Brief Fact Summary.

Turkeys (D) assertion of jurisdiction over a French citizen

who had been the first officer of a ship that collided with a Turkish ship on the high
seas was challenged by France (P) as a violation of international law.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A rule of international law, which prohibits a state from
exercising criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of
the states national jurisdiction, does not exist.

Facts. A collision occurred shortly before midnight on the 2nd of August 1926
between the French (P) mail steamer Lotus and the Turkish (D) collier Boz-Kourt. The
French mail steamer was captained by a French citizen by the name Demons while
the Turkish collier Boz-Kourt was captained by Hassan Bey. The Turks lost eight men
after their ship cut into two and sank as a result of the collision.

Although the Lotus did all it could do within its power to help the ship wrecked
persons, it continued on its course to Constantinople, where it arrived on August 3.
On the 5th of August, Lieutenant Demons was asked by the Turkish (D) authority to
go ashore to give evidence. After Demons was examined, he was placed under
arrest without informing the French (P) Consul-General and Hassan Bey. Demons
were convicted by the Turkish (D) courts for negligence conduct in allowing the
accident to occur.
This basis was contended by Demons on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction over him. With this, both countries agreed to submit to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, the question of whether the exercise of Turkish (D)
criminal jurisdiction over Demons for an incident that occurred on the high seas
contravened international law.

Issue. Issue: Does a rule of international law which prohibits a state from exercising
criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of the states
national jurisdiction exist?

Held. (Per curiam) No. A rule of international law, which prohibits a state from
exercising criminal jurisdiction over a foreign national who commits acts outside of
the states national jurisdiction, does not exist. Failing the existence of a permissive
rule to the contrary is the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law
on a state and it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another
state.
This does not imply that international law prohibits a state from exercising
jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case that relates to acts that have
taken place abroad which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international
law. In this situation, it is impossible to hold that there is a rule of international law
that prohibits Turkey (D) from prosecuting Demons because he was aboard a French
ship. This stems from the fact that the effects of the alleged offense occurred on a
Turkish vessel.
Hence, both states here may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over this matter
because there is no rule of international law in regards to collision cases to the
effect that criminal proceedings are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state
whose flag is flown.

Discussion. In 1975, France enacted a law regarding its criminal jurisdiction over
aliens because of this the situation surrounding this case. The law stipulates that
aliens who commit a crime outside the territory of the Republic may be prosecuted
and judged pursuant to French law, when the victim is of French nationality. This is
contained in 102 Journal Du Droit International 962 (Clunet 1975). Several eminent
scholars have criticized the holding in this case for seeming to imply that
international law permits all that it does not forbid.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. WONG CHENG

FACTS: Appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay
two and a half miles from the shores of the city. The demurrer filed by said appellee
alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and
dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the
one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdiction waters.
HELD: There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is
the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States (we were still a US territory
when this was decided in 1922).
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object
of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects
that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute.
Remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION US v. Canada

Brief Fact Summary. The United States (P) sought damages from Canada by suing
them to court and also prayed for an injunction for air pollution in the state of
Washington, by the Trail Smelter, a Canadian corporation which is domiciled in
Canada (D).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The duty to protect other states against harmful acts by
individuals from within its jurisdiction at all times is the responsibility of a state.

Facts. The Tail Smelter located in British Columbia since 1906, was owned and
operated by a Canadian corporation. The resultant effect of from the sulfur dioxide
from Trail Smelter resulted in the damage of the state of Washington between 1925
and 1937. This led to the United States (P) suit against the Canada (D) with an
injunction against further air pollution by Trail Smelter.
Issue. Is it the responsibility of the State to protect to protect other states against
harmful acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction at all times?

Held. Yes. It is the responsibility of the State to protect other states against harmful
act by individuals from within its jurisdiction at all times. No state has the right to
use or permit the use of the territory in a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or
to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein as stipulated under
the United States (P) laws and the principles of international law.
By looking at the facts contained in this case, the arbitration held that Canada (D) is
responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter Company.
Hence, the onus lies on the Canadian government (D) to see to it that Trail Smelters
conduct should be in line with the obligations of Canada (D) as it has been
confirmed by International law. The Trail Smelter Company will therefore be required
from causing any damage through fumes as long as the present conditions of air
pollution exist in Washington.
So, in pursuant of the Article III of the convention existing between the two nations,
the indemnity for damages should be determined by both governments. Finally, a
regime or measure of control shall be applied to the operations of the smelter since
it is probable in the opinion of the tribunal that damage may occur in the future
from the operations of the smelter unless they are curtailed.

