JUAN DULALIA, JR. v. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.

ich is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes conduct that shows

(2007) indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable

members of the community. Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so
The primary duty of lawyers is to be well-informed of the existing laws, o keep abreast
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
with legal developments, recent enactments, and jurisprudence, and be conversant
reprehensible to a high degree.
with basic legal principles.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land
Susan Soriano Dulalia (Susan), wife of Juan, applied for a permit in the Municipal
and promote respect for the law and legal processes. This duty carries with it the
Government to build a high rise building in Bulacan. The permit was not released due
obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
to the opposition of Atty. Cruz who sent a letter to the Municipal Engineers office,
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
claiming that the building impedes the airspace of their property which is adjacent to
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty,
the Dulalias property. Juan Dulalia (Juan) filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
Pablo Cruz (Cruz) for immoral conduct.
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Juan also claimed that Cruzs illicit relationship with a woman while still married is in
The Court therefore concludes that Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Cruz invokes good faith, claiming
and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended from the
to have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of
practice of law for one year.
the Civil Code, for while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall

have retroactive application, there is a qualification.

Felisa De Roy vs Court of Appeals

ISSUE:

157 SCRA 757 Civil Law Preliminary Title Application of Laws Publication of
Whether or not Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility Laws Publication of Supreme Court Decisions in the Official Gazette

HELD:
Cruzs claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August
3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back
The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed
the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to
the death of Bernals daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior
hand but that she was ignored.

