrounding the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale by Pedro Banayo and Pablo Pugay in favor of the spouses Sonya Mathay and
Ismael Mathay further showed that it did not comply with the legal formalities and was not
duly notarized. Furthermore, the residence certificates of vendors Banayo and Pugay appeared
to be of dubious source.
The Spouses Mathay utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving the sustainability of their
posture of them being buyers in good faith. Furthermore, the title of Pedro Banayo and Pablo
Pugay relied upon by them has been shown by preponderance of evidence to be the product
of forgery.
Petition is DISMISSED for the lack of merit, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto.

Laurel v Desierto digest

Laurel v. Desierto
GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial
Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in
1998. He was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine
(9) incorporators. A controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts
to some entities and the petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for certiorari.

The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public
officer since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer

Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer.
The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement
national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is
clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is
chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by
EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner
did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely
an incidence and forms no part of the office.