Tt: RROR AND IERRI10RY

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Terror and Territory
THE SPATIAL EXTENT OF SOVEREIGNTY

Stuart Elden

Uni1<ersity of Mirmesola Press

Porrions of rhe lnrroducrion ;md chapter 3 were prC'oiously published .IS .. Terror
and Termory," Antipode 39, no. 5 (2007): 821-45; rcpnnred with permission
from \'<lilcy-Biackwcll. An earlier version of pan of chapter 4 appeared as
-Reconsriruring lr-Jq." in Dcbor.1h Cowen and Emil)! Gilbcn,eds., W'ar;
Cit1;.cmship. (New York: Routledge. 147-76; reprin ted w1rh
permission from Ta>lor and Fr-Jncis. Pomons of chapter 5 were prt''f'iously
as and dtc war on Terror," f.Jwirc:mment lllld
Planning" 37, no. 12 11005): 2083- 104; reprimcd w1rh permission from PLDn
LimJ(ed, London; Conungcnr So\ercigmy. Tcrrirori<lllnrcgriry, and rhc
Sanctity of Bordcrs,M SA IS of lntcmJ.ltioual 26, no. 1 (10061:
11-24; rcprinrcd w1th permission from The Johns Hopkins Uni\ersir> Press; ;Jnd
as "BiaJr, Nco-conservatism, and rhc \War o n Territorial lnregrity; lmcrndtiollal
Politics 44, no. I [2007): 37-57; reprinted with permission of Pa lgmve
1\.Lcmillan.
!\.laps for rh1s book were crc.ared b)' Chris Onon of the Design and Imaging Unir
m rhe Ocpartmem of Geography ar Durham Universiry.

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Elden, Stuart
Terror .:md territor)' : dte spari.1l extent of smcrcignry I Smarr []den.
p. cm.
Includes b1bhogmphical references :md mdcx.
ISBN Q78-0-.8166-54.8.3-3 (hardco\cr: alk. paJ)('r)-ISBJ\' 978-0-8 166-5484-0
(pbk.: alk. paJ)('r)
L Sovereignty. 2. Hunun rerritonalir>-l?olitic.ll aspecrs. 3. Tcrronsm.
I. Title.
JC327.43 2009
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Pnmed in rite Unued States oi Arn<:rLca on acid-free papc:r:.
The Universit}' of Minnesota is <111 cqua l-opporruniry educator <1nd employer.

16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
The territcmum is the sum of the lands within the boundaries of
a community [cwitati.s]; which some say is so named because the
magistrate of a place has the right of terrifying [temmdi], that is,
exercising jurisdiction, within its boundaries.
-Pomponius
Mcmucll, in the Digest of Justinian

In the history of colonial invasion, maps arc always first drawn

br the victors, since maps arc instruments of conquest: once
projected, the)' are then implemented. Geography is therefore the
art of war but can also be the an of resistance if there is a counter-
map and a counter-strategy.
-Edward \V. Said
The Politrcs of Di.sposses.sio11
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 CONTENTS

Acknowledgments IX

Introduction: Terror and the State of Territory xi

Gr:ograpbir:s of Fear, Tlm<It, and Di,ision

2 Territorial Strategies of lslamism 33
3 Rubbk Reduced to Dust: Targeting Weak States 63
4 Iraq: Destruction and Re-constitution 111
5 Territorial Integrity and Contingent Sovereignty 139
Coda: The: Spatial Extent of Sovereignty 171

Notes 179
Index 149
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 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

.Many of ideas were discussed with a range of other people, and some
have informed jointly written pieces. Although I take responsibility for
all statemenrs made here, E am especially grateful to Luiza Bialasiewic:t,
David Campbell, Klaus Dodds, Steve Graham, Alex Jeffrey, Joe Painter,
and Alison Williams for the experience of working ideas through in other
places. Luiza generous.!}' gave her time in reading the full manuscript and
made several useful suggestions. Neil Brenner was an enthusiastic and
challenging interlocutor on a different bur parallel project. John Agnew,
Louise Amoore, Ben Anderson, Richard Beardsworth, Lawrence lkrg, Dan
Bulley, Elgin Diaz, John Donaldson, J..lark Duffield, Jenny Edkins, Nick
Entrikin, Derek Gregor)'. Engin lsJn, Kaiyan Kaikobad, Morris Kaplan,
.Maria Margaroni, Eduardo Mmdieta, Claudio Minca, Mark Neodcous,
David Newman, Colin Perrin, Martin Pratt, Allen Scott, Jamcs Sidaway,
Jeppe Strandsbjerg, Haim Yacobi, and Maja Zehfuss all made thcir mark
through instructhc discussions. and ins.ightfl1l comments. I am deeply
appreciative of Susan's love and encouragement.
Jason \'(leidemann of the University of Minnesota Press offer"Cd con-
structi\e suggestions, and the reports he commissioned on the initial pro-
posal and final manuscript from Mick Dillon, Neil Smith, Matt Sparke,
and an anonymous reader helped to sharpen the argumetlt and improve
the prose. In particular, Mick's enthusiasm for the project r"Cinvigorated my
own. The International Boundaries Research Unit and the Politics-State-
Space research cluster in the Department of Geography at Durham Uni\er-
sity prm:ided conducive environments for thinking through many of these
ideas. Chris Orton, of the Design and Imaging Unit in that department,
drew the excellent maps in this. book. Hamzah Muzaini did an invaluable
job of comerting in-text rcfercnc"Cs to endnotes and compiling the index.
X ACKNOWLEDC:.MEN rs

Some of this work was funded by a Nuffidd Foundation gram, and

much of the writing was completed while I was a visiting professor in
the Deparcmenr of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles,
in spring 2007. The penultimate version of the manuscript was com-
pleted while I was a visiting scholar in the Department of Sociolog)' at
New York University and at the' Graduate CcntC'r, City University of
New York in late 2007.
Lectures and conference presentations on these topics have been given
in Australia (Uni"ersity of Adelaide; Flinders University; University of
Tasmania), Britain (University of Newcastle; University of Uni-
versity of Wales, AbC'rystwyth; Warwick University; Royal Holloway,
University of London; Durham Uni\ersity; Royal Geographical Society,
London; Queen 1vfary, Uni\<ersit)' of London), Canada (University of
British Columbia; University of Bdtish Columbia, Okanagan), Cyprus
(Uni,ersity of Cyprus), Denma rk (Copenhagen Business School). Finland
(Uni,ersity of Turku), Ireland (British lntC'rnational Stud ies Associa-
tion, Uni;ersity of Cork), Israel (Ben Gurion Uni\ersiry of the Nege\') ,
Singapore (National University of Singapore), and the United States (Uni-
versity of Colorado at Boulder; Association of American Geographers,
Dcmer; Uni\'ersit)' of Ca lifornia, Los Angeles; Purchase Colkge, State
University of New York). The audiences in these places hclpe.d to
test these ideas and pushed the work in useful directions.
 INTRODUCTION

Terror and the State of Territory

In a tc:bision broadcast, a U.S. president addrt"Ssc:s the U.S. population.

explaining air strikes abroad rakcn in response to terrorist attacks. The
target was ''terror," made more con<:rc:te as fac ilities linked ro Osama bin
Laden. Groups associated with the bin Laden network arc described as
sharing "a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of \'iolc:ncc, and
a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innoce-nts,"
and as hating the: United States "prc:cisdy because- of what we- stand for
and what we stand against. " He underscores that "'countries that pcrsis-
tc:ntl)' host terrorists have no right to be safe have-ns," but that the actions
arc- "not aimed against Islam, the- faith of hundreds of millions of good.
pe-ace-loving people: all around the world, including the United States,"
bur rather target "fanatics and kille-rs who \\o'rap murder in the cloak of
righteousness, and, in so doing, profane the- gre-at rdigion in whose name
they claim to act." The-n, seeing these actions as part of a long process,
the prt"Sident concludes:
My fellow :\mencans, our battle agamst terrorism did nor begin with
the bomb1qg ... nor wi ll it end wirh today's snike. It will requ ire
strength, courage, and e ndura nce. We will not yield to this threat. "11/e
will meet it, no marter how long it may take. llus w ill be a long. ongo-
ing struggle bc:cween freedom a nd fanaticism; between the rule of bw
and terronsm.
\'(le musr be: prepared ro do all t hat we can for as lo ng as we must.
Americ;1 is and will remain a t;Jrgct o f terrorists precisdy bec;;J usc we
are leaders; because we acr to advance peace, democraq, and bas1c
human values! because we're rh e mosr open SOCiety o n and
as we shown yet aga in, we take an uncompromising
stand agamsr terrorism ...
xii IN I RODUC liON

will lx no sancluary for will our

o ur J.nd o ur ........ help peopk of all faiths, m ::Ill
p.1ns of world, who ro of ft::J.r
\Vc will persist and will you, God bless )'OU and
rna y God bless our country. 1

Tht' prt'sident was Bill Clinton, the date was August 20, 1998, and the
spccific instance was the bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya,
and Dar as-Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, the response was Oper-
ation Infinite Reach, in which a total of eighty-eight Tomahawk cruise
missiles were sent against camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical
plant in Sudan that was erront'ously thought to be making chemical weap-
ons. Yet Clinton does not see the bombings or the response as unique: an
open-ended script was clc-<HI} envisaged . Take away the spccificity of the
African embassies and this could have bccn delivered word for word by
either Presidt'nt Bush or President Ronald Reagan.
The events of August 1998 are significant, but tht'y have complex
interrelations of cause and effe.ct and action and response that do not
fit a straightforward narrative. The cruisc mis-sile attacks were scripted
as a reprisal, but so too did ther have an cfft'ct. Little O\'er two years
later, on October 12, 2000, an attack was .l aunched on the USS Cole,
moored in Aden apparently in part because it was the kind of
destroyer that had launcht'd t ht' 1998 cruist' missile attacks. 2 The East
African embas.sr bombs wcre timed exactly eight years after U.S, t roops
had a rrived in Saudi Arabia to fight the first Gulf War. Other interrela-
tions, contexts, and putative justifications could be added to the story.
The politics of response is thus more nuanced tha n Clinton, or later
Bush, would have us believe. Searching for an origin for the "war on ter-
ror" is thus a complicated and ultimately misguided task. Where to begin;
when to start? With e\'t'nts that can be dated and loc<Jted? Thc attacks by
terrorist groups include the Yemeni hotel bombs of December 29, 1992;
the attempt to bomb Tower One of the \'(Torld Trade Center in New York
Cit}' on February 26, 1993 0 and the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi
Arabia on June 25, 1996. The ye-ar 1998 is particularly significant, as this
was when bin Laden de-dared his jil1ad against Jews and Crusaders; the
East Afric<Jn bombings followe-d. Looking further back, there is the- suc-
cession of attacks on U.S. targcts in Beirut in the- 1980s and the bombing
of Pan Am 103 in 1988.J Many other attacks across the world- dirccdy
or tangentially linked or entircl}' disconnected- might be added to this
list, each of which provoked conse-quences and actions in response, eithcr
spcctacular or covert.
 IN I RODUC liON xiii

Yet the actions of the United States do not simply follow from these
events. Depending on the perspective taken, a whole host of U.S. foreign
policies provide a context for a ll this conflict and enmity. Taking a wider
view, all of these incidents can be understood as responses of a kind: to
U.S. support for Israd, in particular its occupation of the Gaza Strip, \Vest
Bank, and the Golan Heights and its imasions of Lebanon; to U.S. a rm-
ing of opposition to the Smiets in to the 1991 Iraq war and
its consequences, norabl}' the continued stationing of troops in the Saudi
peninsula, the impact of sanctions, and the constant bombing of Iraqi
positions in the policing of the "no-fly" to the intervention and
ignominious withdrawal from Soma lia in 1993; and to a host of other
complicated networks and alliances with regimes across the world. This
was not lost on the Bush administration, of course, which realized that
U.S. policy has implications, but part of its tactics were to deny that this
is the casc.4
Yet despite these complicated lineages, the "war on terror" is now
often taken to begin with the events of September 11, 2001, in New York
City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. In terms of a visible event,
this is understandable. In terms of sheer loss of IHe, these were greater
than any single terrorist act that preceded them; however, the number of
people who died as a resu lt of sanctions in Iraq following 1991, or those
who died as a result of the lack of drugs that were formerly produced by
the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant certain ly exceed this though
dispersed through, rather than concentrated in, time and Other
events, such the destruction of Grozny in Chcchyna, failed to visually
register for the West due in part to the particular politics of the media.
And as some have been quick to remind us, more than twice as man}'
children died of diarrhea on September 11, 2001, and die every day,
than died in the more-publicized events. A similar figure is given for
AIDS-related deaths in sub-Saharan Africa alone.- In 2005, President
George W. Bush himself put a figure to part of the consequences of his
response, suggesting that a t least 30,000 people had died in Iraq since
the invasion,8 while other counts have put the figures much
Inevitably, these tallies risk losing sight-and losing the site-of the
problem in making such muncrical ac-eounts; with accountanC}' in place of
grid. Let us not forger, then, that these events arc a political, spatial, and
tcmpora.l marker; yet they arc one that we give a particular significance
to through our complicit}' in a construction. The shorthand of "Septem-
ber ll," or the more loaded "9-11" or "9111," masks the spa rial context
of the events in favo r of a temporal indication 10 --onc that is reduced to a
 \ .
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5 Lhwl 10 T111_.. {:i 0 . e. 20 !l:lihann .... St.., 31 Cl IIIII

Locations of attacks by nonstate terrorists since 1998

 .

States wittl U.S. or Allied intervention since the e11d of the Cold War
xvi IN I RODUC liON

number in calendar timC' and scd:s a pri,ilcging of this date for AmC'rican
pain, occluding other events on that day in this and other ye.ars." Indeed,
this date has been seen as a caesura, dividing world history imo a "before"
and "after." 11 Unlike the December 7.1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. which
is convcnknrly referred to onl)' by a place, the lack of a single geographi-
cal site has turned the .. new Pe-arl Harbor" into a simple date. In addition,
New York City and the Towers'' arc much more often noted than
the other sites of the September 11 attack.' 1
Yet the of these events have not been concentrated in a sin-
gle point, either temporal or spatial; there is continuit)' wel l as a break-
dispersal as much as intensity. Instead, they arc in space and
time, spreading across spatia l sc.a les from the local to the national and
from the regional to the global. As Neil Smith indicates, this was both an
.. utterly local"' and a "global e.,.cnt." But Smith's important question is,
"How did September 11 become a natiouaJ tragedy?" suggesting that the
targets were the World Center and the Pentagon, which arc finan-
cial and military symbols, rather than more obvious cultural, social, or
political of American idcntity. 1
A whole range of media, political, and emotional responses indicated
thcsc shifts. CNN, for instance:, initially uscd tl1e banner title of" America
Under Attack," which they changed the following day ro "America at
\Var. " 15 While there was some concentration on the national, in order to
create an international coalition, the emphasis was placed at other times
on the eighty different nationalities whose people died on that day. In
Bush's words, "[TJhc attack took place on American but it was an
attack on thC' hcarr and soul of thC' civilized world. "' 1" And, as Le Monde
declared, "'Nous sommc:s rous Amfricains; suggesting a shared
experience: of suffering that transcended national boundarics. 1- The North
Atlantic Trc<Jt}' (NATO) invoked Article 5, declaring d1at
the events of September 11 were attacks on all members. But from these
different scales of response, it is dear that these events were not. as con-
ventional international relations scbolars bavc tried to suggest, "out-of-
geograph}'. " 18 Rather, as Derek Gregory argues, the convoluted origins
"'have surged inwards and their consequences rippled outwards in com-
plex, overlapping ways. " 19

Geography and the War on Terror

On September 27, 2001, Bush ga\'C' a speech in which he argued that stan-
dard practice no longer \'a lid and that new geographies needed to be
conceived for the "war on termr'':
 IN I RODUC liON xvii

We're J.lso a cilJ.r is adjusring ro :1 nc=w type: of war. This isn't

:1 war thal we're waging. Ours IS a mar will
have to rdkcl rhe new enemy. T here's no lo nger islands co conquer or
beachhc=:.Jds ro storm. We face a brand of e\11, the likes of wh1ch we
haven't sc=en m a long rime in rhe world. These are people who srrike
hide, people who .know no borden ... pc:ople who depc:nd upon
m hers. And make no mismke about n, the new wo r is nor only ago i nst
the: e\ildoers, thcmsehes; t he new war is against those= w ho harbor
them them a nd feed them.N

Bush here outlines a number of ways in which grography and the ''war
on terror" intersect, in part producing a sct of circumstances thr ough his
imocation of them. He suggests a particular set of geographies, referring
back to previous U.S. \'ictories in the Pacific and Europe in World War 0,
and perhaps the 1991 Gulf War, far more than Cold War events such as
Vietnam, which arc perhaps intrndrd to be fo rgotten. This produces imag-
ined and material geograph ies of terror and response, which both work in
different wa)'S. On the one hand, there is the hint of new geographies of
threat, where the "cncm}'" cannot be located straightfornardJy, where bor-
ders arc crossed and permeable. In practice, though, the geographical chal-
lenges have been reduced to solutions that fa ll back on previous ways of
doing things, on a basis that is not very far from a fairly conventional poJiti-
cal geography. A clear sense of this trajectory can be seen Ln the explicit
linkage of the "'evildoers" to those who harbor for the most direct
targeting has be<"n of states. Indocd, Smith notes that October 7, 2001, is
a more appropriate date for the beginning of the "war on terror" than
September 1 t, 2001, for this is when Afghanistan was attacked and war
actual!) started.!' Yet the 1998 strikes and the 1986 bombing of Lib)a
could equally be seen as part of a broader "war on terror. "ll
Geographers and others ha\'C offered man}' spatiaJ insights in their
analrsis of the "war on terror. ,. This has included looking at the geo-
graphical spread of U.S. bases and mapping their interventions in rccenr
}'Cars. The ideas of imperialism and colonialism have been given a spccifi-
call}' geographical focus, and the impact on cities has been explored in
pioneering ways. Other work has concerned the violent geographies of
internment in sites like Guanranamo Bay and Abu Ghraib a nd the geog-
raphy of e).'traordinal')' rendition. In recent }'Cars, there have also been
studies of the grographic.al dimensions of issues concerning hatred and
terror more gcncrally.H
Not all work has been critical. A little over a year after the 2001
attacks, the Association of American Geographers (AAG) offered its own
contribution to the "war on terror. '' 24 This was a book edired b}' two past
xviii IN I RODUC liON

presidents and the executive director of the AAG, and thus it sened as
an almost "official"' statement of the relation between U.S. geographers
and the Bush administration. ln irs preface, John Marburger, who became
Bush's Director of Science and Technology Poliq, Office of the U.S. Presi-
dent. notes:
Whcn Prc-sidem Bush introduccd rhe norian of War Terrorism,
my firsr thoqghr was how a map for such a war would differ from a
comcnrional battk map. Comrentional wars are fought For territory,
easily mr-.uurcd on a chart w1rh lacitudc and longitudc, but tht' fronrs
in thc war aga inst rC'rrorism cover muJtiple dimensions. How can we
derr an unprotectC'd Rank in this complcx tC'rritory? How do we
mcasu re progrcss?2J

Marburger goes on to suggest that geographers arc best qualified to

respond to such questions. 11tis is a particular kind of geographical
approach: "while technology has aided terrorism, it is to technology that
we must turn for tools to counter terrorism. "l4Ttms, in this volume, which
Marburger calls ''timely," the modern tools of gcograph>- gcographical
information systems remote sensing, data modeling.. and the like-
arc brought to be.ar on the issues.
What is at stake in Marburger's claims? Leaving aside the pccuJiarit}' of
his first thoughts, the core is the idea that territory, understood to be two-
dimensional, destined to be conquered, and easily charted, is passe, and
that the "war on terror"' is more complex, more multiple, and more diverse.
Dimensions beyond those of latitude and longitude- presumablr includ-
ing vertkality, and potentially including virtuality and temporality-need
to be taken into ac.count. Geographers c<m, on this reckoning, be relied
upon to offer new insights into surve-iiJance to detect unprotected poten-
tial targets for terror, o r to provide new models by which to "measure," in
a particular sense of politics, what counts as "progress... This
relates to Donald Rumsfcld's 2003 memo bemoaning the lack of "met-
rics to know if we arc winning or losing the global war on tenor, " which
later led to a Pentagon c.all for contractors to develop just such calcula-
the mcasurcs. 2 "
Interrogating the basis for just such claims, questions, and assumptions
at the very heart of any truly critical pcrspc:.cti ve on the "war o n terroL"
In a number of v.rays, the "war on terror" has demonstcated the importani:'e
of Henri L..deb\rrc:'s suggestion that space is dlC ultimate locus and medium
of struggle and therefore a crucial political issue. For Ldebvrc, space is
not just the place of conAict, bur an object of struggle itself. It is for this rca-
son that he claims "there is a politics of space because space is prnirical. "lll
 IN I RODUC liON xix

Considering the interrelation of the spatial dimension of politics and the

political dimensions of space provides an important, arguabl}' essential frame
for understanding the "war on terror." This book approadlcs rhar topic from
a very particular, yet cmcial, angle. This is the question of territory.
Much of tht' work on the gt'ographical aspr.cts of the "war on tt'r-
ror" has operated within what might be a gt'ot'conomic rt'gistcr.
Matthew Sparke, for instance, speaks of "a globalist ge(}('conornics thar
both builds on and buttresses the mcranarrati\'t' o.f globalization's intc-
grathe inexorability, " !t analyzing what he and co lleagues call "neolib-
cral geopolitics. "' 30 Neoconservatism is, on these terms, the political and
military support for nt'olibrralism.>' Neoconservatism imposrs a par-
ticular political and t'.Conomic constructing a neocolonialism of
"dcmocraq promotion" and "freedom," which art' effecti\'cly ciphers for
a Western model of how a state should opcratt'. Thirty years ago, Gio-
vanni Arrighi suggested that the United States had .. freed itself from the
shackles of formal imperialism, which had ended by cramping its mili-
tary and financial supremacy, in order to exercise irs hegemony through
market forces. " ll Yet tht' "war on terror" has demonstrated that militar}'
force may be needed to shore up the financial hegemony; a shift from the
"hegemon)' of consent.. to the "hegemony of forc;C. " :U In a sense, this
devdopmenr was an ine,irable const'quence of the neoconservative criti-
cism of Clinton. While he was hoping to spread freedom and democracy
through the extension of global markets, his interventions were criticized
as lacking a defining logic or purpose. Globalization is thus the economic
strategy, and U.S. militarism its political counterpart. Indeed, the interrela-
tion of politics and economics is cenrral: nicely summarized by Phillips as
"trumpets of democracy, drums of gasoline... Yet the aim is broader and
more subrle than one that can lx: grasped by the claim that it is "all about
oil.">J Rather, the project is to "make the world safe for It
is therefore revealing that the conflict was portrayed by Bush as a "global
war on tcrror ..- global both in its scope and in its goal.
In his analysis of the "long twentieth century," Arrighi argues that
there is a .. recurrent contradiction between an "endless'' accumulation of
capital and a comparathcly stable organization of political space":r

Centra l to such an under!>t:lnding is rhc: ddinit1on of a nd

.. rc:rritonalism .. :J.S opposite: modes of rule: or logics of power. Tc:rrito-
ria list rulers identify power w ith rhc: c:xrc:m and populousness of rhc:ir
domams, and concc:i\c: of wc:althlcapital as a means or a by-product
of the pursmt of rc:rritona l expansion. Cap1r.1lisr rulers,, in comrast,
idenrif)' power with the: extc:nr of rhc:ir command O\'C:I scarce: resources
XX IN I RODUC l i ON

J.nd consider acquisinorts as a and ::1 by-producr of the

J.ccumularion o f capu:al.n

Arrighi notes how discretc logics acrually operate in relation to

each othcr "within a givcn spa.tio-tcmporal contcxt,"' and that as a consc-
qucnce, "actual outcomes have dcparted significant!}', even diametrically,
from what is implicit in cach logic conceived abstracdr."n It is this insight
that David Harvey has illuminating!)' brought to bear on U.S. practicc in
the current moment, drawing om the tensions bctwcen what he calls, fol-
lowing Arrighi, the logic of tcrritory and the logic of capita l.10
The wider economic aspccts of the "war on tcrror" have rcccivcd
extensivc analysis,, and this book docs not seck to rcpcat thesc discussions.
lnstcad. through a focus on the tcrritorial qucstions, it adds a cruciaJ de-
ment: an insistence on one aspcct of the "'geo'' in the geoeconomic and
geopolitical. Deborah Cowcn and Ncil Smith suggest that "whcrc geo-
politics can be understood as a means of acquiring tcrritory towards a
goal of accumulating wealth, geocconomics re\crses the proccdurc, aiming
dirccdy at the ac.cumulation of weaJth through market control. The acqui-
sition o r control of territory is not at all irrelevant but is a tactical option
rather than a strategic ncccssit)' " 41 While sympathetic to this a rgument,
this book seeks to dig a little deeper into the specificaiJy territorial aspects
of this change. As Cowen and Smith caution, "thc ris-e of gcocconomic
calculation is highly uneven temporally as wcJI as spariaJly, it is episodic,
and it can never fully supplant geopolitics. ".u What this requires is an
understanding of the territorial in order to recogni:z.e the relation between
the ongoing geopolitics in the geocconomic moment.
Territor}' itself cannot be assumed to havc remained unchanged as
strategies toward it morph into tactics. lndeed, wh ile territorial acquisi-
tion may have generally become a tactical rather than a strategic goal, this
docs not mean that there is no territorial aspect to state practice, or that
territory docs not continue to be an object of nonstate actors. Today's ter-
ritorial logic is not the same as previous imperial practices. Indeed, a com-
plicated set of territorial and politicaJ divisions and incorporations have
oc.curred over the past several ycars, the underlying structures of which
bc.comc more evident if the temporal scope: is broadened berond simply
the period since 2001. Yet while we should certainly rethink and examine,
and be open to analysis of the ncw, we must not forge,t that the war has
thus far been fought with a very conventional sense of territory in mind-
territory that has bocn targeted, bombed, and invaded.
This book, therefore, offers an interrogation of the territorial logic of the
present, suggesting that this is a cmcia l ingredient of anr examination of
 IN I RODUC liON xxi

the tension betwe-en capitalist accumulation and state-territorial constra ints

a round the distribution of resources and the accumulation of wealth.
Despite me importance of this ropic, as this book a ims ro demonstrate,
there has been little work looking at the question of territory explicit!}'
Indeed, at times the territorial has been distinctly underplayed. AI-Qacda
has often been portrayed as a dttcrritorializ.cd nct>vork rather than as
operating within, between, and against existing territorial frames; while
the challenges to international law have been widd}' discussed, there has
been little analysis of the implications for the kgal basis of tl1c relation-
ship between SO\'erdgnt}' and trrritory. This book Sks to providr such
a corrective angle. In addition, while mr trrm "terror" has been widd)
r mployed, mere has been little examination of what it actually is:u The
definition a nd scope of terror and territor}, and their relation to the state,
require careful analysis.

Terror and the State

In this book, "terror" is understood in a broad sense-from the practices

of the nonstate actors traditionall}' labeled as terrorist organizations to
the actions of statrs in their international relations: and from the bombs,
missiles, and bullets of death and destruction to me imagined geographies
of threat and rrsponsc. States drarly operate in ways that tcrrifr-.4.1 The
terrorism of nonstate actors is a \'cry small proportion of terrorism taken
a.s a whole, with states ha\'ing killed far more than those who oppose
This is as true in thc "war on terror" as in countless othcr con-
flicts. For many writers; thcrdore, thc distinction is one of degree, onc
of tactics, rather than a complete disassociation. This lcads to a number
of pro\'Ocative formulations, which act as a spur to thought evcn in their
glibncss: .. onc man's terrorist is anomer man's freedom fighter'"; "a trr-
rorist is s.omconc who has a bomb but doesn't ha\'e an air forcc";4" the car
bomb is me "poor man's air forcc." 4 '
In his book Luftbeben: A11 den Que/len des Terrors, which litcrallr
translates as "Air Tremors: At the Source of Terror," the German phi-
losopher Peter Sloterdijk argues for an analysis of terrorism from and
of the air, re.cognizing thc power of aerial assault, poison gas attacks in
World War I, and thc gassing of Jcws in the Holocaust. 4 ' These arc, of
coursc, actions of states. He broadcns thc analysis to look at radioactivity,
meteorology, pneuma to logy, and thus provides a series of analyses of how
commanding the air can tcrrorizc the carth. To express this idea, he coins
tlu: term "'atmotcrrorism"-a broadening of terrorism from the earth to
thc atmosphcrc.4 Y Slotcrdijk's point is that many forms of tcrrorism target
xxii IN I RODUC liON

indi,riduals and groups through the air that they breathc, thus targe,ting
the air itself. !o> This is what is meant by the term Luftbeben-"air trem-
ors" or "airquake."
Thcrc is indeed something different about terror that comc:-s from the
a ir. There were particular fears of the bomber airplane in World War U,
with the idea that there was no effective defense and that the bomber
would "always get through." As Herz purs it, "the roof blew off the terri-
torial state." 11 This brought civilian popuJations into proximity with con-
flict in a way that they had prc\iously never cncountcrcd-cspcdally in
countries that had not been invaded in that war, such as Britain or Japan .
In the Cold War, the fear of nuclear assault and the continuing attempts
to create a missile ddensc shidd spc.tk nor simpl}' of the consequences of
an attack, but in part of its mode of delivery. Truck and car bombs, and
suicide bombers, whose ov.'ll bodies arc the means of delivering destruc-
tion, arc undoubtedly terrifying, but barriers and wa lls can be crccred to
attempt to protc.ct a state from them. Assault from the air is much harder
to prevent.
It is not coincidental that tv.o of the most extreme rcsponsc:-s of the
United States and its a llies in the "war on terror" have been to aer-
ial attack: to the airplanc:-s of St:ptrmbc:-r 11, 2001, and to Hezbollah's
Katyusha rockC"ts launched against Israel in 2006. And yet those state
rrsponses, like most other state-terror actions. also carne from the air.
The "Shock and Awe" asS<tult on Iraq in the early days of the 2003 attack
cannot be understood as anything but a form of state-terror. Many of the
attacks were launched from bombers operating from bases in the United
States, flying ovcr the North Pole and return ing at thc end of the mission .
Equally, the destruction of Fallujah or parts of Beirut cannot be under-
stood without recognizing the state's role in terrifying civilian popula-
tions. Questions were rrpcatrdly raised about NATO's attack o n Kosovo
in 1999, Russia's war in Chcchnya, and in particular, the bombardment of
Grozny..s 2 Recognizing the vertical dimension of territory shows that terri-
tory is a volume rather than an area, and noting that linc:-s on maps have
only a limited height when translated into linc:-s on the ground showc.tses
a new level of \'ulncrability:.s 3 a vulnrrabi lity to imagined senses of a pro-
tect ed territory, the bodr of thr statr.
Thrrdorc:, two of the many problcms with the term "war on terror''
are that it suggests that war is something distinct from terror, and that war
is the means of combating it. Violence by states is supposed to be legiti-
mate, wherc:-as that b)' nonstatc actors is illegitimate. Statc:-s and nonstates
arr directly opposed. As Barry H indrss argues, it suggests "a distinction
bctwcc:-n those who conduct the war, who arc opposed to and their
 IN I RODUC l i ON xxiii

enemies, who usc it ... ,.. \'(Fe should recall that the term " terrorism" is of
rdativcl)' recent coinage, deriving from the French word "terrorisme" and
daring from the system of the "Terror" in the french Revolution. It first
appeared in a dictionary in 1798.
It is important to note that " terror" first emerges as a tactic used b)'
states, with Robespicrrc suggesting that the difference between the opera-
tions of liberty and those of tyranny is simpl}' the purpose, nor the means.
The combination of virtue and terror is "virtue, without which
terror is disastrous; terror, w ithout which virtue is powerless. Terror is
nothing but prompt, scverc, inflexible justice; it is therefore an emanation
of virtue. " j 5 Today, though, terrorism is seen as the tactic of nonst.ates,
whereas the response of states is justice or war, or perhaps a "just war. " S6
Rather:, we need to recognize that war operates- as a necessary conse-
quence of its ver)' logic-through threats. violence, and fear. It cannot
be otherwise, however "just" irs purpose. "Just war" is just war. Politics
operates in the same way. In addition, the notion of a lmost
unquestioning!)' seen as a legitimate tactic, and one of states, derives from
the same word. "Deter" means "to frighten from," Thus, as Slotcrdijk
has suggested, "terrorism is not an opponent, but a modus opera11di,
a method of combat, which is immediately shared by both sides of a
conflict- which is why a 'war aga inst terrorism' represents a nonsensi-
cal fo rmula."r
Legally, there arc also complexities a bout the definition of terrorism.
In the U.S. Code, terrorism "means premedjtated, politicaJJy motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups
o r clandestine agents, usually intended to influcn(lc an audience. "18 There-
fore, terrorism is not just any violence, but that with. a particular aim in
mind. It is not simply war when there arc two or more combatants fight-
ing. but rather actions explidtl)' aimed at noncombatant targets. Under
this definition, it also excludes states, since it is perpetrated by "subna-
tional groups or clandestine agents," although special forces such as those
used by the United Stares, Britain, and other states would presumably be
included. The definition is further clarified in terms of their intended effect
on the audicnc.c. It describes actions that "appear to be intcnded-(i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian popuJation: (ii) to influence the policy of a
governmenr b)' intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affe.cr the conduct of a
government b)' mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping." for this
to be "international terrorism,'' they must "occur primari ly outside the
territorial jW"isdiction of the United States, o r transcend national bound-
aries in terms of the means by which they arc accomplished, the persons
they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their
xxh IN I RODUC liON

perpetrators Opc'ratc or seck asylum." Such a broad gcographic<1l fram]ng

allows almost cvcr}rthing to be understood as "international." The attacks
of September 11, 2001, for example, occurred within the United Stares;
they used domestic fl ights. and those involved had been inside the United
States for some time, but they were clearly intended to send a message to
an audience wider than simply the United States. And the United States was
quick ro link and situate the auad::s ro other countries. As chapter 1 will
show in more they tJms moved from a legal, domestic response to a
military, international one.
The pre\ious definition of the U.S. Code described terrorism as ''the
calculated usc of violencc or threat of violcnce to attain goals that arc
political, rcligious. or idcological in narurc ... through intim idation, coer-
cion, or instilling fear. "J? This clearly cncompasscs actions by states, which
thc rniscd dcfinition docs not. The ncw .,crsion thercforc raises issues that
the: prcvious one avoided, c\cn as it sccks to close down other issues,
especially sccking to dcfinc the States' terrorism itself out of cxis-
tcncc. The U.S. Department of State similarly limits it to nonsratc actors,110
although in 2007, the United States declared that the Iranian Revolution-
ary Guard was a "specially dcs ignatcd global terrorist," despite its being
an o rgan of a state. (The "globa l" aspect a llows more far-reaching con-
trols.) In the National Mj litary Strategic Plan for thc War on Terrorism,
the definition is equall)' problematic, because it could clcarly apply to
states: "Extremists usc terrorism- the purposeful targeting of ordinary
people-to produce fear to coerce or intimjdatc governments or societies
in thc pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals. " 61 As Chomsky
puts it, the problem is that
You ro find a definirion thar excludes the rerror WI! out
against them. and includes Me terror that thl!)' C:Jrrr OUt US.

And thar's difficu lt. People hmc- rricd ro rrsrricr it ro subnarional

groups. But rhar doesn't work because rhey want to rallc: about terrorist
st:Jtes.n

T he a rgument trying to differentiate this is most dca rl}' made br Wilkin-

son, who between the force of a legitimate state; and the
uiolence of an unauthorized attack or an illegitimate sta te.63 As prob-
lcmatic as this clearly is, hinging on the notion of legitimacy, the United
States has a lso found itself isolatcd in relation to other stares concern-
ing the definition of terrorism. In 1987, for instance, it objected to U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 42/159, which put opposition to "colo-
nial and racist regimes and other forms of alien dom ination" in a dif-
ft'rcnt category, with a recognition of "the legitimacy of tht'ir
 IN I RODUC liON XXV

M.any states had overthrown oppression in the: name of indc:pc:ndencc,

and did not wish to ddcgitimizc othe rs in similar positions. Historic<1lly,
of course, such a description would fit the United States a nd its revo-
lutionary war" or "war of independence" (depending on which side of
the Atlantic you a rc on), but morr rocently, it would drscribc the situa-
t ion of many of the newly independent ex-colonies of European powers
in Africa and elsewhere. But in 1987, recognizing the distinctiveness of
the struggle of "peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign
occupation or other forms of colonial dom ination" could be used to
describe opposition to South Afric<l and Israd. And as Michael Kinsley
noted, thr United States has been here before, whrn in the HSOs it tried
to find a definition "'to explain why wr were supporting a guerrilla mme-
ment against the go\rrnmcnt of Nicaragua and doing the opposite in
El Salvador. "4
Seeing the difficultks in terminology and definition thrrdorc opcns up
a number of useful issues for a critical study. It explicitly rendrrs problem-
atic .Max Weber's traditional definition of the state as " that human com-
munity, which within a certain area or territory [GebietesJr-this 'area'
belongs to the featurc-(succcssfully) lays claim to a monopoly of legiti-
mate ph)'stcal violmce,''&S It does so in a number of ways-b)' expos-
ing the sovereign fiction that all states have this "'monopoly,"' challeng-
ing the idea that this ,iolence is only physical and always legitimate, and
explicitlr raising and investigating the territorial frame: that this operates
within.

The State of Territory

Turning attention to the question of territory also opens up a number of

questions. Territory is traditionally understood to be a bounded space
under the control of a group of people, usually a state. Interestingly the
term "territor}"' is sometimes used to describe an entity that has not
attained statehood. Britain a nd France, for example, have "overseas ter-
ritories" as legacies of their colonial and there arc: the "occupied
territories" of Palestine and \Vcstern Sahara. Frderal states operate in
similar ways: Australia's Northern Territory is not a full part of the fed-
eration, whereas Canada has three territories that arc not of the: same
constitutional standing as its provinces. Most states of the Un ited States
were labeled territories before becoming part of the union. and man)'
of its overseas possessions, includ ing Puerto Rico, retain this designa-
tion today. While the concentration here is on state territory, and the
state: of trrritory, these rxamples give an important insight into the term
XXVI IN I RODUC liON

itself, as territory is a precondition for statehood. Territory is a political

and legal term concerning the rel ation between sovercignt), land, and
people. A critical interrogation of the basis for the emergence of this
concept within Western political thought and its impositio n on t he rest
of the world is beyond the scope of this book, but some key issues can
be outlined.
The idea that political sovereignty is tied to land, and lhen to the
goods, resources, and people that occupy it, is a relatively recent notion .
It emerged in a recognizably modern form in the late Middle Ages, a
central prerequisite for the establishment of the modern state. Control-
ling large extents of land from a centralized location, a capital city, with
thc emergence of national economies a nd structures required a
whole ra nge of contexts and techniques that were not previously avail-
able. Territory is not mcrdy Iand-a political-economic relation of prop-
erty rights- although this is cle3rly important. Nor is territory simply a
political-stratrgic relation, a military srnse of terra in, though undoubt-
edly wars a rc fought ovrr territory, a nd territoria l control is one of the
indicators of success in this domain. Equally, ideas of territoriality, where
control ovrr land is seen as an innate human behavior either through bio-
logical drive or social nerd, is roo diffuse a concept. It lacks specificity
and analytic purchaSt' in ta rgeting the specific relation betv.'een place and
powrr that is the modcm state's sovereignty over its territory.
Ra ther, two other questions need to be taken into account: the law and
technical ability. The legal framework for the relation between territory
and sovereignt}' (from initial formu lations through early twentkth-ccnmry
attempts to secure this a nd the U.N. Charter, which provides
such context today, arc discussed more fully in chapter 5. T he technical
issues depend on a twofold q ucstioning of the standard definition of ter-
ritory as a " bounded space." \'(That is "space," and how is it bounded?
Space, as understood in its narrow, specific sense, ir. a particular determi-
nation of the materia l world that arises in the scientific revolution of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, understood as calcula ted and mea-
surable, extended in three dimensions. Rene Descartes provides the most
compelling indications of how this is arrived and he suggests that this
determination of the material world means that geometry is the science
that best allows us access to it. Advances in geometry at this time, such as
the coordina te or anal}'ric geometry pioneered by Descartes, which uses
algebra and equations, arc partnered by developments in and
land surveying and improvements in the accur ate measurement of time
through more advanocd docks, which allow longitude to be determined
more
 IN I RODUC liON xxvii

Thus, on this boundaries arc nor a primary distinction that

"s" "'territory" from ways of understanding
control of land, but a second-ordcr problcm founded upon a panicular
sense of calculation and concomitant grasp of Boundaries
existed at a of spatial and at many times, yet onl)'
states had particular to bound their land for political rather
than just e.conomic or strategic reasons, and only when they had tech-
niques to do so through any terrain, such as mountains, descns, or arctic
regions, did they assume significance ha\'e today. In other words,
only bc.come possible in their modern sense through a notion
of space, rather than the other way around. A properly critical
of territory to investigate the quantification of spacc and the
role of calculative mcchanisms in commanding of territory, and
cstablishment of
In much contemporary literature, initially inspired by Gilles Delcuzc
and Felix Guattad but detached from direct the
term "'deterritoriahzation" is uscd. Some ha\le seen this as demonstrat-
ing the lack of weight that territory has in a globalized world. Yet, as
and Guattari insist, is a continual process of
tion and retcrritorializ.ation. En other words, is an ongoing and com-
plicated rcconfiguration of spatial relations than thcir end. In mcir
book A Thousand Plateaus, claim that they arc "always connected,
caught up in another" and that dcterritoriaJization "always occurs in
relation to a rc.tcrr itorializtion. ..,.., Indeed. they this
point more forcdull}' they stress that territoriality itself is thc condi-
tion for changc.b9 Yet in spite of its name, should not
as an argument for the of me importance of territory.
Indeed, the reverse, because territory is both its cond ition of possibilit}'
and, in some newly configured form, its outcome. lbe continual
and reshaping of spatial relations may take on-indeed must
rake fo rms in times and places, bur this is not a
vision of a static world of fixed territories suddenly thrown into flux, as
it is in much of the literature on dctc:rritorialization ." Rather, the analysis
is closer to Neil Smith's claim:
hen before 9111 and the Afgh::m and Jraq wars., before the hardemng
of U.S. borders, it should have be.en obvious th::Jt wb::JteYer
the power of rhc gloool, much it now opcr-
::Jtes through gco-cconom1c mort" than geo-politiCal calculario n-ncvcr
rdinquisnes tcrmori.al defi nition. Powl'r is ncv<"r dctl'rmori.alizcd; n is
spccdic to particular places. Rdl'rrrtorinli:zation counters dt"ter-
ritoriahzarion at t"very turn. - 1
XXVIII IN I RODUC liON

This book draws on ongoing inro the history of me

state of territory, and uses the particular
rechnicaJ configuration of the late century as a lens through
which to "war on terror." It so in a number of ways
that challenge conventional political and academic -..visdom on the topic.
It critically the deterritorial of al-Qaeda, with its dif-
fuse nel\vork of contacts and operations, ytt supplements this discus-
sion br examining the territoriaJ bases of its actions and the territorial
understandings that puncture its actions and It there-
shows how the evrnts in New York and Washington, D.C., were
explicitly in Afghanistan, and how this trades
on arguments about the of weak or failed states. h examines how
particular geographie-s of fear, threat, and division play out territorial!)',
and how states that arc unable to govern within their territories
been recast as global dangers. is rhus a trrritorial dimension
both to the imaginaries of threat and the practices of retribution. It criti-
cally examines the way in wh ich Iraq's was understood before,
during, and after "major combat operations," with emphasis on
the United Nations and tl1e legality of the war, as well as the process of
reconstructing the country and its political system. [ t suggests that this
war, the ''war on terror" in general terms, and earlier " humani-
tarian interventions" such as Kosovo have had a profound impact on
the understanding of territory, specifically through me
term "territorial integrity. '" This is concomitant to
where new geographies, maps, and configu-
rations arc

Terror and Territory

The link betv.ccn "terror" and "territory" is more than merdy coinci-
dental. As writers such as William Connolly, Mark and Barry
Hindess argued, words ha"c a complicated andl related ety-
mology.' These concerns hinge on the Larin words that the English word
"'territor)"' derhes from. The standard claim is that .. territory" is formed
from Larin "land or terrain. '".J The land or the
rnrth sustains and nourishes the peoplc,"4 and even, in founding
myths, ga\'C birth to them, "Terra"' as land or is the straightfor-
ward and most common definition, and territory undoubtedly bears a
relation to these political-economic and politica l-strategic issues. But the
actual term from which territory is directly is the Larin "'tcrrito-
rium." The and meaning of this word itself is disputed. The
 IN I RODUC liON xxix

suffix "-orium'' is uncomplicatro: it means "the place of something,'" or

"surrounding something.'" The English words "sanatorium" and "crema-
torium," and the Latin "dorm itorium '' or "praetorium'' all work in this
war: the places of he.alth, death, sleeping, or the praetor's residence. If
the prefix is "terra,"' then "territorium" me.ans the place surrounding an
area, such as a town: the word is derived from two "spatial "' or locational
terms, "terra" and "orium.'"
However the Oxford English Didionary (OED} suggests that the
etymology of "territorium"' is:
Unsctdcd: usually taken as :1 dcri\'lari,rcl: of terra earth, kind (to which ir
was ccrminJy referred in popular Llarinl. when alrcrcd to terriitormm);
but the anginal fonn lte"iJorh1m] has suggested dcri11aric:m from l!!"ere
ro fn,ghten.- 1

The OED refers to two sources for this. One is Godcfroy's Dictionnaire
de I'attcienne langue which notes variant spellings of the French
antecedent tem1 as "territoire " (used in 1278), "terretoire" (1302 and
1303), and "terratoire" (1311). This is a term that Godcfroy describes as
an "extension of land form ing a political district ......, Thc s-econd sourcc
is Roby's A Grammar of the Lari11 Language, which suggests the fo rm a-
tion of territorium may indeed derive from terrue, and is therefore "a
place from which people are warned off. ..,,.,. The OED also dim:t& re-.aders
to a related term, "terroir," used in the fifteenth century but now obso-
lctc, which was based on a French term of thc same spelling that meant
either ''territory" or "soil." Similarly. the older French 'r'erb ''terrir" has a
range of me.anings from the earthy "trample underfoot'" or "make land-
fall," "atterir," but also to frighten:s Again, there is a relation suggested
lx-tween "terrere" and "'terra.''
There is therefore a possiblc direct linkagc bctwcen "territor"}"' and
"terror. ,. Terror, like "terri f)," is more nonproblematically derived from
"terrere." Using this logic, "territorium" would be a place from which
people a rc frightened, or where terror is exercised, as the epigraph from
Pomponius suggests. As Connolly argucs, this complicate<! set of relations
"insinuates a dim memory of violcnce into the bounds of territory. " "l'
Elsewhere, he has argued that "perhaps these two contending derivations
continue to occupy territory today. To occupy territory is to receive suste-
nance and to exercise ''iolcncc. Territory is a land occupied by violence.'"&'
For Hindcss, it means that "whilc terror may sometimes pose a threat
to the territorial order of statcs, the possibi lity that territor)' and terror
deri\'e from the same Latin mot suggests that it might a lso be an intcgral
part of this order's funcrioni ng. " R1
XXX IN I RODUC liON

as debates certainly we do not need ro rdy on this

suspoct etymological basis. More importantly, we can relation in
practice, too. Creating a bounded space is already a act of exclu-
sion and maintaining it as such require-s constant vigilance and
the mobilization of thre-at; and challenging it ne.('essarily entails a trans-
gres:sion.U ldebvre dc-scribcs the modem state in these ve-ry terms:
Sonrcignr:y implies "spJce," and whar is more ir implies a space
against which 'riolence, whether larcnr or overr, is dirccred-a sp:Jce
csrabhshed and consriwred b)' violence.... [\'cry smre IS born of
violence, and srarc power endures only b) \'irrue of violence directed
towJrds a space.... A violcnc,e , and connnuous ere-arion by
violent me-ans (by fire and blood, in B1smarck's phrnsc)-such arc the
hallmarks of the sr.ue.i>J

This is, in part, what Etienne Balibar means by the violence of borders
and the .,iolcncc beyond Elsewhere, Lefebvre claims that "vio-
is to political space, not onlr as an expression of (political)
will to power, but due to a permanent reign of terror .... gs This cannot
be seen in isolation from political and the of unification
whercb)' social practice is to the state and its States
arc territorial, ccrtainl}', but the territorial aspe-ct is not a mere container
for state action. control of territory is what makrs a pos:siblr.
Thus, control of territory accords a to the and
its spatial Those in control of
act in ways that those not in control of territory cannot
To control a is to exercise terror; to territorial
is to rxrrcisc terror. Whilr the first is obscurrd b}' the workings
of the system, the is continually rein-
forced by it, in that sdf-dctermination movements the world over (that is,
those that seck control of space currently held by a state) a rc
coded as The misnamed United Nations-a le-ague of states
or an assembly of gmcrnmrnts would be apt-is appcalro to as the
of such ln 1988, for instance, U.N. Sccre,t ary General
ja\ier Perez de Cuellar described the United Nations as an organization
of and said that it would be "against our philosophy to be
in touch with the rncmics of The continued insistrncc
of the Unitrd Nations on the idral of "territorial intcgrit}'"-that states
should have their existing borders and have exclusive- sover-
cignry within this link, The current international s itua-
tion, brought into specific focus in the "war on terror, exposes the ten-
sions within this term. For some statc-s, sovereignty, starr violence,
 IN I RODUC liON xxxi

and state terror is rendered problcmaric, comingent., ycr state tcrrirory is

supposed to remain unquestioned.

This book therefore interrogates the territorial aspects of rhe "war on

terror" twofold, both that it important territorial dimen-
sions, which arc palpable yet underplayed, but a lso that taking territor)'
into ac.count provides a scrirs of valuablr insights into t he "war" more
generall}' It rccognius that today, many people arc arguing for an under-
standing of political-spatial relations that gOC"s beyond territory, but it
counters this suggestion by showing that it is still a crucia l component
of state-spatial thinking and one that rhe international legal system still
privileges. As Brenner narcs, analyses oftc:n suggest that territory is an
either/or problem, with territory either bC"ing prcscnr or absent. "Conse-
quently, the possibilit} that territoriality is being rC"configurcd and rcscaiC'd
rather than eroded cannot be adeq uatcly explored. " 90 This book therefore
docs not aim to suggest that a ll configurations of power arc
nor that this .is the onl}' spatial scale of ana lysis. Rather, it demonstrates
that territory is an important a nd neglected issue that demands
intrrrogation. In doing so. it shows how a critical geographical perspec-
tive, informed by historical work on p<lljtical theory and the concept of
territory, can offer a challenging and useful perspective" on contemporar)'
events. It attempts therefore to sec how territory is onC' of the "constitu-
tive dimensions" of geopolitical struggle rather than "a staric background
structure. ""1
In interrogating the spatial logics of power and the sites of resistance,
the book is oriented around a number of questions. What arc the territo-
rial issues concerning "terror,'" both rhat of states and of nonstates? How
arc threats represented geographically in military and s.tratC"gic texts, and
what implications docs this have for the understanding of "terror''? What
is the contemporary relation between territory and sovereignty. especially
in relation to the legal term " tnritorial integrity"? How docs thinking of
"territor)''" as a topic of concern in itsC'lf provide an insight into contem-
porary geopolitics?
Thus, this book seeks to uncover the logic and grammar of contem-
porary geopolitics and to insist on the spatia lity of the globa l condition
in examining the hegemonic politics of the post-Cold War period. In
making this anal)sis, thC' book continually aims to opm up a widC'r con-
text for understanding the specifics of thC' "war on by suggesting
that many of the territorial issues and tensions have a range of histori-
cal antecedents. In this, it directly opposes Richard Perle's notorious sug-
gestjon that "terrorism must be dccontextualiz.cd. " 93 Ail Gregory argues,
xxxii IN I RODUC liON

"Terrorism cannot be reduced to circumsta nces; but neither can it be sev-

ered from them. " !U The usc of historical material. explored most fully in
chapter 5, raises an importanr point. This is that the "war on terror" is
taken to be an intensification of pre\'ious trends-<>ne that makes explicit
what has previously been implicit. rather than making a radica l brC3k
from the past. Temporally as well as spatia lly, the "war on terror" encom-
passes a wide terrain.
 CHAPTER ONE

Geographies of Fear, Threat,

and Division

Replacing Terror

It did nor take long after the e\rnts of September 11. 2001, for the United
Stares to work out who was going to pay. Flight transcripts were examined
that day, and on the register for American Airlines Flight n were Khalid
ai-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who were known to U.S. authorities as
members of aJ-Qaeda. Even had this very obvious linkage been ltnavailablc at
the time, many of the examinations of available intdligence have made clear
that warnings had boen made. Ron Suskind notC'S a number of thCS(' instances
and suggests that President George W. Bush had a tendency to rdy on his
ability to judge experts as his basis for making key decisions. "At an eyeball-
to-<:yeball intdligencc briefing during this urgent summer [200 1]. George W.
Bush seems to have made the wrong choice. He lookod hard at the panicked
CIA bridcr. 'All right,' he said. 'You've covered your ass, now.""
Gi-.,en the way that the: nc:nts played out in the media, and given
responses to prnious attacks, it seemed inconceivable that the United
States would not respond in some fashion, and man}' expected it to lash
out very quickly. Indeed, when told by Ddense Secrctary Dona ld Rums-
fdd that force could not be used for retribution bur only as a pre\'entative
measure, Bush said, "I don't care what the international lawyers say, we're
going to kick some ass."'' Other commentators joined the chorus. One of
the more sober, and therefore inherently most worrying. analyses was that
of Henry Kissinger, fo rmer secretary of &tate and National Security Advi-
sor. Kissinger suggcstod that the goal was to "destroy the network":
An arrock such as yesterday's requires plannmg, :.1 good
organiun1on, a lot of mone)' ond a base. You cannot impro11ise
2 GEOG RAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREA I. AND DIVISION

something like this, and you cannm plan Jt when you're constanrly on
the move. Heretofore our rC"sponR to attacks., and understandably so,
has been to c-.ury out somt" act that was s.uppcsc:d ro
the scales whde hunn"g down the :1crual peopk who did ir.
This, is an ::m.ack on the" territorial Unired State-s,. which is. a
thrC"at ro our roc1al wa)' of hle and to our C'Xisrencc: as a frC'C' society. lr
thC"rt"fore has to bt" dea lt w ith m a different wa)'-wlrh an arr;.1dt on the"
system that produces lt. 2

There is a telling recognition of the logic of using preYious responses as

retaliation-for example. Libya under Ronald Re.agan and Sudan, Iraq,
and Afghanistan under Bill Clinton-which is illega l under international
law. The stress on the "base" a nd the recognition that this is not an entirely
mobile adversary is crucia l in terms of what actions would follm'>'. So too
is the suggestion that there is a fundamen ta l difference between previ-
ous attacks and this one, which was "an arrack on t he territorial United
States." Though that swiftly shifted into one which is a threat to a way of
life and a society. the territoria l stress is important.
Kissinger then made a number of moves. He suggested that the response
should be against the "system," which he described as "a net\.vork of ter-
rorist organizations sheltered in capitals of certain countries." The diffuse
network is locatable, he argued. He bemoaned the way that existing U.S.
policy maintains normal relations or docs not actively punish states that
shelter these organizations. Then, in a paragraph of casual case, he dis-
pensed with straightforward ideas of causa lity or responsibility:
We do nor yt"t know whe1her Os.ama bm Ladt-n d]d rhis, alrhough it
appe:1rs ro h.we r.he eannarks. of :.1 bin laden-4:ypc operation_ Bur any
that shdrc=rs groups capable of th1s kmd of attack, whether
or nor rhey C:Jn lx shown to havt" been m\olved m rhis. mu!>r
!XI)' an c=xorbmtnt price.l

Bush too agreed that this action had to be more than pounding sand," 4
criticizing Clinton's 1998 snil::cs on Sudan and Afghanistan. as well as
Operation Desert Fox against Iraq. The conteA't of that time was. of course,
shaped b)' the manufactured scandal around Monlca Lewinsky, with much
criticism that the response was a way of ddle.cting attention from Clinton's
domestic problems. This produced very different kinds of r"Cacrions.
Afghans apparently began to call Tomahawk missiles "monicas."s Others
saw this as a crude and macho response. But in the light of September 11,
2001, Bush claimed that it actual!)' showed "the impotent America . .. a
flaccid, you know, kind of technologically competent but not vcrr tough
country."' l11is was, therefore, not nearly effective enough for Bush, who
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION 3

declared that "when [take action, I'm not going to fire a two-million-dollar
missile at a ten-dollar empty tent and hit a camel in the butt. h's going to
be decisive.... -
A number of mmes were thus made. On September 12, Bus h said
that "the deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday
against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war."
The definition of this conflict is significanr. The smercignry of the United
States was profoundly challenged, and a sovereign response, a
was needed. This was to brand the acts, and the response, as a rvur: either
the "war on terrorism" or the (global) "war on terror." The term "'war on
terror" seems to have been finally settled on in Bush's speech to the joint
se-ssion of Congress on September 20, 1001. This term was deemed prob-
lematic befordtand. e The naming of this event is certainly erratic, fluctu-
ating from a war on, or against, "terror" (a state of bodr and mind) and
"terrorism" (the actions of states, groups, or individuals), and has been
redc-scribcd at various times as the "long war'' and a "struggle against
violent extremism. ''9
As Weber puts it, U.S. supremacy is partnered by its being "supreme!}'
vulnerable, " 10 and thus it is perhaps not surprising that a demonstration
of American weakness require<J a show of American strength. But war
was not the only option, although it is one that has both marked the polit-
ical nents that followed and has regularly characterized U.S. projections
of its power. Indeed, in a fumbling speech made on the day of the attacks.
Bush declared that he had " directed the full resources of our intelligence
and law enforcemelU communities to find those responsible- a nd to bring
them to justice," suggesting a rather differem responsc:.' 1 a judi-
cial response had been the reaction to both the: 1993 World Trade Cemer
attack and the USS Cole attack. But the very next words of the September
11, 2001. speech demonstrated bow this was likely to proceed: "we will
make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and
those who harbor them." As Bush's sometimc:-speechwriter David Frum
suggested, "with those words, Bush upgraded the 'war on terror' from
metaphor to fact. "' 2
The collapsing of the disti nction between those committing an act and
their spatial location enabled the move to target states, to locate: the: "war
on terroL" n Regardless of the terrorists' e-stablished positions within the
United States and other Western states immedia tely before the attacks.
the intention was to find suitable places in which to respond. Sovercignt}'
over territory became both a priYilege and a liabilit): a privilege for domi-
nant powers who imoke it as legitimation for self-defense; a liabilit}' for
states that have nonstatc actors operating within their boundaries. As Vice
4 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION

President Dick Cheney expressed it, "in some ways rbe states were easier
targets tban the shadowy terrorists." 14 Even though September 11, 2001,
differed from Pearl Harbor in tbat the Uniteti Stares was not attacked by a
state in the former incident, it did not take long to shift thC' focus. Osama
bin Laden and ai-Qaeda were named as primary suspects on September
15, 2001. and it was a short step to position ai-Qaeda in Afghanistan,
although there was an immediate struggle in the Bush administration as to
whether this indeed shou ld be the first target or whether this provided the
opportunit) for outstanding scores to be settled with Iraq.U A putati\ely
detcrritorializt"d thrt"at-the netv.ork of netv.orks of ai-Qaeda global
Islamism'-was therefore reterritorialized in the sands of Afghanistan
and, later, Iraq. for Benjamin this was torrured logic:
Like the drunk looking on the wrong side of the srreet for the keys he
dropped on the 01her side bemuse ''rhe light 1s lxner over here" rhe
United St:.ncs prefers the ir o n locate and vanquish ro the rerronsiS
ir o nnor t:\cn

In tbt" short tem1, Afghanistan was to win out in tht" U.S. search for a tar-
get, with an immediate demand that the Taliban shut down tht" terrorist
training camps. Not meeting this demand left the Taliban vulnerable as
harborers, a situation that is analyzed in more detail in chapter J.
YC"t at the same rime as it began its plans for a foreign response, the
United Stares also rcstrucmrcd its domestic spatial politics. This was the
notion of " homeland security," first a policy and then later a new depart-
ment of the federa l go\ernment. 19 The Bush administration thus imposed
a rigid reinforcement of the territory of the United Statc:s itself. As Gregory
put it, this was ro assert the importance of "a national space," by dosing
its airspace, scaling its borders, and contracting itself to "'the homeland. "20
Thus both the enemy and the home to be protected arc located, placed.
On the foreign front, we have one kind of assertion of sovereignt)', where
the relation between state and territory is questioned; on the domestic
sidC", there is another, wher'C the increased securitization of borders is rcin-
forccd.1' There is thus a forced double Yet these policies, as well
as the boundaries between the fo reign and the domestic, arc increasingly
blurred.
Yet as Brimmer suggests, "'Homeland should bc- more than
just about defending territory.. .. Safety depends not only on territorial
integrity, but also on 'societal sccurity.'"' 11 The idea of "social"' or "soci-
etal" security, not simply in the sense o.f prott"Cting rbe population from
the conscqucnCies of illness, injury, or unemployment, but more broadly
concerned witb securing the socia l body of the nation, led to a range of
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION 5

legislation. Capitalizing on the bipartisan unity within tbc: United States,

a grant of spe-cial powers was made to the: president on September 14.
2001. As Suskind notes, "it so happened that administration lawyers
had for months been incubating theories about how to expand presiden-
tial power. "H The initiative for this espe-cially came from Cheney, who
thought presidential power had been unduly limited since the Nixon era.
On &ptember 14, the presidem was empowered
ltlo ust" all nc-cess:Jr)' and nppropriate force: ngainst those n:1t10ns,
org;miz.:Jtions, or persons he planned, nuthonzed, commit-
ted, or aided the terrorist att:Jcks that occurred on Seprember 11 , 2.00 I,
or hnrbored such organiz:Jtions or persons, to prevl'nt any fumrl' acts
of international terrorism against rhe United St::nes by such n:uions,
org,;miz.:Jtions, or persons.M

Extc:mallr. then, the president would not be: limited. The linkage betv.c:en
nonstate groups and the: sta tes they inhabit is fomlalized. Yet Suskind
notes that the: administration pushe<J for this clause to read, "to usc all
necessary and appropriate force i11 the United States." This would, he: sug-
gests, cffecti\'dy "'grant war powers to anything a president deigned to do
within the United States. Senators shot that down. That would be without
precedent. A resolution passcd in tbc: Senate by a vote: of 98 to 0 and in
the House by a vote of 420 to 1. '" !J
The passing of rhe USA PATR]OT Act prmrided a much more pcrmanenr
basis for these scc:mjngl}' "extraordinary " powers. 26 Thjs act further under-
lines the strict scclUitization and tcrritorialization of the U.S. homeland. Yet
The Century Foundation, for instance, said more: needed to bc done:
9/11 rerrorist armcks higlllighred rhe facr th:n our borders and
ocrons are nor effecrive barm:rs for rerrorisrs w ho plot ro ::mack wnhin
U.S. Wl1ile Aml'ric:Jn soldiers cominue ro in conltins
overseas, few sncrifkes have undertaken ro reduct" vulnerabilines
ar homl'.rr

While the idea that the anacks of September 11, 2:001, wcre conducted
by tcrrorists because: they hated our freedoms is palpably absurd, it has
bcc:n a powerful Civil liberties group& have: pointed to tbc
irony that many of the mo&t prcciou& fre-edoms of Western &ociety, such
as the right not to be deuincd for extended or indefinite periods with-
out charge or trial, ha\c: been profoundly compromised in the responses
to those attacks. These compromises have been made both at home and
abroad. Many critics of the "war on terror" have: made this somc-
timcs suggesting that the angry response of thc West may actually bave
6 GEOG RAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREA I. AND DIVISION

been part of the terrorists' intention, a nd that this brings into the open
foreign policy actions that had previously been hidden a nd renders visi-
ble the repression that is part of the everyday violence of the state. As
Eagleton puts it, "the more \'(festern society reacts to terrorist assault
with a n answerable illegality, the more it drplctes the very spiritua l and
I resources which it its.df to br protecting... 29 In this wa)',
thr response is as much of a Joss as the act it is responding to. Yet as
Ncoclcous has comincingly a rgued, st'Curity is the fundamenta l category
of libera l socict)', a nd the opportunity given by the attacks merely one in
a long list o f rationales. 30
A number of rhrmrs rhus arise in the ways that particular geographies
of threat, and division have been proposed, outlinrd, and worked
through in the "war on terror." Thrsc ways of depicting a nd dividing the
world arc not especially new. While there has bt'Cn no shortage of a rm-
chair generals drawing the maps for the "war on they arr actually
trading on a much longer hcritagr, one that dates back a t least as far as
the latr 1980s.
Thus, this chaptrr looks a t a numbrr of ways in which the post-Cold
\Var ,.,orld has been mapped by security analysts. It begins by briefly out-
lining the a nalyses. of Francis. Fukuyama, Huntington, Zbignkw
Brzezinski, and Robert Ka plan. It describes the territoria l aspects of the
Projec t for a t'\ew Crntury (PNAC) and shows how these link
into the st'Curity strategies of the Bush administration . It then provides an
account of the writings of Robert Kagan and Thomas Barnett, looking at
the implications of thr spatializ.ation of the world 's current gropolitical
sta rr and its attendant da ngers. Finally, the chapter looks in more drtail
at how Bush's. intrntion of making no distinction betv.'Ccn terrorists and
those that harbor them has enabled a move to target states; how the prop-
osition of " with us. or against us" establishes particula r geographies. of
integration and opposition; and how the "'axis of C\'il"' predicates. a series
of potentia l comparisons and connections . All of these exceed the straight-
forward binaries that they arc often assumed to entail and have important
territorial implications. Not least, the conflation of terrorists with those
who harbor them explicitly rcterritoria lizes the putatively dcterritorial-
izcd threat. This leads. into the next chapter, which a nalyzes the territorial
strategies of Islam ism itself.

Cartographies of the Post-cold WtJJ' World

Toward thr end of thr Cold War, a whole range of academic and popular
commrnta tors brgan attempts to make srnse of the politica l geographies
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION 7

of the world order." 6 Tuathail has describro this as a ''geopolitical

vertigo," 3 1 where understandings no longer made and various
\vriters have tried to map rhis disorder. In the face of a
of certaintr and a reterritorialization was needed, a new geogra-
phy. Without lines of opposition, poli-
ticians and analysts alike looked for and intellectual moorings.
Four of these widely discussed and criticized arc wonh noting.
The first is Francis Fukuyama, essay End of Histor)?"
with fortuitous riming in 1989 .n B}' 1992, shorn of the question
mark, it had expanded into a book The End of History and
the Last Mau.3 l Fukurama, as is now widely known, suggeste<l that with
of the superpower conflict of the Cold War, was no longer
any esscn6al contest at level of regarding the ideal structure of
political society. Western capitalist democracy had warded off var-
ious and was now ''only
game in town." There would continue to be regressions and conflict, of
but in major history had come to an
The scrond is Samuel Huntington, who argued that instead of a past
clash of the would be a "clash of civilizations. " Like
Fukuyama, his initial artic.lc was posed as a question: the book as a
34
Huntington a number of broadly geographical!}' defined
ci..ilizarions in world and oudined the potential conflicts to come.
While his analysis is crudely suggesting that Islam is a "single
cultuJal political category, " 35 Huntington was not a lone in this analy-
sis. Huntington's phrase was from Lewis, 36 whose work
on Islam has proven important to in the Busb admin-
istration.}- AI-Zayyat has suggested that tbc: was one: that starred
in the West, with forme r U.S. president Nixon suggesting that the main
enemy would be !sla m, and NATO's simi-
lar things. suggests that as a consequence, Bush's usc of the word "cru-
sade'" on September 16, 2001, was not a in that it bought into
particular .logic of tbis confrontation, and that these sentiments had
echocd by Tony Blair.>J
Both Huntington and Fukuyama influential, althougJ1
work was subjected to criticism, both at the and since.
Fukuyama became an important w ithin right-wing debates in
1990s America, being one: of signatories of the PNAC, an organiza-
tion further discussed later in this chapter. H His theories of the supremaqr
of models of economic a nd political systems a link to
imposition of democracies today. September 11, 2001.
and a rguablr before, H untington's prognosis has become a popular
8 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION

media shorthand fo r the: conflict taking placC'.40 As Arjun Appadurai

suggests:
This is primordahsm wirh a rn acrogrographio l oose. It ignores tlte
vast amount of glob:! I inrcracnon between c:ivihz.arional :1rcas, it erases
the di:1logucs and debarcs wirhm regions. a nd ir deleres
overlaps and hybridines. In a word, it cvacunres history from culture,
leaving only geograph)'. The world appcnrs as a large seri es o f slowl)'
moving culrural glacit"rs, wirh sharp c:onrr-asrs at rhcir boundanes and
lirrle \'Micry within. This spanaliz.arion of culrurt', painrcd m large
srrokes in the rrope of ci\'disations, a lso opens rhe door to 3 dangu-
ous c:oll3pse of relig1on., culrurc :1nd race m Hunnngron's argumenr .. .
H untington's error was to conflate messenger and message and ro map
this complex inro a realist geoJ?,raphi cal picrurc of acrual, phys-
call:lnd masses which were st"Cn 3 S the homes of anragonisric cl\'ihza-
nons. Especially in the case o f Is lam, this is 3 c:osdy error b<-cause it
feeds, perhaps uni nrennon all), rhe spanahzcd fanras it"s. that led George
Bush and his ad,>lsors ro rry ro localize AI-Qacda m :\fghanisran and
decimate a cell by t'r.lSing a landmass.

Thus Fukuyama concentrates on history, or what he terms " History, "

ignoring geographica l Spt".cifidty did Hcgd, a nd, a rguably. Marx, in
their broad sweep accounts of human progress), whereas Huntington
buys inro a modC'rn variant of geographical determinism, ignoring his-
tory, along with much else.
The third of these commentato rs is the former National Sccmity Advi-
sor to President Jimmy Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinskj had, even
in the late 1970s, begun tile strategic proc-ess of pla nning for American
supremacy, and his thinking is arguably as importa m as what happened
during the Reagan and first Bush administrations in terms of shaping the
geopolitical cmrironment:n It was Brzezinski whose actions had helped to
fomen t instability in Afghanistan by a rming the enemies. of the pro-Soviet
regime. Brzezinski had suggested to Carter that " tilis aid would induce
SO\'ict military interYention" a nd t hat when thc:y d id intervene', "we can
give the U.S.S.R. its own Vietnam war. Sncral years after leaving
office, Brzezinski articulated his ideas in the book The Great Chessboard,
which offered a series of cartographic representations of the new global
security, which thcmsclvC's linked to a much older linC"agC' of gcostrat-
eg)', such as Halford Jt.t ackinder a nd Nicholas Spykman. Two of Brzezin-
ski's rC'presemarions a rc particularly worth highlightir1g: "the global zone
of percolating violencC''' 44 and " tile critical core of Europe's Sccurity. ''41
Yet Brzezinski dis misses ideas that his actions le<J to the contempora ry
 .. .

Bm:zl- zane a1
pelllllll.hg--"(19!11)

-
oar ,.IliMn ponr..yea .,,..,
N\:lllmal Yllory Pion
- ftlr Ihi> WIJJ an T..ncr.IITI lr.dng
(JIIill Cl11eft. DI Sild' 21m)

Cartographies of ltle post...Cold War world

10 GEOG RAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREA I. AND DIVISION

situation. He: suggests that Tali ban arc insignificant compared to ''the
collapse of the Union," and that is. no such thing as "'a global
Islam," but rather a whole range: of coumric:s that have nothing
more in common than "Christian countries.
The fina l writer to be: discussed here is Robert Kaplan. In a 1994 article,
expanded into a book in 2001, Kaplan spoke of "the coming anarchy. " 4 '
What would characterize the post-Cold War world was neither a settled
debate concerning political structures nor vast hegemonic blocs facing off
against each other. Rather, there would be sporadic conflict, violence, and
disorder dispersed across the world and lacking any significant unifying
cause: or focus. Kaplan discussed what would today be called " rogue"
and "weak" or "failed'' states, and this hclpcd many to make sense of
the "new wars" of the 1990s in Somalia, Bosnja, Rwanda, and elsewhere.
Clinton apparently had a copy of Kaplan's 1994 article faxed to U.S.
embassies across the world. These ideas gained popular Cltrrenq through
the depiction of wars and U.S. interventions in films like Black Hawk
Down and Behirtd E11er1ty LineJ:n Kaplan argued that there was a .. bifur-
cated world," part of which was occupied b}' Fukuyama's Last Jvlan, and
part of which was a disintcgrated zone of Hobbesian chaos :"
\'(13r-m.aking enrims will no longer be resutcred m a specific temmry
... Loose and shadowy org:.misms such as Islamic rerrorisr organisa-
tions suggest why borders wi ll men n increasingly lirrle nnd sedjmentttr)'
la)ers of rribalisric idemiry and conuol mean more.... Imagine 3
c3rrography in rhree dimensions, as 1f in a hologram. In rhis hologr3m
would be rhe O\'erlappmg sc:dimc:nts of group and orher idenrit1es arop
rhe merely two dimensional colour m3rkings of city-smrc:s and rhc:
remaining narions, rhemsd\es confused m places b)' shndowy rent..1cles,
hovering 0\'erhead, mdtcaring rhe power of drug C:Jrrds, mafi:Js and
privarc: securiry 3gencic:s. lnsre3d of borders., rhere w1ll be mming
-cenrers" of power, as in rhe Middle Ages. l'\'bny of rhese la)c:rs would
be in mocion. Replacmg lixed and nbrupr lines on 3 Aat spacc: would
be 3 shiftmg pntrc:rn of buffer entitles. ... To rhis prorro n
hologram one must add other factors, such as m1g,rarions of popula-
tions. explosions of birrh mres. vecrors of d isc:o1se. Henceforward rhc:
map of rhe world ,vjJJ ne\er be s.uric. This future map-in a sense:. rhe
-Lasr .lvlap"-will be an e\'er mumring represcnrarion of chaos. 10

It is clear how much contemporary of ai-Qacda trade

upon this logic. Like thos-c- readings, Kaplan made usc of a range of racist
and imperialist tropes of "primitive: sa\'agc:ry" and animalistic " liberation
in violc:ncc." 1 1
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREA I. AND DIVISION 11

Kaplan's argument works in at least two tc:rritorial registers. There is

a challenge to accepted territorial distinctions, where previous, borders no
longer hold or prcvcnr danger. Threat spreads, ro it must be contained. In
the face of this dctcrritorialization, there must therefore be a rctcrritorial-
ization of the power of the: state. Bordc:rs neal to be protected, rdnforccd,
or erected, and the apparatus of the state takes on an even more
role. Kaplan has written a number of other smdics,, and has travcled across
the globe, especially to "problem" areas, to imestigatc these stiiJ further.
Somc arc presented as travelogues, others as political commentary; mos,t arc
a bit of both. These ha\'e included studies of places such as the Balkans, the
M.iddle East, West Africa, Central Asia, and the Caucasus,u and Imperial
Gmms, a study of locations whcrc U.S. troops arc dcployed.u The chapter
titles of this book bear the names of U.S. military-gc:og:raphical commands,
such as CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM. Even bdorc September 11,2001,
Kaplan found his influence on the \Vhitc Houst"'s thinking wouJdl continue
with the new administration. Mnfson recounts how Bush read Eastward to
Tartar)' at Camp Da,id in carl}' 2001, and tbcn invited Kaplan to tbc White
House to discuss its idcas. 14 In a 2006 piece cntitlc:d "'The Coming Nor-
malcy?" on U.S. occupation in Iraq, Kaplan sees the potential for creating
a scmblancc of stability through continued U.S. involvement in the: region,
suggesting that "except for the collapse of Turkey's empire, thc creation of
the state of and the Iranian revolution, nothing and nobody has so
jolted the Middle East as has George \YI. Bush. " fl

"In Search of Monsters to Destroy"

ln the 1990s, during the two Clinton administrations, out-of-office conser-

vatives and otbcrs began to plan for a funtrc Republican administration.
Drugs, "'rogue statcs'' with weapons of mass destruction, and the insta-
bility caused b)' "failed" and "weak'' states were the llCW enemies thC)'
mobilized against in their geographies of fear, alongsidc marc traditional
enemies such as a rising China. Although there were a number of think
tanks, the IPNAC became particularly influential. This is partly of
the figures invohed in its foundation, including Chcney, Rumsfdd, Paul
Wolfowitz, and Zalma}' Khalilzad, who all took on major roles in the
Bush administration, along with Bush's brother Jcb and former Vice Presi-
dent Dan Quayle.
In addition, PNAC included figures such as William Kristol and Robcrr
Kagan, who werc associated with tbc conscrvatilc magazine The \Veekly
Stat1dard.s Tbcy arc traditionall}' labeled "ncoconservati,c,'' wbicb had
12 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION

originally largely bc-C"n a term used to describe a particular kind of domestic

politics, but now largcl}' indicates an approach to foreign policy.>- There
is a dose relation between neoconservatism and neoliberalism, with one
content to operate in a political realm and the other in a broadly economic
realm. Harvey has suggested that the difference of neoconservatism from
nco liberalism is twofold: "'fint. in its concern for order as an answer to the
chaos of individual interests, and second, in its concern for an overween-
ing moralit> as the necessary socia l glue to keep the bod}' politic secure in
the face of external and internal dangers. " 58 If this sounds like the politics
of the New Right under fo rmer British prime minister Margaret Thatcher
and Reagan, a program Andrew Gamble memora bly summari:z.cd as '' the
free economy and the strong state, this is not coincidentaL Howe.,er,
some commentators have suggested that the term "neoconservative" is
misleading, suggesting that it is used to describe a disparate group of
largely unconnected thinkers and that "if you ever read a sentence that
sta rts with 'Neocons bdic\'c,' there is a 99.44 percent chance everything
else in that sentence will be untrue."' 60 Nonetheless, there is a certain uni-
fied purpose, par ticular ly in terms of PNAC's initial "Statement of Prin-
ciples," to which many of them signed up.o
The arguments PNAC would make hark back to July 1996, when
Kagan and Kristol wrme an essay for the inAucnriaJ journal Foreign
Affairs entitled "Towards a Nro-Reaganite Foreign Policy. ""1 j ohn
Quincy Adams had declared that America ..goes not abroad in search
of monsters to destrO}', "'fJ but this essay takes the exact opposite line:
America sltmlld go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. The rca-
son, according to this argumenr, is that the consequences of inaction arc
wors.c: than war:

The: alrernati\c: is ro lc:3ve monsters on rhc: loose. ravaging and pillag-

ing ro their hc:arrs' conrc:m.... Whar may ha,rc: been w1se counsd in
I 823 (siC], when America was a small, 1solarro power in a world of
Europc:nn giants, IS no longer so, w hen Amc:ric3 is me: giant. Because
AmericJ. has the capacit)' to conta in or destroy many of the world's
monsters, mosr of wh1ch found w1rhom much sc:Jrching, and
rhc: rc:sponsibdiry for the JXace and security of the inrc:rnarional
order rc:sts so heavily on America's sho ulders, a policy of sirring arop a
hill and lc:3d ing by exampk bc:comc:s in pract1ce a policy of cowardice
J.nd dis ho nour.fr.l

We can sec in this essay the germ of subsequent policy, in rhe idea that
the United States should actively seck out conflict, dcaJing with issues that
emerged as tlJey emerged, or even trying to anticipate future problems.
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION 13

The geographical net should be thrown wide, as it is in the follow-up

edited \'olume Presmt Danger.s.iD The aim shouJd be to spread "bcne;o-
lenr global hegemon>' ''M
The arguments were not simp!}' forged in oppmition, however. Thq
bear dose rdation to a text written in the last year of Bush the father's
presidency. This was the 1992 "Defense Planning Guidance." The first
draft of this was written by Wolfowitt and Khalilz.ad, fo.llowing an ear-
lier review of the U.S. military after the first Gulf War, but was deemed
to be too controversial.- It was rewritten, in style if not in substance, b)'
I. Lewis ''Scootrr" Libby for Key themes rrmerged in a rrport
Khalilzad wrote for the U.S. Air Force. 9 Among othrr things, the rrport
urged the United States to "show the leadership nm:ssary to rstablish
and protect a new o rder that holds the promise of convincing potential
competitors that they need not aspire to a grcatrr role or pursue a more
aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interrsts." In this, it was not
mcrdy content for thr United States to be in a dominant position, but it
needed to ensure that it remained unrivaled. While some of this might
be done b)' persuasion that these possible rivals' rational interests would
be best served by following the United States, there was a need to "dis-
couragr them from challenging our lrndership or seeking to overturn the
established political and economic order ... [or) even aspiring to a larger
regional or global role."71l
PNAC accordingly called for the United States to recognize and embrace
its unrivaled position as global leader. It proposed "a Rcaganite policy of
military and moral clarit>;' suggesting that though it "'ma}' not
be fashionable today . .. [it) is necessary if the UnitC'd State's is to build
on the successes of this past ce-ntury and to ensure our security and our
greatness in the ne).'t. , -. PNAC a imed to provide the- intdle.ctua l justifica-
tion fo r the Unitrd to usc power. both in terms of influence but
also potentially its military force. But this not merely be: reactive;
rather, it should anticipate and preempt problr-ms before they become
fu lly realized. As they suggest in their Sc-ptemlx-r 2000 report Rebuildi11g
America's De{e11.ses, .. the history of the 20th century shouJd have taught
us that it is important to shape circwnstances before crises emerge, and
to meet thre-ats before they becomr dire. n Smith claimed that Henr}'
Luce's famous t 941 editoria l for Life magazine. "The AmC"rican Century,"
masked its spatial, territorial ambitions through a temporal aspiration.-!
Following this, Ha rvey has suggested that PNAC "deliberately repeats.
therefore, all the e\'asions that Smith exposes in Luce's presentation. "-4
Yet Luce's piece had explicitly argued that "tyrannies may require a
largr amount of li\'ing space. But Freedom requires and w ill require far
14 GEOG RAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREA I. AND DIVISION

greater lhing space than Tyranny. "'.5 So too docs PNAC make explicit its
territorial agenda.
PNAC sets out to establish four core missions for U.S. miJitary fo rces:
Defend r.hc Homeland;
Fighr and dcclsl\'dy win mulnplc, ma1or wars;
rhc "consTabulary,. durics associarcd with shaping se<U-
riry t'nvironmcnr in crincal rcgjons;
Tr:1nsform U.S. forces ro cxploir rhe re,olurion in mllimry

Thr spatial imaginary of these propositions is pronounced. PNAC says

that the aim of the United Statrs should be to "sr.('ltre and expand zones
of democratic peace; deter rise of new gre.at-power competitors; defend
key regions; exploit transformation of war.''- During the Cold War, there
was the potential for a "global war across many theaters," but now the
preparation has to be for several "potential theater wars spread across the
globe,"' which may need to be fought against "separate and distinct adver-
saries pursuing separate and distinct goals ... U.S. troops therefore need
be present "in critical regions around the world" as "the visible expression
of the extent of America's sta tus as a superpower and as the guarantor
of liberty, and stability.""'ll This "cx:pande.d"' understanding of U.S.
security means that its forces "provide the first line of ddense in what may
be described as the 'American security perimeter' ... [which] since the
collapse of the Soviet empire ... has expanded slowly but inexorably. " 80
Thus "the cavalry on the new American frontier ... must be positioned
to rdle.('t the shifting strategic landscape. " 81
Thus PNAC's ana lysis trades on demems a lready found in Fukuyama,
Huntington, and Kaplan, among others. The United States needs to
ensure that a common defense and security policy in the European Union
docs not weaken U.S. influence, and that the rise of China is a peaceful
one. nercfore. certain (probably more subtle) forms of power need to
be used in those areas that arc already part of a network of global, politi-
cal, and economic cooperation. Other forms of power need to be used
in those places requiring intervention. These arc variously described as
"'threats,"' as "zones of instabilit),"' as " rogue states," as. "states. of con-
cern," and as "globa l hotspots." Thry must be targeted and dealt with,
both to sohe those problems and to ensure that they do not spread chaos
or disorder to the a lready-existing zones of economic cooperation and
democratic pcace. This now becomes a new narrative to make sense of
U.S. forrign policy since the demise of the So\iet threat. Rogue states,
the "'war on drugs," and militant Islam can be scripted into a coherent
story. u
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION 15

The influence that PNAC had was astonishing. As Irwin Stelzer

suggests:
At irs peak, PNAC had four and an budgn of about
$400,000. Irs imdlectually congenial :\mc:riC::Jn Enterprise lnstltllrc: has
sixty-h\'C: scholars fellows and annual of about $ 18 million.
The smaller Hudson Institute l which I Opc'mtc:s
dfrivd) with a budget of less than !8 milhon. The: more: libc:ml
mamstream Brookmgs Institution has about 150 scholars, an endow-
ment of $200 miJhon and an :utnual budget in the neighborhood
of 540 million. Add ro that the: enormous budgets of rhc: lefr-lc.1 ning
incl uding Harvard's John F. Kennedy School-the ho me: of
ol power" alternative to neocon policies-and we
have: a tffi1moniaJ m of IQ and to trump
the: superior financial resources ol their polrtical opponents.13

This is, of courst", disingenuous. The number of figures associated with

PNAC that had been members of tbe Reagan or the first Bush adminis-
trations a nd the number that would take up offic.e with tbe administra-
tions of the second President Bush demonstrate that it is not merely a
question of cmployet"s and budgets. Rather, the relations arc closer to
what William Connollr has described as " the evangclical-capiu list rt"So-
nance machine," a series of networks and contacts that arc often informal,
rarely explicit, and emergent and resonant rather than straightforward ly
cfficicnt.84 Indeed, PNAC reali:z.cd tbat they were unlikely to immediate!}'
affect foreign polic}', noting that "the process of transformation, even if it
brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some cata-
strophic and catalysing event- like a new Pearl Harbor. " 1 3
PNAC was not content simply to shape the intdle..ctua l climate of for-
eign policy discussions. Rather, they urged the United States to intervene
actively. In 1998, for instance, they signed a letter to Clinton suggesting
that he act decisively agai nst the threat Iraq posed with its weapons of
mass destruction. This was a question of ''the most fundamental national
st"Curity interests of the country," and they exhorted bim not to "accept
a course of weakness and d rift"' that would "put our interests and our
future at risk.''8 " Following the election of George W. Bush in late 2000,
thqr had a more re.ceptiYt" government-inde-ed, \Volfowitz wrote tbt"
1998 letter- and September 11, 200], provided the "catalyzing evenr."
On October 1, 2001, " An Open Letter to the President," published in
The \Veekly Staudard and signed by a lmost a ll the key PNAC figures not
actually in tbe Bush administration, urged a wide approach. 8 " They sug-
gested that captuJing o r killing bin Laden and destroying "his network
16 GEOG RAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREA I. AND DIVISION

of associates" should be "a key goal, but by no the only goal." Its
proposed next step was Iraq, suggesting that:
E\ren 1f evidence- docs not link lrnq dirccrly ro the au:1ck, any strarcgy
aiming at me emdication of rcrrorism and 1rs sponsors musT include
a determined dfon ro rcmo\e Saddam Hussein from power m Iraq.
Failure- ro undermke such an dfon w1ll consrirure an early and perhaps
decisl\'c surrender in me w:1r on intcrnarional rerrorism.x1

This was closely followed by the urging of action against Hcrbollah and
its "state sponsors" in Iran and Syria, and a rdusal to assist the Palestin-
ian Authority until they "put a stop to terrorism emanating from territo-
ries under its control and imprison those planning terrorist attacks against
IsraeL "n It also urged large increases in defense the enlisting of
other countries' aid, and economic and financial measures.
An open-ended script for the "'global war on terror'' was dearly c-twis-
agcd. Rumsfdd had urged his staff to "Go massive. Swee-p it all up. Things
rdatcd and not," suggesting a grand narrative for future US. policy.90
Bush had declared to Congress on Septembe r 20, 2001, that "our war
on terror bcgjns with al Qacda, but it docs not e-nd there. It wiJl not end
until every terrorist group of global rcach has bc-cn found, stopped, and
defeated. ., Against Adams's warning. this was an open call to find mon-
sters abroad continually. This is positioned not as a choice, but as an
injunction. Ddensc budgets arc justified because of these enemies; enemies
must be found to justify these defense budgets. As Chcrnus notes. "since
monsters must always be found to threaten our we must live in
a constant state of terror and national security. '" ' 1

This is intentionally ambiguous in terms of its aim, allmving the- Unite-d

States to launch new attacks or declare victories at will. No e-xternal means
of validation exist. Even broadl}' sympathetic U.S. commentators have
found fault with the broad scope of these policies. A report for the Cen-
tury Foundation, headed by Richard Clarke, former counterterrorism chief
to both Bush and Clinton, suggeste-d that should be clarity that the
threat is not 'te-rrorism,' or C"\'en all te-rrorist organizations, but rather the
jihadist groups who seck to hijack Islam and usc violence to replace existing
democracies with theocracies."1'2 On some level this makes
sense:. YC"t, looking closer at the- states under threat demonstrates some-
thing rathe-r difbcnt. the states being opposed by Islamic movements
actually democratic? Iran is suggested to have been a successful takco\cr,
along with conte-mporary challenges in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pak istan, and
lraq.9 l We might add Indonesia and othe-r states in Southeast Asia to this
list. To what c.x.'tcnt arc- any of these actually There arc partial
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION 17

exceptions in certain periods of Pakistan's history, and an optimist could

try to argue the case for Iraq today, but Iran under the Shah was unq ucs-
rionably a dictatorship, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia fail ro meet man)'
"Western standards" today. Yet they do share one key criterion, which is
that they art' U.S. allies, dependent on its aid and armamt'nts.
In the 1990s, Kaplan outlined a world where oldt'r, more traditional
canographics of S<:curity arc thrown into question by chaos and disorder.
This has been a dominant understanding ever sLncc, and has been used
to makt' sense of the post-St'ptembcr 11 world. In a ..,aluablc anal}sis,
Emmanuel Todd t'Xposes tht' "myth of universal terrorism" and shows
how the: media have bCt"n complkit in the construction of "the image
of a world organized by hatred and ravaged by 'r'iolence, a world whert'
the massacre of individuals and whole peoples occurs at an accelerat-
ing Yet while the threat is geographically diffuse, source loca-
tions can be continually found. This is through the linkagt' of thrt'at to
states, whetht'r in themselves or as "harbors" or "safe havens." The U.S.
National Military Strategy makes this explicit, in that it "will work to den)'
terrorists safe ha\'t'n in failed states and ungoverned As chap-
ters 2 and 3 will show, the usc of the term "safe haven " is revealing here,
as it parallels idt'as of humanitarian safe spacc:s.116 Such language was pro-
nounced throughout the strategies published by the Bush admin istration.

StrategJes agaJnst "Contagion"

One of the dominant ..,.,ays in which the problem of terrorism has been
dt'picted has bct'n through metaphors of disease andl infection. Kaplan's
"shadowy tentacles" and "ever-mutating representation of chaos" give
war to ideas of breeding and swarming. Bush suggested that "ddeating
the militant network is d ifficu lt, because it thrives, like a parasite, on the
suffering and frliStration of Blair declared in a spcrch to the
U.S. Congress that:
The r.hrc::Jt com5 b<:causc:, m another JY.lrr of rh.c: glob<:, dtt'rc: is shadow
:1nd d:1rknc:ss wht'rt' not allrhc: world is frc:e, whc:rc: many millions
suffc:r under brurnl dicurorship; where: a rhird of our planc:r li v5 in a
pO\'C:rr)' beyond anything c:vc:n the poorc:sr in our socieries c::m imagine:;
:1nd whc:rc: :1 f:Jnntical stm in of rdig1ous c:xtrc:mism h.as nrisc:n, that 1s
a mmation of rhe true: and pc:acdul faith of Islam and beca use: in the:
combination of thc:sc: afAinions.. a new and dc:adl)' virus has c:mergc:d.
The: virus is rc:rrorism, w hose: inum ro inAict destruction is uncon-
s.trainc:d by human fcdml?,; and whose: C:lJY.lCity to mflicr It is enlarged
by tc:<hnology.
18 GEOG RAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREAI . AND DIVISION

This 1s a that can't be fought or won only by annies. are

so much more in ::111 con\'enriono l ways the
even in a ll our might, we ore taught humiliry. In rhe end, It is nor our
power alone that w1ll ddeat this evil. Our ulunl3te weapon is not our
guns but our bebefs.YI

This ".,irm"-a "strain,"' a " mutation," "these afflictions"-is one that

needs medical operations to erad icate. Richard N. Haass, now president
of the Council on Foreign Relations and previously director of policy
planning in Colin Powell's Stare Department as well a member of the
Carrcr, Reagan, and George H. \Y.l. Bush administrations, has elaborated
upon this at length:
:\norher way of looking ar the challenge is ro view international terror-
ism as analogous to a terrible, lethal ' 'irus. Terronsm hves as pan of
the environmem. Sometnnes dormant, somerimes it is always
presem in some form. Like a virus, international terrorism respects
no boundaries-moving from country to coumry, exploitmg global-
ized commerce and commumcarion to spread. h can be panicularl>
malevolent when it can find a suppornve host. therefore need to
rake appropriate prophylactic measures or home and abroad to pre\ent
terronsm from muJtipl>mg a nd check it from infecnng our soc1eties
or damaging o ur Lives. \Tie need, for instance, better border control
regimes and improved international counrenerronsm cooperanon
across rhe board. We also need to make sure th:u the does not
mutate inm somethmg e11en deadly through the acquisition of
nuclear, bJOlog1cal, or chemical wc:o1pons of mass desrrucrion_
The cha llenge of terrorism is thus akin to fighring a ' 'irus Ln that we
can accomplish a grc:-.ar deal but not eradico1te the problt<m. can take
steps ro pre\renr rt, protect oursel\es from it, and, when an outbreak
occurs, quar.annne it, mimmiz.c: rhe dnn1::1ge 1r inAicrs, and attack it with
.all our power_ the ultim::ue goal of our campa1gn is progress
through the steady accumulation of sm:cc:ssrs. Patienc,e and
persistence wiJJ be rhe warchwords for this campaJgn _Y!

