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So long as this regulation is extant, it has the force of law. In The demands of and the resistance to the subpoena present an
United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 obvious controversy in the ordinary sense, but that alone is not
(1954), regulations of the Attorney General delegated certain of sufficient to meet constitutional standards. In the constitutional
his discretionary powers to the Board sense, controversy means more than disagreement and conflict;
rather it means the kind of controversy courts traditionally
Page 418 U. S. 696 resolve. Here
of Immigration Appeals and required that Board to exercise its Page 418 U. S. 697
own discretion on appeals in deportation cases. The Court held
that, so long as the Attorney General's regulations remained at issue is the production or nonproduction of specified evidence
operative, he denied himself the authority to exercise the deemed by the Special Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible
discretion delegated to the Board even though the original in a pending criminal case. It is sought by one official of the
authority was his and he could reassert it by amending the Executive Branch within the scope of his express authority; it is
regulations. Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363, 354 U. S. 388 resisted by the Chief Executive on the ground of his duty to
(1957), and Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535 (1959), reaffirmed preserve the confidentiality of the communications of the
the basic holding of Accardi. President. Whatever the correct answer on the merits, these
issues are "of a type which are traditionally justiciable." United
Here, as in Accardi, it is theoretically possible for the Attorney States v. ICC, 337 U.S. at 337 U. S. 430. The independent
General to amend or revoke the regulation defining the Special Special Prosecutor, with his asserted need for the subpoenaed
Prosecutor's authority. But he has not done so. [Footnote 10] So material in the underlying criminal prosecution, is opposed by
long as this regulation remains in force, the Executive Branch is the President, with his steadfast assertion of privilege against
bound by it, and indeed the United States, as the sovereign disclosure of the material. This setting assures there is
composed of the three branches, is bound to respect and to
enforce it. Moreover, the delegation of authority to the Special "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
Prosecutor in this case is not an ordinary delegation by the issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
Attorney General to a subordinate officer: with the authorization of difficult constitutional questions."
of the President, the Acting Attorney General provided in the
regulation that the Special Prosecutor was not to be removed Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 204. Moreover, since the
matter is one arising in the regular course of a federal criminal
prosecution, it is within the traditional scope of Art. III power. Id. "A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is
at 369 U. S. 198. directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other
objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly
In light of the uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be
arises, the fact that both parties are officer of the Executive unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books,
Branch cannot be viewed as a barrier to justiciability. It would be papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be
inconsistent with the applicable law and regulation, and the produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to
unique facts of this case, to conclude other than that the Special the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon
Prosecutor has standing to bring this action, and that a their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects
justiciable controversy is presented for decision. or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their
attorneys."
III
A subpoena for documents may be quashed if their production
RULE 17(c) would be "unreasonable or oppressive," but not otherwise. The
leading case in this Court interpreting this standard is Bowman
The subpoena duces tecum is challenged on the ground that the
Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 214 (1951). This case
Special Prosecutor failed to satisfy the requirements of Fed.Rule
recognized certain fundamental characteristics of the subpoena
Crim.Proc. 17(c), which governs
duces tecum in criminal cases: (1) it was not intended to provide
a means of discovery for criminal cases, id. at 341 U. S. 220; (2)
Page 418 U. S. 698
its chief innovation was to expedite the trial by providing a time
the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum in federal criminal and place before trial for the inspection of
proceedings. If we sustained this challenge, there would be no
Page 418 U. S. 699
occasion to reach the claim of privilege asserted with respect to
the subpoenaed material. Thus, we turn to the question whether
subpoenaed materials, [Footnote 11] ibid. As both parties agree,
the requirements of Rule 17(c) have been satisfied. See
cases decided in the wake of Bowman have generally followed
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 304 U.
Judge Weinfeld's formulation in United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D.
S. 61, 304 U. S. 64 (1938); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288,
335, 338 (SDNY 1952), as to the required showing. Under this
297 U. S. 346-347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
test, in order to require production prior to trial, the moving party
must show: (1) that the documents are evidentiary [Footnote 12]
Rule 17(c) provides:
and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable
reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) least part of the conversations relate to the offenses charged in
that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such the indictment.
