Santiago v Fojas AC 4103

FACTS:

An expulsion case was faced by the complainants contending that they have illegally removed from the union
(FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. The lower court resolved in favor of Salvador and ordered the
complainants to pay, jointly and severally, Mr. Salvador. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals.
The complainants lost in their petition at the Court of Appeals due to abandonment, failure to act accordingly, or
serious neglect of their counsel, Atty. Fojas to answer the civil complaint on an expulsion case. Atty. Fojas
assured them that everything was in order and he had already answered the complaint. However, the appellants
soon discovered that he never answered it after all because, according to him, he was a very busy man. Atty.
Fojas admitted his mistake in failing to file an answer for the expulsion case, but he alleges that it was cured
by his filing of a motion for reconsideration. However, such motion for reconsideration was denied. Atty. Fojas
defended his negligence with the reason that the case was a losing cause after all. Atty. Fojas also asserts that he
was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the
union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant. Complainants then filed for a disbarment case.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file
for the complainants an answer

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up
the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. This means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the
required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work,
while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his
overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court. Whether it be the first or the second ground, the
fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondents inability to exercise due
diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. Furthermore, a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve
his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Atty. Fojass negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a losing cause.
The Supreme Court held that he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give
a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the clients case, neither overstating nor
understanding the prospects of the case.

REPRIMANDED AND ADMONISHED

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS vs. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO
A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005
Facts: Atty. Macatrio D. Arquillo represented opposing parties in one a case before the before the National
Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, La Union. Herein, complainants
accuse Atty. Arquillo of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney by
representing conflicting interests. The case was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline which found
Atty. Arquillo guilty of the charge and recommended a penalty of suspension for 6 months. The governors of the
IBP increased the penalty for 2 years.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of Arquillo merits his suspension from the practice of law.

Held: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
their dealings and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting
interests, except with all the concerned clients written consent, given after a full disclosure of the facts. When a
lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is
determined by three separate tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for an
issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer
will require an attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a
new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or (3)
when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorneys duty to give undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
of that duty. An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy
that a lawyers representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription applies when the
conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies
even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.
In accordance with previous rulings from this court Atty. Arquillo is suspended for 1 year from the practice of
law.

Artezuela v Maderazo (Barrientos)

Facts: Echavia crashed the car he is driving which is owned by Kiyami, but was registered in the name of
Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by Artezuela. The destruction of the carinderia caused
the cessation its operation, resulting to her financial dislocation. Artezuela incurred debts from her relatives and
due to financial constraints, stopped sending her two children to college. Artezuela hired Maderazo in filing a
damage suit against Echavia, Villapez and Kiyami. For his services, Artezuela paid Maderazo 10,000 as
attorneys fees and 2,000 as filing fee. However, the case was dismissed, allegedly upon the instance of the
Artezuela and her husband. Because of the dismissal of the case, Artezuela filed a civil case for damages against
the Maderazo. The case was dismissed.

Artezuela filed for disbarment against the Maderazo. Artezuela argues that Maderazo engaged in activities
inimical to her interests. While acting as her counsel, Maderazo prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended
Complaint. The said document was even printed in Maderazos office. Artezuela further averred that it was
Maderazo who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was
with her consent. Maderazo denied Artezuelas allegations. However, he admitted that Echavias Answer to the
Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and having acted as
counsel of Echavia.

Case was referred to IBP. IBP investigated the case. IBP found Maderazo guilty of representing conflicting
interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics.
Issues:

(1) Whether Maderazo violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 (conflict of interest) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

(2) Whether Maderazo had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint.

Held: YES to both

Maderazo was actually giving advice to Echavias but he was not the counsel of record. Maderazo does not have
to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse partys
conflicting interests of record. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the
pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require
that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and
reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client
relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or
discharging inconsistent duties. Good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring lawyer does not make
this rule inoperative. The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions are governed by the uncompromising
rules of professional ethics.

A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:

In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank charged respondent
Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank with
violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which respondent during
his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.

Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the sale of steel
sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the
gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out
of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction
between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent
who had since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.

Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by complainant bank
against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as
counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.

Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainants Asset Management Group, he
intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant
bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the
Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.

In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only
with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the
litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged
that he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo &
Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer.
Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other
lawyers named therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers,
who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them
handles their own cases independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared
among them.

In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.

During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously fined by this
Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon.
Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros
Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."

The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated. Respondent's
averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant
consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the
hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although
he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the
court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent
impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was working in
the same office as Atty. Ferrer.

Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the clients secrets and confidential records and information
are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.

From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways and means to
attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the legal
weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service. In
sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he expected to
earn.

The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.

The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994, submitted to this Court
its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25,
1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12,
1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for
Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the paramount
importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and
Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of
PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted
as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA
13 119681) ruled:

The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him, that even if
respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence acquired by him as counsel
it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information regarding the ownership of the parcel
of land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that
triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This
Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:

"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the
nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might
only further prejudice the complainant's cause."

Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client
information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship
should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case.
In the case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:

Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent
the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy,
of good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of
the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can
litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.

The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in the case at
bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite
side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an
employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and
conflicting interests, to wit:

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting consent of all

concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from the
practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.
Regala v Sandiganbayan GR. No. 105938 9.20.96

F: Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure and financial matters upon
which legal advice were given by petitioners. Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG
involving ill gotten wealth. Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it may implicate them in the
very activity from which legal advice was sought from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of the
petitioner with their client.

I: WON fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to disclose names of their clients (privilege
information)

R: SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their clients under the pain of breach of
fiduciary relationship with their client.

As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE:

1.The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.

2.Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been established.

3.Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.

4.With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his adversary.

EXCEPTION: LAWYERS MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE WHEN:

1.Strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate the client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyers advice.

2.Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case)

3.Government lawyers have no case against the lawyers client unless by revealing the clients name it would
provide them the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime.
(present in this case)

4.Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client seeks legal assistance. (present in this case)

5.Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be
confidential.

Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901:Section 383 of the Code
specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to
him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions
of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:Sec. 24. Disqualification by
reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence
in the following cases:An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of
the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity. 29Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.This
duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:Canon
17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:The lawyers
owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by
the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the
full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and
not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for
any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that
of his client.

Unity Fishing vs. Atty. Macalino

Client (P) vs. Lawyer (D)

AC 4566 [T]

Summary: A lawyer misappropriated money from his client.

Rule of Law: Canon 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession.

Facts: Atty. Danilo Macalino (D) was hired to represent Frabal Fishing and Ice Plant Corporation against
Wheels Distributor, Inc. Frabal was eventually bought by Unity Fishing Development Corporation (P) during
the pendency of the case.

Unity Fishing (P) was evicting Wheels Distributor from their property. Macalino (D), as counsel, advised the
Unity Fishing (P) to severe all contractual relationship with Wheels Distributor and return their security deposit
amounting to P50,000. Macalino (D) volunteered to take the check to Wheels Distributor himself.

Later, another lawyer was hired to replace Macalino (D) and the case of Unity Fishing (P) against Wheels
Distributor was eventually settled. But Unity Fishing (P) was shocked to learn that Wheels Distributor never got
the P50,000 security deposit.

After an investigation, Unity Fishing (P) discovered that the check was deposited to Macalino's (D) account and
he was actually the one who withdrew the money.

Issues: Which provision of the Code of Ethics did Atty. Macalino violate?

Ruling: Atty. Macalion (D) violated Canon 16 of the Code of Ethics.

Canon 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.

Rule 16.1 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.2 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.
Rule 16.3 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he
shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on
all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Junio v Grupo

Facts:

Rosario Junio entrusted to Atty. Salvador Grupo, P25,000 to be used in the redemption of a property in Bohol.
For no reason at all, Atty. Grupo did not redeem the property so the property was forfeited. Because of this,
Junio wanted the money back but Grupo refused to refund. Instead, Grupo requested that he use the money to
help defray his childrens educational expenses. It was a personal request to which Grupo executed a PN. He
maintains that the family of the Junio and Grupo were very close since Junios sisters served as Grupos
household helpers for many years. Grupo also stated that the basis of his rendering legal services was purely
gratuitous or an act of a friend for a friend with consideration involved. He concluded that there was no
atty-client relationship existing between them.