to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court
of Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Roys counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled
that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended.
De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable
because said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast
of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
People v. Gacott
G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995
Bidin, J.
Facts:
On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A.
No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom
and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending
that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under
Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or
authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-
Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of
1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion
espousing the position that the Letter Of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal
is not the law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal
another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March
18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute
the case and ordered that the case be quashed.
Issue:
whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely
abused his discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari
Held:
Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite
obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The
intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly
than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa
failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the
text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact
that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2
reads:
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the
Executive Branch of the National Government, the following agencies of the
Department of Justice are herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the following
instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).
General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former
President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the
laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs.
Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and
acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former President are part of the law of the
land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts
of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President Marcos
in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch as neither
P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or repealed,
both continue to have the force and effect of law.
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
COLLATES VS RENOMERON
Facts: This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by Atty.
Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty.
Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latters irregular actuations
with regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute
Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the
registration of the documents with certain special conditions between them, which
was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila
plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondents
Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself
elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator
Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA).
The Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite
the resolution of the Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof
but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements
not adverted in his previous denial.
Issues: (1) WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for
his malfeasance as a public official, and (2) WON the Code of Professional
Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of official tasks.
Held: (1) Yes, a lawyers misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. The lawyers oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay
no man for money or malice. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.
(2) Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest (Rule
1.03).
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000
Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the
COMELEC and held the position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the
Pasig City Board of Candidates. The respondents helped conduct and oversee the
1995 elections. Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the
respondents tampered with the votes received by them by either adding more votes for
particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV) or reducing the number of votes
of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an administrative complaint for their
disbarment. Respondents argued that the discrepancies were due to honest mistake,
oversight and fatigue. Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had
already exonerated them from any offense and that the motion for reconsideration filed
by Pimentel was not filed in time.
Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended
the canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer
for such irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error,
and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared
the SoVs. There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake
or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of
the error renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as
incredible and simply unacceptable. Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of
mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election
returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs but a
systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of
the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A lawyer
who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the
misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or
the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or
shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member
of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in
question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government
service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no
falsehood. The Court found the respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP
10,000 each and issued a stern warning that similar conduct in the future will be
severely punished.
A.C. No. 5119 April 17, 2013
ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO BERENGUER, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY. PEDRO
VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo
Berenguer (complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin),
Marcelino Jomales (Jomales) and Pedro Vega (Vega).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre, Rosario
Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer (Berenguers) are the registered owners of a
58.0649-hectare land in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Sometime in April 1998, a
notice of coverage was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regarding
the acquisition of their landholding pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Berenguers protested and
applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice to lift coverage
based on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively for livestock
pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 09.2
On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the application
for exclusion, cancelled the Berenguers certificates of title on the land and issued
Certificates of Land Ownership Award3 (CLOAs) in favor of the members of the
Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (BARIBAG).
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied their
application for exclusion from the CARPs coverage in the Order4 dated February 15,
1999 based on the Investigation Report dated February 9, 1999 submitted by the DAR
Region V Investigation that said area sought to be excluded is principally devoted to
coconuts and not the raising of livestock.5
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal6 with the Secretary of DAR.
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition7 for the implementation
of the Order dated February 15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD). This was granted by Florin, as RARAD, in an Order8 dated March 15, 1999.
Accordingly, Florin directed the issuance and implementation of the Writ of
Possession.9
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration,10 claiming that
they were denied due process as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAGs
petition for implementation. Florin denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit in an Order11 dated March 22, 1999.
12
On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB). BARIBAG, on other hand, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.13 The Berenguers opposed14 the motion saying that the execution would
be premature in view of their pending appeal before the DARAB. Nevertheless,
BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff.15
In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied
the Berenguers appeal.
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution,17 which granted BARIBAGs Motion for the
Appointment of a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance of the writ of possession
prayed for.
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside18 the Resolution dated
April 8, 1999, arguing that: the DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case when
they seasonably filed an appeal before it; and that Florin should have waited until the
DARAB has decided the appeal. In an Order19 dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the
said motion prompting the Berenguers to move for her inhibition20 on ground of
partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals
(CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51858, which was denied outright on procedural
grounds, to wit: (1) copy of the assailed order bears the words "certified true copy" but
the name and authority of the person certifying is not indicated as required in SC
Circular No. 3-96, and the signature therein is illegible; (2) only one of the petitioners
signed the certification on non-forum shopping which is an insufficient compliance of
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court; and (3) there is non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the assailed order of the Regional Director is not directly
reviewable by the CA.21
Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 53174, which questioned the Orders dated March 15, 1999 and
March 22, 1999 issued by Florin. The petition was also denied on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and wrong mode of appeal.22
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession23 in favor of BARIBAG.
Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of possession pursuant
to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court in spite of the Berenguers protestations.24
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash25 the Writ of Possession, to no avail.
On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint26 for the disbarment of
respondents Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant Regional Director for DAR,
and Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly conspiring and
confederating in the commission of the following acts:
 A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY
RENDERING AN UNJUST JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS
ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS;
B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION EX-
PARTE AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING AND SIGNING THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION WITHOUT CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY ISSUED BY THE
PROPER OFFICER FULLY KNOWING THAT SHE HAS NO AUTHORITY
AND TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE RULES AND IN
CONTRAVENTION WITH THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD;
FURTHER, HIDING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS
INSPITE OF REQUEST FOR A COPY;
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY PETITIONERS
THRU COUNSEL AND FAILING AND REFUSING TO CONDUCT A
HEARING AS PRAYED FOR BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND REFUSING TO
FORWARD THE APPEAL TO THE PROPER APPELLATE BOARD;
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIPS TO THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS AND LAWYER;
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO CITE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN
CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF ARREST WITHOUT HEARING
CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF COURT;
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF
THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION, PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION TO THE PREJUDICE
OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS AND PETITIONERS.27
Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of possession is
anchored on the CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, and not on a final and
executory decision that would require a certification of finality as prescribed by the
DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus (De Jesus), as Berenguers counsel, was
not furnished with a copy of the writ because it was not yet issued at the time when it
was requested; (3) there was no intent to hide the writ; (4) when the writ of possession
was finally signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and enforcement; (4) it was
unfair to impute illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as DAR lawyers in view of the
DARs denial of the motion for a cease and desist order and because of the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty; (5) the petitions for certiorari
filed with the CA were both dismissed; and (6) the findings of DAR and the issuance of
the CLOAs remain undisturbed. Florin also claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus who wants
her disbarred and not the Berenguers.
In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against him arguing that: (1) the
writ of possession is not illegal in the absence of a court order stating its invalidity; (2)
he did not participate in the issuance of the writ of possession because he did not
appear as the farmers counsel; (3) the Legal Division he heads has no control or
influence over the DARAB; and (4) his presence in the execution of the writ of
possession was to ascertain that no violations against any law are committed by the
person/s executing the writ.30
Jornales Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima facie infirmity;
(2) he is not privy to the issuance thereof; (3) he has no supervision and control over
the DAR which issued the writ; and (4) he has no authority to determine the writs
validity or invalidity. Jornales admitted, however, that he was in the meeting presided
by the PNP Provincial Director of Sorsogon prior to the writs implementation in his
capacity as Regional Assistant Director for Operations of DAR Region V and not as a
lawyer. He added that the disbarment complaint against him is not only malicious for
lack of legal basis but is also meant to harass and intimidate DAR employees in
implementing the CARP.32
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply,33 the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended34 that
Florin be "suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, Orders and Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the
interests of the Complainants."
Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against Jornales
and Vega be dismissed for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges
against them.35
Commissioner San Juans recommendation against Florin is based on the findings36 of
the CA in its Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53174,37 which
reads:
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of Appeals was
treated as a petition for review and the court found the following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being
devoted to pasture and livestock and already classified as residential and industrial
land, hence, outside the coverage of Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law) The generation and issuance of Certificate of Landownership Award
(CLOA) was therefore void;"
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent Hon. Isabel E.
Florin who is exercising delegated jurisdiction from the DARAB has no jurisdiction over
Petitioners Properties as held in Krus na Ligas Farmers Coop vs. University of the
Philippines; G.R. No. 107022, 8 December 1992, which is squarely in point with the
case at bar."
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the Court
ruled thus "Assuming that the lands are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand
why the DAR awarded them to members of respondent Baribag and not to the farmers
in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of the CARL x x x."
The court further stated "We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning our
observation on the actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel Florin.
Just why she issued a writ of execution and eventually a Writ of Possession in favor of
respondent Baribag puzzles us no end. She knew that Baribag is not a party in
petitioners application for exclusion filed with the Office of DAR Regional Director
Percival Dalugdug. Obviously, she never acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also
knew that petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary from the Order of Regional
Director Dalugdug dismissing petitioners application for exclusion. Clearly, such order
was not yet final and executory when she issued the assailed writs of execution and
possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would be set aside."38
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVII-2006-282
modifying the recommended penalty, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and for knowingly rendering an unjust Judgment, Orders
and Resolutions, adverse and prejudicial to the interest of the complainants, Atty.
Isabel F. Florin is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. The
charges against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Peter Vega are DISMISSED for
failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges against Respondents.39
In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over BARIBAG at
the time it filed a petition for the implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999;
(2) the DARAB has jurisdiction to issue the CLOAs; (3) as RARAD, she has concurrent
jurisdiction with DARAB; (4) the Berenguers were not denied due process; and (5) the
Berenguers never questioned the regularity of the DARs acquisition of their
landholding nor did they file a petition for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to
BARIBAG.
This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the
penalty to be imposed.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority so to do. x x x.
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross
misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a
person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this
conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.42 (Citations
omitted)
In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction
against the three (3) respondents as members of the bar. The grounds asserted by the
complainants in support of the charges against the respondents, however, are
intrinsically connected with the discharge of their quasi-judicial functions. Nevertheless,
in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,43 the Court already ruled that if a misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer
may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as
a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member
of the Bar.
xxxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21,
1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 644 of said
Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the
public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the
public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.1wphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer
in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.45 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,46 the Court ruled that an administrative case against
a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the DARAB may
be likened to administrative cases against judges considering that he is part of the
quasi-judicial system of our government.47
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government,
performs official functions of a RARAD that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly,
the present controversy may be likened that of a judge whose decision, including the
manner of rendition, is made subject of an administrative complaint.
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-
00 provides:
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the President, or the
Court of Appeals shall have the following effects:
(a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.The appeal
shall stay the order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution pending
appeal, as he may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of the case
(Executive Order No. 292 [1987], Book VII, Chapter 4, Sec. 21).
xxxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary
clearly stayed the implementation of Regional Director Dalugdugs Order dated
February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is the DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order
execution pending appeal. Records reveal that there was no order by the DAR
Secretary directing execution of the Order dated February 15, 1999 during the
pendency of the Berenguers appeal.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when
execution may be had, namely: (1) after a decision or order has become final and
executory;48 (2) pending appeal, only upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order after due hearing;49 and (3) execution of several, separate or partial judgments.50
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:
Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.Execution shall issue upon an order,
resolution or decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution
shall issue as a matter of course and upon the expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a
resolution, order or decision has been served to the counsel or representative on
record and to the party himself, and has become final and executory, and, upon motion
or motu proprio, issue a writ of execution ordering the DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer
to enforce the same. In appropriate cases, the Board or any of its Members or its
Adjudicator shall deputize and direct the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of
the Philippines or any of their component units or other law enforcement agencies in
the enforcement of any final order, resolution or decision.
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. Any motion for execution of the decision of the
Adjudicator pending appeal shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same
upon meritorious grounds, upon the posting of a sufficient bond in the amount
conditioned for the payment of damages which the aggrieved party may suffer, in the
event that the final order or decision is reversed on appeal, provided that the bond
requirement shall not apply if the movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper litigant.
(Emphasis ours)
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug
denying the Berenguers application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final
and executory as it was seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also
nothing in the records that will show whether BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the
Rules.
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error
was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice,51 the facts on
hand prove otherwise. Florins issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession
in order to fully implement Regional Director Dalugdugs Order dated February 15,
1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued
only after the subject judgment or order has already become final and executory.52 As
aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin ordered the issuance of such writs
despite the pendency of the appeal with the DARAB.53Consequently, the Court finds
merit in the recommendation of suspension.
As to the penalty
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate
intent to do injustice will be administratively sanctioned.54 In this case, it appears,
however, that this is the first time that Florin has been made administratively liable.
Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith attended the commission of the
acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin executed an act that
would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ of
execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but an
obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended
and instead impose the penalty of suspension for three (3) months55 without pay. As
also held in Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months suspension without pay was
imposed against a judge after finding out that the ignorance of the law he committed
was not tainted with bad faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees and adopts
the finding of the IBP that no sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate the
charges against them. Hence, the complaint against them should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is found
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is penalized
with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon notice
hereof. The complaint against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega is
DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991
PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY.
ARSENIO FER. CABANTING,respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw,
Arsenio Fer. Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC
Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise of their legal profession
committed in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana
allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they built their residential house, from a
certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However,
they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo
Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short)
another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses since both were relatives
and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the
Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of
sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a
different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their differences. (Report
of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a
complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus
Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of
Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in
lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty.
Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the signature of the
alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was
executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief
that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary
Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a
workable solution concerning his house. While the petition was pending, the trial court,
on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case
has already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a
writ of execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty.
Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative
Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly
violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment
proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw
for his participation in the forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent
introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and
Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article
1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil
Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August 17, 1975, Constancia Valencia filed
additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:
1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with
one Lydia Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before
him as Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as
a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years
before in the year 1965.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in
confabulation with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public,
executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa
de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds were not in fact
executed by the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino Rincoraya
had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void the said sales (p. 7,
Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the
grandparents of Lydia Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during the
last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of
confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights over the
property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered to
sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of
donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw
allegedly prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather
(deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother's approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint
against her (Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public
document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence,
while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No.1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974,
the resolution of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of
the Second Division both dated December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302,
1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976,
all of these cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza
per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.1wphi1 When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of these
cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50,
Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged
threats against the person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the
transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, under the sala of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of
cases against Atty. Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of
Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in Administrative Case No.
1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the
suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty of
malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
 I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation
of Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in
falsifying notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-
2170.
I testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al.,
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they make take part by virtue of their
profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It
is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get
the better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this
prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78)
and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation
is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40
Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot
after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said
to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also
from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan
Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the
appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to
conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the
judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in
progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes
malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this
malpractice is a ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no
attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the
latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not
covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00
in consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would
show that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is
settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative
L40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is
not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los
Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony,
even if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied
upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it
would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a
deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the
administration of justice as an officer of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84
SCRA 622), but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs.
La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to
illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the
purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with
truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most
important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T.
Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show
his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112).
Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order
that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison,
125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law
profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be
dismissed for lack of evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full
on direct examination, but she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several
subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded. She eventually requested the
withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.1wphi1 He enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved.
(Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9,
1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but
proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative
Case No. 1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by
complainant for lack of interest does not ipso factoresult in the termination of a case for
suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We
are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no
evidence to substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is
predicated on the information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the
personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on
the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p.
486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in
Administrative Case No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her
additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative
cases conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil
Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the
Valencias are neighbors and only two meters separate their houses. It would not be
believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with the
heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing them to sue the
Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the parties in a
meeting held in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary
witness to attest to the holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of
brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar.
A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession,
with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in law: strive mightily
but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw
DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll
of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against
Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case
No. 1543 DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
TRIESTE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Generoso Trieste, Sr., the Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan, was charged by the
Tanodbayan with 12 counts of alleged violations of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law
for having financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in
connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and
in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases of
construction materials by the municipality from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator, director and major
stockholder.
After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision, convicting the
petitioner in all the twelve criminal cases.
After the petition for review was filed, petitioner filed an urgent petition to lift the order
of the Sandiganbayan. There having no objection coming from the Solicitor General,
the petition was granted, hence lifting the preventive suspension. A supplemental
petition was also filed by petitioner.
The former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the original petition and
to the supplemental petition filed by the petitioner. He argued the dismissal of the
petition (the urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan) on the ground that
the same raise factual issues which are, therefore, non-reviewable.
In the briefs, however, the new Solicitor General, filed a Manifestation For Acquittal,
concluding that: (1) petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen; (2) Sales of stocks
need not be reported to Sec; (3) Prosecution failed to prove charges; (4) No evidence
to prove petitioner approved payment; (5) Testimonial and documentary evidence
confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment; etc.
Issue: WON the Solicitor General made a conscientious study and thorough analysis in
the case.
Held: Yes. Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of the Court by
the SolGen and in view of the reassessment made by the Office of the issues and the
evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the
decision appealed from cannot be rightfully sustained. The conscientious study and
thorough ananlysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case truly reflects
its consciousness of its role as the Peoples Advocate in the administration of justice to
the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of
having the guilty punished.
This court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation that
the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed
and that as a matter of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of
acquittal.
Generoso Trieste, Sr. vs Sandiganbayan
145 SCRA 508 Legal Ethics Prosecutor Must Recommend Dismissal of Case If
There is No Ground To Sustain It
Trieste was the mayor of Numancia, Aklan. In 1980, during his term, the Municipality of
Numancia purchased construction materials from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation. Trieste was allegedly the president of said corporation. Trieste was then
sued for allegedly violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly for
willfully and unlawfully having financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or
transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official
capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest.
Trieste, in defense, said that he already divested his interest from the corporation when
he took his office as mayor; that he sold his shares to his sister; he presented evidence
to that effect. The Solicitor General doubted said sale because it was not registered in
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Further, the advertisement of Trigen in the
local rotary club shows that Trieste is the president of the corporation.
In time, the old Sol-Gen was replaced by a new one. The new Sol-Gen gave credit to
the arguments presented by Trieste as it recommended the dismissal of the case on
the ground that Trieste did divest his interest from the corporation by virtue of his
selling his shares to his sister; that said sale cannot be doubted simply because it was
not reported to the SEC; that sales of stocks are not required to be reported in the
SEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation of the Solicitor General is correct.
HELD: Yes. The Solicitor General is well within his rights to make such
recommendation. A public prosecutor should not hesitate to recommend to the court
the accuseds acquittal if the evidence in his possession shows that the accused is
innocent. If on appeal by the accused from a conviction by the trial court he finds no
legal basis to sustain the conviction, he should not also hesitate to recommend that the
accused be acquitted.
G.R. No. L-12817 April 29, 1960
JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and
ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for
respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section
2 (c) of Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General
dated 24 June 1957.
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership, jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District
as well as all areas served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage
and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities, and municipal
districts in the Philippines, and those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills
Section of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On 19 September 1955 the
President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 127 providing, among
others, for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of all the
records, properties, machinery, equipment, appropriations, assets, choses in actions,
liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all indebtedness of all government-owned
waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities and
municipal districts (51 Off. Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal council
of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the
desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our local
Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No. 1383." (Annex A.) On 20
April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the
Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on
the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle
and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially
the legality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the
municipality, (Annex B). On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion
holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent
the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought against the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act creating it
(Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed Resolution No.
201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or
proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to
engage the services of a special counsel, and appropriating the sum of P2,000 to
defray the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956 the
municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for
the municipality in its contemplated action against the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On 27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of Batangas
adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829 approving Resolution No. 201 of the
municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the
municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the municipality under the following
terms and conditions: that his professional services shall commence from the filing of
the complaint up to and including the appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that his
professional fee shall be P1,500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the
complaint, P500 upon the termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First
Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have become final or, should the judgment be
appealed, after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the appellate
court; and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for
the prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff
fees, transportation and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of transcripts
of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28 June
1956, the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas (civil No. 542, Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the
petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of
28 June 1956 (Annex H). On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the
complaint (Annex J). On 24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal
treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as
docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee. Attached to the
letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer
forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through
channels for pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the
petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500, based upon an opinion
rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial
Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the
municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had no authority to engage the
services of a special counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to the refund to the
petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15
August 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and
on 11 September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his
decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court Annex N). On 13 September
1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court.
The Revised Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. When the council
is desirous of securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own
powers or the constitution or attributes of the municipal government, it shall
frame such question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for
decision.
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial
subdivisions. The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the
provincial government and its officers, including district health officers, and of
the mayor and council of the various municipalities and municipal districts of
the province. As such he shall, when so requested, submit his opinion in
writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body
pertinent to the duties thereof.
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions
in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any
municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof
original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the
same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any
political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf
of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other
political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its
council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the
mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to
represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. When he
is disqualified to represent the municipality, the municipal council may engage the
services of a special attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court
the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is
vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality in the same province;1and when in the case The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and
involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir, mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit
legatee, creditor or otherwise.2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees. The decision under review is
was of the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and, affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with
earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the Misamin vs. San Juan (Adm Case 1418 August 31, 1976)
services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Sunday, March 18, 2012 Posted
a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of by Schizophrenic Mind
Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification.3 And
unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment,4 a fiscal cannot
refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesars
violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others, "that he will well and Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila
faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon
which he is about to enter. . . ."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from such
the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an
isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel while
acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and
prosecute its case in court, pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative holding a government position is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of
Code. The petitioner claims that the municipal council could not do this because the
Secretary of Justice, who has executive supervision over the Government Corporate Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.
Counsel, who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the
case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and
direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendantshould prosper
awkward and absurd position of having control of both sides of the controversy. The
petitioner's contention is untenable. Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947 and further amended by
Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5913, 5917, provides that the
Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government Corporate Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to be decided in
Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In Mondano vs. Silvosa,
an administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor General.
97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2888, this Court distinguished supervision from
control as follows: Nonetheless, the court held that while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would

