2.1 PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS radio/television time, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where
he may express his view. This form of regulation is tantamount to a
[G.R. No. 90878. January 29, 1990.]
restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.
Facts: Therefore, Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional
Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region was enacted into law, and
2.1 In Re Ramon Tulfo
pursuant to it, the City of Baguio and the provinces comprising the
Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the AM 90-4-1545-0, April 17, 1990
ratification of the Organic Act. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
Facts:
2167 to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region. Petitioner filed a petition, assailing the In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target'
constitutionality of Section 19 of said resolution because it violates the stating that the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16, 1989, where he called the Supreme Court
enshrined in the Constitution. Section 19 provides that during the plebiscite stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme
campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media Court". Tulfo was required to show cause why he should not be punished for
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or contempt. Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had
radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. been a victim of harassment in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical
COMELEC maintains that the questioned provision of COMELEC and unwise, and "bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the
Resolution No. 2167 does not violate the freedom of expression and of the case had been decided and terminated, there was not contempt. Lastly, the
press. Rather, it is a valid implementation of the power of the COMELEC to article does not pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court.
supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as Issue: Whether or not Tulfo is in contempt
enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
Held: Yes.
Issue:
1. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet
Whether or not Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is been decided upon, and the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR
unconstitutional. filed from the CA.
Held: 2. Power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation.
Contempt of ocurt is defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of
The Court held that Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167
the courts. It brings disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of
is unconstitutional. Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that
publications which can be punished for contempt:
what was granted to the COMELEC was the power to supervise and
regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued
a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit.
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
Tulfo's article constituted both.
public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured.
However, it does not grant the COMELEC the power to supervise
3. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used,
and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
but if its object is only to degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an
expression during plebiscite periods. While Section 19 of COMELEC
obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be gained from them.
Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from
Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not an
expressing his views and or from campaigning for or against the organic act
excuse also, because at the end of his article, Tulfo said, "So you
because he may do so through the COMELEC space and/or COMELEC
 bobo justices, watch out!" Also, he said he was not sorry for having
written the articles.
Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured.
2.1-a. IN RE: ATTY. EMIL JURADO
JULY 12, 1990
Facts:
Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and journalist who writes in a newspaper of
general circulation wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the
judiciary over several months. What was particularly given attention by the
Supreme Court his column entitled, "Who will judge the Justices?" referring
to a report that six justices, their spouses, children and grandchildren (a total
of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong, and that luxurious hotel
accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a public utility
firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this
public utility firm. This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme
Court decision favorable to the public utility firm appears to have been
authored by a lawyer of the public utility firm. The Chief Justice issued an
administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the said
reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from
the public utility, denying the allegations in Jurado's column. The Supreme
Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter
and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an
official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the
allegations made by Jurado are true.
Held:
Jurado's actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate
gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that
he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They
constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase
the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. The
Court declares Atty. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and sentences him to
pay a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
Free press not to be preferred to an independent judiciary. The court
underscores the importance of both the constitutional guarantee of free
speech and the reality that there are equally important public interests which
need on occasion to be balanced against and accommodated with one and the
other. One such public interest is in the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself
can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it: ". . . A free press is not to be
preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free
press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free
society." Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the
following terms: 'The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and
press. This constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be
confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an
unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the
maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary
cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court
adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by
subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the court.' (In Re
Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 at 807 [1930])."
Excercise of freedom of speech not to be abused.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise
of any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: "ARTICLE 19. Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." The
provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of "abuse of
rights," "one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always
implied in any system of law."
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the
statements when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting
themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of
honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private
persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the
Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to
private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage all save
those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges.
The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest
of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of
private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And
the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate
interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking
freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not
require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But
the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by
publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort
to ascertain the truth thereof.
2.1-b. BURGOS vs CHIEF OF STAFF
Facts:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then
CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the Metropolitan Mail
and We Forum newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other
articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, were seized. A petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question
the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate
General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the
articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon
City (People v. Burgos).
Issue:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may
be the basis of the issuance of search warrants.
Held:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In
mandating that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no
less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a
statement in the effect that Burgos is in possession or has in his control
printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means
of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as
amended is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements
of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is
directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.
2.2. CORRO VS LISING
FACTS: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of
articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition.
Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies,
typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines
and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was
denied.
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law
and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The language used is all
embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under
consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable.
Respondent RTC Judge Esteban Lising, upon application filed by Lt. Col.
Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation
Service, issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of articles
allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of inciting to sedition.