The case was referred to the IBP and found Grupo liable for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Profesisonal
Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended that he be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. Grupo filed a motion for
reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an atty-client relationship.

Held:

Yes. If a person, in respect to his business affairs, consults with an attorney in his professional capacity and the
attorney voluntarily permits in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as
established.

Having gained dominance over Junio by virtue of such long relation of master and servant, Grupo took
advantage of his influence by not returning the money. Grupo has committed an act which falls short of the
standard conduct of an attorney. If an ordinary borrower of money is required by law to repay his loan, it is more
so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct serves as an example.

*SC orders Grupo suspended from the practice of law for a month and to pay Junio within 30 days with interest
at the legal rate.

Note: 5 yrs. has already passed since the loan.

A.M. No. 2662-CFI November 25, 1982

FLAVIANO A. PELMOKA, complainant,

vs.

FELIX T. DIAZ, JR., Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch IV, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

In a verified complaint dated December 4, 1981, Flaviano A. Pelmoka charged Judge Felix T. Diaz, Jr. of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and Attorneys Facundo T. Bautista and Inocencio B. Garampil, Sr. with
serious misconduct in connection with Civil Case No. 279-G, entitled Eustacio Nepomuceno, et al. vs. Ester
Garampil, et al.

The charge against Judge Diaz is for gross ignorance of the law and judicial proceedings; failure to protect the
complainant's charging lien as one of the lawyers who intervened in the aforementioned civil case; and
partiality, bias prejudice or malicious motive.

This decision concerns Judge Diaz only who was required to file an answer to the complaint. The answer denies
the allegations of the complaint with a prayer that it be dismissed. The complainant filed a reply to the answer
and issues having been joined, it was ascertained that the case could be decided on the basis of the documentary
evidence submitted without resorting to a formal hearing.

The Rollo of the case reveals, according to Deputy Court Administrator Romeo D. Mendoza, the following:

Civil Case No. 279-G was a case for partition and reconveyance filed with the CFI of Nueva Ecija, Branch IV,
on March 4, 1972, long before respondent judge was appointed to the Bench. When the respondent judge
inherited the case in 1976, there were many side issues and/or incidents pending to be resolved, among which
were: (a) Motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as an heir of the late Leon Arguelles; and (b) Motion for
appointment of commissioners to partition the properties, both filed by herein complainant. Respondent judge
issued an order denying the motion of the plaintiffs for exclusion of defendant Ester Garampil as heir so as to
avoid the piecemeal adjudication of the issues raised in the case. (p. 74.) The motion of the plaintiffs for the
appointment of commissioners was likewise denied by respondent judge for the reason that there was then
pending before the Court of Appeals, an appeal involving the same parties and the same properties whereby the
legality of a Deed of Donation concerning the same properties being litigated, is the very issue to be resolved.
(p. 75.) It was for this reason that respondent judge held in abeyance the trial of Civil Case No. 279-G pending
termination of the appeal before the Court of Appeals. (p. 80.)

On May 4, 1981, a Motion to set the case for conference among the parties, was filed by defendants Serranos,
Rigors and Garcias who were represented by Atty. Facundo T. Bautista. After a hearing on the aforesaid motion
was held, the defendants moved for the approval of the "Compromise Agreement" dated July 1, 1981, which
was signed by all the parties to the case (except defendant Ester Garampil), as well as by all the lawyers of the
said parties, namely, complainant himself, representing the plaintiffs, Atty. Facundo Bautista, representing the
defendants, and Atty. Inocencio Garampil, representing defendant Ester Garampil. (pp. 89-94.) The parties
agreed that they would partition the properties being litigated in the manner specified in the "Compromise
Agreement" and that they would be separately responsible for the payment of the fees of their respective
lawyers. On September 21, 1981, the respondent judge issued a decision approving the said compromise
agreement on July 1, 1981. (pp. 97-100.)

