OLAGUER v MILITARY COMISSION
And as long as the civil courts in the land
Facts: Filed with this Court are two Petitions wherein
the fundamental question is whether or not a military
tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the
civil courts are open and functioning. The two
Petitions have been consolidated inasmuch as the
issues raised therein are interrelated.
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by
military personnel and they were placed in Camp
Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all
civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful
possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2)
conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos;
(3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan
Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno;
(4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco,
Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine
buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo
Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino
and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On
August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and
filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas
corpus.
Issue: whether or not military commissions or
tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians for
offenses allegedly committed during martial law
when civil courts are open and functioning.
Held: Due process of law demands that in all criminal
prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either
his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to,
among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the
due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to
the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process,
not by executive or military process. Military
commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are
called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial
system
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive
Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
the legislature for the President as Commander-in-
Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army
and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
utilized under his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives. Following the principle of
separation of powers underlying the existing
constitutional organization of the Government of the
Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting
the laws (as when an individual should be considered
to have violated the law) is primarily a function of
the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function
of the Executive Department, through the military
authorities.
remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do
so today and as they did during the period of martial
law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses
committed by them and which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise
would be a violation of the constitutional right to due
process of the civilian concerned.
This provision in the fundamental law is just one of
the many steps taken by the Filipino people towards
the restoration of the vital role of the judiciary in a
free country that of the guardian of the
Constitution and the dispenser of justice without fear
or favor.
No longer should military tribunals or commissions
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses
allegedly committed by them when the civil courts
are open and functioning. No longer may the
exclusive judicial power of the civil courts, beginning
with the Supreme Court down to the lower courts be
appropriated by any military body or tribunal, or even
diluted under the guise of a state of martial law,
national security and other similar labels .
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so
hold, that a military commission or tribunal cannot
try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period
of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts are
open and functioning, and that any judgment
rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
military tribunal concerned
The creation of the respondent Military Commission
No. 34 to try civilians like the petitioners is hereby
declared unconstitutional and all its proceedings are
deemed null and void. The temporary restraining
order issued against the respondents enjoining them
from executing the Decision of the respondent
Military Commission No. 34 is hereby made
permanent and the said respondents are permanently
prohibited from further pursuing Criminal Case No.
MC-34-1 against the petitioners. The sentence
rendered by the respondent Military Commission No.
34 imposing the death penalty on the petitioners is
hereby vacated for being null and void, and all the
items or properties taken from the petitioners in
relation to the said criminal case should be returned
to them immediately.
IBP v ZAMORA
Facts: The President of the Philippines, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the
PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility
patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression. In compliance with the presidential
mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter
of Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the
manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called
Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task
Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of
the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Invoking his
powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed
the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate
with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. The President also declared that the services
of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely
temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have
improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the
"IBP") led the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000
and to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional, arguing
that the deployment of marines in Metro Manila is
violative of the Constitution because no emergency
situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify,
even only remotely, the deployment of soldiers for
law enforcement work; hence, said deployment in
derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the Presidents factual
determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review
Held: When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from
the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called
upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute
its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it
was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to
give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed
forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justi cation for calling out
the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to
support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in
such a manner as to violate the constitutional
provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In
the performance of this Court's duty of purposeful
hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch
as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the President's judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the
Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and
to determine the necessity for the exercise of such
power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which embodies the powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
xxx xxx xxx
The full discretionary power of the President to
determine the factual basis for the exercise of the
calling out power is also implied and further
reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which
reads, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-
four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding led by any citizen, the suffciency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ,
any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
shall be released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may
revoke such proclamation or suspension and the
Court may review the suffciency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
President's action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the
three powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification.
Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in
the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law,
two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an
actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety
must require it. These conditions are not required in
the case of the power to call out the armed forces.
The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes
necessary," the President may call the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." The implication is that the President is
given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise
of the power to call as compared to the two other
powers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
MONSANTO v FACTORAN
Facts: Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug
City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents. She was found
guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was
howevergranted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a
letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be
reinstated to her former position since it was still
vacant. She was also requesting for back pays.
The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the
Office of the President and Factoran denied
Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first
seek appointment and that the pardon does not
reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers
that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be
compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought
about by her acts.
Issue: whether or not a public officer, who has been
granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is
entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment
Held: Pardon is defined as "an act of grace,
proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual,
on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private,
though official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is
