Property // Reviewer for Atty.
Donna Gasgonia
PROPERTY // Term 1, A.Y. 2015-2016
Case Digests Reviewer by Angelo Tiglao
Sibal v. Valdez
Issue: W/N the growing sugar cane is personal or real property?
W/N unfathered products have the identity of personal property
Held: It is contended that sugar cane comes under the classification of
real property as ungathered products
The law enumerates as real property. However, under certain conditions,
growing crops may be considered as personal property.
Growing sugar cane is considered as personal property under Article
416.
Ungathered fruits or growing crops may be personal property if it is
mobilised by anticipation. If harvested in the future, it will be considered
as movable property.
U.S. v Carlos
Issue: W/N electricity can be the subject of the crime of larceny
Held: Accused argues that only corporeal property can be subject of the
crime of larceny. Electricity is an unknown force and cannot be the
subject of larceny. Petitioners argue that despite electricity is no longer
considered a s fled, the manifestations and effects of it, like gas, maybe
seen and felt. The true test of what may be the proper subject of larceny
is; whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner.
Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought
and sold like other personal property and is capable of appropriation by
another. The Court rules that electricity may be the subject of the crime of
larceny. It is personal property because it is under the concept of nature.
1 Prepared by: Jose Angelo C. Tiglao
Strochecker v. Ramirez
Issue: W/N the property is a movable property?
Held: SC ruled against Ramirez saying that the property being
questioned, which is half interest in the drug store is a personal property
capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration properties
in Article 415 and may be subject of mortgage.
All personal property may be mortgaged.
Heirs of Preceso Bautista v. Sps Barza
Issue: W/N the Barzas has the right to the fishpond even after their
refusal to reimburse the Bautistsas for the improvements in the area?
Held: Barzas failure to pay the same requires of her and to file then
necessary action within 10 years was tantamount to a non-user of her
rights.
Until public dominion properties had been properly declared available,
any application is ineffective because there is no disposable land to
speak of. Accordingly, Bautistas application was premature.
Forest land by the very nature is for the development of national wealth;
you are granted the right to cut natural resources for natl development.
After it became a swamp, he made it into a fish pond. He applied from
the forestry division.
Barza applied for a fish land lease when the land was declared released.
Does it make it alienable and disposable? No, because
You have to wait for the government to say that the forest land is
released and it can be changed into a fish pond lease. The first one who
applies is on rule on possession.
Property // Reviewer for Atty. Donna Gasgonia
Insular Government v. Aldecoa
All lands thrown up by the sea and formed upon the shore by the action
of the water, together with the adjacent shore, belong to the national
domain and are for public uses.
Notwithstanding the fact that lands formed along the shore by accretion
thrown up by the action of the sea belong to the national domain and are
for public uses, the Government may declare them to be the property of
the owners of adjoining properties if they are no longer necessary for
administrative purposes and those of public utility; but no private person
shall be permitted to construct, erect, or perform any works on the
seashore and thereby gain land to his benefit and profit in contravention
of the explicit prohibition contained in article 18 of the said Law of
Waters, unless he shall have obtained proper authorization from the
Government.
Written or verbal permission will not transfer the ownership, unless
expressly allowed by the State.
Government v. Cabangis
LAND REGISTRATION ; LAND DISAPPEARING INTO SEA; PUBLIC
DOMAIN.As the lots in question disappeared by natural erosion due
to the ebb and flow of the tide, and as they remained in that condition
until reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the Government,
they belong to the public domain for public use.
Maneclang v. IAC
Issue: W/N the petitioners can be given ownership of the property.
Held: A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the
2 Prepared by: Jose Angelo C. Tiglao
public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be registered
under the Torrens System in the name of any individual and considering
further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the
National Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing
in and out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter
or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain, the
Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and void and of no legal
effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
RP v. Lat Vda. De Castillo
Issue: W/N the land registration courts decision involving shore lands
constitutes re judicature which in turn bars government intervention.
Held: There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that
the court rendering the formal judgment must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter that shores are properties of the public domain intended
for public use and,
therefore, not registrable. Thus, it has long been settled that portions of
the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be
registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the
same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the
registrant
Petitioner contends "that 'Lbts 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always formed
part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof.
Consequently, the same were not subject to registration, being outside
the commerce of men; and that since the lots in litigation are of public
domain the registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said
lands as private property, hence, res judicata does not apply.
Property // Reviewer for Atty. Donna Gasgonia
Foreshore lands are alternatively dry and wet due to being washed and excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of exercising what
inundated by the waters. otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. And the law has laid in
the Director of Lands the power of exclusive control, administrations,
disposition and alienation of public land that includes the survey,
Santos v. Moreno
classification, lease, sale or any other form of concessions or disposition
Issue: W/N the streams involved belong to the public domain or and management of the lands of public domains.
Hacienda Esteban

