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Spouses Bonrostrovs.

Spouses Luna
G.R. No. 172346 July 24, 2013

Facts:

Constancia Luna, as buyer, entered into a contract to sell with Bliss


Development Corporation involving a house located in Quezon City. A year
after, Luna sold it to Lourdes Bonrostro under the ff. terms:
The stipulated price of P1,250,000, and has the following stipulation,x
xx [I]n the event the VENDEE fails to pay the second installment on time,
[t]he VENDEE will pay starting May 1, 1993 a 2% interest on the P300,000.00
monthly. Likewise, in the event the VENDEE fails to pay the amount of
P630,000.00 on the stipulated time, this CONTRACT TO SELL shall likewise be
deemed cancelled and rescinded and x xx 5% of the total contract price [of]
P1,250,000.00 shall be deemed forfeited in favor of the VENDOR. Unpaid
monthly amortization shall likewise be deducted from the initial down
payment in favor of the VENDOR.
After execution of the contract, Bonrostro took possession of the
property. However, except for P200,000.00 down payment, she failed to pay
subsequent amortization. Luna then filed before the RTC a Complaintfor
Rescission of Contract and Damages. The RTC and the CA ruled in favour of
the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not delay in the payment of installment is a substantial


breach of obligation as to warrant its rescission.

Held:
No. The defendants delay in the payment of the two installments is
not so substantial as to warrant rescission of contract. In a contract to sell,
payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition. Failure of which is
not a breach of contract warranting rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil
Code, but rather just an event that prevents the supposed seller from being
bound to convey title to the supposed buyer. The contract to sell entered by
the parties refers to real property on installment basis, in which Art. 1191
cannot apply since they are governed by the Maceda Law. However, there
being no breach, Bonrostro is still not excused from being made liable for
interest on the installments due from the date of default until fully paid.
Tender of payment, a manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with
or pay an obligation, asserted by Bonrostro for the accrual of interest to be
suspended is not a valid defense because for a tender of payment to take
effect it must be accompanied by the means of payment and debtor must
take immediate step to make a consignation, the deposit of the proper
amount with a judicial authority, then interest is suspended from the time of
such tender.

BJDC CONSTRUCTION vs. LANUZO


G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014

Facts:

This is a claim for damages filed by the heirs of Lanuzo, arising from
the death of Balbino Lanuzo in a night time accident due to the supposed
negligence of a construction company then undertaking reblocking work on
a national highway. The plaintiffs insisted that the accident happened
because the construction company did not provide adequate lighting on the
site, but the latter countered that the fatal accident was caused by the
negligence of the deceased himself.
Before the SC the company reiterates the categorical finding of the RTC
that the proximate cause of the accident was Balbinos own negligence, to
the effect that Balbino was driving his motorcycle at a fast speed trying to
overtake another motorcycle rider before hitting the barricade. On the other
hand, it insists that its documentary and testimonial evidence proved its
exercise of due care and observance of the legally prescribed safety
requirements for contractors.
The company also maintains that Balbino was familiar with the re
blocking project that had been going on for months because he had been
passing the area at least four times a day during weekdays in going to and
from his place of work in the morning and in the afternoon; and that he could
have avoided the accident had he exercised reasonable care and prudence.

Issue: Whose negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino?

Held:

Negligence, the Court said in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,


is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do, or as Judge Cooley defines it, (t)he failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. In order that a party may be held liable for damages
for any injury brought about by the negligence of another, the claimant must
prove that the negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
In this case the company credibly refuted the allegation of inadequate
illumination. Zamora, its flagman in the project, rendered an eyewitness
account of the accident by stating that the site had been illuminated by light
bulbs and gas lamps, and that Balbino had been in the process of overtaking
another motorcycle rider at a fast speed when he hit the barricade placed on
the newly cemented road.
Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence
cannot be fairly ascribed to the company considering that it has shown its
installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the project site. In
that context, the fatal accident was not caused by any instrumentality within
the exclusive control of the company. In contrast, Balbino had the exclusive
control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records
disclose that he himself did not take the necessary precautions. As Zamora
declared, Balbino overtook another motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in
the process could not avoid hitting a barricade at the site, causing him to be
thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly cemented road.
All the established circumstances showed that the proximate and
immediate cause of the death of Balbino was his own negligence. Hence, the
Lanuzo heirs could not recover damages.
METRO CONCAST STEEL CORPORATION, SPOUSES JOSE S. DYCHIAO
AND TIUOH YAN, SPOUSES GUILLERMO AND MERCEDES DYCHIAO,
AND SPOUSES VICENTE AND FILOMENA DYCHIAO vs. ALLIED BANK
CORPORATION