intended, and not communicated officially to the
Court. . . . A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which
delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete
without acceptance
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It
makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the
offense has been established by judicial proceedings,
that which has been done or suffered while they were
in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and
justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
required." This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for
lost earnings and benefits.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued
absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared her not
guilty of the crime for which she was convicted. In
the case of State v. Hazzard, we find this strong
observation: "To assume that all or even a major
number of pardons are issued because of innocence
of the recipients is not only to indict our judicial
system, but requires us to assume that which we all
know to be untrue. The very act of forgiveness
implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong has
been established by the most complete method
known to modern civilization. Pardons may relieve
from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant
upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of
bad character, which has been definitely fixed." 22
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital
point: While we are prepared to concede that pardon
may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal
indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a
pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not
be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not
subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out
the guilt of an individual and that once he is
absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent
For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the
past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce
such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict
in character and conduct with one who has constantly
maintained the mark of a good, law- abiding citizen.
Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime.
These are "historical" facts which, despite the public
manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in
pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account
in their subsequent dealings with the actor."
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual
from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But unless
expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which
is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be
constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true
character and purpose of the privilege.Cdpr
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the
absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents. It is clear from the authorities
referred to that when her guilt and punishment were
expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was
likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply
for reappointment to the office which was forfeited
by reason of her conviction. And in considering her
qualifications and suitability for the public post, the
facts constituting her offense must be and should be
evaluated and taken into account to determine
ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted
with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon
granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but
it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by
the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil
liability arising from crime is governed by the
Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding
service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is
not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor
and debtor, compensation and novation.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former
Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED
PEOPLE v SALLE
Facts: In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal. The Court required Salle's counsel,
Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the
motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion
without the assistance of counsel on his
misimpression that the motion was necessary for his
early release from the New Bilibid Prison following
the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on
December 9, 1993. She also stated that Mengote was
also granted conditional pardon and that he
immediately left for his province without consulting
her. She prayed that the Court grant Salle's motion to
withdraw his appeal.
On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion.
After taking into consideration Section 19, Article
VII of the Constitution which provides that the
President may, except in cases of impeachment or as
otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant
pardon after conviction by final judgment, the Court
required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for
accused-appellants to submit their memoranda on the
issue of the enforceability of the conditional pardon
and (2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of
Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it
recommended to the President the grant of the
conditional pardon despite the pendency of the
appeal.
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor
General maintains that the conditional pardon granted
to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the
judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the
pendency in this Court of his appeal.
On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o,
submits that the conditional pardon extended to
Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto
vs. Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did
not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was
deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his
acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted
in the finality of his conviction.
Issue: Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of
conviction by the trial court is enforceable.
Held: Then came the 1935 Constitution. Paragraph 6,
Section 10, Article VII thereof provided as follows:
(6) The President shall have the power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses,
except in cases of impeachment, upon such
conditions and with such restrictions and limitations
as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the
Congress.
The 1973 Constitution went further by providing that
pardon could be granted only after final conviction.
Section 14 of Article IX thereof reads as follows:
The Prime Minister may, except in cases of
impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, after final
conviction, and, with the concurrence of the National
Assembly, grant amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
The 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution,
however, removed the limitation of final conviction,
thereby bringing us back to the aforementioned
provision of the Jones Law. Section 11, Article VII of
the 1973 Constitution, as thus amended, reads:
The President may, except in cases of impeachment,
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit
fines and forfeitures and, with the concurrence of the
Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.
But the said limitation was restored by the present
Constitution. Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as
follows:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
We now declare that the "conviction by final
judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of
the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon,
whether full or conditional, to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the
trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made,
should not be acted upon or the process toward its
grant should not be begun unless the appeal is
withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government concerned must
require proof from the accused that he has not
appealed from his conviction or that he has
withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form
of a certification issued by the trial court or the
appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance
of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or
waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by
virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall
render those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused
must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the
release of the accused from confinement. And now on
the instant case. Considering that appellant Ricky
Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his
appeal up to this date the conditional pardon
extended to him should not have been enforced.
Nonetheless, since he stands on the same footing as
the accused- appellants in the Hinlo case, he may be
freed from the full force, impact, and effect of the
rule herein pronounced subject to the condition set
forth below. This rule shall fully bind pardons
extended after 31 January 1995 during the pendency
of the grantee's appeal.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as
an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the
release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,
commutation of sentence, or parole before the
withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively liable.
Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must
not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release
of the accused from confinement.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant
Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty
(30) days from notice hereof within which to
secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal
and to submit it to this Court. The conditional
pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed
to take effect only upon the grant of such
withdrawal. In case of non- compliance with this
Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections must exert every possible effort to
take back into his custody the said appellant, for
which purpose he may seek the assistance of the
Philippine National Police or the National Bureau
of Investigation.