1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;
2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;
3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;
4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets,
banners;
5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording
machines, video machines and tapes
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties alleging among others that the properties
seized are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way,
inanimate or mute things as they are, connected with the offense of inciting
to sedition. Respondent Judge Lising denied the motion. Hence, this petition
praying that the search warrant issuedby respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising
be declared null and void ab initio that the padlocked office premises of the
Philippine Times be reopened. Respondents would have this Court dismiss
the petition stating that probable cause exists justifying the issuance of a
search warrant, the articles seized were adequately described in the search
warrant, a search was conducted I n an orderly manner and the padlocking of
the searched premises was with the consent of petitioner's wife.
Held: Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides: SEC. 3. ...no
search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized and, Section 3,
Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:
SEC. 3.Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
2.3. Babst vs. National Intelligence Board
[GR L-62992, 28 September 1984]
Facts:
Arlene Babst, Odette Alcantara, Ceres P. Doyo, Jo-Ann Q. Maglipon,
Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Cielo Buenaventura, Sylvia
Mayuga, Sheila S. Coronel, et al. are columnists, feature article writers and
reporters of various local publications. At different dates since July 1980,
some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who
have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their
works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives.
Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by
Brig. Gen. Artemio Tidier, Jr. on 9 February 1983 with the Office of the City
Fiscal, Manila, against Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama,
and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and published in
the 28 March 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been
interrogated by Brig. Gen. Wilfredo Estrada (Ret.), Col. Renato Ecarma, NBI
Asst. Director Ponciano Fernando, Col. Balbino Diego, Col. Galileo
Kintanar, Col. Eustaquio Peralta, et. al. The complaint included an staggering
P10 million claim for damages. (An information for libel has since been filed
with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region against Suarez
and Doyo.) On 3 March 1983, Babst, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction, which was superseded by the amended and
supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to
prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to
Babst, et. al. and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters
that have been the subject of inquiry by the National Intelligence Board
(NIB).
Issue:
 Whether the issuance by the NIB of letters of invitation to Babst,
et.al., their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of libel suits against
Suarez and Dayo, are illegal and unconstitutional as they are violative of the
constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of
imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media.
Held:
Prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending
in court against Suarez and Doyo and similar suits that might be filed. The
writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis
certain proceedings pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not
pending before the NIB or any other respondent. Further, the issue of validity
of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of
expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before
the court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The
same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that
have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by
the NIB, which Babst, et. al. claim to have been illegally obtained. Finally,
the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of
the aggrieved party, and no one among the officials has the authority to
restrain any of his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his
right by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case
against Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a
member of the NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have anything to do
with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.
2.4. Elizalde vs. Gutierrez
Elizalde vs. Gutierrez,76 SCRA 448 (In order that any news item relating to a
judicial proceeding will not be actionable, the same must be [a] a true and
fair report of the actual proceedings; [b] must be done in good faith; and [c]
no comments nor remarks shall be made by the writer}
A publication of a dispatch coming from the Philippine News Agency by
thesensationalist newspaper Evening News about the Maggie dela Riva rape
case involving prominent individuals is not libelous. Courts must be careful
not to unnecessarily prosecute members of the press if it finds the
prosecution to be baseless, they should immediately dismiss the case and not
allow the editor and publisher to be derailed from their work by being
dragged into trial.
2.5. Policarpio Vs. Manila Times
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of having
publishedlibelous/defamatory articles?
FACTS:
Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO Natl Commission.As such,
she had filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her subordinates in the
Commission, & caused the latter to beseparated from the service. Reyes, in
turn, filed counter-charges which were referred for investigation. Pending
completion, Reyes filed a complaint against Policarpio for alleged
malversation of public funds & another complaint for estafa thru falsification
of public documents. Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing
Co. for publishing two defamatory, libelous and false articles/news items in
Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956 and in the Daily Mirror of August 13,
1956.
2.6. Lopez vs. Court of Appeals
[GR L-26549, 31 July 1970]
Facts: In the early part of January 1956, there appeared on the front page of
The Manila Chronicle, of which Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as
on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan
Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a distress signal to a passing United
States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. He was
not ignored, an American Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an
emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio
set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place
were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of
1995. Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the
island a platoon of scout rangers led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon
arriving at the reported killermenaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major
Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the
same Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view
of this finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," to use his
own descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term employed
by the other newspapers when referring to the incident. This Week Magazine
of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a
pictorial article to it in its issue of 15 January 1956. Mention was made that
while Fidel Cruz story turned out to he false, if brought to light the misery of
the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick, only two
individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then in
the 29 January 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the "January News Quiz"
included an item on the central figure in what was known as the Calayan
Hoax, who nevertheless did the country a good turn by calling the
government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic.
Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz appearing in its issue of 18 January 1956,
reference was made to a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his
isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island
of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. He was given the
appellation of "Hoax of the Year." The magazine on both occasions carried
photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the
pictures that were published on both occasions were that of Fidel G. Cruz, a
businessman-contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the
photographs of Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file,
in the library of the Manila Chronicle in accordance with the standard
procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but when the news quiz
format was prepared, the two photographs were inadvertently switched. As
soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the attention of Lopez
and Gatbonton, the following correction was immediately published in This
Week Magazine on January 27, 1957: "While we were rushing to meet the
deadline for January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently published the
picture of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman
and contractor, in 'Our Own Who's Who feature in the Year End Quiz' of This
Week in lieu of the health inspector Fidel Cruz, who was connected with a
story about a murderer running loose on Calayan Island. We here express our
profound regrets that; such an error occurred." Together with the foregoing
correction, Lopez and Gatbonton published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the
photographs and the correction moreover were enclosed by four lines, the
type used was bolder than ordinary, and the item was placed in a conspicuous
place in order to call the attention of the readers to such amends being made.
The businessman Fidel G. Cruz sued Lopez and Gatbonton in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of
the above publication of his picture. After trial duly had, he was awarded
P5,000 as actual damages, another P5,000 as moral damages, and P1,000 for
attorney's fees. That judgment was affirmed on appeal to the appellate Court.
Lopez and Gatbonton filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the claim of freedom of the press negates Lopez and
Gatbontons liability arising from libel.
Held: A libel was defined as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the
memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation,
or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." There was an express
provision in such legislation for a tort or a quasi-delict action arising from
libel. There is reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code providing
for the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and
Libel: "Publication of a person's photograph in connection with an article
libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is published,
where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person." Why libel
law has both a criminal and a civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of
the Press thus: "On the one hand, libeling a person results in depriving him of
his good reputation. Since reputation is a thing; of value, truly rather to be
chosen than great riches, an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress
this personal wrong money damages are awarded to the injured person. On
the other hand, the publication of defamatory statements tends strongly to
induce breach of the peace by the person defamed, and hence is of peculiar
moment to the state as the guardian of the public peace. Viewed from this
angle, libel is a crime, and as such subjects the offender to a fine or
imprisonment." No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise
of punitive action visited in what otherwise could be characterized as libel
whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting
from the publication of Cruz's picture with the offensive caption as in
complained of. This is not to deny that the party responsible invites the
institution either of a criminal prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted
that what was done did invite such a dire consequence, considering the value
the law justly places on a man's reputation. This is merely to underscore the
primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the hierarchy
of legal values. If the cases mean anything at all then, to emphasize what has
so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary
to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended, a
realistic account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate
information of a public character and to comment thereon as well as the
conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored.
However, the correction promptly made by Lopez and Gatbonton would thus
call for a reduction in the damages awarded. It should be noted that there was
no proof of any actual pecuniary loss arising from the above publication. It is
worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to as the tolerant attitude
on the part of appellate courts on this score, the usual practice being "more
likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them."
2.7. New York Times vs. Sullivan
[376 US 254, 9 March 1964]
Facts: L. B. Sullivan is one of the three elected Commissioners of the City of
Montgomery, Alabama. He was "Commissioner of Public Affairs and the
duties are supervision of the Police Department, Fire Department,
Department of Cemetery and Department of Scales." He brought the civil
libel action against the four individual petitioners, who are Negroes and
Alabama clergymen, and against the New York Times Company, a New York
corporation which publishes the New York Times, a daily newspaper.
Sullivan's complaint alleged that he had been libeled by statements in a full-
page advertisement that was carried in the New York Times on 29 March
1960. Entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," the advertisement began by
stating that "As the whole world knows by now, thousands of Southern
Negro students are engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in
positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights." It went on to charge that "in their
efforts to uphold these guarantees, they are being met by an unprecedented
wave of terror by those who would deny and negate that document which the
whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modern freedom."
Succeeding paragraphs purported to illustrate the "wave of terror" by
describing certain alleged events. The text concluded with an appeal for
funds for three purposes: support of the student movement, "the struggle for
the right-to-vote," and the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., leader
of the movement, against a perjury indictment then pending in Montgomery.
The text appeared over the names of 64 persons, many widely known for
their activities in public affairs, religion, trade unions, and the performing
arts. Below these names, and under a line reading "We in the south who are
struggling daily for dignity and freedom warmly endorse this appeal,"
appeared the names of the four individual petitioners and of 16 other persons,
all but two of whom were identified as clergymen in various Southern cities.
