Cordora v.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009
Facts
A complaint for disqualification was filed by Gaudencio Cordora alleging that
Gustavo Tambunting made false assertions in his certificate for candidacy for the 2004
elections. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements since
the latter was a naturalized American citizen. However Tambunting contended that he
was born to a Filipino mother and an American father making him a dual citizen which is
not an impediment to his running for the elections.

Issue
Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of
Tambuntings failure to meet citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the
present petition an action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The
present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful
statements in his certificates of candidacy.

Held

Petition dismissed. Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino

Absentee Voting
mother and an American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process
involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers citizenship.
Tambunting claims that because of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino
and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a
naturalized American citizen.

The court agrees with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses
dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The
process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship
which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration
which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an
American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the
filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting
had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.

persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

Ugodoracion v COMELEC
April 18, 2008
Facts
Ugodoracion ang Tungol were both candidates for the position of
Mayor in the Municipality of Albuquerque, Province of Bohol in the May 14,
2007 elections. Tungol filed a disqualification complaint against Ugodoracion
alleging material representation in the COC of the latter and that he failed to
meet the residency requirement. Ugodoracion was said to be a green card
holder since 2001.
Issue
Whether there is material representation that would justify the
cancellation of the COC.
Whether Ugodorocion lost his domicile of origin
Held
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. -- The certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for
the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the
election.
We agree with Ugdoracion that residence, in contemplation of election laws, is
synonymous to domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return (animus revertendi) and
remain (animus manendi). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.
Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every
person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of
the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law
attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention.
Japson v COMELEC
G.R. No. 180088, Jan. 19, 2009
Facts
Petitioner Japson and Respondent Ty were both running for the position
of Mayor in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local
elections held on 14 May 2007. Japson sought to disqualify his opponent.
According to Japson, Ty was guilty of misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy for although the latter was a natural born Filipino he acquired
American citizenship and lived in the States for almost 25 years. Hence the
latter could not have met the required citizenship and residency requirement.
Ty argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his
American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007
elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzons Petition in SPA No. 07-
568.
Issue
Given the aforementioned facts was Ty able to meet the citizenship and
residency requirement.
Held
The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.

There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised
in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However,
he left to work in the USA and eventually became an American citizen. On 2
October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul
of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. 16 At this point, Ty still
held dual citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March
2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary public and,
resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a
natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain 17 his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under
such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does
not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking

Certificate of
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency
requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor
does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.

Candidacy
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for
dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.

Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born

Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.

Cipriciano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004

Facts
Petitioner Elena Cipriano filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the 2002
SK elections. However she and several others were disqualified because the
COMELEC adopted a resolution recommended by the Commissions law
department to this effect because it is said that she together with several
others were not registered voters of the barangay were they intended to run,
she even won the elections.

Issue
May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the
exercise of its power to enforce and administer election laws, look into the
qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on the
ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law? This is the issue that
needs to be resolved in this petition for certiorari filed by Ellan Marie P.
Cipriano, the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City, whose
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the COMELEC motu proprio on the
ground that she was not a registered voter in the barangay where she intended
to run.
Held
The court disagrees. The Commission may not, by itself, without the
proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the
COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This
is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The
Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer
designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the
succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge
receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to
give due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy. The duty of the
COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is
ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in
the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of said body. Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allows any person to file before the COMELEC a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any
material representation therein is false. It states:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Loreta-Go v COMELEC
G.R. No. 147741, May 10, 2001
Facts
Petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay,
Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte on February 27, 2001.
However, on February 28, 2001 she filed another certificate of candidacy for the position
of Governor, because of this she sought the withdrawal of her COC as mayor. However,
the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal
and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the
municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for
mayor. Only a few minutes were left before the deadline so instead of going to Baybay
Leyte to personally seek the cancellation she decided to just fax her withdrawal to her
father living in Balay. The father was able to send it at 12:28 am, the following day. The
respondent Montejo and several other sought the disqualification of petitioner because
she filed two COCs. COMELEC gave due course to the petition of Montejo. Hence this
petition.
Issue
Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and
mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for
both positions?
Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte?
(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the
place where the certificate of candidacy was filed?
(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax?
Held
Petition was granted, annulling the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner
disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of
Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay,
Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of
the law.
The court holds that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for
mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her
certificate of candidacy for governor.
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, provides that:
"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw
the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and
if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for
any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of
candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible
and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."

There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be
filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed.
Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the
regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the
province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal
election officer of the said municipality.