production and inspection in advance of trial, and that the failure
to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the We also conclude there was a sufficient preliminary showing
trial; and (4) that that each of the subpoenaed tapes contains evidence
admissible with respect to the offenses charged in the
Page 418 U. S. 700 indictment. The most cogent objection to the admissibility of the
taped conversations here at issue is that they are a collection of
the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a out-of-court statements by declarants who will not be subject to
general "fishing expedition." cross-examination, and that the statements are therefore
inadmissible hearsay. Here, however, most of the tapes
Against this background, the Special Prosecutor, in order to
apparently contain conversations
carry his burden, must clear three hurdles: (1) relevancy; (2)
admissibility; (3) specificity. Our own review of the record Page 418 U. S. 701
necessarily affords a less comprehensive view of the total
situation than was available to the trial judge, and we are to which one or more of the defendant named in the indictment
unwilling to conclude that the District Court erred in the were party. The hearsay rule does not automatically bar all out-
evaluation of the Special Prosecutor's showing under Rule of-court statements by a defendant in a criminal case. [Footnote
17(c). Our conclusion is based on the record before us, much of 13] Declarations by one defendant may also be admissible
which is under seal. Of course, the contents of the subpoenaed against other defendant upon a sufficient showing, by
tapes could not at that stage be described fully by the Special independent evidence, [Footnote 14] of a conspiracy among one
Prosecutor, but there was a sufficient likelihood that each of the or more other defendants and the declarant and if the
tapes contains conversations relevant to the offenses charged in declarations at issue were in furtherance of that conspiracy. The
the indictment. United States v. Gross, 24 F.R.D. 138 (SDNY same is true of declarations of coconspirators who are not
1959). With respect to many of the tapes, the Special defendants in the case on trial. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74,
Prosecutor offered the sworn testimony or statements of one or 400 U. S. 81 (1970). Recorded conversations may also be
more of the participants in the conversations as to what was admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility
said at the time. As for the remainder of the tapes, the identity of of any defendant who testifies or any other coconspirator who
the participants and the time and place of the conversations, testifies. Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses
taken in their total context, permit a rational inference that at is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial. See,
e.g., United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367,
Page 418 U. S. 702 available from any other source, and their examination and
processing should not await trial in the circumstances shown.
371 (DC 1954). Here, however, there are other valid potential Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 214 (1951);
evidentiary uses for the same material, and the analysis and United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335 (SDNY 1952).
possible transcription of the tapes may take a significant period
of time. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the District Court Page 418 U. S. 703
erred in authorizing the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum.
IV
Enforcement of a pretrial subpoena duces tecum must
necessarily be committed to the sound discretion of the trial THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE A
court, since the necessity for the subpoena most often turns
upon a determination of factual issues. Without a determination Having determined that the requirements of Rule 17(c) were
of arbitrariness or that the trial court finding was without record satisfied, we turn to the claim that the subpoena should be
support, an appellate court will not ordinarily disturb a finding quashed because it demands "confidential conversations
that the applicant for a subpoena complied with Rule 17(c). See, between a President and his close advisors that it would be
e.g., Sue v. Chicago Transit Authority, 279 F.2d 416, 419 (CA7 inconsistent with the public interest to produce." App. 48a. The
1960); Shotkin v. Nelson, 146 F.2d 402 (CA10 1944). first contention is a broad claim that the separation of powers
doctrine precludes judicial review of a President's claim of
In a case such as this, however, where a subpoena is directed privilege. The second contention is that, if he does not prevail on
to a President of the United States, appellate review, in the claim of absolute privilege, the court should hold as a matter
deference to a coordinate branch of Government, should be of constitutional law that the privilege prevails over the
particularly meticulous to ensure that the standards of Rule subpoena duces tecum.
17(c) have been correctly applied. United States v. Burr, 25
F.Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). From our In the performance of assigned constitutional duties, each
examination of the materials submitted by the Special branch of the Government must initially interpret the
Prosecutor to the District Court in support of his motion for the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch
subpoena, we are persuaded that the District Court's denial of is due great respect from the others. The President's counsel,
the President's motion to quash the subpoena was consistent as we have noted, reads the Constitution as providing an
with Rule 17(c). We also conclude that the Special Prosecutor absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presidential
has made a sufficient showing to justify a subpoena for communications. Many decisions of this Court, however, have
production before trial. The subpoenaed materials are not unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803), that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 5 U. "Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed
S. 177. No holding of the Court has defined the scope of judicial by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether
power specifically relating to the enforcement of a subpoena for the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
confidential Presidential communications for use in a criminal committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
prosecution, but other exercises of power by the Executive interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate
Branch and the Legislative Branch have been found invalid as in interpreter of the Constitution."
conflict with the Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S.
486 (1969); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the
579 (1952). In a others, the "judicial Power of the United States" vested in the
federal courts by Art. III, 1, of the Constitution can no more be
Page 418 U. S. 704 shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for
example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the
series of cases, the Court interpreted the explicit immunity Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a
conferred by express provisions of the Constitution on Members Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the
of the House and Senate by the Speech or Debate Clause, basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and
U.S.Const. Art. I, 6. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government.
Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972); United States v. The Federalist, No. 47, p. 313 (S. Mittell ed.
Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson 383 U.
S. 169 (1966). Since this Court has consistently exercised the Page 418 U. S. 705
power to construe and delineate claims arising under express
powers, it must follow that the Court has authority to interpret 1938). We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of
claims with respect to powers alleged to derive from enumerated this Court "to say what the law is" with respect to the claim of
powers. privilege presented in this case. Marbury v. Madison, supra at 5
U. S. 177.
Our system of government
B
"requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the
Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President's
the document by another branch." counsel urges two grounds, one of which is common to all
governments and one of which is peculiar to our system of
Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 395 U. S. 549. And in Baker v. separation of powers. The first ground is the valid need for
Carr, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 211, the Court stated: protection of communications between high Government
officials and those who advise and assist them in the of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The
performance of their manifold duties; the importance of this President's need for complete candor and objectivity from
confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. Human advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However,
experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated
of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent
decisionmaking process. [Footnote 15] Whatever the nature of a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive
the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the
the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality
from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by
of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from production of such material for in camera inspection with all the
the nature of enumerated powers; [Footnote 16] the protection of protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.
the confidentiality of
Page 418 U. S. 707
Page 418 U. S. 706
The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would
Presidential communications has similar constitutional place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial
underpinnings. Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly
conflict with the function of the courts under Art. III. In designing
The second ground asserted by the President's counsel in the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the
support of the claim of absolute privilege rests on the doctrine of sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers
separation of powers. Here it is argued that the independence of of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system,
the Executive Branch within its own sphere, Humphrey's but the separate powers were not intended to operate with
Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 295 U. S. 629-630 absolute independence.
(1935); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 103 U. S. 190-191
(1881), insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in an "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential liberty, it also contemplate that practice will integrate the
Presidential communications. dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon
its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the reciprocity."
need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without
more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 343 U. S. decisions, and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
635 (Jackson, J., concurring). To read the Art. II powers of the express except privately. These are the considerations justifying
President as providing an absolute privilege as against a a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The
subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government, and
more than a generalized claim of the public interest in inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions Constitution. [Footnote 17] In Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U.S.App.D.C.
would upset the constitutional balance of "a workable 58, 487 F.2d 700 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that such
government" and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art. Presidential communications are "presumptively privileged," id.
III. at 75, 487 F.2d at 717, and this position is accepted by both
parties in the present litigation. We agree with Mr. Chief Justice
C. Marshall's observation, therefore, that "[i]n no case of his kind
would a court be required to proceed against the president as
Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial
against an ordinary individual." United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas.
process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to
at 192.
resolve those competing interests in a manner that preserves
the essential functions of each branch. The right and indeed the But this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our
duty to resolve that question does not free the Judiciary from historic commitment to the rule of law. This
according high respect to the representations made on behalf of
the President. United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 187, 190, 191- Page 418 U. S. 709
192 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807).
is nowhere more profoundly manifest than, in our view, that "the
Page 418 U. S. 708 twofold aim [of criminal justice] is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. at 295 U. S.
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his 88. We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal
conversations and correspondence, like the claim of justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary
values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of
citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking. A very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the
President and those who assist him must be free to explore system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is In this case, the President challenges a subpoena served on
done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory him as a third party requiring the production of materials for use
process be available for the production of evidence needed in a criminal prosecution; he does so on the claim that he has a
either by the prosecution or by the defense. privilege against disclosure of confidential communications. He
does not place his claim of privilege on the ground they are
Only recently the Court restated the ancient proposition of law, military or diplomatic secrets. As to these areas of Art. II duties,
albeit in the context of a grand jury inquiry, rather than a trial, the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to
Presidential responsibilities. In C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman
"that 'the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence,' except
S.S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 333 U. S. 111 (1948), dealing with
for those persons protected by a constitutional, common law, or
Presidential authority involving foreign policy considerations, the
statutory privilege, United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. [323, 339 U.
Court said:
S. 331 (1950)]; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 284 U.
S. 438 (1932). . . ." "The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the
Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 408 U. S. 688 (1972). The
services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to
privileges referred to by the Court are designed to protect
the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant
weighty and legitimate competing interests. Thus, the Fifth
information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the
Amendment to the Constitution provides that no man "shall be
Executive taken on information properly held secret."
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
And, generally, an attorney or a priest may not be required to In United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1 (1953), dealing
disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence.
These and other interests are recognized in law by privileges Page 418 U. S. 711
Page 418 U. S. 710 with a claimant's demand for evidence in a Tort Claims Act case
against the Government, the Court said:
against forced disclosure, established in the Constitution, by
statute, or at common law. Whatever their origins, these "It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the
exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger
lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
derogation of the search for truth. [Footnote 18] which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.