The advertisement was signed at the bottom of the page by the "Committee
to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South,"
and the officers of the Committee were listed. Of the 10 paragraphs of text in
the advertisement, the third and a portion of the sixth were the basis of
Sullivan's claim of libel. Third paragraph read as "In Montgomery, Alabama,
after students sang `My Country, 'Tis of Thee' on the State Capitol steps, their
leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads of police armed with
shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the
entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register,
their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into
submission," while the sixth paragraph reads "Again and again the Southern
violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful protests with intimidation and
violence. They have bombed his home almost killing his wife and child.
They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times - for
'speeding,' 'loitering' and similar 'offenses.' And now they have charged him
with `perjury' - a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years."
A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded him damages of
$500,000, the full amount claimed, against all the petitioners, and the
Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. Background on Alabama laws on the
matter: Under Alabama law, a publication is "libelous per se" if the words
"tend to injure a person in his reputation" or to "bring [him] into public
contempt"; the trial court stated that the standard was met if the words are
such as to "injure him in his public office, or impute misconduct to him in his
office, or want of official integrity, or want of fidelity to a public trust." The
jury must find that the words were published "of and concerning" the
plaintiff, but where the plaintiff is a public official his place in the
governmental hierarchy is sufficient evidence to support a finding that his
reputation has been affected by statements that reflect upon the agency of
which he is in charge. Once "libel per se" has been established, the defendant
has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they
were true in all their particulars. His privilege of "fair comment" for
expressions of opinion depends on the truth of the facts upon which the
comment is based. Unless he can discharge the burden of proving truth,
general damages are presumed, and may be awarded without proof of
pecuniary injury. A showing of actual malice is apparently a prerequisite to
recovery of punitive damages, and the defendant may in any event forestall a
punitive award by a retraction meeting the statutory requirements. Good
motives and belief in truth do not negate an inference of malice, but are
relevant only in mitigation of punitive damages if the jury chooses to accord
them weight. Further, Alabama law denies a public officer recovery of
punitive damages in a libel action brought on account of a publication
concerning his official conduct unless he first makes a written demand for a
public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to comply.
Issue: Whether printed allegations or criticism against official conduct
should be supported by actual facts, to free persons from liabilities attendant
to libel.
Held: The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public
questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by the
Court's decisions. The constitutional safeguard was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people. The maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system. It is a prized American privilege to
speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions, and this opportunity is to be afforded for "vigorous advocacy" no
less than "abstract discussion." The First Amendment presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. Against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials. The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance
and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly
to qualify for the constitutional protection. Authoritative interpretations of the
First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an
exception for any test of truth - whether administered by judges, juries, or
administrative officials - and especially one that puts the burden of proving
truth on the speaker. The constitutional protection does not turn upon "the
truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered."
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and
in no instance is this truer than in that of the press. That erroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the "breathing space" that they "need to survive."
Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech
that would otherwise be free than does factual error. Where judicial officers
are involved, the Court has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of
the courts does not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism
of the judge or his decision. This is true even though the utterance contains
"half-truths" and "misinformation." Such repression can be justified, if at all,
only by a clear and present danger of the obstruction of justice. If judges are
to be treated as "men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate," surely
the same must be true of other government officials, such as elected city
commissioners. Criticism of their official conduct does not lose its
constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence
diminishes their official reputations. A rule compelling the critic of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions - and to do so on
pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount - leads to a comparable
"self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of
proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be
deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have
recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was
true in all its factual particulars. Under such a rule, would-be critics of
official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it
is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.
They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful
zone." The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
2.8 LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS v. PCWU
108 SCRA 16
FACTS: The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their
employer prevented herein plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading and
unloading of its products inside the premises of Permanent Concrete
Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a sub-lessee. Hence,
the latter sought to enjoin the picket.
ISSUE: May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party?
HELD: Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of freedom
of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and could not be curtailed even
in the absence of employer-employee relationship, is not an absolute right.
The courts are not without power to localize the sphere of demonstration,
whose interest are foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be
recognized at the instance of an "innocent bystander" who is not involved in
the labor dispute if it appears that the result of the picketing is create an
impression that a labor dispute exists between him and the picketing union.
3.a ATTY. PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN vs. ATTY. PRIMA JESUSA
B. QUINSAYAS, et. al.
G.R. No. 194578, February 13, 2013, 690 SCRA 623
FACTS: Atty. Fortun is the counsel for the Ampatuans, the principal accused
in the Maguindanao Massacre.
