[ G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605. December 12, 2005.] Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm.
no M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated F
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK,
FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA
L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN
MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V.
MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON,
GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE
CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK,
JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK,
represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA B ARQUE HERNANDEZ, respondents.
D ECISION
Y NARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004
Amended Decision 1 of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642,
ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and
directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. 210177;
and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision 2 of the Special Division of
Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481, and the LRA to r econstitute
respondents' TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution 3 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
T he facts as found by the Court of Appeals 4 are as follows:
Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a
petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177
issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the
Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in
1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
210177, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and t he Plan FLS 3168 D covering the
property.
Upon being notified of the petition for administrative reconstitution, private respondents
(petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title
under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconstituted title T CT No. RT-
22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest is spurious. jurcd06
On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution Bustos . . . confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the Technical
of TCT No. 210177 5 on grounds t hat:
1.Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq.
Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, xxx xxx xxx
containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or
ebruary 01, 1991;
2.The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr.
Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, GeodeticS urveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter
dated February 19, 1997. 6
R espondents' motion for reconsideration was denied in an order 7 dated February 10, 1998
hence they appealed to the LRA.
The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission
of documents other than the owner's duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying
the petition and should have confined himself with the owner's duplicate c ertificate of
title. 8 The LRA further declared:
Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing
evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine,
authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 210177 . . . . The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT
No. 210177 as among the titles lost . . . . The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself
acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a
certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not
salvaged
f rom the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 . . . .
It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in
TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823
Piedad Estate . . . as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form
No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands . . . .
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT
No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such
circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is
mandatory. 9
xxx xxx xxx
It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly
issued by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose
office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital
Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian
thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said
plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q
dated 9-23-96 . . . . Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty.
Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997
addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. . . .
information about Plan FLS 3168- D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out
duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the
microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number 410436
appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400
and said computer print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt . . . .
The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal
repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is
much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated
statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. . . . 10
Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners' title was fraudulently
reconstituted, the LRA noted that it is only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which can declare
that the same was indeed fraudulently reconstituted. It thus opined that respondents' title
may only be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners' title was void and
should therefore be cancelled. 11
The dispositive portion of the LRA's decision reads: CcAIDa
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of
TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. 12
Petitioners' filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by respondents with a
prayer that reconstitution be ordered immediately.
On June 14, 2001, petitioners' motion for reconsideration and respondents' prayer for
immediate reconstitution were denied. 13
From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review 14 with the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and praying that the LRA be directed to immediately
reconstitute TCT No. 210177 without being subjected to the condition that petitioners' TCT
No. RT-22481 [372302] should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction. 15
Petitioners likewise filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 66642.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision 16 on September 13, 2002, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed Resolution of the LRA dated
June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto and the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 17
Respondents moved for reconsideration. 18 On November 7, 2003, the Special Division of
Five of the Former Second Division rendered an Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of
private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners'
valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 19
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
was denied, 20 hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No. 162605.
Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision 21 on October 29, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the LRA dated 24
June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 22
In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly
deferred in giving due course to the petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final
judgment upholding or annulling respondents' title. 23
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division of the Court of
Appeals on February 24, 2004, thus: WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is
RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel petitioners' TCT No.
RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute
forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177. SO
ORDERED. 24
From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R.
SP No. 66642, petitioners filed separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as
G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively.
In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that: I
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS' EXISTING TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:
a.THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT
PART OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.
b.THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and
c.THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE CANCELLATION
OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN ORDER THE
ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY ALLOWING A "SHORT CUT", THE
MAJORITY JUSTICES DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN ORTIGAS V. VELASCO, CONSIDERING THAT:
a.IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF
LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MOLINA. IN THE
INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS HOLD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS
RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.
b.IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH
PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS' PROPERTY. HENCE, THERE
WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINA'S TITLE OUTRIGHT. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE
CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING. 25
In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO
EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS
EQUALLY DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER THE JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF
1980 SPECIFICALLY SECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR
POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION
TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004 DIRECTING
LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOK'S TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT, AS STATED,
THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL
PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.
III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING
ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24, 1998 OF RESPONDENT LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT
THAT SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH LAW AND CONTROLLING
JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO
HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS EXISTING COVERING THE LAND
SUBJECT THEREOF.
IV.THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER BARQUE, SR.
SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK SHOULD
FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN THE FACE OF
THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF
FABRICATION AND FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE
CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.
V.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF TIME. 26
On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with the petition in G.R.
No. 162335. 27
In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title; (b) the
reconstitution of respondents' Torrens title would be a collateral attack on petitioners'
existing title; (c) they were not given the opportunity to be heard, specifically the chance to
defend the validity of their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal
from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners' title; and (e) the
ruling in Ortigas was misapplied.
The petitions must be denied.
The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the
owner's duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 26 28 clearly provides: SDHETI
Section 3.Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a)The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
xxx xxx xxx
When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof
the owner's duplicate certificate of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly,
the same should have more than sufficed as sources for the reconstitution pursuant to
Section 3 of RA No. 26 which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be made
following the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of the
same law requires that the petition shall be accompanied with a plan and technical
description of the property only if the source of the reconstitution is Section 3(f) of RA No.