Salcedo II v COMELEC
312 SCRA 447, 1999

Facts
Victorino Salcedo II and Eremelita Salcedo both ran for the position of Luna v COMELEC
Mayor in the Municipality of Sara, Iolilo. Victorino filed a disqualification
complaint against Ermelita since she was using the surename Salcedo when in
fact her marriage to a certain Neptali Salcedo was void. In her defense, G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007
Ermelita claimed that she did not know that Neptali was already married.
Facts
Issue
Did private respondent commit any material representation by stating
that her surename was Salcedo when in fact her marriage was void. Joy Chrisma Luna filed her certificate of Candidacy as a substitute
candidate for Hans Roger for the 2004 elections a vice mayor of Lagayan Abra.
Held However, Tomas Layao together with several others filed a disqualification
petition against her since she was a registered voter of Bangued and not
Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation Lagayan Abra. Furthermore there can be no valid substitution since Hans
Roger the candidate sought to be substituted was only 20 years old on the day
of the election. COMELEC ruled in favor of the disqualification case. Hence this
A false representation under section 78 must consist of a petition.
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Issue
It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of the ruled that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.
provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo
were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner
does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when Held
they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were
fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name.
There was a valid substitution . The COMELEC may not, by itself,
without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections
candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez v. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the
denying the petition to cancel private respondent's certificate of candidacy.
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the
usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.

Jamela Salic Maruhom v
COMELEC
G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009
Facts
Salic Maruhom and Abinal were bothe candidates for Mayor in the
municipality of Marantao Lanao del Sur. Abinal filed a disqualification case
against Salic Maruhom due to the fact that the latter was a registered voter in
two precincts, in Marantao and Marawi. Furthermore Abinal alleges that there
were material representations in the COC of Maruhom regarding her name and
residence in Marawi and Marantao. Maruhom filed before the COMELEC an
Answer with Motion to Dismiss SPA No. 07-093 contending that she was
qualified to run as municipal mayor of Marantao, as she had all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. A candidate
could only be disqualified for a ground provided by law, and there was no law
declaring double registration as a ground for disqualification. Maruhom also
insisted that she did not make false material representations in her COC.
Comelec granted the disqualification complaint
Issue
Whether the COMELEC erred in declaring petitioner as a double
registrant. And disqualifying him for false representation
Held
Under Section 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in
the COC is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false
representation must pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the
candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC. Such material fact
refers to a candidates eligibility or qualification for elective office like
citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter. Aside from the
requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with the intention to
deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public
office.
Given Maruhoms double registration in Marawi and Marantao, then
COMELEC should determine which registration was valid and which one was
null. COMELEC could not consider both registrations valid because it would
then give rise to the anomalous situation where Maruhom could vote in two
precincts at the same time. This would be a dangerous precedent that would
open the floodgates to massive election cheating and fraud. This was precisely
the situation that the COMELEC intended to address when it issued its Minute
Resolution No. 00-1513 on 25 July 2000, seven years prior to the 14 May 2007
elections in which Maruhom intended to run. To foster honesty and credibility
in the registration of voters, so as to avoid the padding of vote registration,
COMELEC laid down the rule in Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 that while the
first registration of any voter subsists, any subsequent registration thereto is
void ab initio.
Quinto v COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
Facts
Petitioners sought that the provision of the Omnibus Election code
regarding the differential treatment between appointive and elective officials
be declared unconstitutional mainly because it violates the equal protection
clause and was suffering from overbreadth as they prohibit the candidacy of all
civil servants holding appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or
not they occupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit
these civil servants activity regardless of whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national, municipal or
barangay level; and. Appointive officials are said to be resigned from their
positions once they filed their COCs. At first the complaint was granted but
upon motion for reconsideration by respondent COMELEC the decision was
reversed.
Issue
 Is the assailed provision unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause

Held
No it does not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection
clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is reasonableness
which requires that:1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions;2. It is
germane to the purposes of the law;3. It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and4. It applies equally to all members of the same class. This is as
evidenced by the case of Farinas v Executive Secretary