When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is
appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security
which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an respect. However, we cannot conclude that advisers will be
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent
chambers." occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such
conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal
Id. at 345 U. S. 10. No case of the Court, however, has prosecution. [Footnote 20]
extended this high degree of deference to a President's
generalized interest in confidentiality. Nowhere in the On the other hand, the allowance of the privilege to withhold
Constitution, as we have noted earlier, is there any explicit evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would
reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely
interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's impair the basic function of the court. A President's
powers, it is constitutionally based. acknowledged need for confidentiality
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial Page 418 U. S. 713
similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment
explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" and "to the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair
Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of
shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the justice. Without access to specific facts, a criminal prosecution
manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in
accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by
evidence be produced. disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily
shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
In this case, we must weigh the importance of the general
privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in We conclude that, when the ground for asserting privilege as to
performance of the President's responsibilities against the subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based
inroads of such a privilege on the fair only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in
Page 418 U. S. 712 the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized
assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
administration of criminal justice. [Footnote 19] The interest in need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed, and entitled to great
D Enforcement of the subpoena duces tecum was stayed pending
this Court's resolution of the issues raised by the petitions for
We have earlier determined that the District Court did not err in certiorari. Those issues now having been disposed of, the
authorizing the issuance of the subpoena. If a President matter of implementation will rest with the District Court.
concludes that compliance with a subpoena would be injurious
to the public interest, he may properly, as was done here, invoke "[T]he guard, furnished to [the President] to protect him from
a claim of privilege on the return of the subpoena. Upon being harassed by vexatious and unnecessary subpoenas, is to
receiving a claim of privilege from the Chief Executive, it be looked for in the conduct of a [district] court after those
became the further duty of the District Court to treat the subpoenas have issued; not in any circumstance which is to
subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged and to require precede their being issued."
the Special Prosecutor to demonstrate that the Presidential
material was "essential to the justice of the [pending criminal] United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 34. Statements that meet the
case." United States v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 192. Here, the District test of admissibility and relevance must be isolated; all other
Court treated the material as presumptively privileged, material must be excised. At this stage, the District Court is not
proceeded to find that the Special limited to representations of the Special Prosecutor as to the
evidence sought by the subpoena; the material will be available
Page 418 U. S. 714 to the District Court. It is elementary that in camera inspection of
evidence is always a procedure calling for scrupulous protection
Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to rebut the against any release or publication of material not found by the
presumption, and ordered an in camera examination of the court, at that stage, probably admissible in evidence and
subpoenaed material. On the basis of our examination of the relevant to the issues of the trial for which it is sought. That
record, we are unable to conclude that the District Court erred in being true of an ordinary situation, it is obvious that the District
ordering the inspection. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Court has
District Court that subpoenaed materials be transmitted to that
court. We now turn to the important question of the District Page 418 U. S. 715
Court's responsibilities in conducting the in camera examination
of Presidential materials or communications delivered under the a very heavy responsibility to see to it that Presidential
compulsion of the subpoena duces tecum. conversations, which are either not relevant or not admissible,
are accorded that high degree of respect due the President of
E the United States. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a trial
judge in the Burr case, supra, was extraordinarily careful to point
out that
"[i]n no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed Page 418 U. S. 716
against the president as against an ordinary individual."
it that, until released to the Special Prosecutor, no in camera
25 F.Cas. at 192. Marshall's statement cannot be read to mean material is revealed to anyone. This burden applies with even
in any sense that a President is above the law, but relates to the greater force to excised material; once the decision is made to
singularly unique role under Art. II of a President's excise, the material is restored to its privileged status, and
communications and activities, related to the performance of should be returned under seal to its lawful custodian.
duties under that Article. Moreover, a President's
communications and activities encompass a vastly wider range Since this matter came before the Court during the pendency of
of sensitive material than would be true of any "ordinary a criminal prosecution, and on representations that time is of the
individual." It is therefore necessary [Footnote 21] in the public essence, the mandate shall issue forthwith.
interest to afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest
Affirmed.
protection consistent with the fair administration of justice. The
need for confidentiality even as to idle conversations with
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or
associates in which casual reference might be made concerning
decision of these cases.
political leaders within the country or foreign statesmen is too
obvious to call for further treatment. We have no doubt that the * Together with No. 73-1834, Nixon, President of the United
District Judge will at all times accord to Presidential records that States v. United States, also on certiorari before judgment to the
high degree of deference suggested in United States v. Burr, same court.
supra, and will discharge his responsibility to see to