People v.

Mahinay
302 SCRA 455 (1999)
FACTS:
Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to
take care of Isips house which was under construction adjacent to the latters residence. The
victim was a 12-year old girl who used to frequent the residence of Isip.
On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her mother.
The following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and disappeared.
The victims body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was found
in the septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy showed that the victim
was raped and was strangled to death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short pants, a
brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victims mother to belong to her
daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of the appellant.
Also found in the yard, three arms-length away from the septic tank were an underwear, a
leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellants
belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he
narrated how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court convicted him of
the crime of Rape and was sentenced to death.
The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
ISSUES:
1. WON the appellants extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in accordance with
his rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights; and
2. WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
The Court ruled that the appellants extrajudicial confession was taken within the ambit of the
law as evinced by the records and testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained
to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights.
As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to warrant a conviction of his guilt. However, the Court ruled
otherwise.
The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and settled jurisprudence. Absence of direct proof
does not absolve the appellant because conviction may be had with the concurrence of the
following requisites as stated in the Rules of Court:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
 2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.
And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335, that
facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute
evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect
upon the court.
The Court agreed with the trial courts decision in giving credence to several circumstantial
evidence, which is more than enough to prove appellants guilt beyond the shadow of
reasonable doubt.
The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the developments in law that provided the rights
of suspects under custodial investigation in detail.
NOTES ON MAHINAY CASE:
A person under custodial investigation should be informed:
1. In a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be
in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him;
3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and
competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for
him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed
by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. That, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means
telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any
member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by
any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited
national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer
to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. That he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. That the waiver must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must
be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish
to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not
interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has
already begun;
10. That his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights
does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may
have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
11. That any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

BONDOC vs.SANDIGANBAYAN
 G.R. No. 71163-65

FACTS:

Two employees of the Central Bank Manuel Valentino and Jesus Estacio and nine
private individuals, were charged with several felonies of estafa thru falsification of public
documents in three separate information filed by the Tanodbayan with the Sandiganbayan on
April 15, 1982. The actions were docketed as Criminal Cases Numbered 5949 to 5951. They
were assigned to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.

Before the prosecution rested its case, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan on
August 23, 1984, another set of three indictments, this time against Carlito P. Bondoc and
Rogelio Vicente, private individuals, charging them with the same crimes involved in Cases No.
5949 to 5951 as principals by indispensable cooperation. The actions against Bondoc and
Vicente were docketed as Criminal Cases Numbered 9349 to 9351. They were assigned to the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.

Bondoc moved to quash the informations on January 3, 1985 on the basic theory that as
a private individual charged as co-principal with government employees, he should be tried
jointly with the latter pursuant to Section 4 (3) of PD 1606, hence, the separate proceedings
commenced against him were invalid, for lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the
offenses and his person.

The Third Division denied Bondoc's motion to quash. Bondoc moved for reconsideration
on March 4, 1985 but was denied. However, in order to obviate his objection to a separate trial,
the Third Division, in the same resolution, referred Bondoc's cases (No. 9349 to 9351) to the
Second Division for consolidation with Cases Numbered 5949 to 5951. But by that time, the trial
of Criminal Cases No. 5949 to 5951 had been terminated. The Second Division thus resolved,
on June 4, 1985, to deny the proposed consolidation of the actions and to return Criminal Cases
No. 9349 to 9351 to the Third Division.

On receiving the criminal cases back from the Second Division, the Third Division set the
cases for arraignment and trial on August 1 and 2, 1985. On June 26, 1985, Bondoc filed with
this Court the petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar. He argues that the Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion in seeking to try him separately from the Central Bank
employees.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the declaration of the Sandiganbayan that it was no longer possible or
legally feasible to try them jointly with the government employees accused of the same
offenses, had the effect of causing the Sandiganbayan to lose jurisdiction over Bondoc's cases.

Whether or not those cases became cognizable by the regular courts and should be
transferred thereto for trial and adjudgment.

RULING:
 It must at once be evident that the seeming impossibility of a joint trial cannot and does
not alter the essential nature of the crimes in question, as felonies perpetrated by public officers
or employees in confabulation with private persons. It should be as obvious, too, that assuming
it is correct to construe the law in a strictly literal sense, the indicated course of action would be
to insist on holding a joint trial regardless of whatever circumstances may appear to make such
a joint trial inappropriate, inconvenient, unfeasible.

Besides, there is nothing so sacrosanct or important about a joint trial as to justify a

radical deviation from ordinary, orderly court processes in order to have it, or as to affect the
very jurisdiction of the Court required to conduct it. The evidence of the State or of the accused
does not become weaker or stronger whether presented at a joint or separate trial; the rights of
the accused are not enhanced or diluted by the character of a trial as joint or separate; the
procedure prescribed in either situation is essentially the same. Indeed, it is a gauge of the
importance of a joint trial, in the eyes of trial attorneys and of the law itself, that there are as
many lawyers moving for a separate trial as there are, for a joint trial, and that courts are
granted the discretion, in cases where two or more accused are jointly charged with an offense,
to order separate trials instead of a joint trial, on motion of the fiscal or any accused.

Furhermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc's cases to the Regional Trial
Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As
already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc's
cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not
altered the nature of the offenses charged. These crimes are within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.