Discussion. Responsibility for pollution of the sea or the existence of a duty to

desist from polluting the sea has never been laid at the feet of any country by any
international tribunal. Although regulation of pollution is just commencing, it must
ensure that there is equilibrium against freedom of the seas guaranteed under
general and long established rules of international law.

Blackmer v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. For his failure to respond to subpoenas served upon him in
France which required his appearance in the United States, Blackmer (D) was found
to be in contempt of court.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. There must be due process for the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction in personam.

Facts. Blackmer (D), a U.S. (P) citizen who was residing in France, was served
subpoenas to appear in court as a witness in a criminal trial in the U.S. Contempt
proceedings were initiated against Blackmer (D) when he failed to respond to the
subpoenas and he was found guilty and fined. Blackmer (D) appealed on the ground
that the federal statute was unconstitutional.

Issue. Must there be due process for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in
personam?

Held. (Hughes, C.J). Yes. There must be due process for the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction in personam. The court may adjudge the witness guity of contempt if
the witness fails to comply with the court order. Congress acted pursuant to its
authority in enacting the statute and it could prescribe a penalty to enforce it.
Affirmed.

Discussion. The statute was not found to be unconstitutional by the Court.

Blackmer (D) alleged that there was inadequate notice, but since he still retained
his U.S. citizenship, he was still subject to the U.S. authorities.

Liechtenstein v. Guatemala

Brief Fact Summary. A month after the start of World War II, Nottebohn (P), a
German citizen who had lived in Guatemala (D) for 34 years, applied for
Liechtenstein (P) citizenship.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Nationality may be disregarded by other states where it

is clear that it was a mere device since the nationality conferred on a party is
normally only the concerns of that nation

Facts. Nottebohn (P), a German by birth, lived in Guatemala (D) for 34 years,
retaining his German citizenship and family and business ties with it. He however
applied for Liechtenstein (P) citizenship a month after the outbreak of World War II.
Nottebohm (P) had no ties with Liechtenstein but intended to remain in Guatemala.
The naturalization application was approved by Liechtenstein and impliedly waived
its three-year. After this approval, Nottebohm (P) travelled to Liechtenstein and
upon his return to Guatemala (D), he was refused entry because he was deemed to
be a German citizen. His Liechtenstein citizenship was not honored. Liechtenstein
(P) thereby filed a suit before the International Court to compel Guatemala (D) to
recognize him as one of its national. Guatemala (D) challenged the validity of
Nottebohms (P) citizenship, the right of Liechtenstein (P) to bring the action and
alleged its belief that Nottebohm (P) remained a German national.

Issue. Must nationality be disregarded by other states where it is clear that it was a
mere device since the nationality conferred on a party is normally the concerns of
that nation?

Held. NO. issues relating to citizenship are solely the concern of the granting
nation. This is the general rule. But it does not mean that other states will
automatically accept the conferring states designation unless it has acted in
conformity with the general aim of forging a genuine bond between it and its
national aim. In this case, there was no relationship between Liechtenstein (P) and
Nottebohm (P). the change of nationality was merely a subterfuge mandated by the
war. Under this circumstance, Guatemala (D) was not forced to recognize it.
Dismissed.

Discussion. A state putting forth a claim must establish a locus standi for that
purpose. Without interruption and continuously from the time of the injury to the
making of an award been a national of the state making the claim and must not
have been a national of the state against whom the claim has been filed.
International law 347 (8th Ed. 1955) Vol.1.

MEJOFF V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Fucks: Boris Mejoff was a Russian citizen who was arrested for being suspected as
a Japanese spy after the Philippine liberation. It was found out that he illegally
entered the Philippines in 1944. He was without inspection and admission by the
immigration officials at a designated port of entry. He was then ordered to be
deported to Russia on the first available transportation to said country. But Russian
ships refused to take him due to their alleged lack of authority to do so. He was then
transferred to the Bilibid Prison and was kept in detention as the Commissioner of
Immigration believes it is of best interest to detain the unwanted alien while
arrangements for his deportation are being made. Mejoff contends that he was
legally brought to the Philippines by the then Japanese forces and he may not now
be deported. He also contends that the statutory period to deport him has long
lapsed and that we cannot detain him for an unreasonable period of time pursuant
to the Universal Declaration on Human rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mejoff shall remain in detention?