not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. . . . assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory

The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity
and constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of
Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute
its case.
scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what
the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed.
Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar should refrain from laying

himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position

occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membershipin
an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied.
MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION,
Complainants,
- versus -
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR.,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint[1] filed by Martin Lahm III and James P.
Concepcion (complainants) praying for the disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll.
Mayor, Jr. (respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath.
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment[2] to the complaint.
In a Resolution[3] dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The antecedent facts, as summarized in
[4]
Recommendation dated September 19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr.
of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as follows:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission against the members of
the Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila. The same
was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to
the sala of the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-
respondents are the complainants in the instant case.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified
A.C. No. 7430 Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The said Motion
Present: was set for hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the morning.
A day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants
CARPIO, J., herein entered its appearance and asked for additional time to
Chairperson, oppose and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance
VILLARAMA, JR.,* of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
PEREZ, Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ. Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated
September 14, 2006 that directs the parties in the said case to
Promulgated: maintain the status quo ante. The complainants herein sought the
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 200[6] x x x.
February 15, 2012
xxxx
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David
Edward Toze was immediately reinstated and assumed his former
position as superintendent of the International School Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal
dismissal case were not resolved, however, the scheduled hearing
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 20, 2006
and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the
complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal case filed a motion
for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but
the respondent instead issued an Order dated February 6, 2007
requiring the parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at
10:00 in the morning in order to thresh out David Edward Toze claim
of moral and exemplary damages.
xxxx
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated
September 14, 2006 was issued by him on account of [the] Verified
the Report and Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents that was filed by
David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Additional Time to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the
counsel for the herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case
pending before the respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent
irreparable damage on the person of David Edward Toze, and on
account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
 Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against
the Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for
respondents in the illegal dismissal case have asked for a relatively
long period of fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found
merit in issuing the Order dated September 14, 2006 that requires
the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
xxx
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be
dismissed for being premature since the aforementioned illegal
dismissal case is still pending before the Labor Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission, that the instant case is a
subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself in
resolving the said illegal dismissal case because the complainants
did not assail the Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court
of Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[5]
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1)
the grounds cited by the respondent to justify his issuance of the status quo ante order
lacks factual basis and is speculative; (2) the respondent does not have the authority
to issue a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the
inordinate delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration directed against the
September 14, 2006 Order showed an orchestrated effort to keep the status quo
ante until the expiration of David Edward Tozes employment contract.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the
respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident will be dealt
with more severe penalty.[6]
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-644[7] which adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. The said resolution further pointed out that the Board of
Governors had previously recommended the respondents suspension from the
practice of law for three years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled Mary
Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr..
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition,[8] but it was
denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June
26, 2011.
The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of
Governors that the respondent should be sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and
violation of the lawyers oath. Thus:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme
Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any
fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[9] Gross
misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a
person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this
conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[10]
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary
sanction against the respondent as a member of the bar. However, the grounds
asserted by the complainants in support of the administrative charges against the
respondent are intrinsically connected with the discharge of the respondents quasi-
judicial functions.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter,
is a public officer entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is well settled that the

Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his
unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client
relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal
honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence.[11]
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts
committed in the discharge of his functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this
Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer
simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision
of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds.[12]
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,[13] we stressed that:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government official.However, if
said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on
various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED,
attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre,
Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications
or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given
the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this
Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the
charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the
CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a
member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it
was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money
as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.
xxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not
shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to
govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers
including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of
said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the
utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more
sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their
conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any
act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence
of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.[14] (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,[15] we ruled that an administrative case against a
lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Regional Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases
against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government.
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan[16] where the
respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for acts he committed in
his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board.
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government, performs official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly,
the present controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose
decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of
administrative cases.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not always
constitute misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may

not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a
conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice.[17]
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle
involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary
action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a
license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory
prerogatives.[18]
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to
simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.[19]
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the
law.
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order
requiring the parties to maintain the status quo ante until the said motion had been
resolved. It should be stressed, however, that at the time the said motion was filed, the
2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is
already in effect.
Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter
has, in proper cases, the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides that:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. A
preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the
Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it
is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition
that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor
dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to
post a bond and writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order
shall become effective only upon the approval of the bond which
shall answer for any damage that may be suffered by the party
enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled
thereto.
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the
Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them
in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of
the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strike or
lockout. (emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor
arbiters no longer has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining orders. Under Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC, only the NLRC, through its Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining orders. Thus:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A
preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the
Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it
is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition
that the acts complained of involving or arising from any labor
dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. (emphasis
supplied)
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunctions and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is limited to reception of
evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X of the 2005
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for
the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the Commission to
any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as
he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and
shall thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Commission
within fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)