Others. have spoken of "the h}dra of jihad." 100 though Benjamin and Simon
quote an unnamed Pentagon official who suggested that although ''they
keep likening [ai-Qaeda] to a snake .. . it's more like a dcadlr mold."'' 0 1
For Ruthrn, trading on Mao's remark that communism was a fish that
needed "sympathetic waters." "'terrorism can be likened to a pest or a
parasite, such as the mosquito, which needs stagnant waters or a swamp
to breed in. Drain the swamp. clear t he waten, and the threat will be
reduced, if not climinated"'' 102 With regard to Iraq, even one of the prowar
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREAI . AND DIVISION 19

commentators admitted that there was always a danger of "crc<tting a new

swamp in which terrorists could actually brec<J and flourish." 101 As chapter
4 will show, in a sense they crc<tted this problem out of the intended solu-
tion to a different one.
The usc of metaphorical language concerning d isease and infection is
certainly not new. Truman famously used the metaphor of a rotten apple
in a barrel to showcase the dangers of a single state going communist and
"infecting" its neighbors. Yet even critics have dcplo>ed sim ilar language.
Chomsky has suggested that U.S. fuiiUic in Afghanistan has "spread
ai-Qacda all over the world, like a c<tnccr. "o.t Cooley sees the problem as
a "contagion" which, in the chapter tit les of his book. "spreads,. to Egypt,
the Maghreb, tbc Philippines, and then finall)' to America on September
11, 20Q1.10S
Since that date, the United States has published a series of strategies
that outline its vision of response to this threat. There have been security,
defense, military, counterintdligencc, and homeland sc-eurit)' strategies,
and strategies to combat terrorism and weapons of mass
Many of the ideas have a direct lineage to the writers so far d iscussed, and
at times straightforwardly adopt PNAC phrasing or ideas. In the preface
to the National Semrit) Strategy, Bush dcclarc<J:

In a world th:u is safC", pc:opk will bC" abiC' to make: rhc:ir own li\'C'S bct-
tc-r. We- will ddc-nd the: by figtuing rc:rrorisrs :md tyrams. We- wi ll
prc-sc-r\'C' the: pe-ace- br building good among rhc- grc-:u powe-rs .
We- wall c:xtc-nd rhc- pc-act." by e-ncouraging frC'<! and opc:n socic-tac-s on
conri nc-nr. IIY'

Pc.acc is here seen both as an achic\c:mc:nt but also something territoriall}'

defined. Some parts of the world arc at peace and should be defended and
preserved; other parts of the world need pcaoc extended to them. oQJ Inte-
gration is about geography as much as values, democracy, and capitalism.
Bush's preface similarly sees the interconnection of a world.
Russia is seen as a partner politicall)', economically, and in the struggle of
the "war on terror." China is seen as making economic progress, with a
hop<' and expectation that "in time. they will find that social and political
freedom is the only source of national greatness." io-> But the key claims arc
those that arc unsurprising given prnious rhetoric:

The- Unite-d Srarc:s of America is fighting a wa r ag,ainst tc-rrorisrs of

global rC"ach. The: C'nC"m y is not a sanglc: rc:g,imc- or pe-rson or
re-ligion or ide-ology. The: e-ne-my is tc:rrorism-prc:mc:ditarc:d,
violence- pc:rpc-rrarc:d agamsr innocc-nrs .. . no c<Just." justlhC'S
20 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION

terror. The United Srnres will make: no con.a:ssions to rc:rro ris r demands
J.nd srrike no deals with th em. We make: no disrincrion berwc:en terror-
ists ond those who knowmgly h.arbor or provide a id to

In addition, there is repetirion of the argument that prc,rious boundaries

arc blurred: "Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs
is diminishing. In a globalize-d world, eents beyond America's borders
ha"c a greater impact inside them ... ,., The Strateg)' for Homeland Defense
aud Civil Support is even more explicit that the United State-s can "no lon-
ger mink in terms of the 'home' game and the 'away' gamc. Therc is only
one gamc." 112 For Cooper, this is a dircct cons.cquence of globalization,
which has eroded "the di:stim:tion between domestic and foreign events,"
and thus makes interference- that used to take place only in "unusua l cir-
cumstances" more common. 113 At least two moves arc being made here.
The first is that "home" needs to be treated as "away; to recognize that
threats can come from within the continental United States rather than sim-
ply from outside. This is in part a recognition of the failures of September
11, 2001. The second is that "away'" needs to be treated as "home."li1e
United States needs to recognize that the rest of the world is as much its
concern as the fifty states; it needs to securc and exrcnd the zone of demo-
cratic peace and globalized markets and pursue strategies of integration
and, where necessary, intervention. Other claims from tl1e stratcgies will be
cxplorcd in more detail dscwhcre in this book: the continual invoking of
the we-akness of some states and their inability to dc.al with nonstatc thrc.ats
in chapter 3, the particular references to Iraq in chapter 4, andl the wide-r
territorial and sovereignty issues in chapter 5.
To make sens.c of the situation the Un ited States currently finds its.clf
in, some commentators have tried to fuse clements of the Fukuyama,
Huntington, and Kaplan analyses. Some parts of me world share a con-
sensus about the way to organize themselves politically alld economically,
while others do not. Some parts of the world arc thus open to U.S. trade
and sympathetic to its politics, and hence pose it no threat. The European
Union is clearly parr of the same system, even if it fails to understand the
United Stares and its role in the world. Parts of it might support the United
States, whHe other parts may not-Rumsfcld's division between "old" and
" new" Europe being one attempt to label this.' 14 Other parts of the world
(such as China) arc broadlly congruent in terms of contemporary interests,
c..en if they may well be a mrc.at in the future. China is playing a long
game. Other parts of the world arc full of chaos and disorder. Elements
of this kind of analysis can be found in the writings of PNAC cofounder
Robert Kagan, who suggests an incommensurable differcncc between the
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION 21

United States and the European Un ion in terms of how ro deal with the
contemporary global situation. 11 5 The European Union has moved into a
"post-historical paradise," insulated from events ar1d llOW existing in a
kind of Kantian "perpetual pcaoc." The United States, by contrast, has to
operate within a wild Hobbesian world, one of perpetua l war, and remains
"mired in history. "''h Kagan suggests that Europe is unable to act and as
a consequence sees war as undesirable, but it is at least as likely that the
reverse is true: Europeans have reduced their armies bec<Juse of their lack
of appetite for conflict. For Kagan, though, the United States and Europe
were dfectivcly oc.cupying different worlds, in terms of their perception
and response. The United States needs to intervene in the chaotic parts of
the world pre.cisdy to secure and ensure the European model of thC' future.
Because of its particular role in these areas, the United States is forced to
operate outside the law, and the European Union should not impose its
unrealistic moral and political standards on it. As he puts it, "among our-
sches, we keep the law, bm when we arc operating in the jungle, we must
also usc the laws of the jungle."..- This move is a clear indication of the
logic behind U.S. securit}' strategy and practicc. 118
A further anal)sis is the suggestion of a "'connected" and "discon-
nected" world under globalization, an imagined geography where reo-
nomic disconnection is ,iewed as a securit}' issue-a threat.
Although the relation between the globalized \'(fest ar1d the noll-integrated
rest of the world can be viewed quite differently, such a division has impor-
tant geopolitical consequences. Take New York Times columnist Thomas
Friedman, on the one hand:
If one rhing srnnds our from 9111, it's fact that the tcrrorm:s ongi-
nart"d from the least globali7-Cd, Lr-asr leasr in regrated corners ol
the world: in namdy, Saudi Yemen, :\fghanisran, and nonh-
wesr Palnsran.'"

In contrast, the: official 9/11 Commission concluded:

Amt"rica stood out as an objt"Ct for adm1ranon, l"rt V>', :md blame. Th1s
created a kind of cultura l aS)'IJlmerry. To us, Afghanistan sc:cmt"d very
far away, To mc:mbt"rs of al Qaeda, Amc:rica sc:emed ver)' dose. In a
sense, rhey more globalized than we wcrc.llJI

Although they differ on this point, both arc intent on inscribing a par-
ticular geopolitics of division. one that functions tC'rritorially. Friedman,
especially in his best-selling book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, ' 21 offers
an account of the globalizrd world where everyone desires a Lcxus,
compared to people fighting over olive trees . The world of tradition is
22 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION

as backward to globalization.ll olive arc a

particular symbol of the Palcstinianllsracli conAict, of but they
arc a lso about territory, who controls the resources of sc.arc,e and ferti le
land, and the division which the Israeli wall or has marked
more clcarly. m A similar logic is found in Friedman's 2005 The World
Is Flat,' 2 which suggots not that the world is not round as much as it
is not vertically stratified. This ideal of world as flat or kvc:l is both
description and prcs<:ription. where those \'ertical that remain-
barriers in all senses-need to to aid the free flow of ideas.
And yet some barriers-notably those that might terrorism-
will either remain, be or bui lt. The 911l Commission
report dissents from some of Friedman's analysis of the extent of glo-
balization, but it agrees that it presents new threats and allows to
more rapidl}'
The most detailed of these ideas is found in the work of Thomas
Barnett, fom1cr director of the New Rule Sets Project at the U.S. Naval
College, and then Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Department of
Defense. In an initial and then a book-length he dis-
cussed what he called "the new map. The map shows a
world with a "'functioning and gap"; that is., those
countries that share American values and can seen as part of a global-
ized world, espcciallr the global economy, and those that do not share
those valuo and arc not part of the global system. In this map,
"disconnection defino danger," in that places unconnected to global
systems arc the places where problems will arisc.J.o Barnctt provides two
maps of the world ro illustrate claims: one is a picture of the globe's
physical gcograph)' in two halves, with a dark "stain'' over the
center, across the and north and south to \'arious dis-
tances, taking in the East, Asia, and the Balkans; the
is a map of locations where intenention has taken since the of
the: Cold War. intcr.cntions include both combat and peacekeeping
missions and a range of operations between them. Around these" a
dotted line is drawn-a lasso around the problems of the world. stain
and lasso enclose the same areas.
Barnett sars that this map makes of the strategic incoherence of
the: Clinton years- the various in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
and Kosovo. It fits with the initial deployments of the "war on terror"
in Afghanistan and Iraq, Somalia. Yemen, and Lebanon and hdps under-
stand and predict the future. It bears rdation to the ideas of Brzezinski.
These serve an purpose and fit a wider strategy.
While they reactions to particular states of affairs, they a lso part of
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREA I. AND DIVISION 23

a wider picntre, the rc:alizarion of "'the opponuni[}' to make globalization

truly global. "' 127 Barnett thus claims that the aims of the "global war on
rerror" and the doctrine of prccmprion are part of a wider project and
should be "!mbordinatcd to the largcr goal of spreading economic glo-
balization around the planet." This new grand strategy of integration
into globalization's rule sets is the "historica l successor" to the Cold War
strategy of conrainment. 1l.8
States that fai l to pla}' "by the security rules we hold dear-like 'Don't
harbor transnational terrorists within your territory' and 'Don't seck
weapons of mass desrruction'" 'l.\1-require intervention. Their sovereignty
is no longer absolute but nrcessaril)' C"Ontingent. The wider lessons and
benefits can now be seen more "9/H was an amazing gift-gs
twisted and crud as that smmds. [t was an invitation from history, albeit
one: with a horrific price tag." 130 This is the momcnt of the creation of
"a new international sr.curity order, .. 131 and the actions of the Bush gov-
crnment need to be seen in that contcx't. The stratcg)' is one of not just
"growing the Core but shrinking the Gap as wcJl": otherwise. the prob-
lems will spread from the gap to the corc."l U.S. interventions in iraq-
both in J99 J and 2003-and Afghanistan were not interstate conflicts,
bur were dfr.ctivdy tl1e United States acting in the interests of the "inter-
national community."' While rhe confl icts may be personalizedL-Saddam
Hussein or bin Ladcn- Bamelt claims that "the danger isn't a who but a
where. " UJ Yet this is not a problem area that can be contained, because it
is not that there is an inside and an outside, but rather a gap inside, in the
intrrior. The only option is to reduce the gap. This is a strategy that will
e-qually take time: "Since there is no cx:iring the Gap milirari ly, there is no
such thing as an exit strategy... IJ.I
Like Kagan, Barnett sees a distinction between the Kantian world of
"perpetual peace" and the Hobbesian state of nature as chaos. The Kantian
world is that of thr core: the Hobbesian world is the gap. T hur. the United
States, although part of the cor'<= itsdf, "'ncc:ds special consideration for the
security roles it undenakes inside the Gap. In dfcct. we don't want fel-
low Core members appl}ring their Kantian rule sets to our behavior inside
the Hobbesian Gap." The justification is both that the United States is
"globalization's godfather, its source code, its original model," 134 but also
rhat nobody dse is willing to risr to the challenge. The United Nations is
"toothless," Russia "feeble," Europe "barely united,'' and China merel)'
"rising. '" 3 - We thus have a gcographically separated world: part at "'per-
petual peace," part in a state of "perpetual war." As well as providing a
new cartography of conflict, Barnett suggests that we need a new Pentagon
to go along with this new map," effc.ctivdy requiring "t:v>o militaries: one
24 GEOG RAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREA I. AND DIVISION

to figh t wars and one to wage peace. " 138 OncC' more trading on metaphors
of disease and cure, Barnett suggests that the situation is stark:
One of us musr die. Eather t he Core :.usimii;U(S the Gap, or the Gap
divides the Core. Either lhe forces of connecoviry pre\ail or rhe dictarors
of disconnenedness mr1ve. This cancer either spreads or we exrerminare
it. There as no t":Oting the Gap; there is only shrinkang rhe

Barnett has developed the claims of his book furthe r in what hC' calls a
Blueprint for Action.'.w These ide.as arc revealing in terms of the geopoli-
tics of the "'war on tcrror"-the spatial imaginary of spreading libera lism,
Bush's "freedom on the march," and Barncu's vision of imcgrating the
world, of shrinking the Gap. 141

The "With" and the "like'"

Bush's speeches immC"diatdy aftcr Scptcmbcr 11. 2001, made it clcar that
thcrc would be no distinction made, nor entertaine-d, betwccn those who
committed acts of terrorism and those who supported them:
America has a message for the nations of the world. If )'OU harbor ter-
rorists, you are terrorists. If you rrain or :urn a rerrorisr, you are a ter-
rorisc If you fet"d a tt'rrorist or fund a tt'rronsr, you'r<" a rnrorist, and
you will bt" hdd accountable: by the Uni ted States and o ur friends."!

Lines have dcarlr been drawn hcrc. As a number of the pronouncrments

analyzed in this section makC' clrar, Bush's administration wanted to
demarcate, to establish clear guidelines for action and criteria for coop-
eration. Yet the lines drawn in these speeches arc not nc.arly as straightfor-
ward as is sometimes claimed; nor arc thrir effects so easily policed.
ThC' claim of making no distinction bctwern thosc who acted as terror-
ists and those who harborrd thrm was, in parr, Bush's own. The previ-
ous draft had rcfcrrcd to those who permitted, tolerated, or encouraged
them..u Thus, for some, this principle is thc Bush Doctrinc. 14<1 For the
la\\'}'Cr Michael B)rrs, this has become part of customal'}' international
a dcepl)' worrring o utcome. Yt"t rhc: policy of not harboring terror-
ists is longstanding in U.S. foreign policy, with the Unitcd Statt"s abstain-
ing in a U.N. censure motion against Israel's bombing of Tunis (where
the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization were in exik} in
1985, a lthough the administration had joined the rest of the U.N. Secur ity
Council in condcmning thcl r earlier bombing of the Osira k nuclrar reactor
in Iraq in 198l.'.u Terrorism and nuclcar proliferation- at that time, and
in a complic.ated set of a lliances between Israel and Iran, and between Iraq
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION 25

and the United States---seemingly called for diffnent responses.. Reagan's.

secretary of state, George Shultz, had daime<l in 1986 that "it is absurd
to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in
international waters o r airspace; from attack ing them on the soil of other
nations, cven for the purpos.c of rescuing hostages; or from using force
against statrs that support, tra in, and harbor terrorists or guerrillas."'r-
Ciinton in 1998 had suggcste<l that "'wc w ill us.c our new intcgrated
approach to intensify the fight against all forms of tcrrorism, ro capture
terrorists no matttr where they hide, to work w ith other nations to elimi-
nate tcrrorist sanctuarirs O\'t'rscas, to respond ra pidly and dfoctivelr to
protect Americans from terrorism a t home and In addition, in
late 1989 the Unite<l Statcs invadrd Panama under a notion of "extraterr-
itoriality" to apprchend General Manuel Noriega, wanted on drug traf-
ficking charges, but also, cruciaiJ}', to protect passage through the Panama
Canal. Lxtratrrritoriality hrre is itwoke<l in the sense that actions affect-
ing U.S. citizens, business interests, or national securit}' abroad lcgitimate
action as if it had happened at home. This is a recurrent thrme throughout
the "war on terror."
One of the key ways in which thc more nebulous understanding of
"harbor"- which seems to stretch to include any kind of support-is
gi\rcn more rxplicit spatial rdation is thc idea of a "safe haven." This can
be at home, as e\'idenced b)' Attomcy General John Ashcroft's admoni-
tion to Congress to pass the PATRIOT Act in order "to send a message
to terrorists that they will find no safe haven in But it is
much more common as a way of drscribing a situation abroad. Bush's
September 20, 2001 speech to Congress made this dear: ''\Ve will pursue
nations that provide a id or safe haven to t('rrorism. '' 1$0 The home and
abroad distinction, betv.een domcstic and fore ign, again bocame blurred.
As the 9/11 Commission put it:
911 1 has taught us char terronsm agamsr Arnencan mreresrs 'o\'er
there .. should be regarded 1usr as we reg;ud terror ism against America
"o\'er here." In this same sense, the _.\ merican homeland is the
planer. 11 1

The global pretensions of the United States will be rrturned to through-

out this book and given particular focus in the com:lusion. But the kqr
point is dear: the United St ares must prote.ct its own tcrritory and sov-
ereignty at a ll costs, which necessarily wi ll require it to sec territorial
sovereignty everywhrre else as cntird}' contingent. Wolfowitz pledged
that "it's not just simply a martcr of capturing people and holding
them accountable, but rrmO\'ing thc sam:tuaries. remming the support
26 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION

systems, ending states wl10 sponsor terrorism. "sz Once again, then, it
allows the mo\e to target states, such as Afghanistan, [raq, Lebanon,
Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan. Bm it also demonstrates a crude equation
of the dissimilar. A process of cooption, connection. and incorporation
of disparate dements into a unity that can then be dealt with in a s ingu-
lar way, or a process of comparison. This tactic is something that char-
acterizes some of the other fundamental phrasing of the "war on terror"
lexicon, beyond that of making "no distinction'' between terrorists and
those who "harbor" them.
Two seemingly straightforward words-''with" and " like"-function
as mechanisms of incorporation and integration. ]f we pay attention to
how these words actually function in a couple of speeches by Bush, we
challenge the idea that the "war on terror" is predicated on straightfor-
ward binaries. The first of these words is "with." ]n a number of speeches,
but notably in the September 20, 2001, spcc.ch to Congress, Bush made
the judgment that "either }'Oll arc with us, or }'Oll arc with the terrorists."
He returned to it at various times: "The doctrine that says, 'Either )'Ou're
with us or with the enemy,' still holds. It's an important doctrine. It's as
important today as it was 13 months ago." m Many ha\'e been quick to sec
this as a straightforward dhision into two camps. Arjun App.adurai, for
instance, sees this as a way of turning the world "into a list of supporters
and detractors, ayes and nays, supporters and opponenrs of what became
the names of an ominous global enemy: terrorism, terrorists. " 114
For Domke, it was an "archetypal example of an either/or construction
of rcality."'ss Domke suggested that "the Bush administration offered a
conception of political reality that emphasized binaries, an unbending
form of thinking and language that people, institutions, behaviors,
and ideologies into opposing 'camps. "' 11" Indeed Rudolph Giuliani, for-
mer mayor of New York_ turned this phrase into a more straightforward
division when he dcdared:

There is no room ior on rh.c issue of terrorism. You're either

with el\iliurion or warh te.rrorasrs. On o11c side as democracy, rhe rule
of I::Jw, respe1:r for human Iife 0 011 the other is l)'l"::l nny, arbiuary
exutaons, murder_ We're right and rhey're wrong. h 's as
simple ::1:s

Bin Laden's October 7, 2001, pronouncement on a world di,ided between

faith and infidclit}' also suggests such oppositions. 1ll The idea of "us"
and "them" in the "war on terror" has therefore received some careful
anal)'sis.m and the media a rc undoubtedly complicit in the production of
this particular vicw.0
 GEOGRAPHIES 0 1- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AN D DIVISION 27

The idea of a dear divide of sides would appear to leave no space for
indecision or an active decision of neutrality. For Byers, "it obviated a cen-
tral aspect of state SO\'ereignty-thc right not ro be involved-and rocast
the United States as the ultimate arbiter of right and wrong."'"' Some
nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations thought that this
kind of formulation denied them the independent space that they tradi-
tionally attempt or claim ro operate within.l For Chalmers Johnson, it
was clearly intended to resonate, for at least some of Bush's audience,
with the Bible verse Matthew " He: that is not with me is against
me."' u Domke has suggested that Bush's "consistent rhetoric about the
'war on terrorism' being a divind) ordained undertaking forced political
opponents and the public into an undue position: they were either with
the Bush administration or aga inst God."' 104 for Benjamin and Simon,
this requires us to decide "whether we want a strategy for this conflict or
a theology.''s
Yet it is a more phrasing than generally acknowledged,
and we: should nor find binaries where are there arc none. To Bush, it is
not simply "us versus them," but us, a of operating along-
side, or, in the words of Blair, "shoulder to shoulder.,.,..., It thus demon-
strates a more subtle set of divisions and incorporations than is general!)'
acknowledged. It is offering at le-ast three terms: us; those "'with" us; and
those '' not with" us. Standing "shoulder to shou lder" with Bush docs
not form a unity, in that they become part of a collective "we"; rather, it
seems to be about incorporation, or integration-a bringing together. In
some respects, there is a theological resonanc-e, "with" as a communion,
literally coming wgether.- The rdated phrasing of "'with the terrorists"
introduces another term, although the distinction between ''the terrorists"
and those "with" them is deliberately much less finely drawn.
Much has been written about the notion of "we" as the fint-pcrson plu-
ral pronoun of indefinable extent. \'(fho is included and who is excluded?
But here1 there is not simply a cooption, in that Bush's "we'' or ''us" begins
to include others that might previous ly have been excluded. Rathcr, thcre
is a "we'' that refers clearly to the United States }'Ct remains nebulous and
questionable, and then a diYision of evcryonc clsc in terms of their rela-
tion to that first term. The "with" or the "against" in this phrase func-
tions as means of association or disassociation with an unproblematicall)'
defined first term. To be seen "'with"' something dse. most essentially as
a mode of being alongside or being together is a complicated issue, cspc-
ciallr when worked through in terms of a political community. How do
indi\ridual discrete units-proplc or states, for instance-first get posited
as discrete, and then how can they be grouped together so that they can
28 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION

lx treated as a whole or a unit? In other words, bow can things be made

sufficiently similar (if not the same) in order that they can be summed and
aggregated? It is only when there is sufficienr simiJarity to allow compari-
son that there can be difference. tt.J We would do well to remember here
that identity and differ'Cnce arc not opposite terms, but that d ifference is
the play between the opposites of identity and non-identity. It would be
unfortunate if identity/difference became the new binary. Endorsing and
reversing Connolly, tbere is no identity without difference; there is no
difference without identity.
In terms of the notion of "against" and opposition, what exacrly docs
it mean to be against something? Is it that something is so dissimilar that a
process of comparison becomes impossiblt, or that something is irreconcil-
able to shared norms of identification or bclmior? Politics is far too often
understood effecti'lely as a polemic, which derives from the Greek work
pQ/emos, meaning struggle. The jurist Carl Schmitt argued for a view of pol-
irks predicated on tbe friend/enemy distinction, and both conservative and
liberal commentators ha\'e willingly accepted this.':'() Politics on th is under-
standing is about recognizing who your enemy- polemos in Greek-is.
Yet pokmos need not be understood in such a way. For Hcidegger, it can
be understood as related to agort, wbkb is a less "'iolent model of struggle.
Heideggcr therefore somC"timcs translates polemos as Auseina1rdersetzrmg,
a seuing-apart-from-another, a mode of disassociation. 171 In addition, as
Drucilla Cornell has pointed out, there is a profound ambiguity about
another pronoun invoked. This is not the first-person plural of "we," but
the third-person plural of "'they... Cornell argues that .. Why do they hate
us?" i.s a question founded on ambiguity, with no definable object.":!
It is not surprising then that the principal forC'ign policy and security
strategy shaping U.S. foreign policy today is one that can be described as
a of integration, of bringing countries into line with U.S. accepted
and criteria, of making "tbem" more like "us." AI> Haass
dC'clar ed in 2.002., anticipating an argument made by Barnett:
Is :1 successor idea lo I dunk there IS. Iris the
of mrc:gr.uion. The I of U.S. foreign policy should be ro persuade
the omer major powers to sign on to cenain !key ideas as ro how rhe
world should oppos:inon ro terrorism and pons of mass
destruction, supporr for Ire<: trade, lnregrarion IS
J.bout locking rhem inm th= poJic1es and tllen building institutions
that lock them in c:ven more.1" 1

Elsewbere, he has madC' it clear that the foundation of this wider system
is "integrating new countries and peoples into the global economic order
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION 29

so that they can reap its rewards instead of being left behind." n This is
a change from his earlier position in The Reluctant Sheriff, where he had
argued against Wolfowitz's idea of expanding the "democratic zone of
peace." ,-j Haas!> has become more hawkish, with his newer ideas much
closer to Clinton and Anthony L3ke, for whom the successor doctrine to
containment was "engagemen and enlargement."'-6 As Appadurai notes,
this drawing of lines cffc-ctivcl)' functionC"d as a diagnostic war, but not
merely in terms of identifying an enemy. [tis the choice that is made into
a binary, not the identiC)'. 1_,. In addition,
It sought m identify the: supporters of t he: United Stares and the: United
Kin gdom; forcc:d Europe and to declare t herr loyalties; and
made many fen-s itr<."rs fall on the srde of t he Umrc:d Srntes, wihate\'er
their resc:rvaric:ms. This was a plebiscm: ca lled b)' the mighty U.S. war
machme and absr<."ntions were not permitred. 1'll

The other main phrasing to examine is tht" notorious "axis of evil"

spee-ch, Bush's January 29, 2002, State of the Union address. The phrast"
"axis of evi l"' was, apparent!}', original!)' a n "axis of hatred" (David
Frum's phrase ), but was changed at the last minutt" to one" of more obvi-
ously rdigious and moral resonance b}' Michad Gerson.''? This spC"ech
provoked much criticism a nd commentary. Iran, Iraq, and North Kort"a
were explicitly named as problems requiring U.S. attention, a pparent!)'
in part bC"causC" three soundC"d bcner than two."10 These duee arc not
entirely sur prising, sinct" a picce written by future National Security Advi-
sor and Secretary of State" Condoleez:z.a Rice earlier in the election year
of 2000 for Foreign Policy had pi npointt"d them as tht" three key "rogue
regimes," and they were frequently featured in analyses of such statcs. 181
A Rurnsfcld memo of early 2001 bad joincd thC"sc: three to Russia and
China as "investing in capabilities that explo it provocative lapses in U.S.
capabilities. "' 12
Some havt" qut"stioned the metaphor itself. For PC"ter Galbra ith, "tbe
phrase rdlccted poorl)' on its author's knowledge of geometry and history.
An axis is a straight line between two points. North KorC"a, Iran, a nd Iraq
could not form an axis. " 11:.1 This seems to miss the point entircl)' because
the historical rdcrcncc is to the Axis powers of \'(Torld War II, and Ital}'
Germany, and Japan cannot fo rm a geometric axis, either. Similarl}' "axis"
need not constitute a n alliancc, which means that Ga lbraith's other admo-
nition misses Bush's point. Galbraith notes that "at that time, tht"re were
no more" bitter enemjcs than the Iran of the a}atollahs a nd d1C' Iraq of
Saddam Hussein. " 18 What he doc!> more hclpfull}' recognize is that such a
statement can actuall}' bring a state of affairs into being, ta lking of a new
30 GEOG RAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. f HREA I. AND DIVISION

"Shiite crescent. "i iS Yet it should rC'memlxrcd that a not-dissimilar

phrasing was used by Clinton:
America musr srand :1gainst lhe pOisoned :1ppe:1is of national-
ism, musl combat an unholy :1xis of new thre:us from terrorisrs,
imernarion:1l crimin:1ls, and drug uaffid:ers. These 21 sr-cernury prc"da-
tors fd on thnology and me fr flow of mfonnm1on and ideas and
people and rhey will be all me more lethal if weapons of m:m desrruc-
non fall into their

Thu!> Clinton invoke!> nationalism, terrorism. criminality, and drugs- all

justifications given for previous U.S. interventions-as an axis, and raises
the opportunities crcated by technology and globalization. and the spec-
ter of weapons of mass destruction. Bush, in contrast to Clinton's broad
sweep, invokes states, which means that even knowledgeable reports of his
spcech suggcst that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are thc "'axis of evil. " W
But Bush did not say that these sta tes were an "axis of evil." Ra ther
he named those three statcs for different problems, and then said: "states
likc thesc, and their terrorist allies, consriturc an axis of evil, anning to
thrcaten the peace of the world."' 151 The key word in this phrase is actually
"'like," although the linking "'and" also docs a lot of work. It is "states
like these, and their terrorist allies." An association of the .. like" is actu-
all}' a more intricate approach to thc choosing of sidcs and the drawing of
lines than is generally credited. Bush's spocchwritcrs knew what they were
doing. 18" As Chernus puts it,
There" is, in principle, no limll to tile numbe-r of narions dur mighl be
pm m "ax-is of e\rl." ... The axrs he- meant ro describe was nor a
connc-cnon among stales but, rJther; the- link -states like
the-se" to nonsratc: terrorist

Thus coeva l with integration is a strategy of exclusion. What, then, con-

stitutes sufficient similarity that other states that arc deemed to be .. like"
these three can a lso be sc<:n as part of the "axis"? Will Bu&h define or so
label them, or docs this give an remit? \"(fhat kinds of reduc-
tions arc necessary that they can cffectivdy be aggregated, e:sscntiall)' ren-
dered the same?
\Vhat this has meant, in practice, i& that othcr &tates have been seen
as. sufficiently similar., or cffoctivcly coopted. The axis-now eve""n more
nongcometrical-cncompasscs more than the three named states. John
Bolton's speech to the Heritage Foundation in 2002 declared that ''states
that sponsor terror and pursue WMD must stop. States that rcnouncc
terror and abandon \VMD can become part of our cffort. But those that do
 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION 31

not can expc.ct to lxcome our targets. "' 1' 1 Rogers sees this as clear evidence
that the axis "is in the process of being extendcd''; 191 the BBC reported
that the "U.S. expands 'axis of C"vil. "' 191 The \'CiaslJington Po.st recounted
that one Bush administration official suggested that Libya, Syria, and Cuba
were the members of the "junior varsity axis of cvil."'ll-l Yet this extension
is not something that is being done to the concept but is inherent in its ver)'
definition. t\'ot coincidenrally, the countries oftm routed as sccondary or
"honorary" members arc those other countries on the State Deparonem
list of state sponsors of terror, which is comprised of Libya, S)ria, Sudan,
and Cuba as well as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Yct on Octobcr 7, 2001,
one particular harborer was singled out: Afghanistan. Bringing together
many of the themes of this section, Bush norcd that he had dirC('tcd forces
to target
Al-Qoedo terronst rr.tining camps ond m1lrmry insmllotions of the
Toliban rcg1me in Afghomsmn ... we- ore joined m this opera tion by
our suunch friend. Grcot Britain.. .. l\1orc than 40 countries in rhe
Middle Eost .-\frico, Europe and across Asio have g.rantt:'d air transit or
landing

Thus, these processes of incorporation and intcgration ha\e importa nt ter-

ritorial aspc.cts. Bush was able to divide the world a long a series of lines-
the United States, its ''staunch friend," "'othcr close friends'' and allies,
positioned against those who had not allied themselves in this way. This
was a process of incorporation that creates a linkage of the "with," the
together or alongside, rather than a simple tmification. Different degrees
of linkage arc dearl)' envisaged-the role of the United Kingdom is dif-
fercnt from more reluctant a llies, themselves differentiated from some of
the more peripheral members of the ..coalition of the willing." On the
other side is a loose alliance-created by the United States as much b)'
any prior decision-of states equated with nonstates, and of states com-
pared to others of sufficient similarity they can be dcemed "like .. threats.
The conflation of nonstate groups with states, those that harbor them
or similar, gives an explicit territorial location to putativcl}r nebulous,
Dcterritorialized threats.
There is, of a purpose to portraying rogue regimes and terrorism
this war. As well as spotlighting three particular rcgimes and those "like'"
them, it portrays "an omnipresent terrorist threat as evil as it is wide-
spread."' This allows the United States to legitimate "any punitive action it
might take, anywhere at any time. " 19" Bush has cxplicidy noted the "global
scale" of this campaign: "'from the mountains of Afghanistan, to the border
regions of Pakistan, to the Horn of Africa, to the islands of the Philippines,
32 GEOGRAPHIES 01- F-I:AR. fHREA I. AND DIVISION

to the plains of North Central Irnq.''' 9 - Politically, spatially, temporally,

there arc, it seems, no limits to the responses . As Barnett puts it:
What stands between us and tite goal of making g]obaliz:nion rruly
global IS rite threats pose-d by Me forces of disconnecrednC"SS-{hc bad
individu:1 l acrors that plague rite Gap. Defea t rhem by mem
the Gap 3S rhe1r own and rhe Core wins this war on terrorism, plam
and

It i!> therefore clear that on the e\'ening of Septcm bcr l l, 2001. the Bush
administration had a number of geographical ana lyses of the threats and
opportunities of the post-Cold War SinOC" then, they have had
many more. The continuities between the prcious U.S. administrations
should not be underestimated. T hc complcx topographies and the not-
w-complex diagnoses of them ha\'C continually shaped U.S. policy. This
a number of the states that have found themselves targets,
depicted either as "weak'' or "failed" sta tes that arc breeding grounds
for terrorists, or "rogue"' states like Iraq or Iran. In addition, it raises the
question of just what is the relation of lslamism to thc understanding of
territory? It is to these questions that the following chapter!> turn.
 CHAPTER TWO

Territorial Strategies of lslamism

AI-Qacda is often portrayed as a deterritorialized network or association.

Yet C\'cn networks have connections, and examining tbe materialit}' of its
nodes demonstrates that it is a much more groundeJ organization. If we
think through bow ai-Qacda actually functions, it is clear that it operates in
a profound[}' territorial way. both within and against conventional under-
standings of tbc rdation bct>vccn sovereignty and territOr)'. In tem1s of a
di.,ision of labor within ai-Qacda, the gmcrallr accepted \'iew is cltat Osama
bin Laden is the orator and Ayman ai-Zawahiri is more the strategic plan-
ncr and recruiter. AI-Zanat. for example, suggests that al-Zawahiri is the
key person behind the September 11, 200l , attacks. \Xfhilc ai-Zawahiri
is often described as bin Laden's lieutenant, his role is as more of a co-
organizer and leader. They have each influence() the other, rather than the
older ai-Zawahiri shaping bin Laden. One of the key issues that bin Laden is
credited with has been ai-Zali\rahiri's move from targeting the "ncar enemy"
of Egypt, as a means to challenge Israel, to a direct targeting of the "far
enemy" of the United States. A key 1995 writing of ai-Zawahiri was "The
Road to Jerusalem Passes Through Cairo''i yet in 1998, he was a partner
to bin Laden's wider strategy of iihad against Jews and Crusaders, a move
cllat drew criticism from his colleagucs.2 The influence of ai-Zawahiri on bin
Laden was to persuade him to embark on jilmd himself, rather than funding
operations and working as an Islamic relief worker and pre.acheL3
Taking account of this shift of priorities demonstrates a crucial geo-
political strategy. The proximity of "ncar" and "far" enemies and the
spatial politics of jihad indicate the geographicaJ and territoriaJ aspects of
al-Qaeda's The argument here is thus in opposition to Ro}'s
claims that bin Laden "has no strategy in the true sense of the word,.
and that " there is no geostratcgy of Islam use Islam is not a territo-
rial Indeed, despite his claims about "dctcrritoria lization," Roy's
34 II:FHHTO FI IAL S IRAII:G II:S 01- I SLAMI SM

analysis continually invokes a series of sites, countries, and strategies that

demonstrate a significant territorial sense. As Balibar has a rgued, the idea
of a network as simply a "dctcrritoria lization'' is "the consti-
tution of a network is also of course a rctcrritoria lization.".i A!!. Mustafa
puts it:
The canogrophy of terromm will al.so h.t\'e co move bc:yond tradi-
tional compartmenulisro gcograph) of nation smrc:s.... The: sovereign
sp-.1cc:s of nation smres a nd the nodal nttworks of mrc:rnauonal terror-
ism offer a fundamcmal ch:1llmge to rhe moo:krn srarc-cenrered g.lobal
geopolitics. 6

Similarly, Ehtcshami has suggested that the stratcgks of Islamism act as

a challenge to the "basis of the existing internationa l S)'Stcnt-thc sys-
tem of territorially-based states."' But approciating these insights requires
more than a simple ar gument that we have gone beyond state territory or
straightforward geography. Rather, it requires a fundamental rethinking
of the geographies of territory. Eslamism acts as a challenge to the relation
between state, sovereignty, and territory. Nonstatc actors can control ter-
ritory; many states cannot.
A range of issues arc often used as justifications for terrorist attacks.
These go beyond the widespread condemnation of Israel and extend to a
range of issues with direct U.S. involvement and those with a more indi-
roct linkage. These territorial aspects would include, but arc dearly not
limited to, Russia in Chcchnya, India and Pakistan in Kashmjr, inaction
in Bosnia, conAict in the Philippines with ethnic Muslims, support fo r the
Indone-sian government in the Cold War, and the stationing of U.S. troops
on the Arabian Peninsula, as well a& the long-running sanctions and air
strikes against Iraq. They have now been joine-d by events in Afghanistan,
Lebanon (already a repeat of events from 1978, 1982, and long after}, and
the Horn of Africa, as well as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. At the very least,
these issues arc indicati\rc of the ongoing widespread nature of territorial
problcms in thc \Vorld that have been maskcd by the end of the Cold War
and the supposed triumph of globalizarion. 8 The 9111 Commis.sio11 Report
rocognizes that many of these territorial issues arc, in part. the answer to
the question "Why do 'they' hate a lthough the report tdlingl)' docs
not mention the stationing of U.S. troops. On this last point. it is worth
noting that opposition is not simply to the presence of U.S. troops in the
"land of the two Holy but also bc.cause bin Laden, Hush with
success in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, had offered to rid Saudi
Arabia of the Iraqi threat himself w hen Iraq invaded Kuwait in the early
1990s, only to have- this offer spurned by the royal family.''
 II:FHHTOR IAL SIRA I I:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM 35

As former CIA l'r'1ichad S.Cheuer notes. the United States

is " hated across the Isla mic world beca use of spcrific U.S. government
policies and actions .. . arc at war with an ai-Qaeda-led,
lsla mist be-cause of a nd to defend those policies, and not, as
President Bush mista kenly has said, 'to defend freedom and a ll that is
good and just in wo rld .'"' 2 He notes six reasons:
U.S. support for Israel th:n keeps Palc:sunians in the Israelis' thra ll
U.S. and o ther Western trOOP'S o n the Arabian l'eninsui J.
U.S. occupation o f Iraq and Afgha ni.s.ro n
U.S. support for Russia, lnd1a, and Gina aga inst rhc:i r 1\tushm
mihunrs
U.S. pressure: on Arab energy producers ro keep oil pnces low
U.S. support for aposr:1re, corrupt, a nd t)'rann ic:J l
governments13

All bm the last two arc obvious!} territoria l; all can understood geo-
politica lly. M any other things that couJd be added to this charge sheet
actions against Libya a nd Sudan a nd a whole range of events in
Central America and South America.' 4 Yet where such issues a rc acknowl-
edged, this is generall)' done in such a Wa)r as to o bscure and erase differ-
ences, such as in the fo llowing speech by President George Wl. Bush:
Q,er the years these: extremists have used a lirany of exc uses. for
violence- t he Israeli presence on rhe West Bank, or the U.S. military
presence in SJ.udi Arabia, or t he of me Tali ban, or the Crusades
of a tho usand >'ears ago. In fact, we're not facing a set of
that c:J n be soothed and add ressr<:l . We're facing a radical ideology
with malterable objecri\es.: to whole narions and the
world_ No act of ours invired rhe rage of the killers--(Jnd no conces-
sion. bribe. or act o f appeasement wouJd change or limir rhe1r plans for
murder . ..
Some: h:Jve also argur<:l that ext remism has been by
the J.Ct Jons of o ur co:Jiinon in Iraq. claiming rh:n our presence in thar
country l1.1s somehow caused or triggered rhe o f rad ica ls.. I would
remind rhem mat we: were nor in lrn q o n September II , 200 l--and al
Qaeda :Jttackcd us an>'Wa>' The hatrro of rhe radicals before
Iraq W:JS an issue. and it will exist after Iraq is no longer an excuse.
The g,ovc:mment o f Russia d1d nor support Opcrarion Iraqi Freedom,
:Jnd yet t he: mihunrs killed more rha n I SO Russia n schoolchild ren in
Bcslan."

O f the man}' things that co uld be sa id of this, two will invol\c-

ment of the United States in Iraq reaches back to over a
36 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM

Scptcomber 11, 2001, with the enforcement of the no-Ay zones, the U.N.-
sponsorcd scanctions regime, and the bombardments of Operation Desert
Fox in Docember 1998; and the a.trocity in Beslan is linked to Russia's
involvement in Chcchnya, a different, albeit re lated, war. Given the fog
surrounding the "war on terror," some understanding may be appropri-
ate. It is equally important to rocogni:z.c that the ma jority of territorial
claims arc O rocovcr lost land rather rhan conqucr, 1" although the notion
of what "Muslim lands" arc can be rather vague, sometimes extending
to lands lost to Islam in the fifteenth century. Thus, this chapter looks at
a i-Qaeda and militant Islam more genera lly through the territorial aspects
of its operations and the particular territorial imaginary of its leaders. In
doing so, it explicitly retcrritoria liz.cs the analysis, looking both at spe-
cific territoria l grievances across the world and rhetorical ideas of a new
Caliphate.

Reading Bin Laden

Despite the portrayal of bin Laden as livi ng in a cave, he is generally

acknowledged to be an expert at using the media to communicate his
messages. In re.ccnt his organization's media tactics have changed,
with an extensive usc of the Internet. 1- Yet while he is able to reach a
widesprccad audience, he is much less effective in terms of getting Western
audiences to actually listen to what he says. Part of the reason for this is,
of course, the role of the media in acting as a conduit for his messages.
In the late autumn of 2001, for instance, major U.S. media outlets agreed
to limit the public release of bin Laden's messages on the instructions of
then- National Security Advisor Condole.czza Rice. 18 One of the claims
was that the messages might include coded messages to terrorists, some-
thing bin Laden himself has d ismissed as "hilarious ... it's as if we were
living in the time of mail by carrier pigeon, when there arc no phones, no
tra\dcrs, no Internet, no regular mail, 110 express mail, and no electronic
mail. " 19 Clearly the point was more to deny him a \'Oice/0 in much the
same wa}' that the British govemmcnt used to overdub Sinn Fein's Gerry
Adams in media interviews with the words of an actor during the 1980s
and early 1990s. A similar outcry ac.companicd the September 2007 visit
of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to speak a t the Un ited Nations and Columbia
University in New York.
Yet as the speeches and writings of Stalin and Hirler bccar both histori-
cal and political importance. so too do the words of a ll participants in tbis
current war. The historical and political significance of his speeches require
examination. Understanding docs not, of course. mean empathizing. As Fisk
 II:FHHTO FI IAL S IRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMI SM 37

suggests, '' bin Laden might lx crud, wicked, ruthless, or c:viJ personified,
but he is intelligent. " 1 1 In these terms, Tariq Ali's view of Sayyid Qutb's 1964
work Milestones, alrcrnari\'c:Jy translated as Sig11pos1s, is instructive: ''From
a materialist viewpoint the book is rcpc:titive, banal, uninspiring., and intd-
kctuall}' offensive. Yet it has had a massive impact on two generations of
Muslims, and that alone necessitates an cngagc:mcnt with its idc.as. "'11 Yet
bin Laden docs nm ncc,cssariJy sec a distinction bc:twc:cn speech and acts.
His speech preceding the 2004 U.S. presidential election was as powerful
as an attack, and as Faisal [)c,rji notes, he "describes the C\'Cnts of Sep-
tember the dc\cnth not as hostile: or vc:ngcful actions so much as a set of
communicatiom. " .U In his own words, his encmics "only understand thc
language of attacks and killings. '' 14
Even if his \'iews arc controversial and at times abhorrent, bin Laden is
a dcepl)' impresshc orator. The comments of Octavia Nasr, CNN's senior
editor for Arab affairs and one of the main intc:rprctcrs of bin Ladcn, arc
instructive:

He is doquem, doquem. He usc:s cbsstcal ..\rabtc, which makes

h1m one of the roughest people ro rr:mslare. He also has an exrraor-
dmary knowledge of rhe Koran. He has memoriz.ed the Koran. He
choosc:s ltis quores. He also 1mpro\'1ses h1s speeches. This is someone
who does nor re-ad spC'C'chcs. In a ll of rhe videotapes [har I have seen
and translated, he dOC's nm even look at a script, and he can go on for
hours nonsrop, staying dC':lr and on message. He doesn't get nred. You
can say he's ollC' of thOSC' top public spcakers.ll

has claimed that bin laden is " not an original thinker" and not "an
outsunding Qur'anic scholar: hC' lacks the command of ttxrual subdc:tics that
mark Wahhabi C'xcgctes in Arabia, or their Azhari coumerparts in Cairo."
Instead, Lawrence suggests that his strength is his "'literary gifts," suggesting
that "what actually distinguishes him ... is that he is first and forcmo"St a
pokmiist. " 24 Thc usc of the Koran is, of course, a major part of his rhetoric,
even if his interpretations of it arc disputcd. Whilc the theological aspects of
his will not be discusSl'd here, a fcv. aspects arc worth underlining.
One is that bin Laden and Zawahiri do not generally preach or practice anti-
Shi'a politicsl attempting to hold to the: line that the divisions within Islam
arc less important than those between Islam and the West. An internal war
wrthin Islam will, he suggests, gi\c victory to their common cncn1ics. As Dc\ii
puts it, "bin Laden is not averse to claiming the support not only of her-
c:tics for the jihad, but of apostates as wdl. '" 1- Gunar atna has described this
as a "goal-orientated rather than rule-orientated doctrine. Differmccs
between types of Islam arc important, certainly, but the blankct assumptions
38 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM

of some Western politicians and dements within the media arc tending to
erase differences. As bin Laden himself has phrascti it, "this battle is not
bctwcm ai-Qactia and the United Stares. This is a battle of Muslims against
the global Crusaders. " 29
Indeed, and potentiall)' more so even than Bush. bin Laden is strategi-
cally interested in drawing dividing lines. Chapter 1 argued that Bush's
usc of the term "with" was sophisticarcd and that undemanding this
point was important in cha llenging the idea that the "'war on terror" was
predicated on binary thinking. For bin Laden, such divisions-intentional
or consequential-arc strategically powerful. As chapter 3 shows, many
states found themselves in an awkward position as a result of Bush's
imposed choice. For bin Laden, this was a form of terrorism itself:
The e\'enrs pro\ed the of terrorism that America exercises in the
world. Bush Slated that [he world has to lx: dnided 111 two: Bush and
his supporters, and any country that doesn't get inro the global crusade
is wnh the terrorists. Wh:u rerronsm is dearer rh:m rhis? Many go\ern-
menrs were forced to suppon rhis terrorism." They had to go
along with this although rhey knew that we arc defend ing our brothers
and defending our sacred \'alues.JO

Bush has described the terrorists as "barbaric criminals who profane a

great religion by committing murder in its name. " 11 He has returned to
this theme continually:
Some call thts e\il hlamic rad1cahsm; orhers, mdir.ant J iha still
others, lslamo-fasctsm. \Vhate11er it's called, rh1s ideology is ver)'
differcm from [he rchgion of Islam. This form of radicalism exploits
Islam to sene a violent, political \'ision: the establishment, b) terror-
ism and sub\ers1on and msurgency, of a rotalitarian emptre mat
all polit1caland religious freedom. These cllcremists d istort rhe 1dea of
iihad into a ca ll for terrortst murder ogamsr Christians and Jews and
Hindus-and also again5l from orher traditions, who rney
regard as hcrcrics.ll

Thus, while Bush continually attempted to drive wedges bctv.e,cn factions

and to insist that this is not a war against Islam, he has not succeeded.
Indeed, this attempt has resonances that he may not have intended. As
Chemus puts it, "he took it upon himself to define categorically what
docs and what docs nor constirute aurhcntic [slam, or authenticity in
any religion .... This enabled him to depict the war as a battle against
sin waged not just b)' the U.S. but b}' every imaginable form of genuine
religion and morality. "JJ
 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM 39

Bin ladcn is also skilled in taking specific words that have bocn used
and exploiting their full resonances :
Bush s:ud n in his own words: ..crusade." When Bush says rhat,
thq rry to co\er up for him., then he s.ud he d idn't mean it. He sa1d
Bush divided the world imo rwo: With us or wirh
terrorism." Bush IS the leader; he carries t he big cross and walks. I
sweor rhot e\ery one who follows Bush in his scheme has gi,en up
Islam and the word of the prophet. This is very clear. The prophet hos
said, don'r follow Jews o r Cllrisnans.,. Our wise people
ha\e s.11d thor those who follow the unfaithful have become unfa ith-
ful rhemselves. Those who follow Bush in his crusade against Mushms
have denounced

Bin Laden is thus able to cxploit the full potcntial ramifications of Bush's
intrnrional and unintrntional rhetoric. Thr usr ofthr word "crusade" was
indeed a gift to his cause, allowing him to claim " this is a recurring war.
The original crusade brought Richard from Britain, Louis from France,
and Barbarus from Germany. Today the crusading countries rushed as
soon as Bush raised the cross. They accepted the rule of the cross. " 11 Turn-
ing the "with us or against us" formula against the United States enables
him to paint those who support thr United Statrs as enemies of Islam,
even if those who oppose it would not ordinarii)' side with bin Laden or
his particular interpretation of lslam . In this sense. the usc of the term
"crusade" was a spectacular, and casil}cxploitablc, blunder. More gener-
ally, he is able to upon support because many of those
who disagree with his tactics can find common purpose with his causes.
As a report for the Ccnmry Foundation declared; "'If the criteria for iiha-
dist support were the belief that the U.S. militar}' should depart Iraq or
the Israeli military should depart the West Bank or Gaza, the majority of
Muslims would probabl}' agree. " 36 It is worth adding, though it should be
obvious, tha t many non-Muslims would also agree.
In one of the most insightful analyses of the spatial pracrioes and rep-
resentations of the jihad, Devji has argued that "the rhetorical sophistica-
tion with which bin Laden links the American president's usc of the word
crusade to the globe's division into two enemy camps is quite remarkable,
allowing him to define the war as onc of rcligion in the most logical of
ways. "J" Dcvji is able: to demonstrate the thcological aspects of the war
in a number of compelling ways, but he is on less certain ground when
he suggests that this is more broad!)' interpreted as being a battle at the
level of ideas rather than material practice. As he phrases it, "after all.
hO\v else can the division of the globe into opposing camps be intrrprrtcd
40 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM

otherwise than as a metaphysical one?'"J-1 Elsewhere, the claim is made

that the global aspirations of Islam arc mctaphyskal rather than geopoliti-
There arc undoubtedly a series of representations at play here, but
thcrc arc a lso concrete matcrial practices. Rathcr than a simple metaphys-
ics or a crude unthcorctical geopolitics of practice, there is a continually
intertwined and productive relation between them, a rc<tlized a bstraction,
spaces, and territories of reprcsentation ..w
Territorial issues thus function in bin Laden's speoches as both cur-
rcnt c<tusc and through a highly cffccti.,e stratcg}' of seeing dis.conncctcd
events as part of a gencralizcd history of oppression. Four clemcnts stand
out. The: first is the linkage ills suffered by Muslim peoples and
thc stratcgics chosen for al-Qaeda's actions, thc Iauer being portrayed as
responses. These arc effective both in terms of laying claim to a legitimacy,
but also for seeking to crcatc an accountancy of equivalence. For example,
hc suggests that it was '' dcstroyed towers in Lebanon" in 1982 that sug-
gested the plan to "'punish thc oppressor in kind by dcstroying towers in
Amcrica." This was to give thc United States "a taste of its own medicine''
and to prc\'cnt it "from killing our own women a nd child ren. "41 As ever,
of course, one person's response is another's provocation, and the chain
of reaction is ne\er easily ended. Palestine is a key theme, of coUJsc, dem-
onstrated by his claim that " I feel still the pain of al-Quds Ucrusalem] in
my imcrnal that loss is like a burning fire in my intcstincs";-4! and
the suggestion that the United States will not "live in security until we live
it truly in Palestine. "'U
Thc second is the linkage of different e\cnts, showcasing a wide
geographica l rc.ach: "Every dar, from cast to west, our umma of 1200
million Muslims is bcing slaughtered, in Palestine, in Iraq, Somalia, West-
ern Sudan, Kashmir, the Ph ilippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Assam, " 4' In
one tnining video, bin Laden stood in front of a map of the world
and claimed that '"the wounds of the Muslims arc deep everywhere. But
today our wounds ar c deeper becaus.c the crusadcrs and the Jews have
joined togethcr to invade t he: heart of dar ai-Islan1.; our most sacred places
in Saudi Arabia, Mecca, a nd Medina, including the Prophet's l\tosque, and
the al-Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. " 45 At other times,
he condemns the U.S. and its allies fo r their lack of response: "Where arc
your declarations, dcnunciations, and repudiations rcgarding thC' sla ughter
befalling Muslims in Palestine:, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippine-s, Indone-
sia, Chochnya, Eritrea, Kashmj r-or how about Gujarat, where just h\'enty
days ago one thousand Muslims were burned a livc?".c. The notion of the
umma-the community of believers- will be furthcr discussed below, but
at this point, one ker issue needs to be explored. This is that the attempt
 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRA II:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM 41

ro forge a particular community is her'C nor through belief, bur through

suffering, and an appeal is made to compassion in the ct}mological sense
of suffering with or a longside someone. Bin Laden continued in this speech
to move from the position of ictim to responder, suggesting that:
We do no t hear their \'OJCcs, yet :u soon as lhe vtct1m nses up and
offers h1msdf on behalf of his rdigion, people are outragt:<l . 12 mjlhon
Muslims are being slau&htert:<l without anyone even kn owing, but if
anyone comes to t heir defense, those people ju!>t repeat wh:uever rhe
t)'rants want them to say.4 -

There is mort' to this cla im than simply that of unequa l re<tction. T he fun-
damental issue is the point made t'<t rlicr, of the inrerrdarion of voice and
action. The rising up of the victim or others coming to their defense is as
much a form of communication as an act; a \'Oicc being given to problems
that gt'nerally remain unheard.
Tht' third as pect is that, like ma ny others within the Is lamic religion,
bin Laden docs not simpl}' criticize the Unitt'd States and irs European
allies. Another of his principa l targets is the illegitimacy of many Midd le
Eastern states and regimes in other Muslim nations. In a mcssagt' broad-
cast on February l1, 2003, ht' noted Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, and J\lorocco a s among the aposta te a mi-Muslim states
to bt' liiKnned by ji/Jad. As a Saudi national, bin Laden rt'pt'atedlr
returns to the illegitimacy of tht' Saudi regime. But this is not simply to
replace the existing ruling family. he has proposed a breakup
or Saudi Arabia, a nd a restructuring of borders in the entire peninsula,
ro form two new countries, Greater Yt'mcn and Greater Hi jaz, ending
the reign of the ai-Sauds a nd reshaping the region.49 As the next sec-
tion demonstratt's, there is a wider purpost' tha t exceeds single nations
or regions. To turn statt's toward a Mus lim political practi<:t' is not
isolatt'd: ratht'r, it is part of a larger project to create what Suskind
desc ribes as "a rt'stored [\lluslim empire, a ca liphatt', stretching from
Tehran to Cairo from the Gulf ro the Atlantic," with bin Laden as its
lea der, j()
The fourth and final aspect to be noted ht're is that the grievances mar-
shaled b)' bin Laden arc not lim ited to the present or re.cent past . Wl1ilt'
some issues_ notably Palestine, have a long heritage, bin Laden goes far
bt'yond this. His speeches a rc pcppt'red with important historical markers,
many of which arc largely forgotten by the West. For cxampk, one spce-eh
claimt'd that "our mnma has been tasting this humi liation and contempt
fo r O\'t'r t'ight} years ... aher t'ighl} yt'ars ... the sword fa lls down on
Americ<t. '"' This is a reference to the Tre<tty or which dissol"ed
42 II:FHHfOFI IAL S IRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMI SM

the Ottoman Empire following World War L The mourn ing for the loss of
the Ottoman Empire is somewhat unusual, given its corruption and politi-
cal weakness and the Turkish oppression of Arabs, but its importance to
bin Laden lies in the fact that it was the sole remnant of the Caliphate,
an Islamic Empire, and that this was replaced by Europe-an- Christian-
power. Some therefore sec E924---the beginning of secular rule in Turkey-
as the most signific.am date for the destruction of lslamjc political power. 12
Bin Laden parricularl) singles out the Unjted Kingdom as "responsible for
destroying the Caliphate system,"lJ and the 19l 6 S)kcs-Picot agreement,
b}' which France and Britain planned to divide up the spoils of Ottoman
possessions in the Middle East fol lowing World War I, is another recur-
rent reference. Going even farther back, so too is the loss of Andalusia in
southern Spain in the fifteenth century.
Bin Laden has undoubtedly played a major role as an actor and a
mouthpiece for a movement. But as some commrntators ha\e pointed
out, his role has become more: prriphcral and less important as time has
passed. His death or capture would function as a propag.anda coup for the
United States and a moment of certainly, but it would have
much less impact on the mo\ement itself. As Fisk puts it, "seeking to dis-
cover his whereabouts was akin to arresting thr world's nuclear scientists
after the invention of the atom bomb: ai-Qacda now existed in the minds
of thousands of Muslims.''H AI-Qacda has become more of an idea than
an organization, a set of principles in a broader movement. Gerges sug-
gests that it has moved from being "a skeleton of an organization ... to
an idrologic.al label, a state of mind, and a mobilizational outreach pro-
gram to incite attacks worldwide. " H De Waal and Abdd Salam make a
similar point when they cla im that the "structural conditions exist for a
protracted global insurgency," whether or not this is led by bin Laden and
ai-Qaeda.14
Bin Laden is, of cours.ce, not alone as a throrist of fundamentalism.
Two other prominent figures require: ana lysis. The first is al-Zawahiri,
who as noted above, has plared an equally imporrant role in the move-
ment. Two themes bear relation to bin Laden's writings. The first is his
recognition of the importance of territorial control, either as a base: or
ideally as a state. trrritorial control then acts as the foundation for
a transnational or even global iihad.> AJ-Za wahiri has suggested that
"armies achieve victor}' onlr when the infantry takes hold of land." 18
This is related to the idea of taking "the battle to the enemy's own soil.
After long centuries of his taking the battle to our soil and after his hordes
and armed forces occupied our lands in Chcchnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Palestine, and after centuries of his occupying our land while enjoying
 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRA II:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM 43

sccurit}' at home:." 59 The: second is the linkage: of diffC'rc:nt struggles. In

his important text Knights tmder the Bmmer of the Prophet, he explicit!)'
links Chechnya to the Caucuses more generally, and describes the region
of the Caspian Sea through to Afghanistan as "a mujahid Islamic belt
to the south of Russia,"' which will hdp opposc: the perceived Russian-
U.S. alliance against Islam in that area, which thc:n can bring in Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmc:nistan, and Tajikistan.00 This thc:mc: has a much lon-
ger lineage. One exponent is Abdallah Azza m, whosc: 1984 text Defend-
ing tbc Land of the Muslims Is Each Man's Overriding Duty is widcl)'
citc:d. Azzam dc:.clares that:
Th1s dur)' sh3 1l not bpsc wid1 \'lcrory in .-\fgh3nist3n, and the iilmd \vlll
rem3in 3n obligarion umil all ocher l:!nds which former!)'
were Muslim come back ro us a nd reigns w1rhin rhern o nce
lkforc us lie Bukham, U:banon, Chad, rirrea, Som:J-
h3, Philippines, Burm:1, South Yemm, Tashkenr, Andalusia ...61

And once again, the concentration on particular sites does not mean a
neglect of the long-running issuc: of Palestinc:: "Our presence in Afghani-
stan toda}' ... docs not mean that wc: have forgottc:n Palestinc:. Palcstinc:
is our beating hcarr."'bl.
The sc.cond key theorist is Hassan ai-Turabi: a Sudanese religious leader
who played an important role in the political system in the: 1990s before
bdng imprisoned by President Omar ai-Bashir. Hc: has been described as
"the region's most prolific theoretician" "} and has combined his theories
with his political activitics. 64 As de \Vaa l and Abdcl Salam put it, 'if there
is to be an Islamist Lenin, then it is Hassan al Turabi .''s One of the most
significant aspects of his work is that the analysis of the Caliphate puts
some conceptual flesh onto the rhetorica l bonc:s. Like bin Laden, who
was gready influenocd by Turabi in his time in Sudan, and the Hczbollah
leadcr Sayyc:d Hassan Kasrallah, al-Turabi is an accomplished orator, able
to speak to different audiences in different registers:
When wriring in fng,lish, Turabi presents 3 liberal face:. This not just
because he is wnring for a non-Muslim audience:, but also bcc3usc h1s
umqu<" Ar-ab style is Vlrruall)' unrranslarable. \Vhen writing m Arable,
Tumbi uses an mnov3tL\Ie me-thod , whw:h urih:ccs ver)' lew cit3tions
from the Qur'an 3nd H:.1dirh, bur is enrhuscd throu ghout wirh Qur' 3nic
rt"son3ncc and echo_ Many o f h1s mosr impormnt sentences arc slight
rephr3ses of the Prophet 's words, apphed ro conrc:mporary comexrs
wirh con:sideroble creati\'lty. This IS ro gi\e his words the:
of Qur'3nic 3urhoriry wrrhour necdmg ro e ire: specific sources and
44 II:FHHTO FI IAL S IRAII:G II:S 01- I SLAMI SM

As ai-Mubar ak states, hownrer, t here is a lso a disjuncru rc between his

words and his practices: "Turabi's tongue is progressive; his hands (where
our focus of attcmion should be with a master trickster) arc authoritar-
ian, ruthless, and even barbaric. Yet c..,cn al-Turabi struggled with the
of thr Scptrmber 1 ], 200 1, attacks.. As someone trained in
internationallaw,b8 he signally failed to address the lrgal issues in rda-
tion to these events/ 9 and in his 2002 text "The Phenomenon of Politi-
cal Terrorjsm and the Valuation of the September Incident in America,"
hr is. equivocal. For dr Waal, this "apologia" can "onlr quarre l with the
1mmber of casualties inflictrd on Scptrmbrr 1 1, not with Usama 's right to
conduct this modr of warfarr. ,.-o

The Return o1 the Caliphate

Three key spatial formations-the Caliphate, the nrtwork, and thr bas('-
thus arise as issues requiring furthrr examinati on. In Islamic thought, a
fundamenta l distinction is drawn between the dar al-Isiam as the land of
Islam or " Islamic territory" and dar aJ-harb as the land of warfarc.- 1 Bin
Laden has d ivided these as a region of fa ith and a region of infiddity.""l
Thrsc arc the fundamental spatial d istinctions through religious determi-
nations, although some suggest that t here can a compromise thir d divi-
sion, a dar al-sufh, a land of treaty wbcre a deal has been struck,') or
invoke a dar al-bijra, a land of migration, beyond areas of
The role of jihad is sign ificant here. Its sense is. plural and disputed,
deriving from a meaning of " to strive, exert oneself, or take extraordinary
pains." As Firestone notes, "thcre arc, therefore, many kinds of iihad1 and
most have nothing to do w ith warfare. " -s jihad is tbus dose to the idea of
struggle, o r the German Kampf; indeed, H itler's Kampf is translated
as. jihadi- "'mr jihad"-in Arabic.' As. religious. war or struggle, it can
be seen as a means of transforming tbc dar ai-1Jarb into dar a/-islam. Dar
al-harb is a realm of war, harb, which is not legitimized by religion, but
this realm is the place where the expansion of the ideas and rule of Islam
is possible. Such ;ihad may be to recover lands pre\iously lost, or
to ensure that existing J\fuslim goernmcnts adbcrc to a particular line of
religious politics. Jihad can therefore include fighting brtwecn Muslims,
but rither way, jihad has been crucial to Islam ic territorial expansion."'"'
For Arzam, only jihad can restore tbc rule of a Caliph over the umma.""ii
If jihad is understood as "a politica l-military struggle, it provided the
rationale for the Islamic imperium. " "'j Like the imperium of the Roman
Empire, tbis is a determinant of politica l power and a spatia l extent.
 II:FHHTO FI IAL S IRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMI SM 45

In Islamic thought, the rough oqui\ralent of the rule or

empire-is the Caliphate. This is a complkated and important term, which
recurs as an I and political motivation in the speeches of bin Laden and
others. The British journalist Jonathan Freedland has suggest:c<l that "plcnt}'
on the left tend to skim over this stuff, dismissing it as weird, obscurantist
imagining it as somehow secondary to a i-Qaida's anti-
imperialist mission."' He suggests that this is a big mistake and that the
Caljphate is an "animating idea which helps to explain a i-Qaida actions
that otherwise make no sense. " 80 It took Bush until September 5, 2006,
to begin discussing the notion seriously in a spccch. The Caliphate, the
ai-Khilafa, is ideally spatially synonymous with dar a/-islam, in that it is the
political systcnl of rule for the land of but the term can also mean
a temporal stretch, in phras-es such as the Abbasid Caliphate [758-1258),
which had its center in Baghdad. Indeed, the term derives from kbal{.
which Akbar suggests means "to leave behind, and so a successor or vice-
regent. ,.1 1 The question of succession is at the heart of the historic divide
botwccn Sunni and Shi'a.32 Thus, Caliphate has resonances both of reign
and
AI Qaeda's uhinurc aim of rescoring rhe hlamic kbili(.l n:qu1red e ither
spom.anrous popular or dl\'l ne mrervcmion. Usama and h1s
followers seem ro ha\'e counted on both.... lslam1st theor)'s weakest
pomr mat u not only possesses no theory of poJirics, but 1s actilld)'
hostile to any rhco.ry. 1 l

These authors contend that one of the problems with bin Laden\ program
is that he has "not clarified how he will translate a battlefield success into
the establishment of the kbi/afa. i\lorc general!)', we might contend
that the ideal is hardly worked our in any detail, with a range of contra-
dictions and promissory notes.
One fundamental issue is the distinction bet\\een an Islamic state and the
Caliphate. At a strajghtforward the former would be an Islamic gov-
ernment for an existing nation-state, while the latter would have a supra-
national extent. This is a distinction that in part about with the crisis
in Islamic poljtical theology initiated by Mustafa Kcmal's ending of the
Caliphate and the founding of modern Turkcy.&s The Hczb ut-Tahrir orga-
nization bclicves that a nation-state under Islamic rule is a contradiction
and that the Caliphate is the only appropriate politbl system. The organi-
zation comcned a major international conference in August 2007 in Jakarta
to call for prccisd}' this. [n this argument, the modem Caliphate can be
broadly associated with the one that operated in the medieval period, 86
46 II:FHHTOFI IAL S I RAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM

which would suggest a break with contemporary territorial divisions

and potentially even from the very concept of territory.
AI-Turabi has been one of the most significant thinkers here. He
contends that " the phrase 'Islamic state' itse lf is a misnomer,"' because
"the state' is only the political dimension of the colle-ctive endt'avor of
Muslims. '' 8" He argues that "Islam docs not allow for anr limitt'd a lle-
giances t'ithcr social, ethnic, or n:rriwrial, " RR and that the "universal char-
acteristics of an Islamic sute" derive from the Koran and the political
practice of the Prophet Muhammad and thercforc constitute an "eternal
model.,.,.. His view is that "nationalist values that dhide people on bases
of color, gcograph)', or national interest . . . arc \'a loes fundamentally at
odds with Islam. " 90 He therefore claims that the characteristics of this
organization in its ideal form arc not nationalistic but rather an incorpo-
ration of the communit)' of believers, the smmra. 9 1
The mnmo is itself a signifkant concept. The community of Muslim
believers has a priority more narrow!)' conceived national or regional
identities, and the interests of the whole oun.vcigh those of the part. Tactical
reasons may dictate a territorial affiliation, where an Islamic movement
seeks control of a particular state, but this docs not restrict it stra.tegically.92
AI-Turabi therefore concedes that " there is an Islamk concept of a territo-
rial state which is not coextensive with the whole umma,'' but insists this
is for realistic reasons rather than nationalistic ones. We can sec this in
practice in al-Turabi's Sudan as much as in the territorial aims of al-Qaeda
alongside the Taliban in Some contend that a lQaeda in
Mesopotamia is seeking something similar in contemporary Iraq. Qutb, on
the other hand, declared at his trial that '' the: bonds of ideology and belief
arc sturdier than those of patriotism, bar.cd on region, and this false distinc-
tion among Muslims on a regional basis is but one expression of crusading
and Zionist imperialism that must be eradicated.
There is therefore a crucial spatial clement to ideals of lslamic politi-
cal rule. This may operate witbin existing territorial boundaries, seck to
redraw them, or transcend them entirely into a more open r'Cgional or
nen global S}'Stcm. But even this last form is still a territorial definition of
a sort, though one that refuses to accept boundaries. AI-Turabi,
for instance, suggests in relation to the charge of expansionism:
I think rhc-y undersrnnd th:u rhcse 1mag,innr)' lines wh1ch rhcr call
borders h:J\'e, cspccally in a plan like Afric::t. been 1mposro upon dte
pcopk. In rh.c Sudan we ha,c no idea w har these borders arc because
th ere are no narural barriers bcr>11ecn us and our neighbors, nor docs
color, race, or language separate us. How can we give any legirimacy
or sancriry m rhese borders whiCh they rhemsehes do not
 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRA II:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM 47
The argument that Western models of division have been
imposed o-.,er more traditional understandings of the relationship
political rule: and land in the Arab world is not uncommon.
accounts note that there were more zonal,
ping, nomadic, or fluid understandings ..... Yet much the same
could made for the relation between place and politics in Europe and
Norrh America in a not-dissimilar period, A shift from earlier under-
standings to a more rigid divis ion is a historical as wdl
as geographical distinction. What is significant is the wa)' in which the
Ottoma n Empire was divided. The borders were not drawn along the
lines of interna l divisions, as were the Spanish colonies in South America,
larer parts of the British a nd French possessions in Africa, or the Soviet
Union. Rather, the: dhisions and the newly created countries were prod-
ucts of another round of grea t-power politics and a renewed coloniza-
tion. This-as w ith any drawing and redrawing of boundaries-brought
together thost' who wished to remain apart a nd fragmen ted existing
bonds. Issues concerning Syria and Lebanon, Iraq, and, of co urse, Israel/
Pa lestine, all date from this time.
Dnji has a rgued that the indctc:rminacy of the concept of the Caliphate
is more than simply rhetorical obfuscation. He contends:

The cahphare is nOf a political \'ISion as much as a metaphysical

caregor}'. Ir remains only an 1o:kal, With neither a dcscripnon or any
concrete pl.m ro set ir up. And in fuct rhe caliphate's rule rhus far is
s.imply conceptual, allow1ng rhe to abandon rhc polrrical geogra-
phy of rhe Cold \Var. mack up o f national scares grouped into \'a rio us
a llia nces, for a complerdy ck-cerrirona lized and e\en anri-g.c=ogrophical
space. smce the= calipharc= imagined by rhe jihad possesses ncirher center
nor penphery ... After na\ing been a dc:ad lener for well over half a
cemury, rhe caliphate has suddenly as a living careg.ory. in
no matrcr how meraph)'Sic:al an incarnorion.1<1

Dcvji undoubtedly raises some important qua lifications, and some of the
more fa nciful imaginations arc difficult to sec translated into a political
actuality. Yet this is not to sar that some: dcmems a r'C not profound!)'
geopolitical, actually rea lizable. He similarly suggests that the invocation
of former Isla mic lands renders "its strictly geopolitical claims absurd,"'
and that "'the iiluui's description of the Arabian Peninsula as the land of
the two holy sanctuaries" similarly exemplifies the "same shlft from geo-
politics to metaphysics...
He is closer ro a more realistic appraisal when he notes thar the Ca liph-
ate "represents the future of the monotheist in lvluslim lands."'
48 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM

This is not, he suggests., " in t he: form of a political or even geographical

order but by defining Islam's future: victory as a set of global relations out-
side the political language of state and citizenship." 100 But to argue that it
breaks with Western models of state, citizenship. and inde.cd territory docs
not deny it any political or spatial character or reduce it to the level of an
ideal. Rather, its break with the Western political imaginary translates into
a potential break with Western political practice thro ugh a series of differ-
ent representations of s pace and concomitant spaces of representation.
One of these spaces of representation is the understanding that Islam
has of the particularities of local struggles. As many commenta tors have
noted, the sites of the jihad in recent years have often been in more mar-
ginal locations. These have included Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and
Iraq, rather than more obvious sites such as Pa le-stine, Saudi Arabia, or
Egypt. 101 Some other struggles in Asia have a lso been linked to the wider
a ims of this loose mo\cment. In former So\iet central Asia, for example,
the Islamic movement of Uzbd:Jstan seeks to O\'Crthrow the existing sec-
ular and pro-Western dictatorship and to unite various Isla mic peoples
of the area together. This has extended to operations in Tajikistan and
K>rgyzstan. Pottenger has described its vision as a n "Islamic caliphate
that extends from the Muslim region of Wcstem China on the east to the
Black Sea on the wcst." ' 02 In southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiah orga-
nization has expressed an a im of a pan-Islamic state, bringing together
the: world's most populous Islamic nation, lndonesia, with the neighbor-
ing states of Malaysia and the Philippines. There is dispute about the
relationship betv.ecn Jemaah lsla miah and a l-Qaeda, with some c.-tling
it a subsidiary and o thers an affiliate. Undoubted ly responsible for the:
2002 Bali bombing. this organization certainly finds common purpose
with ai-Qaeda in crucial respects.' 03
For Dcvji, the iibaJ is thus "located on the peripheries of the Muslim
world geographica lly, politically, and rdigiously." 104 He suggests then that
the: jihad i.s nor mming from the: center to the periphery, but rather the:
reverse. The Middle East therefore docs not function as a center in any
obvious sense:, with ai-Zawah iri relocating from Egypt and bin Laden
fmm Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan, via Sudan, and now probab1}' to Paki-
sta n. Zawahiri noted that it was in Afghanistan that the muiahidin became
acquainted with a global struggle that transcended their own national
backgrounds. 105 Once again, Devji suggests that this means that the speci-
ficities arc unimportant:
By moving bc(wecn Bosma nnd Afghanistan, Chcchn)'a and lrnq, tho=
;ihad displ.tys i[s fundamcmal mdiffcrcnce ro (hesc rermorics r.uho=r
 II:FHHTOR IAL SIRA II:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM 49

than consolidating into a single= Mushm gc=ogrnphy. h ends

by dc=-tc=rrirorializ.ing Islam alcogerhec,. since ic is nor one= country o r
another rhat 1s impon:anr, bm insread Islam itsdf as a globa l emiry.'00

But this is once more overdrawn. Each of these sites had a significance,
both at tht' time and as a catalyst and inspiration for future: struggb. As
Kohlmann has suggested, part of the point of working in Bosnia was to
t'Stablish a fonvard base for ocher actions, including those against the
United States. 10- After the Dayton Agrct'mt'nt, which ended that conflict,
most jihadists ldt, but some remained because they had married local
rcsidmts. OJ In addition, Dcvj i's claim falls into the trap of assuming that
global movemt'nts arc by their nature dctcrritoria lizcd. This is not neces-
sarily the case. Rather, they open up possibilities within ex isting territo-
rial configurations, challenge straightforward understandings of territory,
and excet'd the static limits of nation-state boundaries. It is entirely pos-
sible for Abu Musab to declare, as he d id in 2004, that " I am
global, and no land is my countr(' at the same time' that he was lead-
ing the struggle of in Mesopotamia. A letter sent by al-Qacda to
ai-Zarqawi made this strategy clear:
The first stage: expel rhc= Americans fro m Iraq. T he= second stage:
establish a n Islamic aurho ri ry or amirarc=, rhc=n d c=.,dop it and suppon
it until it the le"el o f a ca li phare-<ncr as much rcrrirory
as you can to spread its power in Iraq .. . The rhi rd sragc: exrend
the Jlllad wa\e to che secular counrri es ne1ghbormg Iraq. The fourth
srage: It may comc1dc wirh what came bcforc:- chc dash with Israel.
because lsrad was csrabhshc=d o nl)' ro challenge :Jfl)l new Is la mic
c=nciry. 110

Thus, to understand al-Qacda's operations, we need to understand the

disrincti\e relation betwc:c:n its ne,t work organization and the essential
base. The former tends to invite under-standings of a global operation,
while the latter demonstrates the territorial aspect of its workings .

The Network and the Base

Several of the characterizations of ai-Qacda by U.S. politicia ns and the

military ha\'C stressed its nodal structure. The: NatiorUI! Strategy for Com-
bating Tefforism suggests that:
The ai-Q.uda nerwo rk is a mulrinacional enterprise with operatio ns in
more rhan countri es. Irs camps in Afghanistan s.ancruary
and irs bank accounrs served as a rrusr fund for rc:rrorism. 111
50 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM

In similar terms, the later Natiouai MilitaJ<y Strategic Plan for the \Var on
Terrorism argues that:
T he: c:nc:my is a transnational movc:mC'nt of e-xtremist orgamzarions,
nc:rworks, and indl\iduals--a nd thC'ir srnlC' and non-statC' supporlC'rs-
which in common thC'y e-xploit Islam and usC' terrorism for
idC'ological C'nds. ThC' :\1 Qa'ida M.ovc:mC'm tAQAMJ,
compnsC'd of Qa'ida a nd affihatC'd extremists, is the: most dangc:mus
prc:SC'm nunifC'srarion of such C'Xtremism . CC'rrain othC'r ' 'iolent c:xrrc:m-
ist groups also posC' a serious conrin uing threar."l ll

What is revealing about these characterizations is, once again, the link-
age of rhc dissimilar. Over 60 countries arc suggested to be linked, thus
opening up the further poss ibility of a range of responsive operations.
However tenuous some of its claims of association arc, they work effec-
tively and in different ways. AJl groups that utilize-or exploit -Islam
and do not fir within a stare monopoly of violence arc characterized as the
enemy. AI-Qacda is diffuse enough on its own, but the Nati01ral Militar)'
Strategic Plan for the \Var OPI Terrorism broadens this still further into
the AI Qa'ida Associated Mo\cmcnt (AQAM). affiliating other groups to
a network. It is for this reason that Jason Burke's charact erization of a
"ncnvork of networks" is so apr.' 1) In addition, this plan associates the
supporters-state and nonstatc- with the mo\ement.
These operations a rc made possible, the NatioPiaJ Strategy for
Combating Terrorism contends, by the extent and the limitations of
global ization:
The: C'nnrormtc:nr chc: boundanC's w1rhin which
tC'rrorm:s' str-:.tC'giC's rake: shape:. As :1 rc:suJr of frC'C'r, more oprn borders
th1s unwittingl) prO\ides accC'SS to ha\c:ns, cap:.1 l>iliries.,
and other support m rerronsts. Rur access is nor rnough.
Terrorists must M\'C' a physical base from wh1ch ro Whc:thC'r
through in.1bilit)', or inrC'nt, smrC's the:- still
offer phys ical (C'.g., safe: houSC's, craming grounds) and
reliable:- comrnun icanon and financial nc:rworksj-(hat ter-
rorists ncC'd to plan. train, and conduct thC'ir opc:ratmns. OncC'
C'nrrc:nchOO in a safC' opcnuing C'ft\'lronmC'nr, rhe can begin
ro soltdify and c:xp:md. ThC' tC'rrorisr scrucmrc:, member-
ship, and sC'Curiry dC'tC'rminC' in capabihriC's :md .. .' 14

On the one hand, then, al-Qacda and militant ]slam arc positioned more
generally as multinational nct\vorks that arc diffuse in space, but on the other
hand, thqr arc placed in particular locales-the up to sixt)' countrtes alluded
 II:FHHTO FI IAL S IRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMI SM 51

ro can bc targeted. The fir"St a llows a wide-ranging stratcg)'

of international financial controls, border reinforcement, and global opcn-
rions.115 Much effort has been expende-d on prc\'enting ai-Qaeda from using
"blood" or "conflict" diamoncls, although it is rumored to have most of its
assets in gold, thus rendering this tactic only marginally effC'-etivc. ' 16 ThC'
sec-ond strategy allows for concentration oo particular sitC's. "' TogethC'r, the)'
lead to a policing of flows and Sp<"cific targcting of As Appadurai
has suggested, "because the C'ncmy ,vas named as a global terrorist
itself linkC'd by shadowy mechanisms to nameless other such networks with
tC'ntacles throughout the world, many states WC'rC' able to idmtif}' with such
naming of their own dissidents, antistate acri1rists. and \'iolent minorities.
This was a name with a powerful global constintcncy."
The meaning of the term "al-Qaeda" has been widely discussed. Man}'
have highlighted the ambiguity between its sense of "base" as a territorial
support and the "database" of networkC'-d For Johns and
as well as meaning '"the base' (for jihad or radical action )," it
may also mean "exemplar)' modd." 120 AI-Zawahiri has explicitly linked
these suggesting that "Qaedat aJ-jihad !the base of jihad-i.e.
al Qaeda] remains a base [qaeda] for jihad." 12 1 \Vhat is worth dwelling on
is the foundation of thC' mo\'C'ment. hs origins in the resistance to the Soviets
in Afghanistan is well known, and the linkages to wars in Bosnia and
Chcchnya arc increasing!)' being recognized. The camps in Afghanistan- in
places like Khost, and Zawwhar KUi Al Badr, ncar the Pakistani
border-and in Pakistan itself certainly acted as a node Ln a developing net-
work. Many reports have emergC'd of the transnational makC'up of those
in the camps. In the report of one obsener, thcy indudcd "'Arabs) Paki-
stanis, Afghanis, Bengalis) Indonesians, Jt..falaysians, Turks, and African-
Americans." ' 22
In 1987, in Afghanistan, Russian forocs attacked a camp ncar Kho&t
dtat had been established the previous year. Those present in the camp
were notable. Bin Laden was one, but orhcrs included those involved in
the Riyadh attack in 1995, a person who was killed in Bosnia in 1992.
and another who would surface in Chechnya . For Abou Zahab and Roy,
"thi& battle could to an cxtC'nt be viewe-d as thC' which saw the
foundation of ai-Qacda. " olJ VI/hat is interesting bc)ond the concatena-
tion of forces is the namc of the camp. While many of the camps had
names such as Beit al-Shuhadaa, Beit a i-Ans.ar, and Bcit ai-Salaam-
thc houses of martyrs, companions, and peacem -this camp was called
Masada, which is generally translated as the "lion's den," and is some-
rimes seen as a reference to Osama himself, whose na me also means
52 II:FHHfO FI IAL S IRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM

"lion.'' But the name ''i\1asada" has another resonan<:e, which is that
it is Latiniz.arion of the Hebrew word "Mctzada,'' fortress. The famous
fortress of Masada in contemporary Israel was a site of the mart)'rdom of the
Zealots in the Jewish-Roman war of 72 CE. 111 The idea that bin Laden
would pick a Jewish site seems unusual, unless we sec it as part of his ques-
tionable assertion that " the people of Palestine are pure Arabs and original
Semites. It is the Muslims who arc the inhrritors of Moses (peace be upon
him) and the inheritors of the re<!l Torah that has not been changed. " 1u
What is less well-examined is how much the period of al-Qacda, based
in Sudan bct>vocn 1991 and 1996, was crucial in developing the network
and providing it with a more cohcrenr theorrtical underpinning. Obvi-
ously, the territorial basis at this time was >'try strong until bin Laden
was cxpdlrd in 1996. 1r For a report by the Century Foundation, the key
to understanding its impact is to what it calls "the concentric
circles of ;ihadism." h suggests that the inner circk of a l-Qaeda numbers
in the hundreds. If this is broadened to a i-Qarda-rclatrd groups, it would
include several tens of thousands: if it includes those who "identify with
the iihadist cause or some dements of its idcologr," that would bring in
another number ranging from tens to a few hundred million. But in its
outer circle, it is tlu entire Islamic world. l l:l Purring this another way, it
suggests that only '"an extremely small number (tenths of 1 percent) of
Muslims arc iihadists ... a lthough a growing number may be sympathetic
to one or more aspects of the iihadist agenda such as the establishment of
new governments. " 129
Thus, the relation between the network and the base is central to under-
standing its operations. The much-discussed notion of a state sponsor of
terrorism is only part of the equa tion.uo Many states ar c unable to choose
whether they arc supporting terrorists or not. \'{fhile some commentators
have suggested that the base clement may be less significant, this opinion
is not widely shared. Procyshcn, for example, has suggested that the net-
work strucrure works in opposition to a territorial stmcture, 1' 1 but the
analysis suggests that they a r'C often intcrrwincd, and as chaprcr 3 will
show, the importance of the support of the Tali ban regime in Afghanistan
was crucial, as is its ability to exploit other places such as. Pakistan. This
is the notion of harboring, discussed in part in chapter 1. The Natwnol
Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism makes it dear that this
works in a number of registers;
One: of the: mos1 Importa nt rc:sourcc:s ro c:xtrc:mists is safe: ha,c:n. Safe:
ha\'c:ns provide: the: c:nc:my with rdati\'C: frc:edom ro plan, org,anizc:,
 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM 53

train, resr, and conduct operarions. Safe ha\ens can be physical

or no n-phystcaL Tcrrorisrs benefit from physical safe haven when
slates grant them access to territory, or rhey g,J.in access ro
ungoverned, ill-govern!, or under-go\emed space: within st ..m:s rhar
lack c:fic:cnvc: control over their own rerriror)'. Terrorists sometimes
concc:::tl themsc:lYc:s in remote: hideouts, wnn mimmal contact with
authoriric:s and limite<! access to transponauon and communic.uion
lines. Other ilficir groups, such as insurgents, drug lords, and smug-
glers, a lrc:ad)' identified territory wirh these characrerisrics, and
some groups ma)' artracrivd)' sires to enem)' groups
for financial gam or out of c:thmc, religious, or sympa-
thies. Urban areas ore: also used by rc:rronsts for meeting, planmng,
and hiding in smaller numbers. urban for
such activity shore few characrc=risrics with remote mc:s in
some cases, poor go\ernment control. Non-ph)'sical safe h;.l\'c:ns for
terrorists on c:xast within cyber, linanciol, and lega l S)'stc:ms. These
''virtual" safe h:l\'ens allow enemy networks to enjoy relative freedom
from disruption, as in sancru;Jrtes, since stares often make
them avaalable or arc: unable: to den)' thear use. These ;Jreas mJ.y creore
opponunnies for cooperation by criminal dements and c:xrremisu. 111

The distinction between the physical and nonphysical is revealing, as is

the separation between rural areas, seen as remote, and urban ones. But
what is missing here is an understanding of just how serious the chal-
lenge might be. [n Gunaratna's words, al-Qaeda was distincthe because
it was "the first terrorist group to control a state-the lslamic Emirate
of Afghanistan. " 133 But the destruction of the bases, the physical cle-
ments of support, in Afghanistan and dse\\o'here, havc pushed the orga-
nization to rely .less and less on this, and work more with the virtual.
the decentcred, and the network. This is an issue raised by Benjamin
and Simon:
A sahenr quesrion is wherher ai-Qac:da wall make the: leap from
bricks-and-morLlr statehood ro varrual starc=hood. In AfghaniSI:.an
31-Qaeda WJ.S. m rruth, a st:ne. It conuollc:d ternrory, maintained an
army and waged war, forge:<! alliances, and spmt, and enforced
a S>'Stml of law. The de: facto soverc=tgnt)' ir en joyed in Afghanastan
offered great ad\'antages: a rerritonal base, training f3cilities, and a
secure headquorrc=rs. Bur gi.,en the pombiliry that rhe Unired Stares
would do in Somalia, or U:banon what ir did in Afghanistan,
v1nuaJ holds h:nards than rc:-<:st3bhshmg camps and
trammg facilities where: rhey willanmct rhe terminol gutdancc: sensors
54 II:FHHfOFI IAL SIRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM

o f Amc:rican bombs. Vinualiry has its own ad11anragc:s. A d1spers.:-d

group is harder ro loc:Jte and :mack . LU

Appadurai is therefore not q uite right to suggest that the September 11 ,

2001, a nacks were "a war undertaken by a new type of agt'ncy, a n agen<:y
neither intt'rested in establishing a state nor in opposing any particular
sta te, nor in the relations between states at a iL This was a war against
America, but it was a war against tht' idea that states arc tht' o nly game in
town. "Us But while ProC)shen and Appadur ai may have somewhat exag-
gerated the earlier situation. this has the pott'ntial to bt' the outcome of
the operations. Appadurai rais-es an important question of bounda ries in
relation to terror, suggesting that:
Terrorists blur the line berwec:n mihtar)' a nd civilian space and create
uncertainty about the very boundanes within whtch we t::tke ci11il soci-
efy robe sovt'rc:ign. Terror is a kind of mc:tastasis o f w:H; war withour
spatial o r temporal bounds. Terror divorces war fro m the idc:a of rhe
narion. 1.1o

The extent to which this is true is, of course, debata ble. a nd the same
kinds of questions might be asked of state-led responses in the "war on
terror. Some of these issues will be further t'Xamine.d in subsequent chap-
ters, particularly concerning the interrelation of military and civiJian tar-
gets. And the "'war on terror" is increasingly seen without limits of time
and space- the "global wa r o n terror" or ..the long war."
For the critics associated with the Reto rt project, a range of spatial
scales need to be taken into account. "Islamism is multifo m1, then, and
operates at many le.,els- the global tlmma, the: territoria lly defined nation-
sta te, the urban neighborhood, the kin group, or the: tribe. This in part
explains its appeal, its reach, and its astonishing politica l dynamism. ''' 37
Perhaps only a recognition of the interrelation of these spatial senses c.m
trul}' grasp what is at stake. Neither wholly global o r local, nor straight-
forwardly territorial, and certa inly not entirely detc:rritorializcd. What is
significant then. beyond the particu lar rdation of the net\....ork and the
base, is a range: of spatiaJ imaginaries and practices and their particular
interrelations. For Devji, this has led to a range of new spatial sites. "The
ruin, the cave, a nd the battlefield as sites of holy war and martyrdom have
b}' their vc:ry currenC)' become: the a r'Cnas of a globaJ [slam, displacing in
this respect the shrine, tomb and hair city of past. "I J.J WhiJc their argu-
ment is general, Abdel Sa lam and de Waal's suggestion that "it is probable
that no theorization of this group can capture its historical spccificit)',
is particular!}' the case spatia lly.
 II:FHHTO RIAL S IRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMI SM 55

SUite SovereJgnty and Space1S of Exception

The que-stion of the camp invites further attention. The d)namic bet-
ween terror, the state, and territory is particularly crucia l here. To
what extent can the terrorist training camp be understood as a ''space
of exception," the term imroduccd into conremporary discussions b)'
the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agambcn? Agamben's anal}sis of the
camp, by which he means the concentration camps of Nazi Germany,
has alrcad}' proved a model for analysis of some of the spatial issues in
thc "war on terror."
Most of the work using his idcas, particularly in his book Homo
has focused on tvm particular sites: Guantanamo Bar and Abu
Ghraib. 1 1 In the first, the United States believed that thc ambiguous geo-
graphical status of the naval base---either in U.S. sovereign territory or
in that of anothcr state--would translate into a legal grar arc-a. Thus,
the United State-s believed it could operate there outside both U.S. and
international law. 142 The situation in Abu Ghraib is rather different, but
Agamben's ideas ha\'e been used to make sense of the legal geographies
of the atrocities carried out by U.S. soldiers and prhate contractors in the
prison. His work can equally be brought to bear on the scandals around
CIA prisons in Eastern European countries and the notion of "extra.-
ordinary rendition. " 14 ' In each of these specific places, what is at stake
is how the relation benvocn sovereign power and territor)' can become
more intensified in particular sites. This is what Agamben calls the "space
of exception," developing the ana lysis of the "state of exoeption"' by the
German jurist Carl Schmitt. 144
A "state of exception" is an extraordinary legal moment, made pos-
sible by a number of state constitutions, where the normal rule of law is
suspended. This is usually a state of emergency declared in the face of a
national catastrophe such as Y.ridesprcad civil disorder, natural disaster,
or an attack from another state. ln the current constitution of France,
fo r example, Article: 16 states that the President of the Republic may take
all necessary mcasuJes "when the institutions of the Republic, the inde-
pendence: of the nation, the integrity of its territor)', or the execution of
its international commitments are seriously and immediately threatened
and the: regular functioning of the constitutional public powers is inter-
rupted. "s Article 16 has been used only once, by Charles de Gaulle dur-
ing the war in Algeria, from April 23 to 29, 1961. However,
Agamben claims that Western democracies have tended to brpass the:
actual declaration of a "statt' of exception" through a more general and
cffectivt' extension of their powers. He suggests that we have seen the
56 II:FHHTOFI IAL S IRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMI SM

generalization of the paradigm of security as the normal

technique of gmernment.'" 4 " The extraordinary fM'Wers granted to Bush
on September 14, 2001, and the of the USA PATRJOT Act, as
discussed in chapter 1, would serve as potent examples. Yet these have
a of parallels at other times of supposed often, in
fact, that it is difficult to sec just how exceptional these situations arc. It
is imporrant ro just how useful the idea of a "'state of
exception" actually is. French Fifth Republic constitution was born
out of "emergency": de Gaulle took power in 1958 on the express basis
that he be granted six months of emergency powers while proposing a
constitution to replace that of the Fourth Republic (a constitution he
had opposed since its inception
In Schmitt's analysis, it is the sovereign that on the exception, " 14 3
and this is his key definition of sovereignt}' [t is the sovereign who rules
when the standard operation of law must be suspended. Agamben,
Schmitt's ideas but suggesting that this has been more exten-
sively gcncraliud, argues that the temporary suspension can often become
permanent:
Tbe camp IS lire splice which is opened wlum the state of f'xceptioll
bt."gins to become the rule. In the camp, the sr;are of cxceprion, w hjch
was essentially a tempo.r;l.r)' of ordering [ordinamentoj on
the basas o f a factual of d.:anger, is now given :.1 permanent spatial
arrangement, which such nevenhdess outside rhe normal
o rdering.

