VARIATIONS ON A THEME OF ORDER Notes for discussion at the University of Keele Conference on Nigeria 21-22 September, 1980 Sam C Nolutshungu University of ManchesterVariations ona theme of order Nigeria exhibits many of the characteristics of a neocolonial society; it is poor, economically backward and heavily dependent on a few advanced capitalist states; the vast majority of its population are illiterate, cultural and regional cleavages seem to override those of class or ideology; it has had its fair share of military coups d'etat, and even fought a now familiar type of war in Africa, against secession, ‘he leadership has manifested the combination of appetitiveness and incompetence so characteristic of the Third World, and corruption in the bureaucracy is everywhere suspected if not actually pervasive. There is a comprador bourgeoisie with many of the attributes associated with that class, and multinational corporations play a large role in the most vital areas of the economy, With all these afflictions it ought not to work, or to hang together, yet as I shall suggest, it does ‘work', xemarkably well; there are both order and stability - as these conditions are conventionally understood ~ at least as regards the state and the fulfilment of its role, The full argument for this view and its implications is long and rather involved: it relates to legitimation and domination, and thus to the nature of the state. In the brief notes that follow, I restrict myself merely to abstracting a few themes ~ for discussion. There is no claim to completeness or, less still, exhaustiveness. The integration/disintegration theme of modernization political science tended to exaggerate the degree of fragility ofthe state over its claimed domain ~ quite apart from opening up false paths in other directions (e.g., the excessive emphasis on cultural cleavages, culture used descriptively). We know, of course, that this approach eventually degenerated into a preoccupation with order ~ one that also leads naturally to an emphasis on conflict and fissiparousness of the polity.’ Marxist analysis, only weakly represented in Nigerian political studies, also by its nature stresses the conflict of class interests.” Little has been written on the limits and forms of conflict behaviourthe various forms and moments © of the class struggle. If the conflict of class interests is not simply represented in actual politics, is it possible that conflict may in certain moments assume a form that secures stability and the basic order of exploitation and domination? The role of the state in that struggle ~ the role of legitimation as well as forcible intervention ~ also xemains ill-defined beyond the stipulation that it represents the capitalist's interests however those may be composed. he conventional wisdom of ordinary people (those 'ordinary'people who think and talk about such issues) also reinforces the sense of impending doom through disintegration.” Yet there is a considezable degree of ‘order’ in Nigeria; and there has been for a long time despite the Civil War. It is a Rechtstaat in which the laws are known, and within the limits of existing resources enforced and obeyed tolerably well. The territorial integrity of the state is under no serious challenge despite the recurrent references by public figures to ‘security! and the possibility of fragmentation. Even the Civil War, compared to the problems that have confronted Btheopia, say, since the overthrow of Haile Selassie, seems, in retrospect to have been a modestone despite its appalling costs in terms of human suffering. There is a kind of coincidence of views and expectations and values among the very elements who feature most prominently in the political conflicts that seem to threaten order ~ what Dudley and 0'Connor have called the ‘political class'.* More on thie later. With regard to the integration theme, there exists a very real material and ideological support for the continued existence of the state in roughly its present form ~ i.e., of a modern national state ~ controversy centering rather on representation within that state form, (hence on the creation of states, jurisdictional isputes, appointments etc). As regards values and ideology more broadly conceived, there is more evidence of a community of outlook among the political class than of fundamental difference. What emerges from practically all studies of Nigerian politics, and expecially of the First Republic, is precisely that ‘there was no conflict about what the state should be, and do, and all the Gisputation in the world about who should manage it, get what, and share withwhom ~ who, i.e., among economically similar competing candidates, not which class or classes - precisely the conditions that have made a game theoretic analysis both the most relevant and most convincing approach so far.° although there was a fair amount of ideological controversy during the preparation of the new constitution and after the publication of the draft, this tock place among politically marginal sections of the intelligentsia. Politicians and would-be politicians showed little patience with ultimate ends which were not debated in the Constituent Assenbly, and the election campaign was character- ised by a lack of policy discussion, let alone ideological debate, that contrasted sharply with the preoccupation with rights and paths of development which had become evident when the end of military rule was not yet sully in sight. That grotesque trivialization of democratic aspirations and the ecrudescence of a familiar species of African demagoguery was, however, itself evidence of consensus - ideology could be taken for granted; there were no ideological differences - minority, ideological parties notwithstanding. Among the political class, therefore, consensus exists and conflict, it would seem, arises out of a similarity of mental formation, aspirations and claims, rather than significant ideological cleavage? It is, certainly, plausible to argue that the conflicts of the First Republic, and even the Biafran secession, revolved not around the role of the state with regard to ‘the economy", ‘the individual', ‘the oppressed’, etc., but on the shares which particular coalitions defined in cultural-political rather than, say, class terms, enjoyed under the existing distribution of state positions, perquisites and influence ~ and, of course, the privations that were real enough which were not redressed. It would be hard to show that any significant party to these conflicts wanted more (or less) democracy, or socialism, or capitalism, or traditionalism, or whatever might stand for deep ideological dissent, than any other group, If these conflicts reflected disagreement about the rules of the game (though there is the ghost of a suspicion they had more to do with outcomes than with rules, outputs rather than process), then, those were rulesnot for the vemaking of state, economy and society; but essentiallyrules of distribution. Evidence of a negative consensus can be found in other areas too: in the paucity of radical criticism of the economic order; in metooisn - the assertion of similar demands by competing regional elites - universities are a case in point; competitive demands which unvariably favour greater state expenditure, more hands on the till, and more places for each regional group in the machinery of government, ‘here is consensus too, in the pervasive suspicion of office holders - well justified though that may be - and in the reliance of kinship and putative cultural identities in the struggle for wealth, power and preeminence, even in the very belief that others rely not on merit but on these affections for their advancement, The political Litigiousness that was a feature of the First Republic, recurring now after a protracted forced abatement, is also not restricted to any single party or ethno-cultural area, Most important, the recognition that public office is the main means of rapid personal advancement as well as a way of securing a large share of resources for one's ‘group! or constituency, is widely shared. The state itself - as distinguished from ‘representative’ institutions and state apparatuses that mediate between state and the people - is also remarkably stable, and consistent as can be seen by observing the conduct of its concrete representatives, the bureaucracies both civil and military. Despite changes in government and the modes of representation and mediation (e.g., creation of more states, ete.), the structure, composition and ethos of the bureaucracy has remained renarkably constant - except for the large scale egress of Ibo Civil Servants in the build up to civil war, even, in fact, in spite of it. ‘the bureaucracy is governed by the same colonial rules - no overt involvement in ‘politics’, essentially meritocratic selection and advancement within a framework that allows for ethnic favouritism and nepotism (in peineiple no different from the paradign British Civil Service in which merit and the old boy network still co-exist peacefully); discrete but easy collaboration with business interests both foreign and domestic; a jealouslypreserved, elaborate systen of stratification of positions, rewards and status within the bureaucracy; commitment to a concept of ‘development? that differs only in detail from the late colonial ideal: nanely, fostering indigenous private capital through state intervention, expanding the role of the state alongeide a thriving, crucial, multinational sector - often in partnership with it; and finally, support for expanding the traditional economic and cultural Linke with the West, and particularly Britain, At no point throughout the troubled years of Nigeria's independence have the senior bureauerats indicated any desize to change any of these relationships. ulLitary interventions have not greatly thceatened the basic relation of the bureaucracy to the wider society and econony and may nevely have accelerated the development of ‘nurture capitalien’, as through the indigenization decree.” The most innovative military regime, with a populist