Held: Pursuant to Article 420 of Civil Code (formerly Article 339 of the
Spanish Civil Code), channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners
of estates over which they flow. The channels, therefore, of the streams
in question, which may be classified as creeks, belong to the owners of
Hacienda San Esteban.
The streams, considered as canals, of which they originally were, are of
private ownership in contemplation of Article 339(1) of the Spanish Civil
Code. Under Article 339, canals constructed by the State and devoted to
public use are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by
private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively for private
use must be of public ownership.
However, when the ownership is lost through prescription when the
owner allows the public to use the said canals.
City of Manila v. Garcia
Issue: W/N the defendants may be ejected
Held: Squatting on public property cannot be legalized by means of
permits or leases".The Mayor of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry
into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or for that
matter, by executing leases. Squatting is unlawful. No amount of
acquiescence on the part of the City officials will elevate it into a lawful
act. Such permits are void.
Houses of squatters on public property are nuisances.The houses and
constructions of squatters on the land belonging to the City of Manila
constitute a public nuisance per sebecause they hinder and impair the
use of the land for a badly needed school building. As such, they could
have been summarily abated without the need of judicial action.

Baguio Citizens Action v City Council

Heirs of Palanca v Republic
Issue: W/N the ordinance is valid
Issue: W/N the properties in issue should be governed by the law where
Held: An ordinance legalizing the occupancy by squatters of public lands the properties are located.
is null and void.Being unquestionably a public land, no disposition
Held: Public Lands; When the property is still unclassified, whatever
thereof could be made by the City of Baguio without prior legislative
possession applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot
authority. It is the fundamental principle that the state possesses plenary
ripen into private ownership.While it is true that the land classification
power in law to determine who shall be favored recipients of public
map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the
domain, as well as under what terms such privilege may be granted not

3 Prepared by: Jose Angelo C. Tiglao

Property // Reviewer for Atty. Donna Gasgonia
fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains
unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. When
the property is still unclassified, whatever possession applicants may
have had, and however long, still cannot ripen into private ownership.
This is because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in such lands and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. Thus, the Court has emphasized the
need to show in registration proceedings that the government, through a
positive act, has declassified inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.
Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon
Issue: W/N the properties in issue should be governed by the law where
the properties are located.
Held: Succession; Settlement of Estate; Decree of Distribution; Once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.A
decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to
the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be
corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is
like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional cases, a final
decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730 (1951),
the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have
a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.
4 Prepared by: Jose Angelo C. Tiglao
Cuevas v. Pineda
Issue: W/N the subject lots are private in nature.
Held: Mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the
land of its public character.The mere possession of the land, allegedly
since 1928 by the private respondents, does not by itself automatically
divest the land of its public character.
Manila International Airport Authority v. CA
Issue:
Held: Manila International Airport Authority; The Airport Lands and
Buildings of the MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore
owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.The Airport
Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property ofpublic dominion and
therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The
Civil Code provides: ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion
or of private ownership.
Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to
the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis
supplied) ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of
the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property
of the State.
The term ports in Article 420 (1) of the Civil Code includes seaports and
airportsthe MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port
Property // Reviewer for Atty. Donna Gasgonia
constructed by the State.No one can dispute that properties of public
dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, are
owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports and airports.
The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by
the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands
and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.
PFDA v. CBAA
Issue: W/N the LFPC is considered as a property of public dominion.
Held: The Lucena Fishing Port Complex is a property of public dominion
intended for public use, and is therefore exempt from real property tax
under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code properties of
public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.The Lucena Fishing Port Complex is a property of public
dominion intended for public use, and is therefore exempt from real
property tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code.
Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic of
the Philippines. Thus, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides: x x x The
Lucena Fishing Port Complex, which is one of the major infrastructure
projects undertaken by the National Government under the Nationwide
Fishing Ports Package, is devoted for public use and falls within the term
ports. The Lucena Fishing Port Complex serves as PFDAs tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of
commitment to continuously provide post-harvest infrastructure support
to the fishing industry, especially in areas where productivity among the
various players in the fishing industry need to be enhanced. As property
of public dominion, the Lucena Fishing Port Complex is owned by the
Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax.
5 Prepared by: Jose Angelo C. Tiglao
MWSS v. CA and Jose Samonte
Held: In a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case
and a second decree for the same land is null and void. Although
petitioners title was issued in 1940, it will be noted that petitioners title
over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area of 599 square meters was
based on the Cadastral Survey of Kaloocan City, Cadastral Case No. 34,
while private respondents title was derived from OCT No. 994 issued on
April 19, 1917. In the case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, this Court ruled
that in a cadastral case the court has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case
and a second decree for the same land is null and void.
Republic v. Southside Homeowners Assoc.
Issue: Is the JUSMAG area alienable, and can it be subject to lawful
conveyance?
Held: The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any
tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of
the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any
the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes.
Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non- alienable and
shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared
alienable. Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence
teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not
open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as
Property // Reviewer for Atty. Donna Gasgonia
disposable and alienable public land. And until a given parcel of land is
released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone
and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and
alienable, its status as part of a military reservation remains, even if
incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or for
defense.
Public Lands; To reiterate what we earlier said, lands of the public
domain classified as a military reservation remains as such until, by
presidential fiat or congressional act, the same is released from such
classification and declared open to disposition.
Reclaimed lands are no longer foreshore or submerged lands, and thus
may qualify as alienable agricultural lands of the public domain provided
the requirements of public land laws are met.This is why the Cebu City
ordinance merely granted Essel, Inc. an irrevocable option to purchase
the foreshore lands after the reclamation and did not actually sell to
Essel, Inc. the still to be reclaimed foreshore lands. Clearly, in the Ponce
Cases the option to purchase referred to reclaimed lands,and not to
foreshore lands which are inalienable. Reclaimed lands are no longer
foreshore or submerged lands, and thus may qualify as alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain provided the requirements of
public land laws are met.

