Case No. 12. People vs. Gatbalayan, G.R. No.

186467, July 13, 2011

TOPIC: Chain of Custody in Drug Cases

FACTS:

A buy-bust operation was conducted on a basis of information

from an asset that appellant Jaime Gatlabayan alias Pungay was
rampantly selling illegal drugs. Three police officers composed the
composite team and subsequently arrested Gatbalayan after the
consummated sale of the suspected shabu. Gatbalayan was brought to the
nearby police station for investigation. Subsequently, the plastic sachet sold
by appellant to poseur-buyer PO1 Antonio was subjected to a laboratory
examination and was found that the subject crystalline substance is positive
for shabu.

Gatbalayan contends that the arrest was a mere frame-up. The RTC
however rendered its judgment rejecting Gatbalayans defense of frame-up.
Accused appealed, and is of the stance that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assails the prosecution evidence for
its failure to establish the proper chain of custody of the shabu allegedly
seized from him. The CA affirmed the conviction of the accused on the basis
of the testimony of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro, III which it found credible and
sufficient to sustain a conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not sufficient evidence exists to support the

conviction of the accused for illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

HELD: The court ruled in the negative. While the identities of the seller
and the buyer and the consummation of the transaction involving the sale
of illegal have been proven, the Court, nonetheless, finds the prosecution
evidence to be deficient for failure to adequately show the essential links in
the chain of custody. The testimony of PO1 Antonio clearly lacked specifics
on how the confiscated shabu was handled immediately after the arrest of
the accused. The prosecution evidence failed to identify the police
investigator to who the buy-bust team turned over the seized item, the
person who marked the sachet, how the same was done, and who witnessed
the marking. Neither was there any evidence adduced to show how the
seized shabu was handled, stored and safeguarded pending its offer as
evidence in court.

In view of the foregoing loopholes in the evidence adduced against the

accused as well as the gaps in the chain of custody, it can be reasonably
concluded that the prosecution failed to convincingly establish the identity
and integrity of the dangerous drug. The prosecution failed to fully prove
the elements of the crime charged creating reasonable doubt on his criminal
liability

Case 13
IMSON VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 193003.July 13, 2011.* CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE

Facts:

On 24 January 2003, at around 9:30 p.m., a confidential informant arrived at

the District Drug Enforcement Unit office in Langaray, Caloocan City. The
confidential informant advised PO1 Gerry Pajares (Pajares), PO1 Noli Pineda
(Pineda) and other policemen that Imson was selling shabu at Raja Matanda
Street, San Roque, Navotas. District Drug Enforcement Unit Chief P/Supt.
Reynaldo Orante formed a team to conduct a buy bust operation, with
Pajares acting as poseur buyer.

Pajares, Pineda, the confidential informant, and other policemen arrived at

Raja Matanda Street at around 10:30 p.m. There, they saw Imson talking
with Dayao. Thereafter, they

saw Imson giving Dayao a transparent plastic sachet containing white

crystalline substance. Pajares approached the two men and introduced
himself. He immediately apprehended Imson while Pineda ran after Dayao
who tried to escape. The policemen confiscated two plastic sachets
containing the suspected shabu.

The policemen brought Imson and Dayao to the Langaray Police Station
where Imson and Dayao executed their joint sworn statements and where
PO1 Ariosto B. Rana marked the two plastic sachets with RDS and FIA.
The two plastic sachets were sent to the Philippine National Police -
Northern Police Crime Laboratory Office for examination. Both tested
positive for shabu.

Both accused interposed the defense of denial and alibi.

After trial, Imson alleged that he should be acquitted due to the failure of
the apprehending officers to: (a) conduct a physical inventory; (b)
photograph the plastic sachet in the presence of the accused or his
representative, counsel, representative from the media and the Department
of Justice and any elected public official; and (c) immediately mark the
plastic sachet on site, all cast doubt as to whether the chain of custody
remains intact.

Issue:

WON the two plastic sachets containing shabu were inadmissible in

evidence because the integrity of the chain of custody was impaired.

Held:

No. The failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to

photograph the two plastic sachets containing shabu do not render the
confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.

In People v. Campos, 629 SCRA 462 (2010), the Court held that the failure of
the policemen to make a physical inventory and to photograph the
confiscated items are not fatal to the prosecutions cause. The Court held
that: The alleged procedural lapses in the conduct of the buy-bust
operation, namely the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA and the
failure to inventory and photograph the confiscated items immediately after
the operation, are not fatal to the prosecutions cause. x x x x The absence
of an inventory of personal effects seized from appellant becomes
immaterial to the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation for it is enough that it
is established that the operation was indeed conducted and that the identity
of the seller and the drugs subject of the sale are proven.

Likewise, the failure of the policemen to mark the two plastic sachets
containing shabu at the place of arrest does not render the confiscated
items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, 603 SCRA 510
(2009), the Court held that the failure of the policemen to immediately mark
the confiscated items does not automatically impair the integrity of chain of
custody.

14. TIU V PBCOM

G.R. No. 151932.August 19, 2009 Best Evidence Rule

Facts:

In 1993, Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by herein

petitioners, applied for a real estate loan with the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCOM) to fund its purified water distribution business. It
submitted a Board Resolution and guaranteed the loan with collateral over a
property. Additional loan was thereafter applied for, however, no additional
security was provided by AWRI. Since the loan was unsecured, PBCOM
required the members of the BOD to become sureties. Thus a Surety
Agreement was executed.

In 1998, AWRI informed the bank of its desire to assign all its properties to
apply as dacion en pago for its existing loan to the bank. The bank refused
and demanded full payment from the petitioners. Unheeded, it filed a
complaint for collection against petitioners.

Petitioners, in their Answer, alleged among other things, that they were not
personally liable on the promissory notes, because they signed the Surety
Agreement in their capacities as officers of AWRI. They claimed that the
Surety Agreement attached to the complaint as Annexes A to A-2 were
falsified, considering that when they signed the same, the words In his
personal capacity did not yet appear in the document and were merely
intercalated thereon without their knowledge and consent.

PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave
of Court to Substitute Annex A of the Complaint, wherein it attached the
duplicate original copy retrieved from the file of the notary public. It
explained that the changes was made by the banks auditor to conform to
the bank standards.

