Statutory

Construction
Atty. Chip Pilapil

Part IV Basic Principles Used in Statutory Construction
1. Ratio legis est anima legis (The reason of the law is the soul of the law)

Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo
Where the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have
the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration and where this is not duly accorded to the
agricultural lessee, it is a deviation from the reason of the framers of the Land Reform code to grant unto leasehold
tenants and share tenants equal rights and opportunities.

Where the true intent of the law is clear, such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof. Whatever is within the
spirit of a statue is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and
contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.

League of Cities vs. COMELEC
11th Congress 33 bills converted 33 municipalities into cities but Congress did not act on 24 other bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
12th Congress Enacted RA 9009: increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into the
city | Reason: to prevent the mad rush to convert for larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotments despite
incapability of fiscal independence | HOR moved for Joint Res. 29 to exempt the 24 municipalities left behind
from the 11th Congress of RA 9009 but 12th Congress ended without approving JR 29.
13th Congress JR 29 in 12th Congress moved to be JR # 1 BUT Senate once again did not approve of it. Instead
in accordance to the advice of Sen. Pimentel, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills containing a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009. This was approved by the HOR and soon lapsed into law on various
dates from March to July 2007 after the President failed to sign them. Move in underline was declared to be
unconstitutional as Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became
effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the
cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of
non-retroactivity of laws. RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is to be applied prospectively.

Relevance to StatCon:
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any exemption
from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending
when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no
exemption whatsoever.

Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the
increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

2. Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum (The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself)

Serana v. Sandiganbayan
Case trigger: UP Student Regent committed estafa
Petitioners interpretation:
She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person,
in her capacity as UP student regent.
Claimed that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.
Courts interpretation:
Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch-all phrase in relation to office,
 thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner.
Petitioner, despite her protestations, was a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she had the general powers
of administration and exercised the corporate powers of UP

Relevance to StatCon:
In her argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding
paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to
each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the legislator must be
ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. In other words, petitioners
interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that
the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.

3. Plain Meaning or verba legis Rule
Victoria v. Comelec
Petitioner ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation
to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein.

What the law states: Ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained
by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters of each district. It does not mention anything about
factoring the number of voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the
law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words

Republic v. Lacap
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a
contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed
therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to
the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

The plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This rule derived from the maxim

Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its
intent by use of such words as are found in the statute.

Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Bolos v. Bolos
Petitioner filed the petition to the Supreme Court contending that the appellate court erred in ruling that their case is
not covered by the Family Code; that AM no 02-11-10-SC covers/pertains to the word petitions instead of marriages;
if the Family code covers the case then a motion of reconsideration is a precondition for an appeal; and, since the
respondent refused to comply with the precondition of filing a motion for reconsideration, a relaxation on the rules of
appeal is not proper.

The court ruled that AM 02-11-10-SC is strict in its scope wherein section 1 of the rule reads:
Section 1. Scope This rule shall govern petitions for declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and annulment
of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. Applying the rule verba legis, the said section leaves no
room for interpretation and is very clear that it would only cover marriages under the Family Code.

4. Spirit of the Law vs. Letter of the Law
Alonzo v. IAC
Case trigger: Sale of land that involves notice (issue: should notice be written or not?) to other brothers and sisters.
There are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. What should be done instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may
be done even as the law is obeyed.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that
which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the
intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the law makers

5. Rule of avoidance on questions of constitutionality
PACU v. Secretary of Education
There is no justiciable controversy as regards section 1 of Republic Act No. 139, abut textbooks, where the petitioners
have not shown that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that textbook, or that he petitioners refused or
intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so doing.

Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid
the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into
play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion."

6. Lex de futuro, judex de praeterito (The law provides for the future, the judge for the past)
PDIC v. Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank
PDICs appeal to the appellate court raised the lone issue of whether Section 12 of RA 9302 may be applied retroactively
in order to award surplus dividends to Intercity Bank creditors, which was what the parties had stipulated upon as the
sole legal issue in PDICs Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation
Proceedings.

A perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity
clause indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary: Section 28. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not
the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito the law provides for the future, the judge for the past,
which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its
liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions.

7. Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit (The law looks forward, not backward)
Valeroso vs. CA
The Letter-Appeal in the present case regarding Valerosos breached constitutional rights against unwarranted search
and seizure is actually in the nature of second motion for reconsideration, while a second motion for reconsideration as
a general rule is a prohibited pleading. However, in De guzman vs. Sandiganbayan and Astorga vs. People the SC
entertained their second motion and set aside their earlier decisions. The lack of subsequent decisions abandoning the
earlier rulings by theSupreme Court moved the SC to adopt and apply the same rulings in the case at bar.

8. Last Antecedent Rule
Doctrine of last antecedent
Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated not those
which are distantly or remotely located.
 Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia relative words refer to the nearest antecedents,
unless the context otherwise requires
Rule: use of a comma to separate an antecedent from the rest exerts a dominant influence in the application of the
doctrine of last antecedent.

PLDT Co. vs. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. L-26762, 29 August 1975
The rule that a qualifying or relative word or clause, such as "which," "said," and "such," is to be construed as applying to
the words, phrase or clause next preceding or, as is frequently stated, to the next preceding antecedent, and not as
extending to or including others more remote, unless a contrary intention appears may be applied in the present case.
This rule is known as the doctrine of last antecedent, which is both a rule of grammar and a rule of law.

9. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole
Alpha Investigation and Security Agency v. NLRC
The joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance
with its provisions, including the statutory minimum wage. The contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct
employer, while the principal becomes the indirect employer of the former's employees for the purpose of paying their
wages in the event of failure of the contractor to pay them. This gives the workers ample protection consonant with the
labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a
careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. In fact, legislative intent
must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision
alone.

10. Mens Legislatoris or Mischief Rule
The Mischief Rule: When it is not clear whether an act falls within what is prohibited by a particular piece of legislation,
the judges can apply the mischief rule. This means that the courts can take into account the reasons why the legislation
was passed; what mischief the legislation was designed to cure, and whether the act in question fell within the
mischief.
Mens Legislatoris (the purpose and object of the enactment by the legislature): When the language of a particular
section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction that gives effect to the evident purpose
and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole must be followed

Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co.
A marriage that took place after the fatal accident gives no question that at the time of his death, widow was married to
him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel
Macabenta, is likewise a dependent. Where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain, courts must apply it to the facts as
found.

11. Pari Materia Rule
Upon the Same Subject
A designation applied to statutes or general laws that were enacted at different times but pertain to the samesubject or
object. Statutes in pari materia must be interpreted in light of each other since they have a common purpose
for comparable events or items.

Tan Co v. Civil Register of Manila
LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the Philippines. While
they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No. 270governs
naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the same purpose and objective: to enable aliens permanently
residing in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the Philippines Absent any
express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473(1939) in LOI No. 270 (1975), the said provision should be read into the latter
law as an integral part thereof, not being in consistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No.473, which
extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized, should be similarly applied to the
minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.

12. Rule Against Surplusage/Ut Magis valeat quam pereat (It is better for a thing to have effect than to be made
void)
Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals
The settled rule is that in case of uncertainty as to the meaning of a provision granting extension to a contract of lease,
the tenant is the one favored and not the landlord. 'As a general rule, in construing provisions relating to renewals or
extensions, where there is any uncertainty, the tenant is favored, and not the landlord, because the latter, having the
power of stipulating in his own favor, has neglected to do so; and also upon the principle that every man's grant is to be
taken most strongly against himself

Besides, if we were to adopt the contrary theory that the terms and conditions to be embodied in the renewed contract
were still subject to mutual agreement by and between the parties, then the option - which is an integral part of the
consideration for the contract - would be rendered worthless. For then, the lessor could easily defeat the lessee's right
of renewal by simply imposing unreasonable and onerous conditions to prevent the parties from reaching an
agreement, as in the case at bar. As in a statute no word, clause, sentence, provision or part of a contract shall be
considered surplusage or superfluous, meaningless, void, insignificant or nugatory, if that can be reasonably avoided.
To this end, a construction which will render every word operative is to be preferred over that which would make
some words idle and nugatory

13. Cessante ratione legis, cessa tipsa lex (The reason for a law ceasing, the law itself ceases)
People v. Almuete
Pre-reaping and pre-threshing of palay by rice tenant is no longer a crime under the Agricultural Land Reform Code
which superseded the Agricultural Tenancy Law. Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has
no more raison detre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in section 34 of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in R.A. 6389 which took effect on September 10,
1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also
ceases), applies to this case.