This is an analysis that he particularly applies to the concentration and

extermination camps of Nazi Germany, and paradigmatically Auschwitz. uo
German Weimar Constitution was dfoctivcly suspended in 1934
with the passing of the Enabling Act- a law to deal with the "'Emergency
of the People and the ReiciJ"-allowing Hitler not onlr to pass laws
directly, but also to break with the constitution. The argument is then
made that the Nazi camps were the spatia l extension of this legal usurpa-
tion. Yer Article 48 of rhe \'(fdmar Constitution had used extensively
before Hider, so in some respects, Hider was continuing and extending
previous state practice rather than radically breaking with it.' s1 Indeed,
Neoclcous notes that "'exception" is perhaps a misleading term, because
the declaration of states of emergency is often, paradoxicallr. rather
commonplace. Instead, he makes a compelling argument for stressing the
notion of "emergency," noting that the extraordinary powers claimed arc
strategically inherent in the operations of political power, only to emerge
when tacticall> useful. m
 II:FHHTO FI IAL S IRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMI SM 57

One thing that is crucial in the Nazi camps is their conccrn with thc
management of life and death itself, which Agambcn, fo.llowing Michel
Foucault, c.alls "biopolitics." Agambcn thcrcforc claims that rhc camp
is "the ptuc, absolutc, and impassable biopolitkal space (insofar as it is
founded solely on thc state of exception).'' It thus appt".ars "as the hidden
paradigm of the political space of modernity. "U The question of biopoli-
tics and its rdation ro politic.al space is a crucial issue, While biopolitics is
essemial in the anal ysis of the "war on terror," there can sometimes be a
tendency to follow Foucault in seeing too straightforward a shift from a
supposcdlr earlier "territorial politics" to a contemporary
The analysis herr, while focusing on the territorial politics of thr "war on
trrror" sees rhis as part of a more complementary anal>sis. m The question
of "humanitarian intervention" and the management of life and death in
camps-cdugcc, internmrnt, or training-have sign ificant territorial cle-
ments. Other questions analyzed in this book-the spatial izcd issue of
contagion and contamination, for inst.ancc-havc significant biopolitical
dements. The territorial and thc biopolitical exist, and must therefore be
analyzed, together. More specifically, we should ask if Ag.ambc:n's failure
to provide a coherent account of the state demonstrates a more signifi'Cant
weakness in accounting for the relation of sovereignty to territory. .10
This is because while the camp may be his fundamental cxamplc, as
Agambcn himself notes, it is not the only possible "'space of excoeption, '' r-
The issues he raises about the relationship bct>vcen sovereign power and
space can potentially be used more broad ly in an anal)sis of territorial
issues, particularly in terms of the relationship so\ereignty and
trrritorr. What is crucial to rcmcmbc-r is that Agambcn's point is both his-
torically focused and geograph ically bounded. His important claim con-
cerning the relation of sovereign power to its location can be broadened,
as he suggests, but this is only possible if we introduoc both historical and
geographical spccificit)' into any extension to othrr spaces. Al:so, it is cru-
cial to interrogate the particular configuration of soverC"ign power in each
casr. In addition, we must remember that Agambcn's argumrnts arc about
a particular kind of camp that he finds significant, and that there is a risk
that hr mercmpha:siz.es the exceptional nature of it.ls It is essential to
rcxogniu that the Nazis appropriated an earlier model of the c.amp from
colonial practice and used it in at least two distinct ways: thC' concentra-
tion camps, which were used as administrative tools to deal with domestic
opponents and those deemed medically degenerate, and the later eA"termi-
narion C'amps. It is the first of these that provides a modd for contempo-
rarr analrses, not the second. The crucial thing, as Mcz:zandra points out,
is that these camps drny the "right to mobility.
58 II:FHHTOFI IAL S I RAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMI SM

Edkins, for has. shown how Agambcn 's. can be

usdul in understanding faminc-rclid camps and the camps set up by the
North Atfamic Organization (NATO) during the Kosovo con-
flict in Nlaccdonia. .o "Humanitarian spaces" such as these, and those
deployed in conflicts in Iraq, Rwa nda, and Bosnia an interesting
to throrists of political Humanitarian spaces-
variously coded as "safe havens," "areas,'' or "zones''-are set
up as a response to events such as genocide, refugees, famine, or war, and
attempt to institutionalize a state of protection in more than a merely
transitory way. Although they arc unlikely to be permanent, their tem-
porary nature can be quite long-term, because they a rc designed to be in
place until the situation is and the suspension of the nom1
be ended. Agamben contends that the camp appears when the balance
between the ordering of the state and its loca lization-that is, between
soverdgnty and tcrritory- "enters a period of permanent crisis and the
state decides to undertake the management of the biological life of the
nation directly as its own
\Vhat we have in humanitarian spaces of exception is an intervention
from beyond, where the international communit}' take-s the role of the
sta te away from it while prescn'ing its territorial extent. When a state is
exercising the ''monopoly of legitimate physical within its ter-
ritory, grave human rights abuses may result. Sim ilarly, when a state is
unable to do this because of the existence of other dements, such as under
a civil war or in the case of a "failed state,"' protection of the people may
be equally impossible. Genocide and refugees thus produce rather differ-
ent situations. One is due to particular state practices., the other to the
collapse of state structures.t6J In the first case of human rights abuses,
the state's territorial intcgrit}' is sustained and indeed makes the repres-
sion possible, while in the second case of inabilit) to rule, the state is
clearl}' not in effective control of its territory. In this way, then, Agam ben's
description of the logic of the camp as a particular instance of a "space of
exception" is productive in the way humanitarian spaces
operate both within the existing state (thus allowing territorial preserva-
tion) and as a limit to the sovereign power of the state (thus limiting the
extent of its power and its territorial soverdgnty).
\Vhat is important to underline is that the humanitarian establish-
ment of a particular space is itsdf a so\ereign act. The United Nations
or NATO makes a sovereign decision concerning the spatial extent of the
monopoly of legitimate violence. It decides the "spac,e of exception,"' and
manage-s the biological lives of the people it seeks to enclose. Indeed, as
Agambcn has noted, the way humanitarian organizations conoci\e of life
 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRA II:GII:S 01- I SLAMISM 59

means that they ''maimain a secret solidarity with the: \ery powers thc:r
ought to fight." IM
par::Jdo:\ical srams of camp as 3 space o f muS be
considered. camp is a piece o f (errimry placed ourside no rma l
jund1cal bur it IS ne\err.hclcss nor simply :m exrem31space.
Whar is excluded in camp is, according ro rhc etymological of
the term (ex-capereJ, take11 for capruredl outside,
through irs own exdus10n. 1r.l

Terrorist training camps, o r more broadly, the spaces in which the)' oper-
ate, demonstrate a rather different problem. Whereas Aga mbcn's para-
digma tic example: demonstrates an intens ifkation of sovereign power and
humanitarian safe a reas impose an international presence as a putativcl)'
neutral sovereign, these camps operate in nominally sovereign space, due
to either the tacit consent or ineffective control of the sovereign power.
The absence of sovC'rcigmy in particular places can therefore a lso been
sccn as an exception. In fac t, given that there is no longer anrthing ver}'
exceptional about "states of .. with the generalization of the
phmomC'na to the point where thC' standard operation of law is con-
CC'rnc:d with C'mergenq, it is perhaps the absC'nce of soverdgnty over
territory itself that is thC' break w ith the norm. YC't rnthC'r than being
cx-rraterritoria l spaces like Guantanamo, these: arC' inrraterritorial spaces.
These places therefore demonstrate the suspension of sovereign control
through absence rather than its intensification through exC'cutive deci-
sion. ThC' obvious example' of this is, of course, AfgJ1anistan, but it can
be extended to a number of in Africa and the greater J\liddle East.
What these spaces illustrate is that the sovereig nt)/tcrritory relationship
has broken down. At times, this is created through the ume<)listic impo-
sition or maintenance of fixed territorial containers for sovereign power.
Yet at other times, these camps operate: within the borders of supposed!)'
strong states within Europe or North America. This is a point Derrida
made eloquently:
As for smres thm .. ha rbor" rerrorist nerworks. ir is diffu:uJ( to iden-
tify rhem as such. The Unitro .Srares and Europe, london and Berlin.
:1re J.lso pl.1ces o f rramin g or formarion a nd information
for all the o f the world. No geograph)', no '"terrirori:1l"
derermmation, is rhus perrinem an)' longer for locaring the seat of rhcs.c
new rcchnolog1es of transforma(ion o r aggrrssion.... The rclarion-
ship eanft. terra, remtory and terror has changed, :1nd it IS
necessary to know t h.ar this 1s because of rhor is, because of
JU
60 II:FHHTOFI IAL SIRA II:.GII:S 01- I SLAMISM

ThC' point about thC' genC"raliz.ation of sanctuaries is usdul, bm thC' rda-

tion be-tween territory and terror is somewhat overdra'A'll, and the link to
technosciC'nCC' potentially misleading. It is problematic be-cause, with the
exception of new te-chnologies that hae helped communications, the
material supports for terrorist networks arc not especial!)' new or modern .
Some training camps Op<"ratc within Western cities and arc closer to much
oldC'r idC'as of safe houses, or the idC'a of a cell. The idC'as con\cyed by the
word "cell" is particularly interesting. with thC' multiple rC'sonancC's of a
prison, a place of monastic isolation, and an clement of a larger organ-
ism. Much U.S. policy-including, notably, the PATRlOT Act-has been
predkatC'd on the number of terror cells operating within the contincntal
UnitC'd State's, but generally thcse have not acmall}' been discovercd. 16-
0nce again, there is a carefully constructed operation of threat. In
Donald Rumsfdd's words to the U.S. Armed Forces in May 2001, "wc
may not know precisely who our adversarics may be or precisel y what
challenges they will posc, but we do know that challenges to freedom arc
unending. Your task is to defend }'Our nation against thc unknown, the
uncertain, the unseen, and thc unexpected." 161 As Devji comments:
arc these= unknown, unseen, unc:xpc:'Cted, and even, for
the momc:m, non--ex istent adversaries? They arc enemies wh.o inhabit
the of the posr-Cold era. To idetni(y rhcm wirh
l\lushms or Islam mtglu be comfornng because It allows du: da ngers of
thas new world to be loc:J iizcd castigated Ln a single name, bur it ts
also shon-sightcd and dangerous, since rhe iilMd onl)' ina ugurarcs thts
new world of d:J ngcrs b) pro,iding an cx:tmple of what else ma)' come
to

These strategies therefore link to thosc constructions of the post-Cold War

world dis.cusscd in chaptC'r l. While for some rime after September 11,
2001, there was a fe-eling that ai-Qaeda was in disarray, more recently it
has experienced a resurgence. A numb<:r of factors contribute to this. One
is that the U.S. invasion of Iraq radicalized a whole generation of new
re-cruits; another is that this invasion has dep leted U.S. forces fTom Afghan-
istan, and turned its focus dsewhere. But thC' rc<tsons have more ro do with
the way that ai-Qaeda did nor function in the way that the UnitC'd States-
led responses expected it to function. This was the point made above con-
cerning the role of bin Laden. His importance is not as an organizational
lcade[, or ef'en as a commentator on new events. Rather, it is as an idea, as
an inspiration. The organizational structure of al-Qaeda is loos.e enough to
allow a grc-<tt deal of operational autonomy, cven if ai-Qaeda itself is not
as dcccntraliud as is sometimes suggested. But more importantly, a whole
 II:FHHTO FI IAL S IRAII:GII:S 01- I SLAMI SM 61

rangc: of sc-miconnected groups now function as conduits for these- ideas

and principles. Thus, imagined geographies of aJ-Qaeda as a "terrorist net-
work" that blurs the boundaries between outside and inside only partial!)'
grasp the natme of its construction as a real and imagined opponent. The
territorial issues tend to be underplayed, not merely in terms of the terri-
torial base-s in which they operate, but also in terms of the wider issues of
tc:rritorial control b)' nonstare organizations. They should therefore cau-
tion us against seeing al-Qaeda in nonrerritorial terms or as indicative of
some wider detcrritorialization.
Political geographers hae thus perhaps been too willing to suggest
a generalized model of Agambcn 's "space of exception.'' In utilizing a
model, it is always essential to provide an inrerrogation of the
particularities of the specific situation and to question whcthc:r the model
of a concentration of SO\'crcign power is always appropriate. If we arc
to usC' Agambcn 's insights concern ing the relation of force to sire and of
power oveT space to understand terrorist training camps or the territorial
strategies of Islamism more generally, we must recognize that places arc
exploited when there is an absence or weakness of SO\'ercign power rather
than an intensification of such power. Jvluch has been made, therefore,
of the way in which al-Qaeda has exploited the ungoverned or so-called
undcrgO\erncd spaces of the world, those places where tcrrirorial sov-
erc:ignry is linle morc: than a myth.-u AI-Qaeda's invo.lvcmenr in Yc:men
and Afghanistan was tied to civil wars, and the situation in Sudan and
Somalia of fractional politics or sc-.cession opened up spaces that could
be exploited. As Agnew notes, "works across state boundaries
while exploiting the lack of territorial sovcrc:ignty exercised by some of
its host states (such as Pakistan). " This is the trope of rhc "weak'' or
"failed" state, discussed in chapter 3.
This page intentionally left blank
 CHAPTER THREE

Rubble Reduced to Dust

Targeting Weak States

This chapter looks in more detail at the impact of the move to target states
that "harbor"' terrorist groups. Drawing on arguments made Ln the previ-
ous chapter, it shows that these arc states where the supposedly im iolable
relation between sovereignty and territory has broken dovm. They thercb)'
expose the sovt"rcign fiction on which the United Nations is constructed,
namely, that every state is in control of its own territory and therefore has
territorial sovereignty within its bounda ries and equal smereignt}' outside
them. These hne be-en described as "weak"' or "failed'' states- terms
whose invocation L5 often used as a prelude to intervention of some kind-a
further compromise of territorial smercignty. Ghcn the attempt to preserve
a monopoly of state power, these states arc socn as challenges to the e.:dst-
ing international system in two main ways: they threaten the structure of
international law and they provide oppornmitics for nonstate actors to base
and to mobilize. They show that not aJJ stat es control their terri-
tory, and that nonstatc actors somctimes c.an. The second provides for a par-
adoxical response. \Vhile the ideal of a sovereign state in complete control of
its territory is aspired to, a state that fails to control its own territory can find
its smereignty as a whole challenged. Thus, the two challenges arc related:
the failure of a state to live up to certain imposed responsibilities and obliga-
tions fmther unravels the relation between territory and sovereignty.
In recent years, powerful states ha\'e claimed that the traditional right to
noninterference in domestic affairs should be limited. of popu-
lations was used to justify international intervention Ln Bosnia, Kosovo,
and East Timor. and was indfcctivcl}' discussed in relation to Rwanda.
Following the 1991 Gulf \Var, Allied forces established no-fly zones in the
north and south of Iraq, ostensibly to protect civilian populations. Other
64 RUBBLI: RHlUCED ro DUS I

interventions, such as those in Somalia in the early 1990s or Sierra Leone

at the end of the have been understood in this way, as "humani-
tarian intervention." U.S., British, and other forces fre.quen dy undertook
intervention missions, and sometimes the United Nations sanctioned these
actions. Thus, the principle of inter\'rntion in the sovereign affairs {and
thrrdore the territory) of independent states has inm::asingl)' become an
accepted pan of inrernational relations- nor simply a normal pan, but
one that is argued for and justifird by several high-level panels and reports
for the United Nations.
Yet these interventions were not simply bocause of a desire to protrct
ci\'ilian populations. Often there were widrr issues a t stake, with a frar of
instability in the wider region or the world in general. This was because
states that were deemed to have collapsed were perceived "as thrrats to
international Surity in the broadest sense of the word-as breeding
grounds for disease, refugee flows, arms traffidcing, transnational crime,
environmenta l destruction, regional instability and other problems."'
If states arc usually understood as power conraincrs, these can only be
leaky ones, where the absences within can lead to a spread of danger out-
side. A state that is not in full control of its territory can lead to impacts
beyond those boundarks. We can :sec this exportation of problems from
Sierra Leone to Liberia and the Ivory Coast, and now the reersc; the rela-
tion between events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda,
and Burundi; Afghanistan and Pakistan; and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.2
These arc therefore the kinds of places that Robert Kaplan anal)zed as
part of his ''coming anarchy."
How to deal with these kinds of problems \\o'as one of the key issues
in the post-Cold War world, particularly for the Clinton adminimation .
One option was to try to enclose the problem, transferrLng the contain-
ment method from the Cold Wa r. A method that had been conceived as a
way of preventing the fu rther extension of communism was now poten-
tially a method "to ha lt the spread of anarchy. '"J Yet as chapter 1 showed,
many commentators suggested this kind of thinking was redundant, that
there needed to be a suc.ccssor idea to containment. The proposed solution
was that of integration: incorporation into a set of shared rules and val-
ues. Thus, while states that arc seen as "weak," "failed," or "collapsed"
may initially be targeted to deal with an immediate problem, the longer
term solution is seen as integrating them into-or in rarer cases back
into---global society.
Since 2001, these arguments ha..,c been extended to a number of other
states that ha..,.e been portrayed as unstable and therefore da ngcrous.
While Afghanistan was certainly portrayed in that way before the 2001
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 65

invasion, it has cominuc.d to be described in that way, as has neighboring

Pakistan. Iraq was seen as a danger for other reasons, before the invasion,
bur the collapse of effective wuraliz.cd territorial control after the inva-
sion has created something rather different. States increasingly usc simi-
lar arguments to deal with their own concerns. Aside from the regional
claims of India, Russia, and China, there arc plenty of othcr cxamples. In
Cyprus, there have been claims that the north is acting as a base for ter-
rorists, particularly Chcchens. Nonh Cyprus is constructed as a lawless
space because it is not rccogniz.cd except by Turkey. and maps produccd
in the south a ll ha \e "'arca under Turkish occupation" marked, instead of
any other form of annotation. The key is whose interests might be servcd
by such stories, although gicn the proximity of Cyprus to the Levant and
its 2004 membership in thc European Union, it is not surprising to find
that the U.S. Department of State notes that "the United States is work-
ing closdy with C)prus in the 'war on terror.' A Mutual Lcgal Assistance
Treaty, which has in force since September 18, 2002, facilitates bilat-
eral cooperation. "4 Similar claims were made by the Unitc.d States that
the Marxis t group FARC in Colombia had rccehcd training in ai-Qacda
camps, although these were later
Other states that ha,re come under simila r pressure from the Unitcd
States and its allies include Sudan and Yemen, while Lebanon's 2006 crisis
was for precisely this reason. Simjlarly, it is unsurprising that Somalia and
the Horn of Africa more generally have become a key focus. \Vhile these
kinds of states had intervention previously for humanitaria n relief and
violations of human rights, in the conte:-.1: of the "war on terror, " the jus-
tifications for intervention within nominal state territory arc broadened.
The two key instances arc the pursuit of weapons of mass dcstm<:rion and
allowing terrorist groups to operate within the territory. It is important
then to recognize that the "war on terror" is not a radical break from pre-
vious practice-in key aspc-ets, it i& a continuation, at the very least in the
logic of intencnrion itself.
The kind of states where intervention has occurred is sign ificant. States
such as Iraq, Ira n, S}rria, Libya, and North Korea ha\'e been the focus of
attention for their pmsuit of weapons of mass destruction. Other state&-
including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon. Yemen , Sudan, and Somalia-
ha..,c been seen as allowing nonstate actors to operate within their terri-
tory. In the language of contemporary internationa l relations, these arc
"strong" and "weak" states-i n this case, the former arc where a con-
siderable part of the state's resources arc diverted to the building up of
weapons arsenals; the latter arc where the absence of effective territorial
control in wholc or part of the states enables alternative concentrations
66 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I

of power. Ignatieff has described these lamr states as ha..ing an ''inability

to maintain a monopol) of the internal means of violence.''" Iraq, and
before it, Serbia, were rather different: states that were centra lly con-
trolled though contending against separatist movements (the Kurds or
the Kosovars), but thereby failing to protect the rights of the people, and
more importantly, c hallenging U.S. hegemony.- While "strong " states can
be treated as comcntional enemies, "weak" states req uire rather differ-
ent
Yet even this listing demonstrates the difficulty of drawing such lines.
Iraq may have been a "strong'' state in some respects before the over-
throw of the Baathist regime in 2003, but in other respects, it:s provision
of services made it exccptiona ll) weak. Its repression of the ciilian popu-
lation indicated a strong state a pparatus, but large parts of the countr)',
notably the Kurdish north, were outside its control. Since 2003, the weak-
ness of the state government has enabled a splintering of political author-
ity and territorial control. North Kore<t can barclr feed its people or run
an efficient electricity suppl)'. Pakistan has nuclear we<tpons and operates
in many respects as an cffccti\e state, yet the key concern of the United
States today is its ineffective territo rial control in some areas. This is there-
fore a question not merely of the preservation of territorial extent, but
effective control within it. John Agnew has therefore noted that it is the
latter tha t dC'termines rule and stability: " In other words, effecJive soller-
eignt) is not 11ecessarily predicoted and defined b) the strict tmd fixed
territorial boundaries of ir1diuidual sfotes. " ' It is essentia l to rc.cognizc
that the international legal term of territorial integrity requires both ter-
ritorial preservation or inviolability and territorial sovcreignt}', though a ll
too often the international community invokes it onlr to mean the former.
This is despite the importance of territoriaJ control even when borders arc
preserved and the possibility of nonstate actors using that territory for
particula r purposes.
Thus the argument is made that that today wea k or failing states arc
often as much of a threat as strong or rogue states. The Natio11ai Sea1rit)'
Strategy of the U11ited States of America makes this clear: "America is
now threatened less by conquering states than we arc by failing ones. \V.lc
arc menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastro phic technologies in
the hands of the embittered few. " 10 This is a theme elaborated in the U.S.
military and defense stratcg)' documents:

T here: exists an ' arc of Lnsrobilit)'" snerching from the H emi-

sphere:, t hro ugh Afnca and the Ensr and extending to As1a.
T here: a re areas m t his arc char S(:fVe as grounds for rhrc::ns
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 67
to our interesTS. \V1thin areas rogue pro111o:k sancruaq
to rerrorisrs, prorecring mem from and arrack. Orher
adversanes ad\amage of ungo\erned space and under-governed
territories from which rhey prepare plans, train forces and Llunch
anacks. These ungoverned are::.s often coincide wirh locarions of ilhcir
acti111ries; such coincidence opponuniric:s for hosrilc: coahrions
of elements ideologiCal exrrem1sts. 11

The absence of c:ffecti\e go\c:rno nce m many ports of rhe world cre-
ates for tc:rronsts, criminals, and msurgents. :Mony stares
are unable, in some: cases unwilhng, to exerc1sc: effecti\'e control
O\'er their rc:rritory or frontiers, thus le-.111ing are-.1.s open ro hostile
exploitation.
Our experience in me: war on rc:rrorism poinrs ro the need ro reorient
our mlhtar)' capabilities ro conrc:nd with such irregular challenges more
effc:ctl\'d). 1l

Several political science commentators ha\'C de\dopcd these themes.

One of the most sustainc<J set of anal)scs has been offered by Robert
I. Rotbcrg, who has directc<l a program at H arvard and is the president of
the World Pc.1ce Foundation . Earlier analyses of weak states tended to sec
them in a continuum from 1nini-statcs to superpowers in terms of power
and cconomics. 11 The newer work dc,dops different themes. In a series
of pieces, and particularly in edited volumes on these themes, RotbCTg has
proouced a set of definitions and propositions.
Rotbcrg offers a continuum of weak, failed, a nd collaps.c:d states. He
contends that effective government is about providLng political goods, the
most fundamental of which is security. Security, fo r Rotbcrg, is both of
the nation-the population---and of territory, and this is a means to pro-
vide both internal and cx"tcrnal order.' 4 The spatial clements of a failure
to prO\idc this are pronounced:
In contrast w strong smtes, failed states cannot control their borders.
They lose: authority over chunks of territory. Ofrc:n, rhe expression of
official power is limited too capita l cit)' a nd one or more cthnicall)
specific zones. Indeed, one measure: of the extent of a state's fuilure is
how much of the state's geographical expanse a 11,0\'emmenr genuinely
controls. How nominal is the central govern mem's swa )' o\c:r rural
towns, roads, and waterways? \'(lho really rul es up<ounuy, or in
parttcular d1sranr districrs?li

Failed states thus arc unable to "project power'' cffcctivC'ly and may col-
lapse entirely. These states ..C'xhibit a vacuum of authority; they a rc "black
holes into which failed politics have fallen. He describes Somalia as
68 RUBBLI: RHlUCED ro DUS I

"a merC' hollow geographical exprC'ssion---dc:void of national government

lif not of gmcrnance) ....- For Phil Cerny, such states arc '"gray zones,"
which can be similarly understood as "geographical areas and social con-
texts where the ruiC' of law docs not run." 1K What is revealing is the stress
on the geographical, even as the spatial monopoly of violence is precisely
in question. The question of "'territorial control" is one of the axes of
the "' typology of state health " proposed by one of Ro rbcrg's collabora-
tors; rhc o ther is " provision of public services."' This gi.,c:s four kinds of
states-strong, weak, fragmented, and failed. Menkhaus similar]}' shows
how the territorial aspect is crucial. Some states exhibit what he calls
" territorial collapse.'' where thcr have lost c"Dntrol of some terrain and
have left the others fai l to have e-ffective control even where: they arc
present ( ..collapse of governing ca pacity ") . Some sta tes sha re both char-
acteristics. Other states might have cffectl\'C control. but from nonstate
organizations_,the rise of sub-sta te politics.zo What is pa rticular]}' signifi-
ca nt in his ana lysis is the sepa ration of territorial failure: and ineffective
sovereignty, even if they arc effecti\cly intcrlinked. 21
Rotberg therefore contends that "'understanding the dynamics of nation-
sta te fa ilure" and "strengthening weak nation-states in the developing
world has consc.quently assumc<J new urgency" in the "war on terror."22
This is to prevent their becoming failed states, or collapsing entirely. The
Century Foundatio n's report De{eati11g the ]ihadists makes ver)' similar
suggcstions. 2J [n their obsequious ongoing program of work on behalf
of the Association of Amc:rican Geographers, Cutter, Richardson, and
Wilbanks suggest that of the " priority rese""<lrch issues,'' number one is:

How has pobric:1 l conrrol of for lack iostcrcd

rcrronsm? In wh:n (Fun.cnonal, policy,
terrorism? 1s t he rcgion:1 l space
of rnro rism and ho w do rcrrironal ideolog1es ch:mge it? How do
st:Jtdt'SS zones shift their through rime, through changing
cn\'ironmentJ l conditions, and populanon m1gmnons?2

There are therefore tv.o key a rguments made by the United States, its
allies, and complicit political scientists. These states may be a problem for
what happens within their territory, but also for how the}' may affect their
neighbors. or those further afield. The)' arc "catalysts, havC'ns, a nd incu-
bators of other threats. '' 25 On this logic, states under threat emanating
from such places claim tht:)' arc justified in ta king action within or against
them. Of cowsc, the human tragedy is that the occupants of these areas
become victims from both sides. Cerny suggests that the " territorial and
authorita tive boundaries" of such targeted states "wJll cffecti\d y become
 RUBBL I: REDUCED ro DUS I 69

more fluid," even though "of course, legal sovereignt}' is not fom1allr
threatened, state borders still appear as real lines on the map, and guaran-
tees of diplomatic re.cognition and of membcrship in certain international
institutions remain. " lo \Ve have here a clear instance of how territorial
integrity is split apart, in that there is a call for the preservation of exist-
ing territorial settlements but an insistence on wholly contingent sover-
eignqr. The stress on territorial preservation is enforced most strongl)' at
the very time territorial SO\'ereignty is disrupted. Territorial sovereignty is
challenged b)' both nonstate actors and by intervention, but while territo-
rial preservation is e.qually cha llcngcd by the first, it is fully reinforced by
the sccond. In this context, it is worth rccalling that a lmost all thc groups
on the: U.S. Department of Statc's list of terrorist organizations arc sclf-
deternlination mo\ements, 2 ' a linkage that is pursued in chapter 5.
The claim of the strategic importance and security danger of weak states
is common within both the official U.S. security, ddense, military, and
strategy documents, as wdl as in more popular accounts
of the new rules in the '"'global war on terror." In the Bush expansion
of Jefferson's "empire of liberty".l.ll- another tcmporallsparial/political
marker-there is inherently no limit. As Gaddis de-scribes this logic, thc
United States "can no longer rcspcct the: smcrcignty of m1y statc that har-
bors terrorists; it must preempt such threats wherever they appear; it will
extend democracy cvcf}'\Vhcre. Alain Finkiclkraut has described this as
the " idealism of democratic contagion. " 30
The substantive focus of this. chapter is on four such sites in thc "war
on terror." The is perhaps the: most obvious: Afghanistan. This is fol-
lowed b)' examinations of Pakistan, Lebanon, and Somalia. Each of thesc
states faced a choicc: Cooperat e with the Unitcd States or be hddl account-
able, and thus targeted, for the actions of nonstate actors operating from
within rour territory. As thc Natio11ai Strategy for Terrorism
suggests, the a im of the United States is to "den}' further sponsorship,
support, and sanctuary to terrorists by ensuring other states accept their
re-sponsibilities to tal::c action against these international th reats within
thcir sovereign territory.',3 1 In each of these places, the complete- or par-
tial absem:e of smereign power has been rc:scripted as a global danger,
justifying intcrvc:ntion. V:'hile the " ln unanitarian spaces " established in
places likc norrhcrn Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda sought to prescrve thc
state's nominal territorial cxtent }' C:l fundamentally challenged its terri-
torial solcreignty; the existence of te-rrorist training camps is seen as a
failure- of a state's dut}' to act in particular ways. While territo ria l extent
might be prc:scncd in theory. a state that cannot dfcctivcl)' control its own
territOr}' also cannot sccurt' its borders. When thc sovereignty/territor)'
70 RUBBLI: REOUCED ro DUS I

relation breaks down, exposing one of thC' fundamC'ntal structural fictions

of the international legal system, intervention is frequently nvift to follow.
ThC' absence of sovereign control within a state can lead ro instabi lity our-
side' its borders, both in tem1s of immediate' neighbors but also potC'ntially
farther afield.

Afghanistan: Unseadng the Tallban

This was something that the United Sta tes and its allies were slow to real-
iz.c: in relation to Afghanistan. The role of the United States, particularly
former National Security Advisor Brzezinski, in fomenting a nti-Soviet
feeling in thC' 1970s was noted in chapter 1, but the other great powC'rs
have intervened in this region many timC'S over the centuries. In the late
twentieth century, it became one of the last battlegrounds of the Cold War
following the So\'tet invasion. The Soviet Union was re luctant to send
troops from its own Asian republics, fearing that t hey would sympathize
more with the Afghans than with Moscow, so thc)r sent forces from Russia
and the European Soviet republics. The Soviet Union had its own prob-
lems with and other minorities, partly complicated by the way
Stalin had drawn the borders of the republics in centra l Asia to ensure that
rherC' were minorities in each republic and often to separate' major cities
from c:ach other through physical o r political geography.n This tactic had
benefits in preenting signifi<:ant challengC'S to Moscow, but it
a lso has had lasting implications. One of these is the link betv,recn opposi-
tion to Russia in Che"hnya and fighters from Afghanistan.n
Throughout the 1980s, the United States armed the mujahidin, seeing
a victOr}' in the SoviC't withdrawal in 1989. The Soviet retreat ldt a vac-
uum in the state, however, which was filled with a long civil war where:
global and regional powers continued to intervene. The Taliban emerged
as a major power in 1996 with Pakistani support, unifying Is lamic forces
in the coumrr and capturing KabuL Russia a nd Iran armed the anri-
Taliban forces, while the UnitC'd State's continued to give support to the
muiahidin and succC'Ssor groups after the Soviet withdra wal. Other pow-
en; backed anti-Taliban forces, including the centra l A&ian republics of
the former Sovic:t Union, India, and Turkey. U.S. interests in stability in
the country were soon trumped by a concern over international terror-
ism. These powers were therefore continu Lng to usc Afghanistan as a sur-
Russia was particula rly concerned that the Ta li ban could spread
its influence bC}'ond "the old frontiers of the former Soviet empire. " Js
While there was undoubtedly an clement of paranoia in this, which trades
on exactly the same fears that led to the Soviet invasion in 1979, the
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 71

Ta liban did have a loose affiliation with fore ign fighte rs. So while it is
generally acknowledged that the Taliban itself d id not have a foreign
policy beyond its links to Pakistan, nor was it planning fo reign inter-
ventions because it wanted to sort out itr. internal politics first, J.6 Abou
Zahab a nd Roy note that they were bound to foreign \'olunteers in two
ways. First, they used such \'olunteers- themsclvcs often a remnant of
anti-Soviet m11;ahidi11- in their own second, they "provided
space within their territor) fo r tra ining camps for foreign volunteers." r
These volunteers had links to conflicts elsewhere across the world, includ-
ing Cht'-ehnya and Bo.snia.J1
While the United States had launched cruise missile attacks on
Afghanistan in 1998, ir ne\'er planned a more concerted ass<lult on the
country at that time. These attacks may have been entirely co unterpro-
ducti'le, becausc as Marsden argues, the pan-Islamism of the Taliban and
its links to radical groups in Pakista n date from those attacks, leadi ng to
closer association with Osama bin Laden.Jll Negotiations in 1998-1999
had yielded no resulrs. 40 Spec ial Forces missions had been discussed under
Clinton but had never been put into practice. 41 The standard account is
that September tl , 2001, changed e\'er)thing for the George W. Bush
administration, but the pattt'rns of action seem to indicatt' more of a con-
tinuity with prt'Vious policy. Although the CIA and Special Forces were
on tht'ir way ro Afghanistan within a day, the military did not havt' a
plan ready for a fu ll gro und invasion of Afghanistan, which is one of the
reasons the military action was delayed until October 7, 2001. Yet even
then, what the Unitt'd States did was to effectively intenene in a long-
running civil war, supporting the ground foroer. of the Northern Alliance
with its bombs and Special Forces, rather than the As Paul Rogers
suggested, the "apparent U.S. victory" was simply a stage in that lo nger
conflict;12 The allia nce was of Uzbcks, Hazaras, and Tajiks, all longstand-
ing rivals of the Parohtun Ta liban. T here was not quite a U.S. invasion,
bur the Northern Alliance would nor have succeeded aloneY McGeough
describes the tactics of the United States as having " t\''0 taps in this war-
its bombing missions and the supply of weapons and advisers. It turned
them on and off ar. it attempted to control the mm't'ment of the Northern
Alliance." 44 The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan thus sig-
nific<lndy from that of Iraq, with far fewer ground troops uscd and much
more reliance on prOX)' forces.4 l Indeed, the Unite<J States had been will-
ing to hand responsibility over to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO} in Afghanistan for tht' peacd.:ecping operations, w hich in
actuality turned out to be a much more extensive ongoing conflict with
the Tali ban.
72 RUBBLI: RHlUCED ro DUS I

'I...J ........
I

Afghanistan and its provinces

Nonetheless, the war in Afghanistan was not the war of a "new

nature" that French president Jacques Chirac had suggested it would lx-.
Rather, the means of dealing with a supposedly deterritorialized opponent
was surprising old-fashioned: launch a ir strikes to soften them up and
then try to conquer territory. CIA operatives and a great deal of money
were used, bur ultimately the aim was to unseat the existi ng regime and
replace it with one mme a mena ble w U.S. interests."' As Rogers no ted,
there were rclativcl> few areas in Afghanistan where the Taliban were
concentrated:
Some= of the= uwol\'c=d arc= hone)'Comlxd wid1 undc=rground irriga-
non runnds-not mapped, no t visible= ro but known ro
pc:opk. provide= shdrc=r and rransir ro Tali ban forcc=s rh.1.t
arc=, in an)' case=, widdy dispc:rsc=d. These= linc=s.. :Jrc=
fluid intermingled with farms and \'lllagc=s, .s,o that any kind
of bombing is likd)' to cause= ci111lian casu:J inesY

In addition, the operations of a l-Qaeda did not map conveniently onto ter-
ritorial boundaries. The borde-r with Pakistan, in pa rticular, was porous.
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 73

Legally, the United States was fairly well covered; politically, it was
surrounded by allies in deed or in principle. U.N. Security Council Res-
olution 1368 was initiated by the French on September 12, 2001. The
resolution declared that the Sccurit) Council was prepared "to take
all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks. "n While this fell
short of an explicit authorization for war, both this resolution and sub-
sequent ones reaffirmed "'the inherent right of indi\'idual or collc:cri..c
sclf-ddense." Resolution B73, invoking Chapter VU of the
requires all states to police their own territories and ensure that they do
not function as "safe ha\ens," a nd to .. prevent the commission of ter-
rorist acts. '' 4Y Byers argues this "adopted language that C{)Uid be argued
to constitute and almost unlimited mandate to usc forcc.'' 1D Rcsolurion
1377, passed six weeks later, noted that many states would require assis-
tance to live up to their requirements under 1373.5 1 All of the above-
noted resolutions were phrased in general terms rather than relating to
explicit states. Resolution 13 78, by contrast, was a reflection ofthe s itu-
arion in Afghanistan and madc clear how the Se<:urity Council saw the
position. It supported "international efforts to root out terrorism," and
condemned "the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base
for the export of terrorism by the ai-Qacda network and other terrorist
groups and for prmiding safe ha..cn w Usama Bin Laden, ai-Qacda and
others associated with them, and in this context supponing the efforts
of the Afghan people to replace the Taliban regime. " H In addition to
U.N. support, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter for the first time,
declaring an attack on one was an attack on all. J\luch of this is unsur-
prising. In the wake of the attacks in the United States, few states were
likely to oppose a response. or, as importantly, wanted to be socn as sup-
porting the Taliban and ai-Qaeda. 13 Significantly, as Heisbourg notes.
"the Security Council's interpretation of Article 51 officially and for the
first time made the U.N. responsive to threats from nonstate
Bm despite what was going on within Afghanistan at that time, Res-
olution 1378 reaffirmed the Security Council's .. strong commitment to
the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unit)'
of Afghanistan,"H a position that was reinforced in 1383, 1386, and
subsequent resolutions.J The Bonn Agreement on the new Afghan
government, passed on December 5, 2001, also stresses the "territo-
rial integrity"' of the state.s- Afghanistan, despite all its problems, must
remain as a state within its existing territory, with the: rights and respon-
sibilities that come with this. This is important to underline. It was what
Afghanistan was doing-or allowing to be done-in its own territor)'
74 RUBBLI: RHlUCED ro DUS I

that was as the problem. For the nco-cons Frum a nd Perle, it

was simple math:
Plane fares, box cutters, petry cash: $ 1OO,()(){f. Rccruitmg., training.,
and protecting thousands oi suicide: bombt-rs: millions. Acquiring
ideological and tc:rnmrial bases of your own: priceless.

As Chri stopher Greenwood, a lawyer who later provided advice on the

invasion of Iraq, suggested, though the Ta liban regime itself was no t
responsible for t he a ttacks 011 September 11, it "'had undoubtedly vio-
lated internationa l law in permitting AI-Qa'ida to from its terri-
tory" a nd had therefore "'violated the general duty o f a stare under inter-
national law not to allow its territor}' to be used as a base for attacks
on other states. "' 19 This argument hinges on U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 3314 which defines aggression, a nd therefore, for
Greenwood. provides a justification under international law. There is a
clear ambiguity hownet; fo r the passage in the Resolution in q uestion
censors:
T he action of a Srate in a llowing irs tc:rmory, which it has placed at the
dispos.:tl of another Stare, to be by tha t other Stntc: for pcrpc:rrar-
ing an act of agg,rc:ssion against a t hird Smre ... [orl the sending by or
o n behalf of a State o f anned bands, gro ups, irregulars or mercen.tric:s.,
which caST>' our acts o f anned force ag;J.mst another State o f such grov-
ity as to amount to the acts listed abo\'e, or its substantial iawol\'emcnt

The question, of course, is to what ex-:tent al-Qaccb can be understood

"another State," or if it is more accur ately described as "am1ed bands,
groups, irregulars, or mercenaries" whethc:r they arc Sl'nt "'by or on behalf
of a State."
The United States demanded that the Taliban shut down terrorist train-
ing camps and surrender bin Laden immediately. Although the Taliban did
offer some initial concessions, saying that bin Laden could potentially be
handed to an Islamic country, this was not good enough for the United
States. Indeed, the United States refused to either provide evidence against
bin Laden or to submit a forma l request for his extradition. This was in
part bc.cause previous diplomatic negotiations, such as the visit of the U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations to Afgha nistan in 1998 and the cruise
missile attacks of later that had fa iled."' Misra suggests that at this
rime, it was significa nt that "although the regime and the: Afghan state
were unacceptable to the larger world, the latter did not denounce its spa-
tial sovereignty or the sanctity of Afghanistan's territoriality. "02
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 75

Abou Zahab and Roy have argued that the: r"Cfusal of the: Taliban to
cooperate: fully with the U.S. meant that "Mullah Omar liter-
ally sacrificed his regime to protect bin Laden." The)' se-c: this as his acting
"for the sake of international solidarit}," malcing the suggestion that it
demonstrated a broader than territorial affinity. 3 This is too straightfor-
ward. The idea of .. harboring" dfoctivcly made the: Taliban equivalent to
ai-Qaeda in U.S. eyes. The ide-a of making no distinction ben.veen them
demonstrates a particular process of incorporation. In this case, it is guilt
through proximity, intentional and geographical.
One of the key argummts made:, as chapters l and 2 outlined, was
that the absence of effective sovereign power in states like Afghanistan
left a vacuum that nonstatc actors could filt This is problematic in that
camps were often established in places where the Taliban did have effec-
tive control, rather than those that were occupied by other forces. At best,
the Taliban were able to control 85 to 90 percent of Afghanistan before
200l.4 The Taliban were able to c-apture and retain control of large parts
of territory through the choil war of the 1990s, but it ne\'C:r gained effective
sovereignty over the whole country. This was a product of the period fol-
lowing the Soviet withdrawal, where: factiona l groups, tribes. and militar)'
units occupied and controlled different parts of the country. And before
the Taliban brought that much under unified rule. for sustained periods
some parts of the count)' were running more "states" than the
central government. As this chapter will go on to discuss, the: same was
true for Somalia. Yc:t while: the Taliban were on ly officially recognized b)'
Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, there was a
reality on the ground that obligated the: United Nations and aid agencies
ro work with it. 05
But a similar argument about the: lack of territorial control could be
made for Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban. Today,
President Hamid Karzai [known by his detractors as the "mayor of
Kabul'") is nor able: to exercise power much beyond the capital. and the
Afghanistan/Pakistan border, in particular, is far from secure. In part,
this is because Afghanistan has never fo rmally recognized the border.
though Pakistan accepted the British-drawn Durand Line as its bound-
ary upon its independence, partly because of the ethnic groups that live
on both sides of the: line: and partly due: to its contemporary political
situation, especially in relation to lndia. 06 There is an ongoing situation
where: the feuding factions within Afghanistan allow the same klnd of
"safe havens" that allowed to operate before. The power of
the individual warlords makes this a continual possibi lity. This was rec-
ogni:z.ed as a problem by Bush early on: " I've talked to many countries
76 RUBBLI: RHlUCED ro DUS I

that arC' interested in making sure that the post-opennions Afghanistan

is one that is stable, and one that doesn't become ret again a haven for
terrorist criminals ....- Yet leaving Afghanistan ha lf-finis hed, a situation
that was exacerbated by the UnitC'd States shifting its attention to Iraq
in 2003, bas increased the chanct's of a ret'mt'rgence of the proble-m in
that location .&8 Tht' differenct' is that before. these camps Wt'rt' effectively
operating with at least the tacit consC'nt of thC' Taliban, t'mboldened by
the lack of official recognition they had and obliged by complex relations
of interdependence, whereas now, the central control of Afghanistan is
so weak that no territoria l awmntability is possible in largt' parts of the
country. A report in latt' 2007 cl aimed that mcr ha lf the C{)Untry was
under Taliban control.69
Just as with Iraq, as chapter 4 will argut', the Unitt'd States and its
allies sought to produce a new and functioning state out of the chaos of
a destroyed one, without addressing any of the structural or "constitu-
tional" difficulties it faced. The term "constitutional" here docs not refer
to a written document, or c..,en the procC'ss of its production as a political
entity, but the material makeup of the state-at base, its territorial extent
and the people within it. There arc complex negotiations around the eth-
nic makeup of tl1e country that arc being both dcferrt'd and activdy pro-
duced through that neglect. As Johnson and Leslie phr ast' it, this was a
process of "imagining a state" :

If me mrernanonal communit)' Imagined a peace agreement, so roo it

imogmed a state; born what it was (a terra mdli11s on whiCh the)' could
SC( to work from scr.Jtch) and what it should become (a liberal demcx-

raq). The text ot the Bonn agreemem sets ouc the e\'entual gools of the
tro ns it1on ... The reahry is rhat Afghamslan 1s far from all those thmgs
and they cannot be wished into being over a penod of two ond a half
years. Nor is the coun[r)' a blank n.vas on w hich (he outs1de world
con paint the colors of its cbo1cc, but a lerritory staked out by powerful
players who their feer in the pas( and rheir eyes ro the future .711

The ongoing NATO deployment in Afghanistan is producing numerous

casualtiC's of both civilians and soldiers. U.S. air strikes havC' incrC'ased
the opposition of the population to the troop deployment. In addition, the:
drug trade out of Afghanistan is flourishing, again predsdy because there:
is a vacuum of authority in large parts of the countJ)' Yet Johnson and
Leslie' note that the heroin trade is not Afghanistan's problem but the
West's. If production stopped in Afghanistan, unlike!}' as that might seem,
but just as it previously stopped in Turkey, Pakistan; and Iran, it wouJd
relocate to another "v.<u-torn country. "- It is a question of demand, not of
 RUBBL I: REDUCED ro DUS I 77
s upply. Similar arguments could be made for the production of those with
grievances agaimt the West, and their location.

Pakistan and the Question of Relocation

The immediate impact of the U.S. r"<'sponse to the e\'ents of September

11,2001, was felt almost as strongly in Pakistan as in Afghanistan.-! The
choice of "you are either with us or aga inst us" was exactly that offered to
Pakistan br Colin Powell." J It put President Pervez Musharraf in a difficult
position. The longstanding suggestion in Pakistan is mar a gmemment
needs the supports of thc three "As": Allah, the Army, and America ."4 So
on the one hand. Musharra f craved recognition for his militaq takeover
two years before, and he obviously did not want to be targeted by the
United States. He also wanted to ensure that he was not outmancuvercd
by longstanding enemr lndia."s Both India and Pakistan wanted to cnsure
ther were seen to be on the side of the United States. with all the benefits.
that that would bring, and India quickJ y uti lized the rhetoric of Bush to
characterize Pakistan's actions in Kashmir and India.'" But on the other
hand, :.01usharraf had to take account of domestic sensibilities-in par-
ticular, those of Muslim and Pashtun groups-and thc dcep links between
his security scn ices (the Interserviccs Intelligence [lSI]) and the Taliban
regime..,... Pakistan was the last country to terminate diplomatic rela tions
with the Taliban (the UAE and Saudi Arabia did this within two weeks of
September 11 ). Unsurprisingly, M usharraf sought to balance these con-
flicting demands in his response: at times explicitly supporting me United
States while offering concessions to those closer to home, and at other
times taking the opposite: approacb.
The initial choices faced were stark. Powell had issued Busb's ultimatum,
but Richard Armitage of the U.S. State Departm ent put it e\'en more stark!}'
Musharraf recounts that he was warned that unless Pakistan cooperated. it
"shou ld be: prepared to be: bombed bark inro the Stone Age.'"-s The Un ited
States had seven demands. These j ncl uded such obvious steps as condemning
the terrorist acts tdemand 5); stopping ai-Qaeda operatives and am1s ship-
ments at the border and ending all logistical support for bin and tbe
Taliban, including fl1d shipments (demands 1 and 6); providing intelligence
information (demand 4); and the key de<ll-breakcr of cutting rdations with
the Taliban if they continued to ha rbor bin Laden (demand 7). as
wciJ as compromising an independent foreign and security policy. some of
these demands effectively surrendered Pakistan's territorial sovereig nty."Y
Armitage requested "blanket O\'erfligbt and landing rights for all neces-
sary milita ry and intelligence operations"' (demand 2) and the pro\ision
78 RUBBL I: REDUCED ro DUS I

..../
I
?
\

I NDIA

Indian Ocean

Pakistan's federal structure

of "territorial access to U.S. and allicd military intelligence a nd other

personnel to conduct operations against al Qacda'' (demand 3), including
naval and air bases and borders. Pakistan granted a ll these concessions
that same day but stressed its "substantial conces.sions in allowing usc of
its territory. " ll> Among the benefits it re.('ei\re,d in retum was a dramatic
incrcasc in a id.
Musharraf therefore effectively abandoned the Taliban but sought to
endear himself to his country more generally by attempting to rdocus
attention on Kashmir and threatening to usc his nuclear against
India if ne.cessary. In part, he justificd his actions br appcaling lO Pakistan's
s.clf-prcsenration: "Pakistan is regarded as a fort of Islam. If this fort is dam-
agcd, Islam will be damaged." 81 He thcrcfore had w play a careful ba lanc-
ing act bctwccn appeasing the United States and bowing to Indian pressure
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 79

by appearing and cracking down on militants, but at thC'

time offering some concessions. Various militants were freed. some jiha-
dist.s WC'TC' nm pursuC'd. and the madrassas largely allowed m oper-
as bdorr.J1 U.S. pressure was kss visible. In what Ron Susk1nd
has c<illed " thC' or "onC'-pcrcent doctrine," the United States was
deeply cont:erned about possibility of weapons of mass destructions fall-
ing into the hands of ai-Qacd.a;
If there's a one percenr chance th:u Pakistani scienrisn are helping a I
Qaeda build or dedop a nucll:"ar weapon, we ha,e to rrear it as a
cermint}' in terms of our response.... Ir's not abour analysis, or
finding a preponderance of e\'1dence.lt's about our response. 11

This was raised by dirrctor of C1A, in a visit to

Pakistan on 1, 2001. 14 pressure on lt.t usharraf was thus
enormous. A moment was his January 12, 2002 address to nation,
hC' the of "soil," "'land,'' and ..territory" to
Pakistan. For Abou Zahab and Roy, this constituted an attempt to dis-
tance himself from pan-Islamism and former President Zia ul-Haq's poli-
cies of Islamization, to stress the imporr.ance of Pa kistan as a nation-state
as wdl as an Islamic state. He portrayed Afghanista n as a forrign
country and saw Pakistan as "a territorial nation-state', not an ideologic<ll
state."85 He focused jihad on the larger against " illiteracy, pov-
erty. backwardness, and hunger" than just "armed struggles." Yet
in the same speech, he the crucia l importance of Kashmir and
both dialogur with and to India. 36 His careful
positioning has been in many ways. EhtC'shami suggests that has
moved from being the principal sponsor o f the Tali ban to being of
Bush's key allies; 8 - the Century foundation has described him as a "'mini-
mum satisfier; doing the least necessary to ensure that the States
docs not turn its to him more dircctly."1
Pakistan has bC'e n understandably resistant to U.S. forces
direct!}' within its territo ry to hunt down a i-Qaeda forces. Some opera-
tions have happrned, but they ha\c lar gely been condm:ted in sccrct.89
Pakistan has cracked down on militants itself, arresting and
thC'n later thC'm. The murder of journalist Daniel Pearl was a
particular catalyst to such Hersh r"Cports sources who daim that
some of the escapes of Taliban and ai-Qaeda forces were enabled by the
Bush administration after giving in to pleas from Musharraf that Pakistani
forces be a llowed to lea.,e because their return in body bags could spell
his end:' For years, Musharraf was able to avoid w idespread
challenges ro his rule, a lthough he lived in constant fC'ar of ass.assinarion.
80 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I

Often thC' manc:u\ering has been more concerned with Islamabad's own
control of the remote Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which
lie thC' Nonh-\Vest frontier Province and Balucbisran in western
Pakistan, than anything directly tied to Bush's "war on terror" agenda.
These areas only allowed the Pakistani army to enter in 2000, and the aim
is to integrate them into the North-West Frontier Provincc.Y2 Pakistan's
own territorial politics thus play a central roiC'. Following the defeat of the
Taliban, these issues became more stark because it is widely accepted that
Pakistan was the immediate refuge for many and Tali ban foJ"Ccs.
As Gunaratna has suggested, it effectively merged its forces. w ith the Tali-
ban and relocated to the Afghan-Pakistan border. where it "is. preparing
to wage a protracted guerrilla campaign that might last a decade. '193 While
the government tried to blame the group j hangvi-dcscribcd as
"the Pakistani wing"' of was only pard}' successful"' Paki-
stan therefore continues to function as both a base and a focus in the "war
on terror." KJcvcmann therefore describes it as. " the cradle: of terror ":1>s
AJ Qaido mi litants who had iniriall)' found a safe lu\en m the tribal
areas ond loter mo\ed to Azad Kashmir, Punjab and Kamc hj wou ld not
ho\'C been oblc to do so Without rhe connivance o f the lSI.'"

More generally, there: have been extensive debates. about the long-term
stability and sustainability of the country. Some have seen Pakistan as a
"failed others have d irectly challenged this construction.98
In summer 2007, anention turned back ro Pakistan, with a U.S.
National lntd ligence Estimate' suggesting that a i-Qac:da had established
itself in a dominant position within the Federally Administered Tribal
Arc:as.!>9 These arc not the only tribal they ex ist in the North-\'<fc:st
Frontier Province and Baluchistan, too. In a ll of these. t here arc territo-
rial ambiguities about \vho actually c:xc:rcisC's sovereign power, despite
article: 247 of the Pakistan Constitution, which unequivocally states that
it is the: federal government or the provincial government, depending on
whether they arc FATA o r within the provinces. Nonetheless, the govern-
ment has effectively declared some areas ungovernable, and there have
lxc:n several reports of ai-Qaeda and Taliban groups working in these
areas, something accepted by Musharra f himsdf. 100 Several U.S. officials
began to suggest that perhaps the United States had targeted the wrong
country aftn September 11, 2001. Previous sensitivity to 1v1usharraf's
difficult position was abandoned, with then-U.S. presidential candidate
Barack Obama saying in 2007 that he would sanct ion a ttacks within
Pakistan without prior approval. Crucially, Obama would appro\'e
either a ir attacks or ground forces. Bush too was careful not to rule this
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 81

out, and acrion soon followed. But widespread reports indicate that tbc
United States had long been launching Predator raids in the tribal areas
for some time, with Pakistan often claiming responsi bility as a protccti,:c
measure. Ground forces made it harder to deny U.S. imolvemcnt.
The Taliban bavc tbcmsdves attacked Pakistani targets, breaking a
ten-month truce in the border r"Cgion, which many contend gave tbc
chance to rebuild their forces. Musharraf himself inflamed tensions with
his actions against groups within Pakistan, notablr in the assault on tbe
Red Mosque in Islamabad. The fragile balance he had attempted to keep
since 2001 unraveled. Ironically, just as he took much st ricter action.
Musharraf came under more pressure from the United States while at
the samt' timt' facing unprecedented opposition at home, including v.ridc-
spread protests and suicide bombs. The idea of a state of cmcrgcnq
was floated , and martial law was dt"clarcd, in pa rt to show the United
States just how precarious his rule was. Two previous prime ministt'rsl
Bcnazi r Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. returned anticipating power-s haring
deals: Bhutto was assassinated sbord} afterwards. Musba rraf a brupt!)'
pulled out of a Pakistani-Afghan peace summit or jirga. onlr to attend
its dosing ccrt'mony after a rebuke from Secretary of Sta te Condolcczza
Rice. In late 2007, 1\lusharra f was reelected witb dubious legitimacy.
rcmming bis uniform and becoming a civilian president, a lthough be
remained in office for less than a year. While Musharraf was an equivo-
cal supporter of the "war on terror," his removal has created a nightmare
scenario for the United States: a n unstable. possibly Islamic-influenced
state with a strong military and nuclear weapons. So for all his flaws, tbc
United States has long recognized they were bt-ttcr o ff with Musharraf
in place.l 0 1
Pa kistan was not alone in being seen as a place wbcre a i-Qacda or
allied forces would rcloc<Jtc in the future. Minitcr suggested that " like
a cancer, a l Qacda would have to metastasize." auJ But this means those
prosecuting tbc wa r can suggest that things that a rc quite different arc
actually the same:. Indeed, one of the characteristics of tbc "'war on terror"
is that man}' different groups, often with contradictory aims, arc Jumped
together indiscriminately. In speeches in the early winter of 2005, Bush
continually invoked a series of locations in tbe "war on terror": "from
the streets of Western cities to the mountains of Afghanistan, to the tribal
regions of Pakistan, to the islands of Southeast Asia a nd to tbc Horn
of Africa. " 103 Geopolitical metaphors a bound, including the Brookings
Institution's "crescent of crisis" 1114 and Tony Blair's "'arc of extremism
now stretching across tbc M iddle East. "tor Mt'anwhile, Busb a nd his allies
insisted that Iraq remained the kc)', both as the central front in the U.S.
82 RUBBLI: RE:DUCED ro DUS I

l .rMt Anlb RIF.:bl.c QINJ-Jll

- - - PM23CC: ftl .llld'et...l.d at,
SAUDI A RAB I A
: :.:::.::-.:. .... \
- -
... OM A::"'
..
... ,.j.l \
) .......... _,- .. .... ,_ ..,

)
e Sadati ,
-.
- ,_.,.
-., ,/
; /_/ e Say'un

..}' YEMEN N

Ta'iu
...... ::' .)

G u If of A 1111
,.J. . .
Yemen

..war on terror" and in the tenorists' "war against humanity,"' the latter
now supposedly justifying the firsr.o.. Others, including Obama, have sug-
gested that the concentration on Iraq has deflected rcsourccs and attention
from Afghanistan. Nonetheless. othcr sites arc continually found.
Actions ha\'e rakcn place in a numbcr of locations. Yemen has becn
continua lly highlighted as a special proble-m and U.S. imcnention has
regularly taken place thcre since 2001 alongside the Yemen gmernmcnt's
attempts to address the problems. 10 - As Benjamin and Simon note, "the
government's writ at the city limits of Sanaa, leaving large tracts
available for secure resettle-ment." '00 Yemcn has as a unified coun-
try only since 1990, and it fought a war in 1994 to prcscro.c the union
against the wishes of many in the south. Bin Laden ronsidcred Yemcn as
a more pcrmancnt base, a lthough it has been Jong uscd for operations .n,
Minitcr a meeting between Bush a nd Yemeni president Abdullah
Salah where, through a st"rics of threats, Bush made it clear that Ycn1cn
had to acquiesce to U.S. demands to operate within their territory.' 10 Thc
military and economic a id that Yemen receives from the United States,
along with the ending of its past support from Iraq, means that it is closely
allied to efforts in the region. Collaboration with Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia,
and Sudan in fighting terrorism i1> a further Several have
been fought bcrwccn Yemeni security forces and Islamists, with the Yemeni
government supported by U.S. special forces based in Djibouti. The United
States has a lso made cxtensi\'e usc of Predator Highrs, including a Hellfire
raid on suspected in late 1002.
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 83

States of SUdan and the histOf'lc Nortl\fSouth dloolng line

Sudan was a focus for ai-Qacda operatives in the 1990s, with bin Laden
spending several years there. The net'h'ork of ai-Qaeda operations was
actually created here,' 12 and the government's links to the religious leader
Hassan a l Turabi put them in close contact with [ran.' n A number of dif-
ferent groups operated there, including HczboiJah, lslamic J ihad, Hamas,
a nd other Pale-stinian groups, and it bad links to groups or dissidents in a
range of other northern African and Arabian countries. ' '4
84 RUBBLI: RHlUCED ro DUS I

Sud.an was me new.::sr addinon Srare Dc:parrmem's list of srare

sponsors of terrorism. The counrr>' was so designated in 19 93 because
e\'er)' group m rhe IslamiC world in the
open on Sudanese sotl-from Palesrini.:J.n lsi:Jmic jihad to rhe radical
Shiite group Hezbollah and from rhe F:gypria n ai-Ganuat aJ-Isbminoa
to rhe rovtng mtemanonal killer _,\lnJ NidaL 11 S

Barbara Bodine, forme rly State Department acting director for counter-
terrori!im and then country director for Horn of Africa affairs, described
it as a "Holiday Inn for Terrorists ... ,,, As Timothy Carney, the last U.S.
ambassador to Sudan, who left in 1997, notes:
The Sudan ininally figured on the U.S. list of sure sponsors of terror-
ism n(){ ir created rerrorisr groups or designated t3 rgets for
terronsr acrion, bur rather lx-cause n afforded sancrun ry, g;:we facilities,
and offered :1 rroining \'enue to a brood range of E.1.srem nnd
netgh boring rerronst orga niz:mon s." 11'

In 1996, when bin Laden was expelled from Sudan, an offer was made
to extradite him to the Unite-d States. f<"aring lack of evidence, Clinton
turned this offe-r down, late-r suggesting that this was the biggest fa ilure
of his
Its pharmaceutical factory was targeted in 1998, but since 2001, Pres-
idem Omar al Bashir has managed to cooperate successfully with the
United States and has not bccn thc focus of attack. Minitcr attributes this
in part to the change of gmcrnment from Clinton to but it has
as much to do \Vith Sudanese actions. As de \'(faal and Abdcl Salam note,
the stakes were high: "Khartoum knew that Washington had both motive
and evidence to put it in the same category as Afghanistan and Iraq. The
Sudanese government needed to act fast, which it did. " 120 U.S. special
forces were deployed in 2004 to hunt dO\vn Saudis using the Jebel Kurush
mountain area as a base. AI Turabi was even imprisoned 2004
and 2005. It is thus something of an anomaly. 11 1 Nonetheless, Sudan has
faced numerous challenges of its own during this period, with the fragi le
peace in the South and the ongoing crisis in Darfur. Indeed, as Byers notes,
"in July 2.004, reports surfaced that British Prime Minister Tony Blair had
ordered his officials to begin planning for an arme-d inrenenrion in Darfur,
until Se-cre-tary of State Powell deemed the idea 'prematurc."' 121
As Prunier and Gissclquist suggest:
The Sudan as define-d by irs presem borders is an arbitrary consrrucr.
Sud.anese tcrmo ri.tliry cannot be defined b> its pre-colonial h1srory, by
culrure, by language, or even by irs colonial htstor>' As 3 result of the
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 85

Sudan's culrural hererogmcuy and dte arnbiguoll!> namre o f a posl-

Orroman policy, iris a connngenr stare. rhm is, a stare char was created
in error_ Ill

U.S. obstruction of international intervention in the Darfur genocide for

so long is in part the benefit Sudan has gained for its support. Also, the
United States worries about the state collapse that it fears couJd follow
such inter\'ention, so it has. reason to wish to avoid this. Thus, there arc
other sites that could rcoei.,e more rxtcnsivc attention, such as the Philip-
pines, where the United States srnt counter-terrorism advisors in late 2001
to help in figlu with Abu Sa))af, 1ZA Colombia, and Nrpal. ln thr
United States. has been extcnsi..,cly invohed in support to governments
in central Asia, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzs.tan. 125 The
United States has madr somr oprrarions public:
In Norrh Africa, we are wor&::mg with our parrners ro counrer
ai-Qaeda's expansion inro the in rho:- emergence
of "al-Qacda in rhe Islamic Maghreb,. llus g.roup has claimed
responsibiliry for recenr lerrorisr bombmgs in Algeria, including rhe
Aprilll and July I I anacks ag.:tinsr ci\ ilia ns in i\Jg.iers.' 16

The Struggle over Lebanon

In many ways, it is unsurprising that Lebanon is included as a site in the

"war on trrror" because the struggle for external influence in the countr)'
is longstanding. 12" It has long been usc:d as a base or location for surro-
gate forces-Syrian, Israeli, Pa lestinian, Iran ian, U.S ., and others. Once
again, it is, difficult to provide a simple beginning to the events, but the
Valrntine's Day massacre of former prime ministc:r Rafik Hariri in 2005
shifted the constellation of forces.m: Lebanon was not doemed able to
invrstigate the murder of Hariri itself, a nd the U.N. Securit)' Council has
passed se.,eral r'Csolutions concerning this (esprdally 1595 and 1757). 129
Initially, the crimes were sc:cn as "acts of terrorism." Next, Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter was deemed app licable:, and now an internationa l
court is bdng set up, an action usually reserved for ethnic cleansing and
genocide. This bombing was swiftly blamrd on S)'ria, and as a resuJt
the diplomatic pressure it was alread)' under increased. It is notable that
this assassination brought a condemnation of Syria that generally has not
accompanied Israel's exrcutions.U 0 And this contrasts st arkly with the
lack of interrogation of the crimes committed by both sides in the "sum-
mer war" of 2006. u'
86 RUBBL I: REDUCED ro DUS I

In 2004, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1559, demanding

a withdrawal of Syrian troops from the region. Perceiving that getting the:
S}rrians out of Lebanon would deal a substantial blow to the Bashar a !-Assad
regime in Damascus, the United States were determined to work on a num-
ber of fronts.' ' 1 In his 2005 State of the Union address, Bush noted that
"Syria still allows its territory and parts of Lebanon to be used by terrorists
who seck to destroy every chance: of in the: rcgion." 111 Tactics included
inciremem and encouragement within Lebanon, particularly in the naming
of the anti-S)rrian opposition "the Cedar Revolurion"'l-l to link it to move-
ments elsewhere, as wel l as the covert support of Kurdish rkments in Syria
itself. Syrian inAurncr was portrayed as the: key dement prevc:nting Lebanese
unity, political ami territorial, with the pro-Western "Gucci"' prorcsts receiv-
ing much more Western attention than pro-Syrian drmonstrations. Syrian
troops lxgan to withdraw in spring 2005, whi.ch Bush and Blair both hailed
as part of wider change within tbe region. It was also notable that actions of
"forcig11'' actors in Lebanon drew widesprrad criticism at the time, in spite
of the fact that the history a nd current practice of the United States is filled
with both covert and overt interference. Indeed, the United States criticiz.cs
Iran for interfering in Iraq, which they themselves occup)' As Glass noted
in relation to tbis strategy, "whether American SU<'ceeds or fa ils, Lebanon
will pay.'' I IS
Remming Syria from Lebanon was part of the process. However, the
radical group Hezbollah remained . T his group, backed by [ran and S)ria,
had established a strong foothold in southern Lebanon, took credit for
the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, and had pledged to continue to act as
an armed force until Israel was no longer a threat. In 2001, the United
States named Hezbollah as a tnrorist organization whosc assets needed
to be targeted by new financial controls . Hariri rejected this, claiming
that it was a political party a nd that its resistance to Israel was justi-
fied as anti-imperialist warfare.' 34 The 2006 war betv.ren Hczbollah and
Israel demonstrated how U.S. rhetoric and practice could be: adopted by
one of irs allies. lsrac:l effcctivelr acted in the same manner as the United
States in Afghanistan, responding to a nonstate group b} attacking the
state that "harbors" them. In its tactics of air strikes and the t.arge"ting
of infrastructure, it parallels Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosmo. Indeed, the
links may go beyond mere: parallels, with allegations of U.S. complicity in
Israeli actions, in large part as a trial run for a possible: future U.S. attack
on At least, it seemed indisputable that Israel had planned fo r an
assault and was simply waiting for appropriate provocation-something
that former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert admitted to the \'(finograd Com-
mission looking into that wa r.' ' 1 Trnsions had bren rising through the late
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 87

spring and early surnmerY9 Sayycd Hassan NasraJiah of Hezbollah has

claimed that "there was a war plan and a big militarr decision taken b)'
the United States and Israel. If they did not implement it on July 12, the)'
would have implemented it in August, September, or October. "UD
Yet Israeli actions here a lso parallel its longstanding actions in Pales-
tine. Indeed, while the attack on Lebanon r(:(ICived more attcntion in the
me.dia-and is the focus here-it was Gaza that was the first target in late
June 2006, with the destruction of its power plam, sonic booms, and other
tactics of state terror. l11e 2008- 2009 war on Gaza continued these actions.
On the one hand, Israel expects the Palestinian Authorit)' to be a ""partner
for peace." to act as an cffe-etivc check on terrorism cmanaring from within
their territory; on the other hand, it continually emascuJatcs it through
punishment responses that destroy its infrastructure, target its leaders. and
further alienate its This was replayed in their attitude to the
Lebanese government, which was unable to proje-et its power throughout
the entire state, lea\ing a vacuum that Hezbollah was able to fill . As a con-
sequence, ir bad to endure the destruction of whatever sma ll gains it was
able to make..u As Roy says of Afghanistan, the: rubble was "pounded into
finer dust." IH Just as Yasser Arafat was supposed to control the fighters of
Hamas while imprisoned in his compound in Ramallah, tl1e Lebanese gov-
ernment was supposed to rein in Hezbollah wh ile Israel was bombing its
cities, destroying its roads and bridges, blockading it by sea, targeting its
armed forces, and rendering its airport unusable.
The casualtics on each side arc scriptcd by the Israeli state in such a
way as to parallel the U.S. security of the homeland and the: "global ,.,.ar
on terror" abroad. The killing and capture of Israeli soldiers was sa:n as
an attack on the body of the nation, and because thcre is national service
fo r the Israeli Ocfence Force (IDF) and males under fifty arc require-d to
do a month of reser\'c service a year., the distinction bctwa:n soldicr and
civilian is blurred. The Katyusha rockcts sent b)' Hczbollah into northern
Israel were of course attacks of terror; a dcparture from prc\'ious prac-
tice, where their usc had ba:n calibrated car'Cfully to avoid accusations of
ci\dlian attack..u On the other hand, the IDF droppcd leaflets warning
people to leave southern Lebanon when the bombardment was taking
place. Those who remained were deemcd to be complkit, guilty by geo-
graphical location, ignoring, of course, the destruction of the transport
infrastructure that mar have allowed them to lcavc had it bocn intact. This
was an old tactic. Fisk noted this in relation to earlier imasions, calling it
an "'ugly obsession with 'terrorists,' which reduced an}'Ont:-alt)''Oite-in
dte war zone to the: level of an animal. " In addition, given the long-
standing problems of thc "right of return" for Palestinians, many people
88 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I

arc understandably reluctant to a bandon their homes to the Israeli arm)'

In the 2006 actions, as much as the earlier incursions Lnto Lebanon, we
see a replaying of the danger of we-<1k stares: in its most successful war in
1967, Israel was able to defeat thrcr countries' conventional armies in six
days; now, however, it cannot "eradicate" a terrorist organization on its
border. Thus, unable to rid itsdf of Hezbollah, Is rael destroys much of
southern Lebanon.
Even when Israel declares a uni lateral withdrawal, s uch as Lebanon in
2000 or Gaz.a in 2005, it never quite finishes the job. Rather than allow a
nominally or putativelr independent neighboring entity the fu ll r ights and
responsibilities of statehood, ir continually undermines that basis, while
then bemoaning its capacity to live up to implied obligations. A
cycle ensues: the failure supposedly legitimates the challenge, which takes
away any possibility of transcending the problem . In the case of Gaza, the
years of what Roy calls "dc-de..,elopmenr" 14& and the ina bility of irs citi-
zens to have acccr.s to the West Bank or [srad, let alone comrol its own
borders, territorial sea, or a irspace, render any charade of " territorial sov-
ereignty" transparent.- T he declaration of Gaza as a "hostiJc territory"
in September 2007 is only a recent illustration of these moves-one that
allowed Israel to sidestep intemationaJ legal requirements for an occupied
territory a nd was a prelude to the war.
With Lebanon, there is the d isputed Shebaa Farms a rea, occupied in
1967 and forn1all}' annexed in 1981, bordering on the Golan Heights
seized from S}ria at the same time. Shebaa is a village in Lebanon, and this
neighboring region of 100 square miles (about 2 percent of Leba non's size)
conta ins a number of farms and, more importan tly, key water resources.
Norton calls this usc of Shebaa by Hezbollah "'a clever prete).'t to con-
tinue paramilitary operations against lsrad,'' 148 which underestimates the
imbalance of power in the region. T he key issue is not that Israel is occu-
pying the area, which is undisputed, but whether it previously belonged to
Syria or Lebanon . U it belongs to Lebanon- as the Lebanese government
and Syria claim-Israel has not fu lly withdrawn from Lebanese territory
and is thus in bre-ach of U.N. Se.curity Counci l Resolutio n 425, a position
cla imed by Hezbollah to a llow a continuation of its military operations,
despite Resolution 1559. 149 Hit is Syrian, o r is thought of as cffecthdy
Syrian--as the United Nations and Israel claim- then its starus can be
reserved for negotiations betv.een Syria and lsrael, deferring a solution
indefinitdy. ro The status of Lebanon itself, slic.cd from Syria br French
colonists as a compromise for Syrian independence, has a lways been dis-
puted, something the United States is trying to get Syria to recognize by,
for example, establishing an embassy in Beirut.
 l.. j
I

WEST
BJtNK

;eb:. - /
, ......... .. "'

..
\.\
.\ I S IA A EL
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I
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EQY P T
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.
0 blome:tes

u;sA"NoN
lltcmolfes 10 '
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J
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.
r
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i
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----. .._--- ..
--- ............
lsraeVPalestlne and soothetrn Lebanon
90 RUBBLI: RHlUCED ro DUS I

The territorial dimc:nsion is dear. As wdl as demonstrating the under-

mining of the territorial sovereignty of Lebanon and what little: is held by
Palestine, the lsradi process is also one of consolidation of the territo-
rial gains of the 1967 war; the 1948-49 gains long having been largely
accepted by the international communit)'.'s' One of the reasons for this
is that in 1948, Palestinians fled or were forcib ly removed from their
homes, implicit!}' ceding the land, though ever since they have cam-
paigned for a "right of rerum,'' In 1967, dte}' largely remained in place:,
thus gi.,ing Israel a very large occupied population. It is for this reason,
above all dsc, that t 948 is the significant date for the Pa lestinians-the
date of a/ Nakba, "the catastrophe "-whereas even for left-wing Israelis,
the ke>' moment is 1967.'52 Understand ing that it could not gain effec-
tive control of all the "occupied territories" or "administrative zones,"
not e.,en with the settler program, Israel's "security barrier" or "separa-
tion wall'" (a 26-foot-high wa ll in places, made of barbed wire or elec-
trified in others) is both incorporating land and cutting communities off
from each other as never bcfore.m Yet as Weizma n has noted, what they
arc doing, in effect, is creating "different degrees of occupation," sepa-
rating Palestinian from Palestinian, rather than separating Israel from
Palc:srine.' 54
In this, they arc clearly in breach of Resolution 242, which stresses
..the: inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war'' and requires
Israel to withdraw from "territories occupied in the recent conflict. "LI .I
This is an important and contested resolution, but in stressing the "recent
conflict," it is dfcctivdy sa}ing that the 1949 Green Line should be the
basis for the territorial settlement and that the 1948 gains arc accepted.
Yet Israel s.ccs the lack of a definite article in the phrase: "from territo-
ries occupied '' to lea.,e an ambiguity as to whether this is some or all
of them, 156 thus using a supposed textual imprecision to avoid political
resolution.
ThC"rc is further ambiguity in that the: resolution stresses the need for
.. rc:stxct for a nd acknowlcdgc:mc:nt of the smereignty, territoria l integrity,
and political independence of ever}' State in the area and their right to
live in peace within secure and recognized lxnmdaries fre.c from threats or
acts of force." As in the later phrase affirming these guarantees for "every
State in the: arC"a,,. th is hinges on the question of statehood. If Palestine: is
not deemed to be a state, then its " territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence" can be continually deferred, yet without those dements, state-
hood can be denied. But aside from any cla ims a bout the illegitimacy of
thes.c actions, they arc rendering a status of "facts on the: ground," which
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 91

in thC' inrernational commun ity, notably including the United States,

sccm willing to as the basis for negotiations. Indeed, the 2006
U.S. National Sec11rity Strategy portrayed the withdrawal of Israeli forces
"from the Gaza strip and the northC'rn West Bank [as] creating the pros-
pect for transforming Israeli-Pa lestinian relations and underscoring tbe
need for the Pa lestinian Authority to stand up (sic] an effective, respon-
s ible 11"' Y as Roy nores:

Under the terms o f dist'ngagement, Israel's occuJ)"ation is :tssured.

Gaz:tns will be cont ained and scaled wirhin the dectrified borders
of the Strap, whde \Vest llankers, the1r lands dismembered by rclem-
less lsraeh settlemem, w1ll be p<:nned into fragmcnred spaces, isobted
behind and between walls and barners. 111

U.N. Security Council 1559 has a range of territorial issues

concerning Lebanon. It first reiterates the Security Council's ..strong sup-
port for the territorial integrit)', SO\'ereigncy, a nd political independence
within its internationally recognized borders.'' a nd then states three ke)'
issues:
NotiTJg the dctermi nario n of Lcb:mon to ensure the withdrawal o f :1ll
non-leoont'SC forces from Lcba no n,

Gravely concerned .u the continued presence of armed milirias in

Lebanon, which prc\cm the Lebanese Go\'ernment from cxercismg its
full sovereignry over all Lebanese territory,

Reaffirming the importance of tht' extens io n of rhe conts-ol of rhe

Government o f Leba non over all Lebanese tcrritor). 1s9

The issue is therefore thC' effective control o f tbe Lebanese govcrnmcnr

over its entire territory, its territoriaJ integrity, in ooth the sense of pres-
ervation of "internationally recognized borders" a nd its territorial sov-
ereignt}\ an ability to have tl1c monopoly of force within tl1cm. Thus tbe
Security Council "reaffirms its caiJ for the strict respe.ct of the smneignty,
territorial intC'grity, unity, a nd political o f Lebanon under
the sole and exclusive authoricy of the Government of Lebanon through -
out Lebanon," calling for aJI foreign forces to withdraw; the "disband-
ing and disarmament of all a nd non-Lebanese militias "; and
"supports the extension of tbe controJ of the Government of Lebanon
mer a ll territory. '' In the face of the exposure of its sovereign
fiction-that all states arc in effect ive control of their territories-the
United Nations simpl)' stresses that fiction more forcefully.
92 RUBBLI: RE:DUCED ro DUS I

ThC'sc demands arc a lmost exacdy the same as Israel's in the 1982.
campaign:
I. No PLO or other Palesrini:m military prcsc:nce in Leb:mon-guerrill.ts
would hove to surrender th en arms bur could lea\'e for nnorher counrry
if they wished
2. No Palestinian (i.e., no PLO conrrol of the
camps l in Lebanon
J. All Palrsrinions in Lebanon would ha,e robe under l eoonesc govern-
ment ourhonry
4. The Lebonese army would be deployed rhroughour Leba non. 1" 0

In 2006, the United States and the United Kingdom prevented an imme-
diate ceasC'-fire to a llow Israel timC' to complete its action, with Israel
apparentl y in formi ng the Unite-d States that it needed 35 days-half
the time actions in Ko:sovo had taken. 1" 1 Bush and Bla ir used the ideal
of Lebanese territorial sovereignty as a sine qua 110n of a settlement:
"Lebanon's democratic government must be empowered to exercise sole
authority over its territor)'... The United States and the United Kingdom
blocked attempts a t a su bsta ntive U.N. resolution (passing only hold-
ing Resolution 1697}, until August 1 1, 2006, when the Security Council
passC'd Resolution 1701. This resolution is uncritical and undemanding
of Israel, requiring only that it cease ..offensive milita ry occupations,"
leaving Op<"n the possibility of their aggrC'ssion being declared as " defen-
sive, .. which Israel had claimed a ll a long. It repC'ats many of the formula-
tions of 1559, notably "its strong support ... for the territorial inrcgrit)',
SO\'ercignty, and political independence of Lebanon within its interna-
tionally recognized borders, as co ntemplate<l by the Israeli-Lebanese
General Armistice Agreement of 23 Ma rch 1949"; and " the importa nce'
of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all
Lebanese territory.'''" Yet Hczbolla h is unha ppy with this being under-
stood in simple terms, suggesting that Resolution 1559 needs to bC' seen
in rel ation to the 1989 Ta if Ac.cords, which ended thC' Lebanese civil
war. 16 Indeed, S}'ria tried to portray its April 2005 withdrawal from
Lebanon as the enacting of those accords, which a lso call for " the grad-
ual extension of the sovereignty of the Lebanese government over all
Lebanese lands," rather than its obeisance to Resolution 1559. In addi-
tion, Israel continued to violate Lebanese territorial waters and a irs pace,
even if land incursions have ended. 105 Thus, Resolution 1701 requires
that '' there' will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that
of the Lebanese state," but this again assumes a monopol}' of fo rce and
a unified state.
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 93

Resolution 1701 auempts to enable Lebanon "ro extend its aurhorit)'

oer its territory, through its own .l egitimate armed forces, such that there
will be no weapons without the consent of the Governmeru of Lebanon
and no authorit)' other than that of the Government of Lebanon." Tbe
contradiction is, of course, that an external force (the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon, or UNlFIL) is needed to create the conditions
fo r this: territorial integrity needs to be violated to create and preserve
it. Yet again, despite a ll signs to the contra)', territoria l iotegrity in the
sense of preservation is stressed bqond a ll reason. Nasrallah appeared to
concede a great deal when he agree<J with the proposa l of the Lebanese
gmernment and suggested that " the deployment of the Lebanese Arm)'
will help preserve sovereignty and independence," for Lebanon,'"" )'ct
o ne rear later, he suggested that this attempt at national territorial sov-
crcigntr had failed.'- These arc not inconsistent. Mahmoud Qumati of
Hezbollah suggrsted tltat until Israel withdraws from Lebanesr territory
(the Shrbaa farms) and the Lebanese state is fully capable of protecting
its territory, Hczbollah must still opcrate. 1"i As Achcar has noted, 1701
is biased, with UNIFIL deployed onJ}' on one side of the border, and says
"not a single word about the protection of Lebanese territor}' against the
repeated aggression by Israel, an oocupy ing power in Lebanon for eigh-
teen yc.ars. Nasrallah has posed it as a question io these terms:
Look at the yardsnck that the internationa l community
Habclla h, Lebanon, and the Palestini:J.ns an Palestine Jrc forb1dden to
have modest WeApons ro defend themscl\'es, their counrr)', a nd their
homci:J.nd. Tl1is is deemed a vio lation of laws and SO\'crcignty, and
should rhcrcforc be eliminated, m sp1rc o f rheu having said that our
land, country, security, J nd sovereignty a re threatened .... If Israel is
threatened, it is Jlrighr for it to hJ';e nuclear weapons in \'lolation o f
all internarional I:J.ws and con\'cnrio ns .... Bur the Palestinians, who
arc bcmg si:J.ughtcred m Palestine t\'ery dJy arc not threatened; the
Lebanese, whose la nd Israel has inndcd and mighr invade again one of
these dJys, arc nor threatened, J nd have no righr to own

The straightforwa rd depiction of Hezbollah as a terrorist orgaoization is

to underestimate its integration into the society. Remembering Benjamin
and Simon's depiction of a l-Qaeda in Afghanistan as a state, we could
make a similar case for Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, wb ich under-
took projects of social welfare, including hospitals and schools, as well
as collecting income for the prorecrion of tbc population and providing
dcan drinking wateL Hezbollah controls a region within Lebanon, terri-
torr within a territoq, giving it effective so\ercignt). One area of Beirut is
94 RUBBLI: RE:DUCED ro DUS I

known as "Dahiyet Hizbullah- the suburb of Hiz.bullah." - Even Bush

described it as a "state within a state ," 1"1 Indeed, following the 2006 war,
Hcz.bollah distributed about $300 million in a id in the form of dollar
bills, allegedly originating from Iran. 17] In addition, Hczbollah is widely
believed to be the only force within Lebanon that is able to stand up
to Israel. 1\"asrallah describes Hezbollah as a "'popular resistance move-
ment"1 7 and notes what it docs beyond its militarr role:

If we come roan area w nerc there is no hospital, the state is Indifferent

toR! and we build ;1 hospnnl there. In an area whc:rc rhc:re is no school,
we build a school. In an a ren where the road is not paved, we pave
the road. The)' soy: Oh, you arc: ha,ing a smtc Within the srJ.rc. Well,
make: me: undersmnd. You arc: the smtc: )'OU don't to libc:rJ.rc tnc
land; you don't want to free rhe pnsoners; you don't wo nt to protect
us from being killed or or protect us from landings; )'OU
don't want to cure us; )'OU don't wont to feed us, and )' OU don't wo nt
to reach us. You on!) want taxes from me. What kind of stare: is that?
That the pc:oplc arc silent about such a sure is itself a m1radc. People
should not remain silent about such a smrc:.... \X1e arc not an alterna-
tl\'e to rhe sutc, but where the sr.are IS :J bscnt we must be presc:nr-we
must do so b)' humanitarian, moral, and patriotic crircna, and not b)'
sccunan and J>"J.rri:wn critcna. 1"

As he suggests, Hczbollah thus contrasts starkly with the Lebanese gov-

ernment's tre-atment of the PaJestini ans in their refugee: camps, something
that compares unfavorably even to their treatment in other countries
of the PaJcstinian diaspora. Yet Lebanon refuses to grant the estimated
400,000 Pale-stinians citizenship bcc<Jusc they arc largely Sunni and this
would destabiliz.c the demographics of the country and the sectarian basis
upon which its democratic distribution is esr.abJished.
The refugee raise a complicated set of territorial and sovereignty
issues, which came to a head in 2007. Since the 1948-49 exodus, and
espc.cialtr since the expulsion of PaJcstinian leadership from Jordan in the
late t 960s and carl)' 1970s, Le-banon has hosted a number of Palestinian
rcfugcc:s. Disperse-d across the coumry to prevent coordination of activ-
ity, the refugee camps had fixed borders, so population increases from the
100,000 that originally fled in 1948-49 have led to more and more over-
crowding. Verticality became a solution, turning the area into a larger vol-
ume. Unemployment was extensive, travel was restricted, and conditions
frequently were appalling. In 1982, Phalangist Christian fo rces allied to
the Israelis our a massacre in the Shatila camp and the neighbor-
ing area of Sabra in West Beirut while the IDF were surrounding the area.
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 95

For the Lcbancril' gO\crnmcnt, these camps have long been a problem
because they arc effective!)' out of their territorial control. lnitially this
was by the terms of a 1969 compromise in the Cairo of the
Arab League saring that Lebanese forces were not permitted to enter the
camps, although this has long been abrogated. n They arc therefore pock-
ets of what is perceived as an ex'ternal problem within their state. This was
initially the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with the "Fakhani
Republic," until lsracl invaded in 1982; now it is
ln 2007, these longstanding problems erupted. The spark for this fight-
ing was the army trying to arrest people suspected of a bank robbery
in Tripoli. Lebanese forces attempted to enter the outskirts of the Nahr
ai-Bared refugee camp in the north of the coumry, and ended up fight-
ing with the Fatah a l Isla m group. There were rumors that 150 to 200
armed men were imolvcd, Jed by Shaker a l Abssi in the camps. Initiall}'
unable to enter the camp proper. they launched an aeria l bombardmcm
that resulted in a number of military, militia, and civilian casualties. Fatah
ails lam responded with attacks on Lebanese army positions. The fighting,
which began on M.a)' 20, 2007, and lasted until early September, was the
'''orst internal violence since the end of the civil war. For the Lebanese
government, the existence of armed mj litias in these camps puts the camps
in breach of the Taif Accords and U.N. Sccurit}' Council resolurions.
The Lebanese government required that people lca\'e the camps or face
destructive consequences: further guilt by geography. The internal tcmpo-
rar}' cease-fires were quickly broken, allowing few to escape and prevent-
ing much aid from reaching the camps. The PLO eventually allowed the
Lebanese armr to take up positions within the camps, lcading to their fina l
mcrthrow. Yet this produced sympathy for the group across the camps
in Lebanon and the linkage of other struggles to this one, particularly in
the revulsion against the mode of assault. One c}'ewitncss said, "We have
never experienced violence like this. Not even the Israelis behaved like
thi.s .... Lebanese military was perceived to be struggling, given that
of their 4-0,000 men, 15,000 arc required to secure the border with Israel
and 8,000 to secure the border with Syria from arms smuggling, and this.
is unlikely to be the end of tensions.
Bush continually lent his support to the Lcbancst" government: "Extrem-
ists that arc uying to topple that young democracy need to be reined in. '' 1"'9
The United States also sent planeloads of arms and ordered the freezing
of assets of any group undermining the Lebanese government. Indee-d, it
likely that the Lebanese government was operating in this W3}' at
least partly to prevent either Israel or, less like l}', the United States inter-
vening instead. The U.S. State Department suggested that "it woltld appear
96 RUBBL I: RH lUCED ro DUS I

that the Lebanese security forces are working in a legitimate manner to

prO\ride a secure, stable environment for the Lebanese people in the ....rake
of provocations and attacks b> violent extremists." 110 Simi larly. the U.N.
SccUI'it) Council, at the time under US. leadership, interpreted these inci-
dents as "an unacceptable attack on Lebanon's stabilit}', secur ity, and
sovercignt).'' They "reaffirmed their strong support for the smercignty,
territorial integrity, unity, a nd political independence of Lebanon within
its imernationall}' rccogniz.e<l borders and under the sole and exclusive
authority of the Government of Lebanon, in conformity with a ll relevant
resolutions. "' g' This is effccti\dy the Lebanese self-policing of the state.
The situation in Lebanon has implkations beyond merely the plight of
the Lebanese or the Palestinians. Various dements w ithin the Bush admin-
istra6on have long seen Syria as a member of the "'axis of evil," one whose
behavior is sufficiently similar to North Korea, Iran, and Iraq that it can
deemed to be a state "like these." Its association with .. terrorist allies"
further reinforces this link. for sel'eral years, bur increasingly since 2003,
pressure on Syria has bc<"n intense on a number of fronts. Israel launched
an air strike on October 5, 2003, targeting a claimed Palestinian train-
ing camp north of Damascus at Ain Saheb, following a suicide bombing
in Haifa.'12 The United States was particularly concerned with securing
the Iraq-Syria border bc.cause of the passage of fighters and weapons into
Iraq and the supposed harboring of Iraqi fugitives. U.S. spe.cial forces have
almost certainly operated across the border. 113 But until September 2007,
when the Israeli air force launched secret attacks on suspected nuclear
installations in Srria. the pressure was most extensive on Lcbanon.' 84
Yet Syria's position in relation to the United States and lsrad is more
complicated than this narrative suggests. ThC' Syrians were welcomed into
Lebanon by the United States, and more quietly by the Israelis, in 1976.
The Israeli invasion in 1978 and another more comprehensive invasion
in 1982 pushed Srria north. but Syrian occupation was deemed to have
provided legitimacy to the Israeli occupation and to ha\'C' provi<IC'd sta-
bility to the state. 1u Israd's ta rget at that time was of course the PLO,
and Prime Minister Begin said that the purpose was to "'root
out the c:Yil weed. " n 6 In 1990, Syria formed part of the Gulf War coali-
tion against Saddam Hussein. In 1994, Clinton offered Syria a chance
to come off the list of state sponsors of terrorism if tbey accepted Israeli
demands on the Golan Heights. They refused because this \Vottld not sec
the return of this territory to them . (lsraclmo\ed north in Lebanon again
in 1993 and 1996. ) Syria condemned the attacks of September 11, 2001,
but it drew a distinction between terrorism and resisting occupation-a
term that would apply to its own actions concerning the Golan as well
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 97

as the actions of HC'Zoollah in Lebanon and Palestinian groups. As a

consequence, it presmrcd Lebanon not to freeze Hezbollah's assets,
despite the U.S. re.qucsl. 18 - Its opposition to the attacks on Afghanistan
came to a head when Blair visited Damascus in October 2001, when
Bashar ai-Assad condemned both this assault and the "daily terrorism,.
of Israel. Although Syria voted for Resolution 144 L on Iraq, this was
simpl}' an attempt ro prc\'ent an arrack. It then criticized the mo\'C to
war and apparently provided military equipment to The rcfmal
to support the 2003 war on Iraq thus frames the context.
Reports in the Gtmrdion in 2003 suggested that Rumsfcld's plans for
Syria were vetoed by the White Housc.' 90 As Tariq Ali noted, "since U.S.
forces arc now in no position ro mount a second im.asion, the ob\ious
route to toppling the government in Syria was to create a pressure point
in Lebanon, where Western powers can maneuver freely." 191 And yet the
Israeli attacks on Lebanon hardly weakened Syria-or, more importantly,
Iran-all the time that Hezbollah was able to resist. This sums to have
been realized by the Israeli inquiry into the war. 191 In late 2007, in parr
as a consequence of his compromised position, there were unconfirmed
rumors that Ehud Olmert offered to return the Golan Heights as part of
a peace deal with Syria; yet just as peace was being discussed, there was
a mobilization on the border from both sides. 19l Through the summer of
2007, there were persistent rumors of war brewing, especially following
the air strikes, but many saw this merely as Olmert attempting to divert
attention from political and pen;onal problems.
However, a challenge to S)ria long predates 2003 and the invasion of
Iraq. One key marker was a 1996 report written by David Wurmser and
cosigned by Richard Perle and Douglas Feith, among other k.:y figures
of the Bush administration, written for the incoming government of
Benjamin Nctan)ahu urging Israel to "shape its strategic environment ...
b} wea kening, containing and even rolling back Syria. Netan}ahu's
election came just as talks betwcrn Israel and Syria had been making
progress and shortly after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. 19.s In a
section entitled "Securing the Northern Border,"' the text

Syna challenges Israel on Lebanese soiL An cffecrive npproach, and one

with whtch Amencan lsicl can symp.1tfuzc, would lx if Israel seized thc
srrarcgic ininari,c along irs northern borders by engaging Hizball:!h,
Syna, nnd Iran, ns t.he principal agcnrs of aggrcssion in Ldxmon,
including b>:

stnkmg S>na's drug-monc:)' and caunrerfciring in frastructure an

Lebanon, all of which focwc:s on R:m Qanan .
98 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I

paraiJdmg Syna's bc:h:lVior by c:srablishing the: prc:croc:m t:h:Jt Syrian

rc:rritory is not immune: ro arracks c:manating from Lebanon b)'
Israeli proxy lorcc:s.
srriking Syri:Jn mi litary mrgers in l.ebanon, and should rh:Jt prove:
insufficient, strikitJg at st!ll!<'t targets itJ Syria proper.

lsmd c-.m mkc: this opporrunny ro remind the: world of the narure
of the Synan regime_ ..
Syria's regime supporrs the rcrrorist groups and finan-
in lebanon and on irs sotl. Indeed, the S}rian-colltro lled BtkJW
Valley in Lcbano11 has bl!conu! for te"or what liM S1licotJ Valley Jras
become for computers _ ..
Ga\'Cn rhe of the regime in Damascus, It is both n:JturaJ and
moml rh:Jt Israel t he slQan '"comprd:lcnsi\'C: peace.. and move
to contain S>na, dr.twmg :Jrtenuon ro its weapons of mass destruction
prQram, and rejectmg for peace.. deals on the Golan Heights. 1116

We find a number of rcvca.ling claims here. Striking is the inverse legiti-

macy. Syria is acting in this way, which is abhorrent, so Israel is justified
in acting in the same wa}'. Equally. while Syria can be condemned for its
occupation of Lebanon, Israd is justified in doing so-its troops did not
withdraw until four years after this advice, and not until it saw another
change of government-because of the threat. Nonetheless. it should usc
its presence to or "comain'' Syria. And it should continue its
occupation of the Golan Heights, and b}' implication the Shebaa Farms,
rather than surrender them.
Over a decade after this document, the wider "war on terror'" undoubt-
edly has had implications for the U.S. treatment of the- Lebanese crisis.
The- principle of holding weak states accountable for actions emanating
from within their territories is well established; figures such
positions in were in office, and thus the United States was able to charac-
terize Israel as essentially undertaking the same kind of reactive military
action they had done, an indiscriminate aerial assauJt de-signed to punish,
rather than something more specific that might cost greater numlxrs of
thc:ir own troops. lsrac:l is, of course, no stranger to this, either in the occu-
pied territories or in Lebanon. Lebanon was attacked from the air many
times, particularly in 1993, 1996, and 1999.
In addition, United States-led actions in the- "war on terror'' may actu-
ally c:rase differences between feuding groups, thus helping to produce
the connections of "global Islamism" that arc usuaiJy assumed, problem-
atical!}', already to exist. One example was the support given by Ayman
ai-Zawahiri to the Lebanese, despite Hezbollah being Shi'a, and backed
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 99

by Shi'a Iran and Shi'a-led (though Sunni majority) Syria, while the lead-
ers of ai-Qae.da arc Sunni. Perhaps, given Bush's conHation of Lebanon,
Iraq, and Afghanistan as " three fronts of the global war on terror,"' 97 this
was not surprising. As Rogers noted, increasingly "the Long War against
Islamofascism is no\v thC' construct, w ith tha t tc:rm embracing everything
from the Taliban, Hezbollah, and Hamas through C'Ven to the
Tehran regime-all of them subsumed imo a single enemy.""'