26. Thus:
Section 12.. . . Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a
plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of
title covering the same property. 29
Since respondents' source of reconstitution is the owner's duplicate certificate of title, there
is no need for the reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny
the petition on the ground that the submitted plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating
the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give
more weight and preference to the owner's duplicate certificate of title over the other
enumerated sources.
The factual finding of the LRA that respondents' title is authentic, genuine, valid, and
existing, while petitioners' title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the
Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even finality by this Court
and, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for
very compelling reasons. Basic is the rule that factual findings of agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions . . . are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the
consideration that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts. 30
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or
weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the
other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without
doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed
and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be
strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side
should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character
by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such
gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are issues of fact.
Questions like these are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule, confines its review of
cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in the petition and
therein distinctly set forth.
31 A petition for review should only cover questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable. 32
In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, 33 this Court categorically declared:
Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that
petitioner's title to the land is of doubtful authenticity.
Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. . . .
In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to the RTC for the
determination of which title, petitioners' or respondents', is valid or spurious. This has been
ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals.
The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the
authority to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the
reconstituting officer. The function is adjudicatory in nature it can properly deliberate on
the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham
or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration, then there
would be no basis for its decision to grant or deny the reconstitution. The findings of fact of
the LRA, when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case, shall be binding on the
Court of Appeals. 34
In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence
submitted which between or among the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to
decide whether to deny or approve the petition. Without such authority, the LRA would
be a mere robotic agency clothed only with mechanical powers.
The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of
the LRA. Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has
jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final orders of the LRA, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine
anew which of the two titles is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court's
ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two divisions of the appellate
court have already declared that petitioners' title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of
Appeals, 35 we ruled that:
Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale and the title issued in
virtue thereof in de los Santos' favor should be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated
at the instance of the Government. However, since all the facts are now before this Court,
and it is not within de los Santos' power in any case to alter those facts at any other
proceeding, or the verdict made inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time
that cancellation proceedings be yet filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title,
would be needlessly circuitous and would unnecessarily delay the termination of the
controversy at bar, . . . . This Court will therefore make the adjudication entailed by the facts
here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases in similar premises.
No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is
remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals
and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of the case or of an issue to the lower court for
further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the
dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not
be subserved by the remand thereof. 36
The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to act on the
petition for administrative reconstitution. The doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al.
v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et al. 37 does not apply in the instant case. In Alabang, the Court
stressed that:
. . . [L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles . . . cannot be the subject
of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without
first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. . . . The courts simply
have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the
names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of
titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance
of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. . . . 38
The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued
and that there is only one title subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed.
In the instant case, it cannot be said that petitioners' title was duly issued much less could it
be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the
same is sham and spurious.
The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in refusing to
remand the case to the trial court. As expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership v. Velasco: 39
Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution
case (LRC No. Q-5405) to the
Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas' and the Solicitor General's appeals from the
judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the
records forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal. This, in fact, is a relief alternatively
prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molina's
theory or cause of
action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal
proceedings would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for
Molina's cause to prosper. To defer adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.
The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of
respondents' and petitioners' title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by this
Court.
A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al., 40 where this
Court, as claimed by petitioners, have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would
reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists
between the parties. 41 There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be
discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property
subject of the instant controversy.
There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property" without
due process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title,
even without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed, there is no need to
remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondents
and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the
appellate court. By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their
administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of
the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority to
pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these
tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners' claim that they were deprived of their right to
be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process.
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis
that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one
already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land
registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of
title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy
as to the authenticity of the certificate.
Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted
certificates of title secured through fraud and misrepresentation cannot be the source
of legitimate rights and benefits. 45
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended
Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No.
RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents' TCT
No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the
Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-
22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents' TCT No. T-
210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian: 42

Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of
certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for
determination in the said petition, and they were given the full opportunity to present their
respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence
presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the
adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and binding.

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners' title which was
irregularly and illegally issued in the first place. 43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of
Deeds for the Province of Cavite: 44

The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the
best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is
faulty as to its purported origin.

In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject
property is indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic.
However, this presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA
report . . . that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis . . .

xxx xxx xxx


Separate Opinions QUISUMBING, J p:
I concur in the result reached by Ynares-Santiago, J., in her opinion and I join Davide, Jr.,
C.J., and Azcuna, J., in the majority vote to DENY the petitions.
While at the inception of this controversy, a trial by the Regional Trial Court would have been
in order, remand of this case for trial at this late stage would only be a time-consuming and
pointless exercise. Prompt resolution of the controversy is in order to avoid further delay.
AZCUNA, J p:
From the record it appears undisputed that, as the LRA ruled and the CA affirmed,
petitioners Manotoks' TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is sham and spurious. For one thing,
the property is purportedly located in barrio Payong, Quezon City, whereas no such barrio
existed or exists therein. It is, therefore, in my view, unnecessary to go though the
exercise of proving this matter again in the regular courts, as would ordinarily be
required, since the point is indubitable.
I thus find applicable the ruling of this Court in Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v.
Veloso, 1 as it would be unjust in the circumstances to require respondents to undergo a
time-consuming and pointless exercise to cancel an evidently sham and spurious title.