A new law which omits anything contained in the old law dealing on the same subject, operates as a repeal of anything
not so included in the amendatory act.

14. Construction is favored when it avoids injurious consequences
Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora
Stipulations in employment contracts providing for term employment or fixed period employment are valid when
the period where agreed upon knowingly, and voluntarily by the parties without force, duress or improper pressure
exerted on the employee; and when such stipulations were not designed to circumvent the laws on security of tenure.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, undefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.

15. Rule of Lenity
Rule of Lenity is a judicial doctrine requiring that those ambiguities in a criminal statute relating to prohibition and
penalties be resolved in favor of the defendant if it is not contrary to legislative intent. It embodies a presupposition of
law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment. The courts
while construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments should resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.

People v. Temporada
In a case where the statute was ambiguous and permitted two reasonable interpretations, the construction which would
impose a less severe penalty was adopted.

16. Dura lex sed lex (The law may be harsh but it is the law)
Obiasca v. Basallote
When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it regardless of its perceived harshness. Dura lex sed lex.
Nonetheless, the law should never be applied or interpreted to oppress one in order to favor another. As a court of law
and of justice, this Court has the duty to adjudicate conflicting claims based not only on the cold provision of the law but
also according to the higher principles of right and justice.

17. Interpretation of tentative/permissive language
Bernadette Adasa vs. Cecille Abalos
The phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean "shall" or "must". It shall be interpreted in its
ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary on the part of the delegate department or the Board 6f
Communications then, now the National Telecommunications Commission whether or not to promulgate pertinent
rules and regulations. There is nothing in P.D. No. 217 which commands that the phrase "may be promulgated" should
be construed as "shall be promulgated."

Part V Latin Maxims Applied to Statutory Construction
1. Absoluta Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget (An absolute sentence needs no
explanation)
Barcellano v. Baas
The respondent Baas has a perfect right of redemption and was never in danger of losing such right even if there was no
redemption complaint filed with the barangay, no tender of payment or no consignation. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. The
law is clear in this case, there must first be a written notice to the family of Baas.

2. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est (A case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted)
People vs. Manantan
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such
laws Instead, the rule merely serves as an additional single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning
of penal laws

3. Ejusdem generis (Of the same kind)
General rule: where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same
class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to, persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

Purpose: give effect to both particular or general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and
the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular
words.

Principle: based on proposition that had the legislature intended the general words to be used in their generic and
unrestricted sense, it would have not enumerated the specific words.

Presumption: legislators addressed specifically to the particularization
4. Expressium facit cessare tacitum (What is expressed makes what is implied silent)
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where
a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended
to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

5. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius (The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another)
Rule may be expressed in a number of ways:
 Expressum facit cessare tacitum - what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters.
Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis - A thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within
the purview of the general rule
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius - The expression of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of
all not expressed, even though all would have been implied had none been expressed; opposite the doctrine of
necessary implication

6. Generalia specialibus non derogant (General things do not derogate from special things)
Tomawis v. Balindong
We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should be read
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. In the instant case, we apply the
principle generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to
the special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter. We must read and construe BP 129 and PD
1083 together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile the two laws. This is so since the
legislature has not made any express repeal or modification of PD 1083, and it is well-settled that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. Implied repeals will not be declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. Laws are
assumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, and it
follows that the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter

7. Noscitur a sociis (Known from its associates)
Where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with
which it is associated.
To remove doubt refer to the meaning of associated or companion words
Chavez v. JBC
Paragraph focused on: The raison d tre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should
ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

8. Reddendo singula singulis (Referring each to each)
Variation of the doctrine of last antecedent
Referring each to each;
Referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the word
should be taken distributively.

9. Ubilex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus (When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.)
Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, 29 June 2010
There is no rhyme or reason in public respondents ratiocination that after the third congressional term from the
ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties
registered exclusively as representing the youth sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.