Atty. Quinsayas filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun for
misleading the prosecution and trial court under the rules and muddled the
issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of the
case.
Atty. Fortun filed an indirect contempt against Atty. Quinsayas and the media
group for active dissemination of the details of the disbarment complaint
against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on confidential
nature of disbarment proceedings.
The media group denied the posting and publication of the articles about the
disbarment complaint. It would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the
responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and
members of the media. orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to
speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Quinsayas is guilty of indirect contempt in violation electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free
of Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of
freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test
HELD: YES. Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in
Rules of Court both as a complainant and as a lawyer in the disbarment case its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's
against Atty. Fortun. opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting,
and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the
constitutionally sanctioned objective.
As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the
confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of
preserving its confidentiality, she disseminated copies of the disbarment
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other
complaint against Atty. Fortun to members of the media which act constitutes
moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no
contempt of court.
clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the
cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger
rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's
mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the
freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on
his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a
3.b BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private
Citation : G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992 vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own
and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers
Facts : A Resolution No. 2347 was promulgated by the COMELEC which provides that should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of
prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner Blo this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated.
Umpar Adiong is a senatorial candidate in the May Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be
11, 1992 elections. Adiong is assailing the Resolution. In addition, Adiong deprived of his property without due process of law.
believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements,
he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury
with this prohibition.
3.c NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC
Issue : Whether or Not the COMELECs prohibition is unconstitutional.
Held :The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. [201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992]
The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make
more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media
of interests individual freedom on one hand and substantial public which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
interests on the other is made even more difficult in election campaign advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992
elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed
of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is
principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No.
66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom
of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section
11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for
suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a
particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda
during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in
derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of
public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further,
petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of
candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political
propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers
and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right
of voters to information and opinion.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
constitutional.
Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of
Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and
freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4)
which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific
limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our own society,
equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to
the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly
an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank
by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that
"the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question
is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of
the operations of communication and information enterprises during an
election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision
or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court
considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of
supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability.
By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section
11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b)
does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio
or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates,
their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover,
Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or
opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or
columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so
forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11
(b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage
that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office.
Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the
candidates themselves is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
3.d. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 79690-707, 1 February 1989];
also Zaldivar vs. Gonzales [GR 80578]
Facts: [Acquired from 27 April 1988 decision] Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor
of the province of Antique, sought, through a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of Criminal
Cases 12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on the ground that said cases were
filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority, since
under the 1987 Constitution which took effect on 2 February 1987, it is only
the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the
authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. Similarly, Enrique A.
Zaldivar, on substantially the same ground as the first petition, prays that
Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting preliminary
investigations and filing similar cases with the Sandiganbayan. The Supreme
Court granted the consolidated petitions filed by Zaldivar and nullified the
criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and ordered
Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers
and functions of the Ombudsman. [Present case] Tanodbayan Gonzales
allegedly made contumacious acts or statements in a pleading filed before the
Court and in statements given to the media. In its Resolution dated 2 May
1988, the Supreme Court required Tanodbayan Gonzales to explain "why he
should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions" and in respect of which, Gonzales was heard and
given the most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and
evidence that he wanted to present for the consideration of this Court. The
Court did not summarily impose punishment upon Gonzales which it could
have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it
chosen to consider Gonzales' acts as constituting "direct contempt." In the per
curiam resolution dated 7 October 1988, the Court found Tanodbayan
Gonzalez to be "guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the bar." Gonzales filed
a motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether the statements made by
Tanodbayan Gonzales transcended the permissible limits of free speech.
Held: The "clear and present danger" doctrine is not a magic incantation
which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the
testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court
to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of
impending apocalypse. The "clear and present danger" doctrine has been an
accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech
and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which
has been recognized and applied by courts. Although the prevailing doctrine
is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation; another criterion
for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which
includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies,
is the "balancing-of interests test." The principle requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable
in a given situation or type of situation' Still, under either the "clear and
present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test" the Corut believes that
the statements made by Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such
a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible
limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam
Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the
"substantive evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent
does not, in the present case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt
violence or similar disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is the
authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil"
consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular
case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the
judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of
professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the
courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as
palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less
deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for society.
3.e Eastern Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans
[GR L-59329, 19 July 1985]
Facts: Radio Station DYRE was closed on the ground that the radio station
was used to incite people to sedition. A petition was filed by Eastern
Broadcasting to compel the Minister of Transportation and Communications,
Ceferino S. Carreon (Commissioner, National Telecommunications
Commission), et. al. to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which
had been summarily closed on grounds of national security; alleging denial
of due process and violation of its right of freedom of speech. On 25 March
1985, before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all
the issues raised, Eastern Broadcasting through its president, Mr. Rene G.
Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition. Eastern
Broadcasting alleged that (1) it has already sold its radio broadcasting station
in favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio
station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its equipment; (2)
the National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness
to grant to the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and
franchise to operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of the radio
transmitter of said station DYRE; (3) in view of the foregoing, Eastern
Broadcasting has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner,
Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further.
Issue: Whether radio broadcasting enjoys a more limited form Held: The case
has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of inferior courts
and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the Court
issues the following guidelines: (1) The cardinal primary requirements in
administrative proceedings laid down by the Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast
station may be closed or its operations curtailed; (2) it is necessary to
reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due
process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action
must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in
each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849); (3) All forms of media,
whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom
of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of
expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule - that words are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the
lawmaker has a right to prevent; (4) the clear and present danger test,
however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums. Broadcasting has to be licensed.
Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users; (5) The
clear and present danger test must take the particular circumstances of
broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations whether
by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for
thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling; (6) the freedom to
comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy; and (7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to
all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
the Constitution. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain
frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of
others.All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Radio broadcasting, more
than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection
from the free expression clause, because: First, broadcast media have
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens. Material
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in
the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from
making certain material available to children, but the same selectivity cannot
be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly
tuning in and out. Similar considerations apply in the area of national
security. The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are
found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities
accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income
masses who find Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 46 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble
means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities. On
the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is
also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a
national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or
unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set.
The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age,
persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s
and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or
offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the
vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work,
the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the
utterance. Still, the government has a right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may
not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread
uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and
television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to
bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the
most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on
public issues, they also deserve special protection.
3.f. NEWSWEEK, INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Nature of the Case:
- Special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking
to annul the decision of the IAC sustaining the Order of CFI Bacolod
denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel led by private
respondents
Facts:
- Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in
Negros Occidental led a case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in
behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province against Newsweek Inc. and
two of their non-resident correspondents/reporters, Fred Bruning and Barry
Came.- The complaint alleged that petitioner committed libel against them by
the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in their magazine. The
article supposedly portrayed the island as a place dominated by big
landowners or sugarcane planters who exploited the impoverished sugarcane
laborers and brutalized and killed them with impunity. They claim that the
article showed a malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and
misrepresentation of facts, putting them in a bad light- Petitioner argues that
private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the
complainant made no allegation that anything contained in the article referred
specically to any one of them--and libel can be committed only against
individual reputation OR, if is claimed to be directed at a group, there i
defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity
to do damage to a specic, individual group member's reputation.
Ruling:
- Decision of the IAC is reversed and the respondents' complaint is
dismissed.
 -The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue
for the benefit of all.
Rationale:
- We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct
- There is no cause of action.
reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest
- Corpus v Cuaderno, Sr.: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that in the subject matter of the controversy.
the victim be identiable, although it is not necessary that he be named
.- Defamatory matter which does not reveal the identity of the person upon
3.g. KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CAMARA SHOES v.
whom the imputation is case affords no ground of action unless it be shown
CAMARA SHOES
that the readers could have identied the personality of the individual
defamed. 111 SCRA 478
- This principle is important especially where a group or class of persons
claim to have been defamed because the larger the collectivity, the more
FACTS: Petitioner Ramos was suspended for writing the phrase "under
difcult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks
protest" in the company payroll to object to the P1.0 deduction made by the
apply to him.
respondent for allegedly getting P500 worth of lumber in 1964. The
- Where the defamatory is alleged to have been directed at a group or lass, it deduction started only in 1969, at the peak of union activities of the petitioner
is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to when several complaints of unfair labor practices were filed by the union
apply to every individual in the that group OR sufciently specic so that against the respondent.
each individual prove the defamatory statement specically pointed to him so
that he can bring action separately.
ISSUE: Is the action of the petitioner a lawful exercise of freedom of
- The case is NOT a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for
expression?
the benet of all or where the representation of class interest affected by the
decree is indispensable to make each member an actual party.