Petitioners opposed the substitution. Petitioners assert that the Rules do not
allow the withdrawal and substitution of a falsified document once
discovered by the opposing party.

Issue:
WON the RTC erred in granting the substitution of the Surety Agreement.

Held:

It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance,

that the written document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also
a matter of both principle and policy that when the written contract is
established as the repository of the parties stipulations, any other evidence
is excluded, and the same cannot be used to substitute for such contract, or
even to alter or contradict the latter. The original surety agreement is the
best evidence that could establish the parties respective rights and
obligations. In effect, the RTC merely allowed the amendment of the
complaint, which consequently included the substitution of the altered
surety agreement with a copy of the original.

It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are but mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice their strict and rigid
application that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.

Moreover, contrary to petitioners contention, they could not be prejudiced

by the substitution since they can still present the substituted documents,
Annexes A to A-2, as part of the evidence of their affirmative defenses.
The substitution did not prejudice petitioners or delay the action. On the
contrary, it tended to expedite the determination of the controversy.
Besides, the petitioners are not precluded from filing the appropriate
criminal action against PBCOM for attaching the altered copy of the surety
agreement to the complaint. The substitution of the documents would not,
in any way, erase the existence of falsification, if any. The case before the
RTC is civil in nature, while the alleged falsification is criminal, which is
separate and distinct from another. Thus, the RTC committed no reversible
error when it allowed the substitution of the altered surety agreement with
that of the original.

15. BEST EVIDENCE RULE

SPOUSES ANTONIO & LETICIA VEGA vs SSS and PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORP.

GR No. 181672 September 20, 2010

FACTS:

Magdalena Reyes owned a piece of titled land in Pilar Village, Las Pinas
City. In 1979, she got a housing loan from SSS for which she mortgaged her
land. However, she asked the Spouses Vega to assume the loan and buy
her house and lot since she wanted to emigrate. However, upon inquiry,
the SSS did not approve of members transferring their mortgaged homes.
Hence, the Spouses Vega agreed for Reyes to execute in their favor a deed
of assignment of real property with assumption of mortgage. However,
Reyes did not readily execute the deed of assignment and left the country.
She gave her sister Julieta a special power of attorney to convey ownership
of the property. Julieta finally executed the deed with the Spouses Vega and
gave the latter two copies while the former kept the original. The Spouses
Vega gave one copy to the Home Development Mortgage Fund and kept the
other. Unfortunately, a storm in 1984 resulted in a flood that destroyed the
copy left with them.

The Spouses Vega learned that Reyes did not update the amortizations
so they updated it themselves. Meanwhile, Pilar Development Corporation
(PDC) filed an action for sum of money against Reyes, claiming that it
borrowed from Apex Mortgage and Loans Corporation to buy the lot and
Construct a house on it. The RTC issued a writ of execution against Reyes
and the sheriff levied on the property. The Spouses Vega filed an action for
consignation, damages and injunction with application for preliminary
injunction and TRO against SSS, the PDC, the sheriff and the Register of
Deeds. While the case is pending, a writ of possession subsequently evicted
the Spouses Vega from the property. The RTC decided in favor of the
Spouses Vega and ruled that SSS was barred from rejecting the final
payment and denying the assumption of Reyes debt. SSS appealed to the
Court of Appeals which reversed the RTC decision for the reasons that the
Spouses Vega were unable to produce the deed of assignment of the
property in their favor and that such assignment was not valid as to PDC.

ISSUE:

WON the Spouses Vega presented adequate proof of Reyes sale of the
subject property to them.

HELD:

YES. The CA ruled that the Spouses Vega were unable to prove that
Reyes assigned the subject property to them, given that they failed to
present the deed of assignment in their favor upon a claim that they lost it.
But the rule requiring the presentation of the original of that deed of
assignment is not absolute. Secondary evidence of the contents of the
original can be adduced, as in this case, when the original has been lost
without bad faith on the part of the party offering it.

In the case at bar, not only did the Spouses Vega prove the loss of the
deed of assignment in their favor and what the same contained, they
offered strong corroboration of the fact of Reyes sale of the property to
them. They took possession of the house and lot after they bought it.
Indeed, they lived on it and held it in the concept of an owner for 13 years
before PDC came into the picture. They also paid all the amortizations to
the SSS and neither Reyes nor any of her relatives came forward to claim
the property. The Spouses Vega amply proved the sale to them.
16. G.R. No. 172874 December 17, 2008 CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS IN
RAPE CASES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO CASTRO, accused-

appellant.

FACTS: Private complainant [AAA], is a fourteen (14) year old. Appellant

Mario Castro is the husband of [BBB], elder sister of [AAA].

On November 11, 1999 at about 11:00 in the evening, appellant fetched

[AAA] from her Aunts house at PNR Compound, Taguig Metro Manila. He
said that her elder sister, [BBB], collapsed and was in the clinic. Believing
the story, [AAA] went with appellant.

As events turned out, appellant brought [AAA] - - not in the clinic - - but near
TEMIC Factory, which is an old abandoned building located at Western
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. As they reached a dark narrow alley,
appellant suddenly stopped and held [AAA]s left arm. Startled and
frightened, [AAA] screamed for help but nobody seemed to have heard the
outcry. Wasting no time, appellant strangled her, with a threat to keep quiet
lest he would kill her.

Appellant hurriedly pulled [AAA] to the side of a building and told her to
undress. When both of them were already naked, appellant kissed her on
the different parts of her body and, in an instant, forced his penis into her
vagina until he satisfied his lust.

Once satiated, appellant told [AAA] to dress up and warned her not to tell
anybody. Appellant initially brought her to the bus and jeepney terminal but
he later changed his mind. He told [AAA] that they have to go to Kuya
Mannys work place. When appellant learned that Kuya Manny was not at
work, he brought [AAA] again to the dark narrow alley beside Temic Factory.
This time, however, they passed by a different route which is near "Pepsi."

He then repeat raping her again.

