Track Two CP

Notes
Instead of conducting official and direct governmental engagement
(academically recognized as Track 1 diplomacy), this CP proposes a bottom-
up approach which informally engages with actors in the US and China in a
non-official capacity (referred to as track 2). The CP avoids the political
scrutiny of official track 1 engagement (thus the Elections net-benefit) and
allows for more effective, genuine, and dynamic engagement.
 1NC Shell
Counterplan Text: The United States federal government
should support an increase in Track Two diplomacy over
[INSERT the issues and mechanism of the affirmative
plan].

The CP competes, solves, and is net-beneficial:

a. Track 2 is distinct and competitive with the plan it
solves from the bottom up through informal engagement.
Chigas 3, [Diana Chigas, (Director of Programs at the Conflict Management
Group, in Cambridge, Massachusetts), Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy, Beyond
Intractability, August 2003. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-
diplomacy]#amandayang
Unofficial Interventions with Unofficial Actors -- "Track Two Diplomacy" The "consultant's" role
described above originated with the development of "Track Two" interventions. The
term "track two" was coined by Joseph Montville, who distinguished traditional diplomatic
activities (track one diplomacy) from "unofficial, informal interaction
between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of
developing strategies, influencing public opinions and organizing human and
material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict."[ 13]The best
known and most developed of the "Track Two" models is the interactive problem-solving workshop
developed by Burton, Kelman, Fisher, and others.[14] Harold Saunders has developed a similar process to
"engage representative citizens from the conflicting parties in
designing steps to be taken in the political arena to change perceptions
and stereotypes, to create a sense that peace might be possible, and
to involve more and more of their compatriots." This "public peace
process"[15] has been applied in the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, begun in 1993 under the auspices of the
Dartmouth Conference Regional Task Force. Track Two interventions bring together non-official,
but influential members of the parties for direct, private interaction with joint
analysis of the conflict and joint problem-solving. The intermediaries are
typically knowledgeable and skilled scholar/practitioners who are impartial
and whose training and expertise enable them to facilitate productive dialogue and
problem-solving between the parties.[16] The participants in these efforts, however,
are not officials or members of negotiating teams, but rather "politically
involved and often politically influential members" of conflicting societies.[17] They
may be parliamentarians, leaders, and activists of political movements,
journalists, members of think tanks, academics; people who are within the
mainstream of their societies and close to the political center. Their unofficial
position, along with the academic setting in which the meetings are conducted, permits
them greater freedom to explore alternative perspectives and
formulate new (joint) ideas.[18]These workshops have been credited with contributing to
the breakthrough achieved in the Oslo Accord of September 1993 by developing cadres prepared to
negotiate productively, by providing substantive inputs (both in terms of ideas and awareness of
sensitivities and perspectives of the other side), and by creating a better political atmosphere for
negotiation.[19]
b. China is more receptive to the CP and thus solves
better unofficial dialogue alleviates internal
apprehension and makes broader concessions possible.
Kerr et. el. 16 (Pauline Kerr PhD (Australian National University) is Fellow and
Director of Studies at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy. Stuart Harris, PhD (The
Australian National University), is Professor in the Department of International
Relations at the Australian National University. Qin Yaqing, PhD (Missouri-Columbia) is
Executive Vice President and Professor of International Studies at the China Foreign
Affairs University (CFAU). China's "New" Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change?
Springer, Apr 30, 2016, pg. 204-206)

There is no question that China has both broadened and deepened its engagement in unofficial diplomacy
since its first experimentation with this form of dialogue in the early 1990s. To be sure, Beijing has tended
to approach unofficial diplomacy rather tentatively. It initially resisted sending high-level officials to
dialogues such as the South China Sea workshops and the Shangri-La Dialogues, for instance, opting
Over time, however, as Chinas
instead to have delegations led by Foreign Ministry officials.
diplomatic confidence levels have grown, higher level officials have attended
unofficial dialogues. Most recently, the presence of Vice Foreign Minister Wu on the sidelines of the
NEACD and the attendance of Lieutenant General 7.hang at the 2007 Sh;ingriLa Dialogue are indicative
of this growing confidence. Based on the foregoing analysis, however, what utility does Beijing see in these
processes, and what might its deepening engagement in them tell us about official Chinese attitudes to
First, Beijing's deepening involvement in
Asian-Pacific multilateralism more generally?
unofficial diplomacy appears designed to alleviate regional apprehensions
regarding China's (re)emergence. In this regard, China's deepening engagement in unofficial
diplomatic processes is virtually synonymous with Beijing's new diplomacythe more nuanced approach to
Chinas attendance at the
foreign relations that is covered in detail elsewhere in this volume.
South China Sea workshops could he seen as a precursor to this new
approach, occurring as it did at a time when most governments in the region exhibited a high degree of
apprehension regarding the motives for Chinas aggressive moves in the Spratly Islands and then during
the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Chinese efforts to assuage these apprehensionsthrough, for instance,
Zheng Bijians famous "Peaceful Rise" speech to the 2003 BFAconstitute a continuation and, indeed, an
evolution of this trend. However, it was perhaps Lieutenant General Zhangs recent address to the 2007
Shangri-La Dialogue that represented the best exposition of this new approach by trying to demonstrate a
greater willingness and abil- ity on the part of China to exhibit more openness and transparency regarding
its intentions. Likewise, Beijings recent use of the NEACD to demonstrate China's commitment as leader of
Second, unofficial diplomacy is
the Six-Party Talks process can be viewed in a similar light.
seen as useful by Beijing in that it provides China with a valuable mechanism
for the discussion of highly sensitive issues. In particular, Beijing is willing to
allow its representatives to interact with their Taiwanese counterparts in
unofficial processes. CSCAP study group meetings, for example, enable policy
experts from China and Taiwan to inter- act and exchange views in informal
settings. In the process, Beijing hopes that they might gain a greater appreciation of each others
viewpoints and gradually begin to develop certain shared understandings. Indeed, as noted earlier in this
chapter, one of Beijings primary motivations for initially participating in the South China Sea workshops
Third (and a related factor), the
was to promote cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
informal nature of unofficial diplomacy is seen as highly advantageous from
the Chinese perspective. Indeed, Beijing has tended to strongly resist
attempts to formalize or further institutionalize these mechanisms.
The clearest example of this was Beijings continued resis- tance throughout the l990s to repeated
The informal nature of this
attempts to formalize the South China Sea workshops.
mechanism allowed for Taiwanese participation without giving any degree of
credence or legitimacy to Taiwan's separatist claims and Taipeis desire for
greater international recog- nition. At the same time, the informal nature of
this process and the ability of representatives to contribute in their private
capacities were conducive to Beijing's participation at a time when internal
contestation remained over the nature, scope, and desirability of Chinas
participation in AsiaPacific multilateralism more generally. Fourth, in weighing the
costs and benefits of Chinese participation in unofficial diplomacy, Beijing
appears to have calculated that it is better to be present at such groupings . In
the case of the South China Sea workshops, for instance, the judgment appears to have been made in
Beijing that it would be disadvantageous for China to be left out of a major forum on the South China Sea.
More broadly, however, China also derives other benefits from its
participation in unofficial dialogues. CSCAP meetings, for example, serve as a
useful tool for information gathering, whereby Beijing can gain an
appreciation of what security issues are preoccupying the minds of various
academic and policy communities throughout the region and how, in
particular, Chinas (re)emergence is being perceived .

c. Track 2 avoids the link to Elections.

Noori, Jasper, Tower 15 (Maral, Daniel, Jason, managed the Institutes ongoing
Asia-Pacific programming including Track 1.5 Dialogues with partners in China, Japan and South
Korea to engage on issues of concern in the region, Asia advocacy coordinator, Congressional
Intern, United Peace Corps Volunteer, American Friends Service Committee, EA QIAR at AFSC,
Overcoming Barriers to U.S.-China Cooperation, United States Institute of Peace,
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB192-Overcoming-Barriers-to-US-China-
Cooperation.pdf)
Political interests undermine the bilateral relationship . U.S. hard-liners
fear an increasingly powerful China. The military threat is used both to
rationalize increasing U.S. defense funding and to counter any Obama
administration attempt to constructively engage China. Even the U.S.-
China climate change and clean energy cooperation joint
announcement was denounced, with Republicans complaining that
China would not be required to make changes for sixteen years .5 Similar hard-line
Chinese sentiments are a growing trend. Conspiracy theories or perceived ill-intentions related to U.S.
policies abound, and nearly any negative outcome in Chinas foreign diplomacy is blamed on Washington.
To prevent domestic politics from
The political transition in Myanmar is an example.
inhibiting constructive cooperation, both the Obama and Xi administrations
should devise strategies to manage the impacts of interest groups on the
relationship. Such strategies might include more talks to repair damaged cooperative efforts, such as
civilian nuclear cooperation (a current point of contention on Capitol Hill), or perhaps to explore Chinese
establish a track II
mediation in U.S.-North Korea relations. Another option might be to
dialogue on the impact of interest groups on the relationship that could
generate stronger awareness of the dynamics.
 2NC OV Card
Track two solves the case by building support for longer
term policy implementation without triggering negative
political reactions. Net benefits are politics and
appeasement.
Graham & Kelley 9 - *teaches in the Department of International
Relations, University of Southern California & ** an assistant professor at the
School of International Service, American University, and a fellow of the
Transatlantic Project of LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics (*Sarah
Ellen & ** John Robert, U.S. Engagement in East Asia: A Case for Track Two
Diplomacy, Orbis Volume 53, Issue 1, January 2009,)//SL

These examples illustrate that track two diplomacy, both in event and dialogue
formats, can be conceptualized as a means of policy coordination, as
well as a process of conflict resolution. Existing track two initiatives in
Northeast Asia should be regarded by the United States as an important instrument
for medium and long-term engagement within China and the Northeast Asian region.
Washington should approach track two with the following functions in mind. First, by
identifying and incorporating change agents and forming epistemic communities around significant
issue areas, which entail establishing network[s] of professionals with expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area. As noted above, given the elite positioning of
track two participants, the information and advice produced by these
communities feeds into foreign policy decision making at higher
levels. Second, track two should be embraced as a medium and longterm
strategy to create incentives for ongoing cooperation in bilateral and
multilateral frameworks by shaping state incentives over time. Track two
settings enable the sharing of information and the generation of shared
expectations under conditions of sustained interaction . Track two must seek
to foster sustainable frameworks to monitor the behavior of regional actors
and thus expose and penalize cheating . Finally, symbolic events, under the rubric
of track two diplomacy, should be seen as a means to leverage regional counterparts by
shaping public opinion and incrementally building public confidence. Current
Challenges and Opportunities for Leverage in the East Asian Context Regional Security The United
States has a substantial and ongoing interest in promoting peace and stability in
Northeast Asia, and track two diplomacy has several applications over the medium and long
term that can contribute to this sphere of U.S. interests . In the short term, Washington is
committed, both by preserving the regional balance of power and through diplomatic frameworks, to
ensuring that flashpoints on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan
Strait do not erupt into war. To this end, the United States maintains the forward-posturing
of its conventional military forces and the nuclear umbrella under existing bilateral alliances with Japan
and South Korea (ROK) and its tradition of declared, if conditional, support for Taiwan in the event of a
Chinese invasion. But in acknowledging the ongoing salience of existing strategic alignments and existing
balance of power and hedging dynamics at the track one level,
it is also in the U.S. interest to
pursue peaceful relations with China over the medium-term. This entails shaping
Chinas strategic perceptions as an emerging regional power. Washington must find ways
to discourage Beijings view that the United States regards a strong China as a
strategic competitor and is seeking to contain it, and at the same time encouraging China to
behave non-provocatively towards its neighbors. China will be the preeminent military power in Asia within
10 to 20 years if it sustains current spending on modernizing and diversifying its military.28 America
should not necessarily fear a militarily strong China, provided that shared Sino-American strategic goals
it is in U.S. interests
and expectations can be fostered. In working toward this ultimate objective,
to foster dialogues and CSBMs with Chinese officials and foreign policy experts to
better understand Chinese strategic thinking Improving confidence and establishing
constructive, ongoing security dialogues on a second track with China could be especially
beneficial in enabling Washington to address perhaps its most substantial security challenge in
Northeast Asia: the North Korean nuclear weapons program . Pyongyangs October 9, 2006,
nuclear test inadvertently highlighted Beijing and Washingtons shared interest in seeking to prevent
additional provocations of this kind when, on the basis of U.S. intelligence, Beijing tried and failed to
dissuade the DPRK from undertaking the test, and then publicly branded Pyongyangs move as brazen
after the event.30 Since this catalyzing moment, and with Washington continuing to regard China as a
broker to Pyongyang, diplomatic avenues toward reaching a workable framework for disarmament on the
Peninsula appear promising. In February, 2007, a joint agreement issued by the Six Party states affirmed
the common goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and signaled the willingness of all parties to work
toward the normalization of diplomatic relations where they do not exist. More recently, the August 2007
posting of American experts to oversee the dismantling of parts of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and the
recent performance of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra in Pyongyang, attest to the Bush
administrations departure from an axis of evil hard-line stance toward embracing diplomacy as an
instrument for moving forward with the DPRK. The incoming administration will thus inherit some
promising and creative diplomatic apertures on the first, second and third tracks that should not be left
languishing. One of the key decisions the next U.S. administration will have to make with respect to
apertures is the selection of envoys to maintain progress in ongoing initiatives and not lose momentum
during a time of transition for American leadership. In the case of the Six-Party Talks, the hard-earned
relationships formed between lead U.S. negotiator Ambassador Christopher Hill and the DPRK counterparts
Lee Gun and Kim Gye Gwan are essential to alleviating any misgivings that have halted the dismantling of
Track two events such as the orchestra visit should be encouraged, as they
the Yongbyon reactor.
will help Washington ensure, in line with its short-term objectives in relation to the DPRK, that
incremental gains in confidence can be transmitted from the semi-official
to the official sphere, giving the 2007 joint agreement its greatest ultimate chance of success.
Track two events could also serve asgestures of good faith by Washington that will encourage Beijing,
which is often exasperated by Washingtons hard-line stance and maintains highly beneficial economic ties
with the DPRK, to remain constructively engaged in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Many
Northeast Asian analysts currently argue that the USs ultimate long-term objectivepeaceful regime
changewill come about only via diplomatic engagement and not through the isolation of the Kim Jong Il
regime. Chadwick I. Smith uses the metaphor of strategic entanglement to describe the kinds of cross-
cutting ties and agreements that will be necessary in order to peacefully draw the Hermit Kingdom into the
international community.31 Track two diplomacy has a substantial role to play in affecting strategic
entanglement. Non-binding dialogues and events will be instrumental in fostering a political climate
conducive to the opening of the DPRK, and for parlaying steps forward in one sphere of relations, such as
disarmament, into discussions about advancing ties in others, such as economic investment or cultural
relations. The authors of a recent Atlantic Council report on U.S.-DPRK relations note that the
establishment of a multilateral regional security framework will also be vital to ensuring the DPRKs
peaceful entry into the regional and international community by providing an environment in which,
among other things, the DPRK will be socialized into adopting the security norms of the international
community. To this end, our discussion now turns to the Northeast Asian strategic order at large, to assess
the prospects for engaging China in substantive dialogue on the prospects for a multilateral regional
security architecture with the U.S. and its regional allies with the goal of engaging the DPRK and other
track two
substantive benefits in mind. Given the shared goal in moving forward on the DPRK issue,
dialogues should open between the U.S. and China at the bilateral level as a basis
for moving beyond the hedging dynamic currently at play in the bilateral relationship.
Here the traditional conflict management functions of track two, focusing on confidence building and
normative socialization if elites, are salient. Given the closeness of its existing bilateral security
relationships, Washington can also act as a broker for confidence-building events
and dialogues involving China and Japan/ROK, both also deeply worried about Chinese
strategic intentions. The United States has a long tradition of shared military exercises with both Japan and
the ROK, which have hitherto been instrumental in sustaining the alliances. While Chinese participation in
dialogue concerning the conditions under
these symbolic events is some time away,
which military collaboration might take place should be initiated.
Generic Solvency
 Solves China Policy

Authorizing Track 2 diplomacy can resolve every issue in

the US-China relationship its a prerequisite to trust and
is more likely to create sustainable engagement
Tanner and Minghao 5/5/2016 --- Tanner is Senior Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer of the 100,000 Strong Foundation. Zhao Minghao is a
Member of the Academic Committee and a Research Fellow at the Pangoal
Institution. (Travis Tanner and Zhao Minghao, Investment in U.S.-China
Relations Starts with People, China Focus.
http://www.chinausfocus.com/culture-history/investment-in-u-s-china-
relations-starts-with-people/)//ET
The U.S.-China relationship faces a critical juncture. Today the relationship is marked by
progress in certain areas but continued stalemate and simmering tensions in
others. The stakes are high given the global implications of the two nations
interactions with each other across a wide range of issues. One important
mechanism to facilitate positive engagement and collaboration, as well
as successfully manage tension and areas of disagreement, is people-to-
people (P2P) exchange. The U.S.-China relationship has changed significantly over the past
three decades and continues to evolve. As ties between the two countries appear to be
entering a new and important phase marked by high international stakes, increased
tensions over strategic and economic issues, and a growing number of overlapping interests the
senior leaders in both nations must counter the buildup of strategic mistrust
and rivalry. From a national security perspective, people-to-people activities have traditionally been
considered a less important issue and viewed more as a tool of cultural and public diplomacy, useful only
for achieving soft diplomatic objectives.
Altering this view and utilizing P2P as a
way to tackle strategic issues could help reduce tensions over
cybersecurity, activities in outer space, nuclear weapons, maritime
disputes in the East and South China Seas, and other sensitive
security-related topics, as well as address the general trust deficit in
the bilateral relationship. People-to-people relations have long played a
critical role in the development of the U.S.-China relationship . More than 200 years
ago, the U.S. commercial vessel Empress of China visited the Guangzhou port, marking the beginning of
such ties. Over 40 years ago, Ping-Pong players broke the diplomatic ice between the United States and
China, heralding the normalization of the bilateral relationship several years later. Since then,
thousands of efforts have contributed to the deepening of understanding
between the people of both countries, thereby expanding communication
channels, addressing challenges, generating economic activity, and improving relationship
management. Nonetheless, significant challenges exist that impede, or at least will
complicate, efforts to elevate such exchanges to address more strategic issues.
One challenge is the fact there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes people-to-people
exchanges concepts such as soft-power, public diplomacy, and P2P diplomacy are understood differently
policymakers are quick to laud the benefits of
by both nations. On the U.S. side, some
these programs in warming interpersonal relations but tend to dismiss their
impact in high-level politics. Consequently, they tend to be driven by nongovernmental actors. In
China, high-level officials have explicitly tied the promotion of people-to-people activities to the countrys
foreign policy strategy. Because of this, the Chinese efforts have been viewed critically by some U.S. actors
as an insidious effort to increase Chinese influence abroad. As a result of these differences in definitions,
second obstacle for P2P exchange is that
evaluating the impact of activities is difficult. A
the bureaucratic systems and mechanisms for organizing these activities vary
significantly between the two countries. In China, most of these activities are originally
promoted by government agencies, though more and more universities, foundations, and other
nonprofit organizations are beginning to play important coordinating roles . In
the United States, these activities are organized in a more ad hoc environment, with civil society taking the
lead. Apathy in the policymaking community toward the value of people-to-people exchanges is another
obstacle. Many believe that such exchange does not serve a strategic purpose and they are unwilling to
allocate the time and financial investment necessary to sustain regular Track 1.5 and 2 dialogues. The lack
of quantifiable data demonstrating the impact of P2P exchange on the bilateral relationship makes
securing necessary resources dedicated for these activities challenging. In order to overcome these
both governments must put aside their
obstacles and move beyond the status quo,
suspicions and be open to dialogues, workshops, seminars, and travel
groups with the broadest array of participants from business, academic,
NGO, scientific, media, and other expert communities that are focused on
strategic issues. As the U.S.-China relationship matures, the types of exchange should
also evolve to include more dialogues oriented toward national security.
Specifically, the two countries should consider creating a high-level channel within the Strategic and
Economic Dialogue framework to orchestrate P2P activities (both Track 1.5 and Track 2) focused
people-to-people
specifically on building collaboration on global strategic issues. Additionally,
activities that focus on areas where the U.S. and China can collaborate will
intrinsically build mutual understanding and trust, allowing for the two nations to
engage in productive discussions on more sensitive issues. Washington and Beijing should develop a
methodology to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of specific exchanges. Furthermore ,
it is critical
that the profile of individuals who participate in such exchange related to
national security concerns expand beyond government officials and think
tank scholars to include participants from the business, scientific, NGO, academic, and
other expert communities. Finally, given that the key for the future of the bilateral relationship rests in the
hands of the next generation of leaders, the U.S. and China should invest in providing more opportunities
for student exchanges to train this future generation of relationship managers.

Track two diplomacy spills over and is more likely to

create official policy adoption than Track one but
sequencing matters
Morrison 2006 --- president of the East West Center with a PhD in
international relations from John Hopkins. (Charles E. Morrison, Track 1/Track
2 symbiosis in Asia-Pacific regionalism, The Pacific Review, 8/11/2006. Taylor
and Francis Online)//ET
Perhaps most importantly, Track 2 constitutes the most reliable support group
outside the government proper for Track 1 processes . To be sustained, government
processes need appreciative audiences that help establish and maintain a
positive value for regional cooperation and reward politicians and policy-makers
for their efforts. In many areas of foreign policy, these audiences are very small despite the relatively
significant media attention to these issues. Aside from small and often inconsistent support from large
businesses, international policy networks provide a significant source of
encouragement and reinforcement for Track 1 processes. Second, Track
2 provides a source of innovation and ideas that is difficult to achieve through
the bureaucracy. Particularly at the leader and ministerial levels, Track 1 has a tremendous
need for new concepts, mainly because it is politically driven. Politicians themselves may initiate
the ideas, but more frequently than not, they are consumers looking for inputs from the private sector. And
even when the politicians are the initiators, they need Track 2 to flesh out,
repackage and legitimize their ideas . Probably no part of the private sector is more attuned
to generating foreign policy ideas than the Track 2 international policy institutions and networks. These, in
fact, have an entirely complementary interest with political leaders in pushing forward new ideas. With
some exceptions where Track 2 is an artificial creation of government-dominated systems to provide
analogues for Track 2 in other countries (such as North Koreas Institute of Peace and Disarmament),
Track 2 lives off its ability to bring big ideas into the policy process. As in
the case of leaders, some of this may be ego-driven, but it is also a matter of funding. Track 2
participants also sometimes find that their ideas gain more visibility and
weight through Track 2 than if they were at similar levels in Track 1. The
essence of the Track 1Track 2 symbiosis consists of Track 2 policy and institutional entrepreneurs seeking
Track 1 champions, and Track 1 policy entrepreneurs seeking Track 2 validators and allies. While much of
this symbiosis occurs within a national context, there are also transnational alliances. In Singapores case
within ASEAN, for example, it is not just Singaporean leaders who want to inject ideas into regional
processes, but also the Singaporean bureaucracy. The Singaporean bureaucracy often finds that projection
through an international policy network provides both a preliminary testing ground and a regionally more
acceptable projection vehicle.5 This leads Singaporean government officials into alliances with Track 2
policy institutes based in neighboring countries with which viewpoints may be more readily shared than
with Track 1 counterparts. Track 2 is not only a useful innovator of ideas in the first instance, but often
serves as a test-bed for such ideas among government-surrogates. This is
particularly important for sensitive security topics. A Track 2 precursor to the August six-
party talks on North Korea, for example, took place in March several months
earlier under the guise of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, a Track 2
process only a stones throw away from Track 1. Another such Track 2 was the Canadian-
sponsored and Indonesian-chaired Workshop Series on Managing Potential
Conflicts in the South China Sea. Carolina Hernandez has gone a step farther, suggesting that
the ASEANISIS group could prepare the way for harmonization of ASEAN foreign and security policies on
such issues as the Spratlys, hardly a task that Track 1 is prepared to address, but one which it could
tolerate (Hernandez 2000: 121).

The CP leads to more effective Track 1 diplomacy over the

same issue
Graham & Kelley 9 - *teaches in the Department of International
Relations, University of Southern California & ** an assistant professor at the
School of International Service, American University, and a fellow of the
Transatlantic Project of LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics (*Sarah
Ellen & ** John Robert, U.S. Engagement in East Asia: A Case for Track Two
Diplomacy, Orbis Volume 53, Issue 1, January 2009,)//SL
Track Two Events as Primers for Change
Events in track two are singular incidents with resounding effects .
The resulting publicity offers incentives for decision makers to respond in
line with the events symbolism. A widely recognized case preceded the
normalizing of U.S.-China relations in the early 1970s. The ping-pong diplomacy event involving members
of the American and Chinese national ping-pong squads, during April 1971, is regarded as a catalyst for
change in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship . The chance meeting between
delegates from the two nations ping-pong squads while on tour in Japan jump-started a process of
rapprochement that culminated with President Nixons historic visit to China the
following February. Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai subsequently proclaimed: Never before in history has a sport been used
another track two event bolstered the
so effectively as a tool of international diplomacy.7 Years later,
negotiations leading up to the 1997 Northern Ireland peace accord, when the
United States issued a controversial 48-hour entry visa to Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams in
January 1994. This critical decision, taken after months of pressure by Irish-American citizen and private sector groups,
effectively signified the end of the old American passivity and brought the United States in as a
broker in the peace process. The strength of events lies in their
symbolism as turning points in diplomatic relationships, particularly in domestic or world public opinion.
Furthermore, events can lead to dialogue scenarios and vice versa. One may
bring about the other and so it is often the case that the principal track two manifestations work
together. In a recent example, the launching of the Geneva Accords 2003 took place at a highly-publicized ceremony
held by two founding political elites representing Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Largely a symbolic act, it did not
commit either party to honoring the terms, but rather offered a negotiation model for their constituents to consider. Since
then, the process has led to ongoing dialogues under the rubric of the Geneva Initiative.
 Solves Relations
Unofficial exchanges solve coop --- public role, distribution
of goods, and communication
Yongtao 6/22/2016--- Assistant Professor of Center for American Studies,
Fudan University. (Liu Yongtao, People-to-People Exchanges: A Main Dish, Not
A Spice, China Focus. http://www.chinausfocus.com/culture-history/people-
to-people-exchanges-a-main-dish-not-a-spice/)//ET
The 7th China-U.S. High Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange, in parallel with the 8th Strategic
and Economic Dialogue, was concluded in early June in Beijing, and the two countries have signed 12
cooperation agreements and presented 158 results of cooperation covering seven areas including
education, science and technology, culture, public health, sports, women and youth. Since the launch of
this annual meeting in 2010,the people-to-people exchange has become another
highlight in China-U.S. cooperation. Some, however, would argue that
international politics is primarily about physical power, conventionally
assumed to be the business of politicians in high office. All cultural and normative
elements are ultimately seen as secondary to it. This state-centric perspective is
problematic as it downplays the publics role in international relations as
well as broad social and cultural contexts in which relations are unfolding. In
reality, thanks to globalization and technological advances that make folks travel and ideas flow more
the public is playing increasingly determinant roles in international
easily,
relations. In this context, official diplomacy tends to act more as a service to
individual citizen needs for better contacts and engagements with people in
other countries. The way in which human beings live and know each other has been undergoing
profound changes today. It gradually breaks and transcends hedges fenced by various conventional
barriers.International relations increasingly extended from physical aspects to
those of humanity covering closer connections of society to society, of people
to people, and of races to races (even ethnic groups to ethnic groups). In the efforts to advance the
world toward a better human community, human beings are decisive driving forces in the
process. Also national ethos and its identities are, rather than relying on beliefs in any
metaphysical power, represented through a series of social and cultural practices,
in which a given social order is established. Taking China for example, regarding the
questions as to how to formulate a social order, a shared world and common development, the
Chinese people have accumulated their own intellectual sources, philosophies
and cultural and social practices. In this sense, the people-to-people exchange is a valuable
concept and practice and is beneficial to the maintanece of world peace and human development. In
recent years, China has witnessed itself reiterating in its diplomatic discourse and behavior the
significance of humanitarian communications. Bringing people-to-people exchanges back into its
relationship with other countries is a remarkable aspect in Chinese diplomacy today. It is through this that
the humanistic nature of international relations can be better observed and understood. In Chinese
tradition, humanity is put in a very high place in social life. As one Chinese classic alludes to it, one can
learn about the change of seasons through observing natural phenomena while promoting social
development through studying human phenomena. Thus both nature and culture are revered and taken
as equally critical and powerful elements in (re)shaping the social world. If humanity is central to all things
in social life , interactions among human beings can be arguably the most attractive and fasinating in all
forms of practices in the soceity as it is an exchange of human souls. A sincere and candid dialogue
The people-
between human hearts constitutes valuable parts in people-to-people exchanges today.
to-people exchange in international relations has several functions to play. Such exchange
is metaphorically a pavement stone, which lays a solid foundation of
social and public opinions for a sound development of interstates
relationship. If war is the last resort in international politics, culture is always a tool that is
calculated to be employed first. It is a delicate way with more flavors of humanity in it,
compared with other ways like trade transactions and military contacts. It is also a social practice that can
hardly be substituted. Compared with the trade and military, peopleto-people
exchange is less costly but covers wider and broader areas and scales with
bigger numbers of players participating in it. Other features can be identified in the
people-to-people exchange. One is that it is primary about public
communication highly institutional, as communicators usually follow, and are conditioned by, a
number of communicative rules and norms. The content of the communication includes
culture and ideas. As a rule, diplomacy favors communication and dialogu rather
than military violence in the resolution of conflicts and hostilities. But it does not mean diplomacy
and military are not interrelated. On the contrary, physical capabilities can be a guarantee
of diplomacy, as an old adage in China holds that diplomacy is backed by
military readiness. Another feature is that it allows more social entities to participate
in events that may produce effects, directly or indirectly, on diplomacy. Besides
politicians in high office and professional diplomats, entrepreneurs, artists, writers and
intellectuals, who are working or paying a visit overseas, are equally
recognized as messengers of their home countries . With a sea change in a globalized
world, the definition as to who will be internationally recognised as players in diplomacy is changing as
well. That makes the identity of players participating in diplomatic activities increasingly inclusive and
another feature is that it is also about production, management
subject to (re)definition. Still
anddistribution of public goods such as shared values, common
languages, collective identities, which are produced by people-to-people
exchange. When some people in a given society benefit from these public goods, it does not mean that
other people in the society are excluded from obtaining equally the same public goods. Put another way,
the process of globalization is redefining any given public goods as global
public goods. Some areas conventionally taken as national concerns such as
environment, health, security and justice are becoming global concerns. This transformation
makes diplomacy an instrument no longer narrowly for the achievements of national interests, but more
for the resolution of global and regional issues. Diplomacy is thus committing more efforts to make
efficient management and distribution of benefits brought about by diplomacy itself on international and
regional levels.
 Solves War

Track two efforts assure regional alliances and peace

Weissmann 10 - a Senior Lecturer at the Swedish Defence University and a
Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs
(Mikael, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT AND SINO-ASEAN RELATIONS: A
STUDY IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING, Asian Perspective,
Vol. 34, No.3, 2010, http://www.ui.se/upl/files/49747.pdf)//SL
The Track-2 frameworks have also worked as an important catalyst for regional
cooperation. Regional cooperation has, in turn, had a positive spillover effect
on the ability to prevent conflict and build peace in the SCS . For example, without
enhanced regional cooperation, China would not have accepted the inclusion of the SCS conflict on the
agenda in multilateral settings. Regarding the SCS, the informal SCS workshops played an essential role, in
particular during the critical 1990s period, when they promoted cooperation and confidence building
among the parties. They were also essential for increasing understanding between the parties at a time
The SCS workshops, together with the
when there were otherwise limited interactions.
increasingly thick web of Track-2 frameworks in the rest of East Asia, provided
a framework for conflict prevention and peace building in the SCS. The workshops
can, in this respect, be understood as prenegotiations and a forum for policy innovation for future Track 1
Through the workshops, continued inter-party
negotiations and/or agreements.
dialogues are assured and, thereby, the hopes for an eventual peaceful
resolution kept alive. The Sino-ASEAN and East Asian regionalization processes
have been moving relations toward a stable peace both between China and ASEAN,
and in the SCS, by transforming perceptions, interests, and identities. This
has been a reciprocal process whereby the regionalization process and the new engagement policies in
both China and ASEAN have been mutually reinforcing. This transformation is the result of a policy focus on
economic growth and development in both China and among the ASEAN members. The institutionalization
of the APT process and the general acceptance of the ASEAN Way as the framework and guiding principle
Peaceful
for interstate relations in East Asia have also been highly significant for this transformation.
relations have been institutionalized, and common diplomatic practices
accepted, creating a feeling of security across the region . Of particular importance for
conflict prevention and peace building are features of conflict avoidance and facesaving, which are among
This has allowed the concerned states to focus on
the characteristics of the ASEAN Way.
positive relations while avoiding conflict-ridden issues in their relations. When
applied to the SCS, these developments have created strong incentives to avoid
an escalation of the conflict, and a preference to leave it for the future (i.e.,
conflict avoidance).

Track Two dialogue is key to preventing conflict escalation

Rland 02 Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Freiburg (Jrgen, The
Contribution of Track Two Dialogue towards Crisis Prevention, ASIEN, October
2002, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.597.7210&rep=rep1&type=pdf)//SL
After having briefly sketched the genesis and the key actors of the track two processes in the Asia-Pacific
region and between Asia and Europe, this section seeks to assess the performance of track two toward
All in all, preempting the answer, security-related track two processes
crisis prevention.
represent an innovative response to the region's security problems and at the
same time helped shape an Asian security identity.9 However, while they had their merits, they did not
match the high, sometimes exaggarated, expectations placed on them, although they did better than the
economic track two. A few examples may illustrate this.
One of the avowed objectives of security-related track two processes in the
AsiaPacific region is the prevention of armed interstate conflict through
reducing uncertainties and threat perceptions. Paramount among these
uncertainties, which helped to generate track two, was the transition from
the old bipolar to a new, still unknown, world (dis-)order. Salient among
the sources of post-Cold War uncertainties was the reduction of American
military presence in Asia which, many feared, would create a power vacuum
in the region. This was seen as facilitating the rise of new regional powers
with suspected hegemonial ambitions such as China, India, and Japan. Many
states in the region responded to these developments by deftly increasing
defence spending, thereby creating the spectre of an arms race.
Viewed against this background, the ASEAN-ISIS track two dialogue must be
credited for keeping the region's emerging security dilemma manageable.
ASEAN-ISIS has successfully lobbied Southeast Asian and other governments
in the Asia-Pacific to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)
which may be regarded as a Southeast Asian Magna Charta for the peaceful
settlement of disputes.10
 AT: Government cant increase T2

The federal government is key to support track two

diplomacy
Farrell 2015--- an Associate Professor at George Washington University in
political science. (Henry Farrell, April 2015, Promoting Norms for
Cyberspace, Council on Foreign Relations.
http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/promoting-norms-cyberspace/p36358)//ET
For the same reason, the United States should participate in systematic conversations
with countries, businesses, and leading experts in the hope of generating some
shared values that might lead to stronger normative commitments. This already
happens through track-two diplomacy with China and other world powers. Paradoxically, it
may be harder for the United States to start talking to the technology companies and groups like the EFF
who share a common normative vocabulary of commitment to openness and free debate. The bitterness of
the last two years will be difficult to overcome. Implementing these three recommendations will require the
U.S. government to change critical aspects of its approach to cybersecurity, balancing offensive and
The U.S. government should identify
defensive strategies against the capacity to persuade.
ways to work with actors with whom it lacks mutual trust, in order to build
legitimacy for its claims about appropriate actions in cyberspace. Finally, the
government should support these much-needed conversations about
norm building, while letting business and civil society actors take
the lead. If the United States can carry through on these steps, it will be in
a much better place to promote norms and, in the process, restore its
own credibility.

The federal government establishes the mechanism ---

coop results following that
Wheeler 14 - Professor at Harvard Business School Talks (Michael O., Track
1.5/2 Security Dialogues with China: Nuclear Lessons Learned, Institute for
Defense Analyses, September 2014, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?
verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA622481)//SL
Finally, although this paper presents a picture of Track 1.5/2 processes, which
may appear orderly on the surface, in reality the number of Track 1.5/2s has
grown so large, managed by different institutions with their own needs and
biases, and taking place across such a diverse set of issues, that it is
difficult to track issues from one Track 1.5/2 to another. There is no forum
for sharing best practices or lessons learned among the multiple Tracks
1.5/2s, and no good mechanisms for building on past discussions or on
converting even modest ideas into actual government actions. It would be
useful to establish an unofficial forum that permits American
participants in Track 1.5/2 meetings with the Chinese to meet with one
another periodically to hold informal discussions on their Track 1.5/2
experiences as they plan for the next set of meetings. Such a forum also
could serve as the venue for informal discussions with U.S. government
officials responsible for China matters, and as a means of maintaining
corporate memory of what ideas translate into government actions.
Case-specific solvency
 Solves Trade
Track 2 key starting point for TPP
Bergsten et al 14 (C. Fred, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Sean Miner, Senior
Fellow and Director Emeritus at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics, Senior Fellow at PIIE, China Program Manager and Research
Associate at PIIE, Bridging the Pacific: Toward Free Trade and Investment
between China and the United States, p. 25-26)//TN
Whether and how China and the U nited States decide to pursue intensified
economic cooperation, their decisions on the matter are presumably some time away. In the
interim, and before they are in a position to set a firm course of action, they might initiate
informal consultations through which they could share views on their current
regional negotiations and trade policies more broadly, getting a better sense
of what the potential partner is thinking. Kissinger (2013, 180) suggests that the two
countries begin any of their coop- erative efforts with a common analysis of
where we think the international system is going and should go. Such
conversations could proceed bilaterally, perhaps through the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. If that
would raise concerns about the reactions of other countries, or domestic anxieties within either country,
they could proceed in a regional forum such as APEC, which has been sponsoring discussions of existing
bilateral FTAs and their implications for its long-term Bogor Goal of achieving free and open trade and
Unofficial conversations can be carried out
investment in the Asia-Pacific region.9
through the variety of track II dialogues between the two countries. The US
China CEO and Former Senior Officials Dialogue , conducted by the US Chamber of
Commerce and the China Center for International Economic Exchange, have addressed these
issues most directly and positively to date.

Chinese government officials and academics who would

participate in track 1.5/2 support TPP
Li and Hu 11(Ronglin and Yang, Professor of International Economics at
Nankai University, Ph.D. candidate at Nankai University, RCEP, TPP and
China's FTA Strategies, Knowledge Partnership Programme, p. 13,
http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload_files/Report_3_54_RCEP,_6192294083.p
df)//
There are controversial points of view about whether China should join in TPP
domestically. The opposition comes from the consideration of impossibility and competitiveness
between TPP and RCEP backed by the United States and China both economically and politically. However,
many of academics and even some of government officials believe that to
join in TPP negotiation would bring another new opportunity for China to
promote the domestic reform after access to WTO. It is just the domestic reform brought
about by openness and liberalization that have provided a great impetus for economic development in the
past over 10 years. Many negotiating issues in TPP, including those crosscutting and new issues like
regulation, competition policy and so on, will help to break the resistance of interest-groups and promote
the new round deep reform. It seems that the government is making the trade-off and taking both the
China has taken some steps
difficulties and opportunities into account. As a mater of fact,
toward TPP. In spite of the effort to up-grade the China ASEAN free trade agreement, China had
established Shanghai Free Trade Experiment Zone two years ago, and some
new similar zones will be established soon in Tianjin, Guangdong and some
other costal cities. One purpose of the zones is to carry out a more free trade
and investment policy inside the area to test their possible impacts and accumulate the experiences in
These liberalization and facilitation measures are
deregulation of the government.
supposed to be copied and extended to the whole economy . It is apparent that, like
 China would be going beyond the broader measures in free trade practice and become
or not,
more willing to discuss those used-to sensitive issues in FTA negotiation .

Solves Economic Internal Links

Graham & Kelley 9 - *teaches in the Department of International
Relations, University of Southern California & ** an assistant professor at the
School of International Service, American University, and a fellow of the
Transatlantic Project of LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics (*Sarah
Ellen & ** John Robert, U.S. Engagement in East Asia: A Case for Track Two
Diplomacy, Orbis Volume 53, Issue 1, January 2009,)//SL
Economy
The United States has extensive economic interests in Northeast Asia and these
interests will likely be high on the incoming administrations agenda, most especially in its trading
relationships with China, Japan and the ROK. As the Armitage and Nye report observes, a regional
economic framework to promote free trade and financial stability remains absent in Northeast Asia. They
argue it is in U.S. interests to foster multilateral regimes for trade and investment, as well as fiscal
governance.40 As is the case with guaranteeing military stability in Northeast Asia ,
promoting an
economic order conducive to U.S. interests requires regional coordination
based on realizing common interests, the generation of stable
expectations, and the building of trust. Track two diplomacy constitutes
an important tool to further these objectives, even as track one Sino-American
economic diplomacy often remains marred by disagreement. Trade liberalization, for example,
remains a thorny issue in the track one context, and must, as C. Fred Bergsten recently
argued, be taken up by the US through persuasive negotiations at the bilateral level.41 The U.S. trade
deficit to China topped $256 billion in 2007, and U.S. pressure on China to increase imports, encourage
consumer spending, and lower export subsidies have had little obvious impact on Beijing.42 Friction has
developed over Beijings lack of transparency on export subsidies and reluctance to increase the value of
the yuan, which has allowed it to accumulate more than $1 trillion in U.S. dollar reserves.43 Yet the United
States also depends on trade with China: cheap imports keep prices low and real incomes high within the
United States, and Chinas dollar reserves create downward pressures on domestic interest rates.44
Washington thus has a strong interest in ensuring that policy tensions are resolved without seriously
The Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) between China and
destabilizing overall trade patterns.
the United States, established in 2006, constitutes an important track two mechanism
for coordinating trade and monetary policy that can help address these points
of tension over time. Its function is to engage multiple and diverse government officials in both
countries to facilitate more inclusive interactions . . . [seeks] to break down bureaucratic stovepipes that
hinder effective communication.45 As a track two framework, the SED thus already serves as a vital
supplement to high level interchanges as a forum for debate, transparency, and confidence building:
functions as garnering
treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. recently characterized the SEDs key
equality and trust, as well as direct speaking between cabinet officials and
bureaucratic representatives from the two parties.46 The confidence-building function of track
two is particularly significant in the case of the SED: it signals that America welcome[s] the
rise of a confident. . .and prosperous China. Track two can also enhance the
Sino-American economic relationship on two key problems in the Chinese economy:
corruption and intellectual property (IP) violation. The costs of corruption in China are
substantial: direct costs were estimated at $86 billion in 2003, roughly three percent of Chinas GDP. But
the costs of corruption transcend the economic realm. They include social and political costs, such as
efficiency losses, waste, and damage to the environment, public health, education, the reliability of . . .
public institutions, and the morale of the civil service- are incalculable . . . corruption has lowered the
quality of Chinas economic growth, which exacerbate the social tensions generated by inequalities of
Opportunities for dialogue between U.S. experts and Chinese anti-
wealth.48
corruption officials on best practices for corruption monitoring and
prosecution should be created. The establishment in September 2007 of a Chinese National
Bureau of Corruption Prevention represents a positive step in CCP efforts to address the problem. In
addition, Chinese support for the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities, which held its
first Annual Convention in Beijing in October 2006, also represents a positive step. Both initiatives signal
the CCPs willingness to tackle corruption, and should be enriched through U.S. and regional participation.
There are also recent indications of greater willingness on the part of the CCP to crack down on IP
infractions: in 20062007 convictions rose by 52 percent and seizures of pirated goods by nearly 100
percent.49 Washington could fruitfully enhance international IP law enforcement through the Financial
Action Task Force on Money Laundering and by building on past cooperation between the Federal Bureau of
Track-two diplomacy constitutes a
Investigation and the Chinese Ministry of Public Security.50
mechanism at once policy-relevant and non-antagonistic to supplement steps
already take by Beijing to address both corruption and IP problems .
 Solves Warming
Solves warming by galvanizing support for existing
institutions
Graham & Kelley 9 - *teaches in the Department of International
Relations, University of Southern California & ** an assistant professor at the
School of International Service, American University, and a fellow of the
Transatlantic Project of LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics (*Sarah
Ellen & ** John Robert, U.S. Engagement in East Asia: A Case for Track Two
Diplomacy, Orbis Volume 53, Issue 1, January 2009,)//SL
Track two diplomacy is an instrument which Washington should use
to promote Northeast Asian regional cooperation on such issue as transnational crime and
environmental degradation. Unilateral initiatives can, by definition, only
partially solve problems that transcend national borders. Consequently, where
ongoing regional coordination, transparency and cooperation are most needed are areas in which track two
diplomacy will probably be most effective as a supplement to track one initiatives. Given that Northeast
Asia already encompasses several regimes tied to transnational issue areas, the challenge facing the next
administration will be to sustain a commitment to these initiatives and ensure they remain effectively
embedded in policy channels. Transnational crimeincluding drug smuggling, counterfeiting, maritime
piracy and activities linked to terrorismis beginning to be addressed effectively at the regional level in
Northeast Asia. U.S. participation, through track one and track two, will help boost such initiatives as the
Shanghai International Maritime Forum, which was established in November 2007 to set standards for
maritime security in shipping routes subject to piracy and drug smuggling such as the Malacca Straits. The
Forum has also opened debate on establishing coordinated responses and protocols for oil spills and the
transportation of hazardous materials. The health of the environment will be a crucial determinant of Asias
the United States has an interest in ensuring that
future stability and prosperity, and
effective solutions for the problems of energy security and climate change
are found. Frameworks such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum already
serve as a framework to develop a regional response to climate change , and
track two diplomacy can supplement these encouraging first steps .56 The Asia
Pacific Partnership on Energy and Climate, spearheaded by the United States and Australia, and
incorporating China, Japan, India and the ROK, represents a positive step toward a coordinated regional
In ensuring that existing agreements are
response focusing on clean technologies.
adhered to, Washington should build confidence through track two
mechanisms for sharing best practices. Washington should harness Beijings efforts to brand
the 2008 Olympic Games as the green games to encourage greater Chinese leadership in environmental
initiatives focusing on the region and developing nations. As the foregoing analysis indicates, numerous
frameworks and opportunities for track two instruments exist and can be refined as part of U.S. statecraft
in Northeast Asia. While setbacks can be expected, enhancing Americas diplomatic instruments would be
If the next
a relatively inexpensive means for rebuilding American legitimacy in the region.
administration seeks to create a climate cooperation rather than
competition in Sino-American relations, as we believe it should,
track two diplomacy should be embraced as a mechanism through
which to pursue the epistemic conditions of policy coordination that
are needed to bring about such an outcome. While many initiatives noted above
relate to the applications of track two at a bilateral level, it is important to reiterate the significant inroads
for building confidence in the area of security via multilateral track two pathways.

Climate Co-op works better through Track 2 Diplomacy

Mabey et al, 13 (Nick Mabey was previously a senior advisor in the UK Prime Ministers
Strategy Unit working is areas such as: energy, climate change, countries at risk of instability,
organized crime and fisheries. Nick trained as a mechanical engineer at Bristol University and
holds a masters degree in Technology and Policy from MIT. October 2013. Understanding
Climate Diplomacy: Building diplomatic capacity and systems to avoid dangerous climate
change The E3G Report [E3G is an independent, non-profit European organisation operating in
the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development].
https://www.e3g.org/docs/E3G_-
_Understanding_Climate_Diplomacy.pdf?/docs/E3G_Understanding_Climate_Diplomacy_.pdf) IS
Diplomacy should be about increasing understanding and collaboration
among countries that disagree, seeking commonality and compromise, not
only about building cooperation among allie s. Traditional allies on other issues, such as
Europe and the US, disagree strongly about the institutional basis of the climate regime, the role of equity
and the importance of delivering a 2C outcome. E merging
powers such as China and India
have underlying tensions over how atmospheric space should be allocated
given their different rates of development and population growth . Diplomacy
has traditionally used strategic confidence building measures to
increase trust and understanding in such difficult relationships.
Alongside these public confidence building processes it is critical to
build a thick web of informal channels including better use of Track
II and 1.5 processes utilising think-tanks and officials in informal settings .
Perhaps the biggest gap in the current regime is a strong structure to prepare discussions between Heads
of State and Heads of Government (HoS/HoG) in advance of the 2014 UN Leaders Summit and the 2015
Paris negotiations themselves.

Track 2 increases cooperation on warming

Aspen Institute 13 (Aspen Institute, Track II Dialogue on Climate Change and
Energy, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/events/track-ii-dialogue-climate-change-energy/) jpr
Enhancing Bilateral Cooperation Between India and the U.S. (Third in-person meeting) The Aspen Institute Energy and
Environment Program in partnership with Aspen Institute India, the World Resources Institute, the Confederation of
Indian Industry and the Center for American Progress have convened high-ranking civil society individuals from
India and the United States in a Track II Dialogue. This process aims to
foster trust and cooperation between the two countries through sustained,
direct exchanges involving influential non-governmental actors on both sides
with close ties to their respective governments. Complementing and informing formal
diplomatic relations, the Track II Dialogue can delineate options for collaboration,
foster communication and trust, and discuss implementation issues. A strong
strategic India-United States partnership on climate change, building on
existing ties and rapidly evolving climate positions, presents a unique
opportunity to deliver diplomatic and economic gains on both sides. An
enhanced bilateral relationship can foster progress on energy and climate
issues and could catalyze the multilateral negotiations under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Track 2 Solves Climate Change

Caballero-Anthony 7 (Mely Caballero-Anthony, Associate Professor and Head
of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School
of International Studies, Non-Traditional Security Issues in Asia Imperatives for
Deepening Regional Security Cooperation, pg. 205-206) jpr
A global consensus on how to collectively combat climate change has not
been reached yet. However, the urgency to accomplish a worldwide frame of
action has been aptly reflected in the release of reports detailing the gloomy
implications climate change could bring to mankind, if no concrete action is
taken. Such consequences include the rise of health-related problems, increased incidences of natural
disasters, impact on food and water security, which could bring in the follow-on effects such as forced
migration and sharpening of inter- and intra-state conflicts, especially those over resource issues.
Southeast Asia, in particular, is one of the most vulnerable regions, as identified in a recently published
climate change vulnerability mapping report.3 In 2007, the Expert Group Report on Climate Change and
Sustainable Development identified five likely outcomes that would be most pertinent, as far as Southeast
the rise in sea levels, which could submerge
Asian security is concerned. They include
low-lying coastal plains and river deltas, consequently affecting the livelihood
of coastal communities in particular; more intense summer monsoons
resulting in intensified degrees and frequencies of destructive flows and soil
erosion; major loss of mangroves and coral reefs that would impact on fish
stocks, which are heavily depended on in Southeast Asia as major source of protein; melting of the
Himalayan mountain glaciers that would add stress on water resources; and,
lastly, greater uncertainty associated with water supply management in the
midst of population growth.4 Clearly, if no strong actions are being taken, the
adverse effects of climate change could potentially reverse the many
decades of hard work undertaken by Southeast Asian governments to create
an economically vibrant and promising region . Also, climate change could well
derail regional efforts to eradicate poverty and accomplish the Millennium Development
Goals, since the poor are the most vulnerable to climate change. A point to note is that Southeast Asia
produces 12 per cent of the worlds greenhouse gases and this share is likely to increase if a business as
usual attitude continues in the region.5 More importantly, Southeast Asia is also among the regions with
the greatest potential for mitigating carbon emissions by reducing deforestation and improving land
What is needed is not just action at the national
management practices.6
level, but also coordinated, committed actions among ASEAN
governments and with the wider Asia region. The inclusion of non-
state actors (e.g. NGOs, civil societies, etc.) would have to be considered in
order to comprehensively adapt to and mitigate climate change. At the
ASEAN level, there has been general recognition of the potential security risks posed by climate change to
the region. On 13 December 2007, ASEAN environment ministers met during the UN Climate Change
Conference in Bali discussed regional efforts to address climate change, and agreed to encourage efforts
to develop an ASEAN Climate Change Initiative (ACCI) to further strengthen regional coordination and
cooperation against climate change, as well as undertake concrete actions to respond to its adverse
As part of the fight against
impacts.7 Despite such efforts, more work clearly needs to be done.
climate change, efforts to prevent burning of peatlandsa major source of
carbon emissions and the cause of trans-boundary haze problems prevalent
in the regionare crucial, yet beset with problems. Much of the carbon emissions in developing
countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia especially, result from the burning of peatlands.8
Notwithstanding the introduction by ASEAN of the Regional Haze Action Plan in 1997, which outlined
prevention, mitigation and monitoring, the mitigation part played by Indonesia has been poor. Moreover,
Indonesia to date still refuses to sign the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution,
thereby limiting collective ASEAN action against the problem. The issue of peatlands aside, however,
ASEAN managed to attempt addressing issues related to climate change, such as sustainable
development, in other separate agreements and plans of action, such as the ASEAN Vientiane Action
Program (VAP) 20042010. Gradual, incremental steps towards closer regional cooperation to combat
climate change have been taken by ASEAN countries, the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change,
Energy and the Environment adopted on 21 November 2007 being a noteworthy example, whereby
ASEAN countries affirm their commitment towards an effective approach to
inter-related challenges of climate change, energy, environmental and health
problems, in the context of sustainable development .9
 Solves Space
The counterplan solves space cooperation disputes but
avoids the link to the space leadership da
Cyr 2014 --- Masters Candidate in Political Science at Lund University.
(Philippe Cyr, Spring 2014, Per aspera ad astra: Identifying Opportunities for
International Cooperation with China in Space Exploration, Lund University of
Political Science. http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?
func=downloadFile&recordOId=4228175&fileOId=4228177)//ET
To facilitate the alignment of main stakeholders the authors apply a SMART58 analysis to evaluate the
strategic planning of global space exploration. It was found that to efficiently implement a long-term space
To achieve this
exploration strategy requires a better definition of SMART and performance objectives.
stakeholderinterdependency, the authors suggest a focus on information
exchange, organizational knowledge, and human capital. It is
acknowledged however that a political environment capable of
providing balanced technology protection and that can establish
synergies between different strategic national goals is required to pursue
long-term missions. Schaffer (2008a; 2008b) has researched what design criteria are necessary for
a desirable multilateral international coordination mechanism for space exploration. The author published
two papers that utilize synthesized informal interviews with representatives from 10 of the Global
Exploration Strategy59 participating countries to identify desirable criteria for a coordination mechanism.
One of the papers grouped the perspectives of spacefaring nations and contrasted their required criteria
with US criteria requirements. It was found that the main overlap between the US and other actors is a
support for independence, flexibility, and a clear scope. The only area of disagreement between the two
sides was that the US was concerned over who could participate in the mechanism citing foreign policy
implications of collaborating with non-preferred partners.60 The second paper builds upon these findings
by contrasting required criteria synthesized from informal interviews with successful features of existing
mechanisms for international collaboration. The analysis considered the following existing mechanisms:
the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites, the Group on Earth Observation, the International Agency
Consultative Group, the International Space Station, the European Space Agency, ITER, and the Antarctic
Treaty System. It was found that no existing mechanism adequately satisfied the requirement criteria of
the US and other spacefaring nations and therefore recommended establishing a new mechanism. The
proposed new mechanism builds on the previous work and recommends the inclusion of independence,
flexibility, and clear scope as key principles. 1.4.3.2 Proposals for international cooperation Enhancing
international cooperation in the era of Space Exploration 3.0 requires a sustainable multilateral
international coordination mechanism. The design criteria of such a coordination mechanism include
metaprinciples, stakeholder integration, and must permit independence, flexibility, and provide a clear
scope. While these contributions are in regards to the design of a coordination mechanism as a platform it
is also necessary to consider various frameworks used to identify and evaluate opportunities for
cooperation in space exploration. The following will overview various proposals for international
cooperation and the parameters that inform them. Ansdell et al. (2011) propose a stepping stone approach
towards creating a global space exploration program. The approach consists of three steps: (1)
creating an international Earth-based field research program to prepare for planetary exploration, (2)
increase exploitation of the ISS to use it as a platform for exploration , and (3) a
global CubeSat61 program that supports exploration activities. The authors organize the space community
What differentiates these
into space powers, emerging space nations, and developing countries.
categories is where a state places on a continuum of space capabilities from
high complexity with low dependence on foreign partnerships to low
complexity with high dependence on foreign partnerships. Achieving established
space power status requires a state to have proven launch vehicles and to have played a significant role in
exploration missions. This interpretation therefore places technical capability as the primary criteria for
classifying space capabilities of states. For each step a different mechanism for collaboration is
recommended with each step increasing in level of collaboration, providing emerging space powers and
developing countries with the opportunity to participate directly in a space exploration project. The
proposed collaboration mechanism for the international Earth-based field research program in preparation
of planetary exploration would be modeled on the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR).
SCAR is an in-situ exploration model that facilitates regular meetings and information exchanges about
various research. Data sharing would support collaboration for increasing
exploitation of the ISS where data generated from an experiment
would be used as payment for renting space on the ISS. It is recommended
that UN COPUOS and the Committee on Space Research take leading roles in organizing this collaboration.
Finally collaboration for the global CubeSat program would operate on the data sharing in exchange for
ridesharing model. This arrangement would allow partner nations to share data generated from their
CubeSat as payment for a space launch vehicle-providing partner hosting the payload. Broniatowski et al.
(2008) contribute a systematic framework to evaluate proposals for international cooperation in space
exploration. The framework builds on six types of international cooperation representing various degrees of
collaboration by adding technical and policy parameters. The authors argue that previous frameworks
have been too focused on technical aspects and therefore undervalue the impact of policy factors.
Technical parameters utilized by this framework are cost, schedule, and performance and are considered
main determinants of system success. Policy parameters refer to the political utility from the perspective
of each partner nation and are constructed to capture domestic and foreign policy concerns. More
specifically, the authors identify the effect of national space activities on the domestic economy, national
security, national prestige, influence on policy at global and regional levels, and on desired technical
capabilities as key factors in this calculation. Furthermore policy impediments must be considered. The
authors concede that the list of factors constituting a countrys political utility is not exhaustive and cannot
apply to each country equally. Instead, policy parameters need to be updated at the time of decision-
making and be informed by a national environment to capture the realities of a given context. Szajnfarber
et al. (2011) create and evaluate various collaborative space exploration architectures62 using NASA, CSA,
JAXA, and the ESA in their analysis. The goal of their analysis is to identify a sustainable exploration
strategy. Collaboration architectures are based on near-Earth object (NEO) and Moon-first destination
scenarios. The technical requirement to support each destination and the technological capability of the
four space agencies inform the technical parameters of the architecture. Political parameters for each
space agency were derived from various sources including press articles, reports, and interviews with key
individuals. Using these sources the authors established each agencys priorities and capabilities. The main
findings of the study were found from overlaying technical and political collaboration architectures to
determine the feasibility of international cooperation in developing the various technical requirements
needed to support NEO and Moon-first missions. It was found that politically the US needed control of a
security core including crew capsule, launch vehicle and heavy launch vehicle. Given this US requirement
international contributions were most likely to be in robotic precursor missions and planetary access and
operations. These potential areas of contribution for international partners are therefore susceptible to
whether the US chooses a NEO or Moon-first approach. For example a NEO destination, such as an
asteroid, would not require contributions in planetary access and operations, such as a habitation module.
In this scenario then the potential areas of contribution for international partners is more limited.
Opportunities for international cooperation with the US is therefore strongly influenced by the US desired
destination. Given the relative lack of opportunities for international cooperation for NEOfirst approaches,
the authors suggest that a Moon-first approach is more desirable. The Moon-first approach is also
considered to be more politically palatable since it stirs greater interest, scope and prestige. Finally the
authors find that a sustainable exploration strategy should be destination-driven since it is the politically
feasible approach. 1.4.4 Critique of literature The above discussion was intended to provide a background
on how to facilitate international cooperation in space exploration in the current geopolitical environment.
The goal of this study is to help identify opportunities for international cooperation with China in space
exploration activities. Building on existing literature this study can now argue that the conditions for
cooperation in the Space Exploration 3.0 era are increasingly participatory and that national space policy is
a product of both domestic bargaining processes and influences from the international environment. This
insight is relevant for this study as it suggests that new configurations of cooperation are available.
Specifically, it cautions against over-emphasizing state-to-state partnerships instead recommending that
linkages between new domestic and international actors be considered. The body of literature for
international cooperation in space exploration however is still relatively underdeveloped. For this reason
the literature review is more descriptive for the articles chosen but limited in breadth. The key points
relating to mechanism design criteria are that a sustainable mechanism requires flexibility to
accommodate the interests of a diverse range of actors. This requirement is in response to the new Space
Exploration 3.0 international environment. Contributing authors believe that these recommendations can
be achieved by applying open-system architectures at various levels, by promoting stakeholder
integration, and by including principles of independence, flexibility, and a clear scope. Much of the
literature related to proposals for international cooperation and collaboration employ collaboration
architectures, a common method used in engineering and applied by authors with technical backgrounds.
Generally, collaboration architectures create matrices that outline the capabilities of partners in relation to
various subtasks needed to complete a project. These capabilities can be measured in terms of technical
capabilities or policy considerations and subsequently overlaid to identify potential opportunities for
cooperation. In relation to these discussions two points need elaboration. First, the idea of stakeholder
integration has particular salience. New actors in space exploration are a major driver in the shift to Space
Exploration 3.0. As referenced earlier in this work, the new era includes states, non-government
organizations, universities, and industries; states of course remain the central actors.63 Developing a
methodology to capture the contributions of new actors is not a straightforward task. In regards to national
space programs, previous methodologies such as aggregate number of satellite launches have been used
to measure national space activities grossly misrepresented national space activities.64 Furthermore space
activities of developing countries were systemically excluded.65 Due to the increasingly participatory
other actors such as NGOs are having a measurable
character of space exploration
effect on space exploration activities. Space related NGOs themselves are of diverse makeup
and have different roles that mainly assist with capacity building. One study surveys the efforts of four
prominent space related NGOs the Space Advisory Council, EURISY, The Planetary Society, and the
Secure World Foundation and found significant contributions in outreach activities, space awareness,
dissemination of the benefits of space activities to the general public, education campaigns, and capacity
building particularly in developing countries.66 Furthermore NGOs can be used as proxy
for diplomacy and communication between policymakers making
them an effective option for Track Two diplomacy strategies. 67 An
example of this is the work done by the International Astronautical Federation ( IAF). The IAFs mission is
to foster dialogue between scientists around the world and support
international cooperation in all space-related activitie s.68 In this pursuit the
organization has co-organized a number of conferences including the Global Space Exploration Conference
64th IAC having recently taken place in September 2013 in
in 2012 and the IAC, with the
China. To summarize developing countries, space-interest NGOs and private
Beijing,
actors are contributing to space exploration activities in various ways. The
idea of stakeholder integration is needed to accommodate the interests and
concerns of these actors so as to create an environment conducive to participatory space
exploration. Including new actors in a meaningful way is a key component in creating a sustainable space
exploration strategy.

Solves Space The counterplan resumes track two air

force academy dialogue
Harold 13 - Associate Political Scientist with the RAND Corporation,
specializes in the analysis of Chinese foreign and security policies and the
international relations of East Asia (Scott, July 2013, Expanding Contacts to
Enhance Durability: A Strategy for Improving U.S.-China Military-to-Military
Relations, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Project Muse)//SL
A separate U.S. Air Force Academy dialogue on space issues with the
Chinese National Defense University and the Academy of Military Sciences
existed from 2004 to 2010 but has lapsed because of lack of funding. The
Pentagon should consider resuming funding for this dialogue as a part of
proposed discussions with China on space, cyber, and nuclear issues. Such
dialogues may pick up additional participation from federally funded research
and development centers such as RAND, CNA, and IDA. Indeed, IDA
previously participated in three rounds of dialogue with the China Institute for
International Strategic Studies (CIISS) from 2006 to 2008 on topics including
personnel costs, common security challenges, and defense industrial
development and procurement.80 Chinese experts tend to view this as a
promising area for expanding contacts and building mutual understanding.

Track two bottom up approach is key to solve space debris

Munters 2016--- doctoral researcher at the Leuven Centre for Global
Governance Studies with a MA in space studies law. (Ward Munters, April
2016, SPACE DEBRIS: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION? Ku
Leuven Center for Global Governance Studies.
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp-
171-180/wp175-munters.pdf)//ET
To be sure, this notion has been gradually coming to the fore in the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) as a
valuable tool in securing the long term sustainability of outer space
activities92. This recognition of the advantages of a bottom up approach, that
is both technically robust and includes a wide variety of space actors
across multiple levels and sectors to reach non-binding agreements by
consensus, is a hopeful sign. An added advantage of this process is the
difficulty of reopening these voluntary agreements, or rules of the road, for
the political levels93. The process essentially entails track two diplomacy:
the interaction between private citizens or groups of people within a country
or from different countries who are outside the formal governmental power
structure94. Here, the emphasis is on a non-adversarial, humanized
communication process that avoids the constraints of formally representing a
nation State with its complicated diplomatic and political concerns95. Thus, it
avoids many of the difficulties and the ensuing immobility present in
reaching binding international consensus on the higher political and legal
levels. Moreover, a lot of future uncertainties remain, while current short-term
decisions and approaches to the space debris problem can have long-term
and equally uncertain effects. Thus, informal, bottom-up approaches are well
suited to adaptive governance by allowing for a quicker and more closely
tailored response to new problems or unforeseen consequences. They avoid
the path dependency of more formal, fixed policies by constantly assessing,
monitoring and adjusting towards better measures to combat the debris
problem96. Lastly, a more factual argument for a polycentric approach is the
highly complex and fragmented network of space actors, across all levels,
each with varying mandates, structures, powers and authorities, that
currently exists. Multipolar space governance is already a reality97 and the
polycentric principles can provide valuable insights in how to best harness
this complexity and instrumentalize it towards the sustainable governance
of near-Earth orbits.
 Solves Taiwan/SCS
Solves Taiwan Deescalates cross strait tensions
Graham & Kelley 9 - *teaches in the Department of International
Relations, University of Southern California & ** an assistant professor at the
School of International Service, American University, and a fellow of the
Transatlantic Project of LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics (*Sarah
Ellen & ** John Robert, U.S. Engagement in East Asia: A Case for Track Two
Diplomacy, Orbis Volume 53, Issue 1, January 2009,)//SL
A further way in which the next administration should advance U.S. objectives
in Northeast Asia is to adopt track two as a strategy for mitigating
tensions across the Taiwan Strait. Although Washington adheres to the
one China policy, it also has an interest in seeing Taiwans democratic system
and open economy remain vibrant, and most importantly in ensuring that any
future unification with China will occur peacefully. Consequently,
Washingtons current position consists of advocating dual restraint and
sponsoring multiple channels of dialogue between Taipei and Beijing. As the
April, 2007, controversy sparked by Taiwanese objections to being included in
the domestic leg of Chinas Olympic flame relay and Chinas repeated
blockage of Taiwanese attempts to join the United Nations as Taiwan
indicate, symbolic and rhetorical factors can easily inflame cross-Strait
antagonisms. At the same time, the underlying trend of Taiwans domestic
politics is toward moderation on the independence issue. The election of the
Ma Ying Jeou to the Taiwanese Presidency in May was greeted internationally
as a highly promising step for cross-Strait relations. Ma has pledged to
improve ties with the U.S.; has Chinese government contacts and signaled a
willingness to forge party-to-party contacts between his Party, the KMT, and
the CCP; and has shown a commitment to flexible methods for improving
cross-Strait relations such as commercial ties, tourism, and a more
accommodating nomenclature for membership in international
organizations.37 So too, arguably, do trends within Chinas own domestic
political scene such as its search for international prestige as Olympic host
signal that the time is right for a renewed effort tackle the problem.38 Track
two channels provide an opportunity for Washington to encourage
collaboration in non-government and even government sectors
across the Taiwan Strait. Areas of common interest between China, Taiwan
and the U.S. that lie beyond the reunification issue should be identified and
leveraged to extend dialogue and cooperation. In particular, events and joint
projects in areas such as transnational health protocols, including through the
World Health Organization (to which Taiwan has repeatedly sought
membership), should be sponsored as a primer for sustained dialogue and
political engagement.

Two Track diplomacy over Taiwan ends tensions and any

risk of misalc
Chang 2001 --- fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at
Harvard. (James C. P. Change, U.S. POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN, Harvard
University.
http://conferences.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/fellow
s/files/chang.pdf)//ET
To use unofficial track-two dialogue to supplement official contacts can have
considerable value in clarify issues and dispelling misperceptions. Such
dialogue allows a deeper and more direct enlargement with issues and long-
term trends. It could also involve broader participation by influential people
on both sides, especially the various political parties on Taiwan. This reflects
the fact that, in Asia, track-two dialogue is a well established way of dealing
with sensitive issues in a responsible but informal manner, and that broader
participation would help build the political base on Taiwan for a redefined
relationship with the mainland, whether on an interim basis or on a final
arrangement.54 In Taiwan, the pros outweigh the cons for an active U.S. role
in track-two diplomacy. Beside providing a sense of security and trust, the
presence of an international witness will be a force of mediation and
monitoring that Taiwan and mainland China will not slide into emotionalism
and get bogged down in the passion of their historical feud, but will instead
be able to negotiate pragmatically. Wang Dao-han, chairman of ARATS, has
also said that although the cross-strait issue must be settled directly without
outside interference, track-two dialogue could be useful because people from
the three sides could speak with candor and convey honest views about
possible future courses of action.55

Solves SCS Conflict via elite interaction

Weissmann 10 - a Senior Lecturer at the Swedish Defence University and a
Senior Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs
(Mikael, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT AND SINO-ASEAN RELATIONS: A
STUDY IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING, Asian Perspective,
Vol. 34, No.3, 2010, http://www.ui.se/upl/files/49747.pdf)//SL
The proliferation of elite interactions, in particular Track-2 diplomacy and
personal networks, has been important for peace building and conflict
prevention in the South China Sea, as well as in Sino-ASEAN relations and the
broader East Asian region. The elite interactions have increased the regional
ability to prevent conflicts from arising and escalating and have thus been an
important peace-building mechanism. Not least, they have been an important
force for regional trust and confidence building, and for the development of a
regional identity through East Asian community building. Regarding the South
China Sea dispute, the informal South China Sea Workshops have been of
particular importance. These workshops have been promoting cooperation,
confidence building, and trust among the conflicting parties. The importance
of these workshops should be understood in the context of the thick web of
Track-2 frameworks that developed in the region in the 1990s. The
frameworks are interlinked: They interact both formally and informally; they
discuss similar issues; and, to a great extent, they have overlapping
participants. This creates synergy effects and strong links to the Track 1 level.
These mechanisms are explored in more depth in the following sections on
proliferation of Track-2 diplomacy and on personal networks.
 Solves Trust
China empirically responds to and prefers Track Two
diplomacy
Johnston and Ross 2005 Johnston - Professor of China studies and World
affairs at Harvard, Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College,
associate of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University.
(Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Politics in Asia : Engaging China :
The Management of an Emerging Power, Chapter: China and Multilateral
Security Institutions p. 258-261, Accesed through Ebrary)//ET
In the second phase which began in 1995 and was especially evident at the
ARF track two meeting in Paris on preventive diplomacy in November 1996,
the approach has been more positive and enthusiastic. It reflects a more
sophisticated grasp of the dynamics of regional discussions, a rising comfort
level with them, and increased self-confidence. It has emphasized flexible
interaction in formal and informal settings, detailed preparation, the use of
humor, and a better under-standing of the possibilities provided by officials
appearing in their "personal capacities," a creative feature of track two
processes.'4 Chinese participants have frequently been involved in drafting
meeting summaries and reports. Chinese officials have been fulsome in their
praise of the new dialogue structures. In June 1997, for instance, Assistant
Foreign Minister Chen Jian stated that "a multilateral framework seems to be
the order of the day, both in the economic and security fields." In assessing
the ARF, he argued that we should judge the ARF by what it has achieved, not
what it has done. ARF is the first ever collective endeavor in this region to
carry out institutionalized multilateral security dialogue. It represents a
regional effort to form a new security order. Its progress and success is
already remarkable.' A month later the then Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
praised the "ARF approach" and expressed support for ASEAN efforts to "to
be a major driving force in the ARF."" The change in approach extended
beyond style into content. Chinese participants have been increasingly pro-
active in advancing specific approaches and positions. In the ARF, for
example, these initially covered general concerns about the pace and
direction of regional discussions, including insistence on non-interference in
domestic affairs, insistence on "consensus" interpreted to mean unanimity,
and insistence on a gradual pace comfortable to all participants. More
recently, China has advocated regional cooperation in the areas of military
medicine, multilateral collaboration on defense conversion issues, the
exchange of high-level visits by senior military officers, port calls by naval
vessels, and joint action in search and rescue, maritime safety and marine
environmental protection. A major emphasis has been the identification of
the distinctive characteristics of the region which demand special approaches
to confidence-building. Chinese officials have repeatedly noted the success of
this regionally sensitive approach as seen in the five-power border CBM
agreement it has signed with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, and
the bilateral CBMs with India.' All of these agreements were negotiated
bilaterally without targeting third parties, and without including rigorous
verification provisions." Most interestingly, the five-power agreement is now
touted by more committed multilateralists in Beijing as an example of
"mutual security," portable with modifications to other areas of the Asia-
Pacific." A dominant view in Beijing is that the ARF's main function is to build
confidence and trust. Chinese officials have been hesitant about moving
into two later stages outlined in the initial ARF concept paper, preventive
diplomacy and "elaboration of approaches to conflict." They have been
particularly anxious about what they perceive as the intrusive elements of
preventive diplomacy which might include third-party mediation, use of the
good offices of the ARF Chair, or a regional crisis prevention center. Mirroring
positions which Chinese diplomats have adopted at the UN, they have
insisted that this should only be undertaken in highly unusual circumstances
when all contending parties agree, and cannot be imposed unilaterally. The
pattern of Chinese thinking on post-conflict situations is less clear. In July
1998 China published "China's National Defense,"89 a more comprehensive
statement than either the 1995 White Paper on arms control and
disarmament or the annual reports presented to the ARF. Prepared by an
inter-ministerial group with the lead role performed by the PIA, the document
does not break new ground on the topics of defense expenditures or national
defense policy. Rather, its significance lies in the motive for its creation and
some new lines of thinking that emerge within it which are consonant with
regional norms and practices developing in the ARF and CSCAP contexts. It
uses the phrase "dialogue and cooperation" no less than fourteen times,
mainly in the context of regional track one and track two processes but also
extending to bilateral mechanisms which China has established with the
United States, Russia, Japan, France, Canada, Australia and MEAN. In
objective and design, it parallels efforts by several other countries in the
region to produce defense White Papers as an exercise in transparency. It
thus serves the function of responding to complaints by China's neighbors
about a lack of transparency in its defense doctrine and polices. Critics may
be unimpressed by the absence of new information, but the level and kind of
information provided is similar to that included in the White Papers of several
other Asian countries including Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.
Moreover, White Papers are seen as part of a process in which initial
compilations provide a basis for informed discussion and interrogation on
matters previously considered to be of strictly domestic concern.

Subnational diplomacy results in lasting coop and

excludes the plans official negotiations
Tavenner and Watkins 6/15/2016 --- Tavenner is the Executive Director of
The Tai Initiative focusing on U.S. China subnational dialogue and member of
the National Committee for US-China Relations. Watkins is journalist and U.S.
China bilateral relations consultant (Carson Tavenner and Tom Watkins,
China-U.S. Relations: Creating an Effective Relationship at the Subnational
Level, China US focus. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-us-
relations-creating-an-effective-relationship-at-the-subnational-level/)//ET
Building Subnational China-US Relationships
In his recent article, Stabilizing Relations through High-level Exchanges,
Shen Dingli, Associate Dean at Fudan University, presents an urgent case for
the importance of the national challenges ahead between China and America.
Shens premise is that America and China must have regular and sustained
high-level exchanges including summit meetings to help boost trust and
soothe concerns.
We concur with Shens premise but believe it is only part of the puzzle that is
sustaining relations during both good times and bad. Citizens on both sides of
the Pacific should be informed by the overlooked pieces: powerful Chinese
and American leaders hard at work below the national level.
These connections go beyond people-to-people exchanges. Birthed by U.S.
President Eisenhower, the people-to-people concept continues to play an
important role in preventing national fear or contempt of foreigners that was
found in the first half of the 20th century. But its influence at the national
level is limited.
Nurturing a personal relationship with foreign counterparts through decades
of mutual struggle and achievement at the business, university, think tank,
provincial and city level creates time to marinate a lasting win-win
relationship.
National leaders responsibilities compel them to spend no more than a few
hours or days at most per year with a counterpart. The time they spend is
often scripted and each side must posture for the home audience as well.
Their staffs are the ones who manifest the communication. Therefore, little
genuine relational substance is generated in such environments.
Clearly, we need these regular high-level meetings, but we need to nurture
effective relationships at the subnational level as well. Subnational leadership
includes governors, mayors, executives of businesses, universities,
and non-profits; thousands are filling the gap between people-to-people
exchanges and high-level diplomatic missions.
In America and China, as former U.S. House Speaker Tip ONeill famously
observed, all politics is local.
Generational Investments
In communities all across America and China, one can find leadership
invested both in programs for posterity and in personal relationships, building
trust and creating jobs and investment. Often, this leadership is found in the
context of a city and state.
We need to begin such relationships long before our respective leaders
achieve top positions. We must create a bumper bowling approach to
international relationships in the early career stages of educators, business
leaders, civil servants, diplomats and local and provincial officials. Bumper
bowling is played on a regular bowling lane with the gutters protected to keep
the ball in the game. This enhances success ten-fold.
Building connections at the subnational level can pay dividends for both
nations. This lesson has been reinforced by none other than Chinese
President Xi Jinping. Xi picked Iowa as the centerpiece of his 2012 vice
presidential tour of America because he stayed in Iowa when he was a low-
level staffer in 1985 learning about American agriculture. When he returned
as President in September 2015, he unexpectedly visited Lincoln High School
in Tacoma, WA. In 1993, Xi had been the Communist Party Secretary of the
city of Fuzhou and signed the Tacoma-Fuzhou sister city agreement with a
port official who had hosted Xi and the delegation for dinner at the time.
Reconnecting with Americans who have hosted him in their home a
powerful tool of citizen diplomacy we all can wield provides a backdrop for
the Chinese leader seeking to emphasize the image of an enduring America-
China friendship at a time when our two nations are fierce economic
competitors, military rivals, and the only two major powers on the world
stage.
Some see these visits as nothing more than a propaganda machine intended
to fool an unsuspecting public. Even if this is the truth, Xi demonstrates the
need to create opportunities for relationship building and win-win successes
long before our respective leaders reach the top rung of their national career
ladder. We look forward to Chinese officials doing more hosting in their homes
in the future.
In the meantime, lets stop judging or doubting the sincerity of corporate
executives who create amazing new technologies to propel both of our
nations forward. Lets start listening to non-profit leaders, philanthropists,
educators, and many other China-America bridge-builders who lovingly
struggle to solve problems while building trust and bonds of honesty for the
future. Such people are found in great numbers in communities far from
Beijing and Washington, D.C.
Making, While Facing, Our Future
Facilitating trust, not only with the presidents, ambassadors, and ministers,
but also at the subnational level is critical to obtaining a sustainable
relationship between the USA and the PRC. Much work remains! Such trust
cannot be nurtured through roots of commerce alone and military tit-for-tat.
International issues between our respective leaders dominate the headlines,
yet every day subnational leaders quietly lay the foundation of a strong and
lasting relationship. What they are building will outlive any world leader on
the stage today.
The Tai Initiative was created to help us build on the opportunity for
subnational leaders of both countries to play an active role in shaping a
positive outcome for the sake of our two nations, worlds apart but
inextricably linked together with the world community.
Mayor Bill Wild of Westland, Michigan is an Advisory Board member with The
Tai Initiative and explains his involvement this way, saying, The world has
indeed been flattened; what happens in China does not stay in China.
Certainly there are differences between us but as leaders and as everyday
citizens we must find ways to connect to build a world where we trust,
understand each other and find ways to assure we leave this planet in better
shape than we found it for our children and grandchildren. He continues,
Understanding China and the Chinese people, one-fifth of all humanity, is
vital to us as Americans and the world.
 A2: Kelley/No Cred
Kelleys 2006 paper ignored the massive future potential
Feffer 2006 --- co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for
Policy Studies and a fellow at the Open Societies Foundation. (John Feffer,
12/18/2006, All Talk, Foreign Policy in Focus. http://fpif.org/all_talk/)//ET
U.S. public diplomacy is broken. With a new strategic dialogue, FPIF
investigates ways to fix the system. This advice to listen, rather than simply
push a product, is central to salvaging the international reputation of the
United States, writes Nancy Snow in Anti-Americanism and the Rise of Civic
Diplomacy. She argues that Washington has a one-track mind: It is essential
to move from the efforts of government officials to those of ordinary people,
from the formal world of Track One diplomacy to Track Two diplomacy, in
which non-governmental exchanges play a leading role.
R.S. Zaharna, in her contribution to the dialogue, focuses more on U.S. lack of
credibility. If U.S. diplomats are struggling at the level of listening, then U.S.
public diplomacy is in worse shape than we realize, Zaharna writes.
Unfortunately, even listeningwithout first establishing credibilitycan be
perceived as gratuitous and insincere. John Robert Kelley, meanwhile, argues
that before civic diplomats replace the State Department as the chief
conveyors of U.S. public diplomacy, the professional diplomats have to get
their act in order.
Finally, Nancy Snow responds to Zaharna and Kelley: While I recognize
that track two diplomacy will never replace official diplomatic efforts,
weve barely tapped the possibilities of what the United States might
accomplish in gaining credibility if we shift focus away from foreign policy
lectures to international understanding.
Net Benefits
 Elections NB

Track two diplomacy avoids the election link --- arent tied
to politics
Mapendere 2006--- Assistant Director Conflict Resolution Program at the
Carter Center (Jeffrey Mapendere, Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the
Complementarity of Tracks, Culture of Peace Online Journal.
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/TrackOneandaHalfDipl
omacy_Mapendere.pdf)//ET
Strengths of Track Two Diplomacy The strengths of Track Two Diplomacy
have been discussed in detail, but separately by Montville (1991), Ury (1999),
Sanders (1991), Ryan (1995), and Lederach (1997). First, Track Two parties
are not inhibited by political or constitutional power; therefore, they can
express their own viewpoints on issues that directly affect their communities
and families. Second, Track Two officials do not have the fear of losing
constituencies because they are the constituency. Third, Track two
empowers the socially, economically, and politically disenfranchised groups
by giving them a platform from which they can air their views on how peace
can be achieved in their own communities or nations. Fourth, Track Two is
effective both at the pre-violent conflict and post violent conflict stages;
therefore it is a very effective tool for violent conflict prevention and post-
conflict peacebuilding. Fifth, Track Two involves grassroots and middle
leadership who are in direct contact with the conflict. Sixth, Track Two is not
affected by electoral cycles.

Track two diplomacy provides political cover for elites and

policy makers
Graham & Kelley 9 - *teaches in the Department of International
Relations, University of Southern California & ** an assistant professor at the
School of International Service, American University, and a fellow of the
Transatlantic Project of LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics (*Sarah
Ellen & ** John Robert, U.S. Engagement in East Asia: A Case for Track Two
Diplomacy, Orbis Volume 53, Issue 1, January 2009,)//SL
In the conflict management arena, track two participants primarily act as
intermediaries facilitating communications between disputing parties. But in
the absence of conflict is there a raison detre for track two dialogues? One of
track two diplomacys chief proponents, Harold Saunders, once termed it a
policy-related, problem-solving dialogue, thus extending the notion of good
relations as an end unto itself. Saunders argued that by capitalizing on open
communication for a conflict resolution purpose, track two dialogue extends
diplomacy to include a broader range of policy actors, and brings them
together without the trappings and constraints of diplomatic protocol.12 At
the same time, to guarantee both the credibility and influence of these
dialogues, track two participants must have experience within the policy
milieu and wield connections to the official domain.13 Our assessment of the
prospects for track two in Northeast Asia challenges the conventional notion
that opening dialogue channels is useful only in conflict resolution. There are
three key ways that track two dialogue can contribute to the reorientation of
bilateral and multilateral relations toward policy coordination and enhanced
confidence in non-conflict settings: by shaping elite perceptions; by
maintaining open communication channels, and by enabling the pursuit of
joint projects As stated earlier, elites embedded in the policy-process play a
vital role in track two arrangements because they represent credible agents
of change. Track two depends on elite participation in two ways. On the one
hand, the second track provides political cover so elites do not feel
obliged to recite government policy or have to bear the political costs
endemic to traditional diplomatic interactions.14 On the other, track
two processes are contingent on the fact that elites have access to the
policymaking level. This dichotomy demonstrates the balance to be struck in
crafting track two initiatives. Relative independence of thought must be
guaranteed without forsaking connections to power. Elites, by virtue of their
positions, in a track two atmosphere constitute an ad hoc epistemic
community actively and collectively reflecting on policy issues. Whether track
two solutions catalyze policy change depends partially on the elites access to
political leaders and partially on socialization, whereby ideas gain the
acceptance of a broad segment of society. In conflict scenarios, socialization
entails changing prevailing attitudes toward an adversary. In our
conceptualization of track two the function of socialization is to build
political support for sustained policy collaboration at bilateral or
multilateral levels. This approach has gained widespread acceptance in
Southeast Asia, where Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has
encouraged regional security dialogue in track two settings.15 Between 1993
and 1995 there were at least 93 non-official meetings stemming from ASEAN,
convened to discuss regional security issues. In 2003 that number increased
to 149 and surged further to 217 by 2005.

Track two diplomacy isnt publicized --- doesnt link to

politics which improves solvency
Fowler 1999 --- Director of the Muhammad Ali Institute of Peacemaking and
Conflict Resolution, University of Louisville. (MICHAEL R. FOWLER, The
Increasingly Complicated World of International Mediation, United States
Institute Peace Press.
https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/77074/OSJDR_V18N4_0977.
pdf?sequence=4)//ET
One of the most important, yet understudied, roles of NGOs in conflict
resolution involves what is sometimes termed "track-two diplomacy," and
several of the chapters, most notably those on Northern Ireland 46 and the
South China Sea, 47 focus on this phenomenon. That is, in various important
disputes, apart from officials acting at their government's behest and
direction ("track-one diplomacy"), regular, though unofficial, contact is also
taking place between- representatives of conflicting parties and other
concerned onlookers. This is aimed at creating an environment more
conducive to the eventual official resolution of the conflict. Track-two
diplomacy often occurs informally, in scholarly settings, in an open
problemsolving atmosphere, with the aim of "fostering dialogue, developing
ideas for joint cooperation, and reducing tensions by placing issues once
considered taboo on the negotiating agenda .... -48 That it is largely
ignored by the media minimizes grandstanding by the participants ,
who also need not concern themselves with diplomatic protocol or with
drafting a steady stream of private cables and public statements to feed the
appetites of bureaucratic and news agencies alike. These advantages ought
not to be dismissed lightly. One diplomat noted: As a former news reporter
and a strong believer in free speech and open societies, I was struck by how
disruptive the constant news coverage was at public peace negotiations for
the Middle East. As soon as the delegates arrived in Washington or other
official venues, journalists would confront them with the more hostile
comments made by the opposing side, thus leading to even more aggressive
responses.49
Permutation answers
 AT: Perm do both

Perm do both fails --- official government representation

in Track 2 compromises the integrity of the process
Graham & Kelley 9 - *teaches in the Department of International
Relations, University of Southern California & ** an assistant professor at the
School of International Service, American University, and a fellow of the
Transatlantic Project of LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics (*Sarah
Ellen & ** John Robert, U.S. Engagement in East Asia: A Case for Track Two
Diplomacy, Orbis Volume 53, Issue 1, January 2009,)//SL
When elites are involved in track two frameworks in an official capacity,
the functions of track two as independent but politically embedded events or
dialogues can be compromised. Consequently, it is important to
distinguish track two from track one-and-a-half diplomacy: more
formal negotiation taking place on behalf of official actors.17 Track two differs
from track one-and-a-half due to the relative independence of participants.
They are not required to make binding commitments. On the other end of
the spectrum, policy dialogue that is devoid of direct links to key political
figures can be termed track three, or public, diplomacy, involving
people-to people exchange, academic collaboration and non-government
institutional ties.

The perm decks solvency and links to politics because it

ruins track twos autonomy
Kraft 2k the Executive Director of the Institute for Strategic and
Development Studies (Philippines), and Assistant Professor at the Department
of Political Science at the University of the Philippines (Herman Joseph, THE
AUTONOMY DILEMMA OF TRACK 2 DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, The
Security Dialogue, http://www.guillaumenicaise.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/autonomy-dilemma-of-track-two_kraft.pdf)//SL
Track 2 channels are too intertwined with governments in the region. The
linkage between Tracks 1 and 2 provides Track 2 diplomacy with access to
privileged information and a position from which it could directly influence
official policy. At the same time, it affects Track 2s potential for critical
thinking and, consequently, the quality of analysis and discussion. This
problem is becoming more evident as the distinction between tracks
becomes increasingly blurred The partnership between ASEAN and ASEAN-
ISIS approximates the ideal complement between Tracks 1 and 2. The fact,
however, that some of the new member-institutions of ASEAN-ISIS are
government agencies, and therefore tend to behave like government
representatives, creates the impression that Track 2 processes largely
represents the views of foreign policy bureaucrats. A statement drafted by
some members of ASEAN-ISIS and critical of the coup led by Hun Sen in
Cambodia just prior to that countrys scheduled entry into ASEAN in 1997 was
never released. Some members of ASEAN-ISIS opposed its dissemination,
arguing that it violated the principle of non-interference. While the document
made its way onto the desks of some ASEAN foreign ministers, it was never
formally issued as an ASEAN-ISIS statement. The blurring of what is official
and non-official has also bedevilled CSCAP. One of the principal reasons
behind its establishment had been to open a venue for engaging China
multilaterally on issues of regional security concern. In particular, a Track 2
forum was thought to be a safe way to handle the issue of Taiwan and cross-
strait relations. China, however, made it a condition for its participation in
CSCAP that these issues would never be discussed. China also insisted that
there should be no member-committee from Taiwan. In the CSCAP member-
committees bowed before the demands of pragmatism and accepted China
on the latters specified terms. A further issue arises from the way that track
one mechanisms such as the ARF have taken to organizing their own Track 2
activities. Such activities, including the publication of newsletters and books,
have been extended financial and even political support by governments in
the region as long as they reinforce government policies. Political exigencies
can cause this support to be withdrawn. The trends in the Asia Pacific,
including Southeast Asia, indicate that Track 2 is moving towards greater
alignment with governments and their agenda. In this context, how far can
Track 2 maintain its autonomy and provide effective support to Track 1? If
these trends continue, Track 2s role as a source of policy ideas will
eventually diminish.17 As official processes and officially sponsored
processes become more institutionalized, Track 2 activities will have a more
passive and less important role as information providers and analysts.

Combining Track 1 and Track 2 undermines the

effectiveness of Track 2 alone
Ball, 7 - *Desmond Ball is credited with successfully advising the US against
nuclear escalation in the 1970s **Anthony Miller; Co-Chair of the Australian
Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
***Brendan Taylor; Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Coral Bell
School of Asia Pacific Affairs Track 2 Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific:
Reflections and Future Directions, Asian Security Journal, 04 Jan 2007,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14799850600920445)//SL

Krafts concern, however, stems from the fact that the growing intimacy
between the first and second tracks potentially limits the capacity of
the latter to engage in critical thinking and analysis. Along similar
lines, Joseph Camilleri has suggested that too close an alignment between
Track 1 and Track 2 will often lead to a replication of the very geopolitical
dynamics of the first track level that second track processes are designed to
circumvent. Camilleri also maintains that those second track activities which
marry their fortunes too closely to the Track 1 level will invariably tend to
limit the strategic options available to them.

Combining them sucks resources and independence away

from Track 2
Morrison, 6 --- president of the East West Center with a PhD in international
relations from John Hopkins. (Charles E. Morrison, Track 1/Track 2 symbiosis
in Asia-Pacific regionalism, The Pacific Review, 8/11/2006. Taylor and Francis
Online)//ET
The Track 1Track 2 symbiosis Since the mid-1960s, countries in Asia and the
Pacific have engaged in various forms of regional cooperation. Track 2
international policy networks started about the same time and progressed
hand-in-hand with Track 1. By the 1990s, in both the regional economic and
security cooperation processes, the two tracks had become deeply and
symbiotically interconnected, so much so that the distinction between them
is often blurred. Track 1 cooperation simply would never have developed as it
did without the ideas and the consensus-and support-building activities of
Track 2. Track 2 would have been a sterile exercise but for its impact on Track
1. In fact, almost by definition Track 2 cannot exist without a Track 1.
However, despite the symbiosis between Tracks 1 and 2, there are often
tensions in the relationships. While in some ways Track 1 gives Track 2
continuing life, in other ways it sucks resources and attention away,
leaving little space for truly independent Track 2 processes . Track 2
provides Track 1 with valuable intellectual resources, but it can also crowd
Track 1, demanding a pace of action that is difficult for Track 1 to deliver and
then criticizing the results. Track 1 also protects its prerogatives as the
official relationship among governments. As Barry Desker has noted, a
stronger relationship between the two tracks would require a change of
attitude in many official establishments (Desker 2003: 355).
 AT: Perm do CP

The perm severs - Diplomatic engagement is official

diplomatic actions conducted through the State
Department
Tara Maller (research fellow in the International Security Program at New
America. She also currently serves as the Associate Director for Strategic
Communications for the Franklin Project at the Aspen Institute, PhD political
science MIT) 2009 The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in
Counterterrorism Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:511536
Diplomatic Non-Engagement Different forms of non-engagement have been employed throughout history.
Haas and OSullivan define engagement as a foreign policy strategy which
depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its
objectives.2 They also correctly point out that an engagement strategy does not mean there cannot
also be concurrent military pressure and sanctions. The present author adds to their
definition the notion that engagement also tends to entail diplomatic
relations with a state, a diplomatic presence in that state and a substantial
amount of interaction between high and low level diplomats . Building
on their definition of engagement, the present author defines non-
engagement as a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree
on punitive measures, a lack of positive incentives, and a general aversion to
diplomatic interaction with a state to achieve foreign policy objectives. Non-
engagement strategies typically are characterized by punitive strategies across the military, economic,
This article will focus specifically on the diplomatic
and diplomatic realms.
component of non-engagement, which is characterized by severing formal
diplomatic ties with a country or significantly downgrading ties from the
normal level of diplomatic activity for foreign policy purposes .3 It is also worth
noting that in most cases of U.S.-initiated diplomatic sanctions, there may also be economic sanctions
aimed at the economic isolation of the target state. In addition, once diplomatic ties with a state have
the United States still faces choices about the degree to which it is
been severed,
willing to engage with a severed or downgraded state . Third party state actors may be
used as a diplomatic go between for states without diplomatic relations and there may be very little face-
to-face interaction between U.S. officials and officials of the target state .
In some cases, certain
types of diplomacy may be permissible (i.e., multiparty talks), whereas other forms
of direct talks are not (i.e., bilateral talks). Regardless of the acceptable threshold for
communication, cutting diplomatic ties with a state and opting for diplomatic disengagement sends a
strong signal about U.S. willingness and desire to communicate and creates substantial barriers to doing
the concept of diplomatic severance or non-engagement is
so. In general,
somewhat counterintuitive and paradoxical given the inherent purpose of
diplomacy. Conventional wisdom on the purpose of establishing an American
diplomatic presence around the globe would suggest that the general aim of
U.S. diplomacy is both to promote the U.S. image abroad and improve the
United Statess understanding of developments in other countries . After all, the
practice of diplomacy essentially consists of communicating both agreements
and disagreements between states, conducting negotiations and handling
affairs between states. Diplomacy is aimed at seeking to avoid conflict or ameliorating potential
conflicts when they might arise, which would seem to imply diplomatic relations would be all the more
Top U.S. foreign policy officials have also
necessary and valued with problematic regimes.
acknowledged the inherent value of diplomatic relations and the importance
of maintaining diplomatic ties with countries. For example, in his series of lectures on
Measures of War, George Kennan remarks, I am very, very leery of the breaking of diplomatic relations
as ameans of getting anywhere in international affairs . . . Breaking relations has the direct disadvantage
of sometimes redounding your own discomfort because the maintenance of relations between
governments has been found to be generally advantageous to both parties. If you break off relations with
another government, the chances are, over the next few years, you are going to find you need relations
with that country.4 Secretary of State Dean Acheson made similar remarks in September 1949, stating,
We maintain diplomatic relations with other countries primarily because we are all on the same planet
We do not establish an Embassy in a foreign
and must do business with each other.
country to show approval of its Government. We do so to have a channel
through which to conduct essential government relations and to protect
legitimate United States interests.5 Most recently, in the Senate confirmation hearing for
Senator Hillary Clinton for Secretary of State, Senator John Kerry, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, stated, Last year, six colleagues and I, including Senator Levin, wrote to Secretary Rice urging
her to establish an interests section in Tehran. It just seems counterproductive and almost
incomprehensible that were not on the ground in some of these places. We dont have an ambassador in
The purpose and aims of the U.S. State
Syria, for instance. We shouldve.6
Departments diplomatic efforts appear to mirror the values intrinsic to the
definition of diplomacy as defined earlier. Without delving into the entire
history of the U.S. Foreign Service and the role of diplomats and embassies
abroad, suffice it to say there are a number of reasons for diplomatic relations
between states. According to the U.S. State Department website, the State Department has four
main policy goals:7 (1) protect the United States and Americans, (2) advance democracy, human rights,
and other global interests, (3) promote international understanding of American values and policies, and
(4) support U.S. diplomats, government officials, and all other personnel at home and abroad who make
these goals a reality.One of the central ways the State Department does this is
through diplomatic interaction with foreign officials and diplomatic presence
abroad. Specifically, a diplomatic presence abroad is a communication tool
between the United States and a given state. Diplomatic ties also serve as a
mechanism by which the United States can both gain information and project
a positive American image abroad. Having an embassy in a country not only
makes it easier to track what is going on in that country, but it also allows the
United States to gain a perspective it might not otherwise have .8 Diplomatic
ties also serve as channels of communication for countries to work out their
differences and hopefully resolve conflicts before they escalate to a higher
level. For all of these reasons, the notion of severing diplomatic ties or not diplomatically engaging with
problematic regimes seems all the more at odds with the central tenets of diplomacy and all the more
puzzling. Therefore, given the benefits accrued by diplomacy and the very purpose of U.S. diplomacy, why
has the United States chosen to disengage diplomatically with certain states throughout history?

Track 1 is the only official form of diplomacy Track 2 isnt

gov-to-gov
Wheeler 14 - Professor at Harvard Business School Talks (Michael O., Track
1.5/2 Security Dialogues with China: Nuclear Lessons Learned, Institute for
Defense Analyses, September 2014, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?
verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA622481)//SL
Track 1 meetings are official encounters between American officials and/or
military officers and their Chinese counterparts.2 They may be formal
diplomatic discussions, military-to-military exchanges, or meetings held in
more informal venues. Track 1 meetings may be publicly announced, but also
can be unpublicized, backchannel activities such as the secret missions of
then Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to Beijing in the early 1970s to
prepare for President Richard M. Nixons historic first trip to China.3 Track 2
dialogues normally are considered to be ones that do not involve officials (in
any capacity), although if only a few officials are present in an unofficial
capacity, the meetings sometimes still are called Track 2. Academic
institutions, non-profit organizations, and similar organizations often sponsor
and populate Track 2. Track 2 talks also frequently involve senior retired
officials. Track 1.5 dialogues are ones in which serving officials and/or active
duty military officers are part of one or both delegations. The serving officials
are participating in an unofficial capacity. The Beijing and Hawaii dialogues
that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has funded since 2004
initially were described as Track 2 with only a few officials in attendance, but
now are more appropriately thought of as Track 1.5 as the number of officials
has expanded. There is no hard-and-fast rule for distinguishing Track 1.5 from
Track 2.

Its is exclusive---means no channel other than US

government engagement
Douglas F. Brent 10, attorney, June 2, 2010, Reply Brief on Threshold
Issues of Cricket Communications, Inc., online:
http://psc.ky.gov/PSCSCF/2010%20cases/2010-
00131/20100602_Crickets_Reply_Brief_on_Threshold_Issues.PDF) Italics and
bold in the original

AT&T also argues that Merger Commitment 7.4 only permits extension of any given interconnection
agreement for a single three year term. AT&T Brief at 12. Specifically, AT&T asserts that because Cricket
adopted the interconnection agreement between Sprint and AT&T, which itself was extended, Cricket is
precluded from extending the term of its agreement with AT&T. Id This argument relies upon an inaccurate
assumption: that the agreement (contract) between Sprint and AT&T, and the agreement (contract)
between Cricket and AT&T, are one and the same. In other words, to accept AT&Ts argument the
Commission must conclude that two separate contracts, i.e. the interconnection between Sprint and AT&T
in Kentucky (Sprint Kentucky Agreement) and the interconnection between Cricket and AT&T in Kentucky
(Cricket Kentucky Agreement), are one and the same. Upon this unstated (and inaccurate) premise AT&T
asserts that the ICA was already extended; id. at 14, and the ICA Cricket seeks to extend was
extended by Sprint . . . .; id. at 15, and, finally, Cricket cannot extend the same ICA a second time . . . .
AT&T
Id. (emphasis added in all). Note that in the quoted portions of the AT&T brief (and elsewhere)
uses vague and imprecise language when referring to either the Sprint Kentucky Agreement,
or the Cricket Kentucky Agreement, i n hopes that the Commission will treat the two
contracts as one and the same. But it would be a mistake to do so. The contract governing
AT&Ts duties and obligations with Sprint is a legally distinct and separate contract from that which
governs AT&Ts duties with Cricket. The Sprint Kentucky Agreement was approved by the Commission in
September of 2001 in Case Number 2000-00480. The Cricket Kentucky Agreement was approved by the
AT&T ignores the fact that
Commission in September of 2008 in Case Number 2008-033 1.
these are two separate and distinct contracts because it knows that the
merger commitments apply to each agreement that an individual telecommunications
carrier has with AT&T. Notably, Merger Commitment 7.4 states that AT&T/BellSouth ILECs shall permit a
requesting telecommunications carrier to extend its current interconnection agreement . . . . As
the commitment allows any carrier to extend its agreement. Clearly,
written,
the use of the pronoun its in this context is possessive, such that the term
its means - that particular carriers agreement with AT&T (and not any other
carriers agreement). Thus, the merger commitment applies to each agreement that an
individual carrier may have with AT&T. It necessarily follows then, that Crickets right to extend its
agreement under Merger Commitment 7.4 is separate and distinct right from another carriers right to
extend its agreement with AT&T (or whether such agreement has been extended).
With requires the Peoples Republic of China be a
participant in engagement
Websters 16 Merriam-Websters Online Dictionary, with,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/with
2
a used as a function word to indicate a participant in an action,
transaction, or arrangement <works with his father> <a talk with a friend>
<got into an accident with the car>