The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the
respondent, in violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to
issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On this point,
the Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled that:
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Tozes
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it
outright on the basis of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.
xxxx
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission, should have been familiar with
Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission. The first, states that it is the Commission of the
[NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction or restraining order. While the
second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings on the application
of preliminary injunction or restraining order only in a delegated capacity.[20]
What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in
resolving the motion for reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The
unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the delay
in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that the
respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants.
On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:
The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated
September 14, 2006 and the delay in the resolution of the pending incidents
in the illegal dismissal case before the respondent.
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract
between David Edward Toze and International School Manila provides that
David Edward Toze will render work as a superintendent for the school years
August 2005-July 2006 and August 2006-July 2007.
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze
as superintendent of International School of Manila until the resolution of the
formers Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and
International School Manila is about to expire or end on August 2007,
prudence dictates that the respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of
David Edward Tozes Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents
because any delay in the resolution thereof would result to undue benefit in
favor of David Edward Toze and unwarranted prejudice to International
School Manila.
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal
dismissal case before him, there are barely four (4) months left with the
Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School
Manila.
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the
reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 that does not escape
the attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to
delay the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14,
2006 and keep status quo ante until expiration of David Edward Tozes
Employment Contract with International School Manila come August 2007,
thereby rendering the illegal dismissal case moot and academic.
xxxx
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution
of [the] assailed Order x x x should not be countenanced, specially, under the
circumstance that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract
between David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The
respondents lackadaisical attitude in sitting over the pending incident before
him for more than five (5) months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom,
shows the respondents disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence. Failure to
decide a case or resolve a motion within the reglementary period constitutes
gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction
against the erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is
akin to judges, and enjoined to decide a case with dispatch. Any delay, no
matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary x x x. [21]
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in
consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the clear import of the 2005
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law,
his acts as a labor arbiter in the case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably
resulting into prejudice to the rights of the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the
appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Under Rule 140[22] of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge,[23] punishable by a fine of more
thanP20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from
[24]
the service.
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator,
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, was suspended from the practice of law for
six months. Additionally, in parallel cases,[25] a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of
the law was meted the penalty of suspension for six months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar incident would be dealt with more severe penalty. We adopt the
foregoing recommendation.
This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously
recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for three years in
A.C. No. 7314, entitled Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.. This case,
however, is still pending.
It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical
conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the
standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject
to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the
heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the
public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official
functions.[26]
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation
in Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Caguioa,[27] thus:
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable
failure to observe basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable.
Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, for transgressing the
elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent should be
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge
is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or
he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.[28] (citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross
ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar
offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance and likewise be entered in the record of the respondent as
attorney.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National
Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the
Asset Management Group of complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in
which respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in
arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of
Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his
subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of
the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose out
of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of
complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case
filed by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave
misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be
later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainants Asset
Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses
Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the
couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda
spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm
"Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior
Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel
for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC
decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the
trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he
never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo
Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually
handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a
general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein.
They are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers,
who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting
staff. Each one of them handles their own cases independently and individually
receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was
previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No.
94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum
shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy
"through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully
substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the
Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the
attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of
the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer,
and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty.
Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the
application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted
being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was
working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in
itself a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the
clients secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other
lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to
devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank
since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer,
a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the IBP
saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he
expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4,
1994, submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation
contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994,
respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid
Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the
aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to
emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting
interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95
SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who
participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta
later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court,
citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him, that
even if respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence acquired
by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information
regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the forcible
entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling incident
which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's remarks
in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's
cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former
client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in
the forcible entry case. In the case ofHilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed
not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to
protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is
founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been said in another case,
the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can
litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to
respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank,
respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his
former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an
employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is
his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S.
CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.
CATU VS RELLOSA
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who
were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the
former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723,
Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The
parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at
an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of
the appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against
Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed
the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as
counsel for the defendantsdespite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent
claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and that he
acceded to Elizabeths request to handle the case for free as she was
financiallydistressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline
respondent. According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section
7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent
committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition,
respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month
with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of
respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the
respondent were proper.
HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the
Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has
left government service and in connection to former government lawyers who are
prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which [they]
had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was an incumbent
punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs
the practice of profession of elective local government officials. While RA 6713
generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160, being a special law,
constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local
elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors)
are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession
or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay
and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are
allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice
his profession.
Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a
prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil
service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey
the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required
written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics
and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and comport
himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession asembodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTYof
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective
from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from
its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent
and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general
public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held
where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by RA 265. AfterEDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino
established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos,
his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against
respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al
are represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed
motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central
Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different
intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting from the matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of
PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of the intervention. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of
an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former function as SolGen and his Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where
assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as
drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
ISSUE laws or briefing abstract principles of law. The court rules that the intervention of
Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of
Mendoza. The prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leavinggovernment service, justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court
intervened while in the said service. litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
HELD Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
However there is still the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest conflict Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a
sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on
key is unlocking the meaning of matter and the metes and bounds of intervention certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this
that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the matter or the act of respondent restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office. A plain
Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in
to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation the government and 2. relates to his accepting engagement or employment in
in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing [G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]
that drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner,
and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN,
scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza had nothing to FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN
do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
participate in the sale of GENBANK toAllied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY
C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA,
of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE
 CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP.,
FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN
DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT
CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE
FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO
HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it
concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in
government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit
competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account
with the Central Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had
approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests
totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as
uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans,
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28,
1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. [5] Subsequently, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First
Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs
liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of
the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents
Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo
Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio
N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel
Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong,
Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings
Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development
Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc.,
Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern
Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading
Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as
respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of theSandiganbayan.[6] In
connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by
the PCGG.[7] After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to
the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their
counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his
private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged
that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General[10] and counsel to Central
Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the
Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and
appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance
in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did
not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term
as Solicitor General.[12] It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the
year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from
practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.
[13]
The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July
11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second
Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in
substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
December 5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated
July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a
petition forcertiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions
contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central
Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of
the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res
judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view,
however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and
forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were
pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did
not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one
source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the
central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client.
The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific
pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to
explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency,
diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated
in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary
America did not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states
used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney
behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such
regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early
America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and
differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some
standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive
standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as
pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the
duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.[20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the
United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two
ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field
Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise
the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and
George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad
outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented
detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of
mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer
behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath and the
deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency
recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property.
Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege
and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely
exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial
and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not
provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast,
were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually
ushered a new era in American legal ethics.[21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began
to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar
codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They
combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century.
Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory
statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the
bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and
oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states
adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes
was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed
sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth
century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking
up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations,
most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association,
assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.[22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association
code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states
codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908
Canons of Ethics.[23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were
insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was
entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32
of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of
the canons. Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which
lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then
leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts,
and influence garnered in government service.[25] These concerns were classified
as adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest
conflicts exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a
client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with
while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are
adverse.[26] On the other hand, congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to
government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers.[27] For several
years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one
canon and added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former
government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-
interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely discretionary
actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the
government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later
become private practice clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits
of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should
not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and
added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47
of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the
ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect
Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and
effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons
needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish
between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in
enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed thatCanon
36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of
lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the
government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of
Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined
minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. [34] In the case of Canon
9, DR 9-101(b)[35]became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee
reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in
August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the
results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement
format, where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following
each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for
enforcement because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules. The
Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on
narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment
discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of
substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. [37] In
particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the
concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms
indefinite nature.[38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to
this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions,
and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this
Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and
provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general
structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
but replaced the expansive phraseinvestigated and passed upon with the
word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted
as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents
Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists
a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning
of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of
the intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter. The American
Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable
act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and
specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of
intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG
relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he
intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth
Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively
intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to
proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by
certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado
R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General
Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they
averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty.
Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK.
The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he
advised that the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board
reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the last
examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that
the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may
be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.
 2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the
liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of
the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan
approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance
reciting the proceedings which had been taken and praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary
Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent
documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition
for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated
March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the
Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of
Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated
March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the
Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No.
265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for
his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as
Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and
white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of
the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into
the condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or
that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or
creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to
inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the
statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in
the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge
of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the
assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the
powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and
foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or
cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,
it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor
General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such
institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate
disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is
necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation
plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official
of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as
liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the
Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed,
convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of
the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such
institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the
appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary
Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be
final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or
injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its
actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless
there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and
made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court
in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an
amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or,
if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be
in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of
the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the
petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The
provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and
dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as
they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this
shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary
demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or
financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of
a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the
provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended
by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in
stressing that the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not
fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of
respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No.
342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is
the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from
the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves.
It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself involved was in informing
Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts
and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First
Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is
related to but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No.
0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in
Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve
the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK
was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking
malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying
that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case
No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated
by Rule 6.03. Intervene means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to
occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by
way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two
things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference
that may affect the interests of others.[42]
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under
the first interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the
intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. [43] Under the second
interpretation, intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings.[44]We hold that this second meaning is more
appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the
Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered
as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally,
Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer should not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed
upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase
which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in unjust disqualification of former
government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the
prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government
service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the
reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client
in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the
special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent
Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings.
Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties
pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In
such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of
the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a
commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the
government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by
the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the
United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that
its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without
necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At
present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the
private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation.
The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to
recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and
contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. [45] Rightly,
Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too
great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the
practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the
firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. [46] Indeed, to make
government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter.[47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation
tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal
representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing
counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings,
deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the
opponent, and observed that the tactic was so prevalent in large civil cases in recent
years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary.[48] Even the United
States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of
disqualification motions as a dangerous game.[49] In the case at bar, the new attempt to
disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent
Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many
years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent
Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was
filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least,
the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled
put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted
that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of
choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. [51] The
client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work
done by the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective
counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading
of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service.
According to Prof. Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or she
can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist
illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private
employment does not enjoy such freedom. [53] He adds: Any system that affects the
right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to
quit inhibits official independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor
General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly
stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree
of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to
recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to
refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of
the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of
law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government
lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the
disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law
firm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and
loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging
public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best [56] which can lead to
untoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of
restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that
free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the
canons seek to protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been
rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct[59]and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of
interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant,
government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.[60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it
correctly disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries
the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official
information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar.
As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on
the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter
of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information
might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to
be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of
Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of
Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests
coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection
to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to
avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a
conflict of loyalties while still in government service.[61] The example given by the
proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he
or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less
vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960:
The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive
administration of government policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this
concern as probably excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to imagine that a private
firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last
client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want
the best government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified
or least vigorous advocates.[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the
case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central
Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et
al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank
and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the excessive influence of former officials or their clout. [66] Prof. Morgan again warns
against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz:
Much of what appears to be an employees influence may actually be the power or
authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from
government x x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those
sitting in government. To quote him further: x x x The idea that, present officials make
significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or
talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it
ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to
avoid even the appearance of favoritism.[68]
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the
congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot
 apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are
disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General,
Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid
to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length
cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates
to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively,
at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP
and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001
and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel [G.R. No. L-
27072 January 9, 1970]
07AUG
Ponente: SANCHEZ, J.
FACTS:
The first contempt proceeding arose from third motion for reconsideration signed by
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano
Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, that the petitioners, who, according to the
Solicitor General and based on their submitted and signed memorandum, alleged that
petitioners:
To have made false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to
prejudice the courts against MacArthur International (such efforts could be
accurately called scattershot desperation);
To have such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral
and arrogant attitude of the petitioners, and petitioners opportunistically change
their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in
the same case. Atty Santiago further alleged that the Supreme Court] has
overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the
petitioners counsel and
And the Supreme Court in the effect:
Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the right to reject any and all bids) can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or
just plain fraud. Atty. Santiago also filed a motion to inhibit against Chief Justice
Concepcion and Justice Castro.
The second contempt proceeding arose when respondent MacArthur, through new
counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose,
lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion
reiterated previous grounds raised, and included citing the New Rules of Court Section
1 Rule 51 and that alleged injustice may cut off all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government by invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment after making it known to the
World Court. Meads, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation
came about the portion left out was anyway marked by XS which is a common
practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer
to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that it is
not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote..
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
a) Atty. Vicente L. Santiago; Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto; Graciano C. Regala; and
Associates; and Atty. Erlito R. Uy; are guilty of contempt on the filed Third Motion for
Reconsideration;
b) Atty. Vicente L. Santiago; Atty. Juanito M. Caling, and Mr. Morton F. Meads are
guilty of contempt on the filed Fourth Motion for Reconsideration;
HELD:
a) For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago YES. Fine of P1,000.00.
For Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto YES. Fine of P100.00.
For Atty. Graciano C. Regala and Associates NO. (Took no part)
For Atty. Erlito R. Uy NO. (Took no part)
b) For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago YES. Additional fine of P1,000.00
For Atty. Juanito M. Caling YES. Fine P200.00. IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562 2/18/70) - Lawyers' Duty