GARCIA v COA
Facts: Petitioner comes to us on a petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of 23 July 1985 of
respondent Commission on Audit (COA) denying his
claim for payment of back wages, after he was
reinstated to the service pursuant to an executive
clemency. He prays for the extraordinary remedy of
mandamus against public respondents to enforce his
claim.LibLex
Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the Region
IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in
Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, petitioner was
summarily dismissed from the service on the ground
of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the
then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications in Adm. Case No. 975 for the loss
of several telegraph poles which were located at the
Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc,
Quezon, telecom lines. Petitioner did not appeal from
the decision.
Based on the same facts obtaining in the
administrative action, a criminal case for qualified
theft was filed against petitioner with the then Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial court rendered
its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense
charged.
Consequently, petitioner sought reinstatement to his
former position in view of his acquittal in the
criminal case. In an indorsement dated 7 April 1980,
petitioner's request to be reinstated was denied by the
Bureau of Telecommunications. Hence, petitioner
pleaded to the President of the Philippines for
executive clemency.
Issue: whether or not he is entitled to the payment of
back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to
the grant of executive clemency.
Held: Our Constitution reposes in the President the
power and the exclusive prerogative to extend
executive clemency under the following
circumstances:
"Except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
"He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress."
From among the different acts of executive clemency
spelled out above, the clemency granted to petitioner
in the instant case partakes of the nature of an
executive pardon
The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in
effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of
the administrative decision which found him guilty of
dishonesty and ordered his separation from the
service. This can be inferred from the executive
clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the
administrative charge and thereby directing his
reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the
grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need
no longer apply to be reinstated to his former
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto
upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the
government service entitles him to back wages. 8
This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for
what he has suffered as a result of his unjust
dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would
defeat the very intention of the executive clemency,
i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right
to back wages is afforded to those who have been
illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated
or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against
them. There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls
within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to
back wages.
Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of
petitioner was not the result of any criminal
conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to
hold public office, but is the direct consequence of an
administrative decision of a branch of the Executive
Department over which the President, as its head, has
the power of control. The President's control has been
defined to mean "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter." In pardoning petitioner and ordering his
reinstatement, the Chief Executive exercised his
power of control and set aside the decision of the
Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The
clemency nullified the dismissal of petitioner and
relieved him from administrative liability. The
separation of the petitioner from the service being
null and void, he is thus entitled to back on his latest salary scale.
wages.LexLib

After having been declared innocent of the crime of

qualified theft, which also served as basis for the
administrative charge, petitioner should not be
considered to have left his office for all legal
purposes, so that he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrued to him by virtue of the office
held, including back wages

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

decision of respondent Commission on Audit
dated 23 July 1985 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one entered ordering public
respondents, the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, the Minister (now Secretary) of Land
Transportation and Communications, the
Regional Director of Telecom Regional Office No.
IV, or whoever may be sitting in office in their
stead, to pay the full amount of petitioner's back
salaries from 1 April 1975 to 12 March 1984 based