Pre election
Remedies

Ong v Alegre
G.R. No. 163295, January 23, 2006

Facts
John Stanley Alegre and Francis Ong, then incumbent mayor were both
running for the position of Mayor in the May 2004 elections in San Vicente
Camarinas Norte. Ong was proclaimed mayor for the 1995, 1998, and 2001
elections. However in 1998 when Ong was proclaimed the winner, an election
protest was filed against him by Alegre. However the decision annulling the
proclamation of Ong as winner only came out in 2001. By this time Ong had
already served his full term. It is because of this event that Alegre sought for
the disqualification of Ong. According to him Ong is banned to run for the 2004
elections as Mayor since he has already reached his three term limit. For his
defense petitioner cites Lozanida v COMELEC. COMELEC ruled in favor of
Alegre. Hence this petition.
Issue
whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be
considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Held
Petition dismissed. The assailed COMELEC resolutions are affirmed.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government
post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Petitioner cannot rely on the case of Lozanida v COMELEC. In
this case, The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once
apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was
declared a nullity for the stated reason of failure of election, and, as a
consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another,
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an
involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there
was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the
present case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or
break in the continuity of Francis service respecting the 1998-2001 term.
Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in question; he
never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
Miranda v Abaya
G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999
Facts
Jose Pempe Miranda then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela,
filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the
synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. Three days after, a complaint to cancel
certificate of candidacy was filed against him by Antonio Abaya which was
granted. Shortly after the deadline for filing for candidacy, Joel Miranda filed
his certificate of candidacy as a substitute for Pempe Miranda. Of course,
Abaya filed a disqualification case against Joel Miranda for void substitution.
After a motion for reconsideration, COMELEC granted Abayas complaint.
Hence, this petition.
Issue
1. Whether the annulment of petitioners substitution and
proclamation was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the
private respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Held
A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid
certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate
did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was
not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be
substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-
called substitute to file a new and original certificate of candidacy beyond
the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal
protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

Tajanan v COMELEC
G.R. No. 104443 April 13, 1992
Facts
In line with the 2004 and 2010 elections COMELEC issued a resolution
adopting the recommendation of its law department regarding the limiting of
the number of candidates to ensure the dignity and manageability of the
election for the Offices of the President, Vice-President and Senators. This is in
line with the ruling in Tajanan v COMELEC
Held
xxx This does not mean that this Court is declaring national politics as
the sole preserve of the so-called traditional politicians. However, given the
complexity of the present political exercise, which involves the election of
government officials from the President down to city and municipal officials. We
recognize the need to keep the number of candidates to a manageable level,
and this means keeping those who are not serious in running for office out of
the race.
Considering the dignity that must be accorded the Offices of the President,
Vice-President and Senators, the magnitude of the responsibility of those
officers, the following criteria was observed in the determination of the
candidates who have bona fide intention to run for the office for which they
seek to be elected:
1. Candidates who, on the face of their certificate of candidacy, do not possess
the constitutional and legal qualifications of the office to which they aspire to
be elected;
2. Candidates who, on the face of said certificate, filed their certificate of
candidacy to put the election process in mockery or disrepute;
3. Candidates whose certificate of candidacy would cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of names and surnames with other candidates; and
4. Candidates who have no intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed as shown by circumstances or acts that
clearly demonstrate the lack of such bona fide intention, such as:
a) candidate who cannot wage a nationwide campaign;
b) candidates who do not have a platform of government;
c) candidates who are not nominated by a political party or are not supported
by a registered political party with national constituency; and
d) candidates for president or vice-president who do not present running mates
for president or vice-president, respectively, nor senatorial candidates.
Garvida v Sales
G.R. No.122872, September 10, 1997
Facts
Lynette Garvida filed a petition for her inclusion as a member and voter
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan in Brgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui Ilocos Norte. The
Board of election Tellers denied her application since she is said to be over the
age limit which is 21. She was 21 and 10 mos. Old. However, the MTCT ruled
that she was qualified. Having been declared qualified, she filed a certificate of
candidacy for the SK chairman position. Her opponent, Sales sought her
disqualification filing with the COMELEC en banc a Petition of Denial and/or
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy against petitioner Garvida for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition
was sent by facsimile and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission
on Elections National Office, Manila. The COMELEC en banc sent a resolution
ordering the suspension of proclamation of Garvida in the event that she wins.
Issues
1) WON the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on the petition
to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy. (not pubcor)2) WON
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she
has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of
the SK is valid
Held
Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age
qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang
Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
However Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that
the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and
shall be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code,
in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy.In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the
COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material
representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence
received by any official designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall
be decided by the COMELEC itself and that the jurisdiction over a petition to
Election
cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not
en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en
banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order
or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider
Propaganda
decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are
resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in
Divisions that can hear and decide election cases.In the instant case, the
COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of
the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.

Chavez v COMELEC
G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004

Facts
Frank Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with a writ of preliminary
injunction against a resolution made by the COMELEC regarding premature
campaigning. It is because of this resolution that he was ordered by COMELEC
to remove the billboards containing his product endorsements along the
Balintawak North Expressway months before the election. According to him,
the contracts he entered into to endorse the products were made by him as a
private individual.