As she could not contain her grief and misery, she told her aunt [CCC] and
her grandmother [DDD] that she was raped. After her relatives learned of
the incident, they brought her to the Barangay Tanod and, later to Camp
Crame for medical examination. They also proceeded to the Police Station
located at the Municipal Hall of Taguig to give her statement.

On the other hand, the defense relied on the testimony of Margarita

Salangsang, a lessee of accused-appellants mother at Signal Village in
Taguig. She testified that at around 9:30 in the evening on November 11,
1999, accused-appellant was in her house for her birthday celebration.
Accused-appellant did not leave the house at any time from the moment he
arrived at 9:30 in the evening until he finally left around midnight. She knew
that accused-appellant went home straight after the party because she
even saw him at his house when she returned the pans she borrowed from
accused-appellants mother. Margarita declared that her house was located
just at the back of accused-appellants house.
The trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of the
crime of rape.

Pursuant to People v. Mateo, accused-appellant appealed his conviction to

the CA via a notice of appeal.

The CA upheld the conviction of accused-appellant and affirmed in toto the

RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and
credence to the highly incredible testimony of the private complainant.

HELD: No, Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who
is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, as in this case, because no
woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame,
humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to
condemn an injustice and have the offender apprehended and punished.

The commission of rape against complainant cannot be negated simply

because of the absence of the testimony of the doctor who examined the
victim. It is well entrenched in our jurisprudence that a medical examination
of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the
victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of
the crime. In fact, a doctors certificate is merely corroborative in character
and not an indispensable requirement in proving the commission of rape.

Accused-appellants defense of alibi is unavailing.

For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing
evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of
the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of
the crime at the time. Where there is even the least chance for the accused
to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water.
Clearly in this case, the physical impossibility of accused-appellants
presence at the scene of the crime on the date and time of its commission,
has not been sufficiently established.

We, thus, sustain the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of

consummated simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.

17. RIVERA VS. CA, JANUARY 23, 1998 PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE

G.R. No. 115625.January 23, 1998

ESMUNDO B.RIVERA, petitioner

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, AMY ROBLES, PEREGRINO MIRAMBEL and MERLINA

MIRAMBEL, respondents.
FACTS:

Esmundo Rivera filed complaints for ejectment against private respondents

Robles and Mirambels. The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of the
petitioner and ordered the private respondents to vacate the subject
premises. On appeal, however, the respondent court reversed the appealed
judgment taking into consideration that the land where the house of the
private respondents stand is outside of the area owned by the petitioner,
hence, there was no cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner proved his cause of action.

HELD:

The Court ruled the petition unmeritorious.

Basic is the rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. By
preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. In
the present ejectment case, petitioner (as plaintiff) has the burden of
proving that the houses of private respondents were located within his titled
land. To justify a judgment in his favor, petitioner must therefore establish a
preponderance of evidence on this essential fact (which he was not able to
do so).

Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on

which side the evidence preponderates[,] the party having the burden of
proof fails upon that issue. Therefore, as neither party was able to make
out a case, neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with
the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded
to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as
they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the
complaints/petitions.

In any event, we are here called upon essentially to review the public
respondents assessment of the weight of the evidence presented by both
parties. This factual question, however, may not be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule is subject to well-
recognized exceptions, but petitioner failed to prove that this case falls
under one of them. If for this reason alone, the petition should be denied.

18. EQUIPOISE RULE

MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 116702. DECEMBER 28, 1995.*

The RTC declared barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the territorial

jurisdiction of the plaintiff MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, Bohol and further
permanently enjoined defendant MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA over the same
barrio.

On appeal, the respondent Court stated that the respective evidence of the
parties lead to the conclusion that the trial court committed an error in
declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the
MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY. Said Court rejected the boundary line since the
plaintiff municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but
also of other barrios and will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding
her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. The respondent Court
concluded that the trial court erred in relying MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAYs
exhibit because, in effect, it included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La
Hacienda within the jurisdiction of appellee Candijay when said barrios are
undisputedly part of MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIAs territory under Executive
Order No. 265 creating the latter.

The respondent Court, after weighing and considering the import of certain
official acts, including Executive Order No. 265 dated September 16, 1949
concluded that Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not
mentioned as one of the barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellant
Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of
plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay.

On that basis, the respondent Court held that there is equiponderance of

evidence which states that: When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise
and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the
other, the court will find for the defendant. WHEREFORE, the CA ruled in
favor the MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA.

Hence, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following

grounds: that there was an improper application of the principle of
equiponderance of evidence, for having based its ruling against petitioner
on documentary evidence which, petitioner claims, are void; that
respondent municipality lack juridical personality, as a result of having been
created under a void executive order and that the challenged decision does
not solve the problem.

Issue: Whether or not the CA improperly applied the principle of

equiponderance of evidence.
Ruling: No. The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the
respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter
tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be
whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing. With respect
to the first and third grounds, we find that the issues of fact in this case had
been adequately passed upon by respondent Court in its Decision, which is
well-supported by the evidence on record. Where neither party is able to
make out a case, where neither side could establish its cause of action and
prevail with evidence it has, they are thus no better off than before they
proceeded to litigate and the courts can only leave them as they arein
such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints or petitions.
In connection with the foregoing, that the assailed Decision, in dismissing
the complaint in Civil Case No. 2402, may leave the parties where they are
or may not resolve their problem one way or the other, is of no moment.

19. PRESUMPTION OF SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE

People v. Navaja

G.R. No 104044 March 30, 1993

FACTS:

The Accused Alexander Navaja was the object of a buy bust operation. He
managed to elude arrest after the transaction. He was subsequently
arrested during a hearing of the Habeas Corpus case filed by his mother,
against the police officers stationed at Taboan Market, Cebu City about a
year after. The accused denied that he was at anytime engaged in the
selling of marijuana or that he had ever smoked it. Witnesses for the
defense testified that the accused has never been known as Sindak, the
person selling marijuana. Defense witness also testified that the accused
was engaged in the buying and selling of fighting cocks. The prosecution
presented as witness Pfc Ranulfo Espina who made a positive identification
of the accused, although it was not corroborated by any of his companions
during the buy-bust operation. The Court, in convicting Navaja, relied on
the testimony of the lone witness Pfc Espina.