tendency, that of Murtalla Motlumed, undertook no veetzucturing of these patterns, while 1t affixmed comitnent to ‘free enterprise! in a ‘nixed economy’, and despite the purges of hundreds of public sexvante vas deeply conscious of the power of civil servants and {f its reliance én thea.” Within the military itself, the format of comand, advancement, and soward aid not change either. Indeed, where there had enezged under Cowon a tendency for a true military oligarchy to enexye,incveasingly zenoved fron the rest of the soldiery (and particularly alienated from sentor officers who actually fought in the Civil War), the Mortalla Mohamed xegine reaffimed the unitary professional ethos and esprit de comps. what ailitazy rule may have adterea - permanently ~ vas the order of doninance and preeminence azong various categories of state functionaries i.e., the status of the armed forces leadership Vis-acvis the rest of the bureaucracy, and the political class ~ and by extension, their place in the wider sectal economy. In the relation of the power-bloc to people,? state to citizen, there was no significant geological change. ‘The ‘democratic’ rights to vote and organise political parties were suspended, and, theoretically, Decree No 1 placed the armed forces regime beyond judicial control. In fact, however, there wasno greater invasion of personal rights - apart from those specifically political ones already alluded to ~ than under previous civilian rule, Judicial self- assertion against military personnel was not challenged in some important instances, and, indeed, when aggrieved, a military head of ‘state even had recourse to due legal process against a civilian publicised.’° on the other hand, nearly a year after the return of civilian rule, strikes by workers axe dill illegal. In the area of rights there is considerable room for debate as to whether civilian or military rule makes any significant difference at all. Popular defences against the bureaucracy through, say, public availability of information, effective complaint procedures, easy access to responsible officials and so on, have not differed much through the alternation of governments. Finally, in regard to the crucial iséue of when to obey, and whom to obey, the bureaucracy as a whole has - barring again, the first and second coups ~ showed no deep division, Since the Civil war no change of government, nor even persistence in office of a government beyond its term, has provoked a crisis of loyalty within the bureaucracy - instances of alleged sabotage notwithstanding. ** ‘ne gunctions of management and regulation of the economy have followed the same principles through the various regimes. To be sure different sets of patyons and clients benefit at every change of leadership, but this has no visible effect on the overall distribution of advantages in the society as a whole, Indeed, no fraction of the bourgeoisie ~ barring again the Biafrian sequence - seems to have suffered much by any change of regime, even though particular individuals may have lost out here and there. Accumulation afterall, also, follows its own rules of the game - impersonal forces more permanent than the regimes that come and go. If there has been no fundamental change in the traditional state ~ economy xelation, there hae, likewise,been no alteration in the efficacy of higher bureaucratic office as a means of accumulation ~ either through directly fraudulent practices (though perhaps less frequent than often supposed) or, more significantly, through opportunities of using influence on state spendingto support private business ventures of self, relations and associates (e.g., in the allocation of contracts). the huge incomes from public office, cash and non-cash, are, of course, not a negligible element in this process. what has enexged, with the general increase in private wealth is perhaps the relative status of those without private wealth but with qualifications, and the ready convertibility of such elite status to the preferred class situation. In other words, the intelligentsia, outside the highest positions in the bureaucracy and parastatals,. without private wealth, have suffered a real decline in relative economic well-being and status, Furthermore, entry into private business is not an available option for most of them who must therefore seek to improve their condition within salaried employment. In addition, even advancement within this sector is now not as rapid as it may have been around independence, ‘This is not without its ideological consequences, which axe un- fortunately not simple and not easily documented. two may, however, be mentioned. On the one hand, there is among this stratum a great deal of support for expansion of the state and its activities - not least through the creation of states, A statist 'patriotien' often suspicious of working class assertion and ‘foreign ideologies", but also, sometimes, anti-imperialist, intermittently finds expression. On the other hand, there is a genuine ambivalence in the attitude of this stratum tovard the “rich and the process of accumulation as awhole. A basis clearly exists in this stratum (which is represented in the bureaucracy as well as the state apparatuses generally and, to a degree, in the nilitary also) for a kind of radical nationalism that could, in its turn, spawn among @ minority of the intelligentsia a genuinely socialist rejection of the existing order. However, there are contravailing forces. ‘The first and perhaps the most important is the illusion of embourgeoisiewent: - i.e., of opportunity of entry into the bourgeoise, this illusion has been sustained by real, relatively large scale shifts of class situation that have occurred since independence, functioning in two ways: (2) As real embourgeoisiement and (2) as illusion of opportunity giving» ideological support to a process mainly occurring beyong the reach of most of the intelligentsia. The process can be easily described in terms of waves of embourgeoisement. ‘The first wave was self-government and independence which saw an enormous enlargement of the bureaucracy, rapid and substantial increase in the earnings of those with high qualifications, and the opportunity to acquize more through corruption. When that wave ebbed, another occurred with the departure of the Ibo bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the openings they left for those who remained in the federation. Oil and the further expansion it brought, the creation of more states, and Mohammed's diemissal of senior civil servants and commissioners replacing then with others, and finally, the return of civilian rule, all created opportunity for the emergence of a new cohort of state capitalists through a process that was only indirectly related to the real development of production. Coups, provide a means of opening up places and so would the enlargement of the functions and budgets of state governments, as does the expansion of central government. Yet the opportunity of access by these means is open to only a few and seems to diminish with every passing year; and there must, surely be some limit on the real. embourgeoisiement that can be achieved by these means. The important point here is that substitution was as important a part of the process as veal expansion. Should this mechansim of improvement begin to slow down and fail in its ideological function as well as in aiding real accumlation, then, perhaps, the latent disaffection of the intellectual petite bourgeoisie may become more evident. However, there is always the hope of a change of xegime that might just reactivate the process os substitution and incorporation once again. Such a change could be ‘democratic! but the military option is always there, especially for the military itself, Indeed, it is not infrequently that anti-imperialism, and anti-bourgeois sentiment, find consolation in the dream of a ‘revolutionary’ dictatorship or a regime of virtue brougit into existence by military intervention. Janus-faced, doomed to disillusion, the intellectuals, and perhaps others ofof similar class, remain unable to take a lead either to reform or overthrow the state which remains, for that added reason, secure. Order, consensus and stability, then, would appear to be far greater than is often supposed. The territorial integrity of the state ~ the one @imension of order ever to come under severe challenge ~ seems now secure from secession. violence, widespread infraction and disregard of the laws, or even their abuse; remain permanent contingencies, erupting in various ways: when intemperate soldiers are let loose on student rioters, or a senior politician is abducted in the small hours and deported by agents of the central government, or peasants revolt or slum dwellers and rural folk resist developers and shoot ox are shot; in the armed robbery that has defied public executions, or the carnage on roads badly made and worse policed, or in sudden, violent, or painful death through crime, or inadequate health care, or the combined effects of squalor, anomie and.urban poverty. But, then, that is part of the neocolonial grder, ite patrimony as well as its hunan essence, Politics, too, may be characterized by bullying and legerdemain, coercion and arbitrariness, and the threat of military intervention remain a permanent possibility. Politics, the mode and processes of mediation, popular representation and legitimation, as @istinguished from the state itself and the econonic order it serves and develops, politics as such may well be unstable, those rules of the game remaining undefined, defying generally acceptable definition. All that may well be so; but of itself it in no way alters the permanence of the order of domination - the extended reproduction of the conditions of exploitation ~ and less, still, the underlying relations of production. and that raises an issue that is perhaps the least well explored in the growing political literature of Nigeria: the relation of the masses to the order of domination. 2 Where is the class struggle? How is their obedience secured - surely not by democratic legitimation. There is evidence enough of an antipolitics among them: a suspicion of ‘politicians' born of the excesses of the first civilian regime, as well as a dislike of the impositions of the~1o- of the soldiery - particularly toward the end of the Gowon regime. ‘Their role in politics, apart from the periodic affirmation of their support for (or submission to) various segments of the political class, seems to be xestvicted to more or less sporadic acts of revolt - either through work stoppages in the case of the small urban proletariat, ox armed revolt by peasants, of localized acts of defiance and revolt as recently in some remote villages of Borno State and in the Lagos seaside slum of Maroko.!? yet that does not dispose of the problem of their relation to the state. Clearly it is not one of simple submission to superior force. Remarkably little direct use of coercion is made. Tt seems implausible to argue that there exists here an ideological consensus, or that the existing order enjoys legitimacy - except in a tediously tautological sense. Yo seck anexplanation in the hegemony of the political class may seen a roundabout way of xestating the thene of legitimacy, and an overestimate of the authority which both state and political class actually exercise. Yet there is a kind of yielding by the popular classes to the dominace of this ‘class',the material basis of which lies in the increasing control they exercise throug the state or predominantly with its aid, over the means of Livelihood and subsistence; a control that is not counter-balanced or systematically challenged by any organized sense of a collective interest ~ except intermittently - among the labouring classes. the effectiveness of the state, the oxder and elite consensus which express that effectiveness, and the ideological vacuities of garrulons institutions of ‘representation’ that mystify and sanctify it, thus turn out to be the result of a conjunction of negative conditions: the absence of meaningful cleavages among the political class and the dominant economic class to which they either aspize to belong or already belong. It is a negative condition that does not rule out political conflict or violence, but mezely ensures that such conflict mostly destroys only individuals and not structures, leaving unaltered the condition and place that 400 years of association with the West have earned Nigeria in world capitalism. A complementary negative condition is the absence’ of popular organizations that express or representne specifically the interest of the people against the power-bloc: the interest of those who remain, in spite of the twists and turns of politics, at a level of living that would be considered intolerable even in the most backward regions of that Western world to which the productive effort of their lives is more and more completely subordinated. It is, ironically, this second negative condition that makes orderly competition within the political class, under the authority of rules of the game, less urgent and unrealizable. Capitalists and their politics exhibit the inherent anarchic character of that mode of production in the absence of the one, true, Invisible Hand: the class resistance that threatens them all. Political order among the political class, then, may not be essential under existing conditions for the progress of the state and the reproduction of the neocolonial economy, Order, in a larger sense,may yet prevail and be stable, ana'even, after a fashion, be relatively peaceful into the bargain. Yet it is a kind of disorder ~ perhaps the most profound.lo. ll. 12. 13. FOOTNOTES G.R, Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World, 1973 and Claude Ake, Political Science as Imperialism. Although there has been a spate of articles on ‘political economy’ there has been very little sustained political analysis. Consider the view expressed in P Ekeh's “The Two Public See B.J. Dudley Order and Instability passim, B.J.D. passim, cf. Diegomaoh in Okpaku, Nigeria, Dilemma of Nationhood. Sayre Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism, Personal communication, various sources. A Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, Ch.4 passim. P.O. Anifowose, “The Military and Human Rights" unpublished paper. ‘There may, indeed, be some bloodletting in the bureaucracy after a coup with the fall of old and rise of new patrons, but no significant section of the bureaucracy, civil, military or parastatal has felt that any change of government ~ Civil War excepted, ~ presaged alteration significant enough to warrant subversion or revolt on their part. Anxiety there has been, to be suze, as with Mohammed's cleansing effort, and the displacement which threatened to follow the break-up of large states into smaller ones ~ e.g. Ogun-men being pressured to leave Oyo state service for that of their own state ete, See, however, A Peace, Choice, Class and Conflict, P.C. Lloyd, Classes, Crises and Coups, and various issues of +E. esp. No.13 and 14. West Africa, 28 April, 1980,