I, therefore, concur with Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago and vote to DENY the petitions. CARPIO, J.,
dissenting:
I dissent because the majority opinion deprives petitioners of their immensely valuable
property worth billions of pesos
without due process of law.
The majority opinion cancels the Torrens title of petitioners in these cases which originated
from an administrative reconstitution petition filed by respondents before the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. The majority opinion patently violates Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree 1 which expressly states that a Torrens title "cannot be . . . cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction . . . in all civil
actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein." 2
Thus, only the proper trial court, in an action directly attacking the validity of a Torrens title,
can cancel a Torrens title after trial on the merit. Jurisprudence has aptly termed this
hornbook doctrine. 3
In the present cases, there is no such direct attack on the Torrens title of petitioners.
And yet the majority opinion cancels petitioners' Torrens title, covering thirty-four
hectares of prime land located in Quezon City conservatively estimated at more than
One Billion Seven Hundred Million Pesos.
The Cases
Before the Court are two petitions for review 4 filed by Severino M. Manotok IV, Froilan M.
Manotok, Fernando M. Manotok, Fausto M. Manotok III, Ma. Mamerta M. Manotok, Patricia L.
Tiongson, Pacita L. Go, Roberto Laperal III, Michael Marshall V. Manotok, Mary Ann V.
Manotok, Felisa Mylene V. Manotok, Ignacio V. Manotok, Jr., Milagros V. Manotok, Severino
Manotok III, Rosa R. Manotok, Miguel A.B. Sison, George M. Bocanegra, Ma. Cristina E. Sison,
Philipp L. Manotok, Jose Clemente L. Manotok, Ramon Severino L. Manotok, Thelma R.
Manotok, Jose Maria Manotok, Jesus Jude Manotok, Jr., and Ma. Theresa L. Manotok
("Manotok, et al."), represented by their attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, against the Heirs
of Homer L. Barque ("Heirs of Barque"), represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez ("Barque-
Hernandez"). The cases were consolidated in the Court's Resolution of 2 August 2004. 5
In G.R. No. 162335, Manotok, et al. assail the 24 February 2004 Amended Decision 6 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. The Court of Appeals ordered the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") of Manotok, et al. and the
Land Registration Authority ("LRA") to reconstitute the TCT of the Heirs of Barque.
In G.R. No. 162605, Manotok, et al. assail the 7 November 2003 Amended Decision 7 and the
12 March 2004 Resolution 8 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700. 9 The Court of
Appeals directed the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the TCT of Manotok, et al.
and the LRA to reconstitute the TCT of the Heirs of Barque.
The Antecedent Facts
On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. ("Barque, Sr.") represented by Barque-Hernandez
filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. TCT No. 210177 was allegedly destroyed when a fire
gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr.
submitted the owner's duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax
Declaration.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos ("Atty. Bustos"), Reconstituting Officer and Chief of the
Reconstitution Division, LRA, wrote a letter dated 29 October 1996 10 addressed to Engineer
Privadi J. Dalire ("Engr. Dalire"), Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands
Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila. In the 29 October 1996 letter, Atty. Bustos requested
Engr. Dalire for a certified copy of Subdivision Plan Fls-3168-D ("Fls-3168-D"). Atty. Bustos
wrote a similar but undated letter addressed to the Chief of the Surveys Division of the Land
Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital
Region ("LMS-DENR-NCR"). 11
In his reply dated 7 November 1996, 12 Engr. Dalire informed Atty. Bustos that the Land
Management Bureau has no record of Fls-3168-D. In a letter dated 28 November 1996, 13
Engineer Ernesto S. Erive ("Engr. Erive"), Chief of the Surveys Division of the LMS-DENR-
NCR, informed Atty. Bustos that a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D is on file in the Technical
Records and Statistical Section of their office.
The letter of Engr. Erive confirming the existence of a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D
conflicted with the letter of Engr. Dalire that his office has no record of Fls-3168-D. Thus,
Atty. Bustos sent another letter dated 2 December 1996 14 to Engr. Dalire requesting for
clarification. In a letter dated 5 December 1996, 15 Engr. Dalire requested the Regional
Technical Director of LMS-DENR-NCR for a copy of Fls-3168-D for evaluation. Engr. Dalire
wrote:
In connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting
Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division of LRA relative to the certified reproduction plan
Fls-3168-D (microfilm) issued by the Chief, Technical Records & Statistical Section on
September 23, 1996 and our letter dated November 7, 1996 that we have no record of Fls-
3168-D. In this regards (sic), please forward to us the copy on file in that office (DENR-NCR)
from where the Chief of Technical Records and Statistics Section reproduced a copy he
issued to LRA for our evaluation.
In the machine copy of Fls-3168-D (furnished to us by LRA) from the copy of that office
issued to LRA, the said copy on file in your office did not emanate from this Office. The
stamp, particularly, bearing the name of this office and the Chief of Geodetic Surveys is
not the same stamp we are using.
Please forward to us the said plan for evaluation and comment. (Emphasis supplied)
A letter dated 2 January 1997, 16 purportedly from Engr. Dalire, addressed to the LRA
Administrator, was handcarried to, and received by the LRA General Records Section on 7
January 1997. The letter states:
In reply to your letter dated December 2, 1996, please be informed that the copy of the
subject plan was forwarded to this office by the Chief, Technical Records and Statistical
Section of the National Capital Region Lands Management Sector for our evaluation. As per
verification and comparison made in our microfilm records, it was found out that they are
identical and bore the same stamps and initials used in this office.