In his appeal, the accused contended that the court erred in giving full
credit to the lone witness Pfc Espina when there were other policemen who
were his companions during the operation.

ISSUE:

Whether the non-presentation of the other witnesses gave rise to the

presumption of suppression of evidence

HELD:

NO. There is no rule in evidence which requires the presentation of a

specific or minimum number of witnesses to sustain a conviction for any of
the offenses described in the Dangerous Drugs Act. The non-presentation of
the corroborative witnesses did not constitute suppression of evidence and
such would not be fatal the prosecution's case. The rule is settled that the
adverse presumption is not applicable when ---

1) suppression is not willful

2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or

cumulative

3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties

4) the suppresion is an exercise of privilege

Moreover, the Court, for its part, is not precluded from rendering a judgment
of conviction based solely on the testimony of a single witness as long as
such testimony is found to be credible and satisfies the court that the
accused is guilty beyond any reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Case No. 20 PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY

ROBERT LASTRILLA vs.

RAFAEL A. GRANDA

FACTS:

Granda is a grandson and legal heir of the deceased spouses Rafael

and Aurora Granda,

During Aurora's lifetime, she owned several parcels of land with some
improvements thereon in Tacloban City, covered by TCTs all registered in her
name.

Said parcels of land were allegedly sold by the Granda spouses, as

evidenced by the deeds of absolute sale witnessed by Lastrilla, among
others.

Lastrilla caused the registration of the deeds with the Register of

Deeds of Tacloban City and that he caused the cancellation of the Transfer
Certificates of Title in the name of Aurora and effected the issuance of the
new Transfer Certificates of Title.

Granda learned of the alleged sale of the properties to different

persons.

To verify such reports, he requested copies of the purported deeds of

absolute sale with the Register of Deeds and was able to obtain copies of
the three (3) deeds of absolute sale in question.
 Upon careful scrutiny of the subject deeds, he noticed that the
signatures of his deceased grandparents were falsified.

Upon verification, the examining officers of the PNP Crime Laboratory

confirmed that the signatures of Granda's deceased grandfather Rafael in
the deeds and his specimen signatures "were not written by one hand and
the same person."

Lastrilla was then charged with the crime of Falsification of Public

Document under Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (1), (2) and (5) of
the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

WON Lastrillas defense that it was actually Aurora who effected the transfer
can overcome the presumption in favor of the RD that in issuing the
certifications, official duty has been regularly performed.

HELD:

NO, Lastrilla's defense that it was actually Aurora who effected the
transfer cannot overcome the presumption in favor of the Register of Deeds
that in issuing the certifications, official duty has been regularly performed.

Notably, other than his bare assertion, petitioner did not present any
other evidence to corroborate his claim, i.e., the testimony of the alleged
representative of Aurora who made him sign the questioned application
form.

In the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of

and who used a forged document is the forger of said document.

If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use

of it, taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is
that he is the material author of the falsification.

The presumptions elicited by the evidence on record are not of little

significance.

The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the

need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created,
thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.

Case No. 21. PAL vs. CA, 257 SCRA 33 (1997) G.R. No. 119641. May 17,
1996.

TOPIC: Judicial Notice

FACTS:

Sometime in May, 1988, Spouses Miranda obtained confirmed bookings

from from San Francisco to Manila via Honolulu from Manila to Cebu and
from Cebu to Surigao. Accordingly, on June 21, 1988, private respondents
boarded PAL Flight PR 101 in San Francisco with five (5) pieces of baggage.
After a stopover at Honolulu, and upon arrival in Manila on June 23, 1988,
they were told by the PAL personnel that their baggage were off-loaded at
Honolulu due to weight limitations. Consequently, private respondents
missed their connecting flights from Manila to Cebu and the flight from Cebu
to Surigao City.

On June 25, 1988, they departed for Cebu and had to transfer to PAL Flight
471 for Surigao . On the way to Surigao, the pilot announced that they had
to return to Mactan Airport due to some mechanical problem, said flight was
also canceled. PAL offered the spouses P150.00 to include the fare for the
return trip to the airport. Dr. Miranda asked for P150.00 more as he and his
wife, along with all of their baggage, could not be accommodated in just one
taxi, aside from the need for tipping money for hotel boys. The request was
refused by PAL. To make things worse, when private respondents tried to
retrieve their baggage, they were told that the same were loaded on
another earlier PAL flight to Surigao. Thus, private respondents proceeded to
the hotel sans their baggage and of which they were deprived for the
remainder of their trip. They reached Surigao City only on June 26, 1988.
Thereafter, they instituted an action for damages which, after trial as well as
on appeal, was decided in their favor. PAL filed instant petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the additional monetary assistance asked by the

spouses is justified.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmative. We agree with the findings of the lower
court that the request of private respondents for monetary assistance of
P300.00 for taxi fare was indeed justified, considering that there were two of
them and they had several pieces of luggage which had to be ferried
between the airport and the hotel. Also, the request for a small additional
sum for tips is equally reasonable since tipping, especially in a first rate
hotel, is an accepted practice, of which the Court can take judicial notice.

Case 22

EDUARDO BUGHAW, JR., petitioner, vs. TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATION, respondent.

G.R. No. 173151.March 28, 2008.* JUDICIAL NOTICE

Facts:

Sometime in March 1986, petitioner was employed as production worker by

respondent. Respondent was receiving information that many of its
employees were using prohibited drugs during working hours and within the
company premises

On 5 June 2001, one of its employees, Erlito Loberanes (Loberanes) was

caught in flagrante delicto by the police officers while in possession of
shabu. Loberanes was arrested and sent to jail. In the course of police
investigation, Loberanes admitted the commission of the crime. He
implicated petitioner in the crime by claiming that part of the money used
for buying the illegal drugs was given by the latter, and the illegal drugs
purchased were for their consumption for the rest of the month.

In its third letter to the petitioner, respondent terminated the petitioners

employment retroactive to 11 June 2001 for using illegal drugs within
company premises during working hours, and for refusal to attend the
administrative hearing and submit written explanation on the charges
hurled against him.

On 20 July 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against

respondent and its President, Emmanuel Ong, before the Labor Arbiter.