Issue
 Whether the assailed provision is unconstitutional as the same is
allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid
exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary
to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.
Held
Petition denied, the assailed resolutions are a valid exercise of police
power. A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary
objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field
for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich
candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other,
by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and
publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid
reason for the exercise of police power as held in National Press Club v.
COMELEC, wherein the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section
11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited the sale or donation of print
space and air time for campaigning or other political purposes, except to the
COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as
practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former
from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests.
This Court ruled therein that this objective is of special importance and
urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in
income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by
the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the
poverty line.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely
product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his
candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan
political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat
of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities included
under this definition are:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups
of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign
for or against a candidate
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or
other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews
for or against the election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to
support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a
candidate
National Press Club v COMELEC
207 SCRA 1
Facts
In this case the representatives of the mass media filed
a petition in order to declare Section 11 (b) of Republic Act
No. 66461 as unconstitutional. The assailed provision
prevents the media industry to sell or donate space for
political advertisements. Alongside the media representatives,
two national candidates and one local candidate further allege
that such provision is a curtailment of the right to be
informed.
Issue
Whether Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461
invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising
freedom of expression.
Held
The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone
outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of
media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of
the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in
time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in
any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or
television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to
candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs
of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by
reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or
columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and
programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments,
opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for
particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b)
is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by
candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to
cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates.
Philippne Press Institute v
COMELEC
244 SCRA 272
Facts
This case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order against a resolution made by the
COMELEC. The assailed resolution was asking publishers for a free COMELEC
space wherein they are required to provide free space in their newspapers to
be used by the COMELEC for election regulation purposes. In addition to this
they are asked to process raw data to make it camera- ready. They contend that
this was tantamount to involuntary servitude and was not a valid exercise of
police power. They move that such resolution be stricken down as
unconstitutional.
In behalf of the COMELEC, the Office of the Solicitor General
contended that such was not unconstitutional for it merely provided for
guidelines to be followed for the procurement of COMELEC space.
Furthermore there were no administrative or criminal sanctions for non-
compliance. The Solicitor General is also of the view that, even if the assailed
provision is mandatory, COMELEC is still mandated to regulate and supervise
the information operations of the media industry in order to ensure the
impartiality of the elections.
Issue
Whether Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on
Elections is valid.
Held
According to the court, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present
form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives,
purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to
Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be
set aside and nullified.
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to "donate"
"Comelec space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of
the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to require prolonged
consideration on our part. Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no
inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power essentially
a power of legislation has been constitutionally delegated to respondent
Commission. Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in
the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to
show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under
the police power.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that
purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other
imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to the
individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in
differing parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or
magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and
palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the
Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only
reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec.
Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Osmena v COMELEC
288 SCRA 447, 1998
Facts
The petitioners Emilio Osmena and Pablo P Garcia seek
for the nullification of the decision made by the supreme court
in NPC v COMELEC wherein it ruled for the validity of the
Electoral Reform Laws of 1987. Said law prohibits the selling
and donating of space for campaign and any political purposes
except for COMELEC. According to them the court erred in
ruling in the NPC case that the freedom of speech was not
violated for such was a valid regulation for election purposes.
According to them the ban to political advertising creates a
disadvantage to the poor candidates for they are deprived of a
medium which they can afford to pay unlike the more affluent
candidates who can provide for other means than
dissemination of information through media. Instead of
leveling the playing field it worsens it.
Issue
Whether the assailed decision is unconstitutional
Held
The petition is DISMISSED. A number of decisions are
cited by the court but it all came down to the fact the State
can prohibit campaigning outside a certain period as well as
campaigning within a certain place. For unlimited
expenditure for political advertising in the mass media skews
the political process and subverts democratic self-
government. What is bad is if the law prohibits campaigning
by certain candidates because of the views expressed in the
ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any
compelling reason.
TELEBAP v COMELEC
289 SCRA 337, 1998
Facts
TELEBAP is an organization of lawyers of radio and television
broadcasting companies. GMA is a network station granted a franchise by
Congress. Both contends the validity of the provision regarding the so- called
COMELEC space of Sec. 2 of the Omnibus Election Code. They argue that such
is unconstitutional for it is tantamount to the taking of property without due
process of law and that such was enacted in excess of the power granted to
COMELEC to supervise and regulate the elections.
Issue
Whether the questioned provision is tantamount to the taking of
property without due process of law and whether such is enacted in excess of
the power granted to COMELEC to supervise and regulate the elections.
Held
Petition DISMISSED. The court said in its decision that with the
prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC
Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates
can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than
merely depriving their qualifications and programs of government. More than
merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast
stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly
deprive the people of their right to know. Art III, 7 of the Constitution provides
that "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized," while Art. XII, 6 states that "the use of property bears a social
function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is]
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene
when the common good so demands."
Furthermore, it said that to affirm the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold
public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of
public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media
are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are
also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have
access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is
paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of 92,
therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of
public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the
state's duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their
just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may
render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
SWS v COMELEC
357 SCRA 496, 2001
Facts
SWS is a research institution that conducts surveys while KPC
publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation here in the
Philippines. Both wanted to conduct an election survey during the 2001
national and local elections. However a resolution was issued by COMELEC
stating that Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall
not be published seven (7) days before an election. SWS and KPC argue that
such resolution is a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech.
COMELEc on their part avers that such is a valid regulation in order not to
manipulate the election results.
Issue
Whether Sec. 5.4 is a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech.
Held
The petition is GRANTED. The court rules that 5.4 is invalid because
(1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct
and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression
is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression.
as this Court pointed out in Osmea, there was actually no ban but only a
substitution of media advertisements by the COMELEC space and COMELEC
hour.
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated
to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is
only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the OBrien test,
namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the
governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-
minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, junking of weak
or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called
dagdag-bawas. Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they
cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when
such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather
than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of
such evils.