Chavez v. PEA-Amari
APEX Mining v. Southeast Mindanao
Issue: W/N
Issue: W/N DAO No. 66 was issued by the DENR
Held: Submerged lands are owned by the State and are inalienable;
Held: Where an entity is not an agent of a corporation who was earlier
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of
granted an Exploration Permit, the assignment or transfer made by the
the States inalienable natural resources.As Justice Bellosillo himself
latter in favor of the former is null and void for directly contravening the
states in his supplement to his dissent, the Ponce Cases admit that
terms and conditions of the grant of said Exploration Permit; The concept
submerged lands still belong to the National Government. The correct
of agency is distinct from assignmentin agency, the agent acts not on
formulation, however, is that submerged lands are owned by the State
his own but on behalf of his principal, while in assignment, there is total
and are inalienable.Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
transfer or relinquishment of right by the assignor to the assignee.In
provides: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
the instant Petitions, it is incumbent upon either MMC or SEM to prove
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
that a contract of agency actually exists between them so as to allow
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resourcesare
SEM to use and benefit from EP 133 as the agent of MMC. SEM did not
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
claim nor submit proof that it is the designated agent of MMC to
natural resources shall not be alienated.x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
represent the latter in its business dealings or undertakings. SEM cannot,
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of
therefore, be considered as an agent of MMC which can use EP 133 and
the States inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property
benefit from it. Since SEM is not an authorized agent of MMC, it goes
of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of
without saying that the assignment or transfer of the permit in favor of
man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of
SEM is null and void as it directly contravenes the terms and conditions
submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution.
of the grant of EP 133. Furthermore, the concept of agency is distinct
6 Prepared by: Jose Angelo C. Tiglao
Property // Reviewer for Atty. Donna Gasgonia
from assignment. In agency, the agent acts not on his own behalf but on The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct
behalf of his principal. While in assignment, there is total transfer or from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. We agree with the OSGs position
relinquishment of right by the assignor to the assignee.The assignee that it is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs
takes the place of the assignor and is no longer bound to the latter. rights under its timber license. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran,
224 SCRA 792 (1993), that a timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless
PICOP Resources v. Base Metal Mineral Corp.
to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
Issue: W/N the areas located within PICOPs logging concessions closed It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due
to mining operations. process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 125
SCRA 302 (1983), this Court held: x x x A timber license is an instrument
Held: Government reservations may be opened for mining applications
by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
upon prior written clearance by the government agency having
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.A timber license is
jurisdiction over such reservation.Assuming that the area covered by
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
Base Metals MPSA is a government reservation, defined as proclaimed
only a license or a privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations,
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
such does not necessarily preclude mining activities in the area. Sec.
case. A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
15(b) of DENR Administrative Order (DAO) 96-40 provides that
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
prior written clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over
neither is it a property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
such reservation. Sec. 6 of RA No. 7942 also provides that mining
right; nor is it taxation (C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting
operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be
of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain limitations.
property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x
R.A. No. 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves
but only those proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.RA No. 7942
does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those
proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. There is no evidence in this
case that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA has been proclaimed
as watershed forest reserves.

Timber Licenses; A timber license is not a contract within the purview of

the due process clauseit is only a license or a privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare.

7 Prepared by: Jose Angelo C. Tiglao