LA ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor
Arbiters Decision in its Decision dated 28 August 2003. The NLRC decreed
that respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner when it dismissed
him from employment. The use of illegal drugs can be a valid ground for
terminating employment only if it is proven true. An accusation of illegal
drug use, standing alone, without any proof or evidence presented in
support thereof, would just remain an accusation. CA overturned the
decisions of LA and NLRC

Issue:

WON the dismissal was proper

Held:

Yes. The charge of drug abuse inside the companys premises and during
working hours against petitioner constitutes serious misconduct, which is
one of the just causes for termination. Misconduct is improper or wrong
conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not merely an error in judgment. The misconduct to be
serious within the meaning of the Act must be of such a grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such
misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless, in connection with the
work of the employee, constitute just cause for his separation. This Court
took judicial notice of scientific findings that drug abuse can damage the
mental faculties of the user. It is beyond question therefore that any
employee under the influence of drugs cannot possibly continue doing his
duties without posing a serious threat to the lives and property of his co-
workers and even his employer.

23. MANDARIN VILLA, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119850. June 20, 1996.* Judicial Notice

Facts:
On October 19, 1989, private respondent, Clodualdo de Jesus, a practicing
lawyer and businessman, hosted a dinner for his friends at the petitioners
restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village. Private respondent offered
to pay the bill through his credit card issued by Philippine Commercial Credit
Card, Inc. (BANKARD). This card was accepted by the waiter who
immediately proceeded to the restaurants cashier for card verification. Ten
minutes later, however, the waiter returned and audibly informed private
respondent that his credit card had expired. Private respondent
remonstrated that said credit card had yet to expire on September 1990, as
embossed on its face but the management refused to charge the bill to the
said card. His companions then started teasing him.

Thereupon, private respondent left the restaurant and got his BPI Express
Credit Card from his car and offered it to pay their bill. This was accepted
and honored by the cashier after verification.

Private respondent then filed a suit for damages against petitioner and
BANKARD

Issue:

WON the petitioner should not be held liable because the negligence of
private respondent (not bringing cash) is the proximate cause of his damage

Held:

No. While it is true that private respondent did not have sufficient cash on
hand when he hosted a dinner at petitioners restaurant, this fact alone
does not constitute negligence on his part. Neither can it be claimed that
the same was the proximate cause of private respondents damage. We
take judicial notice of the current practice among major establishments,
petitioner included, to accept payment by means of credit cards in lieu of
cash. Thus, petitioner accepted private respondents BPI Express Credit
Card after verifying its validity, a fact which all the more refutes petitioners
imputation of negligence on the private respondent.

Also, the humiliation and embarrassment of the private respondent was

brought about not by such a remark of Professor Lirag but by the fact of
dishonor by the petitioner of private respondents valid BANKARD credit
card. If at all, the remark of Professor Lirag served only to aggravate the
embarrassment then felt by private respondent, albeit silently within
himself.

NOTES:

Judicial notice, when discretionary.A court may take judicial notice of

matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court.
24. CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE

PEOPLE vs ZAIDA AMBING KAMAD

GR No. 174198 January 19, 2010

FACTS:

On October 16, 2002, the PNP Drug Enforcement Unit of the SPD, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig received information from an asset that a certain Zaida
was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu. Thereafter, a buy-bust operation
was conducted. SPO2 Sanchez who acted as poseur-buyer arrested Kamad
and recovered from her the marked money. They team also arrested Leo
who was found in possession of one (1) plastic sachet suspected to contain
shabu. The buy-bust team took Kamad, Leo and the recovered plastic
sachets to their office for investigation. The recovered plastic sachets,
marked as ES-1-161009 and ES-2-161002 were then brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination and the tests yielded positive
results for metamphetamine hydrochloride.

The RTC found both accused guilty for violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA No. 9165. On appeal to CA, Kamad attacked the RTCs reliance on the
presumption of regularity on the conduct of the buy-bust operation by the
police. The CA rejected the defense argument and affirmed in toto the RTC
findings. Accordingly, the CA found Kamads uncorroborated denial
undeserving of any weight. It brushed aside as a minor inconsistency the
uncertainty in the testimony of SPO2 Sanchez on the time the buy-bust
operation took place. It also brushed aside the violation of the NAPOLCOM
rules on the ground that Kamad was arrested in flagrante delicto for illegal
sale of shabu committed in the presence of the prosecution witnesses who
were police officers. Moreover, the CA held that the use of assets to aid
police officers in buy-bust operations has been judicially recognized. The CA
found that while the asset brokered the shabu transaction, he had no role in
the apprehension of Kamad and in the search and seizure of the shabu.

ISSUE:

WON the prescribed procedure under Section 21, Article II of RA No.

9165 has been complied with.

HELD:

NO. Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required

because of the illegal drugs unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not
readily identifiable and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution
either by accident or otherwise. Hence, the rules on the measures to be
observed during and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer of
the drugs for examination and at all times up to their presentation in court.
 In this case, SPO2 Sanchez testified on the seizure and the handling of
the seized shabu. The records show that his testimony and identification he
made in court constitute the totality of the prosecutions evidence on how
the police handled and preserved the integrity of the seized shabu. SPO2
Sanchez failed to provide specific details on how the seized shabu was
marked although the evidence shows that the shabu was marked as ES-1-
161009 before it was sent to a forensic laboratory. He also failed to state
whether the marking of the shabu was done immediately after its seizure or
during the investigation. He also failed to disclose if a physical inventory
and photography of the seized items had taken place, or if they had,
whether these were undertaken in the presence of the accused or his
counsel, or a representative from the media and the DOJ and of an elective
official.

In sum, his testimony failed to show how the integrity and evidentiary
value of the item seized had been preserved; no explanation was ever given
by SPO2 Sanchez to justify the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with
the prescribed procedures. In fact, the records clearly reveal that the
prosecution did not even acknowledge the procedural lapses committed by
the buy-bust team in the handling of the seized shabu. The Court also find
the prosecution fatally remiss in establishing an unbroken link in the chain
of custody of the seized shabu; its evidence is simply incomplete in
establishing the necessary links in the handling of the seized prohibited
drug from the time of its seizure until its presentation in court.