The court has two points

First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test because the
causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes
such interest not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By
prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility
that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4
actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression
of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio
and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In effect,
5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring
personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom
of expression means that the government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. Thus,
contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by 5.4
cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only
incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the
right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total
suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only
for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and
seven (7) days immediately before a local election.

This sufficiently distinguishes 5.4 from R.A. No. 6646, 11(b), which this
Court found to be valid in National Press Club v. COMELEC and Osmea v.
COMELEC. For the ban imposed by R.A. No. 6646, 11(b) is not only authorized
by a specific constitutional provision, but it also provided an alternative so that,
 election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature
campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her
candidacy.

Penera v COMELEC
G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009

Facts

Penera and Andanar are mayoralty candidates for the May 2007
elections in Sta. Monica Surigao del Norte . Andanar filed a disqualification
case against Penera and the other maembers of her political party for there
were witnesses that allege that Penera engaged in premature campaigning. She
was seen in a motorcade prior to the official campaign period in certain
baranggays of Sta. Monica. She admitted that she was in the motorcade but she
should not be disqualified because she and her party did not make any speech
and that they only played a marching background music and waved to the
crowd. So technically according to her, they did not ask the people to vote for
them. COMELEC ruled in favor of the disqualification case. Hence, this petition

Issue

Whether Penera should be disqualified for rengaging in premature

campaigning

Held

Petition DISMISSED. The court said that a person, after filing his/her
COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the

Appreciation of
campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b)
of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political
activity. However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the
beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature
campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said
person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can
his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.
Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person
officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of
Ballots
his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her
benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their
 Held

Bautista v Castro
206 SCRA 305

Dojillo v COMELEC
Facts G.R. No. 166542, July 25, 2006
Bautista and Castro were candidates for the position of
Brgy. Capt. In Teacher's Village Quezon City. The Barangay
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bautista as the winner by 2
Facts
votes. Castro filed a protest. The trial court rendered a
decision that Castro garnered the same number of votes as
Petitioner Dojillo and respondent Vidal were candidates
Bautista and declared Miguel as the duly elected Brgy. Capt.
for the 2002 barangay and SK elections running for the
Petitioner Sergio Bautista filed the instant petition for review
position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Nibaliw Vidal, San
by certiorari
Fabian, Pangasinan. Vidal was able to obtaine 374 votes while
Dojillo received 371 votes. Of course, the BET declared Vidal
Issue
as the winner. Dojillo filed a disqualification case against Vidal
Whether or not a ballot which does not contain the signature
for misappreciation of ballots and incorrect tallying of votes.
of the poll chairman be considered a valid ballot.
The trial court ruled in favor of Dojillo and proclaimed him as
winner. However, the COMELEC in its resolutions reversed
Whether or not respondent Judge acted correctly in its
the decision. Hence this petition
appreciation of the contested ballots
Issue
 Whether respondent is the duly elected Punong
Barangay of Barangay Nibaliw Vidal, San Fabian, Pangasinan.
A discussion on the issues of appreciation of ballots Canvassing
Held

Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and Vidal is declared

the winner. As to the appreciation of ballots the court was
guided by the pieces of evidence presented by the lower court
and COMELEC. A ballot indicates the voter's will. There is no
requirement that the entries in the ballot be written nicely or
that the name of the candidate be spelled accurately. In the
reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot is presumed
valid unless there is a clear reason to justify its rejection. The
object in the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry
into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined
with reasonable certainty. The ballots in question had
indications with reasonable certainty

Castromayor v COMELEC
205 SCRA 298
Facts

Castromayor was a candidate for a seat in the eight-

member Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Calinog, Iloilo
in the elections held on May 8, 1995. After the elections were
held the Board of Canvassers began tallying the votes. On the
basis of the canvass the winners were declared. Among which
was Castromayor. However Garin the chairman of the Board of
Canvassers rechecked the tally and she found out that some
votes were overlooked. According to her Dorito another
candidate garnered 51 more votes than Castromayor. This led
Garin to report such incident to the COMELEC so that the board
can be given the authority to reconvene in order to re tally the
votes. A fax letter was sent to the COMELEC in order for the
latter to suspend the proclamation in favor of Castromayor.
COMELEC resolved to act on the suspension of the proclamation.
Upon hearing this Castromayor filed a petiotion for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus for the remedy of the losing party
must be an election protest.
Issue
Whether COMELEC holds the right to suspend the
proclamation of Castromayor
Held
The Petition is DISMISSED. Indeed, since the Statement of
Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and of the
proclamation, any error in the statement ultimately affects the
validity of the proclamation. It begs the question, therefore, to
say that this is not a preproclamation controversy and the
procedure for preproclamation controversies cannot be applied
to the correction in the computation of the totals in the
Statement of Votes.
According to the court what is involved here is a simple problem
of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per
precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in
the election returns. In making the correction in computation,
the MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity, under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence any question
pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly
to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional
function to decide questions affecting elections. What has just
been said also disposes of petitioner's other contention that
because his proclamation has already been made, any remedy of
the losing party is an election protest.
Mastura v COMELEC
285 SCRA 493
Facts
Mastura and Dilangalen were congressional candidates
for the first district of Maguindanao for the May 1995
elections. When the votes were being canvassed Dilangalen
objected to the inclusion of the ballots from the Municipality
of Matonog, contending that the same were tampered. Hence,
COMELEC ordered for the examination of these ballots and
formed a new set of Board of Canvassers. They found out that
the ballots were indeed tampered with. COMELEC ordered a
recount while. Of course, Mastura was not in favor of the
actions of COMELEC. From the recount Dilangalen was found
to have garnered the highest votes.
Issue
Whether there was a grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC
Held
It is settled jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend
the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exists a
discrepancy between the various copies of election returns
from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election
returns were found to be falsified or tampered with, the
COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board
of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the
basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the
members of the board or proclaim the winners itself.

Cawasa v COMELEC
G.R. No. 150469, May 30, 2009
Facts
Cawasa and Manamparan were the candidates for the position of Mayor in the
Municipality of Nunungan, Lanao del Norte. There were 40 precincts were the people
were said to have cast their votes but only 36 were successfully held the elections. There
was a failure of elections in the remaining 4.Hence, a special election was declared by the
COMELEC. In the regular elections Cawasa had more votes but in the special election
Manamparan took the lead. COMELEC proclaimed Cawasa the winner so Manamparan
filed a petition to annul said proclamation. the venue of the special elections was
transferred to the adjacent municipalities of Sultan Naga Dimaporo and Sapad in lieu of
the regular polling places located in barangays Bangko, Cabasaran and Liangan. There is
likewise no dispute that military personnel were appointed as members of the Board of
Election Inspectors in the 4 precincts. The Comelec held that the special elections in the
4 contested precincts were not genuinely held and resulted in failure to elect on account
of fraud.
Issue
Whether the COMELEC en banc Resolution was issued without jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
Held:
Petition DISMISSED, Resolution AFFIRMED. Petitioners fail to persuade.
Sections 152, 153 and 154 of the Omnibus Election Code shed light on this matter, to wit:
SEC. 152. Polling Place. A polling place is the building or place where the board of
election inspectors conducts its proceedings and where the voters shall cast their votes.
SEC. 153. Designation of polling places. The location of polling places designated in
the preceding regular election shall continue with such changes as the Commission may
find necessary, after notice to registered political parties and candidates in the political
unit affected, if any, and hearing: provided, That no location shall be changed within
forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election or a
referendum or plebiscite, except in case it is destroyed or it cannot be used.
SEC. 154. Requirements for polling places. Each polling place shall be, as far as
practicable, a ground floor and shall be of sufficient size to admit and comfortably
accommodate forty voters at one time outside the guard rail for the board of election
inspectors. The polling place shall be located within the territory of the precinct as
centrally as possible with respect to the residence of the voters therein and whenever
possible, such location shall be along a public road. No designation of polling places
shall be changed except upon written petition of the majority of the voters of the
precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the
Commission upon prior notice and hearing.
The transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of Comelec Resolution No.
4360 issued on May 21, 2001 specifying the polling places but also Sections 153 and 154
of the Election Code.
The pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election are: (1) that no voting has
been held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes and (2) that the votes not cast therein are sufficient to
affect the results of the elections. The concurrence of these two circumstances justifies
the calling of special elections. Here, the Comelec found that the special elections were
vitiated by fraud due to the illegal transfer of the polling places and the appointment of
military personnel as members of the BEI. Inevitably, the Comelec could not ascertain
who voted during the special elections. The circumstances were such that the entire
electoral process was not worthy of faith and credit, hence, in practical effect no election
was held.
Garay v COMELEC
261 SCRA 222, 1996
Facts
Garay and Gata jr. were candidates running for the
position of vice-mayor in the Municipality of Matnog, Province of
Sorsogon. The tallied votes revealed that Garay was ahead with
20 votes. However,this result did not include the votes in
precinct 30-A of Barangay Culasi, Matnog. This is due to the fact
that some men forcibly took the balot boxes. Hence,the Board of
Canvassers did not declare a winner. BEI issued a certificate of
votes wherein Gata jr. garnered an overwhelming lead in the said
precint. This was sent by Gata to COMELEC. At first, Gata's tally
board was not acknowledged but eventually COMELEC released
a resolution certiying thevotes in said precinct by annuling the
results of the special elections conducted. Aggrieved, Garay filed
this petition.
Issue
Did the respondent Commission commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the
results of the special election it called due to a failure of
elections and in declaring the winner on the basis of the Tally
Board and the Certificate of Votes submitted by the private
respondent Gata?
Held
 Petition GRANTED, assailed resolution is SET ASIDE.
While it is true that the respondent Commission has the power to
annul special elections or declare a failure of special elections
where it is shown that no voting had taken place or the election
Pre-proclamation
therein resulted in a failure to elect; and the votes not cast would
affect the results of the.election nonetheless, in the instant case,
the June 17, 1995 electoral exercise was not a failed election, as
Controversy
voting had taken place and the election did not result in a failure
to elect. In other words, the people spoke freely and honestly in
a contest voluntarily participated in by both parties herein.
Hence, the
popular will as clearly expressed in the votes cast and counted
should prevail over dubious election documents of a previous
failed election in the same precinct. Since the validity and
binding force of this special election has not been put at issue
and since for all it is worth, such electoral exercise, both in the
casting and canvassing of votes, was conducted regularly and
peacefully, then this Court's duty is to resolve the issue "in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority" as
expressed in such special election, for it is merely sound public
policy to cause elective offices to be filled by

