[GR No.

L47745, April 15, 1988]

AMADORA, complainant vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

FA C T S
- Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon
resulting to the formers death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The
victims parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon
and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the
defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the
school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students
were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear
identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence
through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand
claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement
for graduation (submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE
- Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable

HELD
- The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was
in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for
a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot
be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was
exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by
the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
- In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that
he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on
his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
- Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the
teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury
inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
- Petition was denied.

[G.R. No. L-48006, July 8, 1942]

BARREDO, complainant vs. GARCIA, respondent

FA C T S
- On May 3, 1936, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate taxicab driven by
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Dimapilis. The carretela was over-turned, and a passenger, a 16-
year old boy, Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla, and he was convicted. The court in the criminal case granted the petition to reserve the
civil action. Garcia and Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939, filed a civil action against
Barredo, the proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla, making him primarily and
directly responsible under culpa acquiliana of Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. It is
undisputed that Fontanillas negligence was the cause of the accident, as he was driving on the wrong
side of the road at high speed, and there was no showing that Barredo exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family, a defense to Article 2180 of the said Code. Barredos theory of defense is that
Fontanillas negligence being punished by the Revised Penal Code, his liability as employer is only
subsidiary, but Fontanilla, was not sued for civil liability. Hence, Barredo claims that he cannot be held
liable.

ISSUE
- Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making
him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro
thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer of Pedro Fontanilla

(SandeeSuan) Page 1 of 6
HELD
- Yes. A separate civil action lies, the employer being primarily and directly responsible in damages
under articles 1902 and 1903 of the civil Code
- Quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the civil code and is entirely
distinct and independent from a delict or crime under the Revised Penal Code. In this jurisdiction, the
same negligent act causing damage may produce civil liability (subsidiary) arising from a crime under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code; or create an action for quasi-delito or culpa aquiliana (primary)
under Articles 2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code, and the parties are free to choose which course to
take. And, in the instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produces 2 liabilities of Barredo: First,
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of Fontanilla arising from the latters criminal negligence
under Article 103 of the revised Penal Code; and second, Barredos employer under article 2180 of
the Civil Code. Since the plaintiffs are free to choose which remedy to take, they preferred the second,
which is within their rights. This is a more expeditious and effective method of relief because Fontanilla
was either in prison or had just been released or had no property.

[G.R. No. 150157, January 25, 2007]

MANLICLIC and PRBLI, complainant vs. CALAUNAN, respondent

FA C T S
- The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by petitioner PRBLI and
driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza
- At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel,
Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
- The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing
the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting
to further extensive damage.
- Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt.
- By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
- Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI
- The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. When the civil case was heard, counsel for
respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies in the
criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.
- The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
Respondents Version:
- According to the respondent and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to
70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit
Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit
Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side.
- At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In
other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep
was hit.
- Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he
was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the
incident took place. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it
was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Petitioners Version:
- The petitioner explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left
lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake
another jeep in front of it.
- Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employee
- RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA found no reversible error and affirmed the RTCs decision.
(SandeeSuan) Page 2 of 6
ISSUE
(1) Whether the petitioner, Manliclic, may be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the CA in the criminal case that there was an absence of
negligence on his part.

HELD
Petitioner:
- The version of the petitioner deserves more credit as the petitioner was already acquitted by the CA of
the charge of Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical injuries.
Court:
- From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from or based
on quasi-delict: Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing
the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in
the selection and supervision of its employees it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on
reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based
on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
- Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
- In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action
arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
- The extinction of civil liability referred to in the quoted provision, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused.
- In sum, the court distinguished civil liability arising from a crime and that arising from quasi-delict:
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME
(a) if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the
crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
(b) if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A QUASI-DELICT
- A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity
all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.
- The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. The
acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
- Civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal,
whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist).
- An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana.
- The petitioners urge the court to give more credence to their version of the story however, as they
constitute a question of fact, it may not be raised as a subject for a petition for review. Findings of the
trial court and appellate court are binding on the Supreme Court.
- The testimony of the petitioner about the jeep of the respondent overtaking another vehicle in the
criminal case was not consistent with what he gave to the investigator which is evidently a product of
an after-thought
- If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar
Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took
place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than
on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having been forced
off the road.

(SandeeSuan) Page 3 of 6
[G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979]

MENDOZA, complainant vs. ARRIETA, respondent

FA C T S
- A three-way vehicular accident happened along Mac-Arthur Highway, Bulacan involving a Mercedes
Benz (Mendozas ), a private jeep (Salazars), and a truck (driven by Montoya, owned by Timbol). Two
separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against (1)
Rodolfo Salazar by Mendoza and (2) Freddie Montoya by Salazar.
- The 1st case was against the jeep for colliding with the Mercedes Benz. The 2nd was against the truck
that hit the rear part of the jeep.
- Mendoza testified, and adopted by truck-driver Montoya, that jeep-owner Salazar overtook the truck
driven by Montoya, swerved left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was
bound for Manila. Petitioner (Mendoza) further testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped
from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazars jeep was bumped from behind by the
Montoyas truck.
- Salazar, on the other hand, stated that, after overtaking the truck, he flashed a signal indicating his
intention to turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a
policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at the
rear by Montoyas truck causing him to be thrown out, which then swerved to the left and hit
petitioners car, which was coming from the opposite direction.
- CFI acquitted Salazar from the criminal offense charged whereas truck-driver Montoya was found
guilty and civilly liable, ordered to indemnify Salazar. However, no indemnification was awarded to
Mendoza since he was not a complainant against the truck-driver but only against Salazar.
- Later, Mendoza filed a civil case against Salazar and, this time, Timbol, the owner of the truck. Both
Salazar and Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum, allegedly for the
reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both or only one of
them.
- Timbol motioned to dismiss the case on the ground that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in
the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action. Respondent judge dismissed the case as
well as its review stating that while it is true that an independent civil action for liability under Article
2177 CC could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose,
the New RoC requires an express reservaqtion of the civil action to be made in the criminal action,
otherwise, the same would be barred.
- The case was then raised to this Court.

ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the dismissal of the case by the Court of Appeals was correct

HELD
(1) Against Timbol YES
- The respondent Judge wrongfully sustained Timbols allegations that the civil suit is barred by the
prior joint judgment in a criminal case filed against him, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil
case was made by petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove
damages against Salazar only. For petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is
based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit
against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. Article 31 of the CivilCode provides that, When the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the actor omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Timbols submission that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to
file an independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, bars the
institution of such separate civil action is untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in relation to Articles
2176 and 2177) of the Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action
arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation is required to be
made in the criminal case. And so, to reiterate, the civil case filed against Timbol is not barred by the
fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action
based on quasi-delict
(2) Against Salazar NO
- Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party
has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article
100 of theRevised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana
underArticle 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal
under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal
(SandeeSuan) Page 4 of 6
 action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. The
circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base
his cause of action against Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his
active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The
latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the
case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his
action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case.Salazar cannot be held
civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioners car for considering that the collision between the
jeep driven by him and the car owned and driven by Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear
of the jeep by the truck driven byMontoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right
of petitioner to claim damages from Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause
of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised
PenalCode, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section3(c)
which provides that, Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil right
arise did not exist
DECISION: Dismissal of civil case against Timbol is set aside and ordered to continue whereas that of
dismissing the civil case against Salazar is upheld.

[G.R. No. 126780 February 17, 2005]

YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL, complainant vs. CA, respondent

FA C T S
- Respondent McLoughlin would always stay at Tropicana Hotel every time he is here in the Philippines
and would rent a safety deposit box. The safety deposit box could only be opened through the use of
2 keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the
management of the hotel. McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box 2
envelopes containing US Dollars, one envelope containing Australian Dollars, Letters, credit cards,
bankbooks and a checkbook.
- On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip, McLoughlin took some items from the safety box
which includes the ff: envelope containing Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00), the other
envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his passports and his credit
cards. The other items were left in the deposit box. Upon arrival, he found out that a few dollars were
missing and the jewelry he bought was likewise missing.
- Eventually, he confronted Lainez and Paiyam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box
with the key assigned to him. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted
her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLouglins key and was able to open the safety deposit box
with the assistance of Lopez, Paiyam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key
assigned to McLouglin while the latter was asleep.
- McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered.
Lopez refused to accept responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box
entitled Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit Box

ISSUE
- Whether or not the "Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box" admittedly executed by private
respondent is null and void.

HELD
- YES. Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely
to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common carriers
business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not
only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes
the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or
diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms
imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.
- In an early case (De Los Santos v. Tan Khey), CA ruled that to hold hotelkeepers or innkeeper liable
for the effects of their guests, it is not necessary that they be actually delivered to the innkeepers or
their employees. It is enough that such effects are within the hotel or inn. With greater reason should
the liability of the hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing items are taken without the guests
knowledge and consent from a safety deposit box provided by the hotel itself, as in this case.
- Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the undertaking manifestly contravene Article 2003, CC for they allow
Tropicana to be released from liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety
deposit box for any cause whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim
against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was
(SandeeSuan) Page 5 of 6
 incurred by Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of the
hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests even if caused by
servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it may
proceed from any force majeure. that may spare the hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at bar, there
is no showing that the act of the thief or robber was done with the use of arms or through an irresistible
force to qualify the same as force majeure.

[G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992]

PSBA, complainant vs. CA, respondent

FA C T S
- Carlitos Bautista, a 3rd year Commerce student from the Philippine School of Business Administration,
was stabbed inside the school premises by outsiders. Hence, his parents filed suit against the
schools corporate officers. They allege negligence, recklessness, and lack of security precautions,
means, and methods, before, during, and after the attack on their son.
- During the proceedings, Lt. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security) resigned from his post.
- The defendants prayed for the dismissal of the case claiming that since they were presumably being
sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, jurisprudence therefor dictates that academic institutions are
outside the ambit of the aforesaid article.

ISSUE
- Whether or not PSBA is liable for civil damages through quasi-delict due to negligence

HELD
- No, for the rule of in loco parentis under Art. 2180 to apply, the wrongdoing should have been caused
by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to held liable for having custody over them.
RACIO DECIDENDI:
- When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment, an obligation is created between the
two parties. The school provides the milieu for the education and the development of the skills of the
student but at the same time providing for his security within the premises. On the other hand, the
student has to complete his academic requirements and comply with school rules and regulations.
- However, the rules on quasi-delicts do not govern in this case due to the presence of an existing
contractual relation between the deceased and PSBA.
- The school cannot be held liable because the assailants were neither students nor employees of
PSBA.
- There was neither sufficient proof nor finding that the school was negligent in providing proper
security measures. Supposing that there had been a finding of negligence, this could only give rise to
a breach of contractual obligation insofar as providing security within the premises.
- The court took into account that a school cannot be an infallible insurer of its students against all risks,
i.e., Murphys Law. Likewise, it would be unreasonable to expect schools to anticipate all types of
violent trespass upon their premises. Should that be the case, it may still avoid liability by proving that
the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence.
DECISION: Petition is denied, but the Court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) was ordered to continue proceedings due
to the paucity of material facts.

(SandeeSuan) Page 6 of 6