25. CHAIN OF CUSTODY

G.R. No. 179344 August 3, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDGARDO FERMIN Y

GREGORIO AND JOB MADAYAG, JR., Y BALDERAS, Accused-Appellants.

FACTS: There was a report in Quezon City that two (2) male persons are
engaged in illegal sale of drugs. The two were eventually identified as the
herein accused Madayag, Jr. alias "Rolan" and Edgardo G. Fermin (Fermin)
alias "Jon-Jon." Acting upon the report, Senior Inspector Villanueva created a
team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team was composed of the
police members of the station namely, PO1 Valencia, PO1 Mabutol, PO2
Pascua, PO2 Ibasco and one identified only as PO De Guzman. In their
briefing, PO2 Ibasco will act as the poseur-buyer with the rest of the team
completing the cast. Senior Inspector Villanueva gave PO2 Ibasco one (1)
One Hundred Peso Bill for use as marked money. PO2 Ibasco, in turn, put his
initial "EI" on the bill.

The buy-bust team, together with Senior Inspector Villanueva and the
confidential informant, went to the target area of operation. PO2 Ibasco and
the confidential informant proceeded to the area where they saw the
subject, Madayag, Jr., in front of the house. The informant then introduced
PO2 Ibasco to Madayag, Jr. as a drug-dependent who wanted to buy drugs.
When Madayag, Jr. asked for payment, PO2 Ibasco paid in the one-hundred-
peso marked money. Madayag, Jr. then called another person from inside
the house. The man, later identified as the co-accused Fermin, came out
and gave three (3) plastic sachets to Madayag, Jr. Madayag, Jr. turned again
to PO2 Ibasco and showed him the three (3) plastic sachets at his palm. PO2
Ibasco then took one plastic sachet from Madayag Jr.s palm and examined
its content. Being convinced that the content was positive for shabu, PO2
Ibasco made the pre-arranged signal of scratching his head in order to alert
the other members of the buy-bust team. The members then immediately
rushed to the location and introduced themselves as police officers.

PO2 Ibasco testified in his Direct Examination that PO2 Pascua got hold of
Fermin while PO1 Valencia got hold of Madayag, Jr. He added that PO2
Pascua was able to recover the buy-bust money and plastic sachet from
Fermin while PO1 Valencia recovered a bente nueve knife from Madayag, Jr.
PO2 Ibasco added that the plastic sachet which was the subject of illegal
sale remained in his possession which he marked "EI-JM," while the rest
were in the custody of PO2 Pascua. The buy-bust team returned to the
police station with the two (2) accused and all the [pieces of] of evidence
were turned over to the desk officer, and the desk officer turned them over
to the police investigator.

PO2 Pascua affirmed in open court that he arrested and bodily frisked
Fermin and was able to recover one plastic sachet and one (1) .38 Paltik
Revolver. However, he contradicted the previous statement of PO2 Ibasco
that PO1 Valencia was the one who got hold of Madayag, Jr. He testified that
it was PO2 Ibasco who arrested Madayag, Jr. and recovered from the latter
the buy-bust money. He contradicted himself when, on the earlier part of his
testimony he said that all the pieces of evidence including the plastic sachet
which was the subject of sale were in his possession until they were turned
over to the investigator, he later testified that PO2 Ibasco recovered one
plastic sachet from Madayag, Jr. The accused however denied the
allegations of the police officers.

The testimony of PO2 Ibasco corroborated by PO2 Pascua in his testimony

was that coordination was made with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA). However, as per Certification of PDEA, none was made. This
was affirmed by Police Inspector Avelino Ecaldre when he testified that no
coordination was made by the La Loma Police Station with the PDEA. The
trial court found both the accused guilty of the crime charged. The Court of
Appeals agreed with the judgment of the trial court that the two accused
were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against him.

ISSUE/s:

1. Whether the testimonies of the police officers are credible to sustain

that there is an illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

2. Whether the rule in chain of custody from the seizure of the drugs up
to the presentation was complied.

3. Whether the quantum of evidence needed in the case was acquired.

HELD:

1. No. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following

elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2)
that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3)
that the buyer and seller were identified.

We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have
reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the case.

Cognate to this, while the entrenched rule is that the assessment of

witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor, conduct or
attitude of the witnesses, the findings of the lower court on this point will be
reversed on appeal, if it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances
which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.

This Court believes that on application of the rule to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, the exception to the high value of the trial courts
findings surfaces. We find irreconcilable conflicts in the recollections about
the principal factum probandum which is the buy-bust itself. The varying
versions about the pre-operation, the illegal sale itself and the immediately
preceding actions put doubts about what really transpired.

The clear inconsistencies on important points cannot be disregarded where

the issue is ones liberty. The contradictory statements of the main
prosecution witnesses need not even be appreciated together with the
defense position. The proof of the supposed buy-bust operation rests
exclusively on the prosecution.

2. No. Strict compliance with the prescribed procedures is required

because of the unique characteristic of illegal drugs, rendering them
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration
or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Hence, we have the rules on
the measures to be observed during and after the seizure, during the
custody and transfer of the drugs for examination, and at all times up to
their presentation in court.

While Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic

Act No. 9165 excuses non-compliance with the afore-quoted procedure, the
same holds true only for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. Here, the
failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural requirements
cannot be excused since there was a break in the chain of custody of the
substance taken from appellant. It should be pointed out that the identity of
the seized substance is established by showing its chain of custody.
The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody
in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court.

As provided by the implementing rules and jurisprudence, strict compliance

of the requisites under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 can be
disregarded as long as the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug
are properly preserved; and its preservation can be well established if the
chain of custody of illegal drug was unbroken. The break is clear in this
case.

It must be noted that the police officer who had the initial custody and
control of the illegal drug was not clearly identified.

3. No, it was not. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with

the laws own starting perspective on the status of the accused in all
criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charged laid unless
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the
prosecution to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the
quantum of evidence required. To repeat, the prosecution must rest on its
own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the
prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the defense may
logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the
presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.

The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
two accused. The rule that high respect must be accorded the lower courts
in their findings of facts cannot be misused to diminish the required
evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused as
guaranteed by the Constitution.