Somalia: The " Perfect Storm''

In 2002, ma ny expcctC'd that Somalia would be thC' targC't after

Afghanistan. 199 The U.S. Natio11al Security Strategy and commc:nts from
members of the Bush administration certainly suggested as much / 00 Assis-
tant Secretary of State fo r African Affairs Walter Kansteiner had dcclarC'd
that the Unitt.d Statrs had three policy goals related to Somalia:
Removing the terronst ducat extant m Somalia .md e nsuring agai nst
.Somalia's usc as a terrorist base
Prevenring developments in .Somalia from mrcatcning regional pC'ace
and stabi lity; and
Overcoming the long-term governance challen,ges due terronsts
exploit to make Somalia a base_:!DI

Somalia certainly fit a number of criteria for U.S. imervcntion . It was

often held up as the archetypica l "'failed" or "collapsed" state, with an
absence of effective central government power and a fragmen ta tion of
trrritorial authorit}'. "nlis had been the: casC' since the ci\il war in the latt
1980s and the unrecogn ized secession of Somalialand in 1991. T he war's
trmpora l proximity to the invasion of Kuwait mrant that the world's errs,
at that time, were elsewhere.
The modem Somali state came together with its existing borders onl)'
with its decolonization in 1960. ]t is often hdd up as an example of one
of thr few relatively concenrrated nations in the conrinrnt, It is unusu-
ally culturally a nd linguistically homogeneo us, bur its people arc spread
far beyond simply the Somali state. It was the amalgamation of British
and Italian in the area, though large parts of the Somali
population rrmained outside these borders. French Sornaliland became
the French Territory of Afars and Issas, which was then rrnamcd as the
indepcndrnt sta tr of Djibouti. Other Somali areas became part of Ethiopia
and Krnya.Nl The Somali flag has a st a r with fhe poinrs. representing the
Ita lian, British, French, Ethiopian, and Kenya n clrments. In addition, we
should guard against suggesting that having a common culture, language,
100 RUBBLI: REOUCED ro DUS I

\
r.r
'-
I0
Gulf a/Aden

I .4---tl wnuu

.,__
SCM4UI.A,.I!t
, Hgt!'Sl

ETHIOPIA /

--.... ---- ....

SO MALIA

India n

0 lllc<To<trft 200

Somalia and secessionist claims

and rdigion to coherence. There arc dlffcrcnocs even within the

99 percent of the Somali population that sees itself as Islamic.w For
Clarke and Gosc:ndc, "Somalia is a culmral nation. bur it was ne\cr a
single coherent territory. "roc
Therefore, only two of the points on rhc flag represent parts of thC' offi-
cial state, and of those, one wishes to break away-namely, Somaliland to
the north of the country, who.sc nominal bordC'rs arc those of the former
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 101

British territory. Somaliland is gene-ralJy recognized to be a ''iable state,

although it lacks recognition. It has a historicaJ background and is cer-
ta inly more effective than Soma lia itsdf. ln Rotberg's words, it "has a
strong go\'e-rnment (by local standards) and projects security. It has a legal
framework, co.llccts taxes, a nd provides senices that approximate reason-
able lcvds of good governance."10s As Rotbcrg notes, giving Somaliland
recognition would be bad for Somalia's own attempts a t a strong gO\Iern-
ment, but potentially useful fo r the United Other parts of the
country have declared varying degrees of autonom}' rather than full inde-
pendence, nota bly including Puntland in the northeast, which s-c:cs itself as
a federa l state awaiting a coherent central authority but is itsdf in dispute
with Soma liland abour its borders.w-
Somalia thus has SO't'ereignty only as a legal fiction, but it has been
implicated in previous attacks on the United States. with the 1998 embasS}'
bombings there, a lthough no Somalis were act ually involvC'd in
thC' attack.m Bin Laden himsdf had spent ti me in Somalia, but it was his
deputy, ai-Zawahiri, who was more closely invoJved in the
The Soma li Islamist organization a llt:ihaad allslaami was blacklisted b)'
the United States on September 26, 200 1.m Bases had operated in the
country, in particular in the Ras Kamboni camp in the coasta l a rC'a ncar
the Kenya n border: Shay claims that this was a significant location/ ' ' bur
Menkha us considers that it was a fo rmer camp of little contemporary
significance and that Sha)''s cla ims "arc based on information that is out-
dated and inaccurate. " 212 Its geographical location in the Horn of Africa,
bordC'ring on Kenya, Ethiopia, and Dj ibouti and with coasclines to the
Indian Ocean a nd the Gulf of Aden, that it strategica lly important
in the greater M idd le East. 213 Somalia was linked to global events,
even if it may seem very isolated. In the words of Mcnkhaus. it appC'arc:d
to be a "pcrfe.ct storm " for an Islamic radica l:
A oomplerdy sr:uc, where tcrrorisrs CJ.rt prr:sumably operare
in a safe hnvt'n lxyond rhl' rt':!c h o f rule of lnw_ Jt possesses :.1 lo ng,
unpatrollc-d coasthnc and llurtd reds o f unmonimrt'd ;ursrnps, facili-
uring untrncked mmemenr of foreign 11had1srs and 1ll1cit business
uansnctions.1 14

But these factors need to be seen in relation to what ha ppened when the
attention of the world did come back onto SomaJia in 1993. Perceiving
that there was both a vacuum of a uthority and a lnuna nitarian di saster.
internationa l opinion moved to support an intervcmion. Yet as Marchal
notes, this probably had more to do with the attempts at that time to
find c-onsensus for international action a nd to cJoak this test case with
102 RUBBLI: RHlUCED ro DUS I

the biC'ssing of the UnitC'd Nations. The victims themsdvC"S, on this logic,
were a secondary conc:ern.2' 1 Peter Woodward argues that it was signifi-
canrly the fir st case of the United Nations, under a Chapter VO resolu-
tion, engaging in peacemaking rather than peacekeeping.z16 The infamous
"Black Hawk Down" incident of 199 3 in tht" Somali capital of Mogadishu
has givt"n support to tht" continuing U.S. rductanoc to intt"n't"ne directly
in the country. Soon after this debacle", which kiiiC'd eighteen U.S. senice-
men and over a thousand Somalis, Clinton withdrew U.S. .forces from the
country, and this shaped U.S. foreign interventions unti l 2001. TI1e failure
of Rwanda, the e-quivocation ova Bosnia, and the tactics of at"rial bom-
bardmt"nt employed against [rag and St"rbia have a ll been anributed to
the post-Mogadishu reluctance to commit ground troops. As former U.S.
Assistant St"-eretar)' of Statt" Richard Holbrooke rt"marked on Somalia,
..The scars from that disaster would deeply affect our Bosnia policy. " 2 1'
Both bin Ladt"n and Susan Rice (fom1er assistant secretary of state
for Africa) ha\e claimed that the 199 3 attacks on the United States were
linked to ai-Qaeda.m Interesting ly, Rice was the author of Presidential
Decision Directive 25, which drew lessons from the Somalia problems and
was crucial in the U.S. decision not to intervene in Rwanda.m The linkage
between "Black Hawk Down" and ai-Qaeda has become widcl> accepted,
but we should be skeptical of this assumption, realizing that bin Laden is
trying to take credit, Rice is looking to place blame, and Somalis them-
selves den}' these connoctions.120 As H iro points out, in linklng a whole
range of events to bin Laden, "'America has unwittingly consolidated his
iconic status among wide swathes of the public in the Arab and Muslim
World. " !.!. Rather, as chaptC'r 2 suggested, a l-Qaeda is les.s an organization
than a framewo rk of ideas, and although the chronology is these
attacks certainly fit a pattern of chaiJengLng U.S. action in Muslim lands.
This is one of the ways bin Ladm reads the situation, seeing the achieve-
ment of an easy victory over the United StatC"S. Yet as de Waal and Abdd
Salam note, in 2001 political Islam was snuggling in the Horn of Africa,
but the cont1ict in Iraq has reinvigorated it: "a new militant Islam has been
brought to life by the war.'' 221
So until 2006, it was perhap-s not surprising how little actually hap-
pened in Somalia. With no stable or cffecti\e government to negotiate
with, the United States rdied on their own reports on activities in the
area. There were rumors of Special Forces operating Ln the country, P3
Orion aircraft based in Oman flew reconnaissance missions, and there
were extensive coastal patrols. but they showed relatively little, especially
concerning putative ai-Qaeda bases.m As Menkhaus
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 103

In reality, Somali.l has rurnr-d out robe less rhan ideal as a 53fe haven
for AJ Qaeda, parr.icularl) in compamon wuh mher opnons. FLrst, ter-
rorist cells and bases are much more exposed to intern.uional counter-
terrorist in zones of state collapse. Violations o f stare rovc:rc:1gnty
by a U.S. Special Forces operation a re Jess problemar.ic (or might even
go undetected) where a cenrrnl gmernmmt either does not exist or 1s
unable to extend Its :J.Urhority ro si!'Ctions of the counrry.ll4

ln addition, Somalia lacks \'(festcrn targcts and tourists and as a rrsult,

fo rcign terrorists arr grncrally more conspicuous.w In othrr words, the
nature of Somalia's particular politiC3 l situation a nd gcographical frag-
mentation dictate the kinds of interventions that can and cannot take
place. It is imponant to remember that the a bsence of state authority docs
not me.tn that there is no pol itical and lcgal organization.m The operation
of U.S. Special Forces dsewherc occurs with either the tacit support of
the go\ernmcnt or its ritual condemnation. This allows the United States
a freedom that it would not nocess.arlly have clscwhcre. In addition, the
United States is a ble to utiliz-e a range of militias a nd warlords to hunt ter-
rorists on its behalf, in much the same way that it did in Afghanista n, but
in a way that would be imposs ible in a stronger state. On the o ther hand,
cxplicit U.S. action would likely rccruit more forces for al-Qaeda and act
as fu rther confirmation for U.S. imperialism.u-
Thus, the argument is made that the \'acuums of authority in a weak
state arc actually more hclpful to nonstate actors than a fu lly collapsed
statc. "Terrorist networks, like mafias, appear to tlourish where states arc
governed badlr, rather than not a t all. "UJI Drawing on a description of
Liberia between 1997 and 2003, Mcnkhaus suggests that Somalia may
become a "'paper state." Th is is a statc that would "'attract foreign a id,
embassies, and the other lucrativc tra ppings of sovereignt}', but which
would not become functional enough to thrC3ten the illicit activities fro m
which the elite profiteers .. . [a nd] the c.tpacity to control illicit activities
within its borders. " 219 Ac.cordlingly, this kind of sta te may not be a par-
ticularly "safe haven.,. Just as it was in the 1998 bombings in East Africa,
Somalia is more: likely to be a tempora r)' base, a passage o r "transit zone'"
fo r short-term operations. It is therefore not so much what is in Somalia
but what might pass through it that should concern the United Statc-s.l.lo
What all this mcansl of course, is that rebuilding Somalia as a state may
be counterproductive to a strategy of preventing terrorism. A sta te that
has a of territor ial control would also be a ble to permit things that
the absence of state a utho rity makes much harder. It is thus in the strategic
interests of the United States for Somalia no t to achieve political coherence
104 RUBBLI: RHlUCED ro DUS I

and stability, especially if that would happen through an Islamic gmcrn-

mcnt. As Democratic presidential candidate [and future vice president)
Senator Joseph Biden revealingly put it. the Department of Defense docs
not want to deal with nation-building: "'T ht] think it's cheaper to just go
back in and empty the swamp again if }'Oll have to. " B ' Nonetheless, one
of the problems of weak states, in this understanding of secur ity, is that
neighboring states may end up destabili:z.cd as a result of the movement of
refugees and other problems. The wider regional issues were parricularly
e.,ident in the 2002 attacks in Kenra. Rotberg has suggested a regional
approach. which bears the hallmarks of t he mindset of imperial disdain:

The battle ag3inst terror in the 11ulnemble countries aloqg Red

Sea 3nd the Indian Ocean is best prosecuted from a holistic region3l
pcrspecrhe. The is tra nsnation31 and respccS no boundaries. In
any e\ent, none oflrhel intern3tion:J.II3nd or SC3 borders presenS an
effective barriu to infilrmrors. Drug.> and 3nns smugglers and C3ttle
and sheep rustkrs can cross 3lmosl 3nywh.ere m wi ll. t\ h1stor>' of inter-
pcnerracion, long decades of evasion, triba l or wurior domin3non of
fronrier remere from nacion31 capit3ls, adherence to custom3ry
enrrepreneunal obhg;.m ons, 3nd t h.e absence of robust security con-
nngenrs beyond major cities make region:1l measures 3nd coopcrarlon
necessary, urgent, and probably msuffic1cnt.u 1

1\oknkhaus more hclpfullr disassocia tes three forms of trouble in Somalia,

suggesting that they arc ''three inter-related but distinct crises: (1) the pro-
rractc:d collapse of central gmcmment; (2) protracted armed conflict; and
{3) lawlessness. '"l.ll He suggests that the United States and its allies need to
find a wa}r to reinforce a strong central government while simultaneously
reinforcing security across the country, thus taking away an opportunity
for terrorists to exploit the insecurity of transition.Ll 4
One of the key tactics was regional. Tbc Combined Joint Task Force-
Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOM was established in late 2002 to deal with
issues in the area. As West notes, the aim was "to confront terrorists
directly, to help the nations of the region identify a nd capture terror-
ists, and to help host nations control their ungo\cmc:d spaces, especially
borders and coasdines."m One of irs key tactics has been the process
of national and regional integration, tying the peripheral regions more
tightly to the capital through infrastructure and economic investmcnt.m
The Transitional Federal Government for Soma lia was established in exile
in Kenya, and then mo\ed to Baidoa, Somalia, in 2004. Around the same
time, the Council of Islamic Courts gained a strong base in Mogadishu,
defeating the warlords-some of whom werc allcgedl)' fundC'd b)' the
 RUBBL I: REDUCED ro DUS I 105

United States.U- This created a stability rllat had been unusual for some
time, but one which came under an Islamic banner. The Islamic Courts
and the government therefore conrrolled different parts of Somalia 's ter-
ritory, and tllough there were initial hopes of working they did
not materialize:.
In December 2006, Ethiopian foroes invaded in aid of the unpopu-
lar gmcmment and against the Islamic Courts, forcing some lslamists
to rctreat to an area in the where the United States then launched
AC-130 gunship raids early in 2007. Further air strikes across the countr}'
continued in As well as targeting individuals it saw as responsible
fo r the 1998 embassy bombings, the: Unitrd Statrs was also trying to prr-
vent the Islamic Courts from conrrolling rile state and to strengthen the
nominal Somali go.,crnment. The United States linked the Islamic Courts
movement to and while the: Unitrd States was claiming to be
intrrvcning in order to create stability in thr region, there was arguably
much more stability when the Islamic Courts were opcrating. 140 Ethiopia's
military action is, in itself, not new, given pw.ious inmlvement in the
civil war, and its war over the Ogadan border in J977-78, but the tying
of its str ategy to the United States adds a separate dimension. In the Cold
War, the United States and the Sovkt Union had both supported each
s ide, at different timc:s.241 Now, in the words of a former ambassador to
Ethiopia during the Clinton administration, "The United States sees Ethi-
opia as one of its most important African partners in the battle against
terrorism. n:z.n
The U.S. relation to Ethiopia is not entirely surprising. Along with
Eritrea, it was one of the tv.o African states to have joined the ''coali-
tion of the willing'' for Iraq (sec map on p. 115).1 4 J It is also a countr}'
with Christian leadership and a narrow Christian majority. The usc of
Christian troops to act as surrogates for the United States in Somalia
and the indiscriminate mode of assault by the United States itself will,
of course, further strengthen opposition forc.es. Shinn had sug-
gested in advance of the attack that the United States needed to be careful
not to be drawn into events in Somalia that served Ethiopian interc:sts.u "
Ethiopia has certain!)' attempted to usc the area to its own benefit and to
exploit the context of the "'war on terror." On May 20, 2002, for instance,
Somalia complained to the United Nations about Ethiopian incursions
to little cffect.141 While Arab states wanted Somalia as a counterbalance
Muslim state to the: strongl)r Christian state of Ethiopia, Ethiopia was
more in fa\or of a weaker state that it could manipulate to its advan-
tage, although it has concerns about its own security. 2' " As Prime Minis-
ter Mclrs Zcnawi stated: "We don't look at this as us joining the U.S. on
106 RUBBLI: RHlUCED ro DUS I

the war on terrorism, we sec it as the U.S. finally joining us because we've
been victims for many ye<1rs. " 1.r
In 2004, de \Vaal and Abdd Salam were able to suggest "the ' war
on terror' is not Africa's war. Instead the American confrontation with
a l Qai'da is bdng oc.casionally fought in Africa, but not br Africans and
not for Afrk<l. "l48 Nonethc:less, Eritrea and Z imbabwe have attempted to
brand dissident dements within their countries as terrorists or Isla mic, and
though this has been largely unsuccessful in terms of fo reign recognition,
it has worked elsewhere. In Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army has been
put on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, cvm though it has nothing
to do with And since de \Vaal and Abdd Salam's suggestion, de-
ments of other conAicts have been subsumed in the global struggle. For
instance, the long-running Ethiopia-Eritrca conflict is being played out in
Somalia, with Eritrea a rming some Islamic groups within Somalia such
as the Islamic Courts, and Ethiopia wanting to derail this process; and
the ongoing crisis in Sudan needs to be understood in this light. Indeed,
Connell has suggested that resohing the Eritrea-Ethiopia border d ispute
is of the utmost strategic importance for the United States.zro lntercstingl)',
both parties to this dispute claim to ha\'e the ideal of territorial integrity
on their side.
In summer 2005, when the United States expected that Iraq would
be stabilized relatively quickly, a top general had again suggested that
ai-Qaeda operatives were likely to relocate to the "vast ungoverned
spaces'" of East Africa a nd the region, noting Yemen, Somalia, Sudan,
and Ethiopia as possible ""safe ha\ens. " U The involvement of the United
States in Somalia shows the practice of the National MilitaryStrategic Plan
for the War on Terrorism: "to continue to lead an international effort to
deny violent extremists the networks and components they need to oper-
ate and survive. Once we deny them what they need to survive, we will
have won. "Lil Yet the United States cannot pursue this goal without con-
tinua l violation of territorial sovereignty and targeting of weak states. In
keeping with this strategy, the pliant president of the Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia declared that "it is an article of faith for the TIG
that again shall Somalia become a haven for terrorism. We shall
never allow violent organizations to take a foothold in Somalia. "m When
Blair addressed thC' British Labour Party conference on October 2, 2001,
he suggested that Africa was a scar on the conscience of the world for its
humanitarian problems but was a lso a strategjc challenge and thrcat.L1 4
But the report of the much-trumpeted Comm.ission for Africa has no real
commentary on issues of political geograph)', and in particulu, it fa ils to
make more tha n a passing reference to border problems other than as
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 107

barriers to economic coopcration.m These a rc both problems in terms

of the dispute mer borders and the difticuJt nature of seeking nation-
state solutions within the spatial conraincr of colonial decisions. Like the
United States, and like the new Somali constitution, the commission was
unwilling to consider the importance of political geography.

"The '&end"

Both Lebanon and Soma lia also fit the wider strategy of Condolcczza
Rice's a im of a "new Middle East," 2'" o r Blair's idea l of a n "arc of modera-
tion and re-eonciliation. In more general terms, Bush and his colleagues
attempted to sec disparate events as a "trend.'' Ambitiously, in 2005 Bush
suggested that events in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan. Palestine. Eg}'pt. and
Saudi Arabia shared a similar logic: "The trend is clear: Freedom is on
the march. "ll' Condolcczza Rice madt' simila r claims. As Benjamin and
Simon suggest, the "most re\caling aspt'-Ct of this sta tement is the way that
it imposes a singular meaning on independent, largely coincidental
events, all of which carr)' a mbiguous implications for the inhabitants of the
countries where they took place. "'!..1 9 There is a related logic at play here
to the usc of the tem1s "with '' and "like " as analyz<"d in chapter 1, where
a process of comparison and integration feeds foreign policy goals. Bush
s imilar!)' linked the U.K. airplane plot of August 2006 with Hezbollah,
suggesting that they wish to "take over countries like Afghanistan and Iraq
so they can establish safe ha\'ens from which to attack free nations." 1w We
do not need to sign up to Newt Gingrich's vision of a .. third world war'' 2 " '
ro recognize the intnlinkagcs of the responses.
As Blurnemha l reports, the aim in Lebanon was beyond the immedi-
ate situation:
As explai ned to me by se\eral sutc department officials, Rice
is enuanced by a new "'domino thror):" lsnd's attacks w1ll demolish
H1zbulla ll! the Lebanese blame Hiz.bulb h and destroy its influence;
and the backlash will extend to Hamas, which will collapse. From the
admimstrarion's point of 111ew, [his is a proxy war with !ran (and S}ria)
th.u will inexplicably help rurn around lmq.m

It was a lso revealing that the intervention in Iraq made both Britain and
the United States unable to act as honest brokers in any meditation in
the Israel-Lebanon conflict; cqua lly1 it rook away their ability to act as
pt"<acekecpcrs under U.N. auspices. As some advoc.ates of " humanitarian
intenention '' have noted. the [raq wa r has "squandered a no ble cause." 2 !
Noble or not, this did not seeming!}' dawn on Blair, who repeatedly
108 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I

advocated tbc causc of what he calls libe-ra l imcrvcntionism in his series

of valedictory foreign polic}' spoeches.1 "" Nor has it prc\entcd his being
namcd as the new envoy for the Quartct on the Midd le East (United
Nations, European Union, United States, and Russia). What is generally
not recognized is the interlinkagc of humanitarian intrncnrion to these
kinds of intervention.
Generally thc point being made by thr United States and its allies is
the same as was made regarding Afghanistan and (as chapter 4 wiJI show)
Iraq: what goes on jor is be-lieved to go on) in their territories is of wider
concern, be it the harboring of terrorists or the pursuit of wrapons of mass
destruction. In the 9/11 Commission Report, the scope is broadened still
further. It thus cxce<"ds its initial bricf and moves into the realm of strate-
gic ad.,ice. This is perhaps unsurprising givrn that the commission's exec-
utive director, Phillip Zdikow, earlier had rewritten the 2.002 National
Sea1rit)' Strategy from an original dlra ft by Richard Haass on Condolcczza
Rice s instrucrions. 265 Thc rrport identifies several places where the com-
mission thinks terrorists would be likclr to locate, on the dubious premise
of asking "American and foreign government officials and military offi-
cers on the front lines fighting terrorists today" the question, "If you were
a terrorist leader today, where wou ld )'Oll locate your base?" The answrrs
feed American prejudices and strategies at the same time:
Western Pakistan and rhe Pakistan-Afghanist:m border region
Southern or 'X1esrcm Afghamsran
The Arabian peninsula, espcciall)' Saudi :\rabia :.1 nd Yemen, J.nd rhc
nearb}' Horn of ,-\fnca, mduding Somaha and cxtmding southwest
into Kenya
Southeast Asta, from T hall:md to the southern Phthppines to
Indonesia
\Vest Africa, including N1gena :Jnd Mali
European cities with expatriate Muslim communities, especially
cit1e:> in central and Eastern Europe where SC'Ctlrlt)' forces and
border controls arc less

On one level, these places arc not entirely many of those areas
arc pcrcei'tcd as having fallen outside the world economy. They arc pre-
cisdr the places identified b}' the likes of Kaplan and Barnett. But what
is striking about this list is that the majority of places arc not individual
states but substatc regions, or broader geopolitical theaters. Afghanistan
and Iraq have therefore been somewhat unusua l in the broadcr war, as
events in Pakistan, Lebanon, and Somalia have borne out. As the 9111
Commission Report contends:
 RUBBLI: REDUCED ro DUS I 109

In r:he posr-9/11 world, th re:ns are defined more by r:he f.aulr lines
within societies r:han by r:hc: rerritonal boundaries bc:rwr-c:n rhem. From
terrorism ro globa l diSC":Jse or en,-ironmental degradation, rhe chal-
lenges have become transnanonal rother than imc:rnation.1.l. That is rhe
defining quahry of world politiCS. in r:hc: rwent)-firsr cenrury ...

In rhe twentieth century, !>tr:lt'egjsts focusc:d on rhe world's r,reat

mdusrrial heard.ands. In the twenry-lirst, the Focus. is m rhe oppome
direction, mward remote rc:gjons and states. The United St.1tes
has had to find ways to extend its reach, suaining the limits oi its
mftuence. 167

The fracturing of the rda tionship between territory a nd sovereignty thus

provides a profound challenge. Such a Jack of territorial control is nor
merely of concern for the state itself, but for regional stability, a nd, poten-
tiallr. for global secur ity. Yet the forced continuation of unsusta inable ter-
ritorial the problem.
In this, we sec me reason why ttrrimrial integrity is such an important
issue in international politics, but particularly in the context of the ''war on
terror." Territorial integrit}' is not being asserted simply b}' dominant pow-
ers in terms of their own sc.curity, but because of the destabilizing nature of
sec.cssionist or other territorial cla ims more generally, and beca use of the
dangers of a state not controlling its territory. Territorial control is claimed
to be important because a stare that is not fully in control of irs territor)'
is defined as a lawless zone that can be a .. brccdlng ground" for nonstatc
power. As well as Lebanon a nd Somalia. it is dear that both Afghanistan
and Iraq, after the invasion and oYerthrow of the Ta liban a nd Baathist
regimes, respc.ctivclr, arc in this category. And yet, it what their SO\'er-
eign governments were perceived to be allowing \vimin their state territor}'
that provided the justification for me violation of territoria l sovereignty.
Thus, Dorff's argument that the "ungovernable state and the bad govern-
ment state were simpl} two variations on this same underlying
is wonh considering. The ai-Qaeda/Taliban nexus was dfecrivdr dc.alr
with as a statc problem, as V!ras Saddam Hussci.n in Iraq.
This page intentionally left blank
 CHAPTER FOUR

Iraq
Destruction and Reconstitution

Constructing Threat

Although Lraq had been diswsscd as a strategic priority early in the George
\V. Bush administration, pressure had bocn intensifying since September 11,
2001. The internal debates in the admjnistration have been noted in previ-
ous chapters, but this event was undoubtedly enough to shift rhe balance
from the cautious Powell to the advocates of inttncntion such as Rumsfcld
and Wolfowitz. Ln 2002, claiming to have dealt with Afghanistan, the Bush
administration n1rned its sights to Iraq: from the putari,c net\vork to a more
identifiable and geographically locatable target. The dates arc significant:
Bush gave a speech to the United Nations on 12,2002, timed to
coincide with the first anniversary of the New York and \Xfashington, D.C..
attacks; Congress passed a resolution on the usc of military force Oil October
11; and the U.S. midterm elections were held oo November 5. lluec days
later. the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, ghing
Saddam a final cham:c to disarm.1
The notion of targeting is usefully explored in Samuel Weber's book Tar-
gets of Opportunif)t! shows how the word "target" originally mcaot
"shield" and therefore has dcvdopcd from its original defensive meaning to
something more offc-nshe. For Weber; the attack on Jraq makes sense as a
''target of ---an assault that takes its justification from an ulti-
mately unconnected series of events. As Rumsfdd apparently said irnmc:diatd)'
following September 11. 2001. Iraq offered better targets than
Later, following the destruction of what little: had been left standing in the
Afghan civil war, he quipped to rcponers th.-t the United States was not nm-
ning out of targets. but Afghanistan Iraq the most appropriate
112 IRAQ

could be TC"prcsented as a sufficient threat to nocd de-aling with,

but it 'hras a lso sufficiently weak to allow a quick
The justification fo r action against Iraq was based on a number of
conflicting and contentious daims- Sadda m's trea m1ent of civilian popu-
lations; the harboring of terrorists or links with them; the:- thrc:-at to its
ndghbors; and the pursuit of weapons of mass destructio n. This was both
a confuSt"d, and intentiona lly confusing, rationa le. Wh ile the question of
weapons of mass destruction grabbed thC' headlines, the o thC'r reasons
were, all at stake:-, according to \Volfow itz, even though the weapons issue
was privileged " for reasons that have a lor to do with the U.S. gmernment
bureaucracy. " Wolfo witz himself had long a rgued against the lmdcniable
humanitarian violations of Saddam's regime" a nd St"emed persona lly con-
vinced o f the link bt"tween Saddam a nd a i-Qaeda. 8 Iraq, personified by
Saddam, became:- a target. As Bush put it in a speec h in early 2003:

rhc= gravc=sr danger in rht' war on ruror, me: da nger

facmg Amc:rica and rhc: world, is outlaw rc=gimc:s rhar St't'k .and posst'Ss
nuclear, chc=mical, a nd biological Wt':lpons. These regimes could usc=
such wc=apons for blackmail, rerror, a nd mass murdt'r. T ht'y could
also givt' or seJJ rhost' Wt'apons ro rc:-rronsr alllt'S, who would usc: rhc:m
wirhom the: lt'asr hesirari on.Y

A number of issues a rise in this speech. The ""outlaw rC"gimes,. a rc unspeci-

fied, yet Iraq is undoubtc:-d ly intended. Bush's declara tion of such regimes
as "'outla w " is unila tera l, without a ny basis in international law. 10 There
is a lso a repeat of the: supposed linkage in the shift from tc:-rro rist organiza-
tions to regimes, o r states. But it is the two conditionaJs- "'thcse regimes
could ... they could ... "- built on what turned o ut to be an erroneous
predicate: (tha t Iraq possessed or was cloSt" to possessing such weapo ns)
that make the ca usal logic so suspe-ct. Bush contin ued:
l\ly point is. our presC'nce m Ehc= world is mo re rhan jusr our might;
but our mighr is nc:cdc:d in the: world right now to make: t he world
a mort' pc:aceful place. The: wa r on rc:rror is. nor confin ed suictl) to
the al-Qaedn thnt we're chasmg. T he war o n rerror extends beyond
jus r a shadowy tC'rronsr ncrwork_ The: wa r on invoht'S
H ussein because of tht' nature: of Sadda m Hussein, rhe hi5tor)' o f
Saddam H usst'm and hts willingn c=ss 10 rerrori:lce htmsdf. S.addam
H ussein has rerrorized his own people. Ht"s rerro ri:zc:-d hts own neigh-
borhood. H e: is a dn ngt'r nor only ro coun tries m rhe region, but as I
t'xplained la5t night:, because of ai-Qaeda connc:ct tons, bc:ca ust' o f hts
 IRAQ 113

h1srory. h.:"'s a dJ.ng.:"r ro the Amencan people. And we\e gar ro deal
with him. We've gor to deal wuh him bdore it IS roo lare. 11

Just as in Afghanistan. there .vas an attempt to tic the global security issues
to the bas:is of the internal actions: of the regimes they aimed to deposc-
rolmtcr-terrorism as humanitarian intervention. In addition, by the beginning
of thc war, Saddam was clcarly not in control of aU of Iraq's territory, nor
could he guarantee the needs of its population. Wbar these arguments nec-
essarily conflatc is an external thre-at and intcmal actions. While a right to
self-preservation in the face of a forthcoming attack is legitimated lmdcr inter-
national lav.; and can-in tightly circumscribed ways-aUow the ..,iolation
of anothcr statc's territorial integrity, this is not the case for interna l actions.
What we find is an attempt to usc the internal actions of the regime as a par-
tial justification for intervention, while at the same time denying this is the
casc. 12
The claims of tht' United Statt's go further than this. In fact, tht"y claim
a right to prcempt that is, to take action bdorc threats. materialize.
Legal ad ..icc to the U.S. Congress laid this suggesting that Iraq could
nor be prt'scntcd as an "immint'nt thre-at'' that would justify pr('('mprion
except on two bases: possession of weapons of mass. destruction and links.
to tcrrorist groups that might usc tht'm against the Unitcd States. It sug-
gcstt"d that tl1is ncccssarily related to the National Security Strategy ques-
tion of whether prt'cmption "ought to be r('('ast in light of thc realities
of WMD, rogue states, and terrorism/' 13 British Attorney General Lord
Goldsmith noted that "this is: not a doctrine which, in my opinion, exists
or is recognised in international law. " 14
As well as being illegal, it is also potentially counterproductive, in that
states that may find themselves potential U.S. targets arc likdy to want the
same capacity to retaliate in ad,ancc as the Un ited States currently has.
North Korea's and Ira n's rush to acquire some measure of nuclear power
is arguablr more of a negotiating strategy than realistic aspirations of a
long-term nuclear fumre. It is notable that John Bolton removed a U.N.
call for " nuclear weapons States to reaffirm their commitment to Nega-
tive xcurity Assurances'' from the 2005 Wo rld Summit outcome docu-
ment. This meam that the United States reserves the right to first-strike a
non-nuclear power, even outside the initial restrictions to this policy. For
Bolton, tbC' document was flawed because it "'emphasize-s
when the true thrC'at to intC'mational security stems from prolifcration." ;s
The key issue is that-as North KorC'a has shown---<:ountrics with
nuclear capacit}' arc dealt with in a d ifft'rc-nt way than those who arc-
merely seeking it, thus creating the incenti\'C to go after the weapons in
114 IRAQ

the first placr. 1b But it is dear from the sccurity strategies put forward by
the U.S. administration that they have anticipated this, and that one of
their a ims is to prevent other states gaining that capacit)' ro defend them-
selves from a U.S. precmpti..,c attack, lest the United States lose its power
of deterrence. In addition, one of their conoerns is that they will usc them
not simply fo r defense but for their own preemption.
This raises some crucial issues concerning the doctrine of self-dcfmsc,
which bccomcs much more complicated in the "war on terror.'",- Self-
defense was part of the justification for the Afghanistan action, and this
was effectively by the Security Council and NATO. But there
was a dd1nite danger that it would be classed as retaliation because of the
time lag betwcen the cvents. The United Statcs was, of course, no stranger
to retaliation, as Kjssinger's remarks discussed in chapter 1 show. \X'ith
Iraq, it was prcempthe self-dcfense in that it was committed prior to any
aggressive act. There ar c temporal issues here that differ from the common
notion of self-defense, which implies some coincidencc in time between
the action and the response. Deterrence, on the other hand, which sccks
to prevent a possible future through a logic of rational expectation, is
deemed to be inadequate. Prccmption (that is, dcaling with a threat bcfore
it emerges) is a forcrd incorporation of rogue clements into acceptable
structures. Containment, which can be understood as the spatial equi....a-
lent of the temporal notion of deterrence, is replaced with integration. Pre-
emption is the neccssarr temporal dement of strategies of integration.
Thus on March 19,2003, the United States and its "coalition of the will-
ing" launched an aerial and ground assault on Iraq. Aside from the United
States, this putative alliance included a number of Central American coun-
tries, many of which had been invaded or bombed by the United States
in the past (Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Domjnican Repub-
lic, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama); many European countries, with
notable exceptions such as France and Germany; the African states of
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Rwanda; the 1\t uslim countries of Kuwait,
Albania, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, and Australia and japan;
and a host of small countries from the Pacific, including Singapore, South
Korea, the Philippines, and Micronesia. Other states, including many
Muslim ones, provided more covcrt logistical support. '1
It is worth taking a step back here and look at the history of the coun-
try. Modem Iraq is the a rtificia l construction of a country out of three
provinces of the Ottoman Empire that found themselves under British
and French mandate following World War B.aghdad and Basra were
brought together in 1921 as British mandates, whereas the French man-
date Mosul. with a largely Kurdish population, was a later addition in
alltion of ...._
.. ,e ,., -
nmlflg"
116 IRAQ

1925. In return. France recc: ived o il concessions and a larger share of

Syria, from which it created Lebanon. All this was without regard fo r con-
temporaneous ideals of self-determination, and yet today there is consid-
ered an invio.lability concerning this territorial settlement. All states arc in
some sense artificial; the problem is those states that fa il to build on that
initial framework. As Anderson and Stansfield note. "Iraq has maintainc:d
its territorial intc:grity as a state. What it has never succeeded in bc:coming
is a nation. " 20 Indeed, the idea of protecting the territorial imcgrity of Iraq
was an explicit war aim, proclaimed in the Azores Summit Statement on
March 16, 2003, by Bush, British Prime i\linister Tony Blair, and Spanish
Prime M inister Jose l\tarfa Aznar:
We em1sage a unified Iraq with irs cerritonal integrity respected. All the
Iraqi people--its nch mix of Sunm a nd Shiite .-\rabs, !Kurds, Turko
men, Ass)rians, and all ochers.-should enjoy freedom.,
prosperit)', and equaJit>' in a united country. We Will support the Iraqi
people's aspirations for a represenroti\e government that upholds
human righrs and rhe rule of law as cornerstones of democracy.l 1

Similarly, on February 26, 2003, bdorc the war, Bush promised that
"we will provide security against those who try to spread chaos, or settle
scores, o r threaten the territorial integrity of lrag." 22 and Blair's speech in
the House of Commons on March l S, 2003, called for a U.N. resolution
subsequent to the conflict (and its expected victory) that "should protect
totally the territorial integrity of Iraq. " B [n the "U.S, and Coalition Objec-
tives" presented to Bush and the National Security Council on March 4,
2003, by Douglas Feith. the fi rst line stated that "Iraq's territorial integrity
is maintained and the quality of life in Iraq is impro"cd \'isibly. " 24
The notion of territorial intc:grity is a mainstay of U.N . Se.curity Coun-
cil resolutions, so it is unsur prising that the unanimous Resolution 1441
reaffir med the "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty
and territorial intc:grity of Iraq, Kuwait. and the neighboring States."l.l
The tension implicit in such declarations was noted explicitly b)' Senator
John Cherrr of Australia on i\1arch 19, 2003: "A fine wa}' to commit to
the territorial integrity of a nation is by invading it. That is what we arc
doing. Wle arc in breach of 1441."26 Why has this been so little remarked
upon?
One of the reasons is the profound ambiguity about how territorial
imcgrity is to be undcr1>tood. It is clear that Bush, Blair, and others under-
stand it as territorial preservation, the maintenance of the territorial sta-
tus quo. This is conceived as almost an absolute because of the perceived
dangers to stability of secession or fragmentation. Yet territoria l intc:grity
 IR AQ 117

SYRI A

"

t
llllrme1res 200
SAU 0 1 ARA B IA

Iraq and Its provinces

docs not mean simp!}' the preservation of territorial extent but also the
sovereignty within it. The two meanings of the temr-that borders arc
fixed and tcorritory should not bern seized or secession cncouragcd, and
within its own borders, within its territory, a state is sovereign-arc cen-
tral to an understanding of this conflict and the "war on terror'' gener-
ally. Territorial sovereign!}' is now held to be contingent, for humanitarian
reasons. b)' the harboring of terrorists, or the production of weapons of
mass destruction. Iraq could not be hdd to be sovereign within its territor)'
prccisdy bt'C'<I!use of what it was doing or a llow ing to be done w ithin its
boundaries. As chapter 5 demonstrates, it is worth examin ing the histOf)'
118 IRAQ

of tnritorial integrity to sec why there is such tension in the: contemporary

understanding of the concept. This tension relates to the: question of the:
geographical impasse highlighted by the disjunction betwee-n Bush's rheto-
ric and his actions, in that think ing beyond a so\c:rcign sense of territory is
perhaps tilt' limit cast' of the "war on tt'rror, '' bec.auSt' tht' status of a tnri-
tory such as Iraq is precisely the key thing not to be questioned.
On the one hand, then, Cherry is correct bec.auSt' the: U.N. definition of
aggression, following General Assembly Rc:solurion 33 l4 in 1974, would
seem to predudt' the actions takt'n by the United States and its ..coalition
of the: willing"' in tht' spring of 2003. Th is rt'solurion d('('lart's that ''the
territory of a State shall not be \iolated by being the object, e\'t'n tem-
porarily, of military oc.cuparion or of orber measures of forct' taken by
another State in contraventi on of the Charter. "'l" Assuming legitimiz.ation
was sought under the U.N. Charter, tht' justification for the United States
and Unitt'd Kingdom would, in this instance, be self-defense or the enforc-
ing of other aspc.cts of Resolution 1441. As Sands has shown, however,
such a lega l defense is untt'nable.n On the other hand, Iraq's ter-
ritorial integrity in the sense of the sanctity and preservation of its t'xisting
boundaries is indeed seemingly inviolable.
Iraq's neighbors, for understandable reasons, hmt' supported the
rt<temion of its territorial integrity in this second St"nse (notably includ-
ing but also Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, S)ria, and lran),10
and this bas also been stressed by other less obvious countries such as the
United States, China, India, and Pakistan. One of the earliest voices of dis-
sent was. unsurprisingl), The Kurdistan Observer, which suggested that
the maintenance of the arbitrary unity was the root of the problem. The
paper proposed the creation of three statt's: Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite by
dividing the country from north to south, with the Kurds and Shiites pro-
viding some kind of financial r('('ompense to tht' Sunnis to make up for the
uneven distribution of oil rcsenes.J Following the 1991 Gulf War., Iraq
was nor split apart along ethnic lines in a punitive settlement, nor was it
punished by loss of territory to Kuwait. J.l Dismemberment was consid-
ered, but it was rejected because of the importance of mainta ining terri-
torial integrit).U Yet Iraq's territoria l integrity was effecthcly challenged
as a consequence of the 1991 war; This was through the establishment of
no-fly zones to tht' north and south. While these did not actual!)' change
the borders of the state, they did pro'tide an arrangement under which
the Kurds enjoyed de facto "intermediate sovereignty. ''J4 This effective
territorial control gave them a degree of sovereign power, but, arguably
more importantlr. it also limited the spatial extent of Iraq's sovereignty.
Iraq's bordt'rs were not changed, but the reach of its powt'r within them
 IRAQ 119

was curtailed; the spatial extent of its sovereignty was limited. This was
a sovereignty that from 1991 on, and more especiaiJy since 2001, was
held to be contingent, for humanitarian re-asons, on the harboring of ter-
rorists, or the production of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq therefore
provides a particularly significant case in which to examine this territorial
targeting, the assumed territorial preservation, and the limitations on ter-
ritorial sovereignty.
After the first Gulf \Var, Colin Powell declared that " it would not con-
tribute to the stabilit)' we want in the Middle East to have Iraq fragmented
into separate Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurd political entities, "J .< and a White
House policy paper said that "in 110 wa-y should we associate omselves
with the 60-ycuJr-old rebellion i11lmq or oppose lraq:S legitimate attempts
to s11ppress it. " lt. This was one of the main reasons why the march to
Baghdad had been halted in 1991, and why uprisings in the north and
south had gone unsupported. For Project for a New American Century
(PKAC) mainsta}'S Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, though, this
was a risk worth taking in 2003:

We na\'e long ngo passed rhc: threshold whe-re the prospr:cr of,
n lrnq is a grc:mr:r evil th..'ln [he perstsrence of Saddam
Hussem. Th.ar m ight be worse withour him is of course a
possibthry. Bur gi\cn rh.e slatus quo m Ir-aq, ir is difficult ro
imagi nc how. .fT

Drawing on some of the predictive work of Jvlarr on political factions in

lraq, 38 they expect that there will be few problems, but suggest that a fed-
eral system is the The problem is, of course, among other things,
where the boundaries of such federal di1oisions would be drawn, Yet the
consequences arc readily apparent. As Stansfield phrases it, ''\'(fhen the
regime was removed, Iraqi society shattered in pieces. " .w
Of course, any di\rision of Iraq is more complicated than a tripartite
division betv.rccn Kurds, Shi'a, and Sunni would suggest. Tne crudest maps
of ethnic grouping demonstrate that even the borders for a fcdcra J solution
would be d ifficult to draw, and mor'C subdc mappings demonstrate that
a strictly rnajoritarian divide-where more than 50 percent of a region is
of a single ethnic group-is inadequate to the issues. Beyond the distribu-
tion of populations, the geographies of Iraq mitigate against a straight-
forward solution. The disparity in oil reserves is widely r'Ccognized, but
we should note in addition that the admjnistrative arc-as arc in the center
and the ports arc to the tnc fertile land is l>c"tween the Tigris and
the Euphrates (the o riginal meaning of the term "Mesopotamia" means
"between tne rivers"}; the south has marshland, and there a rc mountains
120 IRAQ

to north and desert to west; federal regions would have in

common with neighbors than the other parts of federation; and full
independence would likely lead to calls for redrawing of boundar-
in region. This would open up issues for Kurdish nationa lism, and
in particular claims in the a noma l)' of grcat-
politics that is Kuwait; 4' and Saudi Arabia. Numerous issues a lso
arose following the 2005 election in Iraq, concerning relations of Shi'a
to lran and Saudi Arabia and the fact that Sunnis did not in
large numbers. this, the stress that dominant powers have put on
Iraq's territorial integrity-understood as unsurprising.
As al-Zarqawi of ai-Qaeda in put it:
In a general sense Iraq is a politjcal mosaic, a coum:ry where t he ethnic
groups are mJXW together a nd where there exist s1dc by side va rious
confessions and sects with. man)' and complex differences, which o nly
a srrongl> centralized power and a might)' lc;Jder h;Jve been able: to
go\ern from the rime of Zrad Ibn Abihi to Saddam. D1fficulr choices
arc on the hortz.on for t h.c fururc.

The remainder of this chapter critically examines the of

Iraq since Bush proclaimed on Ma}' 1, 2003, that "major combat opera-
tions in Iraq have '" 4J In looking at the "securing and reconstruct-
ing" of the country that Bush claimed would follow. it critkall}' analyzes
the political process and the transfer of a ud10rity from the Coalition Pro-
visional Authority (CPA} to the Enterim Go"erning CounciJ (IGC)
the Transitional Administrative Law. and then to a new government
Iraqi elections. The focus of the chapter is on the proces.s and
document of its constitution1 looking particularly at the tcnitorial issues.
This examines the \vay that the extent of Iraq was assumed and
therefore Through the prooess of continued occupa-
tion and governmental delays, and through the creation of a "'failed"
sta te in place of a "rogue" one. the has possible
and has therefore the ve-ry thing that it claimed
stability in first place. The of authority from the
CPA to interim illustrates the problematic rendering of
state just as the refusal to engage w ith the territorial
mcnt and of political masks important politi-
cal e.,asions.

The Polttles of Reconstruction

In February 2.003 1 General Jay Gardner was appointed as head of Office

of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance [ORHA), a dilision of
 IRAQ 121

the U.S. Department of Defense, with the brid of managing the civilian
needs of Iraq after the invasion a nd expected quick victory. The remit of
reconstruction and assistance demonstrated that the United Stares was
not expecting to Yet very swihl}' after that declared victory,
with less than a month in Iraq, t he CPA replaced the ORHA, and Paul
Bremer took control on May 12. This was ostcnsi blr due to the lack of
political progress and the widespread chaos and looting of museums and
ancient The United States decided that widespread privari:z.arion,
including the energ)', heavy industry, and media sectors, was necessary.
As Ba rber notes, "The choioc betv.een a public or a private economr
is perhaps the most important democratic choice a people ca n make,
and by making that choice for rhe lraqis, the Americans effectively stole
from them a marker of their so\crcignty. " -16 T hC' purpose of the CPA
was to prepare Iraq for self-sovereignty, implying that it was ckarlr not
ready to immediately ta ke over and tha t some sort of nation-building was
nccded.r The U.K. ambassador to the United States, Christopher i\k)er,
described the attitude of the Pentagon, and pa rtiClllarly Wolfowin,. as
not to bring "perfect democracy but start with a fairly rough and read)
version that would be the basis from wh ich you could move on to higher
things....
Two key problems have undenujned such a n approach: the failure's of
the CPA and the chai.IC"nge to U.S. and U.K. forces. For Parenti, they arc
straightforwardlr linked, in that "the CPA, a policy wonk's Disneyla nd at
the center of hell, rests on a base of brutal and diffimlt mmtary labor. "fll
The CPA was housed in Saddam's old Palace of the Republic, now called
the Green Zone. This is a heavily fortified complex, removed both spa-
riall)' and po.lirically from t he "outside" of Iraq.so Tbis led, inevitably,
to a certain detachment, with U.K. enVO}' Jeremy Grccnstock suggesting
that potential of the period immediately after the war had been "dissi-
pated in poor policy and narrow-minded execution.".l 1 In a more
naive, or perhaps patent!)' dishonest, the: U.S. govcmmenr
listed 100 ways, in ten categories, that the situation in Iraq had improved
100 days after the end of major combat operations.51 The challenge has
bccn described variously resistance, insurgC"ncy, or terrorism. The
favorable label, from a U.S. perspective, was "pro-Saddam militias with
support from Islamic organizations associated with AI-Qaeda " lJ because
this enabled a number of key moves: to dclcgitimizc rcsistam:e by la bel-
ing it as pro-Saddam and therefore reactionary, to further suggest a link
between Saddam and a i-Qaeda, and to enable a branding of Iraq as tbc
central front in the "'war on terror. " 14
In reconstructing Iraq politically, the United Sta tes and United King-
dom were in an awkward position, as their occupation was bound b)'
122 IRAQ

the Hague Convention, notably tbe clause that they must "take all the
measures in [their] power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws
in force in the country." H On several occasions, CPA officials invoked a
sovereign exccCption to this ..s 6 British Inrcmariona l Development Secretary
Clare Short, a critic of the war in the first placcC, finally resigned on May
12, 2003, explicitly citing the limits to rbe powers of the: occupying forces
and their obligations under international law. Shorr argued that under the
Hague and Geneva {1949) Convent ionr., humanitarian needs, tbe keep-
ing of order, and the running of civil administration a llowed the occupa-
tion to administer, but that it was "not entitled to make major
economic, and constitutional changes/' and that only the U.N. Security
Council was able to do this ..s Earlier, on March 26, 2003, Goldsmith had
advised Blair in almost the same wa}'.ls
On May 22, Resolution 14B3 precisclr tl1is restriction on
"all states concerned."'.!" On July 13, 2003, the IGC was established,
which was welcomed by the United Nations as "broadly representative"
and "as an important step towards the forma tion by the people of Iraq
of an internationall}' recognized, reprcsentati\e government that will
exercise the sovereignty of lraq.'' 60 Parenti was more critical, saying that
this body of former exiles and other distinguished figures was far less
effective:
During trs first year the IGC was known mosrly for irs dupliciry, vacil-
larion, macrion, nmidiry, and interminable deadlock over small and
irrelevant decis ions.... :\tore= concrete rns ks---like wrinqg a nc=w con-
srirunon, go\ernmc-m msrirutions, and rc-vi\mg the economy
tor just pri\atiSing everyrhmg]- were left ro the CPA and l:uc-r the U.S.
mbassy.61

Interestingly, when the Govern ing Council was announced, it could not
agree on an accepted version of the Iraqi Aag to hae behind it. As Bremer
recalls, "'in the end, there was no flag. Just a map of a unified Iraq. " ii! This
is an attempted performanoc of Iraqi unity through a cartographic repre-
sentation. This construction of a liable political process was a key issue
bc.cause it was decided that a new constitution was needed for the build-
ing of the new polit)'. a lbeit within an existing territorial frame. And yet,
the question of who would frame the constitution was an instan<:e of the
problem of founding. On the one hand, the constitution was designed to
allow for the dcction of a representative government, but it needed to be
written by someone. Grand Ayatollah Ali ai-Sistani was central to ensur-
ing that tbe framers were ele>Cted, rather than se lected, issuing a fatwa in
 IRAQ 123

the summer of 2003, which in Feldman's words was "'pure democratic

theory, with nary a rdc:rcncc to Islamic legal texts ... designed to appeal
not only to religiously observant Shi'is but to all This view was
shared by munerous international lawyers, and transitional arrangements
were therefore put in place. Initially this was under the CPA with tbe
Transitional Administration Law (TAL), eventually leading to Bremer's
transfer in June 2004 to the interim govC'mmenr, which would pave tbe
way for elections to constitute Iraq. The tC'nsion was created because
Sistani did not want so\ereignty transferred to an unclected government,
but thr Unitrd Statrs was committed to transfer of sovereignty before a
practical date for drctions, due in part to the Novembrr 2004 U.S. presi-
dential
The view from the official "Historic Review of CPA Accomplish-
ments," a seemingly unsdf-consciousl}' congratulator)' document, is that
the CPA had provided Iraq with "four foundational pillars for their sov-
errignty: Security, Essential Services. Economy, Governancr. Iraq was
now a "fully sovereign nation; and the CPA had "achieved its primar)'
goal," and now it ceaSC'd to exist. In the more forthright assessment of one
provincial governor, however:
The Unired Srares s.howcd cerrainl}, and perhaps arro-
gance mo, abour Iraqis and their rc:1ction to occup:nion, and, in me1r
frusrration with existing s.uriry structures such as rhe Unired Nat10ns,
simply ignored the accumulation of pracrical c=xpcric:ncc gamed by such
org;mis:ltions. in similar \'cnrurc=s. If ir c:mnor be: proved rh:l[ th1s atmo-
sphC're of miscakul:uion, rivalry, and dissent c:xacC'rbared CPA's pracri-
cal difficulties, rhe empirical c:\'idc:ncc for t he charge remains strong. 6 t

In pan, of course, the: CPA recognized its own unpopularity and sought
botb the quasi-legitimacy of the IGC and their role in drafting the TAL.b-
A CPA poll, leaked in M.ay 2004, suggested that "92 per cent of those sur-
veyed saw the coalition forces as occupiers, and 55 per cent believed tbC:)'
would frd safer if tho!iC' forces left immediately. As Etherington notrs,
"the: consent of ordinary Iraqis'' had made its operations possible, and
thi.s wa.s not as stable: as the CPA migbt have hoped.9 In Feldman's terms,
the United States propping up an illegitimate government could lead to tbe
"worst-c-ase scenario fo r the Americ-an occupation of Iraq: Vietnam, but
in Lcbanon."" 0 Bremer therefore hurriedly handed over sovereignty sym-
bolically in a two-paragraph letter to an Iraqi judgC' and ldt the scene by
hdicoptrr and C-130. Just how sovereign the new Iraq was is illustrated in
Bu.sh 's comment on the new Iraqi prime minister: "Whoe\rer it is, I want to
be sure that he won't start playing to the gallery by attacking the Coalition
124 IRAQ

right raking office . . . got to be certain new PM won't ask

lts to lcae the day after As the CPA stated:
Drafttd and :1grC'C'd [on] by Iraqi le:1ders, the TAL is Supreme law of
lr:1q during me rranSI[ion:J I period. The TAL provides for Iraq's firsT-
e,rer democratic elections robe hdd no larer than end January 2005,
and for rhe drafnng of a permanenr consriturio n by OC'Cember 2005 .
Under che TAL, rhe system of governmenr in Iraq will be republican,
fede-ral, democranc, and plurahsric. Federalism will be based on geog-
raph)', h1sror)'. and scpa r.uion of powers, and nor o n erhniciry or sccr.'2

of January 2005 la rgely by Sunni Arabs

an overall turnout of mrer ha lf registered in Iraq. Shi'as
won fracrionallr than an overall majorit}', with the Kurdish alliance
in second place. In total, then, the Shi'as and Kurds hdd 221 of 275 se.ats
and would dominate the constitutional charged with
producing a draft, although fifteen Sunnis were coopted onto the panel of
7 J to strive for a constitution that could be truly representative.
These categories of Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd arc not unproblematic.
Sunni, for instance, is not an category, given that they do not
necessary self-identify in that way. In addition, the majority of Kurds arc
adherents of Sunni Islam, bur "Sunni'' is often now used as shonhand for
Sunni Arab.- The disbanding of the Ba'ath Party and association of
Sunnis with Saddam's regime have caused problems in asserting an iden-
tit)'.''4 Indeed, they have problems with the suggestion of discrete Sunni,
Shi'a, and Kurdish particularly in way these arc
presented. of Arab Amr Moussa, for
example, declared:
I do not belu::\'e in rhis division between Shi'a and Sunni and 1\tuslims
and Chriswms and .'\Tabs and Kurds.... I don't bu} rhis and I find
in th1s a true recipe for chaos and perhaps :1 C:Jt:utrophe m Iraq and
around

There is certainly a danger of sed ng ethnic and religious affiliation as relevant

political categories. This raises genuine concerns about the notion of repre-
sentation, and as Brown the"Sunni committee .. .
to be called the representatives of those boycotting January elections...
Some Islamic groups have tried to minimize diffcrcl1ces, with tfle slogan
"Not Sunni, not Shi'i-Islamic unit}!" but as Feldman notes, "the implicit
assumption ofthcse messages was that Sunni and Shi'i were the default iden-
tities to which people would probably have recourse, and that universalizing
Islamic identity should use.d to find common ground bct\ot,ecn them. "'':'"7
 IRAQ 125

Equally, there is a dangeT of sedng these groups as a unity,

each seeking similar outcomes. The Kurds, for example, both under the
de facto sovereign[}' before the invasion and subsequerltl), a r"C divided into
two main factions, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Sheikh
Massoud Barz.ani, and the PatriotJc Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Jed by Jalal
Talabani. Both have political differences (and indecd fought a civil v.'CIIr until
1998) and geopolitical strengths; Turkey favo rs former and Iran the lat-
ter as negotiating partners gi,cn their dominance in the northeast and south-
west sectors of the region,'B even though both states have launched assaults
on the Kurdish region of Iraq since the U.S.-Ied im'CIIsion.
Under TAL Article 61, the National Assembly was charged with writ-
ing a draft of the constitution by August 15. 2005, to be pur
to a referendum on October 15. T he constitution needed to pass two
hurdles: it had to win an oerall majorit)' in Iraq and not be rejected
by three or more governorates by two-thirds majorities. Although in the
final outcome, the rejc.ction ist governorates were Sunni, this was origi-
nally a veto concession for the Kurds. If accepted, the process would lead
to December 15 elections, with a new fu ll government to assume office
by the end of the )'Car; if rejected, those elections would be for a new
National Assembly, which would be asked to redraft a constiturion, set-
ting the political process back a year. Tbe August 15 dc-<tdlinc for writing
the constitution could be extended, but by request of the " president of
the National Assembly, with the agreement of a majority of the members'
votes .. . no later than 1 August 2005," and "for only six months ...
[and] may not be extended aga in.'' The article is quite clear that if they
fail to meet this deadline without a request fo r extension, a new drafting
assembly sbould be elected on DCOC'mbcr 1 5. It was not at all certain that
resolution would e\entually be found, and at various stages. a new assem-
bly looked likely, with some international organi.zations calling for more
time to allow proper Various setbacks dogged the process,
including boycotts in response to assassinations, the leaking of parts of tbc
constitution, and complaints about the procedures. II)
Indicative of the concerns was that there was debate on the very name
of the polit} being constructed, with various combinations of .. Federal,"
"Arab," or "'Islamic" propose<! as qualifiers to "'Republic." The issues arc
more than a mere formalit)'. The Kurds want to sec tbc polity as federa l
to underline their status, but they a lso want it recognized that a federa l
state is a union of equals , rather than ha,ing their autonomous status
granted b)' the larger state. While the Kurdish people sec themselves as
part of a larger Kurdish homeland, the Arabs think Iraq is part of a larger
Arab homdand, and the Shi'as arc part of a wider Islamic community.R
126 IRAQ

Concerns were raised about the lack of rccognirion of Iraq's "Arab iden-
tity," and yet the constitution works c-autiously round this, declaring that
Iraq is ''parr of the Islamic world and its Arab people arc part of the Arab
nation."&! It thus recognizes the separation and lack of a wholesale iden-
tit}' of tht' country. The question of scalt' thus works both ways: dm'>'11
to subnational art'<ls and up to supranational groupings. Although some
clements of the Sunnis wanted "Arab" in the tidt', in the end the straight-
forward name "Republic of Iraq" was chosen. Identity issues were also at
play in the choice of officia l languages: Arabic and Kurdish Wt'rc decided
upon, including the ust' of Arabic as an officiallanguagt' in Kurdish a reas.
In addition, the rolt' of religion provrd C"Ontcnrious, with t'Xtensive debate
as to whether it should be a source of legislation or the sour ce of legisla-
tion. The solution, appart'ntly brokt'red by Zalmay Khalilzad, then U.S.
ambassador to Iraq, was for it to be "a primary source":u qualified but
pri\ileged.
In the event, the daust's of Articlt' 61 of the TAL were ignored, with the
process going through St'Vera l dcla}'S, often only agroed at the last minurc
and with dubious constitutional legality. Rumsfcld declared on August 23,
2005, that it was "delayed a bit, but democracy has never been described
as speedy, efficient, or "a a optimistic outlook he has been pcrft-
ing ever since his comments in the c.arly days after tht' victory, when he
acct'ptcd looting and rioting as ine\o:itable, dcclaring that "stuff happens''
and "freedom's untidy. " 8 s Although some of the delegates wanted much
more time, the United States kept up the pressure, with Khalilzad making
extensht' suggestions of his own. He later tried to put a positive spin on
the dclar, suggesting that:
Nornarhstanding, their success in n;Jrrowmg, differences, Iraqi leaders
made :m irnponanr de-cision nor to rush rhe compleTion of such an
hisronc documcnr ... lmq's free will :md irs democrntic procfi:s were
on dispkly for rhc world ro scc.HOc

The United States also tried to underplay its own involvement, suggest-
ing that democraC}' was "'difficult and often slow, but lt'<lds to durable
agrecments" 8- and that:
This was an Iraqi de3[. brokerc:d by bra\'C and courageous Iraq
leaders.

The United States, workmg with our allies and 1hc U.N., served as a
facalu:a tor where necessary and supported t he dforrs of :.1 11 sides to
broker favorable compromises.
 IRAQ 127

Norhing would ha\c: bc-m done wirhout sophisric::ned and mature-

leadersh1p. 1K

Although Sunni objections were deeply felt, forcing the constitution

through and to a referendum was a deliberate tactic. To register their
disapproval, they would be forced to vote against it, thus drawing them
into the political proces.s. For Laith Kubba; spokesman of the government,
"If that is the price to pay, we lose six months and have to start again,
then it is worth it " 89
Yet one concession was more significant in that it merel)' deferred
problems. This \Vas the eleventh-hour deal, brokered by Khalilzad, that
meant that the new parliament could propose changes to the constinuion,
reinforcing the sense that the constitution is a holding operation. Man}'
contentious dements either were not worked through or were removed
in pan as a response to U.S. pressure about rime because a constitution
could be portrared as one of the signs of but a lso to instill a
sense of compromise in some clemems of the Sunni population. The com-
mittee could be set up, but there was no guarantee proposals would be
accepted. As the G11ardian noted, the constitution was therefore "prob-
ablr unique, .. as "it became shorter and shorter in the process of being
wrirren." It is therefore described as a "colour-by-numbers book, with the
shapes broadly outlined but the all-important colours left to be filled in
later. " 90 But for \ViiBams and Spencer, writing in the Bosto11 Globe, such
objections miss the point. What the Iraqis were working on, they claim,
was a "political compact" that set out how they will resolve future prob-
lems. Thus, the: August 15 projc:ctcd text was "'marc of a General Framc-
work Agreement than a traditiona l lcgaJistic constitution. " 9 1 [n the: words
of BBC correspondent Paul Reynolds, it was a "milestone a long the way,
not the destination it!;df. ""2

The Constitution of Iraqi Territory

While on the one: hand, Iraq's constitution raised issues around the prob-
lem of founding (in that the sovereign "we" was both posterior to the
legitimacy of the event and prior to it), on the other hand, the entity doing
thc constituting was a lrcady dccidcd- prc:determined. This is thc territo-
rial extent of the constitution's sovereignty and the people who would be
included within it. A key part of Iraq's constitution is thus an extracon-
stitutional act. 9J In a n a rticle looking at the issue of earncd so\creignty.
and particularly the case of Kosovo, Williams and Pecci suggest that cer-
tain dements of " phased sovereignty" arc relevant to the case of [raq.
128 IRAQ

But there arc important differences, "most importantly the final status of
the territory (i.e., Iraq as a so\crcign nation) is not in question.'' 9 While:
Williams and Pocci arc clearl}' suggesting that options rhen avaiLilble in me:
case of Kosovo-such as creati ng an autonomous region within a larger
sta te or an international prote-etoratC'-wert" not possible for Iraq, and
that Iraq is o bviouslr destined to be a "sovereign nation," the implicit
assumption is revealing. T his is a matter of determining the "final status
of the territory," and that tt"rritory is lraq.lraq's territorial settlement was
not in question.
One of the ironies of the territoria l sett lement desired b) the United
States was that the 1990 constitution itself declares that "the SO\'ereignty
of lraq is an indivisible ent ity"' and that "the territory of Iraq is an indi-
visible entit y of which no part can be ceded. " 95 But apart from the inap-
propriateness of carrying that over into the new post-Saddam Iraq, they
would also like to diminish centra l control. Indt"ed, the TAL makes some
progress a long this path, seeking to dilute federal power, to "encourage
the exercise of local auth orit>'' yet stiiJ preserve "a united Indeed,
the CPA tasked tht" nt"w Ministry of Foreign Affairs with "actively work-
ing to reverse Iraq's former isolation and pursue the . .. objectives of our
new foreign policy," fo remost of which was to " protect Iraq's sccurit)',
stabilize the country, and preserve Iraq's territorial integrit)...,.,.
There arc some telling claims in the prelude to the 2005 constitution
that showcase a particular geographical imagination:
We the sons of Jt.lesopotamt:J, la nd of rhe prophets, place of the
holy imams, rhe leaders of civili7J.1tton and dte crearors of the alph3-
lxr, rhe cradle of nrirhmctic: on our I:Jnd, rhe first lnw pur in pl:Jce
by mankind was in o ur nation, rhe most noble ern of jusricc
in the polincs of nnrions was laid down; on our soil, tht' followers of
th e prophcr and rhe saints prayed, the philosophers and the sctcnnsts
theorized and th<" wnrers and poers

A subsequent litany of the tra..,.ails of the pt"oplc of Iraq is notable because

the people arc not taken as a whole, but as discretely pcrscnncd groups.
It seeks to constitute them as a people through a reference to the January
2005 elections, where "inspired by the suffering of Iraq's martyrs- Sunni
and Shiite, Arab, and Turkomcn, and the remaining brethren in all
communities," they supposedly voted to put all this behind them. The
final lines of the prelude reassert the bringing together " freely and by
choice . .. to write down this permanent constitution," to preserve the
" free union of people, land, and Once again, we sec tht" con-
stitutjon of a people through a shared community of suffering.
 IRAQ 129

lmportandy, this union of and land is rdnforced in a number

of clauses. The president is seen as "the symbol of the nation's unity and
represents the sovereignty of the country,'' and is charged with guaran-
teeing adherence to the constitution as well as "the presenation of Iraq's
independrnce and unity and thr security of its territory, in accordancr to
the Similarly, the central federa l authority "will maintain the unit)'
of lraq, irs integrity, independence, smerdgnty, and its democratic federal
system. " 10' In addition, in a phrase that bears the boorprim of the "'war
on terror," "the state will be committing to fighting terrorism in all its
forms a nd will work to pre\ent its territory from bei ng a base or corridor
or a n arena for its {terrorism's) activities." 10 1 Aside from the interesting
grographical frames uscd-neithcr a base of operation, nor a corridor of
passagc for actions outside, nor an arena in itself-this is a telling sign of
the contingent nature of Iraqi SO\'crcignty. It was Iraq's supposed complic-
ity in such prc\ious actions that led to U.S. arguments for limitations on
the right to noninterferrnce within the territorial boundarks of a state.
Where a state was not in control of that territory and therefore was unable
to prevent injurious actions bqond those boundaries, or where it acted
in particular ways within its boundaries, such as persecution of groups or
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, their territorial SO\'Creignty could
be overrun.
For a federa l republic to work effectivclr, it is crucial that the power
arrangements between central and regional government arc constituted
carefully for future polit}'. And yet in the actual constitution's text, these
issues arc glosscd ovcr, masked, or dcfcrrcd. There arc a numbcr of indi-
cations, but crucial issues arc ldt undeveloped. Thc different parts of
Iraqi society necessarily have q uire differcm perspectives on rhis. Garerh
Stansfield's work is extrcmclr useful in setting out the position of thc
Kurds. In his analysis, thcy want threc ma in things: to maintain thcir cur-
rent autonomy and "augment it with control of Kirkuk," to "'&ecure con-
trol of oil rcsourccs in Kurdish rcrritory (including the major oilfield of
Kirkuk),'' and to "control a Kurdish miJitary forcc, and ha\c the power
to block thc military deplo)rment of Iraqi forccs to the north. '' This last
point means that this "would, in cffect, make Iraqi Kurdist.an an indc-
pcndent state in all but namc" 1u2 because it would limit thc projcction of
federal power and prevent the cffectivc monopoly of violence. By limiting
thc spatial extent of their sovercignt)', this Kurdish demand ncccssar-
il)' brings opposition from the Sunnis, who ..demand that thc territo-
rial integrity of Iraq !>hould not be thrcatcned by Kurdish a utonomy." 10 l
This bdicf in the maintenance of the territorial integrity is shared with
thc Shi'a popula tion, but in part, this is br.('ausc rhey arc thc dominant
130 IRAQ

group and most likely to benefit from a combination of representative

democracy and the territorial status qtw. As he notes, "for the Shi'a the
issue is about who controls Iraq, for the Kurds it is about whether they
should even be 'in' l raq." a!)I
In the constitution itself, Article 11 3 notes that " the federa l system
in the republic of Iraq is made up of the capital, regions, decentralized
provinces, and local administrations." Several levels of government arc
noted here. The provinces arc the eighteen governorates carried forv.ard
from the Saddam era, which were preserved in the TAL. 1ru The TAL had
declared that "anr group of no more than gO\'ernorates outside
the Kurdistan region, with the exception of Baghdad and Kirkuk, shall
have the right to form regions from amongst thcmsch.es,'' 10" a provi-
sion that again is carried forward in the 2005 constitution. Article 114
of the revised constitution notes that "the regions comprise one prov-
ince or more, and two regions or more have the right to join into one
region." This ability to merge regions is poorly formulated. One thing
was though: a decision had to be approved in a referendum of the
people of the relevant provinces, but this referendum was notably only
of those people within the prO\'inccs, rather than the country as a whole.
It therefore gives a right to limited secession. Equa lly new regions can
be formed onlr from ex isting provinces, thus potentiallr perpetuating
minority problems.
Kurdistan is notably the key region to be formed, and Article 113
of the revised text states that "this constitution shall approbate the
region of Kurdistan and its existing regional and federal authorities, at
the time this constitution comes into force,'' and that it shall appro-
bate nnv regions established in accordance with its provisions." This
is a continuation of the policy of the TAL, which had sought to move
the de facto to the de jure with regard to the Kurdistan Regional Gov-
ernment, consolidating the it had enjoyed under the no-fly zones
until March 19 "'in the gmcrnora tcs of Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya,
Kirkuk, Diyala, and Nennreh," without making a move for full inde-
For Khalilzad, it was much more stra ightforward than it
was being portrayed:
\'l:lirh rc:gard ro federalism isJ broad agrc:emem and some dis-
J.greemem. I know thar of d-te Sunni pa rric1p:mcs on rhe outside
hJ.\'e spoken OU[ ag.'linsT federalism ... On me day rhat rhe constitu-
tiOn IS ronfied rhe Kurdi.s.h emiry will be de jure whar ir 1s de facto, an

autonomous federal umr, a federal unit of Iraq. Feckrahsm 1s bringing

oock the- Kurdjs h rc:gion i ll(O Iraq. h has bc:.::n aW:J)', separat.::d from
lr:.Jq de (t1cto for a long nm.::.ICll
 IRAQ 131

But what Khalilzad failed to consider is the uony that it is the least
powerful community that most wants to preserve the ex isting situation.
The attitudes of Sunnis have been characterized as thinking of Iraq as a
whole and as Arab and Iraqi nationalists. 101 The fact that the
Sunnis werr both thr kast powrrful and most marginalizrd from the con -
stitutional procrss rc.quirrd morc concessions from thc Shi'as and Kurds,
to bcttrr bind the former w the political project, There is thus an uneaS)'
set of ad hoc alliances. Both the Kurds and the Shi'a want somc degree of
autonomy and ccrtainly an end to Sunni dominance. But the Kurds want
much more autonomy, and ker dements arc pushing fo r full indepen-
dence. In opposition to this, the Sunni and Shi'a populations adopt "an
Arab position," as they "fear it is thr first stage in the Balkanisation of
Iraq."' 110 The Sunnis in particular sec it as cementing their loss of power
and threatening territorial unity, and they fear Shi'a regions emerging on
similar linrs to Kurdistan, which would mran thr Sunnis would be left
with the "sands of An bar."
With rrgard to Kurdistan itself, the constimtion fudges a number of
is.sues. 111 Laws initiated since the de facto sovereignty of 1992 remain in
effect:
And dccasions made b)' the go11crnmcnt of the Kurdistan s-cgio n-
induding and courr decisions--arc cffecri,rc unless the-y arc
voided or amended accoroing to t he Jaws of the Ku rdistan region by
the conccmcd bod)', as long as the)' not agains r the .constirution.111

This has been a central concession so that the Kurds should not enjoy lcss
dcccntralizcd power than they did in the last decade of Saddam's rule. But
for the Kurds, the key was not the retention of some auwnomy but the
status of Kirkuk, given the importance o.f its oilficlds and its mix of popula-
tions. " 3 But this was one of the key issues that the constitution has failed to
address, and it mar be a causc of chil war. Indeed, Article 152 of the new
constitution states that it suprrsc:drs and mids the TAL, "except for what
appears in paragraph (a} of Article (53) and Article (58 )." These two ani-
des deal with Kurdistan and the situation in Kirkuk, particularly in terms
of addressing the doctoring of its demographic character,
As Patrick Cockburn notes, this masks some important political prob-
kms. He suggests that a constitution '' assumes a stable balance of powrr."
But this is not the case because "the Kurds a rc at the peak of their power.
They captured the oil city of Kirkuk and intend to keep it. They want to
freeze thrir gains undrr the new constitution. " 115 But in terms of population,
Saddam was able to engineer the makeup of the communi(), so this too is
unstable. In trmls of o il, the constinltion similarly leaves much unworked
132 IRAQ

through. While Articlc l 09 notes that "oil and gas is the property of all
the Iraqi people in all the regions and provinces," Iknnis has claimed that
thi:s is mcrd> for currentlr known resources, meaning that future fidds
be the prcscnrc of regional governments and foreign oil companies. 116 On
resources more generallr, Article H 0 tries to ensure "fair distribution" of
water as part of an overall deal.
While the assertion of thc " sovereignty and territorial intcgrity" of
states i:s a commonplace of U.N. rcsolurion:s-induding a reaffirmation of
"the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity ofiraq, Kuwait, and the neighboring States" in Resolution H4 1
in November 2002-therc has been a telling shift in the reso lutions per-
taining to Ir aq since the invasion. In May 2003, rhe U.K. and U.S. ambas-
sadors to the United Nations stated that:
Th( Uni ted States, rh( United Kingdom :md Co:1linon partners,
working through rhc Coalirion Pr o,ision3l .o\mhoriry,shall mtcr nli:1,
for sccuriry in .:md for the prO\"ISIOnaladminisuation of Iraq,
including by: deterring hosrilities; mainta ining the territorial imegriry
of Iraq and securing Iraq's oorders, sccunn g. :1nd removing, diS3bling,
rendcnng h:1rmless, ebmmating or dc-srroying (a) a ll of Iraq's wc-;tpons
of mass desuucrion.'1 7

In these crucial clements, imoking the Jaw of occupation, theirs was the
smerdgn position, rather than Iraq's. But their position was endorsed
b}' the United Nations on l\1 ar 22, after the forma lity of the invocation
4
of the SO\ereignty and territoria l integrity of Iraq," with the United
Nations "rc""ognizing the specific authorities, rcsponsibiJities, and obliga-
tions under applicable internationa l law of these states as occup)ing pow-
ers under unified command. " 118 Resolution 1500 again pays lip service
through the: usual though Iraq had been invaded, it was
not sovereign, a nd its territorial integrity had been violarc:d. 119
Resolution 1511 docs the same, but there is a notable shift in the atten-
da nt register:
Underscoring that of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq,
reaffirmmg riglu o f rhe Iraqi peopk free-l y co their own
polirical future :1nd control their own narurnl resources, re1terar.ing irs
resolve thar rhe day whe-n Iraqis go\'ern themsd\es must come quick ly.
J.nd r('Cognizmg importance of inrern:1r.ional suppon, panicubrly
thar of counrries in re-gion, lrn q 's neighbors, and regional orgamza-
nons, m t.'lking forward this process expediriousJy ...
Reaffirms t he sovereignt)' and territorial mregrit) o f Iraq, and
underscores, in rh:1t conrext, the- temporary namre o f the exercise b)'
 IRAQ 133

the= Coalition Provistonal Aurhorir>' (Authority) of rhe specific responst-

biliric=s, o bligations under inrc=mauonallaw
recognizc:d and sc:t forth m resolurion 1483 (1003), which will cc=aS<"
when an imern;a.riona lly reco&ni.u <i, represc:marive goYc:rnment c:stab-
hshc:d b) chc: people o f lmq is sworn in and assumes the responsibihric=s
of the Authomy. l:!ll

Thus, we ha\'e an endorsement of the principle, with recognition of tbe

"temporary nature" of the aberration. The occupation is thus rocognized
bur not reuospcctivel) authoriud. By June 8, 2004, the U.N. Sccurit)'
Counci l was welcoming the new arrangements which would lead to "a
fu lly sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq by 30 June
2004," as part of the "transition to a democratically cle.cted govern-
mC'nt, '' and anticipating "the end of the occupation and tbc assumption
of full responsibility and amhorit)'' by Iraq.'2 1 HowC'ver, the U.N. Secu-
rity Council underscored that this government must refrain from "tak-
ing any actions affecting Iraq's destiny beyond the limited interim period
until an clectC'd Transitional GO\ernment of Iraq assumes office." In oth(:r
words, the intC'rim government must simply facilitate thC' C'Xisting systC'm
until the election of a go'\oernment that could begin to change it, through
the constitutional process, of course. But it docs this 'Nithout recognizing
the TAL, which without CPA soverC'ignty was now preswnably mutable'.
Most naively, the resolution went on to proclaim that "by 30 June 2004,
the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority will CC'ase
to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full sovercignty.'' 11!
Instead of merclr the "sovcreignt) and territorial intC'grity" of Iraq.
Resolution 1546 now stressed thC' " indC'pmdence, soverc:ignt}', unity, and
territorial integrity of h aq ." This phrase, which reoccurred in Resolutions
1557 (passed August 12, 2004 ), 1619 (passed August 11, 2005), and 1637
(passed NovembC'r 8, 2005), underscores the constitutive dements of the
political process. SovC'rC'ignty now could be stressed as '"indcpendcncC''"-
although it is clearly a deeply compromised and circumscribed indepen-
dence of action, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy-and terri-
torial integrity could be reinforced by "unit)." But these we're more than
simply superfluous additions. As wdl as sovereignt)' being held C'ff('('-
tivdy in trust for the Iraqi people' under the occupation, which it now
had restored with independence, they marked a very real fiction in the
international communitr's acceptan{'e of a deep ly problematic political
position. The United Nations established the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). whose mandate has bCC"n extmdcd,.u because
it was facilitating "Iraqi national dialogue:," which was "crucial for Iraq's
134 IRAQ

political stability and unity'"; and simultaneously endorsed the '' presence
of tht" multinational force in [raq" bt";Cause it was "at the request of the
Govcrnrnt"m of Iraq. " 24
Evt"n though the constitution was adopted, and elections have since
taken place undt"r its terms, the occupation continues today. In the words
of the U.N. Se.curity Council. though, this is "at tht" request of the Govern-
ment of Iraq," and tht"rcfore, it has reaffim1t"d "the authorization for the
multinational force as set fonh in resolution 1546 (2004} and (decided] to
extend the mandaoc of the multinational force as set forth in that resolu-
tion until 31 0t"ccmber 2006. "ll.l The mandaoc has bcm extcndt"d further
several timt"S. What tht" U.N. &ccurity Council fai ls to address, howe\er,
is that the continual prest"nce of U.S. d{"Cply compromist"S the inde-
pcndmct" of Iraq and that de facto soverdgnty continues to rest with the
military. Until the Iraqi govt"rnmmt is able to back up its demands with
its own monopoly of legitimate violt"nce, it "exercises sovereignty only in
a Vt"f}' limitt"d way. "' U
After the constimtion was fina lly approved, copies Wt"rt" disrributt"d
and the rcft"rcndum campaign began. The question was simplt": "Do you
appro.,e of the Draft Constitution of Iraq?" Onl}' those present in Iraq
could vote: no out-of-country voting was allowed. Political citizenship
was thus effectively tit"d to geographical pf{"Senct". Many of the vott"rs had
not seen a copy of the rderendurn, which was being negotiated until at
kast October 12-thr{"C da}'S bdore the election . ln late Septembt"r, some
had believed that rejection of the constitution was inevitable, but voting
on October 15 dcli\ered an over<1 ll 78 percent in favor and 21 percent
against in Iraq as a whole. There Wt"re some instances of violt"nct", but
voting took place largely as plannro. Turnom was more than 60 percent
of tht" 15.5 million voters. 11' Endorsements in some provinces were very
high, including 96 percent in Basra in the south and 99 percent in the
three Kmdish-dominatcd provinces of Dahuk, lrbil, and S}rlaimaniya in
the north. More mixro arms such as Raghdad (77.7 percent) and Kj rkuk
(62.9 percent} showt"d smaller minoritb. But the situation was entirely
rcvcrst"d in the two Sunni-dominatt"d provinces, which voted overwhelm-
ingly against: Salahaddin (8 1.7 percent) and Anbar (96.9 pcroent). These
provinces indude the towns of Falluja, Ramadi, and Tikrit. [n Nineveh,
which includ{"S a mix of Kurds and Christians, 55 percent voted against,
but this was too small a loss to the third no-voting prO\rincc:
needed to reje;Ct the constinltion. In Diyala, there was also a strong "no''
vote, but ht"re, it did not t"vcn achievt" a simple majority, with 49 pt"rct"nt
against. lbe U.N. approval of tht" resu lt has largely displaced concerns
of widespread fraud, but questions abound about the proct"Ss, and the
 IRAQ 135

starldr geographically pola rizcd support shows the very real divisions in
the country.
The referendum on the constitution was predictably trumpcrcd as the
return of the Sunnis to the politica l process, after their having boycot-
ted the January 2005 dcctions. Condolcczza Rice, who stated that the
result was an endorsement before the results were actually known, sug-
gested that "one way or another, the Iraqis will be in a position to move
forward. " In For Khalilzad, "this constitution could be a national com-
pact, bringing Sunnis in, isolating extremists, Baathists, and hard-liners,
and setting thc stage O\'er rime for dcfc.ating the opponents. But the
return of thc Sunnis was double-edged in two ways: thq largcl)' votcd
only to vote "no," and large dements of rhc " insurgency" co ntinued to
pair the bomb and bullet with the ballot (and do so C\'Cn today}. For them,
these tv.o tactics can work in parallel: rcsistance through the political pro-
cess as well as through violcnce.
Oncc again, the headline figures mask divisions within the communities,
with the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party initiaJly offering a cautious welcome to
the document on the condition that disputed points were resolved by the
cnd of August} "' B)' the middle of October, just as voting v.ras a bout to
begin, the party endorscd tl1e constitution, partly because of the last-minute
inserted clause that allows "articles to be rc-examincd b)' a ncw goernmcnt
if the National Assembly dcsircs."' 11 Nor arc these intern.1 l tensions simply
within Sunni communities. Within the Shi'as, Abdui-Az.iz ai-Hakim, who
has strong tics to Iran, has called for greater autonomy for the south, with
the support of Ayatollah al-Sistani. Otller key figures, including Moktada
al-Sadr and Ayatollah Muhammed Yacoubi, think this goes against central
Islamic rulc, 132 leading to common cause with some dements of the Sunni
population. m And disagreements arc not merely the democratic disputes
that Bush and have labclcd them, as Bush claimed:

Some obsem:rs quesTion t he durability o f democrncy in Iraq. They

undere-snmate the power and appeal of freedom. \Ve',,e heard it SUI]',-
gested that Iraq's democracy must be on sha ky ,g round because Iraqis
arc: ..uguml]', with J:"ach other. But rhar's me essence of democracy'! mak-
ing your case, debanng with rhosc: who you disagree- who disagree,
building consensus by persuasion, and answering ro the will of the
people .... lr is. rrue th:u the seeds o f freedom have only recenrl y been
planted in Iraq- bur democrac)', when 1r grows, is n 01 a fragile flower;
it is a heahhy, sturd>

Yet wha t Bush failed to realize, or to acOC"pt., is that the d isputcs arc not
merely those that take place within any democratic polity; they go to the
136 IRAQ

root of rhC' very constitution of that polity itself. This is constimtion nor
as a document o r a process of making, but constitution as composition,
rhc very makeup of land and people. One of the key concerns shouJd be
that clements both sec themscl\es as having more in common with neigh-
boring states and communities than with other Iraqi populations, and
perceive that of those others as well. Indeed, for many Sunnis, the Shi'as
arc " Islamic fanatics in league with Iran," and the Kurds "traitors work-
ing with the Americans." 111
What is labeled " insurgency" has been made possible through the ere-
arion of a "faile-d" state in place of a "rogue" one, and the United Statts
has rhercforc ere-a re-d the very rh ing that ir claimed threatened stabiliry
in the firsr place. The one group in Iraq that most \cvanrs the existing ter-
ritorial settlement to be preserved consists of those most hostiJe to the
political process, and the United States is in part trying to protect that
settlement for them in the face of rheir opposition. It is likely rhat a new
balance of power needs to emerge in Iraq before it can begin to stabilize.
The ongoing debates about the prcsenc.c of the troops and timetables for
withdrawal hinge on this question: whether the invasion precipitated a
division that the oc,cupation postpones.
As British journalist Simon Jenkins put it in 2005:
Neocon5erv:uivcs might fantasise O\'er Iraq a democr.u1c Garden of
a land ro stablliry :md prospemy. Harder noses
were comem ro dump t he place m Ah mad Chalabi'slap and let ir go
to hell. H.J.d that I suspect there wou ld ha\e been :.1 bloody
of scores bur by now a tnpartrre republic hauling rtsclf back to
peace and reconstrucrion. Iraq is., after all, one of lhe richesr narions on
eartb.'J

Other writers suggested that the situation was likely to gcr worse if pre-
mature withdrawal takes place, following Colin Powell's prewar warning
to Bush that if "you break it, you own it'' Getting rid of Sa.ddam created
a duty to resohc the problems that his overthrow produced. Yet the inter-
nal tensions bcrwccn Shi'as and Sunnis in Iraq cannot be confined to thar
counrry--othcr regional powers hac a srakC' in the outcome of the con-
flict. In the north, fighting has a lready spi lled over the border with Turkc)',
with incursions &om both sides.
Those who sec a mor<1l case for the oc.cupation and re<:onstruction,
however, suggest that "elections must be undc:rstood as the midpoint of
the narion-building undertaking. not the end of the nation-buildc.-r's obli-
gations toward the country in question, n- and sce the potential fo r much
longer-scale assistance. Indeed, as Carroll wrote when it was first dda)cd,
 IRAQ 137

the new constitution "will not scule tbc question of what is Iraq. '" 1J ' It
may well be that by refusing to even consider that question, the United
States has hastened the territorial and political decomposition of Iraq,
rather than reconstituting it and securing its territorial integrity. Iraq is
potentially on tbe brink of an even more destructive phase. The irony is
that tbe intervention has led to the creation of a new failed state, with ind-
fe-etive territorial control. The humanitarian catastrophe is so ovcnvhclm-
ing that were there not already U.S. and British troops there, there would
no doubt be calls for assistance. m \Vith the exception of areas protected
by no-fly zones, Iraq's territorial integrity was intact before the imasion,
both in terms of the preservation of its borders and its abilit)' to exercise
power within them. This could, of course, allow ir to exercise its power in
wars that would contra\ene human rights. After the invasion, Iraq's bor-
ders arc nominally still intact, although the ability of the government (or
indeed the occupying forces) to exercise a monopoly of physical violence
within those is profoundly compromised. [n addition, borders
with Iran and Syria arc porous in a way they never were before, and the
instability with Turkey continues.
Despite the initial notion of a bipartisan agreement with Democratic
leaders in Congress. Bush largely ignored the recommendations of tbe
Iraq Study Group, clinging to a conditional phrasing suggesting that it
"could, however. support a short-term redeployment o r surgc." 140 Tbis
"surgc'"-a short-term deployment of troops, mainly into Baghdad. to tr}'
to address security issues and reduce sc.ctarian killings-has been widcl}'
trumpeted as a success that brought stability to Iraq, thus cre<1ting the
notion that this war is winnable. \Vhile there is. undoubtedly less violence
in Baghdad, this is in part because the city has been divided a long largcl}'
religious lines, with previous!}' mixed neighborhoods undergoing a pro-
cess of transition towards homogeneity. Checkpoints and barriers have
made contact between opposing groups rarer and redm:cd opportunities
fo r sectarian violence. Many ha..e left the country. Equally, part of the
reduction in violence has been in anticipation of an eventual U.S. with-
drawal and an attempt to begin position ing for the aftermath. This after-
math is likdy to result in isolated and divided provinces. Thus. within tbe
existing territorial frame, sectarian division is increasingly being fixed. 141
In earl}' 2007, at the moment the surge was beginning. Bush claimed
that "'succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrit}'
and stabilizing the region in the face of extremist challenges."' This is
aimed at Iran and Syria and their involvement in the region, but the speech
swiftly moved to the kind of Iraq he envisaged within those boundaries:
"A democratic Iraq will not be perfect. But it will be a country that fights
138 IRAQ

terrorists instead of harboring them-and it will hdp bring a furure of

peace and scntrity for our children and grandchildren .'' 1u The lraq Study
Group report equally continues the process of denial. The first explicit
policy proposed in the report is that "the goals of the diplomatic offensive
as it rdates to regional players should be to: i. Support the unity and ter-
ritorial integrity of Iraq. " 143 In 2005, Bush had described victory in Iraq as
dmdold: having a new ally in the "war on terror"; building an Iraqi mili-
tary that could defend Iraq's territor); and creating a secur ity force able to
"prevent safe haven for terrorists. " 144 The United States thus continually
repeats its attempt of 2003: cha llenge territorial sovereignty, but refuse
to countenance the rdated question of spatial c:x"tent. Iraq must remain
togclher, bur its political actors must act in appropriatc, U.S .-approved,
ways. Its territorial extent is fixed, but its sovereignty within remains con-
tingent for three reasons: regional stability (including weapons of mass
destruction). its focus as a base for terrorism, and rhc material conditions
of its people. The la tter is the basis of "humanitarian intenention," bur
the first two arc the kq intcrlinke<J a ims of the ""global war on terror."
 CHAPTER F IVE

Territorial Integrity and

Contingent Sovereignty

This final chapter provides a widCT angle on the issues raised in this book,
suggesting that arguments about the conringenqr of territorial sovereignty
have a much longer histor}' than events since 2001. While these claims have
been made by neoconsenatives concerning Iraq and other states targeted in
the "war on terror," the)' share a logic with earlier calls for "humanitarian
intervention" that similarl)r limited the territorial sovereignty of states. Yet
many states have long had their sovereignt}' compromised, and the United
States is no stranger to making claims for the contingency of sovereignty,
undertaking many interventions within both the Cold War and the "war on
drugs" in Central America in the 19 80s and 1990s. This chapter see-ks to
show both thC"s.c: continuirics and the distincri\eness of the contemporar}'
sintarion. It first providcs a background discussion of international law on
the issues of uti pos.sidetis and territorial integrity, and then it examincs the
topic of humanitarian intenention and current discussions around reform
of the United Nations. In doing so, it considers various historical and con-
temporary examples, paying particular attention to the case of Kosovo.