HELD: Yes. The government has the power and the authority to eject from the
Philippines any and all unwanted aliens. He entered the country illegally in 1944
and was arrested in 1948. Pursuant to Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940 an unwanted alien is subject to deportation within 5 years from arrest. And
he may be held for a reasonable period of time (depending on the circumstances)
while arrangements are being held for his deportation. There is no allegation
however as to the length of time that he has been detained. Hence, the same
cannot be construed as unreasonable. Further, there is no indication that the
statutory period to deport Mejoff had lapsed.

Staniszewski vs. Watkins (1948), 80 Fed. Supp., 132, which is nearly foursquare
with the case at hand. In that case a stateless person, formerly a Polish national,
resident in the United States since 1911 and many times serving as a seaman on
American vessels both in peace and in war, was ordered excluded from the United
States and detained at Ellis Island at the expense of the steamship company, when
he returned from a voyage on which he had shipped from New York for one or more
European ports and return to the United States. The grounds for his exclusion were
that he had no passport or immigration visa, and that in 1937 had been convicted of
perjury because in certain documents he represented himself to be an American
citizen. Upon his application for release on habeas corpus, the Court released him
upon his own recognizance. Judge Leibell, of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, said in part:

When the return to the writ of habeas corpus came before this court, I suggested
that all interested parties ... make an effort to arrange to have the petitioner ship
out of some country that would receive him as a resident. He is a native-born Pole
but the Polish Consul has advised him in writing that he is no longer a Polish subject.
This Government does not claim that he is a Polish citizen. This attorney says he is
stateless. The Government is willing that he go back to the ship, but if he were sent
back aboard ship and sailed to the Port (Cherbourg, France) from which he last
sailed to the United States, he would probably be denied permission to land. There
is no other country that would take him, without proper documents.

It seems to me that this is a genuine hardship case and that the petitioner should
be released from custody on proper terms....
What is to be done with the petitioner? The government has had him in custody
almost seven months and prac
tically admits it has no place to send him out of this country. The steamship
company, which employed him as one of a group sent to the ship by the Union, with
proper seamans papers issued by the United States Coast Guard, is paying $3 a
day for petitioners board at Ellis Island. It is no fault of the steamship company that
petitioner is an inadmissible alien as the immigration officials describe him....

I intend to sustain the writ of habeas corpus and order the release of the petitioner
on his own recognizance. He will be required to inform the immigration officials at
Ellis Island by mail on the 15th of each month, stating where he is employed and
where he can be reached by mail. If the government does succeed in arranging for
petitioners deportation to a country that will be ready to receive him as a resident,
it may then advise the petitioner to that effect and arrange for his deportation in the
manner provided by law.

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala

Brief Fact Summary. A suit against Pena-Irala (D) on the premise that he had
tortured to death the decedent of Filartiga (P), was filed by Filartiga (P).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. For purpose of the Allen Tort Statute, torture may be
considered to violate law of nations.

Facts. A suit claiming that Pena-Irala (D) had tortured Filartigas (P) decedent to
death while he was a police Inspector General, was brought by Filartiga (P). All
parties were Paraguayan citizens. Jurisdiction was based on the Allen Tort Statute,
28 U.S.C. S 1350, which provided jurisdiction for tort committed in violation of the
law of nations. The case was dismissed by the district court for lack of jurisdiction
to which Filartiga (P) appealed.

Issue. For purpose of the Allen Tort Statute, may torture be considered as a
violation of the law of nations?

Held. (Judge not stated in casebook excerpt). Yes. For purpose of the Allen Tort
Statute, torture may be considered to violate law of nations. The prohibition against
torture has become part of customary international law. Various United Nations
declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1975
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Torture further portrays the fact
that prohibition against torture has become part of customary international law.
Torture has been officially renounced in the vast majority of nations and this is the
reason why this court concluded that torture violates the law of nations.