26. DNA TESTING ORDER

LUCAS VS. LUCAS, JUNE 6, 2011

G.R. No. 190710.June 6, 2011

JESSE U. LUCAS, petitioner,

vs.

JESUS S. LUCAS, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for
the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC).

Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which
include (a) petitioners certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal
certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he graduated from
Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of
Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f)
clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment

manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him.

Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which
the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing.

Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be
had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.

Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and
held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba
namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy,
and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC
granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the
grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.

Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He
then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four
significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held
that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:

Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order?

HELD:

Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis
the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented
by petitioner.

***Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court
of Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant
procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face
has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the
parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings,
when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that
are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It
states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample
exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not
previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was
previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule
shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or
proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing
order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said
conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must
be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause
in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a
finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases.

We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue
an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases
in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in
which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for
blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.

27. APPLICABILITY OF ROC IN NATURALIZATION

ONG CHIA VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CA

G.R. NO. 127240, MARCH 27, 2000

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Facts: In 1932, Petitioner, who was born in China arrived at the port of
Manila. Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found
employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina,
with whom he had four children. At the age of 66, he filed a petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under CA. No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, made a petition for
citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the
Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, but the
same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee
on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution
such that processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process
was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications in the sense

that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the
Philippines, and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So
impressed the trial court granted the petition The OSG, however, appealed
and annexed to the States appellants brief was a copy of a 1977 petition
for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on
Naturalization, contending that petitioner failed to state all the names by
which he is or had been known and failed to state all his former places of
residence. Hence, the CA reversed the trial court and denied petitioners
application for naturalization. Petitioner argued that the CA erred in
considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to
its appellants brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the
trial courts-decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as
evidence, they are mere scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary
value,

Issue: Whether or not the contention has merit.

Ruling: The contention has no merit. The Rules of Court which provides that:
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. Prescinding from the above, the rule
on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner
is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy
or suppletorily in such cases is when it is practicable and convenient. That
is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the
State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical
and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.14 Consequently, a
final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving
for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.

28. APPLICABILITY OF ROC IN ADMIN PROCEEDINGS

GSIS v Dinnah Villaviza, et al.

GR No. 180291, July 27, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Winston Garcia, as President and General Manager of the GSIS,

filed separate and formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, et
al., for grave misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative
Investigation of GSIS employees and officials, III, D, (1,c,f) in relation to Sec.
52-A(3), (20), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987,
as follows:

That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with

some employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside
the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration of protest and
support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having
surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;

That some of these employees bad mouthed the security guards and
the GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty.
Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an order
from appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;

That respondent, together with other employees, in utter contempt of

CSC Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public
Sector, caused alarm and heightened some employees and disrupted the
work at the Investigation Unit during office hours;

This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office

memorandum by the Manager of the GSIS Security Department. On the
same day, the manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit, Atty. Barbo, issued a
memorandum to each of the seven respondents requiring them to explain in
writing and under oath within three days why they should not be
administratively dealt with. Respondents submitted a letter-explanation to
Att. Barbo denying that there was a planned mass action, that their act of
going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning
that their former union president was there, aside from the fact that some
were also there because they were interested in the hearing for it might
affect them. Respondent Villaviza on her part submitted a separate letter
explaining that she had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and
that she had informed her immediate supervisor about it, attaching a copy
of the pre-order hearing. These letters however were not under oath.

PM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for grave

misconduct and/or prejudicial to the best interest of the service against
each of the respondents. They were again directed to submit their written
answers under oath three days from receipt thereof. None was filed.

On June 29, 2005, PM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded

decisions finding all seven respondents guilty of the charges and meting out
the penalty of one year suspension plus the accessory penalties
appurtenant thereto.

On appeal, the CSC found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense
of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the
penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied
their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold
them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

PM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia

went to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43. However, the CA
upheld CSCs decision in this wise:

The CSC is correct when it found that the act sought to be punished hardly
falls within the definition of a prohibited concerted activity or mass action.
The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the
respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused a prejudice to the public
service. Respondent employees in this case were assigned at different
offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite the belated claim of the
petitioners that the act complained of had created substantial disturbance
inside GSIS premises during office hours, there is nothing in the record that
could support the claim that the operational capacity of petitioner GSIS was
affected or reduced to substantial percentage when respondents gathered
at the Investigation Unit. Despite the hazy claim of the petitioners that the
gathering was intended to force the Investigation Unit and petitioner GSIS to
be lenient in the handling of Atty. Molinas case and allow Atty. Velasco to
represent Atty. Molina in his administrative case before petitioner GSIS,
there is likewise no concrete and convincing evidence to prove that the
gathering was made to demand or force concessions, economic or
otherwise from the GSIS management or from the government. In fact, in
the separate formal charges filed against the respondents, petitioners
clearly alleged that respondents marched to or appeared simultaneously at
or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass
demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, the latter surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises. Thus,
petitioners are aware at the outset that the only apparent intention of the
respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure the
GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco,
is only an afterthought.

ISSUE:

Whether an administrative tribunal may apply suppletorily the

provisions of the Rules of Court on the effect of failure to deny the
allegations in the complaint and failure to file answer, where the
respondents in the administrative proceeding did not file any responsive
pleading to the formal charges against them.

HELD:

No. The Court finds no merit in the petition. Petitioners primarily

question the probative value accorded to the respondents letters of
explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The
respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges. The
petitioners argue that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal
charges that they filed should have been deemed admitted pursuant to Sec.
11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides that allegations not
specifically denied deemed admitted. According to petitioners, this rule is
applicable to the case at bench pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court.

The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners.

Petitioners own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS Amended Policy and
Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides that if the
respondent fails to file his answer within five working days from receipt of
the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be
considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the
Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be
warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.

A perusal of the said section readily discloses that the failure of a

respondent to file an answer merely translates to a waiver of his right to
file an answer. There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are
deemed admitted. It has not done away with the burden of the complaint to
prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.