In view hereof, it is further informed that in our reply letter dated Nov. 7, 1996 we indicated
the status thereof because we failed to verify from our index cards then for our last result,
hence, this case be given due course for Administrative reconstitution (sic). (Emphasis
supplied)
Interestingly, barely three days after his purported letter of 2 June 1997, Engr. Dalire
wrote a letter dated 5 January 1997 17 addressed to the Regional Technical Director,
LMS-DENR-NCR, thus:
This is a follow-up to our previous request dated 05 December 1996 to that Office in
connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting
Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division of the Land Registration Authority relative to the
certified reproduction of plan Fls-3168-D (microfilm) issued by that office (signed by
Carmelita A. Soriano, Chief of Technical Records and Statistics Section) on September 23,
1996 to Teresita Hernandez and our letter dated November 7, 1996 to the LRA that we have
no records of Fls-3168-D.
The Land Registration Authority however, furnished us with machine copy of Fls-3168-D
reproduced from the copy issued by that Office and we found out that the copy of Fls-
3168-D file (sic) in your office did not emanate from this Office. We reiterate that we have
no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D.
May we request you again to please forward to us the said copy of plan Fls-3168-D on file
in your office for our evaluation and comment. (Emphasis supplied)
Engr. Dalire sent another letter dated 31 January 1997 18 to the LRA Administrator. The letter
states: TEcHCA
In your letter dated December 2, 1996 (IN RE: Administrative Reconstitution of the Original
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 210177 in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Homer L.
Barque, Sr., Represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez, Petitioner) you requested us to clarify
the fact that the Regional Office has a microfilm copy of plan Fls-3168-D, while our office does
not have a record of the same. In that letter, you attached for our reference the following:
1.Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by the TRSS, NCR;
2.Reply letter of Engr. Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;
3.Our reply letter dated November 7, 1996 to your letter dated October 29, 1996
In this connection, please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996 the DENR-NCR
about your letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the plan Fls-3168-D filed in
that Office from where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA did not emanate from our office.
We requested them to forward to us the said plan for our evaluation and comment. Likewise,
on January 5, 1997, we made a follow-up, reiterating that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-
D and requesting them to forward the plan for our evaluation and comment. It is regretted,
they did not respond.
Upon examination of the copy of Fls-3168-D allegedly issued by DENR-NCR, it is certain
that the source of the copy is a spurious plan which may have been inserted in the file.
We requested for the copy in their file last 05 December 1996 and 05
January 1997 but until this writing, NCR has not sent us the copy for authentication as
required by DENR Administrative Order. We are sure that the copy did not come from this
Office. The reasons are:
a.Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our Microfilm Computer list of plans
available for decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls-3168-D, logically we
cannot issue any copy.
b.The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious copy.
1)The certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The certification and the
signing official are separate. Ours is one- piece.
2)The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and Chief in the syndicates (sic)
stamp differ from our stamp. Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division is our stamp, their (sic)
is Survey without the "s" plural.
3)We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy.
4)The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp "Not for Registration/Titling For Reference
Only" is smaller than our stamp. It is also incomplete as an (sic) Stamp, in addition to the
above is "of ".
5)The copy bears forged initials of my section officer and myself. I sign completely
certification.
6)The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in the master copy.
7)Again, it is certified that this Bureau does not have copy of Fls-3168-D.
In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your Office as well as the
alleged letter authenticating it should be disregarded or rejected as they come from
spurious sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D
with an area of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the
reconstitution of title will create land problem involving prime lots in that area.
Meanwhile, we requested our Records Division to find out to whom lot 823 (or portion
thereof) Piedad Estate was conveyed. (Emphasis supplied)
In a letter dated 13 February 1997 19 to the LRA Administrator, Engr. Dalire explained that
the 2 January 1997 letter, purportedly written by him, was forged. Thus:
In reply to your letter dated January 28, 1997 which we received today, please be informed
that as per the inventory of approved surveys which are officially enrolled in our file, the
locator cards, the microfilm, list of plans on file which were decentralized to our regions, that
are on file in this Bureau show that plan Fls-3168-D is not among the plans in our file. The
non-existence of plan Fls-3168-D in our file, hence there is none to decentralize to our
National Capital Region, is the subject of our reply to you dated 07 November 1996 (copy
attached).
With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox copy attached to your letter, this
letter definitely did not come from this office; it is a forged document. The statement that
the subject plan was forwarded to us by the Chief, Technical Records Statistics Section of
the NCR-LMS is not true. Until now the NCR has not turned over the plan they reproduced
in compliance with our urgent requests dated 03 January 1996 and followed up by our
letters 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached).
With respect to the questioned plan of Fls-3168-D, xerox copy attached to your letter of
December 2, 1996, our detailed findings tending to prove it is a spurious copy have been
discussed in our letter-reply dated 31 January 1997.