Discussion. It is not new for many members of the United Nations to make
pronouncements and not be pronouncements into action. It is no secret that torture
is still widely practiced if not by a majority of countries then in a significant manner.
Actual practice, and not U.N. declarations have been argued by commentators as
what constitute international law.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ISRAEL vs EICHMANN

DOCTRINE:
There is no rule of general customary international law, which prohibits the
enactment of retroactive penal legislation. Furthermore, the argument that to
punish an individual for conduct which was not yet criminal at the time of its
commission would be unethical loses its force in face of the odious crimes
committed by the Appellant.

Facts: The crimes perpetrated by the Nazis during Hitlers reign against jewish
citizens were some of the worst recorded in history. The Appellant, Adolf
Eichmann, occupied the position of Head of "section for jewish Affairs charged
with all matters related to the implementation of the Final "solution to the jewish.
He was captured by Israeli "Security Forces in Argentina and handed over to the
District Court of Jerusalem to stand trial for war crimes, crimes against
humanity and crimes against the jewish people. He was convicted of all 15
counts and sentenced to death by the District Court of Jerusalem. He appealed on
both legal and factual grounds against his conviction and sentence based
on t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t r e l y o n t h e A c t o f " t a t e d o c t r i n e
t o e x c u s e h i s c r i m i n a l responsibility.

I s s u e : Ca n t h e A p p e l l a n t r e l y o n t h e A c t o f s t a t e d o c t r i n e t o
e x c u s e h i s c r i m i n a l responsibility

Held: The Appellant contends that his crimes were Acts of the State, the
responsibility for which rests with the state alone and another state has no right to
punish the person who committed the act, save with the consent of the state whose
mission he carried out. T h i s g r o u n d o f a p p e a l w a s r e j e c t e d b y t h e
S u p r e m e C o u r t a s t h e r e i s n o b a s i s f o r applying the doctrine to acts
prohibited by international law, particularly in cases of such heinous international
crimes. T h e r e i s n o r u l e o f g e n e r a l c u s t o m a r y i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w
th at the p ri n ci pl e of te rri tori al sove re ig n ty p roh i bi ts the
enactment of a criminal law applicable to extra-territorial crimes
c o m m i t t e d b y a f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l . T h e s e fi n d i n g s a r e r e i n f o r c e d b y
positive international law; the crimes for which the Appellant was
c o n v i c t e d w e r e international crimes under international law entailing individual
criminal responsibility at the time that they were committed and their universal
character is such that each state is vested with the power to try and punish anyone
who assisted in their commission.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:

Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of

the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of

the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the

said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of

Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of

private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.

On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take

charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition

documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary

requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and

that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have

received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for

the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that

the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any

proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the

governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused

guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by

a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve

preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the

government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source

of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law

incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted

with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international

law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the

extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a

reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law

of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable

in the domestic sphere.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are

confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of

international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since

it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the

generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation

clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be

made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence

dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason

that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all

circumstances.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not

pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in

the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,

decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not

superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior

derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal

a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the

Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are

in conflict with the constitution

government of hong kong vs olalia

Facts

Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest
were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was
upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed
by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting
the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high flight risk.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the
respondent judge subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings
and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court,
will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond
will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its
own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or

if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused,
real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the
accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent
judge. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue

WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling

A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail;
that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a
harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of
America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42,
and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that
the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the
same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the
following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to

the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed
from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post
bail.

Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan

Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and

Fundamental Fairness in Extradition

Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty

FACTS:
 Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary
was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a
comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec.
of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the
issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in
order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr.
Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required
by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an
alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in
the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest
and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing
bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take
cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a
procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant
under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the
prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES.

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima
facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest
and detention of the accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident
from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation
that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings
are summary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the
request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give
them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty
nor the Law could have intended.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does
not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To
determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself
requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the
witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or
may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of
this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a
prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the
issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee
of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape
and frustrate the proceedings.

ii. Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as

well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence
is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition
proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion
in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including,
as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state
when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is
derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant
bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision
and emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United
States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court
ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling
reason to grant him bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant

of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It
would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all
deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and,
while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays
and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
 That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will
stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters;
that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

iii. NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already
had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding
ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We
need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing
crime in our own country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its
trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner,
as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the determination
of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in
the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings
involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered
extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being
rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a

person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the
best claim to try that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in
court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to
deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of
implementation.