Defendant Ester Garampil thereafter filed a motion to deposit in court, the purchase price of a commercial
property in the amount of P250,000.00 in order that the proceeds thereof may be disposed of in accordance with
the approved compromise agreement. Complainant then filed a motion for the payment of his professional fee in
the amount of P57,519.00, (pp. 104-105.) which was later raised to P79,186.00 in two subsequent motions of the
complainant. (pp. 113-119.)

On October 22, 1981, defendant Ester Garampil filed a motion for the withdrawal of the sum of P20,060.00
(p.109.) from the amount deposited with the court, representing partial payment of her share in the estate
pursuant to the expressed agreement of the heirs of the deceased contained in the compromise agreement, which
motion was granted by the respondent judge. (p.110.) The other parties thereafter moved to withdraw their
respective shares in the cash deposit with the court, and on the basis of the said motions, respondent judge
issued the Order dated October 30, 1981, allowing the defendants to withdraw their shares; (p.120.) and the
Order dated November 20, 1981, granting the request of the other parties for the withdrawal of their respective
shares. (pp. 135-137.)

In his complaint, complainant charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and judicial
proceedings committed in the following manner: (a) unduly delaying the disposition of Civil Case No. 279-G
when respondent judge denied plaintiffs' motion for the appointment of commissioners to partition the
properties; (b) not resolving plaintiffs' motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as heir of deceased Leon
Arguelles despite early pronouncement of Judge Placido Ramos, respondent judge's predecessor, that Ester
Garampil is not an heir of the deceased; (c) approving the compromise agreement of partition entered into by all
the parties; (d) allowing Ester Garampil to withdraw the amount of P20,000.00 from the cash deposit, with the
court, considering that she is not an heir of the deceased; and (e) ignoring complainant's motion for payment of
his fees out of the money deposited with the court.

The complainant further alleged that the respondent judge failed to protect his charging lien for his attorney's
fees when he allowed plaintiffs to withdraw their share from the said deposit. He likewise charged respondent
judge with bias and partiality when he allowed all the parties to withdraw their respective shares while the
complainant was not allowed to do the same in so far as his charging lien is concerned.

Respondent judge, in his Answer dated January 13, 1982, (pp. 62-71.) denied all the charges in the complaint.
The respondent judge alleged that Civil Case No. 279-G was a case for reconveyance and partition of the estate
of deceased Leon Arguelles which had been heard and tried by no less than four (4) judges before him. When he
inherited the case in 1976, there were several side issues and/or incidents pending to be resolved and while all
these side issues were pending before the court a quo, an appeal involving the same parties and the same
properties being litigated, was then pending before the Court of Appeals. It was for this reason that the
respondent judge denied complainant's motion for appointment of a commissioner as well as his motion to
exclude defendant Ester Garampil as an heir.

Respondent judge also stated that he allowed the parties, including defendant Ester Garampil who is not a
compulsory heir, to withdraw their respective shares from the cash portion of the estate in order to implement
the compromise agreement entered into by all the parties and their respective lawyers.
With respect to the charge of the complainant that the respondent judge failed to protect his charging lien or f&
attorney's fees, the respondent judge explained that he did not grant complainant's motion for payment of his
professional fees because he could not ascertain the exact amount of complainant's just, reasonable and fair fee,
considering that his claim of P79,186.00 was contested by the plaintiffs as being exorbitant.

Deputy Court Administrator Mendoza has assessed the charges against Judge Diaz in the light of the record as
follows:

The respondent judge cannot be faulted for dismissing complainant's motion for appointment of commissioners
as well as his motion to exclude defendant Ester Garampil as an heir. The respondent judge had to dismiss the
said motions to avoid piecemeal adjudication of the issues raised before him. In fact, respondent judge even
suspended the trial of the case until after the Court of Appeals shall have resolved the issue pending before it
which involved the same parties and the same properties being litigated.

The respondent judge was likewise justified in granting the motion of the parties to withdraw their respective
shares from the cash portion of the estate. The respondent judge only implemented the compromise agreement
entered into by all the parties and signed by all their respective lawyers including complainant herein. With
respect to complainant's professional fees, it was specified in the compromise agreement that the parties would
be separately responsible for the payment of the fees of their respective lawyers. Since the plaintiffs
(complainant's clients), refused to pay complainant's claim for attorney's fee in the amount of P79,186.00 on the
ground that the same is exorbitant, the remedy of the complainant is to file a separate action for recovery of his
fees where the parties win be afforded the chance to prove their respective claims and defenses.

In the case of Bongco vs. Judge Serapio, (Adm. Matter No. 1804-CAR, Feb. 28, 1980.) this Court held that
where it does not appear from the facts in an administrative complaint that the assailed judicial acts of
respondent judge were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were done in persistent disregard
of well known legal rules, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit.

The assessment is well taken except in respect of the failure of the respondent to protect the complainant's right
to collect his professional fees.

The respondent should not have allowed the clients of the complainant to withdraw their shares from the cash
deposit without extending ample protection to the latter's claim. This error was compounded by his order
allowing even Ester Garampil to withdraw her share when she did not sign the compromise agreement of July 1,
1981.

It was grossly unfair for the respondent to leave the complainant holding an empty bag, so to speak, after he had
rendered his professional services as counsel to the plaintiffs. True it is that the compromise agreement
stipulates that the parties shall be separately responsible for the payment of the fees for their respective lawyers;
nevertheless, the respondent should not have improvidently allowed the clients of the complainant to withdraw
their shares without first determining his reasonable fees.

A lawyer has the right to claim the fruits of his labor. He has the equitable right to be paid his fees out of the
judgment which he has obtained from a court of justice. Any allegation of exorbitant or excessive fees should
have been resolved by the respondent Judge on the basis of quantum meruit. Or the respondent could have
inquired from the plaintiffs what they considered as reasonable attorney's fees for the services of complainant,
direct the payment of such "reasonable amount" as partial payment of his attorney's fees, and set for hearing the
disputed difference between the claim of the complainant and the amount considered reasonable by the
plaintiffs.

WHEREFORE, for his failure to protect the complainant's charging lien, the respondent is hereby reprimanded.

SO ORDERED.

TITLE:

Daniel LEMOINE vs. ATTY. Amadeo E. BALON

(A.C. No. 5829. October 28, 2003)

DOCTRINE:

There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection.

FACTS:

Lemoine, the petitioner, is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan Insurance.

His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of Atty. Balons services as his counsel

Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being recovered payable upon
successful recovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee.

Since he was leaving the country, Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to
bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoines claim as well as to negotiate,
sign, compromise, encash and receive payments

Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoines claim and Balon confirmed his acceptance of the offer

December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to Lemoine in the amount of
P525,000 which was received by Balon

When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that Metropolitan Insurance was
offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation

December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of the case and it
answered that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon.

Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the check as attorneys lien
pending Lemoines payment of his attorneys fee equivalent to 50% of the entire amount collected. He also
threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble to Balon and that he has good network with the
mentioned agencies.

Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of Lemoine, however, he gave no
evidence to such turnover
In IBP

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended that he be disbarred
and directed to immediately turn over to complainant the sum of P475,000.00 representing the amount of the
P525,000.00 insurance claim less respondents professional fees of P50,000.00, as proposed by complainant.

IBP BOG: With modification, and considering respondents dishonesty which amounted to grave misconduct and
grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent but the noble profession to which
he belongs, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with the directive to
turn over the amount of Five Hundred Twenty Five Thousand (P525,000.00) Pesos to the complainant without
prejudice to respondents right to claim attorneys fees which he may collect in the proper forum.

ISSUE/S:

WON the respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility? (YES.)

HELD:

There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty
to oppose it for the other client. In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when
he argues for the other client.

The reasons proffered by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his clear representation of conflicting
interests. First, the investigating commissioner observed that the name Gamaliel Abaqueta is not a common
name. Once heard, it will surely ring a bell in ones mind if he came across the name again.

Second, assuming arguendo that respondents memory was indeed faulty, still it is incredible that he could not
recall that complainant was his client, considering that Mrs. Charito Baclig, who was complainants attorney-in-
fact and the go-between of complainant and respondent in Special Proceedings, was the same person who
brought Milagros Yap Abaqueta to him.

Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of Civil Case and Special Proceedings are the same properties could not
have escaped the attention of respondent.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Bernardito A. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for Three (3) months. SO
ORDERED.