Facts:

Metro Concast obtained several loans from Allied Bank. These loan
transactions were covered by a promissory note and separate letters of
credit/trust receipts. Petitioners failed to settle their obligations under the
aforementioned promissory note and trust receipts, hence, Allied Bank,
through counsel, sent them demand letters, all dated December 10, 1998,
seeking payment of the total amount of P51,064,093.62, but to no avail.
Thus, Allied Bank was prompted to file a complaint for collection of sum of
money against petitioners. In their answer,petitioners admitted their
indebtedness to Allied Bank but denied liability for the interests and
penalties charged, claiming to have paid the total sum of P65,073,055.73 by
way of interest charges for the period covering 1992 to 1997.

They also alleged that the economic reverses suffered by the Philippine
economy in 1998 as well as the devaluation of the peso against the US dollar
contributed greatly to the downfall of the steel industry, directly affecting the
business of Metro Concast and eventually leading to its cessation. Hence, in
order to settle their debts with Allied Bank, petitioners offered the sale of
Metro Concasts remaining assets, consisting of machineries and equipment,
to Allied Bank, which the latter, however, refused. Instead, Allied Bank
advised them to sell the equipment and apply the proceeds of the sale to
their outstanding obligations. Accordingly, petitioners offered the equipment
for sale, but since there were no takers, the equipment was reduced into
ferro scrap or scrap metal over the years. In 2002, Peakstar Oil Corporation,
represented by one CrisantaCamiling, expressed interest in buying the scrap
metal. During the negotiations with Peakstar, petitioners claimed that Atty.
Peter Saw, a member of Allied Banks legal department, acted as the latters
agent. Eventually, with the alleged conformity of Allied Bank, through Atty.
Saw, a Memorandum of Agreement dated November 8, 2002 was drawn
between Metro Concast, represented by petitioner Jose Dychiao, and
Peakstar, through Camiling, under which Peakstar obligated itself to
purchase the scrap metal for a total consideration ofP34,000,000.00.
Unfortunately, Peakstar reneged on all its obligations under the MoA.
Petitioners essentially argue that their loan obligations to Allied Bank had
already been extinguished due to Peakstars failure to perform its own
obligations to Metro Concast pursuant to the MoA. Petitioners classify
Peakstars default as a form of force majeure in the sense that they have,
beyond their control, lost the funds they expected to have received from the
Peakstar (due to the MoA) which they would, in turn, use to pay their own
loan obligations to Allied Bank. They further state that Allied Bank was
equally bound by Metro ConcastsMoA with Peakstar since its agent, Atty.
Saw, actively represented it during the negotiations and execution of the
said agreement.

Issue: Whether or not Peakstars breach of its obligations to Metro Concast


arising from the MOA can be classified as a fortuitous event.

Held:

Anent petitioners reliance on force majeure, suffice it to state that


Peakstars breach of its obligations to Metro Concast arising from the MOA
cannot be classified as a fortuitous event under jurisprudential formulation.

Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not


foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should
not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must
be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. To constitute a
fortuitous event, the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor
to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be
impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the casofortuito or, if it can
be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfil obligations in a
normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in
the aggravation of the injury or loss.

While it may be argued that Peakstars breach of the MOA was


unforseen by petitioners, the same us clearly not "impossible" to foresee or
even an event which is independent of human will." Neither has it been
shown that said occurrence rendered it impossible for petitioners to pay their
loan obligations to Allied Bank and thus, negates the formers force
majeure theory altogether. In any case, the performance or breach of the
MOA bears no relation to the performance or breach of the subject loan
transactions, they being separate and distinct sources of obligations.

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