Patoray v COMELEC
249 SCRA 440

Facts
Patoray and Disomimba are opponents for the mayoralty post in
the municipality of Tamparan, Lanao del Sur. From the tally of the
votes, Patoray was ahead by 25 votes. DIsomimba objected to the
inclusion of votes from 4 precincts saying it has been tampered with. In
a resolution, COMELEC excluded the 2 precincts resulting in a
wipeout of Patoray's lead. Patoray was earlier declared as mayor but
because of the turn of events an election protest was filed against him
which was acted upon by the COMELEC. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc alleging that the
procedure
in R.A. 7166 on pre-proclamation cases apply only when there is a valid
ground for a pre-proclamation controversy. Petitioner claimed that
since the objections raised by private respondent pertained to the
casting and appreciation of ballots, the proper remedy was an election
protest. Hence, private respondents objection was correctly overruled
by the MBC.
Issue
Whether the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion
Held
Resolution annulling petitioners proclamation is reversed and
set aside, without prejudice to the final outcome and resolution of the
election protest filed by private respondent before the RTC of Marawi
City.
The court finds that the MBC did not err in refusing to consider the
objections raised by private respondent during the canvass of the
returns. Section 20 of R.A. 7166 applies only where the objection on
the return being canvassed refers to issues proper in a pre-
proclamation controversy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, pre-
proclamation controversies are limited to: (1) challenges directed
against the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers (not
he board of election inspectors), or (2) challenges related to
election returns to which a party must have made specific objections.
In the case at bar, private respondent objected to the two returns on
the ground that the election returns are manufactured, fabricated or
not authentic, considering that the election returns includes votes on
ballots which are spurious, marked and invalid ballots. The objection,
as worded, did not challenge the returns, but was directed primarily at
the ballots reflected in the returns. The issue of whether or not the
ballots were manufactured, fabricated or not authentic involves an
appreciation thereof. It is settled that issues relative to the
appreciation of ballots cannot be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy. Appreciation of ballots is the task of the board of election
inspectors, not the board of canvassers, and questions related thereto
are proper only in election protests.
Sema v COMELEC
347 SCRA 633, 2000
Facts
Sema and Manara were candidates for city mayor of Cotabato
City during the May 11, 1998
Sema together with several others filed for the exclusion of votes from
30 precincts. This was granted by COMELEC and Sema was declared
winner. Aggrieved Manara appealed. A resolution was issued by the
COMELEC suspending the proclamation of Sema as winner as well as a
cease and desist order in assuming the position of Mayor.
Issue
whether or not the order of the CBC of Cotabato City dated May
29, 1998 granting Semas 28 petitions for exclusion of the 30 contested
election returns is null and void for having been issued after its earlier
ruling embodied in its orders of May 22 and 23, 1998 directing the
exclusion of the same returns had already become final.
Held
The COMELEC is ORDERED to direct the City Board of
Canvassers of Cotabato City to reconvene within ten (10) days from
receipt of this decision for the purpose of completing the canvass of
votes and proclaiming the winner. The petition for certiorari in G.R.
Nos. 134163-64 is deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED. The status quo
order dated July 14, 1998 is hereby ordered LIFTED.
The court rules that Maara has every right to expect a ruling from the
Board on its objection over the latters proceedings. Up to this time,
however, the Board has not complied with its statutory responsibility to
come up with a ruling thereon. The failure of the Board to discharge
this obligation should not in any way prejudice Maaras right to
elevate the matter to this Commission on appeal. Otherwise, all that a
partial board can do to favor a party is to refuse to make a ruling on the
latters opponents objections effectively preventing its review by this
Commission. (Abella vs. Larrazabal 180 SCRA 509). It is in this light
that the instant appeal must be considered seasonably filed. This
Commission must assume jurisdiction, entertain the allegations raised
and resolve the issues involved in SPC No. 98-240.
It is clear that the CBC acted without authority when it issued its May
29, 1998 ruling. Consequently, the COMELEC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it
rendered the questioned resolution of October 18, 1999 denying due
course to SPC No. 98-240 for allegedly having been filed out of time
and affirming the proclamation of Sema as Mayor of Cotabato City; and
the resolution of January 2, 2000 denying Maaras motion for
reconsideration of the October 18, 1999 resolution.
Accordingly, the proclamation of Sema is null and void as it was based
on an incomplete canvass. An incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot
be the basis of a valid proclamation. A proclamation made where the
contested returns set aside will affect the result of the election and the
board of canvassers proceeded to proclaim without the authority from
the COMELEC is null and void
Francis Pangilinan v COMELEC
G.R. No. 105278, November 18, 1993
Facts
Pangilinan and Belmonte were both running for the
position of Congressman in the 4th district of Quezon City.
Cadano and Umali as registered voters of the 4th district and as
taxpayers filed a disqualification case against Belmonte because
the latter was seen to have been inducing the voters of some of
the barangays in the 4 th district. He was seen boasting about the
things that he gave the people for free. Pangilinan together with
the two complainants filed an urgent motion to suspend canvass
or proclamation. in order that the petition for disqualification
against private respondent may not become moot and academic,
there was need for an immediate order directing the City Board
of Canvassers of Quezon City to suspend at once the canvassing
of the election returns and the proclamation of the winning
candidate for Representative of the fourth district of Quezon
City. The COMELEC, however, failed to act on the said motion.
Pangilinan further objected to the continuation of the COMELEC.
COMELEC contends that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and
Section 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2413, entitled "General
Instructions for the Provincial/City/District and Municipal Board
of Canvassers" pre-proclamation controversies are not allowed in
the election of members of the House of Representatives.
Issue
Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2413 disallowing pre-proclamation controversies
in the election of members of the House of Representatives are
unconstitutional.
Held
Petition DISMISSED
The court ruled that Sec. 15 of R.A. 7166 is not, therefore,
unconstitutional. On the contrary, it is in harmony with the 1987
Constitution. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his
The petitioner's arguments are totally misplaced. In fact, Section
15, R.A. 7166 is consistent with Section 17, Article VI which
makes the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the House of
Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.
Petitioner's objection relating to the preparation, transmission
and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass
falls within the sole jurisdiction of the (House) Electoral