Soriao vs. Pineda elementary and high school levels.
Without limiting the natural right
CA-G.R. SP No. 31546 August 10, 1994
Facts:
Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of
Dinalungan, Aurora (S.Y. 1993 to 1994). Due to his reputation of
talking back to school authority during the past years, he was
refused readmission to complete his fourth and final year of high
school through a verbal notice not to readmit.
Soriao questioned the notice, averring that he was deprived of a
hearing on the matter and thus the verbal notice was a denial of his
right to due process. The administration ignored the students plea to
reconsider its decision to deny him readmission claiming, it was
their prerogative. Seeking further remedies to no avail, Soriao filed a
petition for certiorari to the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to
education.
Ruling: YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda, Head Teacher of
the Juan C. Angara Memorial High School to allow Soriao to enroll
and study after he was meted out a disciplinary action without due
process. The Court of Appeals invoked the 1987 Constitution and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2
and Article II, Sections 13 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution provide:
Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall protect and promote the right
of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
Section 2: The State shall:
. (1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and
integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the people
and society;
. (2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the
of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory
for all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student
loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be
available to deserving students in both public and private schools,
especially to the under-privileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning
system, as well as self-study programs particularly those that
respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with
training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth
in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human
liberation and development.
Also since it is the Constitution which granted petitioner the right of
education, he may only deprived of such right with due process of
law as stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792, 1993
FACTS:
 The petitioner, all minors and alleges that the plaintiffs "are
all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled
to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests, duly joined and
represented by their parents instituted a complained as a taxpayers
class suit and prayed for the rendering of judgment ordering
defendant Factoran, then Secretary of the DENR, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist form receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.
The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
two grounds: 1) lack of cause of action against him and 2) the issue
raised was a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches. The trial court dismissed the
complaint based on the aforementioned grounds. Thus, the
petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari seeking to rescind
and set aside.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said petitioners have a cause of action to
prevent the misappropriation or impairment of the Philippine
rainforests and have the defendant stop form receiving, processing
and approving timber license agreements.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioners have a cause of action. The complaint
focuses on one specific fundamental legal right-the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in SEC. 15 of Article 2.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not
under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than
any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation --
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even
be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution
itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come -- generations which stand to inherit nothing but
parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The
said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
E.O. No.192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which serve as the bases for policy formulation and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR, the primary
government agency for the proper use and development of the
countries natural resources. The right of the petitioners and all they
represent to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENRs duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the owner who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise
to a cause of action.
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government
(respondent prosecutors), several judges (respondent judges) issued
a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners & or the corporations
of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search
the persons named and/ or the premises of their offices,
warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize several personal
properties as the "subject of the offense; stolen or embezelled or
the fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense" as violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null &
void, said petitioners Stonehill, et.al. filed w/ the SC this original
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction.
Issues:
1 Whether the right against unlafwful search and seizures may be
invoked by artificial beings?
2 Whether or not the search warrants in question were validly
issued?
3 Whether or not the articles seized by virtue of the warrants are
admissible in evidence?
Held:
1. YES. Artificial beings are also entitiled to the guarantee
although they may be required to open their books of accounts for
examination by the State in the exercise of POLICE POWER.
2. YES. Two points must be stressed in connection with Art. III,
Section 2 of the Constitution: (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth therein; and (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code."No specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of a probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed
in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely
the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision
above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is
not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is
likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules
of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was compounded by
the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and
seized, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to ALL business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as
well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of
general warrants.
General search warrants are outlawed because they
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights-- THAT THE THINGS TO BE
SEIZED BE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED-- as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
3. NO. Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondent- Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against
petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado
case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," upon the
theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law
action for damages against the searching officer, against the party
who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those
assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and
such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given
up this approach and eventually adopted THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of
evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing
the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of
trespass against the offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows
that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be
repressed".
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado
case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the
search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in
the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are null and void.
 THE UNITED STATES vs FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918.
Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province
of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the
Executive Secretary charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace
of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office
and asking for his removal.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of
first instance for the 7th Judicial District requesting investigation,
proper action, and report. The justice of the peace was notified and
denied the charges. The judge of first instance, having established
guilt, recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be
removed from his position as justice of the peace and it is ordered
that the proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive
Secretary.Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial;
the judge of first instance granted the motion, documents were
introduced asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of
prosecution, and that charges were made for personal reasons. He
was then acquitted. Thereafter, in 1916, a criminal action for libel
against the defendants who earlier initiated the petition for the
judges removal was instituted. The CFI of Pampanga found the
defendants guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants are guilty of a libel of Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province
of Pampanga.
Held: No.The Constitution of the United States and the State
constitutions guarantee the right of freedom of speech and press and
the right of assembly and petition. We are therefore, not surprised to
find President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty,
the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission, of April 7,
1900, laying down the inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights
of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the
Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of
organic acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words
quoted are not unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they
are the counterpart of the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which the American people demanded before giving
their approval to the Constitution.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not
threadbare verbiage. The language carries with it all the applicable
jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases.
And what are these principles? Volumes would inadequately answer.
But included are the following:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a
scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its
probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public
officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment
upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity
of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not
authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than
the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good .
Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief
Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary - to any or all the
agencies of Government - PUBLIC OPINION should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the
right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law
is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or
badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If
the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the
same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the
part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword
of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over
the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to
stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a DUTY
which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of
all know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the
notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the
law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct
of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free
government, but only in a despotism."
The RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION is the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the complement of
the right of free speech. ASSEMBLY means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs. PETITION means that any person or group of persons
can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or
office of the government for a redress of grievances. The
persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made.
(1)Public policy, (2)the welfare of society, and (3)the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection for public
opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGE.
"The DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS rests
upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may
in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and
malignant slanderer.'"
Privilege is classified as either ABSOLUTE or QUALIFIED. With the
first, we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the
words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by
proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
"A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in
which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference
to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having
a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
incriminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable."
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to
the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to
an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter.
Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is
made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the
mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under
an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive.
Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in
the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public
affairs. The DUTY under which a party is privileged is sufficient
if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith
believe he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is
mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the
communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element
of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint
should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the
respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will
not take the case out of the privilege.
In the usual case MALICE can be presumed from defamatory
words. PRIVILEGE destroys that PRESUMPTION. The onus of
proving malice then lies on the plaintiff.
The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of
malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the
absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to
the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and
petition, having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute
must be construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic
Law, and having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a
position to test the facts of this case with these principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of
a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The
charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one
of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words
imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or
corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his
office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do
not have present a simple case of direct and vicious
accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated
on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly
privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not
true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true
by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable
cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in
office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these
citizens - to secure the removal from office of a person thought
to be venal - were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a
frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to
them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an
investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of
their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition.
The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the
peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were
submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper
functionary, the Executive Secretary.
The present facts are further essentially different from those
established in other cases in which private individuals have been
convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood,
calumny, against the man and not the officer, have been the
causes of the verdict of guilty.
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of
the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional
guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an
honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather
commend them for their good citizenship. The defendants and
appellants are acquitted.
VILLAVICENCIO VS. LUKBAN
(39 PHIL 778)
FACTS:
Respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, for
the best of all reasons, to exterminate vise, ordered the segregated
district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
number of years in the City of Manila, closed. The women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. At about
midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to the orders from
the chief of the police and Justo Lukban, descended upon the
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed
them aboard the steamers Corregidor and Negros. They had no
knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. The two
steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the
night of October 25, 1918.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Mayor of the City of Manila is
constitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court condemned the mayors act.
Respondents intention to suppress the social evil was commutable.
But his methods were unlawfull.
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippines in
conformity with an act of Congress. The Governor-General can order
the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands.
One can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even
hints at the right of the Mayor of the City of Manila or the Chief of
Police of that City to force citizens of the Philippine Islands, and
these women despite their being in a sense, lepers of society are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the
same constitutional guarantees as other citizens.
Law defines power. The law is the only supreme power in
our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit
to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which gives itself
and imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.
The fundamental rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by
those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments
showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the
blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so
that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the
government of the commonwealth may be government of laws and
not of men.