It is true that Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be
applied in suppletory character. Suppletory is defined as supplying
deficiencies. It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be
made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule.
There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in
case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is
that GSIS may render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and
evidence submitted by the prosecution.

Even granting that Rule 8, Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court finds

application in this case, petitioners must remember that there remain
averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same.
Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that
all averments found in the complaint will be considered in favor of the
petitioners. We must not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is
still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of
proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the
formal charges.

Case No. 29 APPLICABILITY OF ROC IN ADMIN PROCEEDINGS

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA vs.

BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON

FACTS:
 Due to her lumbar pains, Editha went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for
check-up.

It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and

non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation.

After several days, Edithas husband, Romeo, filed a complaint for

gross negligence and/or incompetence before the BOM against Dr. Atienza,
who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation

It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or

incompetence consists of the removal of Edithas fully functional right
kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.

The complaint was heard by the BOM.

Editha filed her formal offer of documentary evidence to which Exhibits

A to D (certified photocopies of x-rays) were attached to prove that her
kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was
operated.

The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha

Sioson] was admitted by the BOM.

Atienza filed his comments/objections to Edithas formal offer of

exhibits alleging that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are
mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended
to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are
incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

ISSUE:

WON the BOM is correct in admitting the evidence offered by Editha.

HELD:

YES, the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the BOM.

The admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights
of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby,
that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at
the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence: (y) That things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
 The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits,
that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time
of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial
notice.

The rules of evidence provide for some facts which are established and
need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both
mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences,
specifically biology, include the structural make-up and composition of living
things such as human beings. In this case, the SC took judicial notice that
Edithas kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most
human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.

Moreover, the best evidence rule is inapplicable and the introduction of

secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed. Witness Dr.
Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the
originals of the exhibits because [it] transferred from the previous building,
x x x to the new building. Ultimately, since the originals cannot be
produced, the BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and,
thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it
decides the case.

Finally, the exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the

anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. To further drive home the point, the
anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the
removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

Case No. 30. Nover Bryan Salvador y De Leon vs. People, G.R. No.
164266, July 23, 2008

TOPIC: Circumstantial Evidence

FACTS:

Spouses Zuiga had three daughters, namely: Marianne, Mary Ann and the
victim Arlene. Mary Ann was married to the petitioner herein. The Zuiga
family, including Mary Ann and the petitioner were living together. On
September 20, 1997, the Zuiga spouses, together with Marianne, went to
Bulacan, while Mary Ann with her new born child, and Arlene, stayed at their
home. At 4:30am, the following day, the Zuiga spouses and Marianne
arrived home where she saw Arlene, who suffered stab wounds, already
dead. Petitioner stayed at the sala, crying and was later seen embracing
Mary Ann and telling her that he was innocent.

Upon investigation, the police found no forcible entry into the house; no
valuables were missing; and no bloodstains in other parts of the house
except Arlenes room. They likewise discovered, on top of the kitchen table,
petitioners briefs, gray t-shirt and short pants. They further found hair
strands on Arlenes bed. These pieces of evidence were brought to the
laboratory for examination. The NBI Forensic Biologist also examined
petitioners briefs, t-shirt and short pants, and found that the briefs and shirt
were positive of type O human blood, Arlenes blood type.

Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide. It was further testified to by the
witnesses that petitioner owned a knife otherwise known as balisong, which
he usually brought every time he went out. Ill motive was shown by
petitioners previous act of peeping through the bathroom and Arlenes
room on two occasions while she was taking a bath and while she was inside
the room with Marianne. For his part, all that the petitioner could offer was
bare denial of the accusations against him. The RTC rendered a Decision
finding the petitioner guilty of homicide. The RTC considered the following
circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish petitioners. On appeal, the CA
affirmed petitioners conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not DNA testing alone may be used to prove the guilt of
Gatbalayan.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative. The DNA analysis should consider together
with the other circumstantial evidence. The individual pieces of evidence
may not be sufficient to point to the accused as the author of the crime.
However, when taken together, they are more than enough to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the crime of homicide.
We would like to emphasize at this point that the peculiarity of
circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced
from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a
puzzle which, when put together, reveals a remarkable picture pointing
towards the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.

Case 31.

32. BRIONES v PEOPLE

GR. No. 156009 New Trial

Facts:

Briones was charged with robbery after a clash ensued between his group
and that of the security guards of BF HOMES, where he himself resided. S/G
Molina and Gual came to the rescue of Romulo Bersamina who was being
mauled by Briones and three others. It is when Molina lost his firearm to
Briones. Briones denied any participation in the mauling and the firearm
grabbing, and claimed that he was in his house when the incident
happened.

RTC found Briones guilty of simple theft.

On appeal to the CA, Briones argued that his conviction was based solely on
the testimony of S/G Gual who was not present at the scene and did not
really see what happened; CA found Briones guilty of robbery. He then filed,
among others, a Motion for new trial where he confessed his physical
presence and participation on the alleged robbery of the firearm, but
claimed that he was merely protecting his brother, Vicente, when he took
the firearm.

Issue:

Whether a new trial is justified under the circumstances.

Held:

No. A change of Briones' defense from denial and alibi to self-defense or

defense of a relative is effectively a change of theory of the case brought
only during appeal. We cannot allow this move. Law and fairness to the
adverse party demand that when a party adopts a particular theory and the
case is tried and decided on the basis of that theory in the court below,
neither party can change his or her theory on appeal. While this rule is not
absolute, no exceptional reasons in this case exist to justify a deviation.

Additionally, an error or mistake committed by a counsel in the course of

judicial proceedings is not a ground for new trial.

From the facts, it does not appear that Briones was denied competent legal
representation in the proceedings before the RTC.

Lastly, for new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered

evidence, the concurrence of the following conditions must obtain: (a) the
evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not
have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative,
or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and
produce a different result if admitted. In this case, although the firearm
surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established.

Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not,

by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in
the court below. The determinative test is the presence of due or reasonable
diligence to locate the thing to be used as evidence in the trial.

In any case, we fail to see how the recovery of the firearm can be
considered material evidence that will affect the outcome of the case; the
recovery of the subject firearm does not negate the commission of the
crime charged.