For Mr. Morton F. Meads YES. Fine of P1,000.00. FACTS: Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title,
filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is a great injustice
committed against his client by Supreme Court. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as
a tribual peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
RATIO: without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity. His clients he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by
this Courts unjust judgment, has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar
a) On the Third Motion for Reconsideration
of hypocrisy.

The Supreme Court finds language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
He ridicules the members of the Court, saying that justice as administered by the
courts. Atty. Santiago pictures petitioners as vulturous executives and speaks of this
present members of the Supreme Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb. He
[Supreme] Court as a civilized, democratic tribunal, but by innuendo would suggest
then vows to argue the cause of his client in the peoples forum, so that people may
that it is not. Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of
know of the silent injustices committed by this court and that whatever mistakes,
the Rules of Court; and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated. He ends his
rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. Atty. Regala did
petition with a prayer that:
not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. Finally, borne
out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of
any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith
and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
b) On the Fourth Motion for Reconsideration
profession.

Atty. Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in
resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings.
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment
Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility.
agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision.
Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that [a]
Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the
lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing
time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff
those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to
moved for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, the trial court
their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client
denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his
persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.
first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second
motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on
Atty. Caling lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. He has not shown
August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on
to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge
Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was
against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read
denied by Court of Appeals.
the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in
only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name
should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.

HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as
As to Mr. Meads, having admitted having prepared the fourth motion for
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts
reconsideration, he cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though
of courts and judges.
he is not a lawyer.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen
is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.
In Re: Vicente Almacen
31 SCRA 562 Legal Ethics A Lawyers Right to Criticize the Courts
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every
petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its
constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only those
cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved. It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the courts denial. For
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.

Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said
said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing
criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said
and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals
has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for
the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the
reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme
courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition
of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional.
decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty
He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers certificate
of respect to courts.
of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when
members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party
Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his
of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the
client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became
court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen
one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also stated that justice
was suspended indefinitely.
as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but
also deaf and dumb. [A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition as the Court JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
surrender his lawyers certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to.
Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to give reasons and cause why no Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.
disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing. He
said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant, SYLLABUS
prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic.
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. Among the duties of an attorney are:
(1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which
he is charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all
personalities between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE
AT BAR; PENALTY. Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of
offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for.
Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the
latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a
fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent
failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal
profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that
respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He
has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities
and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. Respondent is
hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and
restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.
RESOLUTION
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for the use of insulting language in the course of judicial
proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the
defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case
on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard
respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter
looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence
of many people, complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The
court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the
complainant, claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner
complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the
record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty.
Castillo referred to by respondent was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for
ejectment was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up
this representation at his house and crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino
Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this representation like any good husband
would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school and confronted Atty.
Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife
of this representation and if yes, right then and there l would sock his face."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b)
and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all
personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the
remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no
right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing
the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also
to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to
the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more
deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed
offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been
admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more
circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of
Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondents actuation was triggered
by complainants own manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is
therefore not entirely free from blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through
the use of improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed
to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense
will be dealt with more severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
SO ORDERED.
In Re Clemente Soriano [G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970]
16AUG
Ponente: CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
Attorney Clemente Soriano, by virtue of a pleading entitled Appearance filed with this
Court on October 10, 1969, entered his appearance in the a certain case (L-24114) as
chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself
would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight
months after the decision in this case became final. Atty. Soriano was in effect asking
the Supreme Court to exhume this case from the archives. He alleged that sometime
during the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own
behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his
professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the case
entitled Varsity Hills vs. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al. (L-30546). He relied on
these premises without further communicating and ascertaining with the courts on its
records.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Santiagos conduct would warrant suspension from the practice of
law.
HELD:
NO. Respondent was simply admonished.
RATIO:
Atty. Clemente M. Soriano was found guilty of gross negligence in the performance of
his duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence
would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law profession, were it
not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology
he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is
hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future
similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano was ordered, in the case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he
has entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
In Re: Clemente Soriano
Atty. Clemente Soriano entered his appearance in the case Peoples Homesite vs
Mencias and Tiburcio et al. He sought to represent Marcelino Tiburcio. The odd thing is
that, when he entered his appearance before the Supreme Court, the case has long
been decided by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then directed Atty. Soriano to
show cause why he should not be subjected to disciplinary actions.
Atty. Soriano, in his defense, stated that he merely relied on the assurance made by
one Atty. Dalangpan who assured him that the case is still pending with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Soriano should be suspended.
HELD: No. But he is severely censured. The only reason why hes not suspended is
that he exhibited candor before the Supreme Court in acknowledging his mistake. He
has been negligent in his duty and this violates his duty to be diligent on his
responsibility to his client. He should have checked with the former lawyer of Tiburcio
as to the status of the case. If not, he could have simply checked with the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court instead of relying upon the assurances of Atty. Dalangpan
(who even denied before the Supreme Court that he made such assurances).
G.R. No. 3593 March 23, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA
BOSQUE, defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.
C.W. Ney for defendants.
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for
contempt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not
entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that
after the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as
such was not qualified for admission to the bar ( In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and an
order was entered accordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing
attorney, to carry on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque,"
stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law in all the
courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation
and office work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law Office - Ney &
Bosque. Juan G. Bosque,jurisconsulto espaol - C.W. Ney, abogado
americano."chanrobles virtual law library
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and
with one exception, occuring through an inadvertance, papers from the office were
signed not with the firm name alone nor with any designation of the firm as attorneys,
but with the words "Ney & Bosque - C.W. Ney, abogado."chanrobles virtual law library
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this
court refused to consider petitions so singed with the names of the defendants and the
practice being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to
the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon instituted
this proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being
within the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be
subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by implication prohibits, a
subscription of the names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore
a signature containing the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a
compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the
addition of the individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this instance was
aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so named was a person residing in these
Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the bar. The papers in
question were irregular and were properly rejected. We refuse to recognize as a
practice any signature of names appended to pleadings or other papers in an action
other than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing by
non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency. ( In
re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a
suitable firm designation by partners, all of whom have been duly admitted to
practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or
removal of the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not
being an officer of the court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably
for that reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?chanrobles virtual
law library
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;chanrobles virtual law
library
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to punishment for
acts so defined. ( Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S., 505.)chanrobles virtual law library
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court has
been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant
Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This
order, however, was directly binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for
its review, and any hope on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its
violation. Even had he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any
license from the court and without an application to it, yet its order made on his own
petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature
to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his authorization and constitutes a
substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth the
establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands,
amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by the
addition that he would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to
Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a lawyer in the
Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in
regard to which a skilled person might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The
fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer
of his professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a
foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified from practicing law. One of the most
eminent American advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest
in the court of New York State. ( In re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.)
Consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an
order made in a proceeding to which he was a
party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable,
inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this
subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct
amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in
holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper
signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible. It is impossible to
say that the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the man
who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while
the offensive character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from
presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of
members of the bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200
pesos, to be paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the
costs de oficio. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and
Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration,
against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder)
for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October
2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-
affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and
graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr.
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by
one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter
informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet
to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo
declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was
not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact.
On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed
signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolos affidavit and
other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing
Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally
dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the counsels signature posed a
prejudicial question to the Complaints validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman
ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be
filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that
he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as
evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of
Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and
that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the
Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed
against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various
offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed
the criminal case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for
insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence,
without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation
of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for
lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos
law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment
Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty.
Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a
Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients,
allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty.
Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained
that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices,
they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute
innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint
Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the
secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents
admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against
complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged
that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to
prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some
minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be
signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that
complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by
testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane
Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the
parties were directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory
conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006.
On the said date, complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents
failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested
that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents
submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit
their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants
position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents position paper dated 23
October 2006.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing
found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The
Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the
practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain
responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature
appearing in the complaint filed against complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony
J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the
findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from his
office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly
breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-
member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that
respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After
all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The
Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned
finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the
notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of
courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over
matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the
principle of "command responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the
bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as
a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty.
Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to
ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court
pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that,
he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively
liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of
the IBP approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolos violation of
Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of
Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby
AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE
the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his
Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his
separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants Motion for Reconsideration
and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors
denied both complainants and Atty. Bancolos motions for reconsideration. The IBP
Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent
Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office
of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly,
this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we
held:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that
this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not
to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And,
the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and
signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is
reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and
duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the
Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the
pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground
to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing ones signature to
a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and
give legal effect to the document.1wphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to
believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his
unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty.
Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to
Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed
with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo,
however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was
constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply
signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses,
the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his
secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved,
had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in
allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the
finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one
year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of
merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule
9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record
in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ALAWI VS ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sale representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. of
Davao City. Ashari Alauya is the incumber executive of clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Shari'a District in Marawi City. It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was
executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, or more precisely on
December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company.
Ruling:
1. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
2. WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use
of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a
judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar
or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and DOMINGO
FORTEZA, JR., respondents.
SANTOS, J:
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the
Order of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for Relief from
Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1,
1971, in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo
Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza
against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed as
Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W.
Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6,
1972, despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent
was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by
the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration
was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of
the case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. Said
Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the
law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his
day in Court by declaring him in default, it being contrary to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly award of
moral damages is contrary to law; and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.2
The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same
law firm. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a
different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same was denied and the
decision became final on June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court,
presided by respondent Judge for execution. 3
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court
which was granted by respondent Judge. 4
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for
Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his
Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently,
his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being
confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. 5
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed
the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". . a clear case
of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner,
and, that the grounds relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in the appeal before
the Court of Appeals ... " 6
On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of
execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for
the satisfaction of the judgment. 7
Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory
maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged
fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e.,
the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of
the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that
in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by
default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fidemembers of the Bar in seeking a
reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence
of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been
amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was
subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the
order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's
failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure
to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to
countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years
to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is
hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209
Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10)
days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the
Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and
GILBERTO SABSALON,respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action
for certiorari to annul the decision 1of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo
Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments,
plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the
date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de
minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we
find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small
wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly
demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their
reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the
underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the
petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour
shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or
P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car
washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their
"boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he
already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he
was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving
a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger
who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his
discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the
same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule
was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However,
on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the
previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth
P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he
adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak
Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily
cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was
left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the
repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by
petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When
Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services.
Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected
when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila
Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with
illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter
holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such
unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who
claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a
mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private
respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by
"Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that
Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left
their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the
ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally
terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering
petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this
resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is
now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public
respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions
are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and
capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray
any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of
the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no
showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi
industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be
refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. No employer shall require his worker to make
deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or
damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the
employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of
making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by
the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss
or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the
same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver
may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped
working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such
unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private
respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P
2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw
his deposits through valesor he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to
petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing
was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly
agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows
that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his
accumulated cash deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his
decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of
practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to
restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as
claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private
respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount
doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing
illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as
illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car
wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private
respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their
P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty
is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized
representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor
arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization
or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the
authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall
in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the
existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's
fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car
effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent
Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this
resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000
Facts: Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. It
appears that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper
PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal
259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand,
respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice
of law and under RA 7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income
taxes and included in this exemption is the payment of membership dues.
Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for
removal of the delinquents name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether
or not respondent is only engaged in limited practice of law. Moreover, the exemption
invoked by respondent does not include exemption from payment of membership or
association dues.
In addition, by indicating IBP Rizal 259060 in his pleadings and thereby
misprepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
Rizal Chpater, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead
or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever
is later.