The Integrity of a State

The 1933 J\t onrevideo Convention noted that:

Tht:" state: as J. pc:rson of mrernanonal low should the: follow-
ing qualifkarions: (a) a po:-rmonc:nr popubrion; a dc:fined r;erritor)';
(c) gov;ernmt:'nt; and (d) capacity ro c:nrer into rdnions w id1 orher
sures. 2

The second of these qualifications i!; at stake here. The definition of a

state's territory is a Clentral aspect of its sovereign power because it gives
140 1ERA II ORIAL IN TE:GRi l Y AND CON l lNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

the very of that Although we might wdl the

actual validity of these claims, the expectation is that within its territory,
a state is and its provide limits to tha t sovC'reignty.
'lllcsc two aspects arc fo und in the term of "territorial
integrity," which can be described as the spatia l of SO't'-
ereignty.3 By a of integrity" this chap-
ter seeks to accomplish two things: to history of
in century, a nd to show how an interrogation
of this term allov.rs a situation of the ">var on terror" in a much
context.
"Territorial integrity'' is a term that is mshrined in U.N. Charter. In
Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles, Article 2, Paragraph 4, it decla res:
AJJ Jt.lcmlx=rs shall refrain in their mtcrmttlonal rd:nions from t he
rhrca1 or usc of forcc against 1hc: termorial intc:griry or pollric::tl
indc:pc:ndc:ncc of ::tny stJrc, or in ::tny other ma nner inconsistcm with 1hc
Purposes of rhc: Unttcd 1'\arions .4

Taken with Article 2, Paragrnph 7, which U.N. in

which arc essenriaiJy within domestic jurisdiction of an}'
state," a nd Article 2, Paragraph 1, which notes that "the Organization is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Jvlcmbcrs," this
a clear orientation of international law a round ke)' prin-
ciple's: equalit}' of all states, competence for
tic jurisdiction, and territorial of existing boundaries. This
is, in a sense, the necessary fiction inherent in the concept of the
Nations: that states arc in control of. and sovereignty
over:, their entire territory.
'lllis ddinition and this reinforcement is not to found-
ing charter, it also c<1n be found in man}' U.N. resolutions,
both in terms of specific disputes in the Council and in broader
statements of purpose, as the 1970 General " Declara-
tion on Principles of law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-opcrntion among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United l'ations. " 5 This declaration continuaiJy three interre-
lated themes of territorial integr ity, noninterference in domestic jurisdic-
tion, and of aiJ states. [t simila rly that this
is not s imply pertaining to the vioJation of international boundaries but
also " international lines of demarcation, such as armistice lines, estab-
lished by or pursuant to an international agreement to which it is a party
or which it is otherwise bound to respect." Similarly, it notes that " no
territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or of s hall be
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON IINGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 141

recognized as legaL" In rimes, the most consistenr \'iolation of this

principlc has bcc:n Israel's continued occupation of the territories seized
in thc 1967 war, in particular the of East jerusalem and thc
Golan Heights and thc construction of Israeli settlements in AJab land.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, explicit!)'
emphasizes "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of tcrritory by war.""
The historical roots of the term "rerriwrial imegrit)'' go back
what further. The of Nations Covenant- (Article 10} made stm-
ilar claims to the U.N. Charter; while thc 1928 Kellogg-Briand
which outlawed war as a mcans of international diplomacy, and the 19 32
Stimson doctrine, wherc the United States warned Japan and China that
territorial through would not be rccogntzed, all helped to
solidify the notion of tcrritorial integrity as an idea l, even if it is really onl}'
since the end of World War ll that the term has had any forcc.'
Thc assertion of territorial intcgrity in the Lcague of Nations Covcnant
may bc somewhat surprising, as the Covenant and the fourtee n Points of
Woodrow \lC'ilson that infom1cJ thc wider setdemenr arc often looked ar
as promoting the idea of self-determination. As a central principle in thc
breakup of cmpires, self-dctem1ination might seem to be thc dtrcct oppo-
site of thc preservation of existing territorial seulemcnts. Wilson oertainl}'
supportcd self-determination, bur he stressed the importancc of territorial
equally. For cxample, in 1916, hc listed the fundamental things
that "we" bdic\'e in. The tint was "evcry people ha\'e a right to choose
the sovercignt)' under which they shall live," but he immediate!}' fo llowed
this with a guarantee of tcrritorial integrity for all states. 11l Equally, the
Fourtecn Points called for the "autonomous development" of the non-
Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empi re (point 12), and for "the peoples
of Austria-Hungary" (point 10). but the Fourtcc:nth Point suggested that
"a gcncral association of nations must be formed under !;pccific covenants
fo r the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of po litic<JI independence
and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.'' Simi larly, point
13, concerning Poland, brought together "the territories inha bited br
indisputably Polish populations,'' but following this is a statement stress-
ing thciJ "political and economic indepcndem:e and territoria l integrity., 11
Even whcn the national self-determination cause was proposed, there-
fo re, territorial integrity would ultimately prevail. '! Publications of the
Hungarian Tcrritorial Integrit}' League made a particular plea against the
dismemberment of that country, using the language of Wilson and the
Lcaguc of Nations Charter against the peace treaties.U Indeed, as is often
pointed out, self-determination was much more concerned with wider
gcopolitical interests than those of the people themsehes. '4
142 1ERA II ORIAL IN TE:GRi l Y AND CON l lNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

It is worth that until LC".aguc of Nations set out these

norms, a state that had won a war could annex territory either through
occupation or treaty. 11 Tho ugh territorial changes still took place
after World War I, they were lirnited by two ma in issues: the Russian
Revolution and Woodrow \X'ilso n's Naturally, if bOlmdaries a rc
traced bac k lo ng arc a lways based on territorial acquisition
of some kind, and changes a rc common through hisrory. Thus, the
acquisition of title by conquest is a nccessar}' step for the later rein fo rcing
of territorial integrity." there was debate about the scope of Article
10 in the of Nation's this was takrn to apply
to statrs that wrrr victorious but had not been aggressor.'g This
necessarily aggressor nations, who now had less to in
launching wars of
In this contrxt, the puniti\e territorial at the end
of World War II, with the redrawing of Germany's borders a nd the territo-
rial changes that benefited the Sovkt Union a nd Poland itsdf was
losing land to the U.S.S.R.) can be understood only by it as fall ing
betwccn the prohibitions of the of Nations a nd those of the
Nations. The partition of lndia and Pakistan, and creation of Israel in
mandate Palestine, were two of the carlirst major of the
Nations. Article lA applies only to the situation following its adoption!'
tha t date though, as was noted in the case of Iraq, even aggressor
countr ies have not been geograph ically punished by loss of their own
ritory. The tacit of Israel's gains in the 1948 war are thus an
anomal)' in thesc ttrms, .as well as
The assertion of integrity in the U.N. Cha rter, has
two interlinked and usually self-reinforcing On the one hand,
it protr.cts existing boundaries, with the a im of preventing nation-states
from territorial acquisition or from promoting secessionism or
changes in other states. O n the other hand, respecting equa l sovereignty,
it protects from interference in interna l .affairs: the idea of
domestic We could call these two
preservation and territorial sovereignty. meanings have
been widdy recognized. in constitutions of indhidua l states; found-
ing of international organizations such as the Arab League
(1 945) a nd the Organization of Arab States (1948); the Organization of
African Unity (1963);!0 the charter ofthe African Union (2000);
and the Helsinki Final Act 0975). and now
Trea ty Establishing a Constitution for an uneaS)' bal-
supranatio nal space and territoria l integrity
of its members.! NATO and the European Union (EU) have
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON I INGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 143

that all access ion states have border agreements with their neighbors
and that all candidate countries should submit outstanding disputes to
the International Court of Justice (JCJ).U Territorial integrity is stressed
fur ther in the 1978 Vienna Comention on Succession of States in Respect
of Treaties, which in Article 11 notes that "'a succession of States docs
not as such affect: (a) a boundary established by a treaty; or (b) obliga-
tions and rights establishe<J by a treaty and rdaring to the regime of a
boundary."ll
Territorial integrit}' has long been asserted as a stabilizing factor, where
it a llowed the de.colonization of a region w ith a degree of norma lcy remain-
ing. In other words. trading upon the idea of tlti possidetis (what you have
you will continue to possess), stares wo uld inherit the boundaries of colo-
nics or internal jurisdictions on independence. The statlls quo, for all its
flaws, is preferred over the disorderliness that would likely result from a
wholesale of boundaries. The Organization of African Unity
made this explicit in the Cairo declaration. when they stated that "the bor-
ders of African States, on the da}' of their constitute a tang i-
ble reality. '"U Various reasons can be given for this stance, including weak
elites who wanted to minimize threats to their rule, the desire to avoid
chaos in recognition of the mosaic of racial and national disrribution, and
stares' intent (at least initiaiJy) to act as the motor of pan-African unity.11
The notion of uti possidetis. deriving from Roman Jaw, was pionccre<J in
South America following Spanish decolonization.16 In addition to its usc
in Africa, it has conditioned the breakup of other empires. For example,
it is behind the differing statuses of the constituent pam of the former
Soviet Union. Satellite states or republics gained independence along exist-
ing lines; bur regions such as Chcchnya or South Ossetia remained as part
of the Russian Federation or the: successor states to the Soviet republics/,.
Sdf-determination therefore not only tightly circumscribed in inter-
national law, but in a lmost all cases. territorial integrit} can be asserted
mer and above it. Indeed, self-determination not only a llows colonial
independence, but can a lso be used as a justification for an existing state's
continued territorial integrity, where people withi n existing boundaries
assert their wish to remain together or separate. Such difficulties of who is
within a disputed region and who therefore is allowed to vote on its future
bedevil places such as Northern Ireland, Western Sahara. and Gi braltar.
And yet indigenous peoples have claimed:

Th.:- principle of intq;rrry nas no spro:.1l st::ttus or significance

:Jbove :.1 nost of other principles.- such :15 dernoc-
mcy, rule of law, rc:spccr for hurn:.1n rights., :.1 nd
144 1ERA II ORIAL IN TE:GRi l Y AND CON llNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

justtc('-which all appl)' in comc:xr of sdt-dc:terminarion. There is

no hierarch)' that would p lace: principle of rc:rrimrialmrc:grit)'
for human nglus or orhc:r mrc:mano1u.llaw idc:nriflc:d
in imc:rn:.uional instrummu.2M

Thi!> claim that there i!> no hierarchy docs not seem to lx- the Gl!>e, aster-
ritorial integrity continuall}' out in struggles with other principles of
international law. In part, this is bccaUS(' of its fundamental importance
to any commonl}' concdvcd notion of statehood and its role in the inter-
national system. This is the ncccssar)' myth of territorial integrity and
absolute sovereignty. A recent example would lx- the Council for Europe's
negotiations around the rights of minorities, such as the Framework Con-
vention for the Protection of National Mj noritics, fommlatcd in Strnsbonrg
in 199 The notion of territorial integrity is stressed three times in the
Framework, notably in Article 21: "Noth ing in the present framework
Convention shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any
activity or perform any act contrary to the fundamental prin<:iples of inter-
national law and in particular of the sovereign equality, territorial integ-
rity, and political independence of States.'' As P notes, this meant that
"'minority rights continued to be hdd in check by the traditional princi-
ples of international relations-state sovereignty. territorial integrity, invi-
olability of borders, and the like. '" 30 This principle was similarly stressed
immediately after the Berlin Wall came down in the "Charter of Paris for
a New Europe," and br the Conference for Security andl Cooperation in
Europe in Copenhagen rlier that same ycar.l In addition, the invocation
of this idea has been used as a defense b}' Lndigenous peoples such as the
Western Shoshone Nation in North America against !>ettlement, nuclear
testing, and mineral exploration of their hi!>toric land.
Despite the widespread usage of the term, tbe explicit literarure on
territorial Lntcgrity is limited, with exceptions mainly coming from inter-
national law. Perhaps part of the reason is the vagueness of the term.
For Akwccnda, it "denotes non-annexation, invio lability of boundaries,
and respect of sovereignty," altbough "no general and exact definition"
is possiblc;Jl while: for Vincent, "territorial integrity- preserved so long
as none: of the territory of the state is taken from it-is not the same: thing
as territorial Lm'iolability-'the right of the state to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction within its own territory."' 33 Other than some recent
in constructivist international rdations/ 4 political science, political the-
ory, and political geography have be-en largely silent on territorial integ-
rity, despite their of numerous related issuesY And )'et, as Li
stares, " if sovereignty concerns the way in which exclusive jurisdiction is
exercised over respective territories of an empire or a nation-state, then
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON IINGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 145

the power of a sovereign state is more than the authority of bureaucratic

administration; it hinges on territorial integrity. '' 311
The notion of "integrity"' requires a number of things. On the one
hand, it speaks to notions of honor, respect, and pride. An as.sault against
the idea of territorial integrity is an attaclc on the integrity of a state, the
bod)' of a nation, its national standing. Yet beyond this is the question of
the term "integraL" Parts arc integral to the whole. An integer is whole,
and fractions, which cause fractures, a rc therefore illegal. To dispute this,
to advocate disintegration, is to question the integrity of those that do
accept it. If truth and integrit)' come into conflict, integrity must be seen
to win out be.cause not even the truth c<tn be allowed to dishonor--or
dismember-the nation.,- Territories are legal, actual, and emotive lands,
whose integrit}' figures in all these registers. Integrit}' must be retained in
atl ways possible, it would appear, evm if the truth or its constructions
render it otherwise.

Secesslonlst!Terronst
The way that the United Nations provided a framework for decoloni-
zation, especially in Africa and helped to couple sovereignty with
territorial integrity, and the supposed "norm of sovcrcignty-as-territorial-
integrit)"' has been reinforced continually What this has meant
is that sdf-dctcrmination applies to colonies or what the United Nations
calls "'Non-Self-Governing Territories,'' bur not to independent countries,
fo r whom territorial integrity O\'erridcs claims people might make. Sdf-
detemlination is asserted in Article 1 of the U.N. Charter, but as dsc-
whcre, it is generally trumped br territorial integrity. The 1970 General
Asscmblr Resolution 2625 clarified the position:

The rerritory of a colon)' or other Non-Sdf-Go\emang Territory has,

unckr the Charrer, a sr.1.tus scparare and distanct from the rerritory of
the state administering it; and such separate and d1srinct sr.arus under
the Charter shall ex1sr untd rhe people of rhe colon)' or Non....S.Cif-
Governing Territory have exercised rheir right of self-determination
in accordance with the Charter, and partlcLLiarl)' its purposes and
principles. "

There is extensive literature in international law concerning secession.

TherC' is broad agrccmC'nt that whitc- international law docs not provide a
basis for secession that exceeds rhis determination, it docs nor express!)'
prohibit it dthcr. 40 This leaves states in a strong positioll bC"Cause the bal-
ance is clearl)' in favor of the status q110, while secessionist movements
146 1ERA II ORIAL IN TEGRi l Y AND CON llNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

have almost no legal recourse. International law has thc:rcforc: largd)' sc:t
itsdf the problem of protecting borders wherever ther arc, rather than
recognizing their artificial nature in many places.
Sdf-dc:tem1ination, in the narrowly circumscribed sense found in the
U.N. Charter, thus applies to colonies alone. to nonsovert'ign tc:rritories
rather than Substate groups art' not subjects of intc:rnational
law, bur crucially, once: nonsoverc:ign tcrritoric:s ha\'C achievt'd indt'pcn-
dc:nce and sovcreignry, they roo ha\'e tc:rrirorial integrity. This is the dearly
implied purpose of the U.N. General Assembly "Declaration of the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" adopted by the
General AsSt'mbly of the United Nations on December 14, 1960 ..u Self-
determination docs not apply to indepcndmt countries, for whom ter-
ritorial integrit)' overrides claims that individual peoples might
It therefore has not been successfully used on an international basis by
indigenous proples within statt's such as Canada or Australia, despite the
state- or provincc-based settlements. nor by those peoples whose land has
been colonized by a comiguous power such as Russia or China. In such
cases, what has more often been granted is Iimitcd "tc:rritoria l a utonotn)'"
rather than independence and full sovereignty. Tc:rritorial autonom)' opc:r-
ates when states dcvohc some dc:gree of sdf-governancc: to regions. It is
worth noting tllat territorial autonomy is dc:pc:ndcnt on individual state
practice: ratllcr than being provided for under international law in more
than a limited way, although it is becomjng more widely welcomed as
a means of allowing some measure of self-rule within the confines of a
state's territorial integrit)'-l-1 For sdf-determination to fully take effect,
colonies need to be St'paratc:d from tbe colonizer by salt watcr.4 s lndc:c:d,
between the end of World Wa r II and the Cold War, only B.ang.ladesh suc-
cessfully seceded, and the self-declared states of Biafra and Katanga had
only brief existences without w idespread rocognition. 4 "
For Canadian politician Stcphane Dion, " There is a contradiction
bc:rween democracy and secession which makes these two notions hard
to reconcile," on the basis that dc:mocracy requires us to accc:pt fellow
citizens as e.quals and scocssion requires a choice between those .. we
accept and those we wish to transform into foreigners. "'P He adds that
"there has never been a well established democracy, which I dcfinc:d as
having had a t least ten consecutive years of universal suffrage. rhat has
experienced St'<ession. " U Yet it is broader than simply well-established
democracies, for as Li states, "the world map of the 1990s dramatically
indicates that most of tbe new states formed ha-.,e been the products of
state fragmentation rather than secession. " 19 It is important that inter-
nal boundarit's of thes-e fragmented states have been preserved as the
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON I INGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 147

national boundaries. For Zacher, "-tbis indicates that states

regarding the international territorial order. They do
not but if they ar c going to occur, do not want
successor states fighting over what their boundaries should be. "'JO
Even the of East Timor may been in part to pre-
vent a breakup of Indonesia and to prese-rve the economic
stability of East Asia. 11 ln addition, this example can be seen as a return
to the shon-livcd prc- 1975 s ituation of East Timor as a separate state.
Indonesia was allowed to oocupy East Timor for so long in part because
of U.S. support in thC' Cold Wa r sparked by fe-ars of
ln tha t sense, its can be lookro at as a consolidation of the
of integrity than a a nd indud,
territorial of was during the and
in U.N. Council ll64. Eritrea's fro m
Ethiopia can looked a t in a simila r way. T he
tional law tends therefore to be one of prot"ting borders the)'
arc, rather than recognizing their artificial nature in many places.
Such claims arc co ntinued today in the of the "war on terror."
Territorial integrity is increasingly taking on a special status and signifi-
cance. This is cspc"'iall y the case in the speeches of Tony Bla ir, which make
the importance and the a key formulation
at H. \V. Bush Library and on April 8,
2002:

The struggle 1s for srabiliry, for lhe sccuriE)' wilhin which progress can
be made. Of course. wam to pro te<:l th eir rerrirorial inregriT>'
bur few inm empire bmldm,g. nus is especial!> uue of democra-
cies whose prople \'ote for higher living standards and pumsh
menrs who don 'r ddl\'er on them. For 2,000 )'ears Europe fought O\'er
tc:rrirory.
Today boundanes arc: \' irtually fixed. Governments and prople know
th:n any territorial ambinon srabiliry, instability threat-
ens

What is striking is bow st.abiJiry and prosperity arc linked to terri-

torial changes.s.c While the analysis of this book has focused o n the first
pa rt of this chain, and to an extent the second, the third should not be
neglected. Territorial prcsen ation and control is part of a much larger
concern with stabiliryl now to prospcrit)' a nd suc-
working of the globa l market. It would be thing if this
to our the grabbing of land from other bm this potcmiall)'
prevents and an}' to Russia
148 1ERA II ORIAL IN TEGRi l Y AND CON llNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

has used exactly the s:amC' argumC'nt, especially with regard to ChC'chnya
(although it has made the opposite claim for Russian-dominated regions
within its neighbors' Indonesia has also crackC'd down on
Acch, Uzbekistan on its people, and China on the Muslim separatists in
Xinjiang. ThC' East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) seeks autonomy
for this last region, aspiring to the status of the independent sta te pro-
claimed in 1933 and 1944 before Chinese annC"xarion. Western Turkistan
includes lands in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in central Asia.
ETIM was labeled a terrorist group b}' U.S. Depot}' Secretary of State
Richard Armitage in Beijing on August 26, 200V" Although China had
been insisting on the links between ETJJ\1 and a i-Qacda since September
11,2001, the United States finally accepted these claims around the time
that China's support was needed in the United Nations for the action
against Iraq. In a similar way, the Russian price for logistical and diplo-
matic support over Afghanistan had been freedom of action in Chcchnya.
China's issues around its own territorial integrity extend beyond Xinjiang,
of course, and include Mongols and Tibetans as well as Muslims/- but
what we sec here is the usc of the "war on terror" as an excuse to suppress
all separatists, and not just violent ones. [n addition. India's insistence on
its territorial integrity with respect to Kashmir has led it to prosecute those
who publish maps with boundaries other than those it believes arc cor-
rect, claiming that "the publication of maps of lndia depicting incorrect
boundaries of the countr)' indirectly questions the frontiers and challenges
the territorial integrity of the nation. " n
Numerous other examples cou ld be given, induding dements in many
of the states discussed in chapter 3. A range of regions in various parts
of the fo rmer Soviet Union show a range of inconsistent positions on the
part of Russia in particular. \While it fears that gi\ing Chechnya indepen-
dence would create precedent for Tatars and others within its borders, it
supports the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossctia in neigh-
boring Georgia, a tension that came to a head in August 2008 / 9 Western
powers, while largely impotent against Russia in this instance, continually
stressed Georgia's territorial integrity in the sense of preservation. \'Xfhat
signific-ant about the conflict was that Georgia initiated actions to
reclaim territorial so\'ereignty over the areas, which, while nominally part
of the state, were effectively autonomous. The return to tl1e status quo
allte continues their de (ado separation while seeking to maintain their
de jure status within Georgian territory. More broadly, the key question is
often recognitio()-{)ne that accords a status in international law. North-
ern Cyprus, for example, has territorial control or effective internal sover-
eignty, but it lacks the external recognition that would gi\e it international
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON IINGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 149

sovereignt).60 Similar situations arise: in Somaliland, Trans-Dnicstra, and

Nagorno-Karabakh-the sort of places that a BBC Four documentaq
described as "Places that Don't Exist.""'
Scoecssion is necessarily a cha.llenge to territorial integrity. For a state to
function. it requires effective enforcement of its rule. which, as Buchanan
notes, requires "cffe>Cthc jurisdiction, and this in turn requires a clearl)'
bounded territory that is recognized to lx- the domain of an idemified
political authority .. . territorial integrity faciJirates the functioning of a
legal order. " 6.2. Without territorial integrity, he claims, states arc not onl}'
not able to sunive, but they arc also unable to d ischarge their responsi-
bilities to thc "most basic morally lcgitimate interests of the indi\iduals
and groups that states arc empowered to serve, their imerest in the prcs-
erva6on of their rights, the security of their persons, and the stability of
their expectations." States therefore do not merely have a "morally legiti-
mate interest in maintain ing the principle of territorial integrity," but an
"obligatory intcrcst. ' 'h}
Buchanan similarly wants to challenge the absolutist inter-
pretation of territorial integrity, where it is applied to all statcs, and pro-
poses a more circumscribed \'crsion that is applied to legitimate states
only. nlis is what he calls "the morally progressive interpretation of the
principle of territorial integrity. " 64 Statcs arc illegitimate if they "threaten
the lives of significant portions of their populations by a policy of ethnic
or religious persecution" or if they deprive "a substantial proportion of
the population of basic economic and political rights. " b.l The &econd case
is cxemplified by South Africa; the first is shown by the infringement of
"Ir aq's territorial integrity in order to cstablish a 'safe zone' in the North
fo r Kurds. '" 66 What we have here is the basis for the a rgument for humani-
tarian intcncntion, where a state that docs not discharge its responsibili-
ties to its popu lations can legitimate international intcnrention, a theme
discussed in the next section.
In the current dimatc, therefore, sceessionist movC'mems (that is, those
who want to challenge an) nOlions of territorial integrit}' in the sense of
existing borders) arc increasingly being redefined as terrorists, or, at the ver)'
least, as dangers to local, regional, and global stabiJity. The line benvecn
secessionist and terrorist is increasingly blurred. Dcspitc their condemna-
tion of many states in thcir prosccmion of independence mo"ements, it is
worth noting that almost all the groups on the U.S. Department of State's
list of terrorist o rganizations arc self-determination movements. 6- The
U.N. General Assembly, in Rcsolution 49/60 from 1994, a lso made this
link, stating that "thc Statcs Members of the United Nations solemnly reaf-
firm their condemnation of a ll acts, methods, and practices
150 1ERA II ORIAL IN TE:GRi l Y AND CON llNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

of terrorism, as criminal and unjustifiable, wberever and by whomever

committed, including those which jeopardize the friendly relations among
Stares and jX'Oples and thrc<ltcn the territorial integrity and security of
States. "M Although terrorists and self-determination movements arc not
mutuallr exclusive, it is notable that sovereignty is a ll too often used as a
defense for a crackdown on
At this point, it is wortb rec<1lling Weber's famous definition of the
state: "Thc statc is that human community, wbicb within a ccrtain area
or territOI')' [Gcbictes}-this 'area' belongs to the fe<l turc-isucccssfully)
Iars claim to a mono pol)' of legitimate physical violmce. ''7ll The point to
be made here is not just that this definition renders any usc of violence
by nonstatc actors nccessarily illegitimate, although that is certainly the
c<1sc .- Rather., the point is a geographical onc: that any potcntial redraw-
ing of the borders of a statc limits the spatial extent of its sovereignty, the
extent of the sta te's ability to usc \'iolcnce, and is therefore, in itself, nec-
essarily violent and illegitimate.
T11is, it sccms, is key to understanding thc a rguments bcing madc. The
argummt is not simply in terms of tbe tbrcat to a countrr's own bor-
ders, but to bordcrs mucb more generally. Not onl}' is the United States
defining its interest in terms of territorial stability, but such a justifica-
tion is being used by India in Kashmir, Cbina in irs northern provinces,
Russia in Chechnra. the Republic of Cyprus against North Cyprus, the
United States against FARC in Colombia, and [srad in the Palestinian-
occupied territories. Lndccd, on April 8, 2002, Blair argued that "the truth
is Russia today has as much intcrcst in dcfeating terrorism as wc have.
In diffcrmt wars, but compatibly, we can dC"vclop relations with China
and India. '"'"2 i\.'kanwhilc, Bush saw September 11, 2001, as a cbance to
improve relations with Russia and China, "both of which had sCHalled
Muslim problems. q
On thc onc hand, this is not new, and the United States exh ibited very
similar hesitation toward nC"w states in the endgame of the Cold War. In
what widclr became: known as the "Ch icken Kiev" SjX'ech on August 1,
1991, President George H. W. Bush cautioned the Ukrainians and others
in the area against too hastily declaring indepcndencc from the Soviet
Union.,. The status qtw was, at that time, prcfcrrcd over the risky future
until the collapse of thc Union bcc<1mc inevitable. The Ukraine
declarcd its independence twenty-three days National Secur ity
Advisor Brent Scowcroft contended that the speech "was aimed at anum-
ber of areas where an upsurge of intolerant nationalism threatened the
outbreak of major violcnce.... The subsequent history of Yugoslavia
and se\eral of the former Soviet republics certainly \'a lidated thc warning
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON IINGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 151

the President ... -6 Today, the territorial integrity of the: Ukraine

is guaranteed by the: United States, in a deal struck when the Ukraine
demilitarized nuclear weapons. The 2004 Ukrainian elections were punc-
tuated by calls from various U.S. officials that the territorial integrity of
the country should be respected and that even discussing secession was
dangerous,- despite the dearly geographically polarized support for the
two Viktors .., It is surely not coincidental that Bush's speechwriter back
in 1991 was Condoleezza Rice, thell in charge of the Soviet affairs direc-
torate of the National Security
Later in 1991, on November 16, the U.S. State Department's "Guide-
lines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the: Smiet
Union" noted the importance of the "inviolability of a ll fromiers," which
was to be: changed only .. by peaceful means and by common agreement.
Some commentators ha ..e noted that the U.S. default position of opposition
to se;('essionist movements comes from its own histor)' in the: Civil War,N
to which we can add Thomas Jefferson's aim of a conrinental empire that
avoided the fractures of the O ld World. As Paquin argues,u the United
States departs from this default position only when the status quo is a
greater danger to stability. Such caution continued through the Clinton
era,u and was the: policy behind t reatment of Bosnia and Yugoslavia more
a point that is returned to below.

A Right to Intervene, a Responsibility to Protect

U the trepidation then has parallds to the caution of the United States
mer Iraq's borders and its tacit toleranoc: of Russia in Chechnya and the
actions of China, then the other side of the rhe-toric of the "wa r on ter-
ror" breaks with longstanding precedent. In this, it relates to more recent
calls for a right to intervene, and a responsibility to protect. As was sug-
gested, the other meaning of the term " territorial integrity" is that what
goes on within the boundaries of the: state is its own business and that
inte-rnational intervention is not permissible. This is the idea of internal
competence. Internal competence is itself, of course, a limitation of an
idea of absolute sovereignty because it acknowledges the idea of inter-
national competence or sovercignty.sr One of the kq statements on this
is the 1965 U.N. General Assembly Declaration on "Inadmissibility of
Interference in Internal Affairs of States and on Protection of lndepen-
dencc: and Sovereignty. "'16 As Vincent puts it, "So long as international
society is primaril)' composed of sovereign states, observance of a general
rule of non-intervention can be regarded as a minimum cond ition for their
orderly coexistence. " If'
152 1ERA II ORIAL IN TE:GRi l Y AND CON l lNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

This is coming under increased pressure. Events in the l 990s, including

in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia, Jed to calls for a grc.atcr role for the inter-
nationa l communit)', as wdl as to such reports as "Prc"'cnring Deadly Con-
flict" and "The Responsibility to Protect. " 53 One of the earliest articulations
was in a report on Africa in the wake of the Somalia and Rwa nda deba-
Kosovo was, in a sense, the test c.ase. Although the "sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia"' was stressed in rhc Petersburg principles
of the G8 of May 6, 1999, in U.N. Socurity Council Rcsolurion 1244,911
and the Rambouillet intervention in Yugoslavia, namely mili-
tary action br NATO, was justified on humanitarian The " ritual
affirmation of sovereignty and territorial integrity in 1244 >vas thus part
of the traditional rhcmric of the United Nations, but this action dearly chal-
lenged those ideals. Indeed, the violation of its territorial intcgrit}' was one
of the key points of the Yugoslavian goverfUllent's protest to the United
Nations following the NATO action.114
Resolution 1.244 did not justify action in Kosovo, which was taken
without Security Council support, but as former British Foreign Secretary
Robin Cook points o ut, intervention was backed by NATO, the European
Union, a nd all of Serbia's neighbors, t hroe tests that the 2003 invasion of
Iraq did not While Cook said this after the event, at the time he was
Jess sure, with international lawyers wa rning that the war could be illegal.
U.S. Secretary of State l\.'[adclcinc Albright notes in her memoirs, "I told
him he should get himself new Iaw}crs. If a U.N. resolution passed, we
would have set a precedent that NATO required Securit}' Council authori-
zatio n before it could act. Th is would give Russia, not to mention China,
a veto mer NATO. Such concerns resurfaced during the Iraq war:.
While Resolution 1244 saw Kosovo's funtre as ..substantia l autonomy
within the Federal Republic of it did not quite, pace Fink
Yoshira,.- expressly rule out independence for Kosovo because this wa:s
the basis under "interim administration." Albright reca lls that "we agreed
among ourselves that Kosovo would have to become an international
protectorate aher the war, with Yugos lav smcrcignt}' retained in name
only. "n As \'(Tilliarns suggests, the actua l substance of 1244 "sigl1ificantly,
and likely irreversibl)', altered sovereign control over Kosovo. Indeed,
problcn1s concerning a final scttlement-oJ:, in the words of Ahtisaari's
plan, ' independence with international 100
- for the disputed
territory stalled on the dua l issues of recogl1itiol1 a nd precedent. A unilat-
eral declaration of independence, while m:ognized by ma ny states, did not
resolve the issue. Claims that Koso\'O is a su; gePieris case that demanded
recognition but docs not create precedent arc politically expedient but
legally dubiotts.' 0 ' They arc in the same category as denials that the initial
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON I INGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 153

for intc:rvcnrions without U.N.

mandate-a claim made by former French prime: minister Dominique de
Villc:pin, among For Ignaricff. the intervention did establish
principle that statc:s can lose sovereignty over a portion of their tc:rritor}'
if thc:y so opprc:ss the majority population there that they rise in
and successfully intcmationa l support for their rc bdlion."' ' (11 But
cautions that this is not a universal bwluse it would not appl)'
in Chochnya or East Turkistan. It docs nor work as a principle
as much as a product of great-power politics.
For the American ncoconsenativc: Char les Krauthammrr, these: intrr-
vrntions a nd the U.S. opc:ration in Ha iti had supporr from U.S. Jibrra l
and world opinio n-as o pposed to their reaction to the Iraq war- for a
simple reason:
Hai1i, Bosni:., and Kosovo were hum:.nitarian \'C'ntufC's-fights for
right and good, det'Oid of ,-aw 11ational intC'resJ. And only humanim r-
ia n imer\enriomsm-<ljsinlercsred inrenc:nrio nism devoid of narion:. l
inrc:rcs1-is morall y pris1ine enough 10 rhe usc o f force. The his
lOT)' of the 1990s rdu1es the: lazy norio n thai liberals have a n aversion
to the use ol force. They do not. They have :.n aversion ro using force
for reasons of pure n:.tional sclf-imercst.1IJ.I

Much has been writtm a bout these huma nitarian interventio ns, both in
terms of the of aid, military and other state: or Lntc:-rnational
organization rc:sourccs a nd in relation to intrmationallaw.os States,
viously held to sovereign for interna l matters. arc incrcasing.l)' held to
have too, a nd fai lure ro uphold them can
externa l AJgumrnts have bc:rn made on the grounds of
international community's "responsibility to protect.'' adopted in part in
the: 2005 World Summit. Gardner notes that the usc of the term "right to
protect" instead of " humanitarian intervention" is pa rt of an "dfon to
downplay the: military connotations of the term "'intc:nrcntion.'' 106 [n
immediate post-Cold War world, howcvrr, intervention did not carry obvi-
ous idc:ologkaJ connotations-or at least thc:rr was no great-power balance
to limit such interventions.
It is worth to former Prime Minis ter Blair here. ln its 1997
doction manifc:sro. the: heading " Human Rights,'' labour parry
declared that it wanted "Britain to be respc:cted Ln the world fo r the integ-
rity with which it conducts its foreign relatio ns," with the "promotion
of human rights" and thc "creation of a permanent international crimi-
nal court"' to priorities. '0" Ra thc:r than thc later shorthand of
"cthical foreign policy," Foreign Secrc:tar}' Cook's early noted
154 1ERA II ORIAL IN TE:GRi l Y AND CON l lNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

an "ethical comem,'" suggesting that foreign policy should have ""an

ethic.al dimension and must support the dema nds of other people for the
democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves . toR T he statement, as
Kampfner shows, "appears to bear out the theory that ethics and human
rights were intended only as a cog, and not a particularly prominent one,
in the \vhed ." 10 Although Bla ir initially showed some caution, later on he
did nor wa nt the ethical dimens ion to be confined to the amlS trade, but
rather to include emironmental issues, crime. a nd-tellingly- "the right
to secure frontiers." 110
For Blair, Kosovo \Vas the key. T he former Supreme Allied Commander
of Europe, Wesley Clark, has note<J how important Bla ir's election was in
changing strategic prioriril:s, 111 with the pressure fo r ground troops par-
ricularl}' coming from him. I l l Blair expresse<J the inherent tension, and
the territoria l aspect, of nonintervention in a famous speech in Chicago
on April 22, 1999, while the wa r was ongoing. Here, he s uggested that
we should not " jettison too readily'" the principle of nonintervention, as
"one state should not feel it has the right to change the political S)'Stem
of another or fomen t subversion or seize pieces of territory to which it
feels it should have some c!a im." But this did not mean that it should not
be "qua lified in important resp ts. These qualifications were genocide,
oppression leading to refugees, and minority rule.t 1
Blair cla imed tha t Kosovo was unusual bause it was "a just war,
based not o n an}' territorial ambitions but on values." 114 Its significance
was certain-it was NATO's first war a nd an explicit recognition of the
rejection of the idea of noninterference within a sovereign state. And Blair
is correct in a sense, because the war was not fought to gain territor)'--at
least, not for the NATO powers, leaving aside debates a bout the Trans-
Balkan pipeline from the Caspian basin. But the relation is more: com-
plicated than this. Blair's rcferenoc to "the right to secure frontiers" is
essential: this war was inherently about territoria l integrity. On the one
hand, Blair sought to cha llenge the notion of internal competence, bur at
the same rime, he insisted o n the territorial integrity (i.e., preservation)
of the "secure frontiers of Yugoslavia in several international forums,
including the G8, a t Rambouillet and in the- U.N. Security Council. For
Lord Robertson, formerly Secretary of State for Defence: under Bla ir and
then NATO secrerar)' general. the Chicago speh did for foreign poli-
tics what reform of Clause IV did domesticallr: "It was one: of those
occasions where Tony Blair sc:t out a bold line which changed the whole
geography." 1 u
J ust over a year later, in Ti.ibingen on June 30, 2000, Blair elabora ted
the '' doctrine of international community , .. a community based on
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON I INGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 155

the equal worth of all, on the foundation of murual r ights and mmua l
responsibilities. " 11" The context at that time was intervention in Sierra
Leone. In paraUd ro the intervention, the Security Council, in Resolutions
1260, l270, and 1562, among others, continually r>tresscd the "sover-
eignty, political indcpcnden<'e, and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone."'"
Thus, advocates of humanitaria n intervention recognize that longstanding
ideals of territo rial integrity need rethinking, explicitly on thC' question of
the C"xdusive internal SO\'ereignty of recognized states. Former U.K. sec-
retary general Kofi Anna n provided another important example. In The
Economist in 1999, he argued:
Stall' SO\'l'rl'ignty, in its most b3sic Sl'nSt", is bt"ing rrod]nt"d-nor ll'mt
by thl' forct"s of globalisarion 3nd mtl'rnauon31 co-opl'mrion. Sta tt"s art'
now widdy undt"rstood to bt" instrumt"nr:s :u the ser.,icl' of rhl'ir peo-
ples, and not VK<= Vt"rsa. At rhl' S3ml' time indiv1du3l smc=retgnr)-by
whjch I mc:a n the rundamc:nt:J l frc:edom o f e3ch indivdu3l, enshrined
in rhc: charrer of the U.N. o nd subsc:quenr intunariona l trearics--has
bt"l'n c=nhanced by a rc=newt"d and sprc=ading consc1ousnl'SS of individua l
righrs. When we rt"ad the ch:trrc=r rod3y, Wl' 3rt' mort' than l'\c=r con-
scious rhar irs aim is ro prorc=cr individual human bt"ings, not m prorc=ct
those= who abust"

Annan went on to discuss the tension between e\'cnts in Rwanda and Kosovo.
In the first, genocide was met with inaction, but he felt that the second " raised
equally imponant questions about the consequences of acrion without inter-
national consensus and dear legal aUlhoriry":

lr has casr in srark rdid the= dikmmo of so....rollro

inrc=r;l'ntion." On the= o ne= ha nd, is it lc=gjtimarc= for 3 rl'giono l orgamsa-
tio n ro usc= iorct" without o U.N. mandate? On thl' o ther. is ir permts-
sible ro lc=r gross J.nd S)'Stl'maric \oiolonons oi human righrs. with gn\'C
hum3ntr.man consC'q uc=nces., cominuc= unchNkcd? The= ina biliry of rhc=
inrc=rnational communit)' to rl'COilcik these rwo compelling inrc=resrs in
thl' case: of can bl' lltcwed o nly 3S a

Altho ugh on one bcl this question is poorlr posed, it is undoubted!)'

seen even more dearl)' as valid today. Annan worried about the way
states and groups of states-in this case. NATO-would act outside the
sanction of the United Nations, a nd whether this would undermine .. the
imperfect, yet resilient, security system created a fter the second world
war. and of scning dangerous precedents for future interventions with-
out a clear criterion to decide who 1night invoke these precedents and in
what circumstances?"
156 1ERA II ORIAL IN TEGRi l Y AND CON l lNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

Trying to work througb these issues led Annan to pr opose four

conditio ns:
1. Intervention need not be force, :md can exrend '' to to
humanit:uin n asststance, to rehabtlimtion and reconstru crion,,. but it is
impo rtanr thts is done more evrnly, with a commitment m
humanitarin n act10n;
2.. Nonns o f so\'ereignry are o problem, bm so too are notional interests.
For many challencs collective interest is the nati onal interest'\
3. T he Sc:cunry Council m llsr to rh e challenge... Unjty nnd inoctton
(Rwanda I and dtvision w ith regional actton (Kosovol should no t be the
chotces. both cases, the U.N. should have been able to find common
ground in upholdmr, t he principles of the c ha rter, a nd ncung in defence
o f o ur common humamry";
4. mremottonal commitment ro pence musr be i ust as strong as w.:u
the commtrmem to war," and thjs too m ust be done consistentJy. 1!ll

These then, arc tbc ker questions and commJtmcnts that condition "this
developing international norm in favor of intcncntion to protect civilians
from wholesale slaughter.'' Fo r Annan, " national smereignty was never
meant to be a shic.ld behind which massacres arc carried out with impu-
nit),"tlt but this must be through the existing structures of the United
Nations a nd international law, rather than something that required
wholesale rdorm or abandonment of core principks. [n the debates pre-
ceding rhe war in lraq, Annan claimed that he stood before tbe United
Nations "as a multilateraJist-by precedent, by prLnciplc, by Cbarter and
by dut)," 111 and stated that:

Any Srare, tf anacked, reta ins the innerenr righr o f self-ddencc= under
Ancle 51 o f t he Charter. Bur beyond rhar, wnen Smres dec ide ro use
force ro deaJ w ith broader rhrcars to inrernnrional peace and security,
mere is no subSiture for rhe umque leginmaq providc=d by the U nircd
:-.l'arions. 1l..l

Annan's is a good example of the humanitarian arguments in fa\'Or of limi-

tations to state sovereignty, something that has found its way into recent
reports discussing tbe war the United Nations can evolve in the face of nc:w
threats, a nd in part adopted at the 2.005 Wor ld Summit. 124 In the initial
reports, the idea of "sovereignty as responsibility" is advan<"ed, where states
have duties to uphold and pay penalties for failure. Signing up for the U.N .
Cbartcr is an " international obligation voluntarily accepted by member
states"' that allows tbem to lx welcomed as "a responsible mcmbC'r of the
communit) of nations" but also requires them to accept " the respons ibilities
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON I INGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 157

of flowing fmm that signatur'C.'" Thcy argue that " there no

transfer or dilution of state sovereignty. But there is a necessary rccha rac-
terization imolved: from sovercignt)r as control ro sovereignty as rcspon-
sibilitr in both internal functions and external duties." I l l Zaum has thus
argued that the understanding of sovereignty as control of territory has
bct-n replaced by the ''liberal notion of sovncignty as responsibility.''' 2"
The claim is that this has a "thre.cfold signific<lnce," in that "it implies
that the state authorities arc responsi ble for thc functions of protecting
the safct) and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare"; that "the
national politic<il authorities arc responsible to the citizens internally
and to thr intrrnational communit) through the U.N. "; and " it means
that the agents of state arc responsible for their actions; that is to say,
thcr a rc accountable for their acts of commission and omission."' The
broader context is the "ever-increasing impact of international human
rights norms, and the increasing impact in international disc ourse of the
concept of human s-ecurity...' 2" In the second an d third points, the possi-
bilitirs and inherrnt limitations of SO\'crcignty arc opened up far beyond
those of humanitarian intervention. In terms of "genocide, war crimes.
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against human ity," the reports advocated a
"cdlective international rrsponsibility to protect, .. with Security Coundl
authorization of "'military intencntion as a last resort."'' 211 This became an
ass-ertion that the international community is:
Prepared ro take collecrive action, m a nmely and decisi,c- ma nner,
through rhc Secumy Council, in acco rdance with rhe U.K Charter,
including Chapter VII, on a case by C:lSC" oosis and in coopcrarion with
rcle\'ant regJonal org.:miznrions as sho uld peaceful means
be inadequ.ue and national authomic=s man ifestly fa iling ro protrct
thc=ir populanons from ge-nocide-, war crimes, emmc cleans ing and
cnmc-s

The claim is that the United Nations. broadl}' in its existing form , is
appropriate for this involvement, that Article 51 "nreds. neither exten-
sion nor restriction of its long-understood scope, and that Chaptrr VII
fu lly empowers the Securit) Council to dc<il with every kind of threa t that
States may confront. " Thus, the task is " not to find a lternatives to the
Sc.curity Council as a source of authority but to make it work better than it
has. "ll0 Indeed, the \Vorld Summit fa iled to agree on C\'en limited reforms
to the Security Council. Thr point is actua lly wdJ made. Bhatia pro..,idcs a
useful timcline of operations under U.N. authorization, a nd it is clear that
these have dramatically increased since the late ]980s. In fact, with the
exception of Korea in the earl}' l 950s, until 1988, all interventions were
158 1ERA II ORIAL IN TEGRi l Y AND CON l lNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

concerned with peacekeeping- in Chad/Libya, the Dominican Republic,

India/Pakistan, West Guinea, Cyprus, and the Mjddlc East-under Chapter
VI Mandarr:s rather than Chapter Vll 1\i andates, which authorize fore;('.
Since the late 1980s, this has changed, with varying degrees of Chapter
VU mandates authorized in Sierra Leone, Somalia, Haiti, East Timor, the
former Yugoslavia, and Georgia (Abkhazia), as well as a prolifera tion of
Chapter VI mandatcs. n
Blair was quite explicit in suggesting that U.N, la w was inadequate and
that it should lx- dc\clopcd to avoid situations where "a regime can S)'S-
tcma tically brutalisc and oppress its people and there is nothing anyone
can do, when dia logue, diplomacy, and even sanctions fail , unless it comes
within the definition of a human itarian catastrophe.'' 1n In this kq speech,
given in his Scdgcfidd constituency. Bla ir de<:lared:

Bur rhe norion of inreocnmg on humannnnan grounds had been

gaining currency. I ser this our, follo wing t-he Kos0\'0 war, in a
in Chicago in 1999, where I c:JIIed for a donrine of inrcrn:uional com-
munit)', where m cenain dear Clrcurnsmnces, we do mrervene, e\en
rhough we :Jre not direct ly threatened . .. So, for me, before September
l ith, I was a lready reachmg for a different philosophy in inrcrnarional
rdarions from a traditional one that has held sw:1y smce the rre:Jt}' of
Westphalia in 1648; namely rhat a country's internal :Jffa1rs are for il
and you don'r mterferc unless il t-h rcmens you. or breaches :1 tre:uy. or
rriggers an of alliancc.IJJ

U.ere arc, of course, many problems with th is, but it clearly demon-
strates Blair's wish to dis,pensc with the support for the internal compe-
tence aspect of territorial integrity, and, with it, the principle of sovereign
e-quality. lndccd, in the Guildhall speech of Novcmlx-r 16, 2004, he sug-
gested that transatlantic cooperation could be used to insist on "a greater
role of for the Un ited Nations on the rcsponsibilit}' of states
to prote.ct not injure their own citizens .'' Given that the existing charter
(in Article 2, Pa ragraph 7) ma kes internal competence outside the remit
of the United Nations, subject to Chapter VII, which deals with external
aggression, this would profoundly rcshift the balance of sovereignty. Blair
and Annan- who rook very different views on the Iraq war- thus share
an understanding of the question a nd challenges.
U.cre is, of course, an unexamined "we" here that calls foJ:, legitimizes,
and underta kes international intervention. ln so me of the recent calls for
the ''responsibility to protect" only partir adopted at the U.N. World Sum-
mit, the a nswer is a reformed U.N. Security Council. For Blair, the solution
is the "'international commun ity," which may or may not coincide with dtc
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON IINGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 159

will of the Socurity CounciL In the latter case, the charge is obviously that
states arc acting in their own interests, but for some, this is not necessar-
ily a problem. In fact, Walz.cr declares that mixed motives arc a practi-
cal advantage" because a combination of acting " in their own interests as
wdl as in the interests of humanity" means action is taken. ' 34 This paral-
lels Blair's assertion of a notion of "enlightened self-interest," where he
claims that "sclf-imcrest and our muntal interests arc today incxtricabl)'
woven togcthc[. " 1u Bla ir even claimed that such rhemricaJ tropes
could explain more than "Politics is different in America. This is a
Republican administration w ith a certain view, so they wi ll couch what
ther do in terms of U.S. national interest, not international community.
But the doctrine of international community is just enlightened national
self-interest, so whatever the different rhetorical perspecti\es you come to
the same point."' u.

"Sovereignty Entails Obligations"

The shift between Democrat and Republican administrations in the United

States thus shows significant continuities. As Clinton declared in his first
inaugural address, "When our vital interests arc challengcd, or the will
and conscicnce of the internationa l community is defied, we will ac4 with
pc.accful diplomacy whenever possible, with force w hen The
significance of the phrase "'vital intcrests" is important, as is the refcrence
to the notion of "international communit)'" Tellingly, Clinton suggested
to the Unitcd Nations that thc United States wouJd act .. multilaterally
when possible, bur unilaterally when necessary." As Derrida notes, it is
significant that this claim was in relation to Article 51 of the U.N. found-
ing charter, that is, "the article of exception. " IJa
This article makes it de<lr that nothing in thc charter limits the right
of "'indhridual or collective self-defense" (the exception), but this itself is
limited to it being in response to "an armed attack,"' and until the Securit}'
Council "has taken measures necessary to ma intain international pe<lce
and security." But even under the Clinton administration, this willing-
ness to act was not confined to am1ed attack but was more
generally. As Dcrrida recounts, Secretary of Defense \'(fiJi iam S. Cohen
was willing to "imenene militarily in a unilateral way (and thus without
the prior accord of the United Nations or the Security Council) each time
its vital interests were at stake; and by vit.al interests he [Cohen] meant
'ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, C""nC""rgy supplies, and strategic
resources,' along with anything that m,ight be cons idered a \'ital interest
by a 'domcstic jurisdiction.'"'J9
160 1ERA II ORIAL IN TE: GRi l Y AND CON llNGENl SOVEReiGN 1 Y

What we find is thus not a dramatic changc in the transition from

Clinton to Bush, but at most a shift of emphasis. In both administra-
tions, the United Statcs enough to constitute a "we.'' Cohen was
a Republican senator before his appointmcnt in thc second Clinton term,
and ht' had made clear his support for a bipartisan national secur ity pol-
icy. The Clinton Natio11ai Security Strateg)' of Engagement and Enlarge-
ment, for example, shows cvidcnce of much of what followt'd. 140 But if in
this carlicr prriod, the emphasis had been on unilatcralism as a last resort,
with a multilateral strategy prcfnred, 1 1 the shift was to one where multi-
lateral strategies Wt're pursued only if dt'cmcd nt'cessary. Clinton's "new
internationalist foreign policy" was designed to make the United States
"the 'indisprnsablc nation'" in such issues as peace in Europc, Northern
Ireland, and the East, and to "reestablish collective security for a
new agt' of globalization a nd intcrdt'pcndence, " 1"l
Tht' rt'action to this internationalism within neoconservatism thinking
was pronounced. Ont' of the issues was the supposed surrender of U.S. inter-
ests to the United Nations, along with the critique of Jt.tadclcinc Albright's
notion of "assertive multilatcralism, " by which is usually meant a majority
in the Security Council, minus an}' great-power veto. In contrast, the Bush
regime operated with more of a "unilatcralist and militarist \'is ion of how
to overcome world disorder." 1.u Krauthammer initially callcd this thc "uni-
polar momcnt" 144 and now calls this a "unipolar era," which he describes
as a fom1 of realism, a "new unilateralism." But he cautions that this is
not isolationism becaust' "the new unilatcralism defines American interests
far beyond narrow In particular it identifies two other major
intercsts, both global: e:x-rending tht' pcacc by advancing democracr and
preserving the prncc: by acting as balancer of last resort. " 14 '
Alongside this willingness to go against the United Nations, or indeed
world opinion mort' gt'nt'rally, was a swift reaction against multilateral
treaties. 14 6 A5 Lind notes, " in his first year, Bush more interna-
tional treaties than any prcsidcnt in American history. " 14- The ground for
this had been pr'Cpared beforehand. For example, future \'icc prcsidcnt
Dick Cheney sent a letter to Clinton in 1997 in the wake of the Kyoto
Protocol, suggesting that it would "'hamstring' American military opera-
tions . .. and undermine American sovereignty. "'43 Not o nly did Bush
refuse to ratify Kyoto, but the Unitcd Statcs walked out of the Durban
conference against racism for criticisms of Israel and refused to be a party
to the International Crimina l Court (ICC) or to conventions, protocols,
and treatit's on tht' rights of the child, land mines, and biological Wt'ap-
ons. In addition, it unilaterally withdrew from the anti-ballistic missile
treaty.' 4 "
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON I INGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 161

John Bohon's a ppointment as ambassa dor to the United Nations,

and the 750 changes he proposed to the 2005 World Summit outcome
document, a rc further indications of this resistance to multilateralis m.
This tension is wdl highlighted in his proposed change to paragraph 60
of this document. Where the origina l first point read " We resolve to:
Appeal to all States to ta ke act ion, in a multilateral framework, to pre-
vent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction a nd their means
of delivery in all irs as pe-cts," Bolton OC'lctcd the phrase' "in a multilat-
C'ral framework " and replaced it with " unilaterally, bilatC'rally, or multi-
laterally."''0 The relevant section did not make it through to the fina l
agrred document.
This intention to take " a narrow virw of America's national interrst"
was largely the position on which Bush had run for president. Bush and
Condolcczza Rice had indicated thatthry were " not intrrested in do-gooding
in far-Aung lands1 " and wrre thrrcfore " scornfu l of thr mulrilateralism at
the heart of Blair's outlook. "S Srptember 11, 2:001 1 was the catalyst for
a rethinking of this position. For Blair, the opportunity of these events
was that his earlier thrmes of "internationa l community " could be seen in
sharper focus. m Indeed, there was a superficial shift in the Bush rhetoric:
Our nanon 's cause has a lways been larger than o ur nation's defense.
We fighr:, as we fight, for a just peace--a th:Jt f:wors
human hbcny. \'f/c wi ll defend the pc:1cc from terror-
ius t)'r:J nts. We wdl prcscr\'e [he peace by building good rdarLons
:.1mong the powers. And wall c:n cnd rhc pc:tcc by cncoumgLng
frl!f! :.1nd op<:n socicncs on every contlnt"nt'.
Buildmg thas j usr is Amcnrn 's opportunity, and Ame-rica's duty. 151

Indeed, this stand and the mobilization of the figures of "good" and "evil"
show how the religious as pects o f Bush's consenatism, which in the 2000
ele-ction had largely been confined to domestic issues, now took on a much
wider international " moral'' agendla.'s
Since the events of September 1], 2001, key voices in the Bush admin-
istration have promoted the idea that for certain kc)' issues-nota bly the
harboring of terrorists and the holding of wea pons of mass destruction-
norms of sovereignty need not a pply. In a 1998 report coauthored by
Philip Zdikow, later executive director of the 911 1 Commission. the
contoms of this approach were sketched out:
lnrcrnarional norms should adapt so rh:.1r such surcs arc obliged to
reassure those who worried :.1nd to rake reasonable ro
pro"e they arc nor sccrcrly developing weapons of mass dcsrrucrion.
Failure ro suppl y such proof. or prosccurc rhc cr1mmals in thcar
162 1ERA II ORIAL IN TE:GRi l Y AND CON l lNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

borders, sho uld c:nritlc: worried n:uions ro rake all necessary for
meir sdf-ckfen sc:.1!5

One of the key miccs has been Richard N. Haass, whose comments on
integration were discussed in chapter 1. Haass declared in April 2002:
Sovereigncy en rails oblig.1.rions. One IS nor ro massacre: your own
people. Another is nor ro support rerronsm many way. If a govern-
mc:nr ro meet these obhg;.u 1ons, then ir forfeirs some: oi rhe normal
of so\c:retgnry, mcl uding rhe nghr robe left :tlone mstck
your own tt'rrirory. Other govt"mmenrs, includi ng rhc: Unired St:ttes,
gain the right ro mrc:rvc:ne. Jn the cast" of terrorism. rhis ca n even le:td
ro a right o f pre\'enrive, or pcremprory, self-<lc:ft"nse. You essenn:tlly can
:tcr in annciparion if you ha\e grounds ro think ir's a quc:srion of when,
:tnd nor if, you're going to be :trmcked.LI6

In a speech from the same yea r, he declared that "'sovereignty docs not
grant gO\'crnments a blank chcck to do whate\cr they like within their
own borders." tP While this socms to mirror Blair's intmtions, it masks
a much harder line of the unipolar moment in U.S. foreign policy, which
refused to be bound b}' the collective constraints of NAT0 118 or the United
Nations.
Tdlingly, Haass includes in a state's support for terrorism not merely
active ar.sistance, but a lso the inability ro control what is happening in its
territory, noting that "one challenge to smcrcignty arises when stater. have
too little of it. " 1.!9 In other words, as chapter 3 argued, a state that faiJs
to exercir.e one of the standard definitions of wvcreignty-cffective politi-
cal control or the "monopoly of legitimate physical violence'" within its
territory-finds that its r.ovcreignty more generally is bdd to be "contin-
gent." He makes it ex-plicit that this is for three reasons: ''stopping geno-
cide, fighting terrorism, and preventing the spread of '"''capons of mar.s
destruction." In each case, "the principle remains the same: with rights
come obligations. Sovereignty is not absolute. It is conditional. "' 60 As b1s
ex-colleague from the State Department, Stewart Patrick, puts it:
Hisroric:tll)', the num obstacle ro :trmed inrer\enrion-hununit:J rian
or otherwise-has been the docmne of sovcretg.nry, which prohtbirs
nol:tring the integncy of anomer S[;Jrc:. One of the srriking
dc,rclopmenrs of the p:tst dec:Jdt" h:.1s been :ln e-rosion of rhis no n-
inten'enrion norm :Jnd rhe rise of :l nascenr doct rine of -conringenr
so\er<"ign cy.
llus school of thought holds rhar SO\'ereign nghrs :tnd immunities
:tre nor absolute. T hey ckpcnd on rhc obsef\:mce of fundamenral sm tc:
oblig:trio ns. t&L
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON I INGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 163

This notion of comingem sovc:rc:ignty" is important. It takes the: logic of

humanitarian intervention or the resp<)nsibility to protect civilia n popu la-
tions and broadens it to include legitimate intervention on the grounds of
pursuit of wea pons of mass destruction or the harboring of terrorists. In
sum, the idea that sta tes hold a monopoly of legitimate physical violence
within thrir territories is therefore not so straightforward. T his inrvitabl)'
gives rise to the same issues around Jcgitimac)', responsibility, and poten-
tial conflict between the United Nations, regional organiza tions, and more
ad hoc coalitions of thr "willing."' Despite the opp<)s,ition between calls
fo r U.S. cxceptionalism and this multilateralism, in terms of the challenge
to s,overcignty, thc:re a rc similar logics at >vork.
These suggestions havc-unsurprisingly, gien their a uthors-found
their way into polk)' documents. The policies ens,hrined in the U.S.
National Secmity Strategy of 2002 (as chapter 3 noted, rewritten b)'
Zelikow from an c.arlicr d raft by Haass) a nd the subsequent strategies
o n homeland srcurity, military, countrr-intdligence, and ddensc all out-
line ways in which trrritorial sovereignty is open to challenge. But a t the
same time, they continuall}' reinforce the importance of states being full}'
in control of their territory, t he importance of territorial stability and
the dangers of fai led states. For instance, the Natio11ai Defcmse Strategy
declares tha t:

lr ts unacceptable for regimes ro usc pnnctple o f sovereagnty as

a shadd behind whach rhc)' claim to be free co engage in actiVItie-s
that pose eno rmous threats ro their <iriZcens, ne-ighbors, or the rcsr
o f t he- international community. ... The U.S., Its alhcs, and parm ers
must re main vigila nt to those st.Jtcs rhat lac k the capacity to go11em
act1viry w ithin thear borders. Sovereign st:Jtcs arc oblig:J ted to work
to ensure that their territori es are not used :J s bases for arta< ks on
others. 1u

Similar claims can be found in the National Security Strategy and the
National Strategy far Combmiug Terrorism, and they parallel the notion
of a shidd that Philip Bobbitt dcvdopcd in his book The Shield of
Aci?i/fes. 1B
Such sentiments arc also found in the neoconservative statement of
purpose, called Ar1 Ettd to El.rii: "National s,overcignt}' is, an obligation
as well as an entitlement. A gmemment that will not perform the role
of a gO\:ernmcnt fo rfeits the rights of a go,ernmcnt.'' 1 Neoconserva-
tives co ntinue to suggest that this has always been the c.ase fo r the United
States, a nd that the United States has often had to intervene where other
states ha\'t' been unable to Jive up to their obligations. Now this, has wider
164 1ERA II ORIAL IN TE:GRi l Y AND CON l lNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

implications: United N arions srstem was founded upon the net ion
of the equal competence of a ll the world's go,ernments ... these hopes
crumbled to dust a long, long rime ago." 161 In practice, such arguments
have been used for the intenentions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as wdl
as the other instances discussed in previous chaprers. But they
simply be dismi ssed as of world relations the neocon-
servatives. Although manr of rhe figures shaping U.S. foreign policy
believe that the founding principles of rhe United Nations should be rcla-
not absolute, as Shawcross notes, a rc distinct parallels
th is and liberal internationalist thought. "'1.6
While call for in domestic affairs and a rec-
ogn ition of the limits to United Nations is shared, and wh ile the
entails obligations" claim parallels Blair's domestic ma n-
tra that "with rights come responsi bilities," there is one key difference
between the likes of Blair and the The Blair doctrine
of international communiry, is- at lcasr in its ideal form-a multilateral
strategy, as is the position of Annan, while the U.S. policy enshrined in
these examples and more broadly in National Security Strategy of
20,2002, is un ila tera l.'"- On November 16, 2004,
Blair his call for U.N. reform by suggesting that " none of this
will work, howner, unless too our. Multilateralism that
works should be its aim. I no sympathy for unilatera lism for its
o wn sake.""'' But on April 22, 1999, he had noted something
lnstead of the United States reaching out to the the
world needed the Unitro Sta tes, as " those nations which have the
have the responsibility. We need you engaged. We need with
you.'" This was fo.llowed by a plea for avoiding ..the of isola-
tionism" because the world could not afford it. 169 Yet this did not achieve
simply a retreat from isolationism, but rather an assertion of U.S.
tionalism. Blair's to provide multilateral support for U.S. unilat-
eralism to ddivc:r Security Council resolution on Iraq,
and )'ct he: still wcnr along with States in its mission in Iraq.
This tension- which might be better understood as question of inter-
nationalism for Blair versus the uniqueness, or of the
United unresolved at the heart of Blair's fo reign policy
as he ldt office.
The two meanings of the term integrity" arc thus
ingl)' in conflict, no more so than in the context of the "'war on terror.''
Blair stressed the territorial integrity of countries that tar-
getro: Yugosla via, Sierra Afghanistan, and Iraq. Blair intended to
intervene in Sudan even as he stressed importance of the preservation
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON IINGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 165

of its territorial boundaries. rathcr rban any othcr

Lebanon's and Somalia's territorial integrities arc repe--atedly underscored.
Territorial integrity in smsc of protection of existing boundaries is
to the violation of territorial integrity in the sense of terri-
torial smercignty or Tbis is not confined to Iraq,
Afghanistan, or e-arlier in Kosovo and Sierra Lronc. Rather,
it is being to other theaters of this war, including North Korea,
Iran, SyTia, Sudan, and Lebanon.

The "Gift" of Sovereignty

U stares can lose sovereignty, can they ga in it? This is the much less
explored corollary of these arguments. As noted the norm has
been for states to inherit the boundaries of colonial upon their
and that have split tended to break along
similar is then in its territorial integrity under
international law. Uti possidetis was also key in informing judgment
of the Badinter Arbitration Commission fo r Yugoslavia. It proclaimed
that in all cases, "the right to self-determination must not involve changes
to existing frontkrs (tlti possidetis except where the states concerned
agree othenvisc... ,- , The Badinter ruling explicitly took its le.ad from rbe
ICJ's 1986 judgment concerning Burkina Faso and Mali. wbicb not only
the importance of stti possidetis but a lso used it to inform their
understanding of territorial integrity. For tbe ICJ, uti possidetis is .. not a
pertaining solely to o ne specific system of international law. It is a
of general scope, logicallr with of
the obtaining of independence, it occurs.'' 1" 2 The Badinrcr com-
mission therefore suggested that "the people of former colonial countries
were wise to appl}' it< Europeans must not commit the folly of dispe-nsing
with it. This decision has come under sustaine<l scrutiny.
One of the arguments against this ruling is that it the
outcome, in territorial and ather temls, without the specificity
of the situation in question. There is an assumption that a llowing any mes-
sage of existing boundaries a lways produce a
worse situation; through immediate conflict or proccdcnt. Ratner,
for instance, that tbe commission '' erred in its of
nature and purpose of uti possidetis." He also suggests that in absence of
the goal it was intended to serve jnamcly, dccolonization), and with
other possible ideas about internal self-determination and political partici-
pation, that its foundations "weak, and the validity of the principk for
noncolonial breakups suspt." 1.,4
166 1ERA II ORIAL IN TEGRi l Y AND CON l lNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

ThC' probiC'm, he claims, is that while: the principle: might be a necessary

first step, it should not bc.come "a permanent solution by ddault. '' The
key to the Badinrer ruling is that changes can be made by agreement,
but circumstances soon showed this to be an inadequate rc:sponse to the
situation. as Lord Owen suggested, the idea that the bounda ries
could even be negotiated was itself barely countenanced. creating a
"straitjacket that greatly inhibited compromises the panics in
dispute." 1- 1 Ratner therefore claims that cl1crc is "a compelling need to
respect the original Roman-law meaning of uri possidetis: to preserve the
quo onlr until states can resolved their competing claims. rather than
appl)' the gloss from dccolonization whereby states cffc:ctivcl>' presumed
indC'pcndence-day lines to be permanent."- He closes by suggesting that
"only by directly engaging the territorial quC'stion, wiclt a ll its dimensions,
is the international community likely to control the breakup of states in
an orderly manner consistent with human dignity." --
It is fo r this reason that one of the most pressing issues for interna-
tional la w is finding a ba lance betwC'en sclf-detC'rmination and the ter-
rito rial rights of established states.'"1 Ad"ocates of territorial intcgrit}'
as presep;ation, say that it creates it wo uld fo llow, then,
that the devotion to the principle is worthwhile on ly if it really safe-
guards the purpose of providing stability and the inrerests of the peo-
ple. If states fail to follow particular norms, the question is how to
resolve the tension that this creates. As Freeman notes. "The U.X had
always been based on a pol itical theory that had sought to reconcile
the principle of territorial integrity of states with that of the self-deter-
mina tion of peoples. '' 180 However, it is clea r in practice: that territorial
intC'grity has regularly and usua lly successfully been asserted as domi-
nant. Gi\en that this has because smercignt}' has been taken to apply
to states rather than peoples, some argue that it is time to rethink that
political theory.
One of the ways that this is bc:i ng advanced in law is through the notion
of "earned sovereignty," itself explicitly promoted as "'a con<:ept that
seeks to reconcile the principles of self-determination and humanitarian
intervention with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. " 111
What is telling in this formulation is the relation of self-determination to
humanitarian intervention and rhe explicit linkage between sovereignty
and territorial integrit)'. Other names for this concept include "interme-
diate so\ereignty, provisional statehood, conditional recognition, and
earned recognition." I &! This co ncept comes from the Public International
Law and Policy Group lPlLI'G], put forward in a number of articles,
working papers, and consulta ncy reports.
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON I INGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 167

Rather than sec sovereignty as virginity- as something you either have

or do not ha'te, as something that once lost, can never be rcgaine.d, and
as something tha t c.annot be shared-it is instead viewed more Auidly. 1sl
Indeed it is seen as a "gift" to be transferrc.d by benevolent powers, per-
haps with the- sant'tion of thr international community, but with condi-
tions a nd qualifications. Total indrpcndence with unlimitrd and undivide-d
sovereignt}' is not seen as the only possible outcome. Rather, a number of
issues c.an be negotiated:

I. The right ro rerrirori:J I inregmy

2. The right ro defend rhe state through rhe ust of force
3. The right ro govern by csm blishing, appl}mg and enforcing law
4. ligibilit}' for mremanonal organi.z:Jrions
5. The c.1pacity to an as :.1 legal enriry for ownmg, purchasing rra nsferrmg
properTy, ere.
6. Gm nr of sovereign mmumiry for non-commercial act J\'iri es and consu lar
relatio ns
7. C.lpacity to sign inrernarionnl agreements
8. The dury ro rcspecr orhc:r natrons
9. The obligation to abide: b}' inrernarional l:Jw 11!4

The three core clements of ea rned sovereignty arc "provision for sha red
sovereignty, measures enabling some t}'pc of internal institution building..
and negotiations fo r fina l status"; the three optional clrmrnts a rc phased
sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, a nd constrained sovereignty. In the
first, changes arc over time and incremental; in the second, key issues
must be addressed; and in the third, "continued limitations on the sov-
ereign authority and functions of the new state, such as continued inter-
national administrative a nd/or mi litary presence, and limits on the right
of the state to underta ke territorial association with othrr sta tes" 11\.1 arc
invohcd. Final status may therefore be less-at times much less-than full
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Scharf suggests that as sovereignty was never absolute, this may not
be a new phenomenon, but legal norms have not rcAcctcd this. '"'The rime
has c-ome to embrace de jsm the new reality of earned sovereignty that
is emerging fro m diplomatic practice. '' 186 Case studies in a rdatc.d arti-
cle: include the " road map" in the M]ddle East, the Good Friday Agree-
ment for Northern Ireland, the Machakos Protocol for Sudan, the Ba ker
Pc.acc: Plan fo r Western Saharn. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244
fo r Kosovo, thr Dayton Accords for Bosnia, U.N. Srcurity Council Reso-
lution 1272 for East Timor, the Comprehensive Ag reement for Bougain-
villc, and the new constitution for the Union of Serbia a nd
168 1ERA II ORIAL IN TEGRi l Y AND CON llNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

It is worth noting that this notion of earned sovereignty is designed ro go

further than the notion of territorial autonomy. Yet many of these arc
weak compromises, denying cmities the rights that the}' would claim as
entitlements, and gi.,ing the responsibility of territorial administration to
the United Nations or other gmups representing the international com-
Almost all poss ibilities for Palestine envisage this compromised,
even clisccrated the much-trumJX'"ted road map and the
2000 Camp David plan that Yasscr Arafat was so roundly condemned for
rejecting. The Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo, while inherently more generous,
similar!)' attached conditions and the need fo r supervision.
The tension between territorial integrity and independence is. of course,
central to the complexities of thc rclarions between Israel a nd Palestine.
At the .,cry end of his presidency. on Janua ry 7. lOOt, Clinton dedared:
"'There will be no peace, and no peace agreement, unless the Israeli peo-
ple have lasting sccurit)' guarantees. These need not andl should not come
at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty, or interfere with Palestinian
territorial integrity." ' 19 Since September 11, 2001, Bush showed consis-
tent support for Israeli control of the airspace, territorial waters, and
land passages through Ga:z.a and the \Vest Bank. Although Bush dedared,
"Israel must freeze settlement actl\rity, help Palestinians build a thrhing
cconomr, and ensure that a new Palestinian state is truly viable, with
contiguous territory on the \Vest Bank, A stare of scattered territories will
not work," 190 he too continually supported Israeli scntrity over Palestin-
ian sovereignt)'. 19' Territorial integrity Ln this sense soems to imp.ly more a
sense of viability than preservation or sovereignty: viability in terms of its
contiguity, sustainability, and issues such as access ro neighboring coun-
tries and bctv.een the \Vest Bank and Gaza. At the moment, Gaza lacks
so man}r of the associations of territorial intcgricy that it is little more
than a prison.
These terms help to make sense of the ongoing tensions concern-
ing Iran, which do not simply concern irs plans for nuclear power and,
potentially, wcapons. l9! just as with Iraq, irs supposed pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction is increasingly linked to two other clements-
support for terrorism and treatment of civilian populations. Thi1> is partly
because the nuclear justification is bccomlng increasingly at odds with
available inrdligenoc. 193 Nonetheless, the Revolutionary Guard, labeled
by the Bush administration as a "specially designated global terrorist.''
is seen as a connection bctwoen the insurgenC}' in Iraq and the pursuit of
nuclear technology, and the bellicose rhetoric of I\t ahmoud Ahmadinejad
concerning Israel has only increascd the tension. l l/4 Thus, in Hersh's words,
"what had been presented primarily as a counter-proliferation mission has
 1ERAllORIAL IN lEGRI I Y AND CON IINGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y 169

been reconceived as counterterrorism. '" 191 In addition, longstanding amip-

athy toward the Islamic m olution itself has been coopted into a justifica-
tion on humanitarian grounds for regime change. 19 As with Iraq, this is
a confused, and intentionally confusing, rationale. Here too then, territo-
rial sovereignty is St'en as contingmt for the multiplt' reasons of human
rights \'iolations, harboring of tcnorists, and the development of weapons
of mass destruction.
On tht' one hand, territorial sovereignty is increasingly seen as con-
tingent; on the other hand, thcoretic.1 l arguments arc being advanced in
favor of challenges to territorial prt'servation. Tt'rritorial intt'grity, which
encompasses both of tht'sc meanings, and is part of tht' post-World War
0 security settlement, is therefore under increased pressure. The notion
of earned sovereignty is another way of compromis ing or circumscrib-
ing the powers that some political entitit's arc aiJowed to have. Palestine
must accept less than Israel; Kosovo must not be allowed to set a prec-
edent for secession; the Kurds must remain part of Iraq, if only nominal!};
Somalil and must keep up the pretense that it is part of a larger state; and
sovereignty in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, or Iran cannot be allowed to
lead to outcomes that arc disliked by the United States and its allie-s. And
yet, while the sovereignty of some states is in question, other statt's arc
incrt'asingly looking to rt'tain or regain it from inrcrnational agreements
they prniously made.
The relation bctv.een sovereignty and territory is therefore of para-
mount concern. What is clear is that the notion of "contingent sover-
eignt}'" in both its humanitarian and sccu rity guises, has profound effects
on both aspects of the question of territorial integrity. The a rgument is
therefore twofold. First, territorial sovereign(}' is rendered contingent b}'
the "international communi(}" or dominant powers, in part due to the
e:xtraterritoriallogics of globalization but more essentially because of glo-
balization's strategic underpinning. Second, in the current international
climate, challenges to territorial boundaries arc seen as inherently vio-
lent and therefore likely to be re-eoded as terrorism by dominant powers.
Taken together, they indicate the way in which globalization both deter-
ritorializes and reterritorializes, a claim that renders problematic some of
the literature that suggests the first concept alone.
This point raises a number of questions. What do borders mC'an today?
How do the}' operate, and how a rc they maintained? How and where
should the}' be redrawn, if necessa ry? These questions additionally show
the way in which the logics of the "war on terror" ar e played out beyond
the specific concerns of the United States, including by dom,inant regional
po\vers such as Russia in Chcchnya and China in Xinjiang. Territorial
170 1ERA II ORIAL IN TEGRi l Y AND CON llNGENl SOVERei GN 1 Y

integrity is inher'C'ndy problematic in the contemporary global climate,

prcciscl)' the linkage of the two aspcds of the term-preservation
of existing boundaries and sovereignty within them-is being explicitly
challenged, rather than the latter simp l}' being practica lly violated. The
semblance of order in the international system requires these two aspects
to operate as founding principles or as necessary myths. That the linkage
between terrilOry and sovereignty has been challenged since September
11, 2001, is not especially remarkable; that it has been argued against is
much more important. Yet the problematic linkage of these two aspects
is onc that has plagued thc United Nations since the beginning, and that
the superpower rivalry of thr Cold War actually Thus, the
tensions bcrween rights and sovereignty in rdation to territory have come
into stark focus in the twenty-first century, but they have a much longer
history.
 CODA

The Spatial Extent

of Sovereignty

This book has described territorial integrity as the spatial extent of sover-
eignty. Sovereignty is an issue at tbc intersection of terror and territory; it
operates as the crucial bridge between terror and the state and is integral
to the state of territory. Those who have sovereignty-recognized states-
arc able to exercise a violence within their territory that they claim is
legitimate. Those who arc deemed not ro have sovereign powcr-flonstatc
organizations, national self-determination mmements, and individuals-
arc in a different position. Their violence is seen as illegitimate b)' defi-
nition, as "terror."' They can therefore be labeled " terrorists," a strateg}'
that immediatel)' shapes their actions; indeed, this label can procedc an)'
action. It has been argucJ that tbe secessionist or tcnorist identification
is made because any challenge to the territorial integrity of a state (in tbc
sense of its territorial preservation) acts as a limit to tbat state's spatial
cx"tcnt and therefore as a potential lim it to the exercise of its violence. It
is therefore seen as a necessarily illegitimate act a nd is in itself violent.
Challenges to Israel 's continuing occupations have certainly been labeled
in that way, both by the Israeli state and U.S. advocates. Yet those states
that claim legitimacy for themselves also claim the right to render terri-
torial integrity, as territorial sovereignty, contingent in places that do not
meet particular nom1s of behavior. These states' \'iolence can cxcocd their
borders: the- United States and Britain can limit the spatial extent of Iraq's
sovereignty with the "no-fly"' zones and eventually overthrow it entircl}';
Israel can invade south Lebanon to provide "peace for Galilee''; Russia
can launch attacks over the border into Georgia.
While communi!>m provided a justification for U.S. involvement in other
countries throughout the Cold War, and the "war on d rugs'' was a basis
for involvement a t least in CemraJ America immediately afrcrv.ards,' there
172 CODA

was a widespread difficulty in providing a rC".ason in other areas. The Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait, with oil scrurity as an issue, succeeded in mobilizing
opinion in a way that intcnentions or situations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti,
or Rwanda ne\'er could.1 1bc notion of humanitarian intervention was the
key rhetorical term used in the interventions in Kosovo and Sierra
which themselves were in part rC"actions to perceived failures in pw.ious
e.,ents. Today, the discourse of the " war on terror" provides a n apparently
new language' to justi fr what is a continuous practice. But it is the justifica-
tion that is key, alongside the gencrahzed acceptance of a need for limits on
sovereign power. Humanitarian arguments for "'sovereignty as responsibil-
it}"'' have been appropriated by calls for "'contingrnt sovrrcignty, '' which
demonstrates both the continuity and that the international spatial order
of territorial integrit)' is now challenged by a fa r wider, more dangerous
set of demands. The U.S. Natiouai Defense Strategy, for example, a rgues
that it is unacceptable for states to invoke a sovereign "shield," rendering
sovereignty as a whole contingent. This strategy a rgues that if a state fails
to live up to the TC"sponsibilities that the "'international community" or the
United States a nd its a llies deem appropriate, thrn it must be rcfom1ed.
Governments may to be prrsua ded or cajoled into changing their
behavior, or, ultimate I)', they may be rC'moved. One of the key assumptions
behind thr post-war settlement, a founding principle of the United Nations,
is effectively rcjcrtcd. As Shawcross puts it: " Intervention and the abroga-
tion of sO\ercignty arc legitima te to stop genocide or other crimes against
human it), or in the case of states protecting their own citizens against the
thrC"at of terrorism, or in cases where they arc acting against dC"ar threats
to international security. '"J ]t is the clumsy equivalence between these three
situations that is the significant shift in recent years.
Yet at the same time. the other relation between smcreignt) and
territory- the question of extent- rema ins strong. ]n the post-war period,
this was reinforced in such a way that secessionist movements were per-
ceived as a danger locally and regiona lly, and the nomlS of the United
Nations were establishrd on the basis that preservation of the territorial
quo and the immutable link benveen sovereigmy and territory was
important to global stabi lity. Thus, even dccolonization happened along
the boundaries that marked the lines of colonial division. As Neil Smith
has suggested, U.S. tactics in framing the United Nations contributed to
its particular role:
Glimpsed here is nor si mply an mrern:monalism bur a globalism in
which th e sigmficance o f grogrnphical boundaries and rermorial
exclusions are circumscribed b) ::1 world
 CODA 173

Th!:' mrem was nothing less rhan rhe unhirching of specific geographical
claams and rernrorialsrruggles from rheanrral d)'ll:J mi cs ofrhe glob:J I
oconomac mrc:rcourse. The: U.N. would medio.re geogr.:tphically roorc:d
struggles, conflicts, :Jnd skirmishes w hile global commerce: prococ:ded
OP:JCC:

By sc:tt:ing up the: U.N. :JS a dc:::mnghouse for termo ri.al dispu rc:s, U.S.
globali5m recognized :1. da11c:stmc:nr of the: country's powc:r dirc:crly inro
the world m:.:trkct. (153iah) Bowman's coimng of 'rhe America n lelxn-
sraum" therefore represented a n appropnatcly spariallexicon for rhis
ambitious new globalism, and the U.K. was irs political ann.4

The notion of the United Nation!; as a "clearinghouse for territorial dis-

pures '' is revealing. By forcing these disputes into the framcwork e-stab-
lished by the United Nations, dominant powers were abll" ro pre-serve their
own standing, especially in terms of ind igenous populations, contiguous
colonialism, and minorities. The coupling of territorial preservation with
territorial sovercignt}' in the term "'territorial integrity" appealed to the
idcal of sta te self-interest, and it was abll" to create a ver)' real sta bil-
ity in tht" international system, especially compared to prC\ious periods.
But there was always a tension implicit in the construction of the Un ited
Nations. Allowing statt"s to exercise exclusive sovereignty within their
own boundaries implicitly enabled, or at least allowed. a ll kinds of repres-
sion of the civilian populations of rhesl" countries. While tl1is has bct"n
long re.cognized, thl" geopolitical tensions of the Cold War madc most c.alls
fo r inten rmtion too politicall)' charged to make it through the U.N. Sccu-
rlt}' Council without a veto. In this sense, the superpower rivalry-often
seen as a barrier to the effective working of the Se<:urity Council-actuall}'
prevented the tensions o f the U.N. Charter brroming evident
Since the end of the Cold War, the: Security Council has operated more
as the founders intended. Wh ile therl" are still issues that the Permanent
Five mt"mbers declare an interest in, th,crc:br often pre\'c:nting action. man}'
more things a rt" not so obviously an issue. But the: d ramatic rise in U.N.-
sanctioned interventions of \'arious kinds has actually had the opposite
effect of what was amicipated. 1 Ra ther than dt"monstrating the cffc:cti\e-
ness of the institution, they have: instead highlighted its flaws. Territorial
integrity is challenged through intervention, but on the other hand, there
is an attempt to prc:sc:rve it. Territorial integrity as prt"servation wins out
mer territorial integrity as soYcreignty. But if a state's territorial sover-
eignty is contingent bc.cause of its treatment of civilian populations, why
should its territorial extent be presavcd in all circumstances? If a large,
discrete minority exists w ithin its borders, why should international inter-
vention be legitimate to protc<"t it only within those borders, rather than
174 CODA

redrawing the borders and changing tbe geography of the problem? The
situation in Kosovo is a classic instance of the international community
opening up a problem througb the first kind of intervention without a
clear sense o f bow tbey might resohe the second issue. The supposed reso-
lution of that problem has. as predicted, opened up issues in other places,
notably Georgia.
The caution is, in some senscs, well placed, A territorial free-for-a ll
would inevitably create thc kind of instability in tbe international system
that cxisting frameworks arc designed prcciscl}' to avoid. But pulling at
one thread in the international framework risks unraveling the whole. It
is for this reason that an examination of international law is so \'aluable.
Bobbin has argued that this is often neglected in work on geopolitics. He
suggests that this neglect has meant that "the fun damental force fields
of the Statc-thc relation between law and war, and between legitimacy
and violence: relations that yield the State's most basic cxprcssion of its
identity, indeed that gave birth to the modrrn statc-arr rarely cven men-
tionrd, much kss addressed.''" [n a small way, and from a d ifferent politi-
cal perspective tban Bobbitt's, this book bas sought to interrogate these
questions through the pcrspcctive of trrritory.
Thr sta te of territory in thc " war on terror,. cannot be understood
straightforwardly. It is clear that tbc: United States is not seeking simple
territorial expansion because its own trrritorial expansion large!)' finished
with thc Civil War.- This is why attempts to discus.s the United States as a
new empire get into difficult}' The approach of understanding the United
States as a new rmpire, or its strategies as those o f imperialism, is in dan-
ger of missing what is csscmiaP [\llichad Mann calls the current conjec-
ture "'temporary territorial imperialism,"9 \\o'hcre a country has its regime
changed to one more: amenable to U.S. interests, and then the United
States removes itsdf. 10 But this. can be questioned at every stage. It implies
that this is a tcmporarr aberration, w hen it is increasingly being seen as
the: norm; it suggests that the territorial aspect is part of that tempora ry
nature when these practices produce a profound challenge to territorial
logics of state power; and it reinforces the sense that these cha llenges can
be understood through thr notion of imperialism. Some analysts have
tried to defend a dis tinction bcrneen imperialism and colonialis m, where
the: goal of the former is political control and the goal of the latter is
territorial control, but this is historical!}' suspect, both conceptual!)' and
cmpiricall}'. 11 Different empires have undoubtedly operated in different
ways. h is in(:umbent on those who wish to drfend thr "United States as
empire" argument to clarify their terms and historica l lineages. The argu-
ment here is rather different.
 CODA 175

While al-Qaeda has looked to usc particular states, such as Afghanistan

and later Iraq, as the birth of a new Caliphate and the reemergence of a
particular form of the United States is looking for something
other than straightforward territorial control. As chapters 1 and 5 showed,
a process of integration has as the principal U.S. foreign policy and
security strategy. This is integration into a system of political and economic
structures, framed by the United States. The economic structure requires
geopolitical support, which has important implications in terms of territo-
rial control because the very nature of U.S. ambitions requires a double
standard in its treatment of trrritorial issurs. Whilr it wants to complrtcly
enforcr the inviolable standing of its own trrritory, and to reinforce and
comrol that with whatever means necessary, it wants to asscn the abso-
lute contingency of sovereignty O\'cr territory elsewhere. George W. Bush
described Iraq not just as the "centra l front in the war on terror," tz but also
a place that was supposed to act as a beacon of democracy for the rest of
the Middle East. Similar logics arc at play as with ai-Qarda here, with the
idea of one state being a potential catalyst for others. tllen, is the
United States seeking to gain? As has been discussed in numerous places,
its real achievement will be in the establishment of bases, the facilitation of
free passage of its forc.cs, of capital flows and ac.ccss to energy.'} In tllrse
terms, its operations ha.,e been much more than headlines in the
"war on terror" might suggest, with the signing of an agreement with the
Iraqi government in late 2007 committing the United States to a long-term
presence in the rcgion being only one example. In all this, the United States
is looking to presrrve its own position, but much more generally, to ensure
the institutional framework and provide the military support for globaliza-
tion. This is the logic of integration: not into a territorial empire, but into
a hcgemony of shared rule sets and values.
It is for this rc-<Json, among others, that John Agnew's claim that we arc
de-aling with hegemony rathe-r than empire is well-taken:
in its frogmenration of exist1"'g sute territories ond
its increasmgl)' predominant nerworked geograph)' of pow-c:r, 1s the
necessary outcome of American global hegemony, not some sort of
empire:. Globalization today and under Americ:111 hegemony represents a
dramatic qu1ckemng and gc:ographtc:1.l reformul::ltlon o f rhc: progressi\'e
uni,ersahzarion of capitolist commodificatio n s nd accumubtlon....
Globalization 1s a hegemomc project mtimatdy connected w the gcopo
hricaJ calculus of the U.S. government and economic interests during t he
Cold War and to the incorporation of the enrire world mto 1rs grip in
the years since the dem1se o f rhc Communist projecr in the former Soviet
Union and Cl1ina by a myriad of U.S.-basro agennY
176 CODA

What the United States is concerned with implementing is effectively a

new, global Monroe Doctrine of American hegemony, partnered with the:
force of the (Theodore) Roosevelt corollary.' 1 To put rbis in more con-
temporarr terms, the U.S. Natior1al Security Strategy tmderpins "the new
Washington
While the norm of territorial integrity was never really accepted by
dominant powers, the difference now is that they a rc being explicit about
the challenge to internal competence or territorial sovereignty w hilc simul-
taneously stressing tbe importance of territorial iniola bility. 1' Numerous
examples could be given where the United States or other dominant pow-
ers have violated the territorial integrity of other states, but the current
conjuncture is somewhat different. It is one where territorial preservation
is seemingly para mount, and yet at the same time, tbere is a concerted
argument against territorial soereignty rather tban simply its practical
violation.
Territorial integrity is thus fractured because while there is an insistence
on the presenation of territorial extent, the sovereignty within it is held to
be contingent. Indeed, it is often in exactly the same places in which terri-
torial so\ereignt}' is contingent that territorial preservation or imiolability
is asserted e\'en more forcduJly. [\en the possibility of Afghanistan's or
Iraq's territorial spatial ex-rent being open to question was de(:med impos-
sible. With Iraq, this was at the very heart of the issue of the new consti-
tution in that the territorial settlement was an extraconstitutionaJ event,
and the resultant problems of resources, and representation
continue to haunt the political process . Similarly, the cry real grievances
of Israel's neighbors concerning the Golan Heights, the Shebaa Farms,
and of course, the Palestin ian territories arc pushed to the background. It
was the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers that was seen as the initiation for
the latest round of conflict in Lebanon, rather than any previous events;
the rockets aimed at Sderot seemingly equivalent to what takes place in
Gaza. Somalia's territorial extent is a problem internally, regionally, and
more widely, yet solutions a re sought within its existing borders without
recognition of the problems they are causing. The de facto collapse of its
sovereignty cannot permit a de ;ure breakup of its territory.
\Vhat is at stake in the question of territory in the "war on terror"
is thus not an attempt at territorial expansion by the United States, nor
a willingness of dominant states to countenance territorial change-far
from it, in fact. Rather, there is a continuous attempt to prescne the: ter-
ritorial framings of existing states as a process of maintaining and cre-
ating stabilit)'.s Instead, the notion of territorial sovereignty is the key
question. The question of sovereignty has, of course, long been a concern
 CODA 177

of relations and international law.'' But to address this

question adequately-today and historically-requires us to take terri-
tory into account in a much more way than has generally been
case. Territory because it is seen to provide the
within which is said to operate, its limits what
state can do, and because its limits are the of the Strug-
over territory and the placing of the boundaries that it
But the delicate compromise of cl1e post-World War U settle-
injum:tions against war and the Holocaust, is fractured
and its is not e<tsi ly Territorial is, this
book has the \'cry of that It necessitates a
rethinking of the bind bcc<tuse internal
cannot be preserved when boundaries this porous, and when the
United States and its allies claim an right to undermine absolute
sovereignty whenever their \ital interests arc threatened.
It is this, rather than a simpl istk argument that no mat-
ters, that is at in globa lization. Cooper, for has suggested
that the division no longer holds ltnder globalization,
that essence of globalization is that it erodes. "ID Yet this erosion of
realms docs not mean that things are cluown into
continual flux. than a process of simple there
is a concomitant process of And it is for that very
reason that "territor}'" itself bears careful analysis. The relation between
sovereignty and territory is one that demands attention, both in
terms of its conceptual, historical, and legal background and beccause of
the changing of the relation today. The problem for the interna-
tional community more generally, and the United Nations in particular, is
that it neros to think much more seriously about the of mak-
ing territorial sovereignty contingent and to consider territorial
preservation can remain as an absolute in &uch circumstance&. To put this
another way: if the sovereignty of a state is limited, can its spatial ex'tent
remain unquestioned? The tension is explicit because
of the collapse of the sovereign fiction that states have a monopoly of
legitimate violence within their territory. An attempt to cling to that fic-
tion is found in the assertion of inviolability of borders; its unraveling is
found in the practice of \iolation of sovereignty.
Taking this broader approach aiJows a deeper understanding of
dynamics currently at play among terror, state, and than that
prO\idro by a simple focu.s on the period since ll , 1001. There
arc more continuities than contrasts between U.S. administrations, a fact
that is in a sense unsurprisJng given that it is structur al forces than
178 CODA

indi,ridual actors that drive these events.. In his. vale<lictory interview with
the \Vall Street ]ourtzal, former presidential advisor Karl Rove offered a
suggestion as to the legacy of Bush's foreign policy. He argued that two
parts. of the Bmh Doctrine would endure: "the policy that if you harbor
a terr-orist, you arc as culpable as the terrorist; and pre-emption.,. He was
reported as saying that "there may be a debate about degree, but it's going
to be hard for an}' president to rc\'ersc that, "ll The logic of the equation
of the dissimilar allowed the move from a i-Qaeda to the Ta liban, the shift
of focus to Iraq, and the incorporation into the "war on terror" of distinct
conAicts with Hezbollah in Lebanon and actions in Somalia. It may allow
similar mo\'CS in the futur e. The logic of preemption. with its reversal of
the temporal logic of self-defense and its spatia l countcrparr of integra-
tion, can legitimize any number of actions an}'timc and anpvhere. Terror
is both an object and method of these measures- the state a target and
an actor of that terror. and territory the terrain and stake of struggle. The
interrdations of trrror and the state thus hinge on thr state of trrritory.
 NOTES

Introduction
l. Wilham J Chnron, Scp.:c-ch of Augusr 10, 1998.
2. Rohan Inside AI Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (london:
Hurn Company, 2002j, J4Q.
3. On rho:io: evenrs., sec Peter Camm, The J 993 \t'orld Trade unli!r Bomb-
ing: Foresight and \\1ammg (l ondon: 200 l ); John K. Cooley, UniJoly W'ars:
A(g!Janistan, America, a11d International Terrorism (l ondon: Pluro, 2002); Gtllrs
K.:pd, }tl1ad: The Trail of Politic<Il lslm11. mms.. Amhony F. Rol>cns (C.1.mbridge.
UniYersiry Press, 2.002); Dilip Huo, \Var rvtlhout f11d: Tile of
ls/anust Terrortsm and Global Respo11.se tlondon: Rourledge, 2002h Mike Davis..
Buda's Wi1gon: A Brief History of the C.u Bomb tLondon: Verso. 2007); Sten::n
Emerson. American ]tltad: The Tt!l'rorists Liri11g <lmong Us York: The Free
2002) Richard Losing Bin Lade11: Btl/ Clinton's Failures
Unleas!Jcd Global Terror D.C.: Reg.nery Publishing. 2003). An e:Jr-
lier generarion 's confl ict is discussed in D:l\id C. \'t'lls. The First War on Tc-rrorism:
Caul/leer-Terrorism Policy duri11g the RMgan "dministrarion (lanham: Rowman
and lirrldidd, 2003).
4. Perry Anderwn, ''Force and Consc:m." New Lc-(1 Relietu 17 16.
5. 1\,tohamed M. Ali . John Blacker. and Gareth Jones. !vlorraliry
R:Jtes and Excess Ift:Jths of C hildren under Five in Iraq, 199 1-98." Popui<Jtion
Studies 57, no. 2 12003); sc:e Chomsky, 9-11 (New York: ...en Stories,
10011.
6. United Jl\arions Devdopmem Reporr figures from hrrp:l/www.undp.org;
see :Jiso John Pilger. Tbc New Rulers of tiJC World (london: Verso. 2002), I.
7. Gilbert Achcar, T1Je Cl<1sh of Bi1rbarisms: The A"iaki11g of the New World
Order, trans. Peter Druck.:-t:, Updared ond E.xpanded E.dinon (Boulder: Parodigm,
10061,36.
180 NO I I:S 10 I N I

8. George \'fl. Bush, speh of 12, 2005; S(:e also B.ol> WDI]((ward,
o f Denial: Btts!J at War, Pan Ill {London: Simon and Schusrer; 2006), 4J I.
9. See, in particubr, hrrp://www.1raqbod>coum.org; Les Roberts, Riyadh
Ltfta, R1clurd Garfield, Jamal Khud h.un, a nd Burnham, "Mortalit>'
B-efore and :\fter t he 2003 Im.-asion o f Iraq: Cluster Sample Suney," Tilt!
364, no. 9448 (2004 1: 1857-64; a nd Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh l a fra, Shannon
Dooq, and Les :1fter the 20()3 lmasion of lr.1q: A Cross-
Secrional Cluster S."1mple Stuve)', .. TIM Lancet 368, no. 9545 (2006): 142 1-28 . For
discu.s.sions, see John Sloboda and Ha mit D:.1 rd agan, Iraq Body Coum Proje<t:
Civil Soc1et)' and the Democranc Ddicir," in The War and Democm tic Poli-
tics, ed . .'\lc:x D:mche\' and John t\1acmilbn (london: Routledge, 2005), 219- 37;
jennifer H )'lldman, "Feminist Gcopolirics Rev1s1tc:d: Body Counts in Iraq," The
Pro fesstona l 59, no . I l2007): 35-46; and Cristina Masters,
Coun ts: The Biopolrrics of Dc:arh,"' in Tht! Logics of fliopower and tiM War on
Terror: Living, Dymg, Surr,wing, ed. Elizabeth Dauphmcc and
(london: Pa lgravc:, 2007) 43-57. The key quest ion-<l\'c:r and al>ove a stmplc:
cakularion-is just w hat IE mc-.ms to count a bod), what Derek Gregory (following
Achille Mbem be, 'J\'ccropohrics," Publtc Cufturt 15, no. I 120031: 11 -40) calls
' the: gnsl)' mlc ulu:> of colonial nccropohrics,.; also sec: Derek Gregory, Palestine:
undCT Siege, .. Antipode 36, no. 4 60 1-6.
10 . See Derek Gregory, TIJe Colonial Presmt: .4.{ghatJistatJ, Palestine, fr,zq
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 19.
I I . A s1m1lar cla im could be m:.1de for the bombings m London on Ju ly 7,1005,
which have similarly reduced to 7f7, or rhOS(: m o n March II , 1004,
which have been designa ted 3/11. O f other events on September II, the coup
agamsr Salvador :\Jlende m Ch1le m 1973 ls. most often noted, l>ut this was also the:
date in 1912 thar rhc: Bnris h M:mdare of Palestine began. See Stuarr Croft, Culture,
Crisis, a11d O JJ Ter-,or (C:.1 mbridgc:: Cambrtdge Uni\'c:rsity Press,

1006), 15-17; Angelo Rasanayaga m, l l{gJmmstan: A Modem H1story (l ondon: t

B. Tauns, 2003), 144.
11. Indeed, one book on the consequ ences has [he sim ple ride "'Afrer, .. wrth the:
subtitle speaking of the 11 Era ... Sec: SteYen Brill, The Rebuild-
mg atJd Dcfendmg of .-\merica in the September 12 &11 (New York: Simon and
Schusrc:r, 2003) .
13. On the: spatial aspects of the World Trade Center c:\c:nrs a nd consequences
for rhe site a nd the city, see After the W!orld Trade Center. Rethinkmg New York
Cit)', ed. !vlichael Sorkin and Sharo n Zukm (Roud edge: New York, 2001).
14. 1'-:eil Smith, "Sca les of The !t.1:mufactunng o f 1\'ationa ltsm and
[he War for U.S. G loba lis m, " in l ifter the \.l lorld Trade Center, 98-99; see also
Arundhati Roy, 71u Algcbm of Infinite Justice (London: Flamingo, 2002).
15. Achcar; The Cfash of B.zrbarism s, 27. On t he role: of popuJa r culture in pro-
ducing the wa r menra lity, see Cynthia Weber, Jm.zgiwng Am er1m <1t \.\:1ar: Morality,
Politics, .md Film !London: Routledge, 20061; Croft, Culture, Crisis, and i\merica's
 NO I I:S 10 I N I 181

War on TC""or; Andrew a nd Pacricc: Pedro, Global &curity:

Media, Popular and ''War 011 Brunswick, N .j.: Rurgc:rs
Uni\'c:rsit>' Prc:ss, 2006); Dc:bnx, Tabloid Culture, and Geo-
politics tLondon: Roudroge, 2008).
16. Grorge W. Bush, spt>c:ch o f October II , 2.001> Set" also Rush, spt>c:ch of
Octobc:r 29,200 I ; Rudolph Gi ul uni, York Ciry after 11,2001,"
Septembc:r 10,2003, hnp:l/fpc.starc:.gov/fpd2397 1.htm; D1mirri K. Simc:s, .. What
War Means," Natwnal i!Jterest, Tha nksg1\'ing Specia l Issue, 200 I, hnp:/1
www. nixoncenter.org/pu blican on sfaniclesffNl spc 10 I dks.pdf.
17. j t":l.n-Marie Colombam, sommes tous Amencams," u Monde,
Septembc:r 12,200 1.
18. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, m Collision," m Worlds itJ Colliston:
Te"or atJd tilt' Future of Global Order, c:d. Booth and Tim Dunne (london:
2.0021, I.
19. Gregory, The Colonial Present, 19.
20. George Vi". Bush, spc:och of Scprembc:r 27, 200 I. Bush equally said its ter-
rams will be rha n the battlefields and beachheads of the past"i see also
spc:c:ch of &ptember 2.9, 200 I. Cohn Powdl remarke-d t hat m his previous t rai rting
as a soldier, .. t here is the roc:my occupying a p1ccc: o f ground. We .:.m define: it in
sp:Ke, and other dimensions., and you c.m :.u.scmble forces :.1 nd go afte-r lt. T his
is. The: c:nemy is in nu ny ploces. The is not looki ng to be found .
T he rnemy is hidden. The cnem)' is very oftrn right here: within our own country.
.-\nd SO you ll3\'e tO design a campoign plan mat goc:s after that kind o f enemy"> SCC
Cohn Powdl, to !Press," September 14, 100 I, http://www.yak.edu/
lawweb.la\'alon/sept_ ll/powell_bncf05.htm. Earli er, ClLnton roo had djscussro the
changing geographies: foes haYe ex'tended t he: fi elds of battle from phys-
ico ! space to .:ybcrspace; from world's \'ast bodiCS of wa ter to the complex
workings of our own human bodies, .. William J. Clinton, .. Prcsidc:m BLII Clin ton
SjX:Jks to the Na\':J l Academy a t Annapolis,.. Ma)' 22, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/
,-\LLPOLITICS/19981U5/Wdinton.academy/transc ript.h.tml.
2L Smith, ..Scales o f Terror," 105.
22. Set" Wills, Tl1e First \V'ar 011 Tefforism.
23. Colin Flint, cd., of Geograpbies of Discrimi1zation and Intol-
erance m the (New York: Routledge, 10041; Colin Flint, cd., The Geography
of War and From DealfJ Camps lo Diplomats lOxfo rd: Oxford
Prcs.s, 20051.
24. The Geographical Dimmsions ofTarorism, Susan L Cutter, Douglas
B. Richa rdson, and Thomas J. Wilbanks (New York, Roudedgc:, 2003 ). The: pres-
em book can be seen as parr of a challenge wid1in the disciphne of geog-
raphy to rh.at book. Vwfcnt Geographies: Frur, Te"or; and Pol1timl cd.
Dere k Gregory ond Alla n Prc:d (New York: Routledge, 20061 arose our of precise-ly
such a challenge, man)' of the papers bemg first presented ot the 2004 meeti ng of
the AAG in Philadelphia.
182 NO I I:S 10

2.5. 1\.i.:trburg.c:r, m Cunc:r c:t a l.., Geographical Dimt!mio11s of Terrortsm,

X\'11.

