LOLITA D. ENRICO, G.R. No.

173614
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. REYES, JJ.
MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-
MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY
VILMA M. ARTICULO,
Respondents. Promulgated:

September 28, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assails the Order,1[1] dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of
its Order,2[2] dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

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On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio)
and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the
complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June
1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3[3] They begot seven children, herein respondents,
namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. 4[4]
On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.5[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner
before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. 6[6] Six months later, or on 10
February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7[7]

In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same

was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article
348[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could
not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision.
Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only
upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the
date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their
cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due
to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband
and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were
exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born
Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30
October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony was
performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal
Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the

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ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order, 9[9] granting the dismissal of
the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, 10[10] dated
7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC
elucidated on its position in the following manner:

The Complaint should be dismissed.

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which

took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a) 11[11] that a petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that
such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is
clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading
of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this
right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse
cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null
and void.12[12] (Emphasis supplied.)

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer

is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby
DISMISSED with costs de officio. 13[13]

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Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by
petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order 14[14]
dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC
reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the
ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,15[15] which was on the authority for holding that the heirs
of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the
death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are
still living.16[16] Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs
may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance,
thus:

The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122
(March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a
deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his
death. The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Nial
vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has
rejected the case of Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic)
the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage
and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the
parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Nial vs. Bayadog
and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case
of Nial vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the]
basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who entered
into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their successional
rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over
the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would
be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition
to declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have
already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right
should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule. Rules of
Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a
legal standing in Court.

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If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their
parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will
give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask
for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of
validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the
parent.

For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void
marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void
marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the
Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the
ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable. 17[17]

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated
October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.18[18]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order;

however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new
matter was raised therein.19[19]

Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the
sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to the
case at bar.

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At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,
countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their
respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the
litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court. 20[20]
Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court
of last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes
in the first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe
the principle of hierarchy of courts. 21[21] However, it cannot be gainsaid that this
Court has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate
exercise of its jurisdiction.22[22] Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the
instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this
Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.

Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A
contrario, respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of
the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death.

We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC

acted with grave abuse of discretion.

While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent
after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason
that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the
validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in

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effect at the time of their celebration.23[23] What we have before us belongs to a
different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to
wit:

Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. 24[24]

Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of
the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with
the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and application. As has been
emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to
Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

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 (a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis
supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When
the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions
cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by
the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of

voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. 25[25] (Emphasis
supplied.)

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless,
all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are

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already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional
right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity
of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without
prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B.
Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents. December 16, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages
solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior
to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision26[1] of the

Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment 27[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage,
status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land
to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots
are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of
Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
reserved.

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Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a
non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot
155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to
1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the
subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or
less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot
28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE
THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y
por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano,
el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que
es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que
forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por
el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que
es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que
forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS. 28[3]

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in
turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the
name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT
No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad
and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The

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said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878,
respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in

Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties
submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the
compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from
the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-
square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition,

dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,29[4] 2,331 square meters of

the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining
10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed

on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted
the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under
the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels
of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-
135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action:
(a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property;
(d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to
Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother
Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

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Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with
respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for
the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums
received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary

damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material
averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of
details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads
marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of
the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They
also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for
summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the
peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of
Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and
respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the
ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there
is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the

testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil
Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias.
In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her
child with Teofilo.30[5]

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Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial
court its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between
the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents) Motion for Summary

Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:

1.Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of
P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of
filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less
the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No.
139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds
to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between plaintiff and

defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City
to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in
the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and

defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant
Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds
of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant

Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds
of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs evidence on his claim
for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, appearance fees, and
litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.31[6]

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued,

inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering
summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in
declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin
for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.32[7]

The CA opined:

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We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo
contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact
that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did
not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to recover
upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on summary judgment apply
(sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was
presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the
petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of
dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had
effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that
appellees own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband
and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means
by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by
the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo
resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts
alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary

judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the
marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo
Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang,
Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo
Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was the
Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have
overlooked the same.

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered
view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the
motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the
case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence of marriage is

not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants non-
presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was
not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be
emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the
legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial courts rejection of
the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the
basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals statements. Although it
had effectively disavowed appellants prior claims regarding the legitimacy of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son
of appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the
said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter,
his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellees
bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an
indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to
support what could well be a minors total forfeiture of the rights arising from his
putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements,
appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of
Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during
the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his
name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have
done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to
thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos
II.33[8]

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition
of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision,
Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Motion for reconsideration under the
Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact
that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and
intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore
decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules
of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing
Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of
the laws and misapprehension of the facts.34[9] (Underscoring supplied)

33

34
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void
ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without
the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of
one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be

proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is
allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 35[10] of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court
governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the
provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial
court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary

judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x 36[11]

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA

was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both

35

36
the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in
cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of
marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with
clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on
March 15, 200337[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case.
No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.38

[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the
application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or

declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to
all kinds of actions.39[14] (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its
lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not
terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists

37

38

39
between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. 40[15]

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when
the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence.
Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor
has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is
not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the

Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the
public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor
to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or
fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the

Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.41[16]

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be

filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage
cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

40

41
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule
is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern
of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. 42[17]
(Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when
and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers
of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their
matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take
a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 43[18]

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a

42

43
nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended
to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean
that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They
can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules
on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. 44[19]

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the
coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on
March 15, 200345[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico
v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,46[21] viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.47[22] (Underscoring
supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in

1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law
would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. 48[23]

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its

44

45

46

47

48
celebration.49[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to
declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for
the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such
person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 50[25] Elsewise
stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.51[26]

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having
no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff
in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible
on the ground of lack of cause of action. 52[27]

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,53[28] where the Court

held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.