- The plaintiffs here have a separate and distinct reputation in the community. HELD: Yes. The freedom of expression is available to individual workers
They do not have a common or general interest in this controversy. subject to legal limitation of industrial peace to air valid grievances. It is thus
too clear from the foregoing that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his
- The disputed portion of the article that they claim is libelous never singled
grievances against the unauthorized and illegal deductions made by
out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The report merely stated that the victim
respondent company. By writing "under protest" on the company payroll,
has been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area
petitioner Ramos was well within the ambit of his constitutional freedom of
by Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. The report, referring as it does to an
expression as well as the right to petition against what was obviously a
ofcial act performed by an elective public ofcial, is within the real of
calculated undue harassment amounting to unfair labor practice perpetuated
privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
by respondent employer herein.
press.- The article in question is not libelous in nature.- The complaint
contains a recital of the favorable working conditions of the agricultural 3.h. IN RE ATTY. EMMANUEL S. TIPON, 79 SCRA 372
workers in the sugar industry and various foundations and programs
supported by planters' associations for the benet of the workers.-
Undoubtedly, the statements in the article are sweeping and exaggerated, but Facts:
these articles may also serve to prick the consciences of those who have but The Postmaster General in a first indorsement to the Chief Justice
are not doing anything or enough for those who do not have. dated May 17, 1965 transmitted certain papers purporting to show that Atty. Emmanuel
S. Tipon (admitted to the bar in 1956) might have violated the lawyer's oath
for having imported the magazine Playboy, which was considered as non-
mailable matter.
Held:
In that indorsement Secretary Raquiza rendered the opinion that
Playboy magazine cannot be character as obscene and that it can be carried
and deposited in Philippine mails. The Secretary concluded that "there is
absolutely no to show that Atty. Tipon had violated or intended to violate the
postal laws, the lawyer's oath or the Canons of Legal Ethics. Secretary Raquiza
requested that the Postmaster General's complaint of May 17,1965 be
considered
withdrawn. WHEREFORE, this case is considered closed for having become
moot andacademic.
3.i PEDRO S. LACSA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 74907, 23 May 1988 SARMIENTO, J.
Important Doctrine:
An incendiary utterance, where the libelous allegations are expressly laid
out, is not the only possible ground for conviction. Following US v.
OConnell , speech where the readers/hearers are merely induced to be
suspicious of the victims merit/honor may suffice. Explanations of the
accused as to the meaning of the assailed utterances are, in a way,
immaterial: what matters is the meaning of the utterances as understood by
the readers, taking the material as a whole, and reading it in its plain and
ordinary meaning. (US v. Sotto; Jimenez v. Reyes)
Information (charge): *not specified*
CFI of Manila: Libel (complainant: Ponciano Marquez)
Guilty (P2,000)
Intermediate Appellate Court: Affirmed, in toto, Judgment of CFI
Facts:
Lacsa is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) by profession. As such,
he offered his services pro bono to serve as auditor of the Philippine
Columbian Association (having previously been a former member of its
Board of Directors, and, then, a representative of one of its institutional
members).
Lacsa accessed the personal folder of Marquez, then-President of the
Assoc. He found out that Marquez was a mere associate of the association:
he questioned Marquezs qualification to hold the presidency, when only
proprietary members can be voted to that position.
Thus, he wrote a letter to the BoD (21 December 1978) wherein he
impugned the status of Marquez as president and proprietary member. He
contended that the issuance of a proprietary membership to Marquez, w/o the
authority of the Assoc.s BoD, was erroneous.
He also wrote a letter (2 January 1979) to Marquez, asking the latter
to relinquish the presidency, and referring to the latter as a de facto
president. The grounds he cited for such a request were the same as the ones
he gave in his letter to the BoD.
He cced the latter letter to a number of people including some
familiar names: Justice Claudio Teehankee, Jorge Vargas, and Prof. Renato
Constantino. Eventually, hecaused the letter to be published and circulated
among the member of the Assoc. He also caused the publication, in a
newsletter circulated to the members of the Assoc., an item entitled Doubts
As to the Legitimacy of the Incumbent President. Marquez instituted
separate criminal and civil actions against Lacsa, claiming to have been
maligned, defamed, and exposed to public ridicule by the latters actions.
The CFI of Manila found Lacsa guilty of Libel, and this judgment was later
affirmed by the IAC.
Thus, this petition to SC.
Issues/Holding/Ratio:
1.Did the appellate court err in affirming Lacsas conviction for Libel?
NO.
DEFENSE (de facto president is not libelous, per se):
 SC: Sol Gen correct in saying that calling Marquez a de facto president
is equivalent to saying that the latter is a pretender/fraud/impostor who
arrogated unto himself powers/rights/privileges to which he is not entitled.
Exposed Marquez to public contempt and ridicule
Created an impression in the minds of the readers of the libelous
materials
DEFENSE (even presuming de facto president is libelous, the letter and
newsletter constitute privileged communication):
To be classified as privileged comm.., the material must be absolutely free
from any taint of malice not the case here
Lacsa knew beforehand that Marquez was already a proprietary member
of the association, as evidenced by the issuance of the certificate for the
latters proprietary membership.