2.6. Ibid.
2.7. Ira Ch.:-rnus, Monstos to Dt!stro)': TIJe Nroco nsentative \ll,1r 011 Terror
and Si11 tBouJdc:r, Colo.: Parad1gm, 1006), 144.
2.8. Hc:nri Lc:feb\rc:, Espan! d poJittqltt!: L drott a Ia 11il/e 11, C:du-ion (Pans:
Amhropos, 1000 ( 1972]), 59; Henri Ldc:bnc:, State, Space, \Vorld, ec:L Ne1l Brc:nnc:r
and Stuan Eldc:n Uni vc:rsity o f 1\tinnesoro Prc:ss.., 2008): p. 174. A
of Lefebvre's work is provided in EJd.:-n , Undtrstanding
He11ri Theory and Possible (London: Continu um, 2004 1. For the
contexT of this ci:J im, see d uprc:rs 5 and 6 of thar book.
2.9. 1\.bnh.:-w Sparke, In Space o(T1Jeory: Postfoundational Geographies o f
(M mnropolis : Universit)' o f Minnesota Press, 1005), 244-45.
30. SuS:J n Robens, Anna Secor, a nd Man h.:-w Sparke, G.:-opoli-
tics, .. ,-\ntipode 35, no. 5 (2003).
31 . Sec: Da\id H arvey, T11e !mpemlism (Oxford: Oxford Um\ersit)'
Pr.:-ss, 2003); ,-\ Brief Htst oi<y of Neoliberalism tOxford : Oxford Uni \ermy Press,
2005 ); Kl em, The Shock The of Disaster Capitalism (New
York: Books, 2.0071.
31. Gio\'anni Arrighi, The Geomf!!t')' of l mpi!rialism: TIJe Limits of Hobson's
Paradigm {London: 1'\ew l...dr Books, 19781, 102-J.
33. Anderson, "Force and Consem."
.>4. Ke\'ln Phillips, Tbe Peril and Politics of Radical Reli-
giOn, Oil, and Borrowed Money i11 the 21st Ce11t11ry (Xew York: Viking, 2006 ), 68.
35. On o1l, sec: in particular .o\ hmed Rashid, T.zl1b.m: Militdnt Islam, 01l,
and in UtJtral Asia (N.:-w Hn\en, Conn.: Ya le Uni,ersit)' Pr.:-ss,
1000); Willia m ,-\ Ci!tlltrry of War; ,-\nglo-l\ mrmam Politics and the
New World Order, rev. ro . tLondon: Pluro, 2004 1; !Phillips, Am erican T1Jeocr,1cy;
Yah)'a Zalloum, O il Crusada: Am ertca Jl1rOitgl1 i\ rab Eyes (London:
Pluto, 1007). For useful discussions, see H arvey, Tbe Nerv Imperialism, and Doug
Stokes, "Blood for Oil? Global Capital, Counter-lnsurgenq, and the Dual logic
of Amc:rica n Energy Security," Retiew of Jnterrrational Studies 33, no. 2. (2.007):
245-64; and for ::1 more nua nced ona l)sis o f lhe role of rc:sourc.:-s, se.:- !Philli ppe le
Bilton, f uelling War; Resources a11d Armed Adelphi Paper 373
(Oxford: Oxford Uni,erslry Press, 2005).
36. See Anderson, " Force and Consent," 5; P.:-rc:r Gowan, A Calculus o f
Power," New Left Retiew 16 {2001).
37. Gio\'anni Arrighi, Long Twentieth CentrJI<Y: Money, Power, and the
Origins of O rtr Tima tLondon: Verso, 1994), 33.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 34.
 NOII:S 10 I N I 183

40. Har\'e)', The Newllnperi,llism.

41. Deborah Cowen and Neil Smu:h, "Afrer From the Geopoliti-
CJI to .. Arrtipode 41, no. I (2009), pp. 22-28, 42.
42. lb1d., 42.
43. :\s D:n1d Cosmopolitanism aud tht! Googmplnes of freedom
(New York: Columbi.:t University Press, 2008 ) has pur it, rhe rdarional problem
of "terrorism" was acmcked m crude absolure rerms . See also Su.s.an
Tltitking P<1st Terror: lslamism and Crit1cal Throry on tlu! L4t (london: Verso,
20031,34.
44. Howevet; "terror" is not used in :JS broad a sense as Henri ldeb\re d1d in
Erreryday Lfe in the Modem \Vorld, rmns . Rabinov1rch (1-Iarmondsworth,
UK: Allen Lane, 1971 [ 1968] ), chapter 4, w here it IS the practice of the
societ)' of controlled consumption." This IS nor to say th:Jt terror
or fear is noc mobilized as a srraregy of governmen(S. For a analysis,
see B)ron Millet; "The Globaliz:Jrion of Fear: Fe-ar :Js a Technolog)' of Go\'ern-
mem," in G/ob,lfltation's Contradiciwrrs: Geographies of Discipfme, Destruction,
<111d Transformallon, cd. Dennis Conw:.1y and N1k Heynen (London: Routledge,
20%1.
45. See in Noo.m Chomsky Gilben Achcar, Perilous .Power: Tl1c
Middle E..zst and U.S. Foreigtl Policy: Dialog11cs on Terror, Democraq; W.zr, and
Justice [Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2007), 2 7, WiiJi:.J m Blum, Rogue Stdte: A G111dc
to the \Vorld's On{y Superpouer (Monroe, t\1a ine: Common Courage, 2005),
124 Charles P. Webd, Terror, Terrorism, mzd tlu! Hmmm Cond1tio11 (london:
Palgmve, 20041, 103; Frederick H. Gareau, .Stllll.' Terrorism cwd the Umtcd Stdtes:
from Countcrinsttrgency to tiJe War orr Terrorism (Arlanra, Ga.: Claril)' Press,
20041.
46. Blum, Rogue State, 123.
47. Davis, Buda 's Wagon, 4.
48. Pc(er Sloterdijk, Luftbeberr; ,-\n Queffe11 des Terrors (Frankfurt a m
Germa ny: 1002) .
49. Atmosphere is a ke)' term in his major work, the three-volume Sphi.iren
[Spheres], see Percr Slcxerdijk, Sp1Jiirtm; Bfasen, Globen, Scbl:inme (Frankfurt a m
2004). oll..JI{tbebcn r.:apprnrs in Volume In.
50. Sloterda1k, Ltt{tbeben, 23.
51. Jonn H. Herz, lntemational Politics ;n tbc Atom;c Age (New York: Colum-
bia Umversit)' Press, 19591, 104; s.:c Will ia m Conno lly, The Eti10s of Pluralization
Umversity of Pr.:ss, 1995), 150-51.
52. See B.:au Grosscup, Strategic Terror. T1u Polir;cs <md Ethics of Aerial
Bombardment (l ondo n; Zed Books, 2006); Derek Gregory, Anoth.:r Time-
Zan.:, rhe Bombs Fall Unsafdy .. .': TargeES, Civilians a nd late 1\!od.:m War,"
Arab \'(/orld Geographer 9, no. 2 (2006): 88-111.
184 NO I I:S 10 I N I

53. work looks at dlC: parricular USC:S of veniCal SOVereignty 10

lsradJPalesrine, wim an espc:c1ally re\ea ling discussion of Clinmn's propos.1ls
for layers of sovereignty m the volume of the Tc:mpk MoumJHam m a i-Sharif.
See Eyal Weiz.man, HolitJw Land; Israel's .-\rdJitecture of Occ11pation (London:
Verso, 2007), 54-55; and Weizman, Polirics of Verricalit)': T he \Xbr Bank as
an ArchitturaJ Construcrion," in Turitom!s: Islands, Camps, and Otl1er States
of Vtop1a, ed. Klaus Biesenbach (Koln: Wa lcher Komg., 2003); Rafi and
Eyal Weizman, 1\(ounr.tin: Principles of Building m He1ghrs," in A Civtfim1
O cc11pation; TIJe Polit1cs of Israeli ed. Rafi Sega l a nd Eyal Weizman
(Td A\iv: Babe-l, and london: Verso, 2003h a nd Stephen Graha m,
Geopolirics: Baghdad a nd After," Allflpodl! 36, no. 1 (20041.
54. Barry Hindess, "Terron orr," A ltematmes 3 1 (20061, 243 .
55. Robespierre, Virtue .md Terror, presented b> Slavoj Zakk
(london: VefS.O, 2007), 115.
56. On dus, m me COfllC:Xt of t he 'wa r o n terror." sc:e Jean Bethke Els htain,
}ttst \"\:far Terror; Tlu 8tJrdl!tl of llmertcan Power tn l l VtolenJ World (New
York: Basic Books, 2003) . Terry E.1.gleton, Holy Terror (0 .\: ford: Oxford Unl\'er-
my Press, 2005 ) has suggested that "it is not a matter of offering Osam.t bin Laden
a scat in Parliament, but o f granting justice to those who magJn omerwisc: exact a
terrible re\enge. jusncc is me onl) prophylact iC for terror" l l 5). This raises some:
1mporro nt temporal issues. T he ao:ka that the assau lt on Afgh;a.ni5ro n m late 200 1
was 'Infi nite justice"- the original name for t he U.S.-Jed actions before ic w.u
dunged to 'Enduring Freedom" a5 a supposed response to Muslim sc:nsitivaries-
atremprs to sc:e justice as rerri buuon subsequent ro the acr rather th:J n a potential
pre\'enrion of it. ''Enduring Freedom" is also imeresnng in char me first word can
either mean ' Lasting"--a temporal indacaror--<lr Eagleton's sugges-
rio n, though, sees justice much closer to fairness, in mat provad.ing the appropri-
ate political and legal structures wall take away t he need for violence. Borh dem-
on5[rate an astonishing naivety, in th:Jt both assume t ha t \'iolence i5 a rataonal
response. Yet whale the U.S. administration sc:c:s justice a5 subsequent, Eagleton's
call for a priorit)' for jusrice is sure!> worthy of a(tention.
57. Sfo(crd ijk, Lu(tbebe11, 14-15. In one o f her more t ho ughtful comments on
t he campaign tra il, HiJJary Clinton ("'You Can'( Lump All Terronsrs Together':
l nten1ew With Michael Tomasky,"' O ctober 13, 2007, http://,'IWW.gu:J rdian.co.ulcJ
usef(ion50SihillaryclintonJstory/())197 197,00.html) suggested that terrorism 1s
a roof tha t has been urili2lcd throughout history to ac hieve certain objectives. Some:
have been ideological, others territorial. There are pcrson:Jlit)-dri \en terroristic
objti,es. The bottom line 1s, you can't lump :JII terrorists rogether. "'
58. U.S. Code, 18 USC 1.B I, http://www.gpoacress.gov/uscode/index.html.
59. Cited in Chomsky and Achcar, Perilous Power, l.
60. Daanish f\1usrata, Terrible Geogrnphica lness of Terrorism: Reft-
rio ns of a Haz...uds Geographer," Antipode 37, no. I (1005): 78; see Eduardo
 NOII:S 10 I N I 185

:\fendiera, JmJXri:JI Grograph1es and Topographies of Nihilism: Theaters of W:1r

and Dead Ciries," City 8, no. I (2004).
61. Joint Chic:&. of Snff, Military Srrategic Plan for rhe War on
Terrorism," 2006a, 4, http://www.ddensdink . mil/qdr/docs/2.005-01 -25 -Srrategic-
Plan.pdf.
62. Chomsky and Achcar, Perilous Power, 3.
63. Paul \V.Ikmson, Pol1ticdl TI!'Yrorism (london: Macmiii:Jn., 1974); P:1ul
Wilkinson, Terromm atJd Liberal State, 2d ed. (london: t\1acmdlan, 1986).
64. Kinsley, 'Defining Terrorism, " The WashitJgton Post, October 5,
2.001, A37.
65. Weber, 'Polirik :.1 ls Beruf," in GI!'S<mrme#l! Pol1tisciJ1! Schriften, ed.
j. Winckelmann (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1971), 510-- 11. Tius rrans larion is modified
from the one gi\en in \'\1eber, Professio n and Vocation of Polirics," in
Political Wriiings, ed. Peter Lassma n and Ronald SJXirs (C:.1 mbridge: wmbridge
University Press, 1994), 311 .
66. The question of termory is much. more fully explored in m>' ongoing work,
mainly in :.1 project currenrl)' under the m le of The Geoml!tt)' of tl1e Politual: A
History of the State of Some initial st:Jtements o f these 1de:.1s c:.1 n be
found in Stu:Jrt Elden, the Point: Globalis:Jtaon, Dercrritoriahs:mon, a nd
the of the World," Tramactions of the fwtltld l!' of British GeograpliN's 30,
no. I (2.0051: 8-19, and 'Govemmenmlity, Gllcui:Jnon, Territory," flwironmelll
tmd Platmillg D: Society and Space 25, no. 3 12007): 562-80.
67. The question of the policies of mlcui:Jtlon is addressed through J. re:.1ding
of Heidegger m Stu:Jrt Elden, Speaking agai11st Nsmtber. Heidegger, Language,
and tiJt! Po littcs of Ca{culatiou (E.dinbu rgh: Edinburgh Uni\ersit)' Press, 20061; the
ddimrio n of space itsdf is discussed m Mapping Present: Heiaegger, f oucau/1,
and the Proiect of a History (london: Conrin uum, 200 1).
68. Galles Deleuze :.1 nd Fehx Guatm ri.. .'t Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenin, rrans_ Brian Massuma !London: Athlone, 19881, 10, 54, also see
181, 508.
69. Ddeuze and Gu:Jttan, A Thousnnd Plateaus, 203, 303.
70. See Eldrn, "Missmg [he Pomt.. :.1 nd "The State of Territory under Globali-
sation: Empire and rhe Politics of In Born(e) across: Meta-
phoricity a11a Postmodern Politics, ed. Maria a nd Effie Yia nnopoulou
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 20061,47-66.
71. Neal Smith, The of Glob.altzation l London: Roudcdge, 2005), 5 1.
72. \V.Iham ConnoJJy, Territory, and Violence,"' Theory, Cul-
ture, and Socil!ty II , no. I (1994): 19-40; Tl1e Ethos of Pluralitation tM innc-
apolls: University of Mmnesota Press, 1995); Mark 1\eocleous, the Map: O n
V'JOlence and Cartography,"' Europea11 ]ormml of Theory 6, no. 4 (20031,
409-25 ; /magining the State Open University Press, 2003h Handess,
186 NOII:S 10 I N I

73. Se.:-. for insrnnce. Jean Gonntann, The Significam:e o f Territory tCitarlor-
resville: Unl\'ersiry Press of Virginia, 19731, 5.
74. Connolly, "Tocqueville, Territory, and Violence," 24; Connoll), TIJ.f!
of Plttralhaiion, xxii l.
75. j . A. Simpson and E.. S. C. Weiner, Tlu Oxford Engl1siJ Drc!IOIWY)', 2d ed.
(Oxford: Cl.arendon Press, 19S9j, XVII: Su-Thri,.ingle)', 8 19.
76. F. Godefroy, Diciionnaire de l'mtcienne langue fnm( aisc 1!1 tor1s ses dia-
/ecJes dtt IXc--XVe s!f?de, Ten Volumes (Pam: t.mlle Bouillon., ISS 1-1901 ),
vol. X, 758; sc:e Alam Rey (ed.J, Didio1maire historiqrre de Ia langr.e frallf;aise,
Two Volumes (Paris: le Rolxn, 1992), vol. 1[., 1,108.
77. Henry John Roby, ,-\ Grammarofthl! Latm Langrrag' from Plar.hrs io Sue-
tOtliiiS, Two Volumes {London: and Co, IS72J, vol. I, 363.
7S. Godefro)', de /'(11JCII!IUII! lcmgiCfranr-aiu, vol. VII, 696; voL X,
758. The French mronings suggested are 'effra)er" (to frighten); J.U.'I: pieds"
(trample underfoot, or rread downJ aterre" (fall to rhe groundj; J.nd
nr" (to land a plane or rtUke landfall).
79. Connolly, The E.tlws of Pfuralhalron, 167.
80. Connolly, 'Tocqueville, Territor}', and 24; see Tlu
Eth os of Plurdllzation, xxu.
81. 244.
82. For Neodeous, the secret of territoriality IS thus \'iolence: rhe force
neces:s.ary for the production of styJ.ce and the terror cruciJ I to rhe creJrion of
boundaries.. the Map," 412). On the linkage berwecn the words terror"
and 'territor)," see a lso Gil Anidjar, 'Terror R1ght," CR: T1u New Ccntennilll
Revi'w 4, no. 3 (2004J, 54-55; Homi BhJbfla, Tile Location ofCIJitMc (london:
Routledge, 1994), 99-1001 G regory, Tbe Coloni11f Pusenl, 69; and Heribeno
Cauo, The Field of :\brs: Heterotopias of Territory :md War," Political Geog-
,.apby 23, no. S (2004J, 1009-1036.
83. Henri Lefebvre, TIJe Production of Spllcl!, trans. Donald Nicolson...Smith
(Oxford: Bbckwell, 1991[1974]), 280; sec also 11 2.
84. Et1enne Balibar, N ous, atoycns d'Europd Lcs frontiers, l'E.tllt, le per.ple
(Paris: Ia DCcou\erre, 100 l j, 193.
85. Henri ldeb\re, mo ndial er le planet:! ire," Espaa et sociitis 8 ( 1973 ),
15-22; Lefebne, State, Space, Worfd, 203 .
86. Lefebvre, The Pmduction of Space, 180-S I.
87. See also 1\,hlano's definition: is t he spatial sphere within which a
srare's SO\'ereignry is normall)' manifested. Often rhe term sotrercignt) IS used as a
synonym of territonal so'rere1gnty" ; see Enrico :\lilano, Unlmuful Territorial Situ-
ations in l nlema-liona{ L.1w: Rr:conolmg E{fectitlencss, Lcgaiily, attd Legitimllcy
(leiden: Martinusl\'ijhof,10061, 66--67.
88. As Connolly puts it, termoriallsccuncy state forms the spoce of demo-
craric liberation and imprisonmC'nt." Wilham E.. Connolly, 'Demcxrocy ond Ter-
moriality," Millennium: foumai of lnttrnlallonlll Studitrs 20, no. 3 ( 199 l j: 476.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 1 187

89. This is cired in Thomas Fra nck and Grorg Noire, Good Offices
Funcrion of U.N. Sc:crer.Jry-General." in Umud Nations, Dwided World: Tl1e
U.N. s Roles inlntematio11al Relations, c:d Adam Rolxrts and lknedict Kmgsbury
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 150.
90. Neil Brenner, New State Sp,lces: Urban Go!lltmauce and the Rescaling of
State/Jood (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2004), 56, 65.
91. Joi"Ln Agnew, HegemoJJ)': T1Je New Sl1ape of Glob,ll Power (Philadelphia:
Temple UnJ\ersit>' Press, 2005); Bob Jessop, Neil Bn:nner, and Mamn Jones,
orizing Sociosparial Rebtions, .. En111r-cmment and Planning D: Society tJnd Space
26, no. J (2008) 389-401.
92. The phrases in marks are from Neil Brenner (New State
Spaces, 70), tradmg on Agnew's criuquc: of the "terrironal rrap"; see john
Agnew, 'The: Territoria l Trap: The Geographic:Jl Assumptions of International
RelAtions T heory, .. Rev1ew of lniematicma! Poi1ticdl Economy I, no. I ( 1994)
5.3-80.
93. Cited m Roben Fisk, "The Dou Die Standards, Dubious Moralir)' and
Duplicit)' of rhe Faght Agamsr The l11depmdenl, J:muary 4, 2003.
94. Gregory, Tlu: Colonial Presellt, 143 .

1. Geographies of Fear, Threat, and Division

I. Richard A. Clarke. i\gairrst All Enemil's: IMide i\merica's \V.1r on Terror
(london: The Free Press, 24.
2. Henry Kissinger, "'Destroy rhc Network. The Washington Post, Scprembc:r
12,200 I, A31.
3. lbad. see Dimatri K. Sames. 'Whar \'\lar Mc:ms.ft Tl1c National lntt!'rest.
Thanksgiving Special Issue. 200 L, hrrp:l/www.nixoncenrer.org/publicarions/arti-
desffNlspclO I dks.pdf.
4. Anthony Seldon, Blair (london: Free Press, 2004), 490; John Kampfner.
Blmr's Wars (london: Fr Press, 2004), 116.
5. Ou-is Johnson and Jo lyon uslie .1t.{gltanistan: Tin! of
(london: Zed Bcoks. 2004), 10.
6. Bob Woodward. Bus1J 111 \Var (london: Books,200.H. 38.
7. Howard Fineman, "A Prc:sidcm Finds His True Voace," Newsrt!t!ek,
S.:-ptember 24, 200 L. 50. cited an Roy, Tl1e Algebra of l11finiu justice. 22 9.
8. Ron Suskand, The One Percl'nt Doctri11e: Dl't!p Irrsidl! Aml!t'ica's Pttrsuit of
Its f.nemies sinu 911 1 t::-.l'ew York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 19.
9. Rumsfeld, an Ira Chernus, Morrsters to Destroy: Tht! Neocomerr.mthl! \Var
011 Tl!rror tmd Sm (Boulder: Paradigm, 2006), 139. E.xccpr when quonng, I will

rend to usc the phrase "'war on terror" rhroughout.

10. Samuel Weber, Targets of Opportunity: On the of Thirrking
(New York: Fordltam Press, 94.
188 NO II:S l 0 CHAP I EA 1

I I. Bush apparently rc:movc:d a line from this said, "This is not an

act of rc:rrorism, rhis is an act of war"; sec: Con Coughlin, 1\meri<"tlll Aii): Torry
Blair and the War otr Terror (Nc:w York: Harpc:r Collins, 2006), 148.
11. Frum, TIN! Right Afarr: Tb11 Surpr1se Presidency of George \V. BusiJ
(Nc:w York: Random House:, 142. Roben Draper, DetJd Cut<Jin: The Prl!:li-
of George w: B11siJ (New York Free: 2007) reports rh.ar rhc:rc: was a
delxttc: in the tc-Jm about the tenor of rhis with reassur.Jncc:
largely repl:tcing militarism ( 144).
13. As Andrew Cockburn notc:s m Rrmrsfeld: His Riu, fall, <md Catastrophic
Legacy (New York: Scribnc:r, 20071, posr-Cold War ddc:nsc: pla nning h:1d war-
ag:lmst terronst anacks bur assumro they were sane-sponsored
(881.
14. Reported in Bob Woodward, B11.siJ at Wdr (London: Pocket Books, 2003),
48; sec: M. Kc:nt Bolton, U.S. fore1g11 Policy a11d lrtJemdtiotlal Politics: George \ll
B11siJ, 9111, and the Global-Terrorist Hydra (Upper S:1ddlc: River, N.j.: Pc::1rson,
2005), 139.
15. On sec: R. A. CL:1rke, Agdllt.st All Eni!mies; B. Woodward. Busl1 at
B. Woodw:1rd, Planof,.J..ttdck (london: Pocket Books, 1004); :mdj:1mc:s Mann. Rue
of VJtfcans: Tbe History of Br.sh's War Cabm11t (New York: PengLLi n, 2004).
16. j3So n Burke:, AI-Q,wda: TIJe Tmi! Story of (H:lnnondsworrh,
UK: Pc:ngum, 2004).
17. Oli\'ler Roy, Globalized l.sfmn: TIN! Search for 11 New UmmaiJ (New York:
Columbia Um\c:rsit>' Prc:ss, 2004J.
18. Bc:ntamin R. B:1rber, har'.s f.mpjre: \\'l'ar; Terrorism, 1111d Democrdcy
(Nc:w York W. \"f/. Norton, 2004), 126, sc:c: :1lso 124-25.
19. Sc:e Office: of Homdand Sc:cunry, Str:lteg)' for Homc:l:1nd Sc:cu-
nry," 2001, htrp://www.w hitehouse.go,rlhomc:landlbookln:lt_s.tmt_hls..pdf.
20. Derek Gregory, The Colonu1l Pr-ewnt, 49-50; sc:e Am} Kapl:1n,
land lnsc:cLLritlc:s: Rc:lkctio ns on L:1nguagc: :J nd Sp3cc:," Radiwl H1story Rez,iew 85
(1003j: 87.
21. Sc:c:, for c:xamplc:, The Rebordaing of North ,.J.,ml!rica: lrrtegra11on and
Exclusion 111 a Neru Security Context, c:ds. Pc:tc:r Andreas :J nd Thom:1s J.
(london: Rourlcdgc:, 2003J.
-:n . Esther Brimmer, "'From Tcrntorial Secur ity to Socic:t:J I Sc:< urity: lmplic3-
rions for the: Tmnsatl:lntic Strategic Outlook,'" in Trarrsformmg Homeland Security:
U.S. and European c:d. Esther Brimmer (Wash ington D.C.: Center for
Transad:1 nttc Rc:larions, 2006), 23.
23. Suskind, The One Percent Doctri11e, 17.
24. Congrcsswn:1l Record, .-\urhorizmr, Usc: of United States Armed Forces
agamsr Those: Responsible: for Recent Atracks [he: United Smtc:s.," September
14, 200 I, htrp:l/www.ias.org/irplthrc-Jtlusc:offorcr-. ntm.
2.5. Suskind, The One Percent Doctri11e, 17.
 NOII:S 10 CHAPIEA 1 189

26. Sec: David Cole: and J arms X. Dc:mpscy, Terrortsm dllli the CortstitrJtiorr:
Sawfit:ing Cir.'tl in the Name of Natiorraf Security, Third Edirion
(New York: The: New Press. 2006).
27. The: Centur)' Found:lrion, Defeating tiN: jiiJddists: ,-\ Blrteprim for Action
(New York: The Century Found:lrion Press, 2004), 119.
28. lndec:d, as Terry Stg.lc:ron nores in H oly Terror, fact thar the United
is o ne: of rhc: b.sr nations on eanh ro understand w hy it is currenrly under
arrack 1s closely related ro the facr that iris.. ( 104).
29. Eagleton, Holy Terror, 50.
30. Nrocleous, Crit1q11e of &curity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
20081.
31. Groro1d 6 Tuarluil, "New World Ordc:r Gc:opolincs," in The Geopoli-
tics Redder, c:d. Georoid 6 Simon Dalb)', and Poul Routledge: (london:
Rourlc:dgc:, 1997), 103. Sec: Gc:aroid 6 Tuathad, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics
of Writmg Global Space (Minneapolis: Uni\ersacy of Minnesom 19911.
32. Francis Fukuyama, 'The: End of H1sror)?" Thl! Nattolmf Interest 16
(1989), 3-18.
33. Francis Fukuyoma, Tlu Errd of Htstory arrd thf! Ldst M.zn lHarmonds-
worth, UK: Penguin, 19921.
34. Samuel P. Huntington, Clash of Ct\'lhzarions?,. Fore1g11 .-'!{fairs
71, no. 3 (1993 h TIJe ClasiJ of artd tlu! Rem<1kmg of \Ylorld Order
(Nc:w York: Simon & Schusrc:r, 1996).
35. :\mhony H. Johns ond Nell)' lahoud, '1'hc: World of Islam and the Chal-
lenge: of lslamism," in lsl,lln m Wlorld Politics, cd. Anrhon)' H. Johns and
Lahoud (london: Routledge. 1005), S.
36. Bernard lc:wis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage:," ttll.zntic MorrtiJly 266, no. 3
( 1990): 47-60.
37. Sec:, for msrancc:, lkm:Jrd lc:w1s, WJmt \\'rent \'flrong? Impact arrd
hfiddle Eastern Response (Oxford: Oxford Um,c:rsit)' Press, 2002) .
38. AI-Zayyat, Tlu Road to ltf-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Lod!!IJ's
Right-Hand .M.zn, uans. Ahmed Fc:kr)' (london: Pluro, 2004), 115-16.
39. Fukuyama has recent!)' artemptc:d ro d1srancc: himself from rhc: consc:-
quc:nces of his ideas and imolvc:mcn.t wirh the: PN,-\C. Sc:c: After tin! Nco-Carts:
\flherc tfre Rigl1t We11t Wrong ilondon.: Profile: Books, 1006) . For a discussion, sec
Sidney Blumc:nrhal, How BttsfJ Rules: Chronicles of a Regime lPnncc:mn,
N.J.: Princeton Uni\c:nity Prc:ss, 2006), 372.-74. PNAC genc:mll} rcm:Jins stead-
fast. Sec: m paniculor its 1005 rc:porr o n Iraq, " Iraq: Setting the: Record Straight,"
http://www.nc:wamcncancentury.org/iraq-042005.pdf. l n Bnuin, the Hc:nry
Jackson Socu:ty l1as bc:c:n foundc:d to tr)' to shape: the: nc:xt gen.c:ration of dc:bare. Fo r
a cnriquc:, sc:c Klaus Dodds and Sru:Jrt Elden, Ahc:ad: Da\id Cameron,
rhc: Hc:nry Jackson Socic:cy and the: British Neoconservatt\'C:s," British }otmwl of
Polttics artd lrttematiortal Relations 10, no. 3 (2008): 347-.63 .
190 NO II:S 10 C HAP I EA 1

40. Luiza Dear:h of the: \'Cic:st: Samuc:l Humington, Oriana

Fallaci, and a Nc:w 'Moral' Gc:opolitics. of Births and Bodtes," Geopolitics II, no. 4
(1006): 701- 24.
41. Arjun Appadurai, of Small t\IJ f.ssa)' 0 11 the Goograplry o f
(Durlum, N.C.: Duke: Press, 2006), 116.
42. SeeS. Weber, Targds of Opportunit)', 95-96.
43. Zbignicw Brzczmsla, with Brzrzins,ki,.. Le Nomlt'l
Observateur, Januar)' 15-21 l1998): 76; sec: Roben M. G:.nes, From Shadows:
Tl1e Ultimate IIJsider's Story of Fitre Presidems and How tluy Wo11 the Cold Wfar
(Ncw Yorik: Simon and Schuster, 19961, 143-49.
44. Zbignicw Brzcz.inski, The Grand AmaicaiJ Pmrwcy and its
(New York: Baste Books, 1997), 53.
45. Ibid., 85.
46. Brzez.inski, w1th Zbtgniew Brzczmslct."
4 7. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarch y," The .it/antic Momhlj 273,
no. 2 (1994): 44-76; Tlte Commg i\nardJy: Sl1attet'i11g tht Dreams of Post
Cold \Var (New York: Vi mage=, 200 I J.
48. For a r.Higc of ana lyses, sc:e Paolo Palladmo, "On FiJm, the Pohrical Ani-
mal, and the= Rerum of j ust War." Theory & Et,elll 8, no. 2 (2005)> Debbie Lisle:
and Andrew Pepper, Xew Face of Global 1-!oll)wood: Black 1-l11wk Down
and r:he Politics of Mcta-Soverelgrlt)'," Cttftural Politics I. no. 1 (1005): 165-92;
Geamid 0 Tuatlud, of Gc:opolincs and r:he Pleasures of W.u:
Behind Enemy Lines and Amc=rican Gcopolincal Ge-opolitics 10, no. 2
(10051: 356-77; and C. Weber. lmagmmg America at \Var: Mordllt)'. .\.fore gener-
ally, scc= Franc;o1s Dcbrix, Tabloid Terror: War, Cui/lire, 1md Goopol1tics (london:
Routledge, 2008 1.
49. Kaplan, 'The Coming ,'\narcby," 70.
50. Ibid., 70-71.
51. Simon Dalb)', 'The Envtronment a.s Geopolitical T hreat: Reading Robert
Kaplans 'Coming :\narchy,'., Ecumc-ne 3, no. 4 ( 1996): 472-96, Simon Dalby,
E1wironmentai Security (.\finneapohs: Uni\ermy of 1\hnncsota Press, 10021.
51. Robert D. Kaplan, Ba/ka11 Ghosts: A]ollrnC')' tl1ro1tgiJ History York:
Sr. l\(artins Press, 1993); The Ends of the Eart/J: A journey at the Dawn o f the
11 st Century (New York: Ra ndom House, 1996); Eastward tc Tartar): Travels
111 BalkatJs, Tile Middle East, tmd the- Caucasus lXew York: Random House,
2000).
53. Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: Americ<1n Mjlitary on the Ground
(New York: Random House, 100.5).
54. Steven Mufson, "The Way Bush Sees. the World,'" The WashitJg)on Post,
February 17,1002.
55. Robert D. Kaplan, 'The Coming Normalcy? " The i\tlm1tic 297,
no. 3 (1006): 81.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 1 191

56. Wilham Kr1s.tol, '' Postscript-June= 2004: Nc=ocoflRn'atism Rcm:Jins

me Bedrock of U.S. Foreign Policy," in Tlu! Neoc011 Reader. c=d. Jrwin .Srdzer
(New York: Grove Press, 75; Roger Burbach and Jim Tarbc:ll, Imperia{
Orustl't:'tt:IJ: George \V. Br.sb aiJd tiJe 1-lr.bris of Emp1r-e (London: Zed Books,
20041,86.
57. Irving Krisrol, Neo-umsenatism: Tin! ll.utobiogMpl1y of atJ Idea: Selected
Essays 1949-1995 t.l\'ew Yofi:: Tne Free Press, 1995 ); l\hrk Gerson, The Neocon-
servatirlt:' Vision: From the CQ/d ro rite Crtltttr-e \\'r.:1rs (lanham, .Md.: Madison
Books, 1996); Nonn:Jn Podhorc:12, The Nonnan Podhort:lz Reader (1'-:c:w York:
Frc:c: Press, 2004).
58. David H.-uvc:y, .-\ Brief HIStory of Noolrber<llism (Oxford: Oxford Univc:r-
siry Press, 2005), 82.
59. :\ndrc:w Gambk, TIJe Free E.coiJomy 1md the Strong State (london:
.\f:Jcm1llan, 1988J.
60. David Brooks, "The: Neocon Cab:Jl and Other Fanmsics; in The Nrocon
Reader, ed. Irwin Stelzer (New York: Grove: 20041, 42.
61. Sec .\4jchacl C. Withams, h rhe The l':roconser-
Chalkngc: m IR Theor)'," EurofN'atr j ournal of llllerll<lttonal Rddtions 1l,
no. 3 (2005): 307-37. .Ste\'en Hum, of Neoconservatism: Grorgc \V. Bush's
'Nc:o-Consc:rvarivc:' Foreign Poliq Rc,ris ited." llllemattonal Politics 42. no. l
(2005), suggests, largcl) unsuccessfull y, mar neoconservatism h;ts had hnk impact
on Bush's foreign policy; he suggests dur it Ls conservative nationalism instead.
62. Raben Kagan and William Krisrol, a Neo-Rcagamre Foreign
Policy," Foreign ,.Vfo1irs 75, no . 4 (1996): 18-32.
63. jol1n Quincy Adams, "On U.S. Foreign Policy," july 4, 1821, http://www.
fff.org/commcntlAdamsPol icy.asp.
64. Kagan and Kristol, a 1\ro-Re:Jganitc Foreig:n Policy."
65. Roben Kagan and William Kl'"istol, National Intc:resr and
Global Responsibility," m Present Dangers: Crisis and Opporlrmity m American
foreigtJ and Defense Policy, cd. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (Sa n Franmco:
Encounter Books, 2000) .
66. Kagan and Kristol, "'Towa rds a Neo-Reag.:Jnite Foreign Policy. n For Repub-
lican cnriques, sc:c: Kim R. Holmes and j ohn Hillen, ''M[sreadmg Reagan's lcg.:Jcy:
:\ Tnuy Consc:rvati\e Fore1gn Policy," Foreig11 Affairs 75, no. 5 ( 1996): 162-67;
and Robc:rt B. Zoellick, :\ Republican Foreign Poliq, .. Fomg11 .J;.ffairs 79, no. I
(2000): 63-78.
67. Paul \Volfownz, "Ex.-cerprs from 1992 Draft Defense Planning Guid:wce,"
1992, http:f/www.pbs.org/wgbh/JY.Iges.lfrondine/sho,vs/iraqlctc/wolf.html.
68. O n th1s, see .\4ann. Rise of the Vu{cans, 198-99, 2 12-13; and Chern us,
Monsters to Destroy, 48.
69. Zalmay Khalilz.ad, From CotJt<lilllnenJ to Gfobdl Leadership: .-'lmcrica and
the World After the Cold War (.Santa :\1onica: RAND, 1995 ).
192 NOII:S 10 CHAP IEA 1

70. Dick Chene)', Smnq;y for rhe 1990s: The Reg1onal Str:n-
t:g)',"1993, http:/lwww. inform:mondeannghouse.inJoJpdf/naarpr_Defensc.pdf.
7 1. P:-.l"AC, of 1997, hrrP":Jiwww.newamerK:Jncmrury.
org/suremenro(prtnciples.lum.
7l. P:-.l"AC, 'Rebuilding AmerK:J's Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for
a New unrury, .. 2000, http:J/www.newameric:J ncentur)'.org/RebUJlding Americas-
Dc:fenses.pdf; S also a nd KnstoJ, "lmroducrion."
73. l"eil Smith, American &npire: Roosetid t's GrogrdpiJer llnd thi! Prelude to
Globalization (Berkeley: University o f Cahforni a Press, 2003), 18-20.
74. David H anrey, Tilt' New imputalism, 19 1.
75. Henry R. luce, America n Centu ry," Diplollflllic History lJ, no. 2
(1999[ l 94IJJ: 168.
76. PN.o\C, 'Rebuildmg America's Defenses, .. i\, 5.
'17. Ibid., 2.
78. Ibid., 2-3.
79. Ibid., 14.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., 15, 74.
82. See Ron.J.Id Steel, Temptdtiotls of <1 Supapower: l lmertca's foreign Poftcy
after the Cold W'ar (Cambndge, ,\bss.: Hanard Um\'ersity Press, 1995); D:.micl
lkntamin and Steven Simon, Tl1f! Agf! of S!lcred Terror: Radical Islam's \Vdr agaimt
America (?\ew York: Random House, 2003 ); Doug Stokes, Ame1'ica's O ther War:
Terrommg Colombia (l ondon: Zed Books, 2005).
83. lrwm Stelzer, a nd their Crirics: An lntroducnon," m
Tl1e Nrocon Reader, ed. Jrwm StelZcer !New York: Gro\'e Press, 2004), 25.
84. Willi:Jm Connolly, 'Tbe vangdicai..Capitalist Resonance Machine,"
Political TIJcol'y .B, no. 6 (20051; see Luiza Bialasiew icz, 0:.1vid Campbell, Stuart
Elden, Ste\'e Graham, Alex jeffrey, a nd Alison Williams, Securiry: The
lm:Jgmati\e Geographies of Current U.S. Str:.Jtegy," Politic4ll Geogruph)' 16, no. 4
(20071: 405-22.
85. P:-.1:\C, " Rebuild1qg America's 51. O n a new Pearl Harbor, see
also Ashton B. Caner, Jolln Deutch, and Phihp D. Zdikow, Gtastrophic Terror-
Ism: Elements of a l\'arional Poliq" (Cambridge, Mass.: Visions ot Go\ern:Jnce for
t he Twenty-First Centurr, 1998 ), http://"MYW.ksg.harva.rd.edu/,risions/J>ublicationf
terrorism.hlrn, talks of act of catastrophic terronsm" that, Pearl
H arbor ... would divide our past and future into a 'before' and 'afrer'"; and more
tendenriously Brzezins ki, The Grand Chessboard, 2 11.
86. PNAC, 'Letter to President Clinton,'" January 26, 1998, htrp:l/www.
newamc:ricancemury.org/iraqclimonlettcr.htm.
87. P:-.1:\C, Letter to rhe President,.., Till! \VeekJy Standard, September 20,
200 I, http://www.newarnertcancentury.of1'Bushletter.htm.
88. Ibid.
 NOII:S 10 CHAPIEA 1 193

89. lb1d.; see also Chernus, Mo11sters tc Dfitroy, 119.

90. Reported in CBS N r:w:s, "Plans for Iraq Atmck lkg;J n on 9/ II," Sept;ember 4,
2002., hnp://www.cbsnews.com/srones/2002/09/04/seprem ber I l/main520830 .shrml.
91. Chernus, Monsters to Destr<ry, 202.
92. The Cenrury Found:mon, Defe<lliiJg the jihadists, 18.
93. l b1d., 63.
94. Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire: Tiu Breakdown of tiJe
Order, rrans. C. Jon Dc:logu (london: Constable, 2003), 23.
95. ]otnt C hiefs of Staff, 'The Notional Military Srraregy of The Unned States
of America: :\ Srrarc:gy for Toda)'; A Vision for Tomorrow," 2004, hnp:l/www.
globalsecurit).org/military/library/pohq/dodld200503 L8nms. pdf, 11 .
96. See H ikoru Yamashn:a, Hrttmmitl1"riml Space 11"!Jd lntemiltional Poliiics:
The of Sil(l! .-\reils (:\ldershot: Ashgace, 201}4); Carol McQueen, HttmAJII-
itilrian lllt1!1'1'1!"Jitlon a11d Saf!.!ty Zoues: Iraq, Bosma, 1111d Rrvrmda (Basing.s,toke:
t\lacmlllan, 2005); Stuart EJden, "Spaces of HumJ.niroriJ.n E..xcepnon,"
Geografiskn ,-\nnlllcr B: Hwnm1 Geography 88, no. 4 (2006): 4 77-85.
97. George \V. Bush, speech of No\embc:r 11 , 2005.
98. Tony Hlotr. speech of j uly 1 S, 2003.
99. Richard N. H;tass, ''"The Bush Ad ministration's Response to Seprc:mbc:r
I l-and Ekyond: Remarks to me Counc1l of Fo.reign Relatio ns," October 15,2001,
http://www.state.r;ov/slpJrem/5505.htm; The Opporttmit): America's Moment to
.-\Ite-r History's Cosme- tl\' ew York: Public 58-59.
100. The Cc:ntur)' Foundation, De{erJtirrgthe)IIJddtsts,21; see Rohan Gunoramo,
.41-Qaeda, 121.
10 I. Benjamin and Simon, Tlu! Age of Sacred 453 .
102. Mo lisc: Ruthven, A Fury for God: Tbe lslamist Attack 011 Amaica, re\'. ed.
(london: Granta, 2004), 25.
103. Wilham Shawcross, ,-\1/il.!s: T1Je United States, Bntain, Europe and tiJI! IX1ar
in fmq (london: Atlantic Books, 2()()4), 2 13.
104. OJomsky and Achcar, Pai/ous Power, 75.
105. Cooley, Unholy \'l:lars.
106. See Office of Homeland Security, "'Nahonal Strategy for Homeland Security;"
The White House, "lbc :-.lotional Sccur it)' Strategy of the United States of America,"
1002, htrp:l/www.whttehouse.go\/nsdnss.html; T he W hite House, 'National Srrat-
egy to Combat Weapons of Mass Dc:stru([ion,'" 2002, http://ww.11.whitehouse.gov/
news/rdeascs/2002112/WMDStmtc-gy.pdf; The W hite.- House, "Narional Strategy for
Combating Terrorism," 2003, http:llwww.whltehousc.go\/news/rc:leasc:s!lOOJ/021
countcr_rerrorismkountc:<r_terrorism_str:uegy.pdf; The W hire House, "The Nattonal
Sc-currty Strategy of the United States of America,'" 1006, http:J/www.whitc:house.
go\/nsc/nss/2006/nss1006.pdf; Joint C hiefs of Staff, N:1tiona l Militlr)' Srrat-
egy of 1bc United Srotes of Americ:1"; Officc of the Nation3l Countcrinrdligcnce
Executi\'e, Narional Countertntdbgencc: Strategy of The United Sr.1tes of
194 NO II:S l 0 C HAP I EA 1

2005, hrrp://www.nci.x.gmrfpublicarionslpolicy/CJStrarer;)'.pdf; Deparr-

mmr ol :-.l'arional Smnq;y of The United of
2005, hnp://www.globalsC'Cllmy.o.rg/mlli.raryllibrary/policy/dod/d2005031 Snds I .
pdf; Department of Ddense, "Srrat.:-g)' for Homd::md Defms.:- and Ci\'il Supporr,"
2005, hnp:J/www.ddensdink.mil/news/j un2005/d20050630hornelancl.pdf. There
as 3 lm:ramre on these. L3wrence j. Korb, A NeuJ Natiomzl Secs.rity
Strategy in atJ ,-\ge of Terrorists, Tyr<1rrts, .md Weapons of Mass Deslrm:tion: Tbree
Options Prese11ted as Prt!sidenlial StHeches (New York: Council on Foreign Rei:J-
rions, 2003}, ourlmes passable oJremati.,e tr3,ccrories.
107. George W. Bush, ro 'Tht Narional Sccurit)' Strategy of me
United Sures of America," 2002, hnp:/lwww.whirdtouse.gov/nsdnss.fmnl, 1.

I OS. See From Containment to Global Leadership, 22.

I 09. ii.
11 0. Tht White 'The N3rionol Security Str:.ner;y of rhe United Stares of
America," 5.
I I I. The White House, '"The Nario n31 Securi ty Strategy," JO.
Il l. Department of Defense, '"Srr3t.:-gy for Homeland Defense 3nd Ci,iJ Sup-
40.
I 13. Robert Cooper, 11Je Breaking of Nations: Order .md Chaos in the
Ftrst Ccms.ry (London: Arlanric Books, 20041, LW-11.
11 4. See Luiz.o Bi.alasiewicz and Claudio "Old Europe, New Europe,
and the Weak Geographies of Translanon,.. .-lrea 37, no. 4 {2005): 367-72.
115. Robert Kagan, 3nd .. Raicw 1 J3 {2002):
l-19; Roberr Kagan, Paradise and Power: i\mertca 1111d E11ropc mtiJe New Wforfd
OrdL'"r tl..ondon, Arlo nne Books, 2003).
11 6. Kagan, and \Veak ness., .. l.
11 7. Kagan, PuradiSI! and Power, 74.
11 8. Thts anaJysis of Kagan as d.:-vdopecl ;u much gre:Jter k ngth m lutza
Bi.alasicwtcz. and Stuart Elden, 1\'cw Gcopoli(ics of Di\tsion ancl the Problem
of 3 Kantian Europe," Rev1erv of lntemal10nal St11dies 32, no. 44 (2006}: 62J-..44,
and Btabsiewicz er aL, Sccuriry." For essays on his ide:Js, see Tocl
Lindberg, eel., Beyo11d Paradise mzd Power: E11rope, ,-\mt!rica, and the F11ture of d
Troubled Partnership (New York: Rourlcdge, 2005), ancl for a thorough reading,
s.:-e Etaennc Bali bar, L'E11rope, {a grtl!rre: Rr!(lections s11r Ia mediation
r:uropCa1111e (Pam: Editions Ja Dou\erte, 10031.
11 9. Thomas L Fnooman, "Globaliz.anon .-\b\e ancl Well,., The New York Times,
September n , 2002, cired in J\.furrhcw Sparke, '"Amencan Empire a nd Globaliz.:t-
rion: Postcolomal Speculations on Neocolomal Enframi ng," Singapore }o11mal of
Troptcal Geography 24, no. 3 (2003}: 379.
J 20. The 9/11 Commis.sion, Final Report of the Nat10n,d Commission on
Terrorist UpontJJe UtJited States CXcw York: \Y/.W. Xorron, 2004), 340.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 1 195

121. Thomas L Friedman, Tin! L.exus and thi! Olhe Tree: Undl!rstanding
Globalization (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).
122. Sec:Spar.ke, Empire: and Gloooliz.arion."
123. O n the olive rree as a symbol of Palestinia n idenrit)', sc:e Hdena Lindholm
Schulz., wtth juJianc: Hamrnt:r, TIJe Pdlestirrian Diaspor<1: formation of fdemitil!s
and Politics of Homi!land (London: RourJc:dge, 2003), 15-16, IOl-7.
124. Thomas L Fric:dman, Tlu Worfd Is Flat (New York: Allen La ne:, 2005).
125. Thomas P.. .\(. B.:trnert, Pc:magon's New M.1p,"
1003, lmp://www.rhomas.pmbarnen.comlpublishc:dfpc:ntagons.newmap. htm; TIJe
Pentagon's New Map: Wdr .md Peace itJ the Tii'e!Jiy-First (Nt:'lv York:
G. P. Pumam's Sons, 20041.
126. Ibad., 8.
127. l btd., 7.
128. l btd.
129. l btd., 25 .
130. l btd., 34.
131. I bad., 45-46.
132. l btd., 56.
133. l btd., 154.
134. l btd., 173; ]78-79.
135. l btd., 174.
136. l btd., 30 l.
137. l btd., 204.
138. l btd., 257, 299 .
139. l btd., 249-50.
140. Tho mas P. M. Bamc:rr, Blueprint for Act10n: .-1. Future \Vorth Creating
(New York: G. P. Putnam's and Sons, 1005 ).
141. On Barnett, see Roberts, and Sparke, "'Nc:oliberal Gc:opolirics," 886-97;
t\(ark .\torunonier, 'Carrog.raphy: Disrornons, World-Views and Creari\e Soluuons,"
Progress trr Hsmlmf GrograpiJy 29, no. 2 [2005); Sp.uke, In tin! Spau of Tl!rory;
Simon Dalby, Pentagon's New lmperiaJ Carrography: Tabloid Realism and me
\'liar on Terror," in Violent Geographies: Fear, Tl!ffOr and Violenc-e, ed. Derc:k
Gregor)' and Allan Pred [:-.lew York: Routledge, 2006), 29 5-JOS . Once ugain the anaJ-
yiis is more cxtenm-c in BiaJastewicz and Elden, Ncw Geopolitics of Divaiion and
the Problem of a Kantian Europe". and Bia.Jasit:'lvicz ct aL, Performmg Sc:currt)'."
142. Spc:cch of November 2 1, 200 1.
143. Woodward, Buslt til W<1r, 30.
144. Bolton, U.S. Forc;gn Policy and lrrJematiorral Politics, I JJ.
145. t\t ichad Brers., "'Terrorism, rhc Use of Force and lnrcrna(ional Law after
II Seprember," lntffnational .md Com}Jilralwe Law Quarterly 51, no. 2 (20021:
401- l4.
196 NO II:S l 0 CHAP I EA 1

146. See Jackson :-.l"yamU)'a t\!:Jogoto, 'J\'ew Fronners, Old Problems: The War
on Terror and the :-.lotion of An.ric1paring Enemy," Netberland5 lntematiorml
Law Re111erv U, no. I (2004): 3 1-32; John K. Coole)', An l tllimlce Again:st
Bab)ltm: Tbe U.S., Israel, and (london: Pluto, 2005), 159-4)2.
147. Quoted in B)ers, me US(! of Force and lnrermmonal law after
11 September." 406.
148. William J_ Clinron, 'Prc:s.idcm Bill Clinron Spe-aks to the Naval Academ)'
at Annapolis," 21, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/AI.LPOUTICS/1998/05fl21
clinton. academy/transcript .hrm I.
149. John Ashcroft, about J\w.a in Sc:anle," Ocrober 12,
200 I , hrrp://www.usdot.gov/nrch ive/ag{spehcs/200 1/agcnSISremark> I 0 _ll.htm.
150. George W. Bush, speh oi 20, 200 L
151. The 9111 Commission, F11ml Report of lht National Commtssion 011 Ter-
roml Attacks Upon 1iJe Uniied States, 362.
151. Paul Wolfowitz. Amwca Under Artack," Sc:prcmber 13, 100 I, http://
transcriprs.cnn.comffRA:-.l"SCRIPTSfO I 09/1 J/S(!.60.h rrnL
153. George W. Bush speech oi J, 1001.
154. J\ppadura1, Fe<1r of .Small Numbers, :!0.
155. David Domke, God \Vdling? Political frmdameni.zltsm in thl! \VInte House,
tbe '\Var otr Terror,' <1nd the Echoing Press (London: Pluto, 20041, 30.
156. Ibid., 25; see also jennifer Hynd man, Beyond Either/Or: A Femini5t Ana l-
ysis of Sc:plember ll ,fl ACME: A.n lntematiDnal E-}otmwl for Critiml Geogra-
pbil!s 2, no. I (2003): 1-13.
157. Rudolph Giuhani, 'Speech ro the Umred Nario ns," October II , 1001,
hnp:J/www. us.amemoria l.orglsept 1 1044. h tm.
158. Sec Osama bin ladc:n, .11,1es.mgcs to till! World, tlte S!-atemmts of Osamll
bm Laden, trans. james Howa rth lLondon: Verso, 20051, 105.
159. J\ndrc:w Norris, a nd 'Thc:m': The Pohrics of Amencan Sdf-As.scrrion
after 9/11," Metapbilosophy 35, no. 3 (20041: 249-72.
160. Sec Stcpbc:n H. jones and Dnv1d B. Cia rke, Terror: The Geopoli-
rics of the: Real," Political 25, no. 3 (1006): 298-314 .
161. Michac:J Byers., War Law: fntern<itiorral Law and Armed Conflict (London:
AtlantiC Books, 2005), 147-48.
161 . johnson and Leslie, ltfglmrristan, 101 .
163. Chalmers Johnson, Sorrows of mpire: i\"iilitamm, and the
End of tbe Republic (New York: Books, 2004), 287.
164. Domke, God Willing?, I 78 .
165. Damcl lknjamin and Ste,ren Simon, The Next i\ltack: the failure of tlte War
orr Terror and a StrJit!K)' for Getting It RigiJt INc:w Yorl.:: T imc:s. Books, 2005), 278.
J 6-6. George W. Bush, speech of II, 100 I.
J 67. Commumon may be a more 1mpormnt, 1f understated, term in the Bush
pracricc man t he idea of comp:tss1on. On rhe notion of comp:tss1on in Bush,
Chcrnus, Monsters to Destroy, 127-JO.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 1 197

168. Thc:S(: ideas arc: uplorc:d in a more: throrc:ucal wa)' in chaprc:r 1 of Smarr
EJdc:n, Spealzi11g Nrmrber: Heidq:ger; Languag.., and the Politics of Calcu-
lation (Edinburgh, Edinburgh 20061.
169. Wilham E.. Connol ly, flilos of Pluralitation, xx; Walliam E.. Connolly,
IdetJiity\Difference: Democratic Negotiatiom of Politlcaf Parddox, expanded c:di-
rion (l\linneapolis: University of 1\'linnc:s.ota Prc:ss, 2002j, 64.
170. O n Bus.h and the: fric:ndlenc:m)' dasrinction, with an attempt to distance
him from Schmitt-without profound!)' challengmg the basiC ideo-see Chantal
,\,fouffc:, On iiJt! Political [London: Routledge, 2005), 77-78.
171. This draws on claams made: in Elden, Spedking Agamst Number, chapter 1.
172. Drucilla Corndl, Dt!fendin:g Idt!als: \V<1r; a11d PoJit1caf Stmg-
gb (New York: Routledge, 2004), 5-6. This is when an answer is. u:pe<ted at all.
See Gregory, Tbe Colo11ial Prt!St'llf, 21.
173. Nichobs. Lenunn, Nc:xt World Ordea:,,. .'\prill, 2002, htrp:l(www.nc:wy-
orl::er..cornlf.lctlcomenri?020401fu_F.'\Cf1; s.cc Ridurd N. 'Ddlning U.S. For-
ogn Pobcy in a Post-Post-Cold War World: The 2002 Arthur Ross lecture, Remarks to
Foreign Poliq Association,,. April 21, 2002, http:llwww.st.ate.go\'ls/plrc:ml9632.htnL
174. Richard N. Haass, 'Mul nlaterahsm for a Global Era,.. No\'ember l4,
200 I, hnp:(/www.srate.gov/s.lplrc:m/6 1.34. htm.
175. Richard K Haass, The RdrJctant T1Je United States A{lt!r till! Cold
\Var (New York Council for Foreign Relacions Press, J997J, 51-53.
176. The Wl1itc House:, Xarional Securit)' Straregy of Engagement and
Enlargement." 1995, hnp://www.dtic.miVdoctrineljeVrc:sc:arch_pu bs/nss.pd f;
:\nthony l.ake, "From Conr.ainmem to Enlargement." September 2 1, 1993, hnp:l/
www.mtholyoke.edu/acadlinrrdllakedoc.html; for Haas.s's earlier critique, S(:e Tl1e
RefttclatJI Sheriff: Tin! Umted States /t{ter tiJt! CoJd 61-614 and S(:e William
V. Spanos, Shadou': ,-\n Anatomy of Empire jMinneapohs, Uni,ersity of
Pres.s, 2000). On the change, set" Haass, U.S. Foreign Policy
in a Post-Post-Cold Wa r World. "
177. See Judith Buder, Life: T1Je Powers of Mourning and VioJem:e
(London: Verso, 2004), 2.
178. :\ppadurni, fear of Smafl Numbers,10.
179. Frum, The R1ght Mnn, 238.
180. See Bruce Cummgs, Ervand Abrn hami.an, and Moshl" Ma'oz., lm.--enting tl1e
..-\xis of E.vil: The Trutll i\boul North Korea, lra11, and S)ri11 (New York: The
Press., 20041, \'li; Frum, The Right Man.
181. Sec, for example, RobertS. Litwa k, Rogue Stdtes; a nd Ra}mond Tanter,
Roge Rq;imes: Terrorism and Pro!ifemtiou (Nc:w York: St. :\oiarrin's Press, l9991,
wht"rc: they are toim:d by Libya and Syria; or, from t he neocons.crvarives. t hemselves.,
see Robert Kagan and William IKristol, cds., Present Dangers: Crists and Oppor-
tumty m Aml!rican foreig11 .md Defense PoJicy (San Fr:1 ncasco, Encounter Books.,
20001, where they are tomcd by Russaa a nd Chin:J as moLLntmg threat"; and
PNAC, Rebuilding America's DdenS(:s," 4.
198 NOII:S lO CHAP IEA 1

18:?.. Citc:d in Ron Suskind. 11Je Pricl! of Grorge \V. BttsJJ, the White
House, and Education of Paul O'NeiJJ (Nc:w York: Simon & Schuster. 20041,77.
183. Pc:tc:r Galbraith, Tfn? nd of How America11 /ncompdi!IJc:e CreaJed 11
War \Vithout End (London: Simon and .Sdu1ster, 2.006), 7 1 n.
184. Ibid., 6.
185. Ibid., 6. On Slu'atc: polit1cs generally, s Juan Cole, SpiJce and Holy
War: Tin? Politics, Culture, <md History of Shi'ite !slam (London: I. B. Tauns,
2002).
186. William J. Clinron, of rhe Umon Address," Januar)' 28, 1998, http://
quc:r)'.n)'ttmcs.com/gsr/fullpagc:.html?n:s.=9D03 E2D61 F3BF9 3BA 15752COA96E9
58260&s=&spon=&pagewamcod=6.
187. Michad Fim Failed Empire: of the Twe-nty-First Century,"
Revie-w of Inte-rnational Studies 30. no. 4 (2004): 634; Dominic McGoldrick,
From "'9- 11 " UJ the Iraq WtJr 2003: llltemallo.n<ll l.mv in an Age of Complexity
(Oxford: Hart, 201)4), 169; Stephen Gn:)', Ghost Plane: Tlu Tme Stor}' ofthe CfA
Torture Program (New York: St Marri n's Press, 2006), 5.
188. Speech of January 29, 2002.
189. Chc:rnus, Monsters to Dcst,.oy, 151; see Frum, Tbe R1ght Mm1, 239-40.
190. Chc:rnus, Monsters to Dcst,.oy, 151.
191. John Bolton, the: Ax1s oi Evil : Additional Threats from Weapons
of t\bss Destruction.,"' May 6, 2002., http://www.statc:.gov/tlus/rm/9962..htm.
191. Paul Rogers, A \tlar on Teffor: lt{ghmustan mtd after (London: Pluto,
201)4), 142-43.
193. BBC News, "U.S. Expands ' Axis of Eval,'" Mn)' 6, 2.001. lmp:llnc:ws.bbc.
co. u kflllufamencas/ 1971 S5l .stm.
194. The W'ashington Post, "'Annan Wa rn.s of U.S., S) ria Fl.ashpomt," Aprd
16, 2003, hup://www.smh.com.au/:1 rricles/1003/04115/1 050172600074.html.
Sc:e Rogers, :\ War on Terror, 55, Ra)' Kidy, Empire in tiJe Age of Globafisa/1011:
U.S. and Neol1beral Disorder (london: Pluro,2005), 68; Warren t
Cohen., ,.l,menca's Fallmg Empire: U.S. Fore1g11 Reli1tions since the Cold War
(Oxford: Blackwell., 2005 ), 136-37. In the wake of the 2003 mvasron of Iraq,
Cumings et al., ed ., the Axis of Evil, co-opt Syria as a replacement
member.
195. George W. Bush, speech of October 7, 200 I.
196. Todd, i l.{tl:"r tbc Empire-, J.
197. George W. Bush, speech of j ul) 9, 2005.
198. B.arnetr., "The Pem.agon's New 304.
199. Thus, rhis departs from rhe view of Bob \'(loodward d1.1.t the United States
cmbarl.::ro on "the road to war .. . wrthout much of a map" (Bush at 33). Thrs rs
rtsclf a mod1fiC.1tton of the c.Jrlier claim by Dan Balz and Bob Woodward,
Chaotic Road to War, " January 27,2002, hrtp:l/www.washingmnpost.com/wp-dynf
articles/A42754-2001Jan26.htm l, rhat it was "wirhout a map" entirdy.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 2 199

.2. Territorial Strategies of l s.lam ism

l. a i-Zayyar, Tbe Road to 111-Qacd<i: The Story of Bm Ladtm's

Right-Hand Afan, tr:ms. Al1med Fekry (l ondon: Pluto, 2004), 98. On al-Zawahiri,
SC<: a lso Youssef H. Aboui-Enein, al-Zawahui: The Ideologue of 1\lockrn
Isla mic Mdirancy," USAF Counterpro liFeration Paper, no 2 1 (20041. More gencr-
all)', sC<: Bryn jar l aa, Architect of G lobal jihad: TIJc Life of al-Qaida SJratcgtst ,-\ bu
Afns'<1b al-Stm (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
2. Sageman, Understanding Tt>rror Nt'tworiu (Phaladclphia: Uni versity
of Pt'nnsyhania Press, 2004), 47; Faw;u A. Gerges, The far E11cmy: Why jihad
\Vent Global (Ca mbridge: Cambridge Uni11ers1ry PrC'Ss, 2005).
3. ai-Zay)'at, TIJc Road to M Qded,z.
4. O li viC'r Roy, Glob.iliz,t'd JsJam: TIJ' Search ford Nc>w Ummah (New York:
Columbia Un i,erslry Press, 20()4), 55, 340.
5. Erienne Ba li b:tr, E11ropc Co11Stit11tion Prontiere (Begles: tdilions du Passam,
20051, l JO.
6. Daanish Musrnfa, 'The Terrible Gcograpb1calness o f Terrorism: Reflec-
tions of a Hazards Geographer," A11tipode 37, no. 1 (20051: 82.
7. Anousharavan Ehteshami, as 3 Pohrical Force in lmunariona l Poli-
tics," in in World Politics, ed. Amho ny H .Johns and Nelly lahoud (london:
Routledge, 2005), 44.
8. For an ana lysis, see the essays in J\tiiC'S Kahler and Barbara F. Walrer, eds.,
Territoriality and Conflict in atl Era of Globali;:ation l Cambndge: Gtmbridge
Universiry Press, 2006).
9. T he 9/ll Commission, Final Report of the Nationdl Commission on
rorist llltacks Upotr tiJe Uniud States, 376- 77.
10. Osama bin Lackn, "In H 1s Own Words: Sraremenrs b)' Os:1ma b an lade-n,"
in AI Qaeda Now: Understmuli11g Today'.s Terrorists, ed. K:1 ren J Greenlxrg
(Cambndgc-: Cambridge Univt'rsiry Press, 20051, 163.
11. f\ t ichad Schruer, TltrarJgiJ Our Enemi's' E)t's: Osama bin Ladm, Radical
ls/mn, and the Fttture of ;\merica, Re,riscd E.dinon (Washingt on, D.C._. PQ[orn.lc
Books, 2006), IH-25.
12. f\ t ichad Sd1c-ut'r, Imperial Wl1y tlu \\i'esl Is Losing the War on
Te"or (Washington, D.C.: Poromnc Books, 2005 ), 24()..4 L
13. lb1d., 24 1.
14. 5C<: William Blum, Rogut Stati'!: A Guide to the Worlds O nly Supt>rporuer
(Monroe, l\1ame: Common Courage, 2005), 35-36, William Blum, A Concise
Hismry of U.S. Global lnrcn enlions 194 5 ro the Presmr," m Der,zstatr11:g Sodcty:
The Nro-Consen'tilil.!t! A.s.S<zult on Democracy and}us/ice, cd. Bernd Hamm
Pluro, 2005).
15. George \V. Bus h, spe-ech of Augusr 24, 2005 .
16. Amalendu .\lis.ra, i\{giJanist.m: Labyrinth o{VioiC'Il<'l! (Oxford: Poliry,
20051.92.
200 NOII:S 10 CHAPIEA 2

17. For an c:arlic:r smdy of me: Islamic rd a rion ro q berspacc, sc:c: Gary Bunt,
Virittally Islamic: Computer-Mediated Commrmication.md Cyber IsJamic Environ -
mellts (Cndiff: Univc:rsrry of Wo lc:s Press, 20001, wnich talks o f a I umma_"
On communication mo re: gene: rally in this conrc:xt, sc:c: Marc Lynch, Voius of the
New .+\rab Publ1c: Al-)azeeM, and M1dd/1!-f.ast Politics Today (Nc:w York:
Colum bia Um\'c:rsit>' Prc:ss, 2006j .
I S. David Domke, God \Villitlg?, 149.
19. Bin Ladc:n, His Own Words," 204_
20. Ibid ., 196_
21 . Robc:rt Frslc, Tiu Grt!at Wl1r for Cwill.ztltiotl: TJ1e Conqrtcst of the Middle
East, rc:\'- c:d_ (london: Harper Pc:rc:nmal, l006j, 1059_
21. Ta riq Ah, TIJe Clash of Fundamentalisms; Cr-usades, )lhads, and Moder-
m ty (london: Vc:rso, 10021, 108; sec: .'\bdel wah:.J b EI-Affcndi, Trtrabi s Revolu-
tion; Islam and Power in Sudan (l ondon: Grc:)' Seal, 1991), 14-16. Sayyid Qutb,
Mtfestones (Beirut and Damascus: T he: Holy Kora n Publishm;g 1980 lorig_
196411.
23. Faisa l Oc:vji, Landscapes of the j ibad: MilildllC}', .111ortlfll)\ Modermty
(Ithaca: Corn ell Universny Press, 2005), 14_
24. Bin laden, ' In H i5 Own Words," 197. O n rhe symbolic of terror-
Ism, see also jdfre)' C . .'\lc:xander, ' f rom t he Depths o f Performance:,
Coumerpc:rformance, and 'September 11 ,"' Sociological Theory 11, no . I (2004 ):
88- 105.
25. Karen j . Green bc:rg, AI Q11edtJ Now: Uuderstmtding Today's Tefforls"ts
(Cambridge: Cambridge Uni\'ermy Press, 2005), 118-24, 132.
26. Bruce lawrmce, "Introduction," in Osama bin L1.dcn, to the
'X'orld: Tl1c Statemmls of Osama bm Ladm, tr3115. Howarth (london:
Verso, 2005 ), X\'i.
27. De,ji, LandscafJt:s of tbc j i1Jad, 53.
28. Roha n Gunara tna, lt1side .-H Qaeda, 146 .
29. Bin Laden, H is O w n Words," 193.
30. Ibid., 196-97.
31 . George W. Bush, spc:cch of Octolx r 7, 100 I.
32. George W. Bush, spc:cch of October 6, 1005.
33. Ira Chem us, Monsters to Dtslroy, 126.
34. Bin l aden, H is O w n Words," 202.
35. Ibid.
36. The Century Foundario n, Defmting tiJt! j ibadists; A Blueprmt for i lction
(New York: The Century Foundation Prc:ss, 2004 1, 18 .
37. De\'ji, Landscapes of tbc ji1Jad, 77.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 125.
40. The a rgument here in part builds on thar o f l deb\'re, Tbe Production o f
Space.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 2 201

4 1. Ban Ltckn, tc the W'orid, 239-40.

42. Ban Ltckn, "'In H is Own Words," 185.
43. lb1d., 204.
44. Ban Ltckn, tc the \florid, 153, 162-63.
45. m Gerges, The Fllr Enemy, 179. The video is J.llailablc=, along with
commentary, at http://www.claoner.orr)cbr/cbrOO/IIIdeolexcerprs/c:xcc:rpts_index.
html.
46. Raymond Ibrahim, ed., The A I Qaeda Reader York: Doubleday,
20071,27.
4 7. bin laden, Afessages to the World, 153.
48. Ibid., 183; scc: aoo Jvlariam :\bou Zahab and Olivier Roy, lslanust Networks:
71Je ,.J,fghan-Pakistan Comwction, trans. john Kmg (London: H um and Co, 2002), 65.
49. Src=vc: Coil, Gbosi Wars: T1u Secret Histcry of the C l.-1., :\{ghanisian, and
Bin Laden, from the So.vtct lnmmon to Sept ember 10, 1001 (New York: Pengui n,
20041, 270; Ron SLW< ind, Tf1e One Pcw:lll Doctritlt', 147, see J oshua Teitelbaum,
Holler Thm1 Thoh: Sat4di Ar<1bws lslamic Oppos1tio11 (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookmgs lnniturion, 2000).
50. Suskmd, The One Pemmt Doctrine, 147.
5 1. Ibra him, c:d., Tfu: i\/-Qaeda Reader, 193-94.
52. For \'arious d iscussions, sc=c: Dc=,ji, LaJtdscafH's oftilt! jihad, 84; Muhammed
]. Akbar, Tbe Sf1ade of Swords: jihad a11d the Conflict between Jsf.m1 dlld Clms-
tianily (london: Roudc=dgc=, 20021, X\'ii; Kepd, jihad, 43-44. A more gc=n-
c=ral d1scuss1on is found in Hamid Ena>at, Modem Islamic Political Thottg!Jt
(Ausrin: Uni\'erslry of Tc=xas Pres:s, 19 Sl 2..-\ bu Tanq of Usbar ai-Ansar,
a l drJ.nc=sc= group, rhat 1924 is. a more= important dare tha n 1948 . T har
datc=-the destruCion o f [he= lslam1c empirc=- put an c=nd ro over 1,30{} years of
Islamic rule.... The war for Islam is a worl d war, takmg place c=\er)".Vhc=rc:: here,
Chc:chnya, Koso,,o.. (quorc=d in Bernard Rougier. f.!'l!r:rday jihad: T1Je R1se of Mili-
tant Islam among Palestit1ians in Lebano11 (C:1 mbridgc=, Mass.: H:J r\a rd
Prc=ss, 20071, 147.
53. Q uoted in Schc=uer, TfJroJJgfJ O u r Enem ies' E:res, 263.
54. Fisk, The Great War for 1284.
55. Gerges, Tile far Enemy, 40.
56. :\lc=x ck \Vaal and A. H. Abdd S:llam, Mnca, Islamism, and Amc=rica's
'\Var on Terror,"' in Islam and Its in t1Je Hom of Africa, ed. Alex de waal
(London: Hurst and Co., 25 1-55.
57. A. H . Abdd Salam and Alex de Waal, the Fs il urc= and Persistence of
J ihad," in l sfam and Its Et1emws in the Horn oft\frica, 45 .
58. Damel Benjamin a nd Sw;en Simon, The t\ gc of Sacred Teffor: Radical
Isfmn's \\'far America (New Yorlk: Random H ouse=, 2003), 134.
59. Ibra him, The Re.zder, 238. The first use o f soil" n:places soul,"
at lbm him's suggc=stlon. 1lus translation comc=s from http:ffnews.bbc..co.uk/llhi/
worldlmiddJe_east/4443J64.stm.
202 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 2

60. Cited in Landscapes o f the jiiJad, 130-J I.

61 . Quored m Kepd, ]tlu1d. 147.
62 . Azza m, quoted in Kepd, jiiJad, 147.
63 . Alex de in lslmn and Its &1emws 111 Horn o f
Afru:a, 9; Stt Khahd a i-M uoorak, Turabi's " /slamist" Venture: Failure and lmpli-
(Ca1ro: El Dar El 2.0()1 ), 69.
64. On his polincal acnon, S(:e EI-Affendi, T11r-abi's Revoluhon; Judnh M iller,
'Global Is lamic .'\w;tkening or Sucbncsc: Nightmare? The Curious C:ue of
H asso n Turab1," in Spokesmen for fiJI! Despised: Frmdammtalist &aders o f the
Mtddle East, c-d. R. Scotr Appleb> (Chteago: Universit)' of Pn::ss, 1997);
J- Millard Burr and Robert 0 . Collins, Retrolutionary Sttdan: l-las.m ,Jl. Ttrrabt and
the fslamist Stutc, 1989-1000 (l e iden, Holland: Brill, 2003).
65. Alex de and A. H. Abdd Salam, State Power, a nd Jihad m
Sudan " in Islam and Its Enemies in tiM Hom of Africa, 83.
6-6. Ibid., 83-84. His conversations in t\1ohamed Elh:lchm H amdi, 11Je Mak-
mg of an Islamic Political Leader. Comtersations witiJ H.uan t1f-1itrabi (Boulder,
Colo .: Wesniew, 19981, though origina ll > in Arabic, would bear o ut the first pan
of this analysis; the d iscuuion in 1992. shows tha t e.,en when the West to
a Western audience, he was to prc-smt things in a calm and moderate way.
67. T11rabi's Velllttr:co, 9 1.
68. H 1s 1964 doctoral degree from the Sorbonne was o n emergenq
powers employed by liberal de-mocracies" ; S(:e Burr and Collins, Revolrtflolllll'Y
Sudan , 5.
69. Abdel Salam and de WaaJ, ..On the fJ iIu re and Persistence o f }1had," 22.
70. de W.1al, (ntrodumon," S.
7 1. The- conrributors ro Ya na.gihashi H iroyub, ed., The Co11cept of Territol'y
111 Islamic Luv tmd Thougbt (London: Keg an Paul, 2000) see the term ter-
ntory" as synonymous w ith dar al-lslam, but lcrritory is used much more broadl>
m their srudic:s. A more useful genera l study is Mohammed R= Dialili,
roires et fro ntihcs dans l'1deologie islamisre contemporaine,., Rdaltons mtema-
tionals, no. 63 (1990): 305-12.
72. J ohn L Esposito, UniJo/y W'ar: Terror in the Name of Islam
Oxford Unl\'c:rsiry Press, 2002.), 2 1.
73. Ibid., 35.
74. Bin Laden, His Own Words, " 230.
75. Reu\en Firestone:, Jihad: The Origin of Holy \Var iu islam (Ox.ford: Oxford
Univen>ity Press, 1999), 16-1 7. DiscusSions of the te-rm are widespread m the:
lite-rature. Aside: from the references gi\'C'n here, S(:e !\b 1KI Khadduri, and Pmcc in
the LaJt' of lsiam (Balnmon::, Md.: Johns Hopkms P.n::ss, 19551; Firestone, j ihad, 18;
Aoou Zahab and Roy,ls/,unisl Nctworks, I; Qasim Zaman, TIM
in Co11temporary Islam: Custodians ofCfhmgco (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton Umversit>'
Press, 2002.), 47-48; Junn Cok, Space dtld Holy War: TiM Politics, Cttltme,
and HIStory of Shi'tte islam (London: I. It Tauris, 2.002), chapter 9; Ruthvrn,
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 2 203

A Fury for God: The IslmnisJ Attack on America, rc:v. c:d. (l ondon: Granta, 20041,
54-55: and from the: perspc:cti.ve of rhe U.5. milimry, see Ll rry Knapp, "The Concc:pr
and PraClice of Jihad in klam," Parameters: U.S. i\nny War Colfl!ge Qtwrterly JJ,
no. l {2003): 82- 94.
76. Ibra him, TJJe A I- Qaeda Rcadt!r, 10.
77. Rmh\'en, A Fury for God, 56.
78. Dtlip H iro, \Val' without End, 2 15.
79. Ruth\'en, A Fury for God, 56.
80. Jonath::m Freedland, " ]r's Not Only about Iraq,.. Jul)' 20, 2005, hnp://
www.gw.rdlan.eo.uk/commc:ntfsrory/O, l 5J 1997,00. hrml.
8 1. Akbar; The Shade of Swords, 33.
82. Hiro, War witho41 End, ch.aptc:r I.
83. .'\bdel Sa lam and de \Vaal, "'On me Failure and Persistence of j ihad," 49.
84. de Waal and Abdel Salam, "ls.Lamism, State: Power; and j1had in Su<bn,"
154.
85. Enayat, ,\4odem Islamic Politital Thought, 69.
86. Suha Ta11-Farouki., " Islamic State: The-ories :.1 nd Contempor.u y Rea liues,"
in Islamic Fundamentalism, cd . o\ bdel Salam Sidahmcd and Anoushira\'an
Ehtesh:.Jmi {Boulder, Colo .: Wc:m1ew Press, 1996), 36-50.
87. Hassan Turabi, "The lsla.mic State,.. in VoiCes of R l!shrgcnt Islam, ed. j ohn
L Esposito York: Oxford Unwc:rsity Press, 1983), 243i sec: Zam:.1n, TIJc
Ul.'liiW in Contemporary Islam, chaprer IV.
88. Turab1, 'The: h lamic Stme," 242.
89. l b1d., 24 l.
90. Hamdi, Tbe Making of an Islamic Politiml Leader,, 48 .
91. Turab1, 'The: lsl:.1mic State," 24li El-.'\ffc:ndi, Tul'ahi's Ra10lutiotJ, 118.
92. Sec :\bou Zahab :.1nd Ro)', Islamist Networks, 2.
93. Turab1, "'The Islamic State,'" 242.
94. Benjamin and Simon, The i\ ge of Sacred Terror, 134- 35.
95. Cited in Peter Jvlarsdcn, The Taiiha11: \\'rar a11d Religwn 1t1 l tfgJmnistan,
rev. cd. (London: Zed Books, 2002),
96. Hamdi, Tbe Maki11g of an Islam ic Political Leader, 75.
97. Tctz Rooke, "Writing t he Kh1,a, iiSh a m l>y Kurd
AJi," in TfJe Concept o{Tcrritory in Islamic Law and Thaught, cd . Y:magihashi
H iroyuki (London: Kegan Paul, 2000), 167; see Ralph W. Brauer, Bomrdaries and
Frontiers 1t1 liJediet!al A1uslim Geography (PhiladelphLa: American Phllosophiml
Society, 1995).
98. DevJi, Landscapes of the }il1ad, 84.
99. lb1d., 126 .
100. lb1d., 85.
10 I. Roy, GJobalheJ Islam.
102. J ofm R. Pottenger, " Islam a nd ldeolor,y in Cc:mral Asia," m lsldm in \Vorld
Pof1tics, ed. Anthony H. Jo hns a nd Nelly u houd (london: 20051,
204 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 2

140. A U.S. analysis ca n be found in Arid m r:he

H ro.r dand: U.S. Policy in Asia aiter 9/1 1,. in Eurasia 111 U.S.
and Regional Power SIJift, c:d. Arid Cohen (Aldershot: 2.0051.
I 03. Sc:e Suskind, The One Perccmt 250; T he: Century Foundarion,
DefeatitJg tbe jiiJadists, 24-27.
I 04. Dc:\'ji, Landscapes of tbefiiJad, 41.
105. Ibid., 63-64.
I 06. Ibid., 27-28.
s
I 07. Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida jlluJd in E11rope: The ll.{glwn-BosniatJ Net-
ltf'ork (Oxford: Berg, 1004), 19, see Lorc:nzo Vidmo, A I Qae-da m Europe: T1Je New
Battleground of (tJtemationaJ jihad (Amhc=rst, M ass.: PrometheU5 Books, 2006).
I 08. /U-Qaeda, 133.
I 09. Quottd in je-.m-Charlc:s Brisard, w ith Da mic:n nc:z, Zarqmti; T1u
New fllce of Af-Qlled<! York; Other Press, 20051, 153.
11 0 . Al-Qaeda, 'Ext.ract: AIQ;Jedo Jv1emo ... 2005, htt p://www.gu;J rdi J.n.-co.uk/
1raq/Stor)/0,2. 763,1591005 ,OO.html.
Il l. The W hite House, ''National Strategy for Comb;Jtmg Terrorism," 2003,
hrrp:J/www. wh iteho use.gov/news/ _ re rrorism/co u n rer_
terrori.sm _str.uegy.pdf, 7.
112.. j oint Cl1ids of Staff, 'Narional Mi hro ry Strattgtc Plan for the War on Terror-
ISnt,,. 2006, 1-25-Straregtc-Pian.pdf, 4.
I 13. j ason Burke, AI-Q<1eda: T1Je True-Story o{Radical l5lam (Ha rm oodsworth,
UK: Penguin, 2004).
11 4. The W hite Ho use, "National Stratcg)' for Comb:.mng 6-7.
115 . See, for example, Mnneke de Goede, .. Hawa b. Discourses and t he Wa.r
on Terrorist Fmance,,. &wironmenl and Plmming D: Soclet)<md Space 2 1, no. 5
(10031: 513- 311 Lo uise .'\moore, .. Btomctnc Borders: Governing r-.tobiliries m the
War on Terror," Polit1wf GrogmpiJy 25, no. 3 (2006j : 336-51; .'\ria, .. In
Whose Interest ? Fmancial Surveilla nce and the C ircuits of Exceprion m the \Va.r
on Terror," Environment t1nd Planning D: Society at1d S/)<lce 25, no. 3 (2.007):
447-75; Ibrahim Warde, T1n1 Price of fear: The Tntth behind the FinmKia{ \Var
on Teffor (Berkeley: Uni versity o f California Press, 2007).
116. De \Vaal a nd Abdd Salant, .. Afnca, fslamism.;Jnd Amenca's 'War on Terror,"'
236-37; jo-Ans.ie K. va n Wyk, "':\frica a nd the War on Terror: From KoJashniko\'S
ro Qura ns to Cooperation,,. in TIN: War on Tt'"or in Com/)<lmtiz'f! Perspedive; U.S.
SuuriJy and Foreign Policy aftr!r 9111, ed.. Mark j. M iller ;JJJd Boyka Stdanova
(london; Palgra\'e !vla-cmtllon, 2007), 112.
11 7. Shaul Shay, The Red Sea Terror Triangle-: Ssida11, Somalia, Yemen, and
Islamic Terror, trans. Rac hel Ltberman (New Brunswtck, 1'\ew Jersey: Trn n.sacrion,
2005), 58.
11 8. Appadurat, Fedr of Small N umb.ers, 2.0.
 NOII:S 10 CHAPIEA 2 205
119. For one sr-c: Ph1lip G. Ce-rny. and the New Securir:y
Naval \Var College Review 58, no. 1 (20041: 27; on d.uabase, see
Kepd, JiJwd, 315.
120. :\mhony H. Johns and Nelly lahoucl, '"The World of Islam and rhe Chal-
of !slamism," in Islam m \"'(lorld Politics, cd. Anrhon)' H. Johns and ::--ldly
lahoud (London: 2005), 13.
121. Ibrahim, TJJe AI-Qaeda Reader, 179.
122. Hamid Mu m A I- Qaed.a Now, 139, see Gerges, Tbe Far
Enemy, 81.
123. .'\bou ;md Roy, lslJJmist Networks, 15, see Scheuer, Through Os.r
,wmes' Eyes, 108-10.
124. Gunaratn3, Inside AIQ11edtJ, 51.
125. Dev11, Landscapes of the }111ad, 86.
126. Bm Laden, ,\fessages tc the World, 161.
127. On rh1s period, su Burr 3nd Colhns, Revolutionary Sud(]fj , 69-73, 216-19;
Gun3ratn3, Imide AI-Qaed,J, 95.
128. The Century Foundanon, the jihadists, 16-17.
129. lb1d., 17.
130. D3mel Byman, Connections: Thdt Sponsor Terrorism
(Cambnclge: Cambridge 20051.
131. Crystal " {slam, lnsntunons, :mel a nd
Network Jihad, .. Conflict, Sectmt), and De!'t!lopment I, no. 3 (10011: 33-53; see
Vnderstandmg Tcrror Networks.
132. Joint Chids of Staff, Military Srraregic Plan for rhe War on
fi I 5. Th1s topic has been l hc subject of an extensive RAND repon for
ProjcCf Air Force. See Angel Bor3z, Peter Chalk, K1m Cragin, a nd
Theodo.-e WI. Kar3sik, U11golemed and Reducmg Ter-
rorism Rtsks (S3nra Monica, C3lif.: RAND, 10071; :1 nd. more cmically, !l.hchael
i\. Innes, ed., Denial of S.mctuary: Ut!derstmJdmg Terrorist Safe Hm'l!llS (\);'orport,
Conn.: Pr3eger Sunry Internationa l, 20071.
I.B. Gun3ratn3, Inside 62.
134. and Simon, Tl1e i\ge of Sacred Terror, 169.
135 . .-\pp3durni, fear of Sma fl Numbers, 17.
136. lb1cl., 92.
137. bin Boal, T. j. Cl3 rk, joseph Matthews, :1n.d .\o1ich3d W:1trs (Rerortl,
.>l.f/lictcd Po1vers: Cap1tal a11d Spectncle 111 a New Age of \Var (london:
20051, 160.
138. Dev11, Landscapes of the }il1ad, 92.
139 . .-\bdel Sa lam and de Waal, "On the F3ilure and of Jihad," 46.
140. Gtorgio Homo Sacer: Sot'i.'fetgn Power and Hare Life, tr..ms.
Damel (Stanford. Conn.: Smnford Press, 1998J.
206 NOII:S lO CHAP IEA 2

141. A wide: range: of rdc:rc:ncc:s could be: gl\'c:n, bur for example:, Am)'
iK.apl.m, lnsc:curiric::s.: Retlecrions on Language: and Space:, Radical
ft

History Rev1ew, 85 (2003): 82-93; Derek Grc:gory, "The: Angd of Iraq: Para-
disc: and Progress," E1wironment D: Society o.tJd Space 22, no_
3 (2004): 317- 24; Derek Grc:gory, Black Flag: Guanr:inamo Ba) and the
Space of Exception," Gcografiska Annaler. Series B, 1-lumo.n Geographj 88, no_
4 (2006): 405-27; Judnh Butler, Life: The Powers of and
Violenu (London: Verso, 2004), 50... 100; Claudio 'The: Rerurn of the:
Camp,"' Progress in Httmo.n Geograplry 29, no. 4 (2005): 405-11. More: dcx:u-
memc:d and less thcoreric-J.IIs Seymour lvL Hersh, Chain of Commo.tJd llondon:
Penguin, 20051-
141. Philippe: Sands, Lawless IX"orld: America tlu Making lllld Breaking of
Glob.7/ Rttles (london: Allen La nc:, 2005 ), 144. For a lhoughrful argument rlur the:
spatiabries of Guancinamo arc: more: complicated than is usually ack nowledged,
see S1mon Reid-Hen1y, 'E..xceprional So\'erc:ignry? Guant.inamo BJ.r and the:
Re-Colonial Presem," 39, no. 4 (2007); and also Am)' Kaplan, 'Where:
IS Gu::ant:inamo?" AmcricatJ Qu.Jrterly 57, no. 3 (2005): 831-58.
143. See Grc:gor)', 'The Black Fl:.1g"; CI:.Judjo Minca, "Agamben's Geogra-
phies of Political GeograpiJy 26, no. I (10071: 78-97; :.1 nd on the:
process. more: genc:rJ.ll)', sec: Dan:.J PTic:st, Holds Terror Suspects. in Sc:cret
Pnsons," Novc:mbc:r 2, 1005,
amdd2005/l i /OI/.-\R2.005110 10 1644.html; Src:pnc:n GTc:y, Gl1ost Plm1e: 11u
Troe Story of the CIA Torl!tre Program ll\ew York: St 1\brrin's Press, 2006);
TTc:\ror Paglen and A_ C. Thompson, Torture Taxi: On the Trail of tl1e CIA's Ren-
dttion Flights (Hoboken, N.j.:
144. Carl Schmin, Political Theofog)': Four Chapters otJ tlu Concept of Sover-
eignty, trans_ George Schwab (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Prc::s.s, 1986 [1911))1 Carl
Schmitt, Tbe Concept of the Political, trans. George: Schwab (Chicago: T he: Uni-
vc:rsit)' of Chicago Press., 1996 [ 1932)).
145. Cmmitut10n of the: Fifth Republ ic, 1958, http://www.consd<ollStlturionnc:L
fr/texrc:slconsrit. htm#lltre%201J.
146. Giorgao Agamben, State of [Tans.. Anel l (Chicago: Oucago
Univc:rsicy Press., 2005), 14.
147. See Sco!"ge Bernstein, 11Je Republic of De GauUe, 1958-1969, trans. Peter
Morris (C:.1 mbridgc:: Cambridge: Press, 1993)_
148. Schmitt, TIJC Conupt of the Political, I.
149. Agamben, Homo s.u:er: fl polcre SOL'rano e {a nttda til.z, 189i Ag,:.Jmbcn,
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power Bare Life, Ordinamento 1s rendc:rc:d
as in the Eqglish translation.
150. Giorgio :\gambc:n, Remnants of ,-\uschwit:l.: The Witness and the .-\rchwe,
[fans. Danic:l Hc:llc:r-Roazen (Nc:w York: Zone: Books, 2002).
J 51. 1\'eoc:Jeous, Critique of Senml}, 55.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 2 207
152. Nc:oclrous, Critique of Security, chapter 2.
153. Ag.amben, 1-lomo Saar: Sovcreig11 Power and Bare Life, 123.
154. Foucaub, St!curitt!, Tcrritoire, Populatton: Cours au College de
( 1977-19 78) (Pans: Seuil/Galhmard, 2.004h Nancy, La creation
du monde ou Ia mondiaiis.1tion (Paris: 2002), 137-39; Elden,
Caku larion, Territory."
155. On the biopohrical issuc:s in me: r on terror," Stt julian Reid, The Bio-
poiittcs of the \Varon Terror: Lt{e Struggles, Libtral Modemity, and the De{mce
of Logisttml Societies (1\.lanchesrc:r, UK: Manchester Uni versiry Press, 20061;
Amoore, Borders ..; M ichael DiJJon, 'Go\'c:rmng Terror. The: Stare: of
Emergency of B10poliucal Emerge: nee:, .. lnternaiion.ll Sociology 1, no. l
(2007): 7-18; Eli:z.:lbc:th Dauphmcc: a nd Cnstin:1 c:ds., Tl1e LogiCs of Bio-
powcr and the War on Te"or. For a sdc:ctton o f rC":Jdings rhat dt>vc:lop t hese: claims
more: broodly, sc:c: Jenn)' Edki ns, VCromquc Pin-Fat, a nd Mid1ael j. Shapiro, eds.,
Sovereign Lu.les: Power in Glob.ll Politics (london: Routkdgc, 2.0041, and also
Duffield, Dettelopmellt, tmd U!Jendtng War. Gor,trmng tire World
of Peoples (Ca mbridge:, UK: Polity, 2007). On rhc: topic generally, Robc:rro Espos-
ito, Bios: Biopolitics and Pltilosopb'), trans. Timothy Campbell Uni-
\'erstt}" of Mmnesota is helpful.
156. Sec: Paul A. PaMJ.\'OIU, The Contradictory State of Gtorgio ,'\g;;unbcn,"
Political Theory 35, no. 2 (2007): 147-74. In a powerful anJ.lysis, William
E.. Connolly, "The: Ethos o f So\'c:rc:tgnry," in Law 1111d the Sacred, ro. Austin Sarat,
Lawrence: Douglas, and !\'[arrha Merrill Umphrey (Sta nford: Stanford
Press, 1007), 135-54, clatms rhat we need to rhc: figure:
'"So\ereignry ts tiMt which de<idc:s an ex-cc:prion exists ond how ro decide: it, with
rhe tbat composed of a plural it)' of forces circulating rhrough and around the: posi-
rionaJ sove-reignty of rhc: official arbttrating body" ( 150).
157. Gtorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on PolitiCs, trans. Vincenzo
Bmetti ond Cesare: Casuino lMi nne:Jpolis: Unjversity of M innesota Prc:ss,10001,
24-25! :\g.amben, Remtmnts of 85-86.
158. :\s Sandro Mc:zz..ondra s uggests, '[TJhe problem is that rhe logic of domi-
nation that functtons in the: camp is a logtc t hat also opc:r:Jtes in other soctal spaces.
This type: of dommation is rea lly diffused throughout [he: comprmc:nst\'C: srructure
of socic:t>'" Sec "'1\e qut, ne a ltro,c:-tl.tigracion, Detentio n, Dc:serrion: A Dialogue
with Brett Nc:tlson," borderlands 1, no. 1 (2003), htrp://www.borderlandsejoumal.
addoide .c:du.aul\ol2no 1_2003/mezzadra _ neilson. hrm L
159. lbtd.
160. Jenny Edkins, so,reretgn Power, Zones of Indistmcrion, and 1he Camp,"
.>\lternatites 25, no . I (2000): 4 77-85; \Vhose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Prac-
tices of A1d (f\.finneapolis: University o f Minn esota Press, 2000).
161. Hikoru Yamashua, Humanitarian Space and .fnter1wtional Politics:
The Crmtion of Safe Areas 1:\ ldc:rshot, UK: :\shgare, 2004h Carol McQueen,
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 2 207
152. Nc:oclrous, Critique of Security, chapter 2.
153. Ag.amben, 1-lomo Saar: Sovcreig11 Power and Bare Life, 123.
154. Se<> 1\h chd Fouc:mb, SCcuriie, Tcrritoire, Population: Cours au College de
( 1977-19 78) (Pans: Seuil/Galhm:ud, 2.004h Nancy, La creation
du monde ou Ia mondiaiis.1tion (Paris: 2002), 137-39; Elden,
Caku larion, Territory."
155. On the biopohrical issuc:s in me: r on terror," Stt julian Reid, The Bio-
poiitlcs of the \Varon Terror: L1{e Struggles, Libual Modemity, and the De{mce
of Logist1ml Societies (1\.lanchesrc:r, UK: Manchester Uni versiry Press, 20061;
Amoore, Borders ..; M ichael DiJJon, 'Go\'c:rmng Terror. The: Stare: of
Emergency of B10poliucal Emc:rgc:ncc:, .. lntemation.ll Sociology 1, no. l
(2007): 7-18; Eli:z.:lbc:th Dauphmec: a nd CnstiJU c:ds., LogiCs of Bio-
powcr and the War on Te"or. For a sdectton o f rC':ldings !hat dt>vdop t hese: claims
more: broadly, sc:c: Jenn)' Edki ns, VCromque Pin-Fat, a nd Mid1ael j. Shapiro, eds.,
Sovereign Lu.les: Power in Glob.ll Politics (london: Routkdgc, 2.0041, and also
Duffield, Dettelopmellt, tmd U1Jend1ng War. Gor,trmng tire World
of Peoples (Ca mbridge:, UK: Polity, 2007). On rhc: topic generally, Robc:rro Espos-
ito, Bios: Biopolitics and Pl1ilosopby, trans. Timothy Campbell Uni-
\'erstt}" of Mmnesota is helpful.
156. Sec: Paul A. P:.ls.s:J.\'Ont, The Contradictory State of Gtorgio ,'\g;;unbcn,"
Political Theory 35, no. 2 (2007): 147-74. In a powerful an.1lysis, William
E.. Connolly, "The: Ethos o f So\'c:rc:tgnry," in Law 1111d the Sacred, ro. Austin Sarat,
Lawrence: Douglas, and !\'[arrha Merrill Umphrey (Sta nford: Stanford
Press, 1007}, 135-54, clatms rhat we need to !he: figure:
'"So\ereignry ts tiMt which de<idc:s an ex-cc:prion exists and how to decide: it, with
!he tbat composro of a plural it)' of forces circulating rhrough and around the: posi-
rionaJ sove-reignty of rhc: official arbttrating body" ( 150).
157. Gtorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on PolitiCs, trans. Vin-cenzo
Bmetti and Cesare: Casarino lMi nne:Jpolis: Unjversity of M innesota Prc:ss,10001,
24-25! :\g.amben, Remnants of 85-86.
158. :\s Sandro Mc:zz..ondra s uggests, '[TJhe problem is that rhe logic of domi-
nation that functtons in the: camp is a logtc t hat also opc:r:Jtes in other soctal spaces.
This type of dommation is rea lly diffused throughout [he: comprmc:nst\'C: srructure
of socic:t>'" Sec ''1\e qut, ne a ltro,c:-tl.tigracion, Detentio n, Dc:serrion: A Dialogue
wtth Brett Nc:tlson," borderlands no. 1 (2003), htrp://www.borderl.andsejoumal.
adelaide.c:du.aul\ol2no 1_2003/mezzadra _ neilson. hrm L
159. lbtd.
160. Jenny Edkins, so,rerctgn Power:, Zones of Indistmcrion, and 1he Camp,"
.>\lternatites 25, no . I (2000): 4 77-85; \Vhose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Prac-
tices of A1d (f\.finnr:apolis: University o f Minnesom Press, 2000).
161. Se<> Hikoru Yamashtta, Humanitarian Space aud .fnter1wtional Politics:
The Crmtion of Safe Areas 1:\ ldc:rshot, UK: :\shgare, 2004h Carol McQueen,
208 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 2

Humamtarian lnten-ellliotl and Safel) Z ones: J,.aq, BosniiJ and (Basing-

stoke:, UK: Palgravc: Macmillan. 2005)_
162. Agambc:n, 1-lomo Saetr: Sovereign Power and IJ.Jre Li(l!, 175.
163. See 1'\evzat Soguk, States aud Strangers: Refugees and Displacmrents o f
Staucraft Uni\c:rsity of MinJ1 c:sou Pras, 1999); Jc:nmfer 1-I)ndman,
Managing Displaament: Rl!{rtgel!s and t!Je Pofttics ofl-lumamtanamsm (ll.[anne-
apohs: Universit>' of Minnesor.a Press.., 2000); Cc:cile Dubernet, lntemattonJI
Containmf!nt o f Displaced Persons: Humamtarta11 Spaces witiJorJt E.:{it (Aidershot,
UK: Ashgate, 2001 1.
164. Agamben, 1-lomo Sacf!r: Sovereign Power mrd IJ.Jre Li(l!, 133.
165 . Agamben, Homo sacer. II potcre sorrar1o I! Ia nuda tJita, 189-90. I have:
shghtl)' modified me: rranslation gi,ren m Agamben, Homo S.u:l!r: SOJ!efl!ign Power
and Bare Life, l69-70, after Mi nca, Return of the Camp," 408, and Agam-
ben, Me.Jm Without &1d, 40. On the C:J.mp, see also Suvendrim, Perera,
IS a Camp ... ?,fl borderlands I, no. 1 (2002 1, http:l/www.bordc:rlandsc:loumal.
addaide.rou.au/voll no 1_2002/perera_camp.html; Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the
Memo f')' of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge: Uni versity Press, 2003), 178-8 1; Enk
Vogt, rhe Camp," in Politits, Met<Jpl1ysics, and Death: Es.s<1)'s on Gtor-
810 .-\gamben 's Homo Sacc:r, ed. Andrew Norris N.C.: Duke Um\'ersit>'
Press, 2005).
166. In Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in 11 Time o( Terror: Dtalogues witfJ
}iirgen Habemras and Jacques Derrida lChicago, Uni versity of ChLc.tgo Press,
2003), 101.
167. Sec: David Cole and J ames X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution:
Sacrificing Ciani Liberties m the Nmne of Nationdl Sewrlt)', Jd ed. lNew York:
The New Press, 20061, 234; :\BC News, "Secret FBI Report Quesrions :\I Q.1eda
Capabiliries," March 9, 2005, hrrp://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Invesrigataon/
stoq?id:5664l5&page=l. Indee-d, one popular account, largely w ri tten before
September II , 200 I, mc:s to show the range of mfilrrauon with the United States
Itself; sc:c: Steven Emerson, i\merican ji1Jad: T1u! Terromts Lia,wg among Us
(New York: The Frc:c: Press, 2002 ).
168. Donald Rumsfc:ld, as Ddi11crc:-d by Secretary of Defense Donald
H. Rumsfeld, ,-\ndrc:ws A1r Force Base, Maryland," :\>iay 18, 2001, htrp:f/www.
dc:fensd in k.millspeeches/speech.aspx ?specch1d=J 56; "Transform ing lbc: Mali ra ry,"
Foreign Af{turs 81, no. 3 (20021: 20-32.
169. Dc:\'ji, Landscafu:s of the]i1Jad, 157.
170. For Wolfmvitz, this idc.a stems from George: Shultz, Ronald Reagan's
Secretary of State; sec Paul Wolfowitz. with James Dao :1 nd ErLc Schmitr,"
Nf!w York Ttmes,January 7, 2001, htrp:J/WI'f-w.fas.org/news/us:J/100210 11 502 wad.
htm.
J 71. John Agnew, Regimes: Territoriality and Stare Aumorit)' m
Contempor;try \Vorld Politics,,. Is of tl1e Association of Americ<Jn Geogra-
phers 95, no. 2 (1005): 438.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3 209
3. Rubble !R educed t o Dust

I. Kenncth J . .\<lenkl1aus, Somalia: Stille Colfapse <md t1Jt! Tlm:at of Terror-

ism, :\delphi Paper 370 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7.
2. See Rolx:rt Cooper, The Brcaki11g of Nations, 66, Hikaru
HumatJitariarr Space and Politics: Tlte Creation of Safe (Alder-
shot: Ashgate, 2004), 188; j effrey Herl>st, ter Them F:ul: Srate Failure in Theory
and Pmctice: lmphc.uions fo.r Policy," m \WJcrr Stati!s Fail: a11d Come-
quencl!s, ed. Rolx:rt I. Ro tberg (Princeton, Kj.: Princeton Uni11emry Prt:M, 20041,
311.
3. Menkhaus, Somalia, 50.
4. U.S. Department of Smte, 'Background Nore: Cyprus," 2004, hrrp:J/www.
srate.go,/rlpa/e&lbgn/5376Jum; su Terrorism Research Ccnrcr, Cyprus," 2.004,
http://www. rerrorism.comlmodules. php ?op=modlo.1d & ntries&filc=i ndex
&Yicw=65.
5. Doug Stokes, Americd's Other W'a.r, 106.
6. :\1ichad lgnatK"ff, Jnter\c:ntion and St:ltc: Failu re:," Dissent 49, no. l
(2002): 117.
7. :\1ichad lgnatic:ff, Rigbrs, Power, and the St:uc,,. m A1lll.:ing States
Work: Failure t111d the Crisis of Gartcmarrcc, ed. Simon Chesrennan, Michael
lgnatic:ff, and nokyo: United 1\'arions Univc:rsrry Prc:ss, 2.005), 65.
8. j ol1n Lc:wis Gaddis, S!trpmc, Sutmt)\ and t1u! AmericatJ &pe.rimcc
(Cambndge, Mass.: Ha.rnrd Uni\'ersuy Press, 2004).
9. j ol1n Agnc:w, Regnnes: Authomy in
World Polincs," Atma!s of tiJC .1\srociaflon of i\mcrican Gcogr.z-
pbers 95, no. 2 (2.005): 438 .
10. The Whrrc: House, "The Karional Sc:curiry Srrnteg)' o f the Unirc:d of
.-\me rica, .. 2002. hnp://www.wlurehouse.go\/nsc/nss.html, I. See also the l
Defense Re\.Jc:w Report,.. published less rhan three wc:cks after
September II, 2001, brgely planned lx:fore rhar dare. 1l1is repon ma kes refer-
ence to "increasing a nd thre:.1ts enunanng from the: territories of WC':lk and
failing smtes. " (hrrp:l/www.defrnsdink.mil/pubslpdfs/qdr200 I. pdf, I ll, but this 1s :.1
rdatiYdy minor 1ssue in the rq>orr as a whole, a rushed add ition subsequent ro the
armcksi sec: Andrc:w Cockburn, Rumsfe/J: His Rise-. fall, and CatastmpiJic Legacy
(New York: Scribner. 2007), 123. B) the 2006 rq>orr, t his 1s ::1 much more: maJor
theme; see Department of Defense, Defense Review Report," 2006,
hnp:J/www.ddc:nsdink.miVqdr/rc:port/Repon2.0060103.pdf, 12-14, 21, 28, 33.
II. Joint Chic:fs of Staff, "'The N:1 rional Military Srrarc:gy of The: Umred States
of A Strategy for Tod:Jy; A Vision for Tomorrow," 2004, hrtp:l/www.
globalsc:cu rity.org/miIitary/library/pohcy/dodld20{1503 L8nms.pd f, 5.
12. Deparrmenr of Defense, National Defense Strategy o f The United
Srarc:s of 2005,
docl/d200503l8ndsl.pdf, 3; see o f Dc:fcnsc, "AnnuJ.l Report ro the
210 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3

Pre"side"nt and the: Congress," 2002.. hrtp:!Jwww.dod.mil/exsc:c/adr2002.Jindex

.htm, U .
13. Sec-, for example, :\.tichad I. Handel, Weak Stales in the [tJJl!rtJahotJal S)'s-
tem, nc:w edition (london: Fronk Cns;s, 1990); Robert H. Jackson., "Qu.1.si-Starc:s,
Dual Regimes, and :-.fc:oclassical Theory: Imc:mationaJ J urisprudence: and the Third
World," Organisation 41, no. 4 (1987) 519-49; Robert H. Jackson,
QuasJ-States: SOl'l!rtlgn{); (tltl!rnatloiJaJ Relations, .md tiJI! Third \Vorfd (Cambridge:
Cnmbridge Uni\'ersiry Press, 1990)
14. Robert I. Rorberg, Horn of :\Fnca and Yemen: Diminishing the
Threat of Terronsm,., in Battling Te"omm in thl! 1-Iom of ,"t,frica, c:d. Robert L
Rorberg, (Cnmbridge,ll.las s.: World Puce 2005), .3.
15. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure;' Tht Wasbiugton
Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2.001): 86.
16. Rot berg, Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon?., CIA
Paper; 2.003, hrtp://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_ GlF_2.020_Suppon/200.3_ 11_06_j)J.pcrsl
pand2_nov6.pdf, 2.-4.
17. Rotberg, "The 1-lorn of Afric.t and Yemen," 8.
18. Cerny, and the New Securit}' Dilemma, .. Nav.ll War College
Revil!w 58, no. I (2004): 18-19.
19. Eri k]. Jenne, lanka: A Fragmented .. in State Fa1lure and State
Weaknl!ss in a Tune of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rorberg (Cambridge, !\-tass.: World
Peace Foundation, 2.00.31, 22.2.
20. Menkhaus, Somalia, 1 1.
21. Ibid., 17.
21. Rotberg, "The New Narure of Nation-State FailLLre, .. 85.
2..3. The Century Foundanon, Defeating lhl! )iluzd1sts: A 8l11eprinJ for iiCIIoll,
5; sec- !vhchael V. Bhataa, War and fntemention: !sSSies for Conl!!mporary Peace
OperattOIIS tBloomfidd., Conn.: Kumarian Press, 200.3), 14 7-4.8; Cerny, "'Terror
asm and the New Securit)' Dilemma;" Michael lgn:Jtleff, The usSl!r E1'1'1: Po/it1cnl
Ethics in an .-\ge of Terror (Ed inburgh: EdmbLLrgh Uni,ersity Press, 2005 ).
24. Susan L. Cutrer; Douglas B. Richardson, and ThomasJ. \Vilb:mks, A Research
and Anion Agenda," in The Geographical Dimemiorrs o{Terrorism, 224-25.
25. Mcnkhaus, Somalia, 50.
2.6. Cerny, and the New S-ecuriq Dilemma," 13 .
27. U.S. Deparrmenr of State, "Fact Foreign Terrorist Organi zations,"
2005, http:J/w\V'.V.5t:Jte.gov/slcrlrlsHsl37 19 l.htm; sec Co"grcssional Research
Service, "For-eagn Terrorist Or-gamzarions," 2004, hnp:/1\V'.vw.fas.org/irplcrsl
RU222.3 .pdf.
28. Thomas Jefferson, Pa/)l!rs of Tbomas jefferson, Volume 4: l October 1780
to 14 February 1781, cd. Julia n P. Boyd (Prince ton, N.j.: Pnnccton Unnersit)'
Press, 1951), 237.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3 211

29. Gadd1s, Surpri!U!, &om"ty, a11d thi! Americm1 Expi!ril!ll<"l!, I 09- 10.
30. Abin Finkidkraur Pc=rer Sloterdijk, Les b.utemf!lll$ monde: Di,l-
logrtl! tParis: Pamerr, 2003), 166.
31. The= Wh1rc= House, Suatc=gy for Combating Terrorism," 2003,
h rtp:/Jwww. whitehouse .gm/newslrelc=ases12003/02/cou n rer_ tc:rrorism/coumer_
I I.
32. Coole)', Unholy \"tlars, 129.
33. Sec ibid., 148-49.
34. For helpful oockgrouncls ro rhis complicared srory, see Maley, ed.,
fundamentalism Reborn? and the Taliban [I'\ r:w York: New Yorlt Uni-
versity Press, 1998 1; Ahmed Rashd, Ta/iba11: Mi/itmlt Islam, Oil . md Frmdamm-
ta/ism in untr<1f Asia (New Haven: Yale Uni\ersity Press, 2000h Peter Marsden,
Talib.m: W'ar .md Rdigion itl /lfghanisldn, re\'. ed. Zed Rooks, 20021;
John L. Esposito, Unl1oly W.1r: Terror in tl1e Name of !slam (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
\'crsity Press, 2002); Rohan Gunaf',Jtna, Inside AI Qaedd; Angelo RasJ.rt.Jyagam,
A{giJamstan: ,-\ ,\4odem HIStory (london: I. B. Tauns, 2003); Chris johnson :and
Jolyon Leslie, l!{giMnistaiJ: Till! Mirage of Peace [London: :Ze-d Books, 20041; Sre\'e
Coli, GIJost \\'Tars: Tl1e Secrrl History CIA , Afghanistan, and Bin Lad ell, from
tl1e !nrtasion to 10, 2001 York: Penguin, 2004)> 1\bhmood
.\l:!mdnni, Good Muslim, B.zd Muslim: ,-\mi!rim, tlu! Cold War, .md tlw Roots of
Terror (New York: Three Lea,es Press, 2004); Am:alendu Misra, Afglumislan: Tl1e
L1byrinth of Vtoll!nce (Oxford: Polity, 2005) .
35. Coole)', Unholy \\'lar, 139; Rashid. Taliboltl, 60-61.
36. Tbe Talibm1, 61.
37. Abou Z.:.hab and OJi,ricr Ro)', fslm11ist Networks: The .A.fgl"m-
Pakist-an Connution, mms. John King llondon: H ursr and Co, 20021, 14.
38. Evan F. Koh lmann, ,-\f-Qaida's jiJ,ad irr &rope: The t\.(gha11-Bosn&m Ni!t-
work (Oxford: Berg. 2004); Lorenz.o Vidino, .A./ Qaeda in Europe: The New BatJfe
ground of ltJtem,1tional ]il1<1d (Amhern: Prometheus Books, 20061.
39. Tbe Talibm1, 71, 1J I.
40. R:Jshid, Tt1liban, 140.
41. Losi11g Bin Laden.
42. Paul Rogers, .-\ War on Terror: A(g;IJallist.m <md After Pluto,
2.0041, 33.
4 3. SC'e Johnson .md Afghanistan, 2 15.
44. Paul McGeough_. Manhattan to Baghd<1d: Despatches from tlu Frontline in
the !J'.1r 011 Taror (Crow's Nest: Allen o1nd Unwin, 2003), 94.
45. Sec Ron Suskind, T11e One Percent Doctrine, 53.
46. lb1d.
47. Rogers,, .A. W'ar on Te"or, 13.
212 NOII:S lO CHAP IEA 3

48. U.N. S.:-curity Council Resolmion 1368, 11, 200 I, to

mtemanonal peace and s.:-curity caused by terrorist acrs.'"
49. U.N. Council Resolulion 1373, 28,2001, to
mtem:monal peace and caused by terronsr acts."
50. Michad Byers, the Use of Force, and lnternation.:tl law after
11 Septem bc:r," I a11d u mparative Law Quarterly 5 1, no. 2. ( 2.002 ):
401-2.
51. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1377, No\ember 12,2001, to
lnternanonal peace and caused by terronsr acts."
51. U.N. Security Counctl Resolunon 1378, No\ember 14,200 1, ''On the Situ-
ation in Afghanistan."
53. Gilbert Achcar, The Gash of Barbamms: The Mak;rrg of ibe New Wforld
Order, rrans. Peter Drucker, Updnred and Exp-.mded Edition (Boulder. Colo.: Para-
dtgm, 2006), I0 1.
54. Franr;ois He1sbourg, \'\1ork in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Conse-
quences," in Reshaping Roglie States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy
toward lr.Jn, Iraq, and North l<ort:'a, ed.o\ lexander T. j . Lennon and Camille E1ss
(Cambridge, 1\.fass.: The Press, 2004), 11. Sec, more rc:cendy, U.N. Socurit)'
Council Re50iution 1735, December 22, 21)01;, "Tflre-.ns to imcrnatiooal and
securiry caused by terrorist acts," wluch affirms 'the need to combat b)' J.ll means,
m accordance warh rhc Charter oi the Un itcd Xarions and inrernalional law, tnrc:ats
to internanorol and secumy caused by rerronst acts, stressing in tnis regard
the important role the Unired Narions plays in lcadmg and coordm.1.ting th1s cffon."
On Heasbourg's point, sec also Hiro, \Var witholil End, 307.
55. U.N. Socurit)' Council Resolunon 1378, No,cmber 14,200 1, "On the saru-
ation in :\fghanistan."
56. For these and other resolutions, see http://www.u n.org/documentsfscres.
hrm.
57. See Afghan Go\'ernment, "Bonn Agreement," Decem ber 5, 100 I, http://
a fghangovern mcnt.com/A.fgha nAgreemcnt Bon n.htm.
58. David Frum and Richard Perle, ..-\11 End to E1il: Horv to Win t1n! W1ar on
Terror fKew York: Ballantme Books, 2004), 197.
59. Greenwood, lmcmarionaJ Law a nd t he 'War on Terrorism',"
lntf!'rnational A.{fairs 78, no. 1 (2002): 3 1 1-13.
60. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), "Dcfimrion of Aggrc:s-
siOn," Dember 14, 1974, htrp://www.un.org/Deprsldh l/rcsgLlidc/g:J.res l. htm.
61. johnson and Leslie, l l{gbarr;stan, 10; 1\timrcr; Losing Bin Lmfcrr, ! 75- 77.
61 . Misra, ,-\fghanistan, 86.
63. Abou Za hab and Roy, lslmnist Nettvorks,l, 68.
64. Johnson and Leslie, ,.ljfglmrr;stan, 10, 151.
65. On this pomr:, and the ro!c of humanitarian agencies more generaiJy m
Afghanistan, see Maley, Fundamentalism Reborn?, The 100-12;
Johnson and Lc:slic, Afghanistan, 151 .
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3 213

66. Lutz Tbt! New Great Game: Bfood am! Oil in Cerrtrai Asia
(london: Arlanr.ic Book5, 20031, 238-39: Samina Ahmc:d, ''Revi\mg Smrc: ugiri-
nucy m Pakistan, in M11kmg States Work, 145-66.
fi

67. George W. spc:c:cn of Ocrobc:r l l , 200 I.

68. Sec: ,\.fichael lgnarieff, Empire Lite: Nallort-Buildmg irt Bosma, Ko.rovo,
and Afghanistall (London: Vimagc:, 2003), 79.
69. The: Scnbs Council, Stumbli11g i11to 0Jaos: ll.fgiJanist.m orr tiJe Brirrk
(london: MF Publishing. .!0071. For a t ho rough disctJssion of rhc: situation, sc:e
Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, and TIJe Neo-1'i1liban
in A(giJanistan (Nc:w York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
70. Johnson and l eslie:, Afgharristau, 158-59; see Amin Sa1kal, Afghanista n's
Weak Smrc: and Strong Socic:ry," m Afakmg States Work, 193-209.
71. ]ol1nson and Leshe, Afgha11ista11, 133.
72. 1\bnm Weinbaum. and t ne Unitc:d Sr.J.rc:s: A P;Jrmc:rsh1p of
Nc:cessuy, m Aml!rica <111d till! World 111 till! AgL' of Terror: ,-\ New Landscape irr
fi

Rl!lations, ed. Damel lknramin (\Vashmgron, D.C., Ccmer for Stra-

tegic and lnrernatio1ul Studies, 1005), 103.
73. Per;a In the LitJe of fir:': A Memoir tl\'c:w York: Free Press,
10061, 20 1; Mary Anne \Ve;Jver. Pakistan: In tiJI! Shadow of}111ad and ,-\fghanistarr
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and G iroux, 1002.), 45.
74. Ahmed, Reming State ugitimacy m Pakismn," 156; Stephen Philip
Cohen, The of Pakistan (\'<1ashington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
20041,267.
75. See Kanishkan Sarhasi\am, UnMsy Neighbours: !ndi11, Pakistan and U.S.
f.oreigtJ PoliCy (Aldershot, UK: Ash gate, 20051; Ifri k na r H. Hinduwa,
and the Taltban: South :hia al the Crossro..'lds !Oxford: Oxford
Press, 20051.
76. :\ppadurai, fear of Small Numbers .
77. Kent Bolton, U.S. Foreign PoliC)' arrd lttternatiotJal Politics:
Bush, 9111, atJd thL' Global-Terrorist Hydra (Upper Saddle Rncr, N.j. : Pearson,
20051, 18. Those links were partly forgc:d during the: Cold War, when Pakistan's lSI
was a key conduit for U.S. a1d to the mujahidi n. On t his, see olso Ras:mayag.1.m,
.,J,fghanistan; Coli, Ghost R i.z wan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergtmce of
lshmuc Afilit.aucy in Afghanistan (Aldc:rshot, UK: Ashgatc:, 20{15 h Za.hid HtJssain,
frotJtlm' Tile Struggle ttJith Militant lsl11m (London: I. B. To uris.1007J;
and on ethnic 155\lc:s, Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, and more criric:.J II y, :\ded
Khan, Politics of ldmtity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan
Ddhi : Sage, 2005).
78. rraf, In the Lilli! of Fire, 10 l.
79. DOS Cable, State 15871 1, cited m the: 911 I Commission, Firtal Report of
the National Commission on Terrorist ,-\ttacks Upon tl1e Urtited States, 3J I; see
MtJsha rraf, /11 tltL' Line of firL', 204-5; Ja mes Mann, Rtse of the Vulcans: TilL' Hts-
tory of Bush's \Var G.1bml!t (New York: Penguin, 2004), 198-99.
214 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3

SO. DOS Cable:, lsb m.J.bad 5 123, crrc:d in me 91L I Commissio n, Final Report
of tiJe National Commission on Terrorist ,-\tJ,a.cks upon tiJe Uwted States, 33 1.
Sc:e also Bob Woodward, BusiJ tJ t mJr, 42-43, 58-59; Bohon, U.S. f oreign Pol1.cy
tJnd Internattonal Politics, 163; !\'l usharraf, l 11 the Lim.' of Fm!,100- 207; Hus.sain,
Frontline Paki$tl1n, 35- 37.
8 1. P.:-na 1\t ush:lrr..Jf, ro t he: Narion," Sc:pc:o=-mbc:r 19, 2001, hnp://www.
p resldenro fpaklsmn.gov.pk/Filc:sSpuch.:-s/Ad dr.:-ssc:s/ 1OJ t2004 1 11025AM
H ighllgh ts% 20ofo/o20G.:-ncrai% 20Pc:rvn:% 20.\iush:.tri'.Jf. pdf.
81. Abou and Roy, Jslamist NetttfQrks, 78- 79.
83. SusJcind, TIJe One Perctmt Doctri11e, 62.
84. Ibid ., 69.
85. Abou and Roy, Jslamist NetttfQrks, 79-80.
86. Pervn: .\.fusharrof, to t he Nanon," January 12,2002, http://www.
presidencofp:J k is<.m.gov.pk/FdesS pcc:ches/Add resses/1 0202004 7 57 58 AM word%
20filc:.pdf.
87. Ano ushi ra\'a n Ehrc:shami, 'h.lam as a Po litical Force: in International Poli-
tics, .. in IsltJm i11 \'Ciorld Politics, ed. Anthony H. j oh11S and Nell)' Ll houd (london:
Ro utledge, 2005 1, 45.
88. The Ccnrur)' Foundnion, DefecWng the }ihadtits, 86.
89. Rog.:-rs, .4 \Var otJ Terror, 52-53, 144-45; Weinbaum, a nd the:
Uni ted Stones, .. 108. An earlier opcr:mon had seen Yus:uf Ramz.i abducted from
Pakistan and impnsoned for h1s rol.:- m t he 1993 bombing o f tho=- World Trade Cen-
ter; sc:e :\bou Zahab a nd Roy, ls/ami.st Networks, 42, n. 8; Miniter, Losing Bm
LtJden, 83-85.
90. Bolton, U.S. Fomgn Poliq <md !ntematlonal PolitiC$, 33.
91. Se)'mour M. H ersh, 'The Gct.J.way," TIM New Yorker, januar> ll, 2002,
http:J/www.g looolresr:arch.ca/aniclc:s.IHER206.o\ .htm l.
92. M us harmf, ln the Line o{Fire, 264; Weinbaum, 'Pakistan and rhe United
States:," 11 7. On the North-Wesr Fronrier Prov ince generally, sc:c: S::ma Haroon,
Frontier of f ,uth: /slam 111 tire lndo-1\fgiJan Borderland INt>w York: Columbia
University Prcs:s:, 200 7).
93. Gunararna, Inside :\1-QtJeda, 233.
94. Abou Z a hab and Roy, l slamist Nettoorks, 6J.
95. Klcvcmann, The New Great Game, 1 34.
96. Abou Z a hab and To)', !s/amist N etworks, 64.
97. Ta riq Ali, T1Je Clasl1 of FutJdam entali$11f$, 2 99.
98. Dennis Kux, Tl1e United States an d Pakistan: Disenchanted Allies
(Washington, D. C.: Woodrow \'\o'ilson CcnreT Press, 200 lj, J68; Cohen, T1u Idea
of 26 7.
99. 1'\'arional lmelligence E.sumare, "The Terronsr T luem to rhe U.S. H offi('-
land," 2007, http:J/d n i.gov/pr('Ss_releases/200 70 71 7_releasc:.pdf. For a useful dis-
cus.sion of the contemporary situation, sc:e Robina Mohammad, .. Paklsran- An
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3 215

Ungovern.able Spacd E1wiro11ment and Pfanning D: Society mzd Space 26, no. 4
(2008): 571-81.
100. In the Lirre of Fire, 272-73; sc:e !nrernauonal Cnsis Group,
Appeasing the Asia Report No. 125, 2006a.
10 I. lnrernm:lonaJ Crisis Group, ''E.Iecrio ns, Democraq, J.nd Smbility in
Pakistan," Cnsis Group Asia Reporr No. 137, 2007.
102. Richard Min iter, Shadow The Umold Story of 1-low BJ<sJJ Is \Vinning
the W.1,- on Terror (Was hington, D.C.: Regnery 86.
103. George \V. Busft. spec:cn of December 7, 2005.
104. lvo Daalder, N icole Gnesono, and Pbll1p Gordon, cd., Crescerrt of Crisis:
U.5.-Ettro/)eatJ St,-ait!gy fo,- the Gre11tt!r M1dd/1! East (Washingron, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press,10061.
105. George \V. Busft. spec:cn of August 1, 2.01)6 .
106. George \V. Busft. spec:cn of October 6, 2005.
107. Rogers, A Wa,- o11 Terror, 48; Robert D. Burrowes, "Yemen: Political
Economy and the Effort Terro.ris m, .. in BatilitJg Terro,-ism i11 tlte Hom of
Af,-,w, 141-72.
108. Damd Benjamin and Ste.,en Simon, The Age of Sacrt!d Terror: Radical
lsl.'lm's .-l.merica (New York: Random House, 2003), 169.
109. Burrowes, Yemen, 17 1, n. 61 .
110. Shadow 7-8 .
111. Sh:.l)', The Rt!d Sed Terror Triarrgll!, 136.
112. Peter Woodward, U.S. foreigtJ Policy mzd tin! Hom of Af,-ica (:\ldershot,
UK: Ash gate, 2.006 1, I 54.
113. Shay, The Red &a Terror Tmmgle, 74-5; /\lex de Waal, .. in
lsl.7m and its Enemies itJ tiJe 1-lorrr of Africa, 2.
114. P. Woodward, U.S. Fort!ign Policy a11d tiJe 1-lorrr of A./rica, 4 7-48.
115. Benjamin and Simon, Tl1e i\gt! of Sacrt!d Terror, ill, 504-6, n. 19.
116. Cited m Timothy Came)', Sudan: Poli(icallslam and Ter.roris m,,. in
Tl!rrorism in the H orn of .-Vrica, 12.5.
11 7. Carney, Sud.<n," 125.
118. Gunaratna, fns1de lH-Qacda, 157; Carney, Sudan,,. 129; P. WO<ldward,
U.S. ForcigrJ Policy and the Hom of .-\{rica, I 02-3.
119. Slmdort' W..rr, 68.
120. :\lex de Waal and H. i\bdd Salam, Jslam1sm, and America's
'\Varon Terror,'., in Isl.un atJd fts Enemies irr the Horn of Africa, 241 .
12.1. De Waal and Salam., Africa, lsb.m isrn., and ,-\mcncn's 'War on Terror,"' 240.
122. Byers, \Vdr Law: Intemational Law and Armed Conflict (London:
:\danric Books, 20051, 37.
123. Gerard Prunier Rachd M. G issdqujst, Sudan: A Successfully
Failed Srotc:," in St,lle Failure arrd State Wedkness m a Time of Terror, I ll.
124. Cooley, UtJholy Wars, 19 1.
216 NOII:S 10 CHAPIEA 3

12.5. See Ira Chernu.s, .'l<1onsters to Destroy. 149, Crarg Mrtrder in

Samarlwnd: A Bmish Ambassador's ContrO!Il"YSial Defi,mce of Tyranny i11 tJu: \\'Tar
on Teffor (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2.01)6).
12.6. 'The Whi te House, Sheer: T he Terrorist ro the U.S. Home-
land,., 2007, hrtp://www.whrrehouse.gov/ne,...-s/rdeases/200 7/071200707 17 -2.hrml;
see lmdligc:nce Esnmare, Terrorist T hreat to the U.S. 1-lomdond ...
On Algeria, see also Robert Frsk, TJN! Grt!at W'a.r for Civilisation: Tl1e Conquest of
the Mtddie East, re\'. ed. (london: H arper Perennial, 20061, 719; Min iter, Sbadow
W.1rs, 89.
12.7. For usdul hisronc1l backgr-ounds, see Asher K.1.ufman, Rtzmin.g PIJoeneci<l:
ln &arch of ldemity i11 Lebanon (london: I.B. Tauns, 2004), Fawwaz. Traboulsi,
A HtsUlf}' of Modem Leb,mon (London: Pluto, 2007); Frank lin P. Lamb, Tire P.rice
We Pa)': ,-\ Quarter-Centur)' of lsmel's Use of Amtncan \Veapons Civ1li11ns
m Lebanon (Berrur: lebanon, 2007).
12.8. Kichol:Js Blanford, K.tlltng 1\.fr Leb.mon: The of RtJ/ik Harm
and Its Impact 011 t/Je hf1ddie fast (london: l.B. Touris, 2006 ).
12.9. For the vanous resolutions, see http:J/www. u n.org/documents/scres.htm.
130. Tanq Ali, ..Mid-Point in the ,\.fiddle Easr?" New Review 38 (10061: II.
131. Geraud de Gcouffre de I:J Praddlc:, .'\moine Korkmaz., and RafJ.ellc Maison,
'Lebanon: A Court without the: law," Le Afonde Diplomatique, Aprrl 2007: 2.
131. Robert Rabil, Syria, the V1zited States, and the \\'l'aro11 Terror i11 tbe Middle
East tWesrport, Conn.: Securi ty Internarion::tl, 2006); Da,rid W. Lesch, 71u
New Lion of Damasws: BasJ111r .md Modcrn Syria (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale Uni,rersit)' Press, 10051.
133. George W. Bush, speech of February 1, 2005.
134. Paula J. " Remarks on Release of Country Reports on Human
Rights Practrces for 2004," Fcbru:Jry 28, 2005, http://w,.vw.srate.gov/glrls/
rm/2005/4279 3.hrm.
135 . Charles Glass," An ,'\sS:Jssm's I...:Jnd," London Rezie1v of Books, August 4,
2005: 18.
136. juan Cole, Sacred Space atld Ho ly War: The Politics, Culture, and Htstory
o{Shi'ite Islam {London: J. B. T:1 uris, 20011, 194. Generally on Habollah ::1nd its
role as terroris t and organrzario n, see Ahm::1d Nizar In the Path
of (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syrocuse University Press, 1004); Mona Harb and
Rc:inoud L:enders, "Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism,' a nd lhe Politics o f
Perception... Third \'(/o.rld Quarterly 26, no. I t2005); Augustus Richard Norton,
Hezbollah: ;\ Short History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univcrsit)' Press, 2.007);
and espccrally judrth Palmer Harik, Hetbollah: Tin! Changing Face of Terrorism
(london: I. B. Tauris, 2004).
137. Seymour M. Hersh, "Warchr"g Leb:J non: Washrngmn's Interests in Israel's
War," August 14, 2006, http:/twww.newyorker.com/fact/contentlanicles/060811fa_
fan; see Seymour M. Hersh, "The Iran Plans: Would President Bush Go m War to
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3 217

Srop Tenran from dtc: Bomb?.. April 8, 201)6a, hup:l/www..new)'orker.corrv'

facr/conrc:nrlaniclesi06(}4 17fa_fact.
138. :\hud Benn, War Planned Momhs m Advance=, " :\oiarch 8, 2007,
hnp://www.haaretz.comlhasc:n/spage-s/SJ 454 9 .hrml.
139. Nonon, 134-35.
140. Sayyed Hass.'ln Nasralla h, Voice of Hez:bollaiJ: Statements of Stl)yed
1-la.ssan Nasralh1IJ, e<J_ Ntcholas Noc= (london: Verso, 2007), 389. Like bin Laden,
N:tSralloh needs. to be: rca d. In t he= words of his translator for t he= rc:cem Vers.o c=di-
rion of has writings, he= is. a powerful omror: Hassan Nos.rallah's mastery
of the: Arabic la nguage: c-.mnot be divorced from nis dc=vonon to Sha'a Islam, the
srrc:ngth of his polincal comictions, his pc:rsonalit)', and hts public appeal as. o
and rc:hgjous lc=adc:r"; St"e Ellen Kcno nc=h Khouri, 'Trans.laror's Note,"' in
Sayyed Hasson Nasrallah, VoiCe of The Sldtt'metJts of So:J)')'ed
NasroJ/lab, cdttc:d b)' Ntcholos Nee (London: Vc=rs.o, 2007), 19.
141. On rhe destruction o f infr-astructure= as a ta.ctic of state, sec Stc=phc=n
Gralurn, Gc:opohrics: Baghdadand:\fter," 36, no. l (20041; Stc=phc=n
Graham, ed., Cities, \Var, and Tcrronsm: Towards o:111 Urlxm GcopoiiJics (Oxford:
Bbckwdl, 2004); Stephen Graham, 'Car.ic:s and tnc= 'War on Terror,'" lttlem.:1lionai
]oum.ll of UrlJ.:-ttJ and Regtom:l Rt>Se.nciJ 3(), no. 1 (10061: 155-76.
141. On the background to trs reconstruction efforts, St"e Orc:n B;1rok, "Lebanon:
F::liJure, Collapse, o nd Resusciranon, in St<lle Failure and State \VL'aknt'Ss in a Tune of
c=d. Robc=rr t Rotbc=rg (Cambndge, World Peace: Foundation, 1003).
143. Roy, The .-\lgebra of ln(imte justifc, 120.
144. Hank., 1-lL'z;hoUniJ, 132.
145. Roben Fi;S,k, Pit)' the Lcbanott at \\'lar (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
siry Prt'S.s, 1990), 131; sc=c= Dc:rc:k Gregory, 'The Dc=atn of the Ci.,tlian?"' Elwiron-
ment <111d Plmming D: Soc1et) <111d Space 24, no. 5 (2006): 633-38; G regory, ... In
,-\norhcr Time-Zone, the Bombs Fall Unsa fely...."'
146. Sara Roy, The Gato Strip: The Pol1tic<Jl Econoltf)' of De-Detoclopment
(Bcirur: lnsritutc= for Palcstmian Studies., 2001 ); Failing Peace: and tin?
Palestiniatt-lsraL'II ConPict (london: Pluto, 1006); Weaz.mo n, Hollow Land, chapter
8; Edward W. Saad, Peace m1d Its Discontents: Gaz:a-]criciJO 1993-1995 (London:
Vintage, 1995).
147. Indeed, as Khalidi nott'S., 'many lc=ga.l experts bc=Jic:\'c= tnar Is rael rc:mams the
occupymg power" because= of such restrictions; sec: Rashid Kho lidi, "'Wnat Hamas
l\(ust Do: On the Palestiman Prisoners' Document," Lottdon Rctr1crv of Books,
july 6, 201)6. Generally on Gaza, sc=c lmcrnorions l Crisis Group, Gaza,"
Middle East Report No. 68,2007; and on Homas, Azzam To mimi,:\ 1-listOt')' from
Wl1tbitt fKorthampton, O li ve Branch Press, 10071.
148. Norton, 90.
149. St"e, fo:r c:x.amplc=, Voice of fle zboliafJ, 240, 319, 34 7, 358-59,
383, 387; Natm Q.15sc=m, The Stat}' from Wilhitt, trans. Dalia Khalil
218 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3

(london: SAQI, ..!004), 132.. It is worth noring mat since:- 1972, the: Untrc:d .Smtc:s
has cons1stc:ndy rc:solutions. c ri ncal of lsrad.
150. Asher Kaufnun, Owns me: Shc:-baa Fal11ls? Chro nicle: o f a Tc:-rmo-
nal Dispurc:-," Mtddfl! Emt joumai 56, no . 4 (2002); Doc:s Not Mat rc:r: The:
Shc:baa Farms in H istory ::111d Comcmpom ry Politics," T ill! MIT El!!ctmnic ]o11rrtlll
of Middle East St11dies 6 (20061; Hamuh, l 11 the Pmh of 1-lizbulfllh, 96; 1-l arik,
Hl!zbolfah, 139-42; Rabil, Syrtl, rbe Uwred Stdtl!s, aud thl! \\'far 011 Terror m
the Middle fast, 122- 24; Internatio na l Crisis Group,
Rc:-nc:wc:d Conflict," M tddl!! mr Report N o. 59 (2006). Benn.,
suggests mat shortly before:- the:- 2.()(}6 wa r, a sett lc:-menr was being acti\el> discusscd
as a means to implement Resolution 1559.
151 . Han Pappe, Th!! fthmc OeaiiSiug of p,Jiestiue (Oxford: Onc:-world, 2.006 ),
175,239.
151. Dc:rek Gregory, Undc:r Siege:-, .. 602.
153. Sc:c:- 1\h chad Sorkin, c:d., i\gainst the !X1<Jil (Nc:w York: Greenwood Press,
2005).
154. Eyal Wc:u.m:m, Snaron a nd rhe Gc:omerry of Occupation, .. 1003,
hnp:J/ www.opendemocracy.nc:-r. On t his., sec:- also Yc:-nezJcel Lc:in (with. Eyal
Weizrnanl Lmd Gr<Jb: l sraels &ttiement Poiicy i11 the \\'fest Bank Uc:rus:.1 lc:m:
B'Tsdc:m, 1002)> Kl.:tus Biescnbach, c:d., Territoril!s: !si<Juds, Camps, 1md Other
St<JUs of Utopia (Koln: Walther Konig, 200JJ; Seg.'lland Weizma n, "'Tne Moun -
ui n : Principlc:s o f Buildmg in Hc:1ghrs," m A Civilian Occuplltion; Gluzi-Wahd
Falah, Peace:, and land Seizure m Palestine's Border Area," Tlmd Wfodd
Quarterly 15, no. 5 (..!004)1 Sam Roy, Duba i on t he fl.1editc:rranc:a n': On
Gaza's Fururc:, .. London Ret,iew of Books, November 3, 2005; Orc:n Yiftachd,
Etlmocracy: Lmd and Identit)' Politics in Jsraef/Pail!sltne ( Philaddph1a: Unwc:r-
my of Pennsyhani:.l Press, 2006); Wc:12m a n, H ollow L<Jnd; Haim Yacobi, ..The:
:KG01zarion of Space:: Dllc:-ntm:.ls o f Social Change, Planmng Policy, a nd the:- l sradi
Public Sphere," f.twiromnent tm d Planni11g D: Sonet)' a11d Space 25, no. 4 (2.007);
Ja mjJ H 1lal, ed., Where Nou. for Plilesti11e? Till! Dem1se of lhl! Trvo-SJ-atl! Sol11tion
(london: Zed Books, 2007).
155. U.N . Security Council Resolution 141, November 'n, 1967, The situa-
t ion in the:- 1\t iddlc:- East. "
156. On Resolution 1 42, scc: also Derek Gregory, T1Je Colonial Present, 89.
157. The \Vhi(c:- House:, 'The N:.1rional Security Strotegy o f t he:- United Sta(es o f
America, .. 2006, hn p://ww,v. whitc:housc.gov/nsc/ns.s/2.006/nss2006.pdf.
158. Roy, 'A Duba1 on rhc Med iterranean," 17.
159. U.N . Security Council ResolutiOn 1.559, Sc:-p(cmbcr 1., 2.004, m uation
m rhc: Middle: East . ..,
160. Fssk, Pit y 1111! Nation, 262.
161 . Hersh, leba no n."
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3 219

162. Grorge W. Bush and BI:J ir;speech of j uly 19, 2006; sec: Bush a nd Blair,spc:ech
of July 2.8, 2006; Condoleezza Rice, 'Special Briefing o n Tr:nd ro the Mtddle Easr
and [urope," july 21, 2006, hnp:/lwww.state.gm/secrerarylrm12.0{)6/6933 l.h ttn.
163. U.N. Sc:curit>' Council Rc::iOiuuon. 1701, August 11 ,2006, situation
in rhe :\otiddle Ease."
164. T he Taif Accords, November 5, 1989, htt:p://www.mide:lstweb.org/tai f.
htm; sec Tmboulsi, .-\ Htstory of Modem Lebanon, 241-46.
165. T he report of rhe Fore-ign :\ffuirs Committee, Globul .Security: TIN! Middfe
East (l ondon: The Sr.--mona r)' Office, 2.007), 50-51, prondes figures for
166. Sayyed Hass:.1 n Address," August 9, 2006, hn p:/1
news.bbc.co. uk/ llhi/world/mtddle_c-:asr/4 779757. srm.
167. BBC News, "We blocked U.S. pla ns'-Hezbollah," jul) 29, 2007, Imp://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/mtddlc_c-:a.st/6920908 .sttn.
168. Cite-d m lnce rnarional Crisis Group, '"l eba no n at a Tnpwue," Middle E..zst
Bri4Jng No. 20, 2006.
169. Gilbert Achcar, with M iche-l W':lrschaws_ki, The 33-Dil}' War: Jswd's War on
HezbollaiJ 11t Lebanon md Its Colo.: Paradt,gm, 2007), 45.
170. NasraUa h, Voice of Helho/lah, 361.
17 1. Harb and Leenders, Th) Enemy," 191; sec Cole, Sacred Sp,lcc and
Holy \Var, 182; H amzeh, In the Pat1J of 48-58; H .mk, Hezbo/Jah,
chapter 6; Achcar, T1Jt! 33-Dil}' War, 25-26.
172. Grorge \V. Bu.s.h, speech of August 14, 200"6p.pec:ch of August 3 1, 2006.
173. Sec Na.s.rallah, Voice of 4()"6-S. Anoushiravan Ehtes.hami a nd
_\,fa hjoob Zwetrt, Ira-11 and tile Ri.sc of Its Ncoconsenatiles (London: J. B. Ta uri.s,
20071, I 0 I , pur rhc at S50 mtlhon from Iran.
174 . Nasralla h, Voice of Hetbo/lah, 395.
175. lbtd., 405-6; sec Qassem, Hhbuffah, chaprer 2.
176. C:.1iro Agreement ofthe Arab League, 1969, http://www.Jebanese-forces.org/
leba nonlagreementslca iro . htm.
177. O n the Pa lestinian refuge-es generall y, and those in Lebanon. specifica lly,
sec: Schulz, wnh H ammer; Tin! Palcstim an Diaspora; and on the camps and the-ir
history, see Bernard Evcr}day j ihad: The Rise of Mil1tant Islam among
Pale-sliniatls m Lcbmwn (Cambridge, Jt.h ss.: Hanard Umvc:rsity Press, 2007).
178. Qucxed in Duncan Campbell and Clancy Chassay, Wo rn Clashes
t\(ay Spread Amid Fury at Lebanese Army," .\Ia} 25, 2007, htt p://w ww.gua rdian.
co. ukls)' rialscory/0,1087 870,00. html.
179. Grorge W. Bus h, speech of May 21,2007.
180. Q ucxed m Ma rk T ran, '"Leba nese Troops Shell Palesrinia n Refugees," f\tay
1 1, 1007, hrt:p:f/www.guardja n.co.uklsrri:J/storyl<l.,2 08467 1,OO.html.
18 L Sc:-rurity Council/9024, Sr.aremC'nt on Leba non," May 23, 2007,
htcp:llwww.un.org/NewsfPressfdocs/2.00 7/sc902 4. doc .htm.
220 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3

181. TIJe N e1v Liorr of Damascus, 166.

183. Rabil, Syria, U11ited Stlltes, cmd tiJe \t1ar 0 11 Terror 111 tbe Middle East,
141-42.
184. Th.:- United Smres provided a ju!irific:uion for atmck in Apnl 1008,
alleging J-.:orrh Korean assistance in building a nuclear r.:-actor. 5: fmp://news.bbc.
co. 364269.snn.
185. Rabil, Syria, the United States, 1md th-e \Varon Terror, 162.
186. Cited in Fis k, Pity tlu Nation, 127. On rh1s period, :stt also Trabouls1,
A Histor)' of Modern Leb,morr, Part III.
187. Rabil, Syria, the United States, cmd tiJe \t1ar 011 Terror 111 the Middle East,
Ul-32.
188. Coughlin, Ammcarr .illy, 187_
189. Tiu Nerv Lio11 of Damas.ws, 181-83; Rabil, S)ri11, the United
States, and the War 011 Terror 111 tbe Middfe &1St, JJ-l4.
190. Juhan Borger, Michael White, Ewen :.\oiacAsklll, and Nicholas Wart,
'Bush Vetoes Syna War Pb.n," ,'\pril 15, 2003, hrrp://www.guardian.<o.uk/Iraq/
Story/0,276J,937105,00.h.nnl; see Lesch, The New Lio11 o f Dmnasms, 184-5.
191. Tariq Ali, "Mid-Pomt in :.\oiiddle 10.
191. The full inrerim report of the Wmograd CommissiOn as available onl)
m Hebrew. For an official Englis h summary, :stt http://online.wsj.com/publid
resourct'S/documentslwinogradrepo.n -04302007. pdf.
193. For a discussion of rhe context, International Crisis. Group,
'Restarting lsraeh-S)rian Middle East Report No. 63, 2007.
194. Richard Perle, James Col ben, Charles Fairbanks, Jr., Douglas Robcn
Locwenberg, Jonatll3n Torop, David \X1unnser, and Meyra\' Wunnser, "A Oean
.'\New Srmregy for Suring Rea lm," The l ns.nrute for Ad,J.nced Sua-
regie and Political Studies, 1996, hrtp:/lwww.iasps.org/s.tratl.h.tm; George Packer,
Tf1e Ass.assin's Gate: Americ<J itl {raq (london: Faber and Faber, 201)6), 30.
195. Anron Bregman and jihan EI-T:J hri, The Fi(t) Years \Var. Israel and the
Arabs (london: Penguin, 1998), 272; Wa rren I. Cohen, Amer1C11's Failing Empire:
U.S. Forl!'i gn RelaJiom since the U!ld War (Oxford: Bb.ckwell, 2005 1, 110-11;
see Rabll, Syria, the United Stales aud tbe on Terror itl tbe "'1idd/e East,
105-13.
I 96. Perle et al., ..A Cleo n Break."
197. George W. Bush, speh of August 14, 2006.
198. Paul Rogers, Global Securitym1d the War on Terror: Ef1te Power arrd the
lllrmon of Control (london: 1008), 20 I.
199. Rogers, A War on Terror, 48; Kenneth j . :1 nd Sorna l-
dand: Terrorism, Pohrical lsbm, a nd State Collapse," in Bauling Tl!'rrorism irr the
H orn of .!{{rica, 39.
100. See Paul \Volfowitz., w1th James Dao and Eric Schmitt," Tbe New
York Times, January 7, 2002, nttp:J/www.fas.org/ncws/usa/1002J(}II502wad.htm.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3 221

20 l. Kansremer in Comm im:e on ForelgJJ Relarions, 'Samaha: U.S. Policy

Opnons. Hearing before the Subcomminee on African Affuirs, of lhe Commirree
on Foreign Relations, United Srates Sen:ue," Febru:uy 6, 2002, 7.
202. Walter S. Clarke and Roben Gosendc:, Can a Collapsed Stale
Reconsrimtc: Itself? .. in State Failrtrl1 aud State \\7t'a.lwess in 11 Time of Terror,
133-35.
203. Roland 1\larcha l, Polirical Dynam1cs m rhc: Somali C ivil \Var, .. in
Islnm Its Encmi11s in the Horn of i\{rica, 11 6.
204. Oarlce and Gosc:nde, "Somali.1,.. 133; sc:e P. Woodward, Tl1e Hom of Afnca,
2.3-!4, 65.
205. Rotbcrg, Horn of Africa and Yemen/ 10; see Bob Woodward, Slate
of Denial: Bush at War, Part Ill, espec1all)' 136- 37; joakim Gundd, "Humanirar-
i:m lnter\'enrion in the New Security Environment: Policy and Operarional lmpli-
orions in Somalia and Somaliland,"' Humanitarian Policy Group BJ.ckground
Paper (london: Overseas Oe\dopmenr Institute, 2006).
206. Rotbcrg, Horn of Africa and Yemen,"' 10.
207. See :\ndre le Sage, Statd11ss justice i11 Somilfta: Formal1md R11fe
of Law ImtiatiL'CS, Centre for Humannanan Dialogue Report, 2005, 28-29; Stig
jarle Hansen, 'Tug of War: Termorial Snifrs in 1'\onhern Samaha, .. }a11e's Intel-
ligmce Revit!w (December 2007).
208. Somalia, 66.
209. Shay, The Red .Sea Terror TriatJgle, 80.
210. Marchal, " Islamic Political D)namJCs an t he Som;J ii Civil 114.
21 L Shay, The Red .Sea Terror TriatJgle, 92.
212. Menknaus, 'Soma lia and Somaliland, .. 47.
213. See Deborah L Terrorism in t he Horn of Africa and
Yemen," World Peace Found;1t1on Report 40, 2005.
114. "'Soma lia and Somaliland, .. 23.
215. " Islamic Political D)namJCs m t he Som;J ii Ci,ril War," 114.
116. P. Woodward, Tbe Hom of /t(rica, 76.
217. Richard Holbrooke, To &1d a War (New York: Modem Library, 19991,
117.
218. See Bin laden, Messages to the W!orld, 54; H1s Own Words," 194;
Menkhaus, and Somaliland, .. 39; P. Woodward, U..S. f oreign Po.fic} and
the Horn of Africa, 731 Burr :1nd Colbns, Ret,olu!lonary S11dan, 114.
119. Alex de Waal, 'The Politics of Dest:JbiJizalion m the Horn, 1989-2001,"
in Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, 2 19, n. 13.
120. For th1s skepric1sm, see J\'1enkha us, Somaliii, 66; :\i enkhaus, "'Somalia a nd
Somabland," 47; and Rash1d, Taliban, 135.
22 L Hiro, \Var without End, 277.
112. De \Vaal and :\bdd Salam, Africa, lslamism, and Amenca's War on
Terror,"' 2J I.
222 NOII:S 10 CHAPIEA 3

2.23. A War on Terror. 69. 95; :\ic:nkhaus. Somalia, 67- 68; Mc:nkhaus.
'Somalia and Somalil:md." 39; Waal and Abdd Salam, "Africa, Islamasm, and
Amc:rica's 'War on Tc:rror,"' 2.46-47.
2.2.4. Mc:nkhaus, and Somaliland, .. 39.
2.2.5. Mc:nkhaus, 12 , 35, 72.
2.2.6. lc: Sage:, Stateless }ttstice m Somalia.
227. Mc:nkhaus, Somalia, 71- 72, 74; "Somalia and Sornabland,'" 40.
2.28. Mc:nkhaus, Somalia, 71; "Somalia a nd Somahland," 40; !;("<: R01:bc:rg, "The:
H orn of Africa and Yc:mc:n," 8-9.
2.29. Mc:nkhaus, Somalia, 12-13, 7 1.
230. Ibid., 12-13, 35, 75.
231 . BiiJ Kdlc:r, 'The Question o f Power," ! mcma!IOIWI Herald Tri-
bttnc, Fc:bruary 10,2003.
231. Rotberg, "The Horn of Africa and Yc:men," S; SC'c: Stephc:n A. Emerson,
'The: Trans--Sa haran Arc, .. an f las1Jpoints in tiJe Wdr on Terronsm, cd. Dc:rdc S.
Rt:'lrc:ron and j effrey Stc:vc:nson t\1urer (Nc:w York: Routledge, 2006).
233. Mc:nkhaus, Somali<l, 10, sec: 16-35.
234. Mc:nkhaus, "Soma lia and Somaliland," 46, a lso SC'c: !vlc:nkha us, Somafid,
80-8 1.
235. Wc:sr, "Combating Terrorism in me H orn of Africa and Yemc:n," 6.
236. Ibid., 6 .
237. Gundel, "Humanitanan lnter"ennon an the: Nt:'lv Sc:rumy n"ironment," 16.
238. See Chronic Failures iiJ tbe WtJr otJ Terror: From l t{ghmmtan t o Somali;J
(london: T he: Sc:nlis Council, 10081.
239. See U.S. Depanmenr of Stare:, "'Somalia : Eli m inatang rhc: Terronst Th rc:at,"
2007, !79 3 SJ . ht m.
240. See Cedric Barnes and Harun H assa n, Rise a nd Fall of
Islamic Courts," Cha tha m House Briefing Paper ,-\FP BP 07/02, 2007.
241 . See P. Woodwa rd, U.S. Foreign Policy and tiJe Hom of :Vnca, chapter 2.
241. David H. Shinn, Go\ernanc,e and Terrorism,,. in 8attlmg Ter-
rorism in the Hom of l\frica, 110.
243. Angola, Rwanda, and Uga nda appeared o n inirial Lists, bul the coalition
rapidly reduced in siz.c. Ethiopia a nd Eriuea ha\'e since Withdrawn.
244. Shinn, Ethiopia," 1 12-13 .
245. Shay, Tlu: Red Sea Terror Trim1gfe, 97.
246. Sec .\<lenkhaus, Somalia, 9; Sh:Jy, Tile Red Sea Terror Triangle, 97.
247. Reported in Wc:st, "'Combatang Terrorism an the H orn o f Afnca and
Yemen." 4.
248. De and .r\bdel Salam, lslamis m, and America's '\ Var on
Terror,"' 223.
249. Ibid., 238, 247-48.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3 223
250. Dan Connell, ''Erirrea: O n a Slow Fuse.ft in Rattling Terro,.ism in the Horrr
of Africa, 89.
251. BBC News. '"U.S. Pred1crs Zarq:l\vi Africa Flighr,,. August 25,2005, hrrp:JJ
news.bbc.co. uk/2.1li/afnca/4 L85596.stm.
152. Joint Chiefs of Sraff. Mi litary Strategic Plan for rhe War on
Terrorism, ft 2006, http:l/www.ddensdink . m]l/qdr/docs/2.005-0 1-25 -St rategic-
Pian. pdf.
253. :\bdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, Somalia's Furure," specchat Cha1ham H ouse, Feb-
ruary 22., 2007. hn p://www.chama m house.org..uk/publ ica rions/papersfdownloadf-1
id/44 3/file/4076_220207ahmed.pdf. J-4.
254 . de Wa.tl and Abdel Salam, ''Africa, lsln mism, and America's "War o n Ter-
ror,"' 232.; see Rim Abrahamsen, "A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Afnca and
Brimm's '\Varon Terrorism,"' Retiew of Afriam Political Economy 102 (2004 1:
677- 84.
255. Sec CommiSSion for Africa, Our Common Interest: Reporr o f the Com-
mission for :\Inca, 2.005 . www.commissionforafric;J. ..org/enghshlreporrltherepon /
mglish/11-03-0S_cr_reporr.pdf.
256. Condoleczza RICe, ''Spcc1al Bn efing on Tra\el ro rhc East and
[urope. ft Ju l)' 2 1, 2006, htrp://www.srate.gov/secrerary/rm/2006/6933 1. hnn.
257. Tony Ulnir, speech of Augusr I, 2006 .
258. George W. Bus h, speech of March 29, 2005.
159. Benjamin and Simon, T l1e Age of Sacred Terror, 2. 11- 12.
160. George \V. Bus h, speech of August 12., 2.00"6 .
26 1. Newt Gmgrich, Third World W;1 r H;1 s Begun," July 20, 2006, hrrp:/1
commenris free.guard1an.co. uk/newt_gingnch/1006/07/the_thlrd_world_ wa r_has_
bcgun .hmd .
262. Sidney Blumenthal . '"The Neocon Resurgence.ft The Guardian, july 27.
2.006, hrrp:f/w"WV;.guardian.co.ukls)Ti:J.Istory/0,. 18309l l ,OO.htm l.
2.6.3. .\in rrin Kettle, " The Special Rcla nonship T hat Sq uandcrro a Noble Cause, ft
27, 2.006, htrp:l/www.gun rdian.eo.uk/commenrlstory/O,. 1784 204,00.html.
164. Tony Blair, speeches of March 21, :\1a rch 2 7, !\b y 26, 2.006; T imothy Garron
:\sh, 'Like It or Loorhe It, ,-\fur 10 Years Blair Knows Ex.1.ctl)' What He Srnnds
For; April 26, 2.007, hrrp://www.guardian.co.uklcommem/story/0,2065453.00.
html.
2.6 5. See Ma nn, Rise of tl1e Vrdcans, 3 16 .
2.6 6. T he 911 I Com mission, Final Report of the Natiorwl Commi.s.sion 011 Ter-
mri.st .O.ttacks Upotl tl1e United States, 366- 67.
167. lb1d., 36 1-62., 367.
168. Robert H . Dorff, failed Srntes After 9/LI: What Dtd We Know and Whar
Have We learned?" lnJcrtwtiollai .Sludies Perspectiues 6, no. 1 (2005): 24 .
224 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 4

4. Iraq

I. Smith, Tlte &ulgame of GlobdfiZtltiofl, 153.

2. James .\(oorc: and Wayne: Slarc:r, Bush's Br.rin: Now Karl Rollt' Made
Bush Preside/Ilia/ N.j.: John Wiley and Sons, 2003j, 308-9;
Domke, God Willing? I%.
3. S. T.1rgets of Opporttmit)l
4. R. A. Oarkc:, .. All Enemies.
5. Donald Rumsfdd. Nt'ws Briefing-Sccn:tary Rumsidd and Gc:n.
Myers," October 9, 100 I, h ttp:Jiwww.ddc:nsc:hnk. m illtm nscriprs.lrr:1.11 script.
aspx?transcripnd=2034.
6. Paul Woliowlt7.. "lnrer\iew wnh Sam Tannc:nhaus, V.mity fair," 1\by 9,
2003, hrrp:f/www.ddensdink.mllltranscripts/2003Jtr2003(1509-depsecdcf0223.hrml.
7. Paul Wolfowirz, Umted Smres and Iraq,,. in Tl1e Ftltlm! of Iraq. ed.
John Calabrese (W::1shingron, D.C.: Middle: Em lnsriru((:, 199711 07-13; Stephen J
Solarz and Paul WoHowitz, ro 0\enhrow Saddam, .. fouiglt .-\{fairs 78
(19991 160.
8. Sec: for instance:. rht' report C hrisrophc:r Jli1e>c:r gives of a lunch with
Wolfow1u., rc:product'd in Mnrk Danner, Tl1e &cret War lo \flar. TIJe Do111ning
Street Memo and the Iraq War's Buried History (New York: New York Rc:\'IC:W
Boo.ks, 1006j, 135-36.
9. George: W. Bush, speh or January 2.8, 2.003.
10. John Prados, TIJe that Reue.ll Horv Bml1 Sold
Us a 41'\ew York: The New Prcss, 1004j, 184.
I I. George: W. Bush, speh or January 2.9, 2.00 3.
12. For a dscussion,sc:c: Jackson NynmU}'a Maogoro, "New Fronric:r:s, Old Prob-
lems: Tht' \V:1r on Terror :1nd The: N01:ion of Anricipanng llhc: Enemy,.. NetiJerlands
lnremaitotlal Law Reuierv U I (2.004J 1- 39; Chrisropher Greenwood,
Llw and the: '\V:1r on Tt'rromm': lntertlatiollal ,'!.(fairs 78. no. 2 (2002) JO 1-317.
13. D:1vid M. Ackennnn, ''lnrernational L3w and the Usc of Force
Against Iraq," Washmgton, D.C.: CRS Rc:pon for Cong;ress, 2.003, htrp:f/www.
usembassy.irJpdf/otherfRS213 L4.pdf, 6; St'C The: House:, "'Tht' Nanonal
Sc:curiry Strategy ol 1hc: United Srares oi Amc:nca," I 5.
14. PeTt'rGoldsmith, .. l\1 emoro Primt' Mimsrc:ron Iraq: Resolution 1441 ." .\larch
7.2003,hrrp:/limagt'.guardian.co.ukJs>"s-files/Gu:lrdi:Jn/docummrs/1005/0412SIIc:gaL
pdf. S3; Set' Clmsrophc:T Greenwood, "1\temomndum: The Lc:gali1y of Using Force:
ag.1i nSI: lrnq," Selecr Commirtc:t' on Foreign Afiairs Mmutc:s of Evidence:, 2.002. hrrp://
www. publica rions.parhamt'nt.uk/pa/cm200203Jcmsc:kcrJcmfaff/ I 9612 l Ol 406.h rm.
S24. On llhc: lc:g.J.I issues abou1 the w::1r, parricularly concerning lord Goldsmith's
ad\'ice to the: Brrrish gmernment, see Goldsmirh, ro Prime: Mmister on Iraq;
Peter Goldsmirh, Legal for rhe Use of Force a gains Iraq," March 17,
2003, hrrp://www.guardian.co.ukJiroqfStoryJ0,2763,14 71659,OO.hrml; St'C Stuart
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 4 225
EJdm, "Bia1r, Nro-conS(:nati.sm and rhe \Varon I lntq;riry," lrrterllal1onal
PoliJics 44, no. 1 37-57, rc\ised vers1on inSpac!s ofSemrity and Insecurity:
New Gl!ographies of the War Orr ed. Klaus Dodds and Alanlngr.lm (Alder-
shot: Ashgarc, 2009), 21-42. On rhe United Stares side, see Prados, 1-loodrvirrked,
and Scott Rmer; Iraq O:mfidemiaJ: Untold Story of ,-\ml!rim's lrrte/ligmce Con-
spiraC)' (london: I. R. Tauris. 2005). For extensive discussiOn of the U.N. process.
see Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, :\Flies at War. Amer1ca, Er1ropc, muJ tiJe
Cr1s1s ouer Imq (1\'ew York: i\>kGraw-HiiJ,
15. John Bolton, to the United Nations and Enclosure on United States
Amendmems," September I, 2005; S(:C Jt.hhmood Mamdam, Good Muslim, Bad
Afmlim , 255.
16. See Maogom, J\'ew Fromiers, Old Problems," J9t W iJiiam Walker, We<lp-
OIIS of Mass Destmcttorr and /ntcrrwtional Order, .'\delphi Paper 370 (Oxford:
Oxford Universiry Press, 2004),
17. See :\mony Imperialism, Sotcmgnly, and the Making of lnterrm-
tional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni11ers1ry Press, 2004), 2 75-77.
18. Sec Anoushlra\an Ehrcshami, as a Poljrical Force: in lnternanon:J I Pol-
itics," in Islam i1J World Polllits, ed. .'\nrhony H. j ohns and Nelly l.ahoud (london:
Routledge, 2005}, 46; John Agnew, Hq:mtOJI)': T1Je Nett' SIJape of GJoba{
19. For oockground, sec Percr Slugleu, Britai11 irr Imq, 19.14-1932 (london:
hhaca Press, 1976); Toby Dodge, l11venJmg Imq: Tbe Failrtre of Nation Building
a11d a 1-f1story Derril'd fl\ew York : Columbia Uni\emry Press, 2003); Tariq
Ali, Busb in Babylon: Thl' RecoJouisation of Iraq Verso, 2.003); Liam
Anderson and G:.1rerh Stansfield, The Fulurc of Iraq: Dictatorsl1ip, Democracy,
or Division? !london: Palgr.we t\!acmllan, 2004); john K. Cooley, Au ltlliancc
against Babylo11: The U.S. , Israel, cwd Iraq (london: Pluto, 2005){ Gareth Suns-
fic:ld, Iraq: People!, History, Politi,s (Cambridge: Polir> Press, 2007).
20. Anderson and Stansfield, The FrtJure of lr<Zq, 6.
2 L George \'fl. Bush, speech of March 16, 2003 .
22. George \'fl. Bush, speech of February 26, 2003.
23. George \'fl. Bush, speech of March 18, 2003.
24. B. Woodward, PL111 of Attack, 318; see Mic hael Gordon and Bc:rnard
Trainor, Cobra 11: The lnsidi! Story of l1wasion and Occupation of Iraq
(london: Adantic Bocks, 2006), 67.
25. U.N. Securiry Council Resolut10n 1441, "The simarion between Iraq and
Kuwair," No\c:mber 8, 2.002.
26. Jolln Cherry, 'Sperch on the Iraq Motion," Ausrralian Senate, .March l9,
2003, hrtp://www.democrats.org.au/spc:echcs/?spcech_id= 114l&display= I.
27. U.N. General AsS(:mbl) Rcs.olunon 3314 (XXIX), of Aggres-
sion," Decem bcr 14, 1974; sec lmp:J/www. un. org{Ocprsfdhllresguidc:lg;Jres l.
hrm.
226 NOII:S l O CHAPtER 4

2.8. Sands, Lawless \VorM: AIIU!f"IC<J and tlu! Making .md Breaking o f
Global Rules (london: Allen Lane:, 2005); ::1lso Pcrc:r Hennessy, "'lniormalir)'
and Carcuntleription: The: Bl:.1 ir Sty I.:- of Go\'ernml:"nt in War and Peace:, " Tlu! Pollti-
Quarterly 76, no_ I (2005J: J-1 1.
2.9. S.:-.:- Chnstophc:r Brc:win, "'Turkey: lkmocnuic l.c=girimaq, .. in Tiu Iraq
War and Democratic Politics, c:d. Alex D:.1nchc:\' :.1nd John :\hcmill:m (London:
9b-l 13.
30. Dommie lvkGoldrick, From '"9-11 " to tiJe lr.zq \Var 2003: lntematlonll
Lau in an Age of Complr!XIIy (Oxford: Han, 2004), 174 n. 83.
31. !Uuf Naqishb.:-ndi, .. M:unmi ning Iraq ',; Terrirorio l lmc:r,riry Is Cau,;-
mg Unned Srares' Failure :1 nd Conti nuing Hardship For The Iraqi People:,"
TIJe Kurd1stan Observer, Seprc:mber S, 2004,
Sc:e Anderson and Smns.-
field, The F141ure of Iraq, 21 Jff; Brendan O ' Leary, john McGarry, and
Khalcd S:.1lih, ed., T1Je F1d11re of Kurdtstan in Iraq (PhiJ:.Jddphi:J: lJm\'ermy of
Pennsylvama Press, 2005).
31. Sharon Korman, Tbe Rigbt of Conqut'st: Thr! Acquisition of Territory by
Force in International Law and Prattice (Oxford: CI:.Jrendon Press, 1996), 21 7,
300-301 .
33. Andrc:w Hurrell, 'Jntcrnarionol Llw and rhe r..-taking and Unmakm,g of
Boundaric:s, .. in Allen and Iv1:uguer Moore (eds.J, States, N,wons, 1llld
Borders: The EtiJics of M1.1king (Cambndge: Cambridge Um\'c:rsit)'
Press, 2003), 290_
34. Michoc:J P. Sc h:.Jrf, "Earned So\'ereignry: Juridica l Denver
]ott mal of International Law .md Polic y 31 , no. J (2003 ): 384.
35. Colin My .-\merican }orJriW')' (Neo.v York:: Random House:, 1996), 51L
36. Quotc:d in l::Jwrc:ncc: F. K:.1plon and Wilham Kmrol, Tbe U1ar oLer Iraq:
Saddam's T;mnny md J\"iission (S;m Fra nc1sco: Encoumc:r Books,
2003), 41.
37. Ibid., 96_
38. Phc:bc Man; "'lraq 'the: Day :\frc:r': lnrc:mol Dyna mics in Pos.t-Saddam
Iraq," N;wal \Var College Ret,ierv 56, no. I (2003): JJ-2.9.
39. a nd Kristol, The \\'lar otter Iraq, 97-98.
40. Sransfidd, Iraq, 158_
41. Sc:e Korman, The Right of Conqttest, 293.
41. Abu :\4uS:.Jb S1gnc:d b)' Zs rqawi, Sc:izc:d in Iraq m
2004," in Zarqawi: TIJe New Face of .-\1-Qa!'!da, Jean-Charlc:s BriS:.Jrd wid1 Do m ic:n
(New York: O[hc:r 234.
43. Gc:orge W. Bush, spc:cc:h at I, 2003.
44. l':oah Feldman, \Vhat W'e Owe lmq: War and the Ethics of Nation Build-
ing (Princc:ron, N.j.: Princeton Uni\ermy Press, 2004), I 13.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 4 227
45. Angela Schum:r ::md Jv1ilbr)' The Looti11g of the ! rdq Musettm,
&.1giJdad: The Lost Legacy of Ancient Mesopot<Jmta York : Abrams. 20051.
46. lknjamin R. B:ubc:r, Empm!: War, Tel'rorism, and Democracy
(New York: \Y/. W. Nonon, 2004), 25.
47. Fddman, \'\1hat \VI!' Owe Iraq, 113 .
48. Glo\c:r and Ewen 1\[acAskall, Pohrical Wa r that R:Jc:Jdirc:d: lnter-
vac:w wirh Sir Christopher L\1e)'c:r," No\c:mbc:r 5, 2005, hnp:l/polirics.guardian.
co.uk/araq/story/0, 12956,1635029,00.html.
49. Ou1snan Parc:nri, The Freedom: SIJadows and Hallucinations i1J Occupu!d
l l'aq (london: New Press, 2004), 48.
50. P;tremi, Tlu Freedom, 42. When the CPA was d issolved, rhc: building was
tron.slormed mro an a nnc:x o f the U.S. Embassy ro rhe nommally SO\' -
ereign Iraqi go\'ernment," Feldman, \VIJ11t \VI!' Olt!e i raq, 33 .
51. Reported in Mamn Bnghr, Jroq Envoy's Tell-All Blocked," October
16, 2005, hrrpJ/obscner.gua rdian.co.uklpohncs/storyi0,690J, 159J370,00.tuml.
52. in Iraq: 100 Da)'S coward Suriry and Frec:dom: H aghhglm of the
Renewal of lraq and rhe End of Sadda m Regime," Augosr 8, 2003, hnp:l/www.
whi rc:housc:.go\linfocusliraq/ I OOdays./1OOdays.pdf.
SJ. Gareth Sransfidd, "The Transition to Democracy in Iraq," in The Iraq War
mrd DemOCP'dtic Politics, ed. Alex and j ohn (london: Routledge,
2005), 15 1. On ropac, sec also Puenti, Tl1c Freedom, 8 8-89; l.ort:tta Napolcoru,
ImurgenJ Iraq: AI Zarqau11 and tiJe New Genera/toll (New York: Sc:\ren Stories Press,
2005); Paul Rogers, Iraq atJd tiJe War on Terror: 7itt'hte Months of Insurgency
200411005 (l.ondon: r. B. Tauris, 2006)> Rory McCarm)', Nobody Told Us We \Vere
Defelted: SJorie.s from the Nt'w f raq (l ondon: Chatro and Wi ndus, 20061.
54. George W. Bush, speeches of Novem ber 19 and November 30, 2005;
and NarionaJ Security Council, "'Nario na l Strategy for Ytctor)' m Iraq , .. 2005,
ht[p://www. w hitehousc.gov/in foe usliraq/i raq_ na tiona!_strn tc:gy_2005 I I JO .pdf.
55. Hague Con\'enrio n, Co1went1on Respectmg lhe Laws a nd Customs of \'<1a r
on land. 1907, http://lawofwu:.org/hague_l\'.hrm, ,o\rticle 43.
56. Feldman, What \Ve Owe Iraq, 54-55.
57. Oare Shorr., Srntcment," Ma} 12, 2003, http://nc:ws.bbc.
co.ukll/ hi/uk_politics/3022 1J9stm; sec a lso Clare Shorr, .'\11 Honoumb/e Deception?
Nert' Labour, Iraq, .md the Misuse of Port.rer (london: Free Press, 2005), 169; Eyal
The Intt'rnationuf Lmv of Ocwpatio11, 2d ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Pn nceton
Uni\IC'rsiry Press, 2004J . The Genc:\a a nd H ague con\'entions can be found at http://
www.unhchr.cM1tmllmenu3/bl92.hrm and hnp:lllawofwaLOrg/haguc:_n.htm.
58. Steven Kettell, D1rty New Labour, Bl'ltish and tiJe
lm,asion oflraq (london: z.c.d Books, 2006 ), 114.
59. U.N. Sority Council Rc:solutaon 1483, uThe simarion between Iraq and
Kuwait," May 11, 1003.
228 NOII:S lO C HAPIEA 4

60. U.N. Security Counc1l Resolurion 1500, "'The= siru::mon berwec:n Iraq and
Kuwait," August 14. 2003.
61 . Parenti, T/Je Freedom, 48.
61 . L. Pa ul Bremc:r Ill, wnh Malcolm 1\!cConnc:ll, My Year itJ Iraq: Tlte SJrug-
gle to Build a Future of Hope {New York: Simo n and Schus ter, 2006), 10 l.
63. Fdd man, What We Owe 40. text o f the farwa c:J n be found m
tbid., l40 n. 31.
64. Ibid., 116-17.
65. Coolirion Provis iona l Au thonry (CPAJ, "'An Histone Review of CPA
Accomplishments,., 2004, hup ://cpa-iraq.org/pressrc:leases120040628_histonc_
re\iew_cpa.doc, 2.
6-6. Etherington, Rt!'-''<>11 on Tigris: The .1\J-Sadr Uprismg <111d the
Governing of Iraq {London: H um and Company, 238 .
67. Sec also jatJ.l Talobani and L. P:.Htl Bremer, "'Agreement on Polincal
Process,'"' No\'ember 15, 2003, htrp://www.g.loba lpoliq.org/sccuncylissuesliraq/
w hich outlines the mam contours of
t he pobricol process, including rhc: framework for the TAL
68. Short, An HonottroJble Deception?, 5.
69. Etheri ngton, Revolt on tiJc Tigris, 197.
70. Fddman, Wlhat We Owe 120.
71. Bremer, My Year m l rcJq, 360.
n. Coalition Pro\'ISIOIUl Aurhont)r {CPAj, "An H tsroric RciiiCW of CPA
Accomplishments," 44; see Larr)' j a)' D1amond, :Sqwmdcred Victory: 17Je Amcric.m
OccupatiotJ and the Btmgled E/fon to Bring Democrdcy to lraq (Nc:w York: 1imc:s
Books, 2005}.
73. Sec lmernarional Crasis Gro up, '"Unma king Iraq: A Constituriona l Process
gone: Awry," 1\hddk E.::!st Briefing No. 19, 1005.
74. Rime .'\llof, :\h ,-\ns:ui, Rosem:J r)' Holhs, Robert Lowe, Yossi Md:c:lberg,
Soli Ozd, Garc:[h Stansfield, ond Yama ni, 'Iraq in Tr:J nsitton: Vortex or Cata-
lyst?" OJotham H ouse Ease Programme Briefing Paper 04/02, 2004, 5.
75 . BBC Nc:ws, ' Iraq Ch:.1 rtc:r a Rec1pe for Chaos," August 29, 2()()5, http://
ncws.bbc.co.uki2Jhi/ middle_eastl41942 14.stm; sec: 17Je Nerv York Times, "'Q&A:
Wro ngling O\'t'r Iraq's U:mstrtution," J uly 27, 2005, htrp:f/www.nycimes.com/cfr/
mtc:rna ttonaVsloc1_071705.hrml.
76. 1\'athanj. Brown, "Consttrut1on of lmq-Draft Bill o f Rights: Commcnttt r)'
and Translot10n,., 2005, hrtp:Jlglobalpolicy.igc.orglsc:curity/issues/i raq/d ocuntentf
2005/0630btllofrights.pdf, I .
77. Fdd man, \\'lhat We Owe 78.
78. Sc:c .\<larr, trJ.q "the: Day After" "Turkey."
79. lnternario nol Cnsis Group, Do n't Rush the Consriturion, .. M iddle
Ease Report No. 41, 2005.
80. Lionel Bcc:hnc:r and Sh:.1 ro n Otterman, Drafting rhe Constmnion,"
Council o n Foreign Rdaticms, 2005,
 NOII:S 10 CHAPIEA 4 229
8 l. Assyri:.1 n lnrc:rnarional News A,gency, Jraq y I 8 Difficult
Sreps,'" 2005, hrrp://v.-ww.ama.org/nc:ws/20050891 13 11 6.hrrn; see N:.1than]. Brown,
Consrirunorul Plung.:s Ahead,'" Carne-gie: Endowmem for lnrerna-
norul Peace, 2005. 19 Brown. pdf.
82. Iraqi Constiturion 1005, trans. the .o\ssociared Press, hrrp://www.
Article 3. A l:uer \'ersion, in a differ-
em translacion, appears ar hnp://www.,globalpoliq.org{securuy/issuc:.sliraq/
documenr/2005/101 5te>:tofdrn Fr.hrm. Thas laner tex't as used onl)' for amendments.
83. Rol")' Carroll :md j ulian Borger, U.S. Rdenrs on !slamac Law ro Re-ac h lr:.1q
Deal," Augusr22,2005, hnp://www.gunrdian..co.ukllraq/Sror)'/0,2763, 1553862,00.
html.
84. Donald Rumsfdd, Consriturion Major Step ro New Way of Life,"'
:\ugusr 23, 2005, hrrp://usinfo.smre.gov/mena/Archi ve/1005/Aug/2.3-J07540.
html.
85. Reported an Sean Loughlin, "Rumsfdd on. Looting in Iraq: 'Sruff hap-
pens," Aprtl 12, 2003, hrrp://www.cn.n.com/2003/US/Q4/lllsprj.arq.pemagon/.
86. Z.:llm.J.)' Kl1:1hlz.ad, on Progrt:ss Drafting lmq's Consnrunon, ..
:\ugusr 16,2005, hnp://iraq. usembas.sy.gov/iraqi200508L6_kha liJzad_con\'ention_
cemer.htmL
87. The White House, on Iraqi lenders Submirring D rJ.ft Consriru-
rion ro As.sembl): Sraremenr by rhe Deputy Press SecreT:.lt')'," August 22,
2005, htrp:l/www.wharehouse.gov/newslrc:leases/2005/Q8/20050822-4.hrml.
88. The \Vhire House, 'Renewa l m Iraq," 1005, http://www.whilehousq;ov/
in focus/iraq/.
89. RepoHed in Rol")' Carroll, " Iraq Gamble as Sunnis LdtOut of Con:mtution
De-al," Augusr29,2005, htrp://www.gunrdian..co.ukllraq/Sror)'/0,2763, 1558602,00.
html.
90. The Guardian, and Fragile Step Forwa rd,"' Ocrober 26, 2005,
htrp://www.guardian.co. uk/lraq/Stor)/0,2 763, 1600653,00. html.
91. Paul R. W illiams and \'<illliam Spencer, Pohrical Compact,"
:\ugust 13, 2005, hrrp://www.boston.com/ news/globc/editorial_opini on/oped/
arricJes/2005108/13/iraqs_political_compactl; see Khaldzad, "Comments on. Prog-
Drafring Iraq's Consriturion."
92. Paul Reyno lds, Referendum: Milestone not Dcstinataon," October
25, 1005, hrrp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/h i/world/m iddle_ cast/43 7 5 160 .slm.
93. Sce lu1z.a Bialasiewacz.., Snmrt Elden, and J oe Pamrer, 'The Constaruti on
of EU Territory," Comparatil'l! ErJrufKan Politics 3, n.o. 3 (1005): 339-43, whach
discussc:s some of rhe general territori:J I issues in conslirutions.
94. Paul R. Wdbams a nd Frana:sca Jannotti Pecc1, ' Earned So\ereignry:
Bridging the Gap between SO\ereignry and Sdf-Dererminataon," Stanfordjourna{
of lntemational Law 40, no. L 39.
95. lmqi lmerim Consriturion 1990, http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/ lawlid/
izO IOOO_.hrm l, Article 3.
230 NOII:S 10 C HAPIEA 4

96. Llw of Adminismu1on for r:he Srare of Iraq for me Trn nsitionaJ Penod (Tran-
srrional Administrative Llw [TAL]), 2.004, htrp:J/www.cpa-imq.org{go\'ernmenrl
TALhnnl, Article 52.
97. Coalition Provisiona l Au rhonry (CPAJ, Histone Review of CPA
Accomplishments,., 46.
98. Iraqi Consmunon 2005, Prdude.
99. Ibid., Anicle 65.
I 00. Ibid., Anicle 10 7.
I 01 . Ibid., Anicle 7.2.
101. Stansfield, Tr:msirion ro Democracy in lmq," 144.
I 03. Ibid., 145.
I 04. Ibid., 144.
I05. TAL, Article 53.
I ()6 . Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Kha lilzad, on Progress Drafting Iraq's Const:iwnon ...
I 09. Ass)ria n Internationa l News Agenc)', "Iraq Assembly F:tces 18 Difficu lt
Stepso."
11 0. Stansfield, Transition ro Democraq in Iraq," 145.
Il l. For general analys.es of these issues, see Ga reth Sranslield. Iraqi lf.urdistdn:
Political Dt!Vt!lopmcnt and f.magclll Dt!mocroJcy llondon: Routledge Cunon,
2003); Tilt' FtttMe of IV1rdistan in Iraq; and T. O 'Shea, Trdpped between
tbc Map and Reo1lity: G t!ogrdpiJy and Perccptiom of K14rdistatJ (New York: Rout-
ledge, 20041.
Il l. Iraqi Consm unon 2005, AnKle 150.
11 3. Brown, "'lruq's Constmltlonal Process Plunges Ahead. ..
11 4. Ibid.
II S. Pattick Cockburn. Diary,.. London Review of Books, October 20, 2005, 31.
116. Phylljs Bennis, "'The lrnqi Ccmstit utJon: A Referendum for Dis:Jster," October
13,2005, http:f/www.lps-dc.org/commentllknnishp34constJrurion.htm.
11 7. j eremy Greenstock and john Negropontc, .. Lc:cter from the Permanent
Represenr.ati,res of the U.K. and the U.S. ro the U.N., Addressed [0 [he !President of
rhe Sc:cumy Council," 8, 2003, http:l/www.glooolpoliq .org/sccurity/iss.uesl
lraq/documentl2003/0608usuklcuer.hrm.
11 8. U.N. Security Counc1l Resolu tion 1483, "'The situation llerween Iraq and
Kuwait." May 22, 2003. On th1s [Opic in the contcx[ o f the law of occupatiOn, see
Bcnvems[i. Tilt! ltJtcmatiotwl Law of Ocmpatio11, viii-x1.
11 9. U.N. Security Council Resolu tion 1500, "'The situation llerween Iraq and
Kuwait." ,\ugust 14, 2003 .
120. U.N. Security Counc1l Resolu tion 1511, situation llerween lmq and
Kuwair," October 16, 2003.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 4 231

121. U.N. Surit>' Council Resolution 1546, .. The s1ru::nion concc:rning lraq,ft
June: 8, 2004.
122. lb1d.
123. U.N. Surit>' Council Resolution 1619, .. The s1runrion concerning Iraq, ..
August 11, 2005.
124. U.N. Surit>' Council Resolution 1637, .. The s1runrion concerning Iraq,"'
November 8, 2005.
125. lb1d.
126. Feldman, W1hat \VI! Owe Iraq, 12 7.
127. BBC News, " Iraq Constitution Rc:sulr," Ocrober 16, 2005, hnp:/1
news. bbc.co. u k/ llhi/world/m1ddle_easr/4 346322. srm.
128. Reponed in Sharon Bc:hn. 'Constrrution Headed for Win in Iraq," October
17, 2005, hnp://www.was hingtormmes.com/world/2005 1016- 11 2.542-5903r.htm.
129. Zolm.J)' Khahlzad, 'Tronscri pt of Interview with Ambassador Kh ahlz.ad,"'
Lite Ed1tion, CNN, August 14, 2005, hnp:/Jiraq.usembass)'.gov/lraq/20050814_
kh.alilz:ld_cnn.html.
I 30. Rory Carroll and Qais al-Bashir, ..Sunnis 111 Cns1s over Iraqi Constitution, ..
August 30, 1005, hrrp:J/www.gua rd ia n.co.ukllraq/Stor)'/0,2.76J, 15589 U,OO.hrml.
131. Pc:rc:r Beaumom, "Sunnis Venture down PolincaJ Parh," October 16, 2.005,
lurp://www.polirics.gua rdian.co. uk/Obse...,er!intc:rnarional/story/0,6903,1593254,00.
lltm.l.
132. Edwn rd Wong, 'Top Shiite: Politician joms Call for Autonomous South Iraq, ..
Augu.st 12, 2005, http://www. n )'ti mc:s.com/2005/08/ 12./i nternari ona.llmiddJeeast/
l liraq.hrml.
133. Glrroll and ai-Bashir, "Sunni in Crisis over Iraqi Consnruuon."
134. George \V. Bush, spc:c:d1 of October 6, 1005.
135. The: Guard1an, "/\Small a nd Frag.ilc: Step Forward."
lJ6. Simon jenkins, "To&!} We Sray m Iraq to SaYC It from Cham Is a Lie,"
Septc:mbc:r21 ,2005, hrtp://ww\v.guo rdian.co.uk/commemlsto[}I0,3604, 1574478,00.
html.
137. Feldman, \VI! Owe Iraq, 3.
138. Rory CarroJJ, "lrnq: :\ra.b Champion or Couldron of Civil War?n August
16, 1005, hrtp:f/www.guardjon.eo.uk/lraq/Srof}/0,1763, 1549724,00.hlml.
139. Oxfam, "Rismg lo rhe Humamranan Challenge: m Iraq," Briefing Paper
No. 105, 2007.
140. James:\. Baker nnd lee H. Ho milton, The lmq Study Group Report: Tin?
\Vay Forward-A New Approach (New York: Vinr.agc:, 73; see Draper,
Dead Certmrr, 4l0.
141. See Pa[rick Cockburn, "\Vho Is Whose Enc:m)?" London Review of Books,
Morch 6, 2008, 14-15; Derek Gregory, The Biopolitics of Bnghdad: Counterin-
surgency and rhc: Counter-City." Huma11 Geography I (20081: 6,...27.
232 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 5

141. George W. Bush, speh of j:muary ](), 2.007.

143. B.aker and Hamal ron, 17u 1raq Study Group Report, 45.
144. Rqlom:d in Raben Orapc:r, Cutdlll, 351.

5. Territorial Integrity and Contingent Sovereignty

I. The srr:m:gac logics of the Cold War arc set out in NSC-6 8, Nanonal
Securir:y Councal. Unired Sr.ues 0 biecrives and Progrn ms for Narional Security,"
(NSC6S), 1950.
2. Montevadco ConvC'nnon on Corwemion on Rights :md Dums of Srmes
(inter-Am<"ncan), OecC"mbcr 16, !933, hrrp://www.yal<".<'dullawwebfavalonlinrdipl
mr<'r:l m/imam03 .lum.
3. To my knowle'dge, rh<' first usc of th<' r<'rm exr<'nr of SO\'er<"ignry" as
by ]<':ln Gorrmann, T!Je Signifjca11ce of (CharlotrC's\ill<': Uninrsary Press
of Virginia, 1973, 49. The term a lso h::1s been used b> others, such as Da\ad
Kewman...Territoria lit}' and Contlter an an f:r::1 of Gloooliz.uion," in Miles Kahler
and Barbara F. Walter, eds., Te-rritoriality arrd Conflict irr <Ill Em of Globalization
(Cambridge: Cambridge Un.i\"ersary Press, 2006), 85-110.
4. Charrer of the United Nations. 1945, hrrp://www.un.org/abourunlcharttr/.
5. U.N. Genera! Assembly Resolunons. 2615 (XXV), '"Declar:nion on Prmci-
plc:s of lnr<"manonal Llw Concerning Friendl) Rebrions and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the Unared Nauons," October 14, 1970;
sec lmp://www. un.org(Dcptsld h 1/rc:sgu ide/gares l .h tm.
6. U.N. Security Council Resolutions, 242, "'The: saruarion in the Middle
East," November 22. 1967.
7. Coven.:an.r of the: League of N::1nons, 1919, hnp:/fwww.r:lle.eduilawwebl

8. The Kdlogg-Bri.:and Pacr, '"Tre::1cy bcrwt:(:n the Unned Scate-s and other
Powers pro\adin.g {or rhe ren uncaation of war as an instrument of national polacy,"
August 2 7, 1928, http://www.yale.cd u/l:lwwebJa\a lon/imt!kbpan.hrm.
9. See J,fark W. 'TheTerrrrorial lntc:grir:y J\orm: lnternarional Bound-
aries and the Usc of Force," !ntematirmal Organization SS, no. 2 (100 LJ: 115-30,
220; Sharon. Korman, The Right of Conquest; The "kquisitio11 of Taritory by
Fore" irr 1ntemallorral Law arrd Practice- (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996 ), 192-99,
238-39.
10. Woodrow Wilson, Tll'' arrd of \'Ciilson, Volume
1, ed. Albert Shaw (New York: Review of Re11aews Corporarion, 1924J, 275.
I I. Woodrow Wilson, Points Speh,,. January 8, 1918, htrp:f/www.
As Neil Smirh notes in Empire,
'the Fourreen Points were concerned w ith rerrilor)' ::15 much :Js pnnciplc:" (114).
11. See "The: Tc:rmoriallntq;nry J\orm," 219.
 NOII:S 10 CHAPIEA 5 233

13. Baron juhus Wlassics., Tlu! Territoriallmegrity of 1111d tbe League

of Nations (Budapest Territorial lntc-grir>' 19191.
14. Hurst Hannum, Limits of Sovc:l1:1g.rlt)' and Matomy Rut(:": :\finoritic-s.,
lnd1genous Peoples, and the Right to Autonom)', .. m NeuJ Directions m Human
R1ghts, c:d. Ellen L Lurz, Hurst and K:uhr)'n J. Burke: (Phil:!ddphia: Uni-
\'erslty of Pennsyhr:mia Press, 1989), 7.
15. Korm:.1n, TiJe RrgiJt of Conq11est, 17.
16. lb1d., 135-36; gc:nc-r:tlly, Smith, American mprr-e, 139-80.
17. lb1d., 26; Parric1a Ca rle:)', Sei(-DetermintJtion: Territorial
Integrity, and the Right to Secession, Peaceworks No.7 D.C.: Unite-d
Sr.ates Institute of Pc--.:tcc:, 1996J, v; joshua Castelli no and Steve :\Hc:n, Title UJ Ter-
ritory mlnternatronnl Law: A Temporal An11lysis (:\ldershor, UK: Ashg.;Jte, 20031;
Anthony Carry, PIJilosopiJy of International Law (Ed in burgll: Ed in burgh Univer-
sity Prc-s.s, 20071, 89, 92-93.
18. Korm:.1n, Tbe RrgiJt to Conquest, 182-83.
19. lb1d., 214.
20. Se(:" jeffrey Herbst, 'The Cre:.1t10n and Mamrenance of
ies in .-\friu,fl Intemattonnl Organisation43, no. 4 (J989J.
21. Treat>' E.smblis hing a Constitution for Europe, August 6, 2004, http://ue.eu.
intfigcpdf/enl04/cg00/cg00087.en04.pdf; see B1absi(:"wicz, Elden, ;1 nd P.tinrer, "The
Constitution o f EU Territor)',.. 333-63.
22. Z..:.cher, 'The lmq;riry 222.
13. Vienna Convention on Succession of Stares in Res.pcct of Trearies, August 23,
I 978, hnp:l/unrrrory. un.org/ildtextsfinstrumenrslcnglish.lcon\'Cntionsl3_2 _1978. pdf.
24. Organization of .-\frinn Umry, 'Cairo .. 1964,
co.z.aJAFIRegOrg{un ity_to_ unionlpd fslooufuoglbHoGAssem bly 1964. pdf; s also
Robert H. j:.Kkson., "Quas1-Stares, D ual Regimes., :.1 nd Theory: In ter-
national Jurisprudence and the Th1rd \'\1orld," fntemalional Organisation41, no. 4
( 19871; S. Akwc:end:.1, lnternationnl Larv atJd the Proteclio11 of Namibia's Territorial
Integrity; Boundarti!S t1nd Territorial Claims (The Hague: Kluwer law fn.tcrnational,
1997), 4 9-51.
25. :\otarl.:us Komprobst, of Border Dispute m African
Reg1onal Sub-5ystem.s: West Afnca and the Hom of Africa," journal of
Afodem African Studies 40, no. 3 (2002); Z..:.cher, "The Territorial lnreg;riry Norm."
16. On d1is, sc:c Sre\en R. Ratner, "Drowing a Bc:trer line: Uti and
the of New States.," T1Jc ,-\mt!'ricatl ]oumal of lntemntional Law 90, no. 4
( 1996J; :\k\\'nda, ltJti!I'JWtionnl Lmv tmd the Protection of Namibm 's Territorial
lmcyrity, 47-49; Castdlinoand Allen, Title to Tt!rritot}' m lnternaJJouaJ Law; Enrico
:\fdano, Unlmvful Territorial Sit11ations in l1ltcrnat10naJ Law: Rt!concliing E(fcctill-
ness, Leg,llity, and Legitimacy (Leiden, Holland: Marrinus Nij hoff, 2.006); :.1 nd, above
aU, SuZ:Jnne L:Jionde, Detenni1sing Bo.rJrularies .i n <1 Ccmflicted T1u! Role of Uti
Possidetis (Montr(:":.ll :.1nd Kingsron: McGII I's-Queen's Unnersit)' Prc-s.s, 2002J.
234 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 5

2.7. See jessica Griffith Prendergast, and Territorial lnregrit)'

m Conrempornr)' Russia, .. i \ Ne!t' Russia11 Heartla11dl WorkLng Paper I, 2004;
Vladim1r Kolossov, and Pohrical ldenur.ies and Terri ronaliries in me Post-
Soviet Space, .. G !!o]ouma/ 4S, no. 2 ( 1999); _\,fcFaul, Scwer-eignt)'
Scnpt: Red Book for Russ1an Revolutionari es, .. in Probl!!mattc SOl>ereigtJty:
ContesJed R11i!s and PolttiCAJ Possibilities, !. Stc.-phen D. Krasner ll\'ew York:
Columbia Universit)' Press, 20()]); L1 j idi, Fragmentation: Toward a
Theoretical Understanding of t he Tenitonal Power of the Sure, .. Sodologim f
TIJoory 10, no. 2 (2002); Carley, Self-Detemunllion, 11- 12{ H endrik Spruyt, End-
mg fmptr-e: Contested and Tl!fritorial Par-tit10rr (It haca., N.Y.: Cornell
Uni versit} Press, 2005).
2.8. American Ind ian law Alhance cr a l. , Right of Peoples to Sdf-
Detcnninauon and Its Applic:nion to Peoples Under Coloma! or Alien Domina-
tion or Foreign Occupation,"' prcsenrcd to Commission on H uman Ri ghts, March
8, 2004, htrp:l/www.unhchr.ch/ Hur idocda!Hundoca.nsf/(Symbolj/E.CN.4.2004.
l\GO. I33.En?Opendocumem.
2.9. On the siruanon bdorc th1s, see Colin H . Will ia ms, "'The Right!i of Autoch-
t honous r-.lmomics in Concc.-mporary Europe, .. in The Political Geograpif} of the
New Wo rld Order, ed. C. H . Williams jLondon: Belhaven, 1993).
30. jennifer Jackson Preece, "Nationa l Minority Rights\':>. State So\'ereignty m
Europe: Changing Norms in lmcm:monal Rdarions ?,. Nations aJtd Nalionalism 3,
no. 3 (1997J: 363.
31 . Con ferc.-nce on Surir>' a nd Co-operation in Europe, "'Document of the
Copenhagen !\'[ec."nng o f the Conference on the Human Dimension of !he CSCE,"
june 5-29, 1990, hrtp:llwww.osce.org/docslenglishll 990- 19991hdlcope90dmn;
Conference on Security and Co-operario n in Europe, of PJ.ris for a New
Europe," :Ko\embcr 19- 21, 1990, hrtp:l/www.lui.org/doo/Pans90.html.
31. Akwecnda, lntematiotml Law and the Protection o f Namibia's Teffitoria f
lntegriry, 6; sec Akwecnda, "'Termorial ln[egrity: A Bn ef Anal>sis of a Complex
Concept, .. Revue tl/ricaim: de dr-ott inttmmtional et compar-e I ( 19S9j : 500-506.
33. R. j. Vincent, Noninterz<ention and lntematiDilal Order IPrince[on, N.j.:
Pnoce[Qn University Press, 1974), 134, c1ring Goodnch and H ambro, 1949, 104.
On jurisdiction, sec RichardT. Ford, "law's Terri[Qry (A H1smry o f Ju ri.sdiction),"
m The Legal Reader-, ed. Blomley, Da,id Delancy, and
Rich:u d T. Ford (Oxfo rd: Blackwell, 100 I hand for a thoro ugh a nalysis of related
1ssues, see .\fila no, Unlawful Terrztorial Sttsmtions in ltJternational Lmv.
34. For example, Zacher, "'The Territoria l Integrity :Korm "' Komprobsr, "The
.lvlanagement of Border D l:>pute in Afncan Regional Sub-S>stems."
35. However, sec Henbc:<rto Cairo, Field of Hc[crorop1as of Terri tor)'
and War," Political 23, no. S 1009-36; John Williams and Tim
Roach, securrty, TcrriroriaJ Bo rders and British Iraq Policy: a Blair Way to
Geopolitics I I, no. I l-23; Abdclhamid El O uaJi, Territonal
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 5 235

lnregnry: Rerhmking the Terrrronal Smereign R1ghr of rhe Exisrence of rhe Smres. ft

Geopolitics I I , no. 4 (20061: 630- 50.

36. u, "State fragmenmuon," 141.
37. These: rdlect:ions are m pan inspin:d by Salman Rushdi e's
novd Shalimar' the Clown (New York: Random 2005J . this novel
speaks to the "war on terror" more rhe here are on the case
of Kashmar (sec: p. 961.
38. K B.'lrneu and Finnemore, "The Politics., a nd
Parhologic:s of !nrc:manon::J.I Orgo nizations.," l!lfcnwtional 0.-ganisation 53, no. 4
(1999): 713.
39. U.N. General Assembly Rcs.olmion 2.615 (XXVI, O<tober 2.4, 1970.
40. :\lien Buchanan, "Theories of Sc:cc:ss.ion," Ph1losopl1y rmd PubliC 1\{(airs,
2.6, no. I (1997): 33.
41. Corley, &1(-Dctl!rminatlon, ..-; 1\tolcolm N. Sh.aw, lmematlolml Law, 4th
cd. (Combridge: Combridge Unl\'c:rsitr Press, 1997). 354-55.
42. U.N. General Assembly Resolutions., 151 4 (XV), "Declaration of the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Cou nmes and Peoples.,"' December 14,
1960; see sc:e also U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions., l 541 (XVJ 'Principles Which should Guide Members.
in Determini ng Whether or Nor an Obligatio n Exists to Trans.mit the Information
Co iled for under ,-\mde 73 c: ofthe December 15, 1960; sec: hnp://www.
un .org/Oepts/dbVresguidc:lgares l.btm .
43. Herbst, "The Creation a nd Mainten::J.ncc: of National Boundaries. in Africa,"
686; :\lain Pellet, "The Opimons o f the Bad inter i\rbirruion Comrnmc:e: A Second
Breath for rhe Self-Determination of Peoples," Europeml journal of international
Luv 3 ( 1992): 179.
44. for s.ec: Counc il of Europe, Loc41 Self-go!'ernmetlt, Te"ito-
"'al Integrity, and Protection of Mi11onties, Proceedings of the UmDc:m Sc:m-
nar Organisc:d in L:lUsonne o n April 25-27, 1996 ( 19971: espec ially Asbjorn
Eide, "Territorial Integntr o f Minorily ProttJOn, and Guarantees for
Autonomy Arrangements: :\pproachc:s and Roles of t he: United 1\'auons,.l Hursr
Hannum, 'Territorial Auton om): Perm:ment Solutio n o r Step toward Secession?"
2000, http://www. zd.dc:/download/c:thmc_conflictlha n n um.pdf1 Hans-Joachim
Hc:intze, "Termorio l Autonomy: A Possible Solution of Sc:lf-Derc:rminarion
Conflicts?,. Paper deli,ered ar Autonomy for Pap11a- Opportunity or IIJJ1sion?
Conference, j une: 4-5, 2003; sec: http:llhome. snafu.defwatc hin/ AfP200Jheintzc:.
hrm.
45. P. Scharf, Sovereignty: Underpinmngs,,. DenVI!f
journal of l ntcnwtiona{ Law and Policy J I, no. 3 (20031: 381 .
46. Fabry, Norms of Termorin l lntegnt}' ond the
of rhc: 1990s," Global Society 16, no. 2 120021: 1541 H:1nnum, The
of Smereignty and .\lajority Rule:," 9.
236 NOII:S l O CHAPIEA 5

47. Stiph:.1nc: Dion, Dc:mocraric Govc:rn:.1nce and me: Principle: of Territorial

lntegnry," july l 6, 2003,
archl\'e&Sub=Arriclc:s&Doc=20030716_c:.hon.
48. Dion, 'Dc:mocraric Governa nce: :.1nd the: Principle of Territorial lnrc:grit)'."
49. Li, Fragmc:nrarion, .. 145.
50. Zacher, "The: Territorial lnregrit)' 1\"orm," 235.
51. Andrc:w J. Bacc:vich, American Empire: The Realities mrd Consequences of
U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, Harvard Universtry Prc:s.s, 2002 ), 157.
51. Zacher, "The Tc:rrirorial lnregrit)' 1\"orm," 232-33.
53. Tony Bla1r, speech of April 8, 2002.
54. See also Grorge Soros, The Bubble of American Supumaq: Tl1c Costs of
BttsiJ's W!ar in Iraq tl\"ew York: Public Affairs, 2004), CJ7.
55. Sc:e Luu. Kle\'enun, The New Great G11me: BlooJ and 011 in Centrtll Asi1J
(london: Atlantic Books, 2003), 63; jeffrey SteYenson caucasus," m
F/nsllpomts itJ tile o11 Terrorism, ed. ReYeron and M urer, 87-11 4.

56. Councd of Foreign Relauons, LJsrTurkestan lslam1c .. 2005,

hnp:J/www.cfnerrorism.org/groupslcrim.hrml.
57. Li, Fragmc:nranon," 153; Dru C. Gladne)', Muslim Chinese: Erb-
mc N,uionalism m tlu: People's Republic (Cambndge, Mass.: Harv.ud Um,c:rsit)'
Press, 19961; Dru C. Gladney, in fl,zsllpomts m the \Var 011 Tc,.-rorum,
ed. Rc:,c:ron and Jvlurer, 2.25-45.
58. S:.1nbran Knshna, Anxiety: rhc: Body Politic
m lndi:.1," in 01allenging G/ob11f Flows, Terr-itorial ldelltltics, ed.
M. j. Sluparo :.1nd H. R. Alker (1\tmneupolis: Uni11ers1ry of Minnesota Press, 1996 ),
203-4; K:.1 ni5,hk:Jn Sath:.1si\'am, Vnmsy Ncighbou,.-s: India, Pakisl.zn tmd U..S.
Fo,.-eign Poluy {:\ldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1005J; Rup:.1l Oza, contr:Jpunral Gcog-
rapbic:s of Threat :.1 nd Sc:currty: The: Unite-d Statc:s., IndLa, and lsr:Jc:l,,. Enmmnml!nt
and Plmming D: SoCiety and Space 2.5, no. I (2007).
59. For a d1scuss1on, 5 In ternational Crisis Group, and Russia:
Clashmg over .-\bkhaz1a,,. Europe Report 193, 2008; and http:l/w,YW.crisisgroup.
org/bomc:lindcx.cfm?id=562J&J= 1
60. See Robc:rr H. jackson, #ttlemationnf Relations,
and the Third World (Cambndge: Cambndgc: Uni\'c:rsity Pres5, 1990); Michael
Barnett, "The :-.lew Umrcd Nations Polirics of Pe-ace:: From Juridical So'rcrc:ig,nt)'
ro Empi rical Sovereignty," Global Govcmattce 1, no. I l l 995 ); Dominik Za um,
Tfn? Sowreig111y Pamdo.x: The Norms and PolitiCS of International Statcbuildmg
(Oxford: Oxford UnivCTSit)' Press, 1007J> more genc:r:.11Jy, Stephen D. Krasner, Sov-
c,..eignty: Orgalll:f.i!d Hypocrisy {Princeton, K J.: Princeton UnivCTSit} Press, 1999).
6 1. See http:f/www.bbc.co.uk/l>bcfour/documentarieslfcarurc:s/placcs--rh:Jt-<lom-

62. Buchan:.1 n, of Secession," 4 7.

63. Ibid., 47.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 5 237

64. lb1d. 50.

65. lb1d.
66. lb1d.
67. U.S. of Foreign Tc:rmrist Orga nizations,"'
2.004, Cong.rc:ssional
"Foreign Terrorist Organi2:.1 rions," 2.004, hnp:J/www.fas.org/irplcrsl
RL32113.pdf; Scharf, Soverc:ignt)',,. 373.
68. U.N. General Assembly Rc:solurion:s., 49!60, Measurc:s ro
Terrorism," December 9, 1994; see hrrp:l/w\VIv.un.org/DeptsfdhlfresgmdeJ
gares l.hrm.
69. Paul R. Willi.tms, :\.t ichad P. Scharf, and james R. Hooper,
ing So\erergnr>-Bascd Connicts: T h.e Emcrgmg Approach of E.1.rncd So11ereigmy,"'
Dellllff }Olll'lla{ of /mernationai umand PoliCy 3 1, no. 3 (2003j .
70. M. Weber, " Polrrik als in. Gesdmmdte Pr:>lillschc Sdmftcn,
510-11.
71. Connoll)', Idcntii)'IDif(erctJCt!, 206-7.
72. Tony of ApniS, 2002..
73. M. Kent Bo lton, U.S. Fore1g11 PofiC)' and lnlcrllationcJi Politics: George
\V. Btdb, 9111, cJIId tile Global- Terromt Hydra tUpper Saddle Rwc:r, N.j.: Pearson,
10051, 158.
74. AmeriCdll Empire, 66.
75. Grah:Jm T. .-\Jbson and Robert D. BkJCkwill, America "s Stake in the So\'ic:t
Future,"' foreign Affairs 70, no. 3 (199 LJ: 77-97.
76. George Bush and Brent Scowcrofr, A World TraJJsformed (1'\ew York: Vin-
mge, 19981,517.
77. U.S. rkpanmcnt of State, S:Jys U.S. Supports Tc:rritori:JI Integ-
rity of Ukraine,,. J\'o,c:mbcr 29, 2004, htrp1/usmfo.statc.go\/eurJ..\rclmd2004/
Nov/29-256007.html; U.S. Department of State, Non-Violent,
Steps ro End Ukraine Crisis,,. 2004, htrp1/usmfo.statc.go\/eurJ..\rclmd2004/
Dc:c/02-269514.hrml.
78. Viktor Yanukov1ch won t he first, disputed election.; Viktor Yushchc:nko
won the: second, rerun one:.
79. :\dri:Jn Monck and Ha nJe)', "'The Secrets of Chicken The New
Statesman, fkcembcr 6, 1004; SteYe CoJJ, Ghost Wan:, 544.
80. Q uoted in Paul R. Williams and J ames R. Hooper, "Earned So\ereignty:
The PolitiCal Dimc:ns1on," Dc11Vi!r }our/Uil of !ntemational Law m1d Polic)' 3 I,
no. 3 (2003): 370.
81. R::!jat Ganguly and Ra)'mon.d C. Taras, Understat1ding Etlmic Conflict:
The Intcmt1tional Dimmsion (london: Longm:Jn, 2005).
82. Jonarh:Jn "The: United States,Sc:cessiomsr Mo\'ements, a nd StabiJ-
ity," presented at rhc: Canadi:Jn I Science: As:s.oci:Jtlon, \Vinmpcg, J une: J-5,
1004, http:/fwww.cpsa-a.esp.c:J/!XIpcrs-2004/Paquin.pdf.
238 NOII:S 10 CHAPIEA 5

83. U.S. Department of State, .. H is.tOI)' of rhe Depanrnenr of Sr:ne during

the Clinton Presidency, 199}-2001)," 100 1,
c6059.htm.
84. See R1ch:ud Europe 1md tbe Recog1zitio11 of NeuJ St<1tcs 111
Yugoslm1a (Cambndge: Cambndge Pr=o, 2005 1.
85. See Mi1oje,ric, ..The !Pnnciple of Ncm-lmerference m the Internal
Affa1rs of Sr.ues, .. Facta Vnl!le,-sil<ltis: l..tJtu and Politics 1, no. 4 (2000); Marek
St. Korowicz, Introduction to Jmernaflo,wl Law: Present Co,ceptioiJS of lntema-
tiona/ l..tmt in Theory and Pract1ce (Jbe Hagt1e: Nijhoff, 1964J, 157ff.
86. U.N. General Assembl)' Resolutions , 2131 (XXI, .. lnadm1ssibilny of Inter-
ference in Internal Affuirs o f Sures a nd on Protection of Independence and Sov-
ereignty," December 2 1, !965, lmp://www.un.org/Deprs/dhllresguide/g.ucs 1. h.on;
see Quince)' Wright, /tJteJ<n<ltional l..t1w and tht UJJited Nations lNew Delhi: Asia
Publishing H ouse, 19601, 63; Vmcem, Nonintert'e"/1011 and lntemational Order.
87. Vincent, NollitJterrre,tion lllld lntcrnallonlll Orda, 33 1; see lnter-
natiotJal Law, 784-85.
88. Carnegie Corpomtion, Pret>'e niing DMdly Co11flia: Final Report wi1l1 Exec-
tttil't! Summary (New York: Grncgie Corpomtion, 1997); lnternauonal Commis-
Sion on lntef\'enrion and Stare Sovereign!}', 'The Responsibi lity to Protect," 200 1,
hnp:J/www. iciss .ca/pd f/CommiSSion-ReporL pdf.
89. Francis .\t Deng, Sad1k1d Kim:uo, Terrence Lyons, Dona ld Rothchild, and
I. Wi lliam Zanman, 5ot't!reignty as RNponsib1l1t y: Conflict ll1llnagement 111 Afnm
(W:JShingron, D.C.: The Brookings lnsrirution, J996J.
90. U.N. Security Cou ncil Resolution 1244 , .. O n rhe s iruanon relati ng to
j une 10, 1999.
91. The Rambouillet Accords.. "Interim Agreement for Peace Self-
Government in Kosovo, .. February 23, 1999, http://\\'1,VW.monde-<lipJomatlque.fr/

92. For see Robin Cook, ..Message ro t he Serb !Prople," :\pril 1,

1999, http://\\'1,VW.frceserbia.nct!Docurnents/KosovoJCookJ.hrrnJ, for :Jn
Fabry, .. lntern:JtiOil:ll 1\orms of Territonal Integrity and th.c Balkan Wars of the
1990s"; Paul R. .. Ea rned So\ereignty: T he Road to Resohing the Con-
fhct over Kosovo's I Smrus, .. Dem,er journal of lnternaliotml Law and Pof1cy
3 1, no. 3 (2003j: 387-430.
93. .. Earned Sovereig.nt)'," 41 L
94. Yugosl:Jv Government, .. Protest to U.N. on Kosovo, .. At1gust 19, 1999,
hnp:J/ag:irprop.org.aulstopnatoll9990820borba.php.
95. Robin Cook, T1Je Pomt of Deparlurc: Diaries fwm tin! Front lknciJ
(london: Pocket Books, 2004), 354; see also his speech to the H ouse of Commons,
March 17, 2003, in Tilt! Poi11l ofDep11rture, 3 78. For ::1 collection of essa}s critiqu-
mg the Kosovo see Tariq Ah, ed., .11,1asters of the U11ivcrsc? N ,-\TO's
BalkatJ Crusade !london: Verso, 2000); a nd Noam Chomsky, T1u New Military
Humanism: Lessons from Kosot'O (London: Pluto Press, 1999j.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 5 239

96. ::\bdc:leine .o\Jbrighr. Madam A llondon: P::m, 20031,

384.
97. Susan Fink Yoshira, in FlasiJpoirrts m the Wdr on ed.
Re\'eron and Murcr, 79.
98. Albright, Madam &crdary, 411.
99. \V.Ihams, "Earned So\ereignry," 410.
100. ::\iart:ii Ahnsaari, "Report of the Special n.,o)' of rhe Sc-<rerary-Gcneral on
Kosovo's Fururc Status," 2007, hrrp://www.unosek.o.rg.idocreflreporr-cnglish.pdf.
101. For a useful djscussion, sec: Gian l\!arreo Apuzzo, 'Kosovo Test' for
Europe," forrhcomjng. The lnremanonal Cnsis Group has produced a series of
useful reports on Kosovo; see particularly "Kosmo: No Good to the
Ahtisaari Plan," Europe Report 182, 2007; and "'Kosovo's Sro rus: Difficult 1\l oncllS
Ahead," Europe Bnd1ng No. 45,2007.
102. Dominique de \fdlepin, "law, Force, and Jusrice," lnstirure for Srraregtc
Srudjcs, March 27, 2003, hnp:l/www.un.intffran.ccfdocumem:s_anglaisf030J17_
nue_\'allepi n_desarmement.htm. O n Hairi, see Peter Hallward, Damming tlu!
flood: Haitt, Aristide, and Politics (London: Verso, 10071.
103. ::\fjchad lg11atieff, Empire 70.
104. Olarles Kraurhammer, Dcmocr.1tic Realism; Arr America11 Forl!ign Policy
for a Umpolar World (W::1shin.groo, D.C.: The AE.I Press, 2004), 5.
105. For a range of perspecti\es, see J:ar:.n Chopra and Thomas G. Wei5.s,
ercignry h Xo longer Sacrosanct: Codifyang Humanitarian Jn.rencnrion, .. tiJ-
ics and lntcmatlott.li ./\{fairs 6 11991 ): 95-117, Sranlc)' Hoffm.1.nn, "The Politics
and Ethics of !vlilirar)' lntef\en.non," Smvi1al 37, no. 4 ( 19961: 19-5 1 Kenneth
J. Menkhaus, Emergencies, Sratc Collapse, and Nauon.al Sccunry,"
National &cunly Studies Quarterly 4, no. 4 ( 19981: 5 3-6 1; Fram;ois Debrix,
Re-Errvistorrirrg Peacekuping; The United Nations and tin! ll1obilhattoll of Ideol-
ogy (MannC':lpolis: Uni\ersacy of Press, 1999); Nicholas]. Sav-
ing Strangers: Humanitarian lntenmtio11 in lntertwtional Socil!ty lOxford: Oxford
University Press, 20001; 1\lichad Dillo n a nd Juhan Reid, "Global Go\crnance,
Laberal and Complex Emergency,'" Altematwes 25, no. I (2000): 111-38;
Duffield, Grobal Got<emarzcc and New Wars; The Merging of Devel-
opment arrd &c11rity (london: Zed Books, 2000); Duffield, Dc!!C!Iopment, &cu-
nl); and Urrcrzding Wm; Nicolaus :VIills and Brunner, cds., Tbc New Ki/Jing
fields: Massacre and the Politics of frrten<ention ll\"ew York: &sac Books, 10021;
&ic Heinze, "Waging War for Human Rights: Toward a 1\loral-l..cg.al Theory of
Huma ni tarian lntencnnon," Human Rigbts and Hwmm \llel{i1r-e 3 (200.>): 83-94;
Kimberley Zisk ::\iarrin, Enforcing the Peace: Learning fr-om the imperial Past
(New York: Columbia Uni\ersny Press, 2004); Roland Paris, i \1 War's Errd: Build-
iflg Peace <l{tcr Civil Conflict University Press. 20041.
Some of this work dmws upon an earlier liter:uure on ,ust For the class1c
statement, sec !vhchacl Walzer, just and Unjust .1\ witlt Hts-
toriall Illustrations, second cd. (New York: &sac Books, 1992).
24{) NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 5

106. Hall AmeP'IC<m Gfobal Strategy and tbe '"' \Var on TeP'roP'ism ''
(AJdershor, UK: As hgate, 2005). 175 .
I 07. Labour Parq, Labour P< lrly M1mi{esto (l..cndon: L1.bour Party, 1997).
I 08. Robin Cook, .. Speh on the Erhical Policy, .. .\.b)
12, 1997, htrp://www.gu:Jrdian.eo.uk/erhical/0,2759,181072,00.1mnl.
109. John K.umpfner, Robin Cook (London: Phoenix. 134, 2.16 .
110. ibid., 216; John K:.1mpfner, Blair's \Vars (London: Free: Press, 2004); Rob
Dtxon and P:.1uJ Wilbams, on Debt, Tough on !he Guses of Odx? New
l..abour's Third W:.1y Foretgn Policy," British ] osmiJJI of Polihcs <md lnttmiJJiionaf
R'1nt1ons 3, no. 2 {2.00 1); Rir.1 Abrahams.c=n and Poul Willi:.1ms, .. Erhtcs and Foreign
Policy: The Antinomies of New Labour's 'Thisd Way' m Sub-So.lharan Afnca, .. Politi-
cal Studies 49 (200 I ); Tim Dunne, \'Vhen the Shooting rts': Ad::mrimm in B.ricish
Secumy Srratq;y," lnJeniJJti01ml .-\{(airs 80, no. 5 (2004); O'Jvid Coares and jod
Kriegel; Bl.lirs \Var (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Coughlin, Amerimn .ill)\
Il l. Wesley K. CLark, A1odem \Var: Bos11ia, and the future of
Combat York: Public Affatrs Press, 1002), 73-74, 79-80.
111. Clark, Wuging Modem \\'l'ar, 264-65, 330-31,411, 414-45, 46 E.
I 13. Ton)' BLatr, speech of April 22, 1999.
11 4. Ibid. :\lso, sec: Phi li p Stevens, Tony Blair: T1Je MakiJJg of a \'Ciorld Ltader
(New York: 162, 170.
115. Cited in :\nthony Seldon, B/,lir (London: Free Pr1:ss, 2.005), 407.
11 6. Ton)' Blatr, speh of june JO, 2000.
11 7. For the \'orious U.N. Security Council Resolunons, http://www.un.org/
documents.lscres.htm.
11 8. Kofi A. Annan, 'Two Concepts of So11ereigmy," TIJe Economist,
September l 8, I 999, hrtp:l/www. un.org/:-l"ews./os.sg/sg/s.tories/artKie Full.asp?
TID=33&Type=Arttde.
11 9. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Kofi Annan, '"Three Cnses a nd the Need for .o\mencan Leadership,n m
Debating Globalization, m Anthon)' Ba rnett, Da,id Held, and Caspar Hrnderson
(Combridge, UK: Polity, 2005), 138.
121. Kofi Annan, "When Force Is. Cons idered, There lsl'\o Subs.ttrute for legtri-
macy Pro\tckd by United Nations.,"' General Assembl) Address, September 13,
2002, http://www.un.org/News!Press/docs/2001/SGSM83 78 .doc.htm.
123. Ibid.
124. United Nations, "Draft Outcome Document, .. 2005, http://www.un.org/
summit2005/0ro ft_ Outcome 130905.pdf.
125. lnternario nol Commission on lmervc:ntion and Sute Soveretgnt)', "The:
Responsibibry ro Protect," 13.
J 26. Zaum, The Souereignty Paradox, l S.
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 5 241

127. lnrc:rn::n:lonal Commission on lnrc:r\c:nrion a nd St:uc: So\'c=reignry, ''The

Rc:sponsibiliry ro Protc:ct,ft lJ.
128. Unitc:d NatioJU, .-\More Secure World: Ottr Shared Rl!spomibrlity: Report
of tiu: Higb-Ler!t!l Panel OP1 Threats, CiJ,lflePrges <md CJJaPrge
(New York: Unm:d Nations, hnp:l/www.un.org.lsc:cureworld/reporcl.pdf,
66; also sc=c: Unitc:d Nations, /11 Larger .Freedom: Towards Dt:velopmi!IJt,
and Human Rrghts for Ail: Report of the .Secrl!tary-Genl!ral (Nc=w York: United
2005), hn p://www.un.org/brgcrfreedom/conrc:nrs.htm.
129. Unitc:d Nations, Outcome= Document," 2005, hnp:l/www.un.org/
summit2005/Draft_Outcome 130905 .pdf, 139 .
130. Unitc:d N:mons, A A1ore Secrre W!orld, 6 1.
131. Michad V. Bhot:io, WtJr <Jild itrlrmft!nJion: ismt:'s for Cmtemporary Peace
Opemlions (Bloomfield, Conn .: Kumaria n Press, 2003), 7-8.
132. Tony BtJ.ir, spe<ch o f March 5, 2004; sc=c: Paul Rc:yno lds, 'lnter-
narionol Comm umry' 2004, hnp://news.bbc.co.ukJ2/hi/uk_newsl
poliucs/35 39125 .scm .
133. Tony Bloir, speech of March 5, 2004.
134 . Walzc:r, "The: Argument :1 bour H umanrrari:.m lnrenention," D1ssc111
49, no. I (1002.): 2.9-37.
135. lb1d., 120.
136. David Good h:1rr, "Tony's World," Pmspl!d 77, 2002, hnp:l/www.
prospecr-magazine.co.ulc/print:Jrticle.php ?id=5347 &category= 151 &
aurhor=&Aurh Kcy=6a507ccS bfS5 75 bc:654c::.cS4c8d 7b79d.
137. Wilham j. Omron, .. First Ina ugural Address," j :Jnu::.r> 10, 1993, hn p:/1
www. undefed.com/EduSrufl!HistDocslclinton l . html.
138. Jacquc:s Rogues: Truo Essays on Reason , rrans. !Pascale-Annc Braulr
and Naas [Stanford, Conn. : Sranford University Prc:ss, 2004), 103.
139. Demda, Rogues, I OJ-4, c1ring Noam Cllomsk)', Rogul! Stdtl!s: T1Je Rule of
force m World Affmrs (C:Jmbridge, Sourh End !Press, 2000), 4.
140. T he: Wl1ite House, 1\ariona l Security Srraregy o f Eng,agement a nd
Enlargement," 1995, http:l/www.dtlc.mil/docrrindjeiJresearch_pul>slnss.pdf.
14 1. Sc=c: Prter RidddJ, 1-lug Oose: Blmr, Clinton, Busb and thl! ".Special
Refa-lionsh;p "[London: Politico's, 1003J, 59.
142. S1dncy Blumenthal, The C linton \Vars (New York: Farrar, Straus a nd
Gtroux, 2.003), 789.
143. ltrcoiJerl!llf Empire (Lond on: Verso, 2003), 2; sec Durido,
Rogues, 95- 96, 98.
144. Ch:1 rlc:s Krautlummcc, "The Umpolar Forc;gn Affa;rs 70, no. 1
( 1990): 23- JJ.
145. Ch:1 rlc:s Kmurhammc:r, Unjpolar Era," in The Imperial Tense: Pros-
pects atrd Problems of i\meriC<111 Empire, ro. Andrew j. B::.ce,ich [Chicago: lv::. n
242 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 5

R. IRe, 20031,60. For :1 discuSSion, sc:e Jam.:-s 1\nderson, "Aml:"rican Hegemon)'

afrer I I : Allies, Rivals, Conuadicri ons," Geopoliti,s 8, no. 3:
(10031.
146. Krauthammer, Democrati R11t1/ism, 5-6.
147. Lind, Made in Texas: George and tlu! Sortthern Takeouer
of .-\mer1can Politics (New York: B:lSLC Books, 2004), ll4.
148. Cited in S:.1nds, Lrwless \Vorfd, 89.
149. See Neil Smnh, The Endgamt of Glob..lliZAUioiJ, 193; Zbigniew Brzc-z.insk1,
TIJe CIJoice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books,
2004), 2JO n6; Stdan Halper and Jon:Jthan Clurke, America Alo11e: The Noo-
Consertldtives and the Global Order (Cambndgc:: C.1.mbridge Um\c:rsit)' Press,
2004), 122-29.
150. john Bolton, to the Umred l':ario n5. :.1 nd En closure: o n Untted Smtes
Amendments," Sc:ptem ber I , 2005.
151. Ste\'em., Tony Blair, 188. See Condolttzza RICe:, "Campa1gn 2000: Promor-
mg the lnterc:st," Foreign A{fa1rs 79, no. I (2000), http://www.foreignaffuirs.
org/10000 I 0 I faess:Jy 5/condolc:ezz..a-rice/camp:l ign-1000-promori ng-rhe-n:.Jtiona 1-
mterest.html; Harper and Oarkc, i\mmca Alorre, 134-35; James Naughrie, Tbe Acci-
dema/ Ammrun: Tony Blair and the Prestdcncy (london: lv1aomUan, 2004), 7J.
151. Steven5., Torty Blair, 10 I.
153. George: W. Bush, spc:c:-ch oi j une I, 2002.
154. For sc:e land, Made i11 Texlu; Domke, God \'flilling?;
Thomas Fr:1nk, \VIhll's the Matter with Km1s.asi H ow Consen,atwes Won the
Heart of America (Xc:w York: Owl Books, 2004); Ke\'10 Philltps, Amer/C<l/1
TIJeocraC)'.
155. Ashton B. Carter, john 1\L Deutch, and Philip D. Zdikow, eaosrrophic
Tc:rrorism: Elemc:ms oi a Narion:1l Policy. Visions of Go\ernancc for rhc Twen.t}-
Farsr Century project, 1998, htrp:l/www.ksg.h:.J mlrd.edui\'ISionslpubllcation/
rc:rrorism.htm.
156. l\'tchob5. Lemann, Xex't World Order," :\pril I, 2002, htrp://www.
newyorker.com/fact/con.tc:m/?02040 Jfa _ FACf see Hugo Young, .-\ New lmpe-
nalism Cooked Up over a Texan Barbecue,'" April 2, 2001, http://www.guardian.
co. uk/commentlsro:ry/0,3604,677 31S,OO.html.
157. Rich:1rd N . Haass, 'Defining U.S. Foreagn Pohq in a Posr-Post-Cold War
World: The 2001 Arthur R05.s lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association,"
Aprii?J, 2002, hrtp://www.sotc:.gov/slplremf9632.htm.
158. Sc:e \\i'eslc:)' K. Clark, Winmng i\-"iodcm Wars: {raq, Terrorism, and the
Amcrica11 Empire (New York: Public Affai rs Prc:ss, 2003), 126-18.
159. Rich:1 rd N. Haa55., F.xistmg Raghts, E.vol\mg Respon5.ibi li-
rics: Remarks ro rhe School of Foreign Ser'>'ace and the J\l orora C<:mer for l n.tc:r-
narional Srudies, Gc:orgemwn University," January 14, 2003, http://www.st.ltc:.
gov/slplrem/2003/16648.hun .
 NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 5 243

160. Haass, ''Sonn1gnty"; sc:e also The Opportunity: Amai<<l's Momelll

to .-\Iter History's Course (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).
16 1. Srewan Pamck, "The Role of the U.S. Go\'c:rnmc:m in H umamranan lmc:r-
\'c:nnon," Apri l 5, 2004 , htrp:!/www.starc:.gov/s/plrc:mf3 1299.htm.
162. U.S. Oc:parnnc:m of Dc:fc:nsc:, :Karional Dc:fc:nsc: Srrarc:gy o f The
Unitc:d Statc:s of Amc:ria.," 2005, htrp://www.globalsc:curacy.org/milimr>lhbrary/
poliq/dodfd20050318nds l.pdf, I.
163. Philip Bobbitt, TIJe Shiefd of Ach1lles: War, Pe11ce, and tiN!" Course of His-
tory tHann ondswonh, UK: Pc:ngum, 2003).
164. David Frum and Richard Pc:rle, A1J &1d to E1il, 102.
165. lb1d., 102-3; sc:c: also Kevi n Phillips, ,-\rrrerican Dyrr11siy:
fortllne, .md tile Politics of Deceit itJ the House of Bml1 (Nc:w York: Pengui n,
20041, 60-6 1, 224-26; Soros, Tlu Bubble of .-\mt!ricatl Supremacy, I 02-3.
166. Shawcross, .\111es, 59.
167. Sc:c: Ka mpfnc:r, Blair's Wars, 21 6-17.
168. Tony Bloir, spc:c:ch of No\c:mbe,r 16, 2004.
169. Tony Bloir, spc:c:ch of Apnl 22, 1999.
170. Tony Hloir, spc:c:ch of October 6, 2004.
171. Badimc:r Arbi1r.1rion Committee:, 1992, hrrp:l/www.c:jil.org/
jou II art 13. html.
172. lnrc:rnarional Coun of justice, Concerning the Fronric:r Dtspute
Burkina Faso/Repubhc of l\lah," Dc:cembc:r 22, 1986, hrtp:l/www.icj-cit.org/icjwww/
icasc:sliHVM/ ihvm_isummanc:s/ihvm_isummary_ 19861222.htm; sec: G!std lino and
Title UJ Territory in l fll crllatiorral Law, 125-3()> Suzanne: l:J Determin-
iflg Boundaries m a \'llorld: Tl1e Roll! of Uti Poss1di!iis (Montreal and
Kingston! McGill's-Quc:rn's Univers ity Press, 1002), 127-32.
173. Sc:c: Pc:llet, ..The: Opinio ns o f t he: Badintc:r Arbm;uion Committee:," 180;
Colin "Statc:s ond Re-cognition in l ntcrnarionol Law, .. in fntematioflai
L.11u, ed. M artin D. E\o ns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 200Jh Za um, Tl1e
Sovtreignty Pamdo.x.
174. Rotner, "'Drawing a Bc:ttcr l me," 613-14 .
175. David Owen, Balknn Odysse)' (Orlando: Brace:, 1997J, 34. For
fuller accounts of the: bordc:r issues., sc:c: Da,id Campbc:JJ, National Deconstructtorr:
V1olencc, Identity, aud j ustice in Bosuia (r..h nnc:apolis: Uni vcrsiry of Minnesota
Prc:ss, l 9981; David Ca mpbc:ll, "' ..\pa rthc:1d The: Political Anthropol-
ogy and Spatial Effects of International Diplomacy in Bosnia," Politic<1l Geogm-
p/ry l 8, no. 4 ( 1999).
176. Rotner, "'Drawing a lkttcr l me," 617.
177. lb1d., 624.
178. Halim Moris, "Self-Determination: An .-\ffirntarive Right or Mc:rc: Rheto-
ric?,. Tl1e II...SA ]oumai of l ntematiotwl and Law 4, no . I ( 19971,
htrp:/lwww.tamilnarion.org/sdfdetc:rminarion/97moris.bnn.
244 NOII:S lO CHAP IEA 5

179. Scharf, 'Eamffi So\'ereignry," J86.

180. Freeman, 'The Righr to Self-Determinanon m Intern I Poli-
rics: Six Theories m Search of a Policy,., Retiew of l"temJJflo"al Studii's 15, no. 3
(19991: 358.
I 81 . Scharf, Ea rnffi So\'erc:ignry;' J 74.
181. WiJli::u ns c:r SoYc:reignry-Basc:d Conflicts, .. 350 n4; also sec:
Sovereignty," 392.
183. 'The rruth is tlur so\c:reigmy is nor some nugical commodiry, which lies
locked up m a vaulr at Wesnninster. It is nor hkc: \'lrginity-either you have 1r or
you don't--as Geoffrey Howe has f;a mous ly argued"; see Lc:on Rritm in, ..,.. Pro-
European Policy for Conser\'acives,"' jul) 2 1, 1999, hrtp:Jicore2.ng.org,.uld
pu blic:J tionsJprocuropc::J n poliq.html.
184. Public lnrem:Jnonallaw a nd Policy Group (PllJ>G), Sovere1g,my,"
2003, htrp://www.publicinternario nal l.aw.org/arc:aslpc:acebuildmg/carnc:dso\'/.
185. PILPG, 'Earned Sovercignt>"'; see Williams, So\cre1gnry," 388-89.
186. Scharf, 'Earnro Sovcrc:ignry," 387.
187. and H ooper, 'Earned Sovereignty; .. see PILPG, ..lnrc:rmroi-
atc: So\c:rc:lgnr)' :Js a Basil. fo.r Resolving t he: Kosovo Crisis;' 19 98, htrp:l/www.
pu bJ icinrc:rnanon:J Lla w.org/docsJKosovoJI nrc: rmediate_Sovercignty_as_a_Rasis_
for_Rcsolving_the_Kosovo_Crisis.doc; P;aul R. \'lltlliams and F'T;ancesca Jannorn
Pccc1, 'Earned Sovereignt)': Bndging the Gap between So\'c:reigmy and Self-
Dc:rerminauon," Stanford journal of Law 40, no. 1 (10041: l-40.
188. Sc:e Ralph Wilde, Da nzig ro East Timor a nd Beyond: The Role: of
Territorial Adminisrration," The i\merican journal of lntemattonlll
Law 95, no . 3 (200 1).
189. j . Ointon, "The Chnron Parameters: Spc:e<h ro luadi PolK)'
Forum on lsrac:b-Pa lc:stmian Violence," January 7, 200 I, hrtp:l/www.jcwis hvlrru-
allibr:J r)'.org/jsourre/Pc::Jcc:ldintplan.hrml.
190. George: W. Bush, speech of February 2 1, 2005.
191. Sec the: comparati\e :Jn;alysis from an lsr;adi perspe<twe Do rc: Gold,
'Bush Erases the: Clinton Po rametc:rs," ]erurolcm lssrJc 3 no. 21 (2004 ),
:1nd for cla1ms for :1n e:\']l:Jns io nist
Israeli tcrrimnal integrity, sec: Elya hu To ugc:r, The Trritonal flltegYtt) of Israel:
A Ltfe-Tf1rmtmmg Concern: Based 0 11 tl1e Public Statements atrd Wrttings of the
Lttb.witcher Rcbbe, Rabbi M. Sclmccrson (New York: Sichos in Eng-
bsh, 2001 ). Blai.r has sim1larly c:qui11ocared, suggc:stmg th:lt o nly viable Pa l-
estini:Jn smte w1ll not just be based Oil territory but O il democratic values" (sec:
h1s speech of 1\o\c:mbc:r 15, 2004), and that "a '' iable independent Palcstmian
srarc: means ' 'table: (a) in terms o f territor)', but (b) in terms of the inst1rut1ons of
srarc:hood ... sustainable: democrncy, the: political institutions ro go along with
It, proper sc:curit)' structures, and proper economic msritutions" l'' lntcr\'lew with
 NOlES I 0 CODA 245

Jon.uhan FrOiland and Ewc-n :\iacAskil," TIJe Guardian, 2, 2005, hrrp:J/

W\W1.guard1an .co. uk/i5raeiJSrory/O ,2763, 1428454,00.html ).
192. Scott Rrrter, Target Iran: TIJt! Truth about the White House 's Plam for
R.egune Change (New York: Nanon Books, 2006). hIS worth noring, in this con-
text, that Zalma)' Kha lilzad's doctoral thesis was on nucle:Jr prolifer:mon, with
Iron as a case srudy; see Ah 1\L Ans..1.ri, Confrorumg ll'"an: TIM Failure of Ameri-
can Foretgn Policy and the Next Great Cri$t$ in thl! ,\iiddle f.ls t York: Bas1c
Books, 2006), 200.
193. N.uiona l Intelligence Esumare, 'Iran: Nuclear Ambitions a nd Capabili-
ties," 2007, http://dni.go,r/prc:ss_relroscs/20071203Jdease.pdf.
194. :\noushm.Jvan Ehtc:shami and :\h hjoob Zweiri, Imn and tiU! Rtse of Its
(london: LB. Tauris, 2007), 109-1 9.
195. Se)'mour Hersh, Targets: The Admm1scrarion's Pla ns, for
Iron,'"' October 8, 2007, htrp://www.newyorker.comlrc:porting/2007/10JOS/
07100Sb_facr_hc:f'h?prinrabk=rrue.
196. :\ns,ori, Conf,.onting ll'"<in.
197. O thers have made: similar cmicisms of rhe immediJ.te obsolescence: of the
U.N. Chaner, wnh John Foster "The: Challenge of Our T ime:: Peace
w1th Justice:," Ameruan B<1r l'tssot:tation journal JS ( 1953), 1066- da1mi ng that
the charter was, a 'pre--atomic"' doc ument, designed for a prcnudcar world of con-
ventional warfare, where the fighting was bcn.11een states cited in Anthony Oark
.-\rend, ')mernarionol law and rhe Prc:emprive Usc: of :\iilitary Force," 2003,
reprinted m Rogue States: Preemption, Regime CJ11mge, and U.S. Pol-
icy UJWdrd lr<1n, Iraq, and North KoretJ, c:d. Akx.ander T. j. Lennon and Cam1lle
E1ss [Cambndge, .Mass.: The: MIT Press, 20041, 29. The Ol:J rtc:r WJ.s d1scussed in
the spring of 1945, and the: U.S. nuclear capacity was nor waddy known until the
bombs, were: actua ll y dropped in ,o\ugus,t; sec Arend, "International law a nd the
Preemptive Use of :\ijlitary Force:,.. 29.

C oda

L Stokes, Oti:Jer WtJr.

2. Stcc:l, Temptations of tJ Superporuer, 115.
3. Shawcros,s,, .\lites, 59.
4. Smith, Americ.Jtl Empm:, 377,379. Chapter 14 is a 11ery useful analysis of
the design of the UN.
5. For rhc: more optimasric view, sec, for example, J arat Chopra and Thomas
G. Weis,s,, "Sovereignt}' Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humamranan Inter-
vention," Ethics ar1d l ntermlliotml Affairs 6i]992).
6. Bobbitt, Tlu: Slucld of l tcbilles, 206.
7. Arrighi, of !mprmali5m, 82.
246 NOlES I 0 CODA

8. The: lirerarure on d1c: Ame-rican empire: and 1mpc:nalism 1s c:xrc:ns:ivc:. Se-c:,

m particular. Alain Joxr-, &npire of Disorder (l os Angdes, Sc:miofc:xt(o:-), 2002.);
Bace\'Kh, American &npire; Bacc:\ich., ed., Ti-M lmptrial Tense; Incoherent
Empire; Smirh, Empir'; TIN.' Nl.'fu lmperwlism; Aleja ndro Col:is
and Richard Saull, cds., TIJe W11lr OJJ Terrorism curd the nllfi"YICQJJ &npire .. ll{ter the
Cold 1X't1r (london: Roudedgc:, I\ lore: genera lly o n empire: as a memphor lor
globalization, Michac:L Hardt and Antonio Kegri, f.mplrf!! (C;un bndge, 1\tass.:
H anard Unwer:sit>' Press, 2000), for rhe1r second thougha., Multitude; \Var and
Democrac)' 111 the i\gL" of EmpirL" (New York: T he: Pe nguin Prcss, 2004).
9. J>..bnn, Firs.t Empire: of the: Twcmy-F'ir:st Cemury," 634.
10. Sc:e Robert Regime Clmnge; U.S. tl1rottgh tl!l! Prism of
9/11 (Washington, D .C.: Woodrow \V.Ison Univemry PrC5.s, 2007).
I I. This was suggested by :J n a no ny mous rc:\'ic:wer of this manuscript. For a
s1milar argument, sec Antony Anghic:, lmpertalmn, and tlu! Makh1g of
lntemational Law (Cambridge, :\oiass.: Cambridge= Uni\crsiry Press, 2004), 284-85.
C loscr to thc ana lysis I am offering is thc ust' of coJomahsm by Gregor)', The Colo-
nial Pri."Scnt.
12. George W. Bush, speech oi Augu5t 3 I, 2006.
I J. Set', for instance, Horlle)', Tlu! N.cw Imperialism; johnson, TIJc Sorrou/s of
Empire; Gio\anni Arnghi, Addm Sm1tb itJ Be111ng: LinMgi"S of tlu Tttlf!lll')'Fmt
Century (london: Verso, 20071, chapter 8.
14. Agnew, Hegemon), l; st"c: Conway and Hc) ncn, cd., Globolli-zat1on's
Contradutiom .
15. Tht' Monroc Doctnnt' held the Americas Wt'rc off-Jim1a. to European
powt'rs, and rhcrcb)' undcr thc cffecrivc control of thc United StatC5.. The R oo:r.evelt
corollar)' was that thc Unucd Smtc:s was justified in inter\'ening w hcn its inrerests
were threatened. The globalizing o f this norio n is one of rhc criric1sms that Barack
Obama made in The Audacity of Hope: Tbougbts on the Ame,-,am
Drmm (Ncw York: Crown, 2006), 292-93.
16. Spa rkc, In tiJe Space o{Theory, 167, 293.
17. The Marxist theorist a nd novelist China Micville, in his pc:nelnl tmg a11:.1lym
of inte rnatiOnal law [Between Equal Rights; A Marxist T1Jeory of International Law
(leidcn: Brill, 2005 )), a rgues that inter11ent1on always bcen pau of so\ereignty. He:
suggcsiS d1at Marx's formulation conccming sr.ruggles on the length of the: work-
mg day-"bctween equal rights, force: decides" (Karl Marx, 0.1pital: .-\ Critique
of Political EconorPty, Vol. I, lnlns. Ben Fowkes IHarmondswonh, UK: Penguin,
19761, 344)-pc-rtams as much to interna.rional a nd domesric s tTugglcs. He uses th1s
to s uggest that contempora ry notions of intcrrc:nrion a rc nol so d ra m atic a change:
as i5 som crimes argued. "So\c:reignty has never bcc:n 1mmune from imcrrc:nrion,
so the: claim that in opc:nmg up sovcreignty has fundamental!>
altered international law is false" cJ 141. Mic\'llle is undoubtedJy correct
rhat the practice of intcrvcntion has lo ng bern the case: w1thin inte rnot10nal pobrics,
 NO l ES I 0 CODA 247
and that of \'arious kinds has bc:en urilizcd. Bur what is SlgJJihcartt roda)' IS not
rhe violation in irsdf bur the argumenr against an absolute right ro sovc-r-
6gnty. :\tievdle contends that a world strucrured around inremarional law cannot
but be one of impc:ri:J.Iist T he: chaoric and blood)' world around us is tlu!
rule of law" [3 19). The: analySIS hc:cc: rakes issue: wirh the historical rendering of this
issue. In seeking to demonstrate: me: Cold War and post-
Cold penod, i\laeville 1s in do nger of missing the: cruc1al assll!."; name!>, that the
internononJ.llegal structure !hat \'IUS constructed after World
11 risks precipitating a much gmerahzcd "d1J.ot1c and bloody" world of war.
18. Israel is only a n excepnon: a consolidArion of 1967 g;Jins and
a deep-rooted resist:Jnce to :1 new Palestinian st:Jte, rhetoric notwithstanding, are
consistent with the O\'ero ll srrategy.
19. For a spirited defense: of sovcnignt)', Chnstopher j. Bickerton, Philip
Cunliffe, and Alexander Goun:virch, eds., Pofttics withaht Swaeignl): ,-\ Critique
of Contemportlr)' lnJertttllional Rdat1ons (london: University College london
Press, 2007). Kor the leasr of irs ma ny problems is. a failure ro dis.<uss rhe territo-
rial relation or spari:J.I aspects o f so\cre1gnty.
20. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, 110-11.
21. Paul A. Gigot, Mark of Rove," August 13, 2007, hrrp:l/online.\vsj.
com/arudo'SB 118697458949295744 . html?mod=US-Busmcss-News; see Paul
Reynolds, 'Architect' leaves White House," August U, :?.007, Imp://
news.bbc.co.uk/lnli/amc:ncas/6943959.srm. See also Robc:rt G. Kaufm.111, In
Defense of the Bush Doctri11e (lexington: Unl\'ersity Pr1:ss of Kc:nruck)', 10071,
155, and Timothy j. lynch and RobertS. Singh, Alter Bush: The Ca.sc for Con-
timttl)' i11 .".mertcan Foretgll Policy (Cambridge, J\1ass.: Cambridge
Press, 1008), w hich expresses the that furure presidents wall ho ld to the Bush
Doctrine.
This page intentionally left blank
 I NDEX

Abdd S:.l.am, A.H., 42, 43, 54, 84, ai-Turabi, Hasso n, 4J-44, 46,
102, 106 83,84
Abou Zahab, Mari:.m, 51, 71, 75, 79 ai-Za rqaw1, Abu Muso b, 49, 120
Abu Ghraib, X\'11, 55 ai-Zawahm, Arman, 33, 37, 42, 48,
Abu Sa)yaf, 85 5 1, 98, 101
Achcar, Gilbr:n:, 93 Mont:Jser, 7, 33
Aden Harbor, XII Anderson, Liam, I 16
Afghanistan, XII, x11i, xi\', X\ii, xx,iij, Anna n, Kofi, 155-56, 158, 164
2, 4, 8, 19, 21, 23, 26, Jl , 34, Appadum i, Arjun, 8, 26, 29,
5 1,54
59-6 1, 64, 65,69,70-77,78, 79, Arafn r, Yasser, 87, 168
8 1-82, 84, 86, 87, 93, 97, 99, Arrighi, Gmn nni, xix-xx
103, 107, lOS, 109, 11 L, LL3, Associnnon of American
114, 148, 164, 165, 169, 174, (AAG), xm, 68, LS I n24
175, 176, JS4 n56, 2 13n65 asylum, xxn
Afnca, Horn of, 31, 34, 65, 8 1, 84, -armoterrorism," xxL Su also
101, 102, 104, 108 SIO{erdijk, Perer
Ag.1mben, Giorgto, 55-61 Axis of Evil, 6, 29- JO, 96
Agnew, j ohn, ix, 61, 66, 175, IS7n92 Azzam, Abdallah, 43,44
Albright, Madeleine, 152, 160
Ali, Tariq, 37, 97 Ba'arh 124
Al lrih:..ad AI lsJ:umi, 101 Balib:u, [rienne, xxx, J4
xxi, x-:xviii, I, 4, S, 10, 16, Bali bombmg, xiv, 48
18,1 9,21,3 l , JJ, J5,36, 38, lknj:. min, 4, 12 1
40,42,45,46,48-49, 52- 54, Thomas, 6, 9, 22- 24, 28, 32,
60-6 1, 65, 72-75,77-8 1,83,85, 108, 195nl41
93, 99, l 02-3, I 05, 106, 109, Begin, Men:.cbem, 96
112, 121, 148, 175, 178. See ,dso Beirur, xii, XXII, 88, 93, 94
bm Laden, Osoma Bhuno, lkn:J7.u, 8 1
250
bm Llckn, xi- xii, 2, 4, 15, 23,
26,33,34, 36-44,45,48,51,52,
60, 7 1, 73, 74-75, 77,82,83,84,
101, 102. 184n56
Black Hawk Doum , 10, 102
Ton}. 7, 17, 27, 8 l, 84, 86, 92,
97, 106, I 07, 11 6, 122, 147, 150,
153-55, 158-59, 16 1, 162, 164,
245n l9 1
Sidney, I 07
Bobbin, Phrlip, 163, 174
bod> counts, 180n9
Bolmn,john, 30-3 1, 113, 161
Bonn Ag.rC'C'rnem, 73, 76
borckrs, 46, 47, 169, 174
conrrol of, 4, II, 18, 51, 69, 88,
91, 95, 108, 132, 147
dispurcs over, 106- 7
csr.tblishmcm of, xx,.ii
prcscrnnon of, ),'XX, 66, 67, 137, 146
violcnct" over, X),'X
Bosni:1, II , 22, 34, 40, 48, 49, 51, 58,
63,69,71, 102, 15 1, 152,153,
167, 172
Bremer, L. P:l ul, 121, 122, 123
Brenner. :-.l't"il, xxx1
Brimmer. Esther, 4
BI'Zcezinski, Zbigniew, 6, 8- 10,22, 70
Allen, 149
Bush, Grorge H. W. 13, IS, 150
Bush, Grorge W. xii. xiii, ll:vi- X\'iii,
l- 8, I I, 15, 16, 17. 19. 24. 25.
26,27,29,30-32. 35. 38.45.
56,69, 7 1, 75, 77,79,8 1- 82.
84, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 107, 11 1,
112, 116, I 18, 120, 123, 135.
136- 38, 15 1. 16 1. 168, 175, 178,
l97n l70, 18 Jn20, 188n ll
Bush xiii, :>....,iii. 4. 6. 7.
8, 11, 15, 17, 24, 26, 27, 3 1, 32,
71, 79, 96, 97, 99, Ill , 16 1, 168
Byt"rs, ,\.(ichael, 24, 27, 73, 84
I NDEX
calcularion, pohrics of, XX\'11, 185 n6 7
Cahpharc, 36, 4 1, 42, 43,44-49, 175
Camp David., II, 168
camps,
PoiC'srinian rramm g, 96, I 0 I
refugee, 94-95, 220n 177
ns spaces of exceprion, 5.5---61,
207n L58, 208n l65
rerrorisr rrn in ing, xii, 4, 3 1, 49, 5 1,
53, 55, 59, 60, 61, 65,69, 7 1,
74, 75, 76
caprralism, " ix, 19
Cmrury Foundarion, the, 5, 16, 39,
52, 68,79
Ccorny, Phil G., 68-69
Chechnya, xi'' xxii, 34, 36, 40, 42,
4 3, 48,5 !,70, 7 1, 143,148,150,
151, 153, !69, 20 1n52
Chene), Dick, 4,5, l l, 13, 160
Chernus, Ira, 16, 30, 38
Cherry, John, 11 6, liS
China, II , 14, 19, 20, 23, 29, 35, 48,
65, 78, 118, 14 1, 146, 148, 150,
151, 152, !69, 175, 197nl8 1
Chomsky, Noam, 19
citizens hi p., 48, 94, 134
Clinton. Bill, xii, xrx, 2, 10. 1S, 16,
25, 29, 30, 7 1, 84. 96. 102, 159,
160, 168, L8 1n20, 184n53
Clinton. Hillary, 184n57
Clinton ll , , 105. 159
Cockburn, Andr"w. I SSn U
Cockburn, Pamck, I 3 I
Cold War, xv. X\'11, xxii. xxx:i, 6, 7, 9,
10, 14, 12, 23, 32, J4, 47, 60,
64, 70, 105, 139, 146, 147, 150.
153, 170, 17 1, 173, 175, 188nl3.
213n77,232nl ,l47nl7
colomabsm, 47, 173, 174, 246n 11
comm umsm, 7, 18, , 171
Connolly, \'ilrlliam E., xniii, :xx ix, 15,
28, 186n88,207nl 56
 I NDEX 251

Cooper, Roben, 20, I 77 foiled Slates, xxviii, 10, 17, 32, 58, 6 1,
Comdl, Drucilla, 28 63, 67, 68, so, 99, 120, 136, 137,
coumerrerronsm, 16, 18, 69, 84, 163. See <1/so weo k states
113, 169 Farah AJ Islam, 95
Cowen, Deborah, xx fatwa, 122-23
Cuba,31 fear, geographies of, xx,oiii, 1-32
Cyprus, 65, 148, 150, 158 Feith, Douglas, 97, 116
Fcldm:m, Noah, 123, 124, 227n50,
Darfur. 83, 84, 85 228n63
defense plonning guidanct', 13 Finkidkraut, .-\ loin, 69
Ddeuze, Gilles, Fisk, Robert, 36-37,42, 87
ckmocraq, xi, x1x, 7, 19, 26, 28, 69, Fouc:JUlt, 57
76, 95, 11 6, 121, 126, 130, 135, FranC<', xxv, 39, 42, 55, 114, I 16
143, 146, 160, 175 Friedman, Thomas, 21,22
Dernda,Jocques, 59, 159 Frum, Da,oid, 3, 29, 74, 188nl2
Rene, xxvi Fukuyama, Fro nc1s, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 20,
dett'rrirorio liz::mon. XX\'It-xxviii, 7, 11, 189n39
3 1,33,34,49,61, 169,177.
S..e also reterrirorio lizonon Gaddis. John Lewis, 69
devji, faisal, 37, 39. 47-49. 54. 60 Galbroirh. !Peter, 29
de Waal, .-\Jex, 42, 43, 44, 54, 84, Gaza, xiii, 39, 87, 88, 89, 91, 168, 176
102, 106 genocide, 58, 85, 154, 155, 157,
dis.1rmamenr, 91 , I 13 162, 172.
Djiboun, 82, 99, 100, 101 geoeconomics, xix, xx
Domke, Qa,id, 26, 27 Grorga, 148, 158, 17 1, 174
drugs, wor on, 14, 139, 171 Germany, 29. 39, 55, 56, 114, 142
Giuliam, Rudolph, 26
Eaglt'ton, Tt'rry, 6, 184n56. Glass, Charles, 86
189n28 globahzarion, xix, 20, 21-23, 30, 32,
East Timor, 63, 147, 158, 167 34, 50, 160, 169, 175, 177
Edkms, Jenn)', 58 Godt'fro)', F., xxix
Egypt, 16, 17, 19. 33. 48, 89, 107 Golan Heights, !(i ii, 88, 89, 96. 97, 98,
Ehteshomi, Anoush1ravan. 34, 79 141 , 176
Eritrro, 40. 43. 83, 105, 106, 114. GrC'C'nwood, Chnstopher, 74
147.223n243 Grl!'gory, Derek, xvi, x.ai, 4, 180n9,
Etniopio, 82, 99, 10 I, 114, 246n11
147.223n243 Grozny, dcsrrucrio n of, xiii, xx:ii
European Union, 14, 20, 2 1, 35, 50, Guanunamo Ray, xvii, 55, 59, 206n 142
65, l 08, 143, 152 xxvii
exceprion, spaceslsr.ues of, 5 5- 6 1 Guli \'Ciar, Arst, xu, X\oii, 13, 63, 96,
extraordinary rendinon, 55 11 8, 11 9
extratcrriroriolity, 25, 59, 169 Gunar:Hna, Rohan, 37, 53, 80
252 I NDEX
Haass, Richard N., 18, 28-29, 108,
162, 163
Hairi, 21, 153, 158, 172
Hamas, 83, 87, 99. 107
Hariri, Rafik, 85-86
Hanrq, xx, 12, 13, 183n43
hegemony
global, 175
U.S., xix, 66, 175, 176
l-leidcgg<"r, 1\[a rrm, 28, 185n67
l-lnbollah, xx11, 16, 43, 83-84, 86-88,
92,93-95,97,98-99, 107, 178,
217n 136
Hindcss, lklrr>, xx11, XX\'111, xxix
Holocaust, xx1, 177
huma.nitanan mrervcnnon, XX\iil,
57, 64. 107, 108, 113, 138, !39,
149, 153, 155, 157, 163, 166, 172
human ng.hts, I 16. 143, 144, 153,
154, 157
violarion of, 58, 65, 137, 168,
155, 169
Hun ringron, Sa muel, 6, 7-8, 14, 20
Hussein, Sadda m, 16, 23, 29, 96, I 09,
111- 13, 119-21, 124, 128, 130,
13 1, 136
lgnaricff, 66, 153
lmpt"ria lism. xix, xxvii. 46, 103, 174,
175. See also colomahsm
India, 34, 35, 65, 70, 72, 75, 77,
79, 11 8, 142, 148, 150, 158
lndoncsi.J., 16. 34.40,48, 108, 147,148
lnrernario na l Court of J usrice (ICJ),
143, 165
]ran, 16, 17, 24, 19- 3{), 31, 32, 65,
70, 72, 76, 83, 86, 94, 96, 97,
99, 107, I 13, 11 8, 110, 125, 135,
136, 137, 165, 168, 169
lranian Revolution, II
lranian Revolutionary Guard, xxi\
Iraq, XX\'111, 4, ll , 18- 19, 2.3, 26,
29- 3{),58,63,64-65,69,86,
96, 97, 102, 106, I 07, 11 1- 38,
139, 142. 164, 168, 171,
174, 178
Coalirio n Provisional Authoriry
[CPA) of, 12 1-24, 128, 133
constitution o f. 124-27, 127-37.
176
a nd the consritution of rcrrirory,
127- 38, 176. Su also rcrri ronal
imcgmy
a nd democracy, 135-36
and dt"Crions, 120, 122- 25, 128,
133- 36
a nd idcnriry, 125- 27
Inrcnm Governing Council (IGC)
of, 122, 123, 133
a nd t he politics of rcconsrrucrion,
120- 27
a nd sO\ercignry, 129, 132, 133,
138
tt"rriroria l integrity of, 11 6-18. 120.
118- 29, 132, 133, 137, 138, 149.
&e a lso rcrrironal integnry
as a threar, 111-12
Trans1ciona l Admimsmuion Llw
lTAL) of. 123, 125- 26. 128, 13{),
13 1, 133
U.S. inv::J.Sion of, 6{), 97, 115,
152, 156
a nd wropons of nt.1.ss desrrurnon.
112- 13. &e also weapons of
mass desrruefion
Islam. xi. 7, 8, 10, 16, 17, 33, 36, 37.
J9, 40, 43, 44, 46,48,49,50,
54, 60, 78, 106, 124
miliranr, 14, 36, 50, 102
war agamsr. 38
Islamic srate, 45, 46, 48, 79
Islamisrn, 4, 54, 71, 79, 98
:.1 nd termory, 6, 32, 33-6 1
 I NDEX 253

lsrad, xi\, xxii, xxv, II, 1,;, 24. Kurds, 6,;, 116. 118, I 19, 124, 125,
.B. 34-35. 39. 49. 52, 85-99, 129, 130, lJ I , 134, 136
107, 141 , 142, 150, 160. 169, 149, 169
171, Kuwait, xiv, 34, 99, 114, 11 6, 11 7,
218n149,247n18 11 8, 120, 132, 172
Kyrg)'Zsran. 48, 85, 148
Japan, xxu, 29, 114, 141
48 Lawrence, Bruce, 37
Jt>nkins, Simon, u,; League of Narions, 141-42
;ihad, xii, 16, 18, .3.3, .37. 39, 41 , Lebanon, :o.1v, 22, 26, 34, 40, 43,
42, 43, . 47-49. 5 1' 60, 79, 47, 53, 65, 69, 85-99, 107, 108,
202n75 109, 116, 123, 1,;5, 171, 176,
jihadism. 38, 52 178, 220nln
Johnson, Chalmers, 27 Lefebvre, Henri, X\'111, xxx, l S3n44
Johnson, Chris, 76 Leshe, Jol}on, 76
Jordan, 41 , 89, 94, II S Lew1s, lkrnard. 7
just war. xxiii, 154, 240n105 xvii, 2, 31 , 35, 65, 158,
197n1 81
Kagan, Robt'rt, 6, 11 , 12, 20, 21 , 2 3, London bombings. 180n 11
194n11S
99 ;\,bdrid bombing, 180n 11
Llwrence F., 119 ;\.fonn , M1chad, 174
Robert, 6, 10-11 , 20, 64, 108 Morchol, Robnd, 101
Kashmir, xiv. 34, 40, n, 78, 79. 80, med1a, xiii, xvi, I, 8, 17, 26, .36, 87,
148, 150, 235n.37 121, 153
Kemal. 45 Menkhaus, Kt>nncth J, 68, 101, 102.
Ken)'3, xii, 83, 99, 100, 10 1, 104, 108 103. 104
Kh3lil.zad, Zalm3y, 11. 13, 126, 127. Mie,illt>, 247n 17
130-.3 1, 135. 245nl 92 Mimrer; Rtchard, 8 1. 82. 84
Khobar Towers. xii Mufson. Steven, 11
Kinsley, !vhchael, Muhammad, Prophet, 39, 40, 43,
Kissinger, Henry, I, 2, 114 46, 128
KJe\'emann, Lutz, 80 muiahidin, 48, 70, 7 1, 213n77
Kohlmann, Evan F.. 49 Pervt'Z, 77-81
Kosovo, xxii, xx\iii, 22, 58, 63, 86, :\fusufa, D3anish. 34
92, 127, 128, 139, 152- 56, 168.
169. 172, 174,20 1n52, 239n95 Nasr, Octa\ia, 37
Kra u rha mmer, Chari f'S, 15 3, 160 Nasmllah, Sayyt'd Hassan, 43, 87, 93.
Krisrol, WiJli3m, I I, 12, 119 94,2 17nl40
Kurdisran, 129- 3 1 Natio ndl Military Plan for
De.mocraric P3rt)' (KDPJ, 125 the War orr Terrorism, xxw, 50,
Parrioric Union of tPUKI, 125 52, 106
254 I NDEX

naZIS, 55-57 PATRIOT :\ cr, USA, 5, 25, 56, 60

:Kroclrous, Mark. x:x,iii, 6, 5t;, L86n82
nrocolomahsm, XIX
XIX, 11- 12, 136,
139, 153, 160, 163-64, 191 n6 1,
197n l8 1
nroli berol gropolirics, xix. &e also
Sparke, M.mhew
:Keranyahu, Binjamin, 97
9/ 11 Commission, 2 1, 22, 23, 2.5, 34,
108, 16 1
:Korrh Adanric Orgamzario n
tKo\TO), X\'i, nii, 7, 58, 7 1, 73,
76, 114, I 15, 142, 152, 154,
155, 162
:Korrhem Allianc,e, 71
:Korrh Korea, 29-30, 3 1, 65, 66, 96,
113, 165, 220n 184
nuclenr weapons, 1S, 24, 66 , 78, 79,
81,93,96, 11 2,11 3, 144,151,
Hi8, 245n 192
Obama, 80, 82, 246n 15
od, xix, 35, 116, 118, 11 9, 129,
13 1- 32, 172, 182n35
Olmert, Ehud, 86, 97
One Percenr Doctrine, 79
Operarion DeS(:rt Fox, 2, 36
Operarion lnfinire xi1
Operarion Iraqi Freedom, 35
EmpiTe, 42, 47. 85, 114, 141
O"Tuathad, Gear6id, 7
Pakistan, XI\', 16, 17, 2 1, 3 1, J4, 4 1,
43, 48, 5 1' 52, 6 1' 64, 65, 66, 69,
70, 7 1, 72, 75, 76,77-85, l OS,
118, 142, 158,2 1Jn77,214 n89
Palesrine, xn, x:xv, 40, 41 , 42, 43, 48,
52,87,89,90-93, 95. 107, 142,
168, 169, 180n 11
Liberarion Org.aniz:trion 24,
92, 95, 96
Parenri, Christian, 12 1, 122
pC3cekeeping, 22, 7 1, 102, 156, 158
PC:Jrl, Da niel, 79
PC:Jrl H:JTbor, xvi, 4 , 15, 191n85
PC'nt:lgon, xvi, X\'111, 18, 23, 12 1
PC'nt:lgon's New Map, 22
Perle, Richard, xxxi, 74, 97
Philippines, xiv, 19, 31, 34, 40, 43, 48,
85, 108. 114
Poland, 14 1, 142
Powell, Colin, 18, 77, 84, 11 1, 119,
136, 18 Ln20
power,
cenrers of, 10
forms of, 14, 56
geograph) of, 175
logics of, XIX, xxxi
42, 44, 56
sofr, 15
smrereign, 59, 6 1, 69, 75, 80, 118,
139, 171, 172
of rhe stare, xx, l l , 58, 63, 64,
144, 174
tcrnrory, 55, 57, 58
Pro1ccr for a :Kew American Cenrury
lPNAC). 6, 7, 11- 15, 19, 20,
119, 189n39
Rabi n, 97
Ratner, Sre\'en R., 165-66
Ronald, xii, 2. 8. 12, 18, 25
rererrironahzario n, xvii- xx11111, 4. 6,
7, II , 34, 36, 169. 177. See also
dere-rritorializar1on
Rice, Condoleez.a, 29. 36, 81 , 107,
108, 135, 15 1, 16 1
Rice, Susan, 1()2
Rogers, Paul, 3 1, 7 1, 72., 99
Rot berg, Roberr 1., 67- 68, 101 , 104
Roy, Arundhori, 8 7
Roy, Oli\'ler, 33, 5 1, 71, 75, 79
Donald, X\oiii, I, 11 , 16, 10,
29, 60, 97, 111, 126
 INDEX
Russia, 19, 2J, 29, J 4, 35, 36,
43, 65, 70, ! OS, 146, 147-48,
150, 151, ! 52, 169, 17 1. 197n I8.
also Sonet Union
Rw;anda, 10, 58, 63, 64, 69, 102, 114,
152, 155-56, J71,113n243
safe h:wens. terror/rerrorisrn, and
havens
Saud1 Arabia, :\::ii, xi'' 16, 17, 11, 34,
35, 40,41,48, 75, 77, 81, 83.
107, 108, l iS, 120
Sclwf, 1\ 1ichad P., 167
Scheuer, Michael, J5
Schmin, 28, 55- 56, 197n 170
Session/sr-cessioniSl, 6 1, 99, 109,
I I 6, I 17, JJO, 145-51, 169, 171.
172
September II, 100 I , events o f, x1ii,
X\1- x-vii . xxii-xxiY, XX\'11, 1-5, 7,
I I , I 5, 19, 20, 24, 32, 33, 35-36,
37, 44, 54, 60, 71, 74, 77, 80,
96, Ill , 148, 150, 158, 16 1,
168, 170, 177, 180n l I ,
209nl 0
Serbia, 66. I 02, !52, 167
Sharif, Nawaz, 81
Shawcross, William, I 64, 171
Shay, Shaul, 10 1
Shebaa Farms, 88, 89, 93, 98, 176
SIJi'a, 37, 45. 98- 99, 11 8, 11 9- 20,
123. 124-27, 129, 130--31, 135,
136.217n l40
SIJi'ite cresccm. 30
shock awe, xxii
S1erra Leone, 64, I 55, 158, 164,
165. 172
Slorcrd11k. Peter, xxi- xxiii
Smith, xvi, xvu, xx, 13, ITl.
Somalia, xi it, I 0, 22, 26, 40, 43,
53, 6 1, 64, 65,67- 68,69,75,
99-107, I 08, I 09, 151, 158, 165,
172, 176, 178
255
Somahland, 99-10 1, 149, ! 69
South x:xv, 149
SO\'ereignry, sm re. xxx, 27,55- 6 1,
69, 70, 101, 103, 110, 140. 144.
145, 148, 150, 155, 156-57,
159-70. 17 1-78, 207n l56,
247n1 7. Set' also rerrimry
smeretGJll)'
connngenr, 69, 69-! 70, 172
e:1rned, I 27, 166- 69
sparial cxrenr of, 58, 118, 119. 119.
140, 150, 171-78, 232n3
184n5J
So\ier Umon, 10, 34, 47, 70, 105,
142, 143, 148, 150, 15 1, I 75.
See also
Sparke, Man hcw, xix
spec1al forces, U.S., 71, 82, 84, 96,
102, 103
Sr.ansfidd,Gareth, 116, 119.1 29
Srclzer, Irwin, 15
Sudan,xn,2,26,31,J5,40, 4J, 46.
48, 52, 61, 65, 82, 8 3- 85, I 06,
164, 165, 167
suicide bombing, xxii, 74, 81,96
S1mrri, 45, 94, 99, I 16, 11 S- 20.
124-27, 129- 3 1. 134-36
7, 14, 67, 170.1 73
sur\eillancc:, xviii, 67
Suskmd, Ron, 1, 5, 41 ,79
16, 31,47, 65,85-86,88. 89.
92, 95. 96-99. I 07, I 16, 117,
11 8. 137, 165, 197n 18 1.
198n1 94
Taliban, 4, 10, 3 1. 35. 46, 52,70--77,
78-8 1, 99, 109, I 78
terrirorial autonomy, 146, 168
terrirorial mregri ry, .'O.'viii, x xx,
xxxi, 4, 58, 66, 69, 73, 90, 9 1,
92, 93, 96, I 06, 109, 113, 132,
133, 139- 70, I 7 1-78 . Set' also
Iraq, re rritonal integrny of
256 I NDEX
rerritonal sovereignty, x:xi, xxvi, JODI,
J , 25, .B, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, 6J,
66, 69, 74, 77, 88, 89, 9(1, 91,
92,93,94, 106, 109, 117,119,
129, 132. 138. 139, 142, 144.
148, 157. 163, 165, 169, 171.
172, 173. 176-77
tenitorirtm, XX"'t"lli-xxlx
territory
and bounda ri es,, xxvi-XX\'11, 9 1
control of. xx, xxx. 4 .W, 53, 58,
6U4, 67, 69, 109, 129, 157, 163
dcfinirions o f, XX\'111-XXIX
geographi es, of, 34
and snuggle, xxx1
lslam1c conceprions o f, 44, 202n7l
and lsJamism. Se-e lslamism
and the law, X"'VI
logic of. xx
and nonstate acrors, 66, 69
pobrical meory of, XX\oli, XXXI
and the polirics of threat, xxvi ii
and power, xxvii
securiry/sccuririzarion of. 67, 129
the smte of, xX"'t- xx,iii, 171, 174
and smre/srarehood, xx. xxi.
XXV, XX\'1, 4, 34, 42, 90, 11 8,
139, 140, 144
and terror. See terror,. and territory
ven1cal d1mensions of, xxii
rerrorisr, XXI\', xx, 3, 4-6, 18- 19,21,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 38, 53.
54, 76, 82, 86, 99, 10 1, 104, 138.
145- 51, 168. 17 1. 184n57
aCtS, XI, 5, 16, 34, 73, 77, 85,
I 88n 13, 2 12n54
a llies, JO, 96, 112
99, IOJ
foreign. 103
53, 63, 65, 73, 84, 98,
113, 148
hnrboring of, xi, xii, xiv, 24, 25, 26,
67, 69, 108, 112, 117, 119, 138,
161, 163. 169, 178
org:mizarions/nerworks, xxi, 2, I 0,
16, 50, 51, 59,60--61,69,84,
86, 88, 93, 103, 106, Ill. 149.
217nl36
rerrorherronsm
bnses and netwo rks, 49-54, 138
da ily, 97
definirions oi, XXI, xxii1, xxiv, xx:x1, 3
funding of, 49
geographies/cartographies of., xvii, 34
and Islam, 50
and rhe med ia, 17. See aim med1a
m)'th of universal, 17
new, 38
nnd nuclear proliferation, 24
nnd safe ha\"ens, 17, 25,52-53,67,
73, 75- 76, SO, 101, IOJ, liM,
107, 138
and so\ereignry, xxi
and smre, xxi-xx'' 52, 84, 162
supporr of/for, 24
and technology, X\oiii, 17,30
:J nd termo ry, xx1, xx\oiii- x:xxii. 16 .
55, 59, 60, 68, 74-79, 86, 87,
171, 176
uaimng camps, 74, 75
as \oirus, 17-1 8
Thatcher, Margaret, 12
rhrc:Jt, geographies, o f, X\ii, xx1, xx\oiii,
l-32
Todd, Emmanuel, 17
Tomahawk cruise m1ssiles, xu, 2
Turke)', 11, 42, 45, 65, 70, 11 7, 118,
125, 136, 137
Twin Towers. See World Trade Cc:nrer
Uganda, 83, 106, 11 4, 223 n, 243
ltmnra, 40,41, 44, -l, 54
 I NDEX
U.N. xxvi, 85, 118, 140, 141.
142. 145-46, 155, 156, 157. 173,
2 12n54, 245n 197
U.N. Councal, 24, 73, 85, 86,
88, 9 1, 92, 95, 96, Ill, 116, 122,
133, 134, 14{)'-41 , 14 7, 152, 154,
157, 158, 167, 173
United Nonons, xviii, xxx, 23, 27, 36,
58, 63, 74, 75, 88, 91, 102,
105, 108, 111, 122, 123, 132,
139, 140, 142, 145, 146, 148,
149, 152, 155-58, 157, 160-64,
168, 170, 172, 173, 177, 2 L2n54
U.S. polK>', 14, 24, 28, 29,
160, 162, 164, 175, 178,
19 1n61
U.S. Homeland 4, 5, 19, 10,
87, 163
U.S. Norional 163,
172
U.S. Norional t\ldn.ar)' Strategy, 17
U.S. Nurional 66,
69, 9 1, 99, 108, 113, 163, 164,
176
USS Cole, xii, 3
1111 possidetis, 139, 143, 165--66
Uzbekis tan, 43, 48, 64, 71, 85, 114,
148
\Tactnam, xvii, 8, 123
war 157
\Varon xxxi, 1-31,36, JS, 54,
57, 68, so, s 1, 87, 98-99, 105,
106, 109,111,114,117, 12 1,
129, 138, 139, 140, 147, 148,
164, 169, 171, 174, 175, 178
:md biopolirics, 57
critics of me, 5
onomic aspts of, xx
257
geography and, xvi-xxi, xX"'iii
gcopolincs of rhc, 14
and human rights ''IOLarions, 65
X\'111
and spatial issues, 55
tcrrilOrral :J.spts of, xxxi, 57, 109,
174, 176
W1!"3k sr.arcs, x:xviii, 10, II, 32, 61,
6J-l09, 209n l0. See <1fso
Wl!"3pons of m:u.s o:ksrrucrio n, II, 15,
18, 19, 23, 28, JO, 65, 79, 98,
108, 11 2, 113, 11 7, 119, 129,
138, 161, 162., 163, 168, 169
X>..'V, 150
Somud, 3, 111
Eyal, 90, 184n5J
&nk, xiii, JS, 39, 88, 89, 91,
168
\Vilkmson, Paul, xxi11
\Vilson, Wood row, 141, 142
\Volfowarz, 11, 13, 15, 25, 29, Ill,
11 2, 12.1, 2.09 nl 70
Woodward, Bob, L98n l99
\Voodword, 101
\Vorld Trade xii, xvi, J,
I SOn 13, 114n89
\Vorld War I, xxa, 42, 11 4, 141
\Vorld War II, >.'VII, 29, 141, 142,
146, 169, 177, 147n 17
Yemen, xii, xiv, 2 1, 11, 26, 41, 43, 53,
6 1, 65, 82, 100, 106, 108
Yugoslavia, 150-51, 151, 154, 158,
164, 165
Z:achcr, Mark W., 147
Z:a um, Dominik, 157
Zehkow, Phalip D., LOS, 16 1, 163
Zimbabwe, 106
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STUART ELD EN is professor of political geography at Durham University.
He is the author of three prmous books, including Speakir1g Agai11st
Nwnber; Heidegger, Language, mtd the Politics of Calculation (2006),
and editor of four more. including most recently Henri Lefebvre, State,
Space, World: Selected Essays, coedited with Neil Brenner (Universiry of
Minnesota Press, 2009). H e is currently writing a historr of the concept of
territory in Western thought.