49

50

51

52

53
xxxx

In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but
reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry,
then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage
on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file
the same.54[29] (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a

real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his
only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II.
Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law.55[30]

Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of
the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs
were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child,
respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

54

55
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect
to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 56[31]

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although
a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a
compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003
of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children

excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The
presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased
precludes succession by collateral relatives.57[32] Conversely, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. 58[33]

56

57

58
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to
seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This
is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire
successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without
ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other
siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other
half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to
Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to
seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner
succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the
nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not
a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo,

then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has
no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For
although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning,
still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,59[34] or even an adopted child60[35] excludes the collateral relatives
from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine
the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly
instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate,
or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of
petitioner.

59

60
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition
of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the
remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This
notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as
error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution
of the case.61[36]

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted
in the case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from
an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from
his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement
that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of
respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such
declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the
CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status
of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of

Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The
language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage.62[37]

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action
concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be

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62
vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding
that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on
the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of
marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or

legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to
DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is

VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch
and to give this case priority in its calendar.

ISIDRO ABLAZA, G.R. No. 158298

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

BRION,
-versus - BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
REPUBLIC OF THE

* and
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. August 11, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil
Code is the legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner
whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the
ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the
action.

Antecedents

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato.63[1] The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117
entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on
January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving
brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of
the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a
real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the

63
validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after
the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.64[2]

Ruling of the RTC

65
On October 18, 2000, [3] the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:

Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved
to DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time
(action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage
(contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949
and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error
that:

The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that
the petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

64

65
 In its decision dated January 30, 2003,66[4] however, the CA affirmed the
dismissal order of the RTC, thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the
beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action
must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the
parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a
brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage contracted by
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that
he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons
other than those specified in the law file the case.

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party
to file the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be
prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal

are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.67[5]

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:

I.

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67
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-
G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-
G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209
AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.

The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest
in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased
brother.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and

wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such
relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of
a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted.68[6] As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated
cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. 69[7] To
illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the
Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the
intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of
the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of
a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony. 70
[8]

68

69

70
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein
of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect
on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of
the Civil Code.71[9] Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages
covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a
procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.72[10]

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,73[11] the following actions for declaration of absolute

nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC; and

2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the
parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to
the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,74[12]
the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the

71

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73
declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted on
December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court
distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and
when each might be impugned, thuswise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not require a
judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage
void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for
the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by
the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances,
the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal
rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place.
And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties
at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the
courts. It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final

74
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. 75[13]

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil
Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action
to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,76[14]
the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. 77
[15] Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the
action.78[16] Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental
interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest,
the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. 79[17]

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and
surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then
he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely
affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not
a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article
1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.

75

76

77

78

79
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or

illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner
from succeeding to the deceaseds estate. 80[18] Necessarily, therefore, the right of
the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether
Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving heir.
Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon
involves questions of fact.

As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented
in this case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the
petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late
Cresencianos surviving wife,81[19] stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the
nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all
marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required

a marriage license for their validity; 82[20] hence, her participation in this action is
made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had
been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have
been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was
truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:

xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before

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82
the court [that] the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 83[21]

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
91025 entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila
Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who
between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved therein.
Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009, and the
petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant
in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the
therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the
late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial
right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise
implead Leila.

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present
action, however, considering that Section 11, 84[22] Rule 3, Rules of Court, states
that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her,
for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may
be made on motion of any party or on (the trial courts) own initiative at any stage
of the action and on such terms as are just.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.

We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the
Court of Appeals.

Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract
between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is
reinstated, and its records are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in
Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first require the
petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and
her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether
the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner
83