Evidenced by the accuseds initials, PSL, dated 28 metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient
September 1978, in a document containing the minutes of a 22 April 1968
meeting. (His initials signified that he had examined the document.)
Thus, there was no sufficient ground to claim that there was no basis
for the conversion of Marquezs associate membership into a
proprietary one.
Even assuming that the January 1979 letter was in fact privileged
communication, its status as such was lost upon Lacsas publishing and
circulation of the matter in a newsletter.
SC noted that, as an auditor, Lacsa was under an obligation to keep
his findings in strict confidence bet. Him and the BoD.
The BoD is the only body that can make the necessary correction in
case there was a mistake in the membership records.
Immediately going public with is alleged findings is unpardonable.
Trial Courts Finding of Malice:
Lacsas appointment as
member of the steering committee (
tasked to implement the terms and conditions of MOA w/ Permaline, Inc. for
the construction of the Philippine Columbian Sports Complex worth
P30M) was not extended; he was only give chairmanship of the finance
committee: the latter position Lacsa rejected, and Marquez, as President,
accepted the rejection
Lacsa felt aggrieved and thus began looking for ways to criticize
Marquez
Dispostion: Petition DENIED. Questioned decision AFFIRMED.
Additional Notes:
Test of Libelous Meaning, US v. OConnell, in cases where nothing wrong is
imputed in certain and express terms:
Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more
effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and
(i) if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and
understand that the person/s against whom they were uttered were guilty
of certain offenses, (ii) if the words are sufficient to impeach the victims
honesty, virtue, or reputation, or (iii) hold the victim up to public
ridicule.
On how to analyze allegedly libelous material (US v. Sotto, citing Jimenez v.
Reyes):
The published matter must be construed as a whole. The court
will disregard any subtle/ingenious explanation offered by the publisher: the
question is what the effect of the publication had upon the minds of the
readers giving the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the
plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what
was uttered.
3. j. Kapunan v de Villa
Facts: prohibition and/or habeas corpus, petitioners, who were implicated in
the unsuccessful coup d'etat of August 28, 1987 and relieved of their duties in
the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), seek the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and prohibition (1) to set aside, as null and void, the "pre-trial
investigation" report finding a prima facie case against them and
recommending their trial for mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer and Issue: Whether or not the house arrest or confinement of Kapunan is illegal
the denial of their motion for reconsideration, and (2) to enjoin respondent
Ruling: the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition . The Court finds that
General Court Martial No. 8 from further proceeding in the case of "People v.
petitioner Kapunan's continued confinement is not tainted with illegality.
Lt. Col. Eduardo Kapunan, et al."Further, petitioner Kapunan seeks the
Among the grounds for the disallowance of the writ of habeas corpus is that
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to procure his release from confinement.
the applicant has been charged with or convicted of in offense [Sec. 4, Rule
In the aftermath of the failed August 28,1987 coup d'etat where cadets of the
102, Rules of Court]. In the instant case, petitioner Kapunan had been
Philippine Military Academy reportedly openly supported the plotters and
charged with mutiny, a serious offense punishable by death or such other
issued statements to that effect. PMABoard of Officers to investigate the
punishment as a court-martial may direct. There is a legal cause of his
alleged involvement of officers and cadets of the PMA [Rollo,p. 187]. A fact-
confinement. Art. 70. Arrest or confinement.Any person subject to military
finding investigation was conducted bythe PMA Board from September 1 to
law charged with crime or with a serious offense under these Articles shall be
11, 1987 and on September 23, 1987 it submitted its findings to theAFP
placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require; but when
Chief of Staff. Charge sheets were filed against petitioners for mutiny and
charged with a minor offense only, such person shall not ordinarily be placed
conduct unbecoming an officer and a "pre-trial investigation" was conducted
in confinement. Any person placed in arrest under the provisions of this
by respondent Maj. Baldonado. Kapunan was allegedly summoned to the
article shall thereby be restricted to his barracks, quarters, or tent, unless such
General Headquarters of the AFP fora dialogue, but upon his arrival thereat
limits shall be enlarged by proper authority. ...It cannot be gainsaid that
on September4, 1987 he was ordered confined under "house arrest" by then
certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of
Chief of Staff Gen. Fidel Ramos. On February19, 1988, the arrest of
speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a
petitioner Kapunan, together with three (3) others, was ordered by respondent
certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness
Chief of Staff De Villa in connection with the killing of Atty. Rolando Olalia
of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent
and Leonore Alay-ay
on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks