Adhikra
The noun adhikra (and related forms derived
from adhi + kr-, be or place over, aim at, or
superintend) denotes a range of personal capac-
ities and statuses, especially those conferred by
religious or social convention. These may be clas-
sified in terms of whether they belong to general
usage or to one of the specialized spheres of
ritual, politics, or law. (For adhikra [and com-
pounds beginning with adhikra], see An Encyclo-
paedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles,
vol. III, Poona, 1982, 15711601).
With regard to persons, the word adhikra
commonly denotes a capacity or fitness to do
something, whether an innate capacity or one
that is cultivated. Yayti in the Mahbhrata,
explaining the process of rebirth to Asta ka,
describes what happens to the spirit (vyu) after
insemination in a new womb:
sa tatra tanmtrakrtdhikrah kramena
sam vardhayatha garbham
There, endowed with the capacity for sense
perception, he in turn makes the embryo grow.
(MBh. 1.85.14)
This is an adhikra that arises naturally in the
process of coming into being as a person, and it is
thus common to all. However, this sort of gener-
ally shared adhikra has its limitations, and it is
with some irony that Yayti describes the apti-
tudes of ordinary people as being qualified only
for vain pursuits:
nnbhv bahavo jvaloke
daivdhn nasta cest dhikrh be known (ayam adhikrrthah yognusanam
tat tat prpya na vihanyeta dhro
dista m balya iti matvtmabuddhy
In the world of the living, the multitude of all
sorts are subject to destiny, fit (adhikrh ) only
for futile endeavors. Whatever he may attain, the
wise man is not disappointed, since he knows
in his heart of hearts that destiny is stronger.
(MBh. 1.84.6)
But adhikra may also point to an acknowledged
competency in a particular activity, as in the
Arthastra attributed to Kautilya ( artha):
vikramdhikra (competency in valor) and laksya-
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010
Also available online www.brill.nl
lambhdhikra (competency in hitting a target;
Ar. 7.17.2324).
This term adhikra is also used for speech or a
textual passage to indicate its scope of reference.
We encounter it thus in epic and literary narra-
tive: The champions now began to spin tales,
most wondrous tales that bore upon war
(prtandhikrh ) (MBh. 1.184.11; trans. van
Buitenen, 1973, 360). In other words, they told
tales on the topic of war or having war as their
concern. Similarly, Rma, passing through the
crowds on his way to the palace, hears in the chat-
ter words pertaining to himself (tmdhikr . . .
vcah ; Rm. 2.14.24).
In scholastic usage, adhikra becomes a tech-
nical term for the scope the relevance or range
of application of a word or a section of a text.
For example, in the Mmm s system of ritual
theory, adhikra is one of the six sorts of proposi-
tions: a definition, a metarule, a general injunc-
tion, a restricted injunction, a topic statement
(adhikra), and an extended application. The
action implied by adhikra in this case is to estab-
lish a topic in need of explication. Commentators
often like to say that the word atha (now, next)
that begins many didactic works has the sense
of adhikra (adhikrrthah ) that is, that it
means taking up. Thus, in explaining the first
words of the Yogastra ( Ptajala Yoga), atha
yognusanam (Now the instruction in Yoga),
Vysa writes, This has the sense of introducing
[a topic: the instruction in Yoga, i.e.] the treatise
which is introduced (adhikrtam), [i.e.] which is to
stram adhikrtam veditavyam). Vysa thus shows
that the seemingly unremarkable word atha is a
speech act that simultaneously sets in motion and
validates the exposition of a teaching.
Ritual Adhikra
However, far from being merely descriptive, in
the more prominent applications of the term,
it denotes a capacity or power with normative
value. G. Jha once explained the Mmm s
BEH, vol. II
672 Adhikra
schools conception of adhikra as actions in a
state of latent potentiality (Jha, 1907, 365). The
concept was first expounded in connection with
Vedic ritual ( yaja). Adhikra to perform a
rite is predicated upon the existence of a
sacred injunction to do so. Ktyyanarautastra inaccessible, whether because of natural impair-
(1.1.110) begins by addressing the question of in
whom such a qualification resides. After consid-
ering the possibility that qualification to make
Vedic offerings might apply to all beings, it
excludes nonhumans, the physically impaired,
those who have not learned the Veda, and
dras (but accepts the ritual adhikra of women).
Contact with impurity also temporarily compro-
mises ones adhikra, which had to be restored
through performance of a penance.
The medieval Mmm s tradition taught that MlVK. 5.4.20).
adhikra, ones qualification and duty to perform
the rites, depends upon three factors: ones prior
knowledge of the Veda, ones establishment and
maintenance of the ritual fires, and ones capacity
for independent action:
Seeking to know dharma is disallowed if one
lacks adhikra on account of not having studied
the Veda and not being able by oneself to per-
form all the [ordained ritual] acts. (MlVK.
1.85)
Consequently, injunctions to make offerings
apply only to those eligible to perform them.
dras, for example, are not penalized for failing
to make such offerings since they are disqualified
on the basis of caste from studying the Veda.
In the 12th book of the Mahbhrata, which
is mainly given over to instruction in dharma,
the special status of the Brahman is explained by
reference to his being qualified to officiate in
offerings (hotrdhikra), which sets him apart
from members of the other two twice-born
classes (MBh. 12.229.67; see caste). This is not
just a right or eligibility, but an obligation or
responsibility, a point made by R. Lariviere
(1988). Likewise, the broader category of twice-
born defines the broader scope of dharma, as the
Manusmrti states:
In this stra one should recognize the adhikra
of him for whom the [ritual] rule is prescribed
[to be performed] with mantras, from insemi-
nation rite to funeral and of no one else.
(MaSm. 2.16)
This implies that full ceremonial preparation is a
prerequisite for both legal rights and duties.
Medhtithi, commenting on this verse, under-
lines the element of duty: Adhikra is to be
understood to mean: I must perform this
(adhikro mayaitad anusth eyam ity avagamah ).
By contrast, those to whom dharma remains
ments (including ineligibility, on account of caste,
to undergo the initiation into Veda study that
constitutes the second birth) or ones belonging to
a non-Vedic religion, are said to lack adhikra in
it: A shameless [beggar-monk] or a fool, whether
a woman or a man, has no competence (adhikra)
to [observe] dharma he is just like a dra
(MBh. 5.70.38). In fact, it was a matter of some
debate in the Mmm s to what degree dras
may be said to have adhikra in dharma (as in
This double aspect of adhikra its combina-
tion of right and duty appears vividly in what is
probably the most famous use of the word, in the
second chapter of the Bhagavadgt, where
Krsn a explains to Arjuna the basis of karma-
yoga, the yoga through [everyday] actions:
You have adhikra only with regard to the
act never with regard to its fruits. Do not be
motivated by the fruits of action, nor crave inac-
tion. (BhG. 2.47)
This eloquent indictment of both self-gratifying
ritualism and ascetic withdrawal deploys the idea
of ritual adhikra to undermine the traditional
premise of Vedic ritual: that a rite performed well
bears fruit for the performer. Finessing the logic
of the Mmm saka exegete, Krsn a proposes that
being entitled (and thereby obligated) to perform
rites and, according to the metonymy of the
Bhagavadgt, ones duties more generally does
not imply that one can lay claim to any reward.
This form of yoga consists precisely in renouncing
that further claim to entitlement, as well as any
selfish attachment (sanga) to the renunciation
of action itself !
Political Adhikra
With reference to a king, adhikra points to his
central royal duties. Bhsma, in describing the
duties of a king, cites an ancient maxim on the
adhikra of a king: that he has the right and duty
to dismiss even his own (Brahman) teacher,
should he deviate from good conduct (MBh.
12.57.67). This sort of adhikra is not merely a
 Adhikra
personal trait, or even a caste-based privilege, but
a status conferred ritually in the royal consecra-
tion. Hence, the Vyavahramaykha (1.1) begins
by asserting that a king is anyone who is [ritu-
ally] empowered (adhikrta) to protect his sub-
jects, not just a Ksatriya.
The king may also delegate a portion of his
authority (adhikaroti) to another. This may be an
ad hoc arrangement to show honor or trust. Thus,
after inviting his Kaurava cousins to his royal sac-
rifice, Yudhisth ira tries to earn their affection by
appointing them to various offices:
Saying this, the first-born of the Pndavas, con-
secrated for sacrifice, next charged them all with
official duties (adhikresu) as appropriate: he
put Duhsana in charge (-adhikresu) of food;
he told Avatthman to take care of the Brah-
mans; he entrusted Sam jaya with offering rever-
ence to the kings, and wise Bhsma and Drona
with reviewing what had been done or not done.
(MBh. 2.32.35)
But that is also the term used in more formal con-
texts to denote appointment to administrative office.
The status, or office, of persons so appointed may
itself be called adhikra (although many other
terms for appointment or delegation also occur),
and titles of officers commonly end in -adhikrta
(appointee, [put] in charge). Hence, we learn that
officers appointed to protect (raksdhikrta) the
people of a provincial district are liable to be pun-
ished for corruption or for shirking their respon-
sibilities (MaSm. 7.123, 9.272; see also YjSm.
1.338). It may also describe a military appoint-
ment, as when Krsn a put Vsudeva naka- the responsibility to serve as a witness in a
dundubhi in charge of the troops (baldhikre
niksipya; MBh. 2.30.12; see also baldhikrta,
commander in Bnas Harsacarita 7.2).
The Arthastra says that honest and effective
officials should be entrusted with permanent
office (nitydhikra; Ar. 2.9.36), but it also
speaks of one fallen from honor or office
(mndhikrbhym bhrasta h ; Ar. 1.14.2). One Any properly ordained king has the authority
may also speak of a king transferring all his own
authority to a successor, as King Kaualya placed
his offspring Brahmisth a in his own [position of]
authority (brahmisth am dhya nije dhikre . . . ties. Thus, when he grows weary of hearing cases,
svatanuprastam; RaghV. 18.29).
673
Legal Adhikra
Intertwined with the notions of ritual and politi-
cal adhikra is the adhikra of the legal sphere.
Here again, aspects of both entitlement and obli-
gation may be involved. Even outside of the legal
technical works, that is, in literary accounts, the
legalistic conception of adhikra is sometimes
evoked. For example, in the Daakumracarita
(The Deeds of Ten Young Men), the mother of a
concubine defends herself from the charge of
forcing her daughter into unseemly conduct by
arguing that she was merely fulfilling her respon-
sibilities as the mother of a concubine, which she
lists at length:
Your reverence, this slave girl tells you that I am at
fault. But this fault is [really] the performance
of my proper adhikra. For such is the adhikra
of a courtesans mother (esa hi ganikmtur
adhikrah ), that from her birth onward, I have
adorned her limbs and nourished her body with
a lean diet that increases her radiance, strength,
color, and intelligence, and balances the humors,
the internal fire, and the bodily constituents.
(Da. 2.2)
She understands her adhikra, then, to be what is
expected of her her legitimate responsibility,
given her social position.
Adhikra can also be a more formal legal sta-
tus, that is, one arising from an act that confers
responibility. Vidura, the uncle and counsellor of
the Pndava brothers in the Mahbhrata, enu-
merates the sorts of people unworthy to be given
lawsuit:
A sailor, a merchant who used to be a thief, a
quack surgeon (alkadhrtam ) and a physi-
cian, an enemy and a friend and an actor one
should not appoint (adhikurvta) these seven as
witnesses. (MBh. 5.35.37)
(adhikra) to judge and to punish in both civil
and criminal cases, although he cannot initiate a
civil suit. He can also delegate these responsibili-
the king may place on the bench (sthpayed
sane tasmin) a prominent minister who knows
dharma, wise and disciplined (MaSm. 7.141).
The classical definition of a court of justice
(often called a dharmdhikarana) includes men-
tion of such appointments:
674 Adhikra
When the king does not try a case personally,
however, he should appoint a learned Brah-
man to do so. Entering the main court itself
accompanied by three assessors, he should try
the cases brought before the king, either seated
or standing. The place where three Brahmans
versed in the Vedas and a learned officer of
the king sit, they call the Court of Brahman.
(MaSm. 8.911)
The assessors (sabhya), members of the council
(sabh) of learned Brahmans, representing expert
authority in dharma, are to be distinguished from
the kings officer (adhikrta, adhikrin), who wields
his practical authority to render a decision, to
bind or to loose, and to carry out the sentence.
The king could also be called upon to propose
further penalties for the neglect of religious and
social sanctions applied by other legal entities,
such as the dharma officer (dharmdhikrin) or
Brahman Council, or a caste or guild council.
Besides the Brahman Council, other decision-
making groups were considered to possess adhikra.
The related term adhikarana, in legal contexts, is
applied to law courts and administrative offices
(Sircar, 1966, 6).
In property law, adhikra is the right and
responsibility to perform certain acts such as the
sale of family property (Davis, 2004, 70). This
adhikra arises from a combination of claim to
land rights (svatva) and authority to alienate the
property (svtantrya), which in the Indian joint
family did not always coincide in a given individ-
ual (Derrett, vol. II, 1977, 86, 91). A similar form
of adhikra as is reflected, for example, in a
17th-century record (Davis, 2004, 88) in which a
group of temple authorities were called the
adhikrapadrthamudayavarkal (the executive
trustees of temple property). Government offi-
cials and temple authorities are frequently called
adhikrin or adhikrika in inscriptions, and
payments made to such officials are called offi-
cial pay (adhikravrtan; Tam. atikrapperu,
atikrappon; Sircar, 1966, 67).
In sum, then, adhikra broadly speaking is
legal competence for a particular range of
actions, explicitly restricted to a particular indi-
vidual or class of individuals. The prescriptions of
ritual restrictions and injunctions, which in some
contexts are taken to be the content of dharma,
apply only to those who have adhikra for them,
namely, the twice-born classes. This implication
is made explicit in the Manusmrti:
For the dra, there is no mortal sin, nor does
he merit sanctification. He has neither respon-
sibilities (adhikra) in dharma, nor prohibition
on account of dharma. (MaSm. 10.126)
From this declaration, it would seem that the
dra is outside the moral universe of dharma.
That does not mean that dras have no stan-
dards among themselves. Customary norms
(cra) are accepted as another basis of dharma,
and Mitramira in his Vramitrodaya (c. 1600)
goes so far as to argue that when the Manusmrti
(2.6) refers to the conduct of good men, it
implies that
the practice (cra) of faultless men, even if
they do not know the Veda, is authoritative
(pramna). So too the practice of good dras
becomes authoritative for their sons and other
(dras). (Mitramira, 1896, 9)
Otherwise, though, it is simply asserted that obe-
dient service to Brahman householders is their
highest dharma (MaSm. 9.334).
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M.A. Jazayery & W. Winter, eds., Languages and Cul-
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Timothy Lubin