84
was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to
succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
a review of the December 10, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an
original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel
Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing
the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69
(RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner
and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision,
dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between
petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on
February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the
Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office
(NSO) copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed
the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for
Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in
violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was
likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision
final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19,
2006 Order which denied due course to Danilos appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006
Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3)
the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and
executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to
render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of
abandoning him, the family home and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the
assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the
ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli 3 to the effect that the
"coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion
for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration [of the Honorable Courts Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The
CA, however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution, 4 denied the motion for extension
of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising the following
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.
MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING
THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE
INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V.
SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER
THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD
"PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES
SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY
HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A
PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS
NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING
AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE
OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY
AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE
PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND
NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is
whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the
case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA
erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case,
which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the
Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case
constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the
substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the
said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the
action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both the Family
Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while
the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable
because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years
before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from
the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his
purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties who
were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as
required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the
Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule,
in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 7 The rule sets a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the
phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
"petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is
only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This
is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there
is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial
justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this
case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has
stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not
be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. 11 As a
corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays
and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these
rules are regarded as mandatory. 12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for
filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex
Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas
Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered
thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial of
petitioners motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioners
earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the
circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its
motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond the
review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which
denied due course to respondents appeal and denying petitioners motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for
review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal. 14 In the recent case of
Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the right to
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our
judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party
of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints
of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct
institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof
emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens
our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone
of the family members.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of
subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the
protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated August 17, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution 2
dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves
(Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City 3 and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was
indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen.
Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in
behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda, 5 filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint 6 alleged,
inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and
that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The
complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by
deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the
same while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his
status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the
deceased never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not
have validly done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant
Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one
contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they
(deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked
from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from
January 4, 1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of
which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on
February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both
Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the
latters disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano. 12 Estrellita argued that the RTC
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
(Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case
for declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari
petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On
December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA 14 which was docketed
thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case
since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if
the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the
trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellitas
turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose 15 were postponed mostly
at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings 16
in view of the CAs temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996,
enjoining it from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision
dated September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment
to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to
present her evidence on June 26, 1997. 20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day,
the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing,
Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to
submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the
case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she
still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City, 25 stating as
one of the reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083,
the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming
jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998, 26 we denied
Estrellitas motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the
aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void
ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never
severed, declared Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio
for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under
Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second
marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the
subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent
marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his
civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the second
marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not
an acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially,
where the subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family
Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision
of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have
required her to file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She
maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and
subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she
highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage
to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004, 32 the CA held that
Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample
opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous
postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a
period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita
cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an
independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial
court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to
Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of
Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for
an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites,
while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then,
according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos
wife and, hence, the injured party in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage
with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the
additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public
prosecutors report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section
3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the
trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial,
negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined
before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer.
Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously
rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case
ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion
to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas marriage to Sen.
Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA
erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving
her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the
allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v.
Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an
answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is
obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely
participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial courts assurance that the
proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on
her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this
commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months
before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11,
1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a
finding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further
proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is
valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he
married her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of
Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered
by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim
law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as
attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased. 38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit
because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. 39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning
and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that
filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main
action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion,
the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition
of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also
supports private respondents legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellitas
purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party
may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such
right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the
latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without
waiting for the Supreme Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R.
No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process;
and c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there
was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage
declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer;
and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of
the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial
proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due
process. She was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in
the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias 40 to justify the suspension of the period to
file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for
certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been
decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA
which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing
an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her
to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent
Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the
case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order
denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the
period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days
computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within
which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x 41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the
trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss
that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should
suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the
motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court
failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because
after it denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the
husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even
when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the
instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion
to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she
filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should
have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and,
subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly
ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the
proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent
action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition
of the judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating
that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." 43 In fact, the
trial court respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA
rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never
issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action.
With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in
refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so,
insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her
failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable
only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory
tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly
proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have
waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait
for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait
for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly
the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of
Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the
public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the
prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion
between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after
receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in
collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if
any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof
in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the
report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss
the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State
at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to
submit the required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with
by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March
30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no collusion between the parties
and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the
private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that
there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public
prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 47 the lack of participation
of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting
attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to
the validity of the proceedings in the trial court. 48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. 50
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except
during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 51 which was not availed of during its
effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal
laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof
provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we
already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites." 53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law
cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights
on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the
prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of
this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and
nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or
legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved
against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and
implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the
Civil Code in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes
enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which
states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in
accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under
Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be
considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual
consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are
Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides,
as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this
was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen.
Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application
and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous
subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, 55 Estrellita relies on
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under
Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano
may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition
to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions
cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
[Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern
of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. 57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed,
the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what
the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance,
the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.
The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the
subsequent marriage.1wphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have
legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution
governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in
application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15,
2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in
November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party
who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken
place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights
as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and
his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be
interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include
striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution
issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision 2 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109,
Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed)
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the
RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC
Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in
Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to
Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9,
1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence,
located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with
two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told
of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until
Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to
apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of
2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on
their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract
wherein the marriage license number could be found. 5 The Municipal Civil Registrar,
Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that
the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued
to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said certification reads as
follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office,
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and
MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS
and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose
or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him
in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice
of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining
to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that
the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated
July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the
Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that
their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely
9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz,
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and
a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola. 14 He
testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar
with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract
was prepared by his secretary. 16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office. 17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed
Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he
requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that
this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He
further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained. 20 He
attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract
as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her
son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9,
1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the
Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the
marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application
for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave
it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. 24 She further testified that she did not read
all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage
license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also testified that a bigamy case had
been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by
an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a)
she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January
9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the
persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas
Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the
marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof. 27 She and her mother sought
the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of
the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the
marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application for
marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned
with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev.
Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on
January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a
certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage,
and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in
Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under
Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and
those around them at the time were Chinese. 31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage
license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of
Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. 32 It also
took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of
the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal
requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against
the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of
the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries
the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-
Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC
denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of
Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A
MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS
THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES
ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW. 35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a
diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus
held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled
that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites
laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage
contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as
husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05
October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January
1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008. 41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN
CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING
ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The
pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor
with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct
of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the
requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code.
The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license
had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had
been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof,
and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to
prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed
turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no
such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having
the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record
or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data. 44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no
such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of
the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria
and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that
it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license
appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the
certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is
worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the
lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license
could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other
evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar
was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to
the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of
Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to
the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona,
Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to
apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and
existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the
contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.
Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came
from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and
a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that
office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so,
further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her
and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that
can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that
there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the
validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No
marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure
to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria
and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that
appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all
the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of
appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the
signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the
witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during the marriage
ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one
offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee
more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take
serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an
Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T.
Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his
own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted
and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that
a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of
the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void
ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be
that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as
it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that
they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was
Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005
in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent
on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, G.R. No. 164493

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC March 10, 2010

OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14,
2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)85[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which
reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.86[2] The reversed RTC decision nullified
Jocelyns marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS

85

86
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were
residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila
with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents
sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Bian,
Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and they
were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with
Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling.
Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household help.
Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk.
Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of
Jocelyns efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another
woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the
RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical
narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her complaint:

xxxx

8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987,
their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable
physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted
physical injuries upon her every time they had a troublesome encounter;

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the
defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations making life
unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their separation in fact in
July 1987;
 10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time
of their marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves to be
continuous, permanent and incurable;

xxxx

Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself
to a psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably
hired by Jocelyn).

The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the
psychologist testified at the trial.

In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition,

including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On
cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations but significantly
declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they were married.

Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:

Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?

A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his
behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?

A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you
got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?

A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.

Q. Even to other people?

A. He also quarrel (sic).87[3]

Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.

When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:

Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his
behavior?

A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the
marriage the respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a
serious and severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-
standing before the marriage.

Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?

A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when

I examined her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant
to marital relationship with respondent.

Q. And the last page of Exhibit E which is your report there is a statement rather on
the last page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the
undersigned that marriage between the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even
before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent(s) immature, irresponsible
and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful
relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person
suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe
and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love, caring, concern and
responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing in proportion
and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the wedding and
became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He
apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic
mean?

87
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long
before he entered marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic)
Basic trust was not develop (sic).

Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).

A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because

psychological disorder are not detrimental to men but to others particularly and this
(sic) because the person who have this kind of disorder do not know that they have
this kind of disorder.

Q. So in other words, permanent?

A. Permanent and incurable.

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at
the time of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?

A. Yes, maam.

xxxx

Court:

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality

Disorder (sic).

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment
exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social
Disorder.

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are
suffering that kind of disorder (sic).

Court:

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the

respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?

A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often
than not he even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).

Court:

Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent
(sic).

Court:

Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Why did you know?

A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent
is not aware that this kind of personality affect the other party (sic).

Court:

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?

A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under
the influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during
the less than one year and one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to
work as housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never
receive and enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the
petitioner who took sustainance of the vices. (sic)

Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?

A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital
relationship but what he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).

Court:

Q. What are the vices?

A. Alcohol and gambling.

Court:

Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?

A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder, he is good for nothing person. 88[4]

The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report
pertinently states:89[5]

Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for Nullity

of Marriage versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO

GENERAL DATA

88

89
[This pertains to Jocelyns]

BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

xxxx

Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3 rd year high school, a part time
tricycle driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to
be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It
was a common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit
relationship. Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose
bickering and squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day living.

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately

suppressed so much so that it does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully
equipped in terms of drives and motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her
socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of
containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic)
with her immediate environment.

She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in
spite of difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external
realities of life that she set simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her
capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order to
direct her energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for frustration appears to be
at par with her coping mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends
appropriately.

REMARKS :

[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above] 90[6]

90
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines
strongly opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a
Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and
test Angelito; thus, what she said about him was purely hearsay.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:

While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be
considered as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds
that would render a person to be unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as
immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility,
otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or
excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism,
or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks (The
Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)

The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and
Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing that the petitioner failed to establish a
harmonious family life with the respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not
shown love and respect to the petitioner manifested by the formers being
irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all a wife beater.
The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior and attitude of the
respondent, decided, after one year and four months of messy days, to leave the
respondent.

In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her
married life with the respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to
physical injuries inflicted upon her and that she was the one who worked as a
housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain the latters niece (sic) and
because they were living with her husbands family, she was obliged to do the
household chores an indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that
she served as a servant in his (sic) husbands family.

This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that
at the time of their marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced
only to said marriage by her relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never
developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent blamed the
petitioners family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.

Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by

this Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,91[7] the RTC concluded:

The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist testimony

quoted above] would only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering
from psychological incapacity which is not only grave but also incurable.

Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:

x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]

The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the
petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case
was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is psychological
incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital
obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is
entitled to the relief prayed for.

A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the

respondent is a speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will
enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using
the surname of the respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim and
sad reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag during the
short span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment should be liberally
construed in favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an
instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social
behavior of herein respondent.92[8]

THE CA RULING

91

92
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC
decision, ruling that:

True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs
Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician
personally examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The
Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of
psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically
identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the
aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social
worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the
absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose mental and
psychological capacity was in question.

In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent
was psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume
the essential duties of marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the
wife gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is
inconclusive. As observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed
to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it
is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological
malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist
that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the
time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical
investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best,
could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes
like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could
have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a
permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in
productive work and more stable relationships with another. The element of
permanence or incurability that is one of the defining characteristic of psychological
incapacity is not present.

There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the
married life of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the
marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in
Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the
marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family that the law
seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to
legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.

THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the
reversal of the CA ruling based on the following arguments:

1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded
the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void Tuason v. Tuason
(256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that the
finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioners
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the
Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis--vis
petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous;

2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this
omission was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term
without being shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would
make a person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:
1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;

(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to
causes of a psychic nature.

The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The
RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological
incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court
magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On
the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without being
specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists
only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns
marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of

law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage
with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.

The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely

introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables compliance
with the contractual obligations of marriage without any concrete definition or, at
the very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on
how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in
jurisprudence.

Santos v. Court of Appeals93[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be

characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 94[10]

93

94
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application
of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals95[11] (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties
or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
95
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.96[12]

Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic

requirements of Santos.97[13]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,98[14] further clarified that there is no requirement

that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.99[15]

96

97

98

99
Pesca v. Pesca100[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then
already pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date
the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by
the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged.

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence
presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature
and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to
consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert
testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.

All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us
were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the
state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-
Te101[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.

100
101
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did
not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that
the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself
was taken from the Canon Law.102[18] Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the
law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its application.103[19]

Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent
with that of the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that
should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated,
the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court
of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the
appellate courts.

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a
judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that
when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-
examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage
tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency
with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been
rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina,
to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it;

102

103
wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the

abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at
other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting104[20]
follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from
abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements,
cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules
on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages:105[21]

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an
accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the
parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that
there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina
Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by
the court during the pre-trial conference.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,106[22] merely stands

for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary
approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:

104

105

106
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.

xxxx

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert

testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos
asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.107[23] [Underscoring supplied]

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.108[24]

Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of

cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the
intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage;
that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.109[25] It is not enough that

107

108

109
the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral
element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown. 110[26] Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on
the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.111[27]

If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of
Santos continuing doctrinal validity.

The Present Case

As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos

psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude
based on our own examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled
to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the appellate courts
appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns presented evidence.

a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively
show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological
condition.

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion

evidence the psychologists testimony and the psychological evaluation report that
Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist
evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived

110

111
all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the
psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of
the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent
set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis
of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable,
we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes
estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though of a partys
complete personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to
him (such as the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an
approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that
it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert
opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager

information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a
complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or
evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this
is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that
psychological incapacity exists.

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and
testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social
personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic,
grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the
bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she
gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found
in her testimony.

For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is chronic
or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage
with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not
developed. However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In
her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently
grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists
own equivocation on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself
may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is
highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of
Angelitos family background and upbringing.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to

what extent was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the
effects of the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and his capability to undertake the
duties and responsibilities of marriage.

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important
concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the
success of Jocelyns cause.

b. Jocelyns Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the
psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns
testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support
a finding of Angelitos psychological incapacity.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified

on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the
physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the marriage.
Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent
behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the
courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified
on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took
place whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or
years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the
law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must
exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of

psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All
these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be
constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment.

While we may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal
behavioral or personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not
constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence
showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is
irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the
psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns account
of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does
not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence, specifically
the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we
now find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing
the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is
Jocelyns main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this
case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its
related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We

AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443.
Costs against the petitioner.

ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR y ALUNAN, G.R. No. 170729

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
 Promulgated:

ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR December 8, 2010

and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. -- -
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (petitioner) challenges through his petition for

review on certiorari112[1] the decision dated May 31, 2005113[2] and the resolution
dated December 6, 2005114[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
75207.The challenged decision reversed the resolution 115[4] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, declaring the marriage of the petitioner
and Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (respondent) null and void on the ground of the
latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied
the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter
worked. The petitioner, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau
of Customs, while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their meeting led to a
courtship, and they eventually became sweethearts. They often spent nights
112

113

114

115
together at the respondents rented room, and soon entered into a common-law
relationship.

On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a
ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The
petitioners family was apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of
the respondents work and because she came from a broken family. Out of their
union, the petitioner and the respondent begot four (4) children, namely: Erisque,
Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.

On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended.116[5] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He alleged that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations
of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household
chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of
time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a
witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name
Agraviador in her activities.

The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him
since 1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their house. In fact,
he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room
several times.

The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of
her psychological incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the
petition.117[6] The RTC denied this motion in its order dated July 2, 2001. 118[7]

In her answer,119[8] the respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs
and maintained that it was the petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She
claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he

116

117

118

119
wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she
was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before he died.

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor General to investigate if
collusion existed between the parties.120[9] The RTC, in its Order of November 20,
2001, allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.121[10] The petitioner,
thus, presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his claims.

In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed what he stated in his petition, i.e., that
the respondent was carefree, irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly
did what she wanted; did not stay long in the conjugal dwelling; refused to do
household chores; refused to take care of him and their children; and consulted a
witch doctor in order to bring bad luck upon him.

The petitioner further confirmed that the respondent abandoned their sick child,
which led to the latters death. The petitioner further stated that the respondent
became very close to a male border of their house; he discovered their love notes to
each other, and caught them inside his room several times.

The petitioner declared that he filed the petition for nullity because the respondent
refused to change; he loves his children and does not want their children to be
affected by their mothers conduct. He intimated that he might remarry if it would
benefit their children.

Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their
marriage contract (Exh. B)122[11] and the psychiatric evaluation report (Exh. A) 123
[12] of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.

In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the following findings:

120

121

122

123
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son and their helper, the
psychological report and the mental status examination, Enrique is found to be
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. He coped with
Erlindas selfish and irresponsible behavior as he dutifully performed what she failed
to do for the family. He patiently tried to understand her and exerted every effort to
make her realize the harm caused by her neglect to the family. Throughout their
marriage, he provided emotional and material support for the family. He engaged in
other business endeavors aside from his employment as he maintained to be
financially productive.

The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage. She manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time before
their marriage. She is known to be stubborn and uncaring who did things her way
without regard to the feelings of others. She is an irresponsible individual who
selfishly ignored and neglected her role as daughter to her parents as wife to
Enrique and mother to their children. Before the marriage at a young age of 17,
Erlinda defied her parents as she lived alone, rented a room for herself and allowed
Enrique to sleep with her. She did not care about the needs of Enrique before and
after marriage and she maintained to be so with her children. She abandoned and
relegated her duty to her family to their helper. She never stayed long in their house
despite pleadings from her children and Enrique. Her irresponsible, uncaring
behavior even led to the death of one of their children. Likewise, she does not show
concern and ignores a daughter who is presently manifesting behavioral problem.
She kept secrets as she never allowed her husband and children know where she
stays when shes not at work. She falsified documents as she hid her marital status
when she used her maiden surname in her present employment. She is having illicit
affairs and is reported to be presently having an affair with a lesbian. Her desire to
bring bad fate and death to Enrique through her consultation with a mangkukulam
point out her lack of care, love, and respect to Enrique.

Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love,
respect and support to her family.

The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder (Mixed
Personality Disorder). She has been having this disorder since her adolescence.
There is no definite treatment for this disorder. She is deemed psychologically
incapacitated to perform the obligations of marriage.
In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same examination as
Enrique underwent.124[13]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision of
April 26, 2002. It saw merit in the petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs psychiatric
evaluation report, and concluded that:

Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the findings of the doctor
show that Respondent is indeed suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder that
render her incapable of complying with her marital obligations. Respondents refusal
to commit herself to the marriage, her tendencies to avoid a close relationship with
Petitioner, preferring to be with her lover and finally abandoning their home for a
lesbian, a disregard of social norm, show that she was never prepared for marital
commitment in the first place. This incapacity is deeply rooted from her family
upbringing with no hope for a cure. Therefore, for the good of society and of the
parties themselves, it is best that this marriage between ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR Y
ALUNAN and ERLINDA AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it never took place at
all. The Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the General Civil Registrar, National
Census and Statistics Office, East Avenue, Quezon City, are hereby requested to
make the necessary correction of the civil record of the marriage between the
parties and on their respective civil status.

The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL AGRAVIADOR, EVELYN AGRAVIADOR

and EYMAREY AGRAVIADOR will however remain as their legitimate children.

It is SO ORDERED.125[14]

The CA Decision

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125
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision 126[15] dated May 31, 2005,
reversed and set aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.

The CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the
respondents personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did
not mention the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had
no basis in concluding that the respondents disorder had no definite treatment
because he did not subject her to a mental assessment.

The CA added that the psychiatric remarks in the Report were nothing but a
showcase of respondents character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a
natal or supervening factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent from
accepting and complying with the essential obligations of marriage. If at all, these
character flaws may only give rise to a legal separation suit.

The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution of December 6, 2005.127[16]

The Petition and Issues

The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the
reversal of the CA ruling, based on the following arguments:

I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL TO

ESTABLISH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE RESPONDENT[;]

II. THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V. MOLINA [HAD BEEN]

SATISIFIED[;]

III. THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION REPORT XXX

STILL STANDS FOR NOT HAVING BEEN CONTESTED XXX BY THE STATE AND/THE
RESPONDENT[; and]

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127
IV. THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES HAD BEEN
SATISIFIED[.]

The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether there is basis to
nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.

The Courts Ruling

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient
basis exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its
related jurisprudence.

The totality of evidence presented

failed to establish the respondents
psychological incapacity

The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of

the Family Code which provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It introduced the concept
of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this concept
eludes exact definition.

The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the

Family Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-
Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted
the Code, conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to
a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.
Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the
Family Code that this psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage. 128[17]

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,129[18] the Court first declared that psychological

incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."130[19] It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.

We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of

Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals131[20] (the Molina case)
where we said:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not

128

129

130

131
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A
later case, Marcos v. Marcos,132[21] further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.

A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,133[22] declared that it may have been inappropriate for
the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina
unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention
of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity,
no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into
question the applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth in Molina.

Ting v. Velez-Ting134[23] and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo135[24] squarely
met the issue and laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In
these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning
Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also
explained in Suazo that Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity.

Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence
insufficient to prove the respondents psychological incapacity.

a. Petitioners court testimony

132

133

134

135
For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of the petitioners testimony that
essentially confirmed what the petition alleged:

Q:Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed with children,
and how many?

A: Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2) girls.
Q: Where are they now?

A: All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the
neglect and fault of my said wife who abandone[d] him at the time of his illness.

Q: Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?

A: It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.

Q: Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?

A: She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature, whimsical and

used to impose what she wanted to get, she refused to do household
chores, like cooking, caring for the husband and children, used to stay
from the conjugal dwelling, initially for weeks, then for months and lately
fully abandoned the family house and stay with a lesbian. [sic]

At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive and used to

be very close to a male renter in the ground floor of their house and
caught them several times alone in his room, thus explaining the reason
why she refused to have sex since 1993, up to and until the present time.

Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult mangkukulam

to bring bad fate against the family and death for me.

Q: By the way did you give her the chance to change?

A: I gave her but she refused to reform.

xxxx

Q: Can you not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?

A: I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she does not want to
change for the sake of our family.136[25]

These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the petitioners
testimony on the respondents supposed psychological or mental malady. We glean
from these exchanges the petitioners theory that the respondents psychological
incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital
obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity,
irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the
law requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal
or neglect, in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some
marriages.137[26] The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders existing
at the time of the marriage clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 138[27] The psychological illness
that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady
so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 139[28]

In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish that the
respondents condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some
incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely
unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely

136

137

138

139
showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their
manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to
establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In
addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition;
neither did he mention that the respondents malady was incurable, or if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The
petitioners declarations that the respondent does not accept her fault, does not
want to change, and refused to reform are insufficient to establish a psychological
or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of
the Family Code.

In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,140[29] we ruled that it was not enough that the
respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the
respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations had to be shown.

b. Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report

The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving
that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and
examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the
respondent to undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent. 141[30]
Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties second
child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the
information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair
gauge to assess the petitioners own psychological condition (as he was, in fact,
declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations
of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondents
condition. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder.142[31]

140

141

142
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos
that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be
personally examined by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such
declaration.143[32] If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means,
no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given
credit.144[33] No such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have
been gathered in this case.

In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the
respondents condition by stating that the respondent manifested inflexible
maladaptive behavior before marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved
before the marriage the respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a
room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her. These perceived
behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the incapacity was
rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. Dr. Patac failed to
elucidate on the circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she did, for
example, why she defied her parents and decided to live alone; why she neglected
her obligations as a daughter; and why she often slept with the petitioner. This is an
area where independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately
related to the respondent, could prove useful. As earlier stated, no such
independent evidence was gathered in this case. In the absence of such evidence, it
is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and
why the respondents so-called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present
at the time of the marriage.

Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or
seriousness of the respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration of the
respondents purported behavioral defects (as related to him by third persons), and
on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality
disorder. In the Background History portion of his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr.
Patac mentioned that the respondent employed one of her siblings to do the
household chores; did not help in augmenting the familys earnings; belittled the
petitioners income; continued her studies despite the petitioners disapproval;
seldom stayed at home; became close to a male border; had an affair with a
lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her departure to Taiwan; threatened to
poison the petitioner and their children; neglected and ignored their children; used
her maiden name at work; and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad fate to the
petitioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded statement that Erlindas lack of
motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and

143

144
support to the family,145[34] there was no other statement regarding the degree of
severity of the respondents condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave,
and how it incapacitated her to comply with the duties required in marriage. There
was likewise no showing of a supervening disabling factor or debilitating
psychological condition that effectively incapacitated the respondent from
complying with the essential marital obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws
mentioned above, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity,
emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Interestingly, Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the

respondents negative behavioral traits without balancing them with her other
qualities. The allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the
claim that the respondent refused to engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of
course, came from the petitioner, but these claims were not proven. Even assuming
ex gratia argumenti that these accusations were true, the Psychiatric Evaluation
Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness or promiscuousness were traits that
antedated or existed at the time of marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the
respondent abandoned her sick child which eventually led to the latters death
appears to be an exaggerated claim in the absence of any specifics and
corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioners own questionable traits his
flirtatious nature before marriage and his admission that he inflicted physical harm
on the respondent every time he got jealous were not pursued. From this
perspective, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report appears to be no more than a one-
sided diagnosis against the respondent that we cannot consider a reliable basis to
conclusively establish the root cause and the degree of seriousness of her condition.

The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac
came to the conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had no definite
treatment. It did not discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its
classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what
extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary
inference that the respondents condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A
glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric Evaluation Reports failure to
support its findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply enumerated
the respondents perceived behavioral defects, and then associated these traits with
mixed personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself was not
called on the witness stand to expound on the findings and conclusions he made in
his Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would have aided petitioners cause had he
called Dr. Patac to testify.

145
Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of
psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper,
in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum. 146[35] Marriage, an
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
parties, especially where the prices of evidence presented are grossly deficient to
show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential
marital duties.

The petitioners marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be
without hope of reconciliation The remedy, however, is not always to have it
declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. We stress that
Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. It is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce
manifest themselves. The State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to
decree that divorce should be available in this country. Neither should an Article 36
declaration of nullity be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, abandonment,
and the like.147[36] Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where
the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the
obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a
marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and
December 6, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the
petitioner.

Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

146

147
FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the

Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas
close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that
they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that
month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat
ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles
house and Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married but without a
marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month,
Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edwards parents
wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they
have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live
separate lives and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological

incapacity.

HELD:

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in
June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment

of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume

the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of,
and has no goals and clear direction in life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes
her unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard
in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus,
declared null and void.

BENJAMIN G. TING,
Petitioner,
- versus -
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 166562

March 31, 2009

Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates
in medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City
when respondent was already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993,
after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest
child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu
City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary
to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to
pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to
give regular financial support to his family.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained

that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that
it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played
mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses
(psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent
declaring the marriage null and void.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTCs decision. Respondent filed a

motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied
to this case

Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases,

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of

psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized,

3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Held:
1. No. respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new.

2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that

petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity
as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
NORMA CUISON-MELGAR, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is a petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 11, 1999 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 55538, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Dagupan City (RTC) nullifying the marriage of respondents Norma
Cuison-Melgar (Norma) and Eulogio A. Melgar2 (Eulogio) pursuant to Article 363 of
the Family Code.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in
Dagupan City. Their union begot five children, namely, Arneldo, Fermin, Norman,
Marion Joy, and Eulogio III. On August 19, 1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity
of her marriage on the ground of Eulogios psychological incapacity to comply with
his essential marital obligations. 4 According to Norma, the manifestations of
Eulogios psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his
family since December 27, 1985.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served by personal service on
Eulogio on October 21, 1996 by the sheriff. 5 Eulogio failed to file an answer or to
enter his appearance within the reglementary period.
On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation on the case to determine whether or not there exists collusion
between the contending parties.6 On December 18, 1996, Public Prosecutor Joven M.
Maramba submitted his Manifestation to the effect that no collusion existed
between the contending parties.7 On December 19, 1996, the RTC set the reception
of evidence on January 8, 1997.8
On January 8, 1997, upon motion of Normas counsel, the RTC allowed the
presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court. 9 Norma testified that since the
birth of their firstborn, Eulogio has been a habitual alcoholic; when he is drunk he
(a) sometimes sleeps on the streets, (b) every so often, he goes to her office, utters
unwholesome remarks against her and drags her home, (c) he usually lays a hand
on her, (d) he often scolds their children without justifiable reason; his liquor
drinking habit has brought shame and embarrassment on their family; when she
would refuse to give him money for his compulsive drinking habit, he would beat
her up and threaten her; he has not been employed since he was dismissed from
work and he refuses to look for a job; she has been the one supporting the family,
providing for the education and the basic needs of their children out of her salary as
a government employee; on December 27, 1985, because of unbearable jealousy to
her male officemates, Eulogio went to her office, dragged her home and then beat
her up; her brothers saw this, came to her rescue and then told Eulogio to get out of
the house; and since then, Eulogio has not visited or communicated with his family
such that reconciliation is very unlikely. 10 The Public Prosecutor thereafter conducted
a brief cross-examination of Norma.11
Twelve days later, or on January 20, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision nullifying
the marriage of Norma and Eulogio. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant petition for being impressed
with merit. As such, pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
marriage between Norma L. Cuison-Melgar and Eulogio A. Melgar, Jr. is declared an
ABSOLUTE NULLITY.
The Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City is therefore ordered to cancel the Marriage
Contract of the parties bearing Registry No. 180 in the Marriage Registry of said
Office after payment of the required fees.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the following offices: The City Prosecution
Office, Dagupan City, the Solicitor General, and the Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan
City.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC reasoned that:
With the testimony of the petitioner, the Court is convinced that defendant has
been incorrigible in his vices such as habitual alcoholism, subjecting his family to
physical maltreatment and many times caused them to be scandalized, his being
indolent by not at least trying to look for a job so that he could also help his wife in
supporting his family, and also his uncalled for display of his jealousy. These are
clear manifestation of his psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligation
to his wife such as showing respect, understanding and love to her. Defendant also
became indifferent to the needs of his own children who really longed for a father
who is willing to make the sacrifice in looking for a job so as to support them.
Without any communication to his family since 1985, certaining [sic] reconciliation
and love would be improbable. The attendant circumstances in this case really point
to the fact that defendant was unprepared to comply with his responsibilities as a
good and responsible husband to his wife and a loving father to his children x x x. 13
Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal
with the CA, contending that the evidence presented are not sufficient to declare
the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code. 14
On August 11, 1999, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the decision of the
RTC.15 The CA, quoting extensively Normas testimony, ratiocinated:
[I]t has been adequately established that the decree of annulment is proper not
simply because of defendants habitual alcoholism but likewise because of other
causes amounting to psychological incapacity as a result of which defendant has
failed to perform his obligations under Articles 68-72, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code x x x.
Contrary to the submission of the appellant Republic, the grant of annulment is not
based merely on defendants habitual alcoholism but also because of his inability to
cope with his other essential marital obligations foremost of which is his obligation
to live together with his wife, observe mutual love, respect, fidelity and render
mutual help and support.
For the whole duration of their marriage, that is, the period when they actually lived
together as husband and wide and even thereafter, defendant has miserably failed
to perform his obligations for which reason the plaintiff should not be made to suffer
any longer. The contention of the Republic that plaintiff never showed that she
exerted effort to seek medical help for her husband is stretching the obligations of
the plaintiff beyond its limits. To our mind, it is equivalent to saying that plaintiff
deserves to be punished for all the inabilities of defendant to perform his
concomitant duties as a husband and a father all of which inabilities in the first
place are in no way attributable to the herein plaintiff. 16
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
In its Petition,17 the OSG poses a sole issue for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT IS
IN THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE. 18
The OSG contends that the law does not contemplate mere inability to perform the
essential marital obligations as equivalent to or evidence of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that such inability must be due to
causes that are psychological in nature; that no psychiatrist or psychologist testified
during the trial that a psychological disorder is the cause of Eulogio's inability to
look for a job, his resulting drunkenness, unbearable jealousy and other
disagreeable behavior; and that the decision failed to state the nature, gravity or
seriousness, and incurability of Eulogios alleged psychological incapacity.
In her Comment,19 Norma maintains that her testimony pointing to the facts and
circumstances of Eulogios immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, constitutional laziness and indolence are more than enough proof of
Eulogios psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations,
which justifies the dissolution of their marriage.
In its Reply,20 the OSG submits that Normas comments are irrelevant and not
responsive to the arguments in the petition. Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that
Normas evidence fell short of the requirements of the law since no competent
evidence was presented during the trial to prove that Eulogios inability to look for a
job, his resulting drunkenness, jealousy and other disagreeable behavior are
manifestations of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family.21 Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested.
The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. 22
In this regard, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates:
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based
upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court, 23 the rule then applicable,
provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. - If
the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not
a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for
the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Molina,24 the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal, and the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.25 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at
the trial level. Other than the Public Prosecutors Manifestation 26 that no collusion
existed between the contending parties and the brief cross-examination 27 which had
barely scratched the surface, no pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the
Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the opportunity to
present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. 28 Truly, only the
active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest
of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or
the fabrication or suppression of evidence. 29
Be that as it may, the totality of evidence presented by Norma is completely
insufficient to sustain a finding that Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court declared that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 31
It should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 32 The intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 33
Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina 34 the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to
wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Later, the Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos36 that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be
established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial. 37
In the present case, Norma alone testified in support of her complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. She failed
to establish the fact that at the time they were married, Eulogio was already
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. In fact,
Norma admitted in her testimony that her marital woes and Eulogios disagreeable
behavior started only after the birth of their firstborn and when Eulogio lost his job. 38
Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not cognizant of
the basic marital obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to 72, 39 220,40 221,41 and
22542 of the Family Code. It was not sufficiently proved that Eulogio was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature,
and not merely physical.lawphil.net
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of Eulogios
immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional
laziness, and abandonment of his family. These circumstances by themselves
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make Eulogio completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.43
At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal separation
under Article 5544 of the Family Code. As the Court ruled in Republic of the
Philippines v. Molina,45 it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person, it is essential that he must be shown to
be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 46
All told, in order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be
considered a mere fabrication, evidence other than Normas lone testimony should
have been adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, 47
an expert witness would have strengthened Normas claim of Eulogios alleged
psychological incapacity. Normas omission to present one is fatal to her position.
There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no
showing that the "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they are incurable.48
The Court commiserates with Normas marital predicament, but as a court, even as
the highest one, it can only apply the letter and the spirit of the law; it cannot
reinvent or modify it. Unfortunately, law and jurisprudence are ranged against
Normas stance. The Court has no choice but to apply them accordingly, if it must
be true to its mission under the rule of law. The Courts first and foremost duty is to
apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, affirming the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061-
D, dated January 20, 1997, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of Norma
Cuison-Melgar in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061-D is DISMISSED.