Meanwhile, we are retrieving the plan allegedly in the file of NCR for investigation and/or
validation under DENR Administrative Order No. 40, s. 1991. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in a letter dated 19 February 1997, 20 Engr. Dalire requested Atty. Bustos to
disregard Fls-3168-D for being spurious, thus:
In reply to your query whether or not a)the copy of plan Fls-3168-D submitted to you involving
lot 823, Piedad Estate as surveyed for Emiliano Setosta;
b)the letter dated 07 November 1996, and c)the letter dated 02 January 1997 are authentic
and really coming from this office.
The letter dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached) stating that this Bureau has no
records of Fls-3168-D is authentic. Our Inventory Record of Approved Surveys, our
computerized list of plans officially filed in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the
microfilm all show that we have no records or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is not issued by
this Office. There are many markings on the copy to prove it did not come from LMB.
Reasons, among others, are:
1)We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we issue a copy of plan that is non-
existing?
2)The copy of plan bears two "Certifications" at the top and at lower half. This is not our
practice;
3)The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for the certification and another for
the signing official. We use one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the letters/words of
one rubber stamp is different from this marking on this spurious plan;
4)The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans with the initials of my action
officers and their codings below my signature. These are not present in the spurious
copy of plan;
5)The letter size of the rubber stamp "NOT FOR REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR
REFERENCE ONLY" is smaller than our rubber stamp;
6)The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry our rubber stamp
"GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF "This is stamped
on all microfilm copies we issue because all microfilm copies are for official use only of our
LMS. We have shown you our rubber stamps to prove that the copy of Fls-3168- D in your
possession is a spurious plan.
I firmly deny having prepared and issued the letter dated 02 January 1997 stating that copy
of subject plan (Fls-3168-D) was forwarded to us by the Chief Technical Records and Statistics
Section of the NCR and that as per verification, the plan is identical to the microfilm and that
the case be given due course for administrative reconstitution. Certainly this is not true. This
is the handiwork of forgers. How can this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy in
their file for validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory under DAO No. 49 for
our validation. This is the subject of our letters to NCR dated 05
December 1996, 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached). Definitely this
letter was never prepared and issued by this Office. Our record books and file attest to this.
We do not use letterheads for letters involving this topic.
Apparently our letter of 31 January 1997 (copy attached) was intercepted and did not reach
you.
For all intent and purposes, please disregard the plan Fls-3168-D and the letter dated 02
January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious documents. (Emphasis supplied)
estate tax receipts would show that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is located at Barrio Payong,
and/or Barrio Culiat [Annexes "2" to "77" inclusive "79", "84" and "85" of Opposition] which is
grossly inaccurate. The map of Quezon City [Annex "N" of Petitioners' Position Paper] would
show that there is no such barrio as Payong. It must likewise be noted that there is a Barrio
Culiat but the same is separate and distinct from Barrio Matandang Balara and they do not
adjoin each other. Quite perplexing though is the fact that the real estate tax receipts for
payments made after the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire on 11 June 1988 would show
that the property covered thereby is already situated at Barrio Matandang Balara [Annexes
"91" to "104" inclusive of Opposition], while in other tax payment receipts [Annexes "103" to
"114" inclusive of Opposition], Barrio Capitol is indicated as the location of the property in
question. This is highly questionable and likewise highly irregular. The said real estate tax
receipts also reflect the tax declarations of the property covered thereby. It is highly irregular
that the tax declaration numbers indicated therein would vary and those tax declarations
which appear to have been canceled would again be revived.

On 14 April 1997, Manotok, et al. filed their formal opposition to the petition for The claim of the oppositors that the property in question per TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]
covers only one [1] lot is also inaccurate and without any basis. Plan FLS 3168D shows that
reconstitution upon learning of the petition. The Ruling of the Reconstituting Officer the property in question indeed consists of two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. The same is
being buttressed and corroborated by the certified copy of the tax map over the property in
In an Order dated 30 June 1997, 21 Atty. Bustos denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 question issued by the Quezon City Assessor's Office [Annex "H" of Petitioners' Position
on the following grounds: Paper]. Said tax map shows that similar to TCT No. 210177 and Plan FLS 3168D, the property
in question covers two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. Granting arguendo that Lot 823 of
the Piedad Estate has not yet been subdivided into two [2] lots from the date of original
1.Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq.
survey in 1907, it is highly irregular that TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would have Lot 822-A
Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate,
Psd 2498, Lot 818-A and Lot 818-C Psd 2507 as boundaries when at the time of the original
containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of
survey, there were no such Psd's yet.
Severino M. Manotok, et al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated
February 01, 1991;
Examination of the technical decription and boundaries appearing in TCT No. RT-22481
2.The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr. [372302] would show that the same do not, in all respects, conform to the certified technical
Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter description and boundaries of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate [property in question] which are
dated February 19, 1997. (Emphasis supplied) the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R and B. L. Form No. 31-10 issued by the Bureau of Lands [Annexes
"I" and "J" of Petitioners' Position Paper]. There was never any mention of Payatas Estate nor
Tuazon Estate as the boundaries of the lot in question. The lot in question does not at all
Barque, Sr. moved for reconsideration of the Order. In an Order dated 10 February 1998, 22
adjoin the Payatas Estate which was surveyed only on January 12, 1923 as per certification
Atty. Bustos denied the motion for lack of merit.
issued by the LMS-DENR-NCR [Annex "L" Petitioners' Position Paper]. As correctly pointed out
by petitioners, Lot
The Heirs of Barque filed an appeal with the LRA, docketed as 822 was mentioned as one of the boundaries of TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]. It was not,
however, indicated whether or not it was Lot 822 of the Piedad Estate. 25
Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A [97]. The Ruling of the Land
However, the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 could only be reconstituted after a court of
Registration Authority competent jurisdiction has cancelled TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]. The dispositive portion
of the LRA Resolution reads:
In a Resolution dated 24 June 1998, 23 the LRA gave due course to the appeal. The LRA ruled
that under LRA Circular No. 13, 24 only the owner's or co-owner's duplicate of an original or
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No.
transfer certificate of title could be used as a source of administrative reconstitution. Hence,
the LRA ruled that Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the submission of documents other than the 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation
owner's duplicate of the TCT. The LRA further ruled that Engr. Dalire failed to deny or question of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of [the] Manotoks upon order of a court of
the genuineness of his signature in the letter of 2 January 1997. The LRA held that the 2 competent jurisdiction.
January 1997 letter is an official communication from Engr. Dalire. Finally, the LRA ruled that
Manotok, et al.'s TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is sham and spurious, thus: SO ORDERED. 26

It is undisputed that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, the property in question, is located at Manotok, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration. In an Order dated 14 June
Barrio Matandang Balara, Quezon City. Several documents submitted by oppositors 2001, 27 the LRA denied the motion.
particularly the several Deeds of Sale and Unilateral Deed of Conveyance including the real
Manotok, et al. filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 before the
Court of Appeals challenging the 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the
LRA.
The Heirs of Barque filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 praying
for the modification of the 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA.
The Heirs of Barque prayed for the immediate reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 without
prior cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
Ruling of the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 66642
The Court of Appeals initially dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 in the Resolution of 23 October
2001 28 for failure to show that Rosa R. Manotok had authority to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping in behalf of the other petitioners. Upon motion for
reconsideration filed by Manotok, et al., the Court of Appeals reinstated the petition in the
Resolution of 27 November 2001. 29
In its Decision of 29 October 2003, 30 the Court of Appeals denied Manotok, et al.'s petition
and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. However, upon motion for reconsideration
of the Heirs of Barque, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision on 24
February 2004, 31 the dispositive portion of which reads: CASIEa
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this
Court dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing
the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents' TCT No. T-210177. SO ORDERED. 32
Manotok, et al. appealed to this Court for relief. Their petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 162335. CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
In a Decision promulgated on 13 September 2002, 33 the Court of Appeals dismissed
the Heirs of Barque's petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. The
Heirs of Barque moved for reconsideration of the Decision.
In an Amended Decision promulgated on 7 November 2003, 34 the Court of Appeals
reconsidered its 13 September 2002 Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of
private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners'
valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177. No pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED. 35
Manotok, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision. In its Resolution
of 12 March 2004, 36 the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Manotok, et al. filed a petition for review with this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 162605.
The Issues In their Memoranda, 37 Manotok, et al. raise a number of issues which may be
summarized as follows:
1.Whether the Land Registration Authority has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Manotok,
et al.'s title.
2.Whether the Court of Appeals may assume equity jurisdiction over the cases.
3.Whether the Court of Appeals, applying Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco,
38 may order the cancellation of Manotok, et al.'s title and the reconstitution of the Heirs of
Barque's title. Administrative Reconstitution under PD 1529 Section 110 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 39 ("PD 1529"), as amended by Republic Act No. 6732, 40 governs the
administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of titles. Section 110 of PD 1529
provides:
SEC. 110.Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Original of Torrens Title. Original copies of
certificate of titles lost or destroyed in the offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and
encumbrances affecting the lands covered by such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent
with this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed
certificate prescribed in said Act may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or
destruction of land titles due to fire, flood or other force majeure as determined by the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority: Provided, That the number of certificates of
titles lost or damaged should be at least ten percent (10%) of the total number in the
possession of the Office of the Register of Deeds: Provided, further, That in no case shall the
number of certificates of titles lost or damaged be less than five hundred (500).
Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be furnished the Register
of Deeds of the place where the land is situated and to the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority. No order or judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certificate of
title shall become final until the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the Register of
Deeds and the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a notice of such order or
judgment without any appeal having [been] filed by any such officials.
The LRA, in reversing Atty. Bustos' Order, ruled that Atty. Bustos blatantly disregarded LRA
Circular No. 13 41 when he required the submission of documents other than the owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 210177. The LRA ruled that Atty. Bustos should have confined himself to
TCT No. 210177. The LRA cited paragraph 4 of LRA Circular No. 13, thus:
4. Sources of Reconstitution. Only the owner's or co-owner's duplicate of an original or
transfer certificate of title may be used as a source of administrative reconstitution.
However, paragraph 4 of LRA Circular No. 13 should be read in conjunction with its paragraph
8, which states:
8. Order of Reconstitution. If the Reconstituting Officer or the Register of Deeds of another
registry, after appropriate verification, is convinced that the certificate of title may be
reconstituted, he shall issue an order of reconstitution. Otherwise, he shall deny the petition,
stating his reasons therefor. The Register of Deeds concerned and the petitioner shall be
furnished with copies of the order. (Emphasis supplied)
When Atty. Bustos requested Engr. Dalire to furnish his office with a copy of Fls-3168-D, it
was part of the verification process prior to reconstitution of the title. Considering the
numerous petitions for reconstitution due to the destruction of the Quezon City Hall, Atty.
Bustos was merely exercising caution to avoid the reconstitution of spurious titles. Atty.
Bustos conducted a verification of TCT No. 210177 pursuant to paragraph 8 of LRA Circular
No. 13. Hence, the LRA erred in ruling that Atty. Bustos should have confined himself to the
owner's duplicate of TCT No. 210177.
Section 3 42 of Republic Act No. 26 43 ("RA 26") enumerates the sources for reconstitution
of transfer certificates of title. For administrative reconstitution of title, the only source
documents are the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title and the co- owner's,
mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title. Section 12 44 of RA 26 does not
apply in the present cases since Section 12 refers to judicial reconstitution of title.
The reconstitution of a certificate of title is far from being a ministerial act. In an
administrative reconstitution, the petitioner must submit the owner's or co-owner's duplicate
of the certificate of title as required by Section 3 of RA 26 and paragraph 4 of LRA Circular
No. 13.
However, the submission of the source documents does not mean that the reconstituting
officer must forthwith grant the petition for reconstitution. It does not also mean that the
reconstituting officer must confine himself with the owner's or co-owner's duplicate of the
certificate of title. In accordance with paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No. 13, the reconstituting
officer or the Register of Deeds shall issue an order of reconstitution only after appropriate
verification which means that he must be convinced that the certificate of title is genuine
and not spurious. Thus, the reconstituting officer must go beyond the owner's or co-owner's
duplicate certificate of title to determine whether the title is genuine. The process of
verification allows the reconstituting officer to countercheck with other government agencies
to determine the validity of the title to be reconstituted.
When Atty. Bustos requested for a copy of Fls-3168-D, he was not only exercising caution but
more importantly, it was part of the verification process under paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No.
13. The Heirs of Barque filed the petition for reconstitution only in 1996, eight years after the
alleged destruction of the original TCT in 1988. The reconstituting officer should not be blamed
for verifying if he should grant the petition for reconstitution. Paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No.
13 mandates that Atty. Bustos shall issue an order of reconstitution only after appropriate
verification.
The Jurisdiction of the Land Registration Authority Section 6 of PD 1529 enumerates the
general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner, 45 as follows: SEC. 6.General
Functions
(1)The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following functions:
(a)Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land
registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the
corresponding certificates of title;
(b)Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and
other personnel of the Commission; (c)Resolve cases elevated en
consulta by, or on appeal from decision of, Registers of Deeds;
(d)Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the Court of First
Instance throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and
functions in relation to the registration of lands;
(e)Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the
registration of lands and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all
needful rules and regulations therefor;
(f)Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision survey plans of name of another party, unless there is a final judgment first cancelling such Torrens title. The
properties titled under Act No. 496 except those covered by P.D. No. 957. (Emphasis supplied) only exception is when the Torrens title has been issued
The LRA has jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions on petitions for reconstitution.
However, it is not within its powers and functions to declare a title void. Under Section 19 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ("BP Blg. 129"), "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction . . . in all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein." The LRA, in its 24 June 1998 Resolution, recognized that
only the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") could declare a title fraudulently reconstituted. The LRA
declared:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is noted that although TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the
name of the Manotoks is alleged to cover a property with an "expanded area" and that the
same was fraudulently reconstituted, the same is existing as a reconstituted title at the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. It is thus presumed valid until ordered
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction. A title issued under the Torrens
system enjoys the presumption of validity (Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 244 SCRA 418). Although it
is now being claimed that the title of the Manotoks was wrongly reconstituted, it is only the
Regional Trial Court which can declare that the same was fraudulently reconstituted. Well-
settled is the rule that a certificate of title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in
a direct proceeding in accordance with law (Section 48, P.D. 1529; Calalang vs. Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88, 106). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It must likewise be stressed that questions affecting title to real property fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts as expressly provided for under B.P. Blg. 129,
particularly Section 19(2) thereof . . . . 46
Clearly, LRA's jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution does not
include the power to declare a title sham or spurious or to order the cancellation of a
certificate of title. AHCTEa
The settled rule is a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack. 47 A certificate
of title may only be altered, modified or cancelled in a direct proceeding. 48 Section 48 of
PD 1529 provides:
Section 48.Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
To allow the cancellation of Manotok, et al.'s title in an administrative reconstitution
proceeding will permit an indirect attack on the certificate of title in violation of Section 48
of PD 1529.
The LRA exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared that Manotok, et al.s' title is sham and
spurious. The LRA itself acknowledged that only the RTC could declare a title fraudulently
reconstituted. By ruling on the validity of Manotok, et al.'s title, the LRA assumed the function
of the RTC. The LRA also preempted whatever decision the RTC may render on the matter.
The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction to act on the
petition for reconstitution filed by the Heirs of Barque in view of the existing Torrens title of
Manotok, et al. No court, much less an administrative body, can entertain a petition for
reconstitution of lost or destroyed title if the land is already covered by a Torrens title in the
for less than one year, 49 which is not the situation in the present cases.
To allow such reconstitution is to allow a collateral attack on the existing Torrens title in
violation of Section 48 of PD 1529. Such reconstitution will result in an anomalous situation
where two Torrens title in the name of two different owners cover one property, a situation
anathema to the very concept of stability and indefeasibility of a Torrens title. In Alabang
Development Corporation v. Valenzuela 50 the Court ruled:
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens
Titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance
under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing
by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. . . . The courts simply have no
jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the
names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of
titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance
of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. A fortiori, such
proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly registered owners and
holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and void. Applicants, land officials and judges
who disregard these basic and fundamental principles will be held duly accountable
therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has repeatedly reiterated this ruling in subsequent cases. 51
By cancelling the TCT of Manotok, et al., and upholding the TCT of the Heirs of Barque, the
Court of Appeals resolved in the administrative reconstitution case the issue of ownership
over the property in dispute. This is grave error because ownership is never in issue in a
petition for reconstitution of title. As this Court ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. 52
: question contains an area of 342,945 square meters. At a conservative estimate of P5,000
Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or
resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution of
a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and
condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby. (Emphasis in original)
In a petition for reconstitution of title, the only relief sought is the issuance of a reconstituted
title because the reconstituting officer's power is limited to granting or denying a
reconstituted title. The reconstituting officer has no power to decide questions of ownership.
A Torrens title, even a reconstituted title, is "evidence of an indefeasible title to the property
in favor of the person whose name appears therein." 53 Certainly, the reconstituting officer
in an administrative proceeding has no authority to deprive a third party of his property by
cancelling his Torrens title to the property. In a petition for reconstitution, such third party is
not even required to be impleaded as a respondent.
Equity Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
In its original Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Court of Appeals held that Manotok,
et al.'s title is presumed valid until annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction. In CA-
G.R. SP No. 66700, the Court of Appeals originally ruled that the LRA is without
jurisdiction and cannot determine which of the two titles is valid.
Yet, in the two Amended Decisions, the Court of Appeals sustained as conclusive the LRA's
finding that the title of the Heirs of Barque is the genuine and authentic title. Moreover, in
the Amended Decisions, the Court of Appeals ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel
Manotok, et al.'s TCT No. RT-22481 even without a direct proceeding before the proper RTC
as mandated by Section 48 of PD 1529 and Section 19 of BP Blg. 129. Clearly, the Court of
Appeals deprived Manotok, et al. of their property without due process of law.
In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals insists that it may decide the cases on the merits
based on the records before it "in the pursuit of expeditious administration of justice." In
other words, the Court of Appeals assumed equity jurisdiction over the cases.
Equity jurisdiction aims to attain complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
render judgment to meet the special circumstances of a case because of the limitations of its
statutory jurisdiction. 54 However, equity follows the law, and courts exercising equity
jurisdiction must still apply the law and have no discretion to disregard the law. 55 Where the
law prescribes a particular remedy with fixed and limited boundaries, the court cannot, by
exercising equity jurisdiction, extend the boundaries further than the law allows. 56 Thus, the
Court ruled:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as 'a justice outside legality,' this is applied
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of
procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present
here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. 57
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the Court of Appeals may not extend jurisdiction to the LRA where the law has not
granted such jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals may not also allow a collateral attack on a
Torrens title, either before the LRA or before itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of PD
1529. The present cases involve a vast tract of land in a prime district. The property in
per square meter, the value of the property amounts to P1,714,725,000. The documents
submitted by the parties are conflicting. The parties question the authenticity of each
other's documents. Manotok, et al. claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the property since 1919 while the Heirs of Barque allegedly have
never set foot on the property.
The determination of the authenticity of the documents and veracity of the claims of both
parties requires a trial on the merits. The LRA exceeded its jurisdiction when it made a
conclusive finding on the validity of the titles of the parties. Such function falls under the
"exclusive original jurisdiction" of the RTC under Section 19 of BP Blg. 129. The Court of
Appeals should not have resolved the factual issues by adopting as its own the LRA's finding.
This Court accords respect, if not finality, to factual findings of an administrative body.
However, this rule does not apply when the administrative body has no jurisdiction to make a
conclusive factual finding particularly when the findings might conflict with findings of the
tribunal or agency which has jurisdiction on the matter.
Respondents claim that there is no Barrio Payong in Quezon City. Respondents point to the 24
June 1998 Resolution of the LRA stating that Barrio Payong is non-existent. However, the
Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the court of origin in Spouses Tiongson, et al. v.
Court Appeals and Macaya, 58 shows that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is located at Barrio
Payong, Old Balara, Quezon City. 59 Indeed, the Court of Agrarian Relations made an ocular
inspection of the property, thus: aDHScI
On June 20, 1978, the Court issued an Order directing the Clerk of Court to conduct an
ocular inspection of the landholding in question, which is as follows:
"Conformably with 'Urgent Motion For An Ocular Inspection' filed with this Court on even
date and as stated in paragraph 2 thereof, the Clerk of Court is hereby direct to conduct an
ocular inspection of the landholding in question situated at Payong, Quezon City, which as
agreed upon between them is set on June 23, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock A.M. (sic), wherein the
parties shall meet at the site of said landholding and to determine.
(a)Portions of the property planted to rice (sic) by the plaintiff and/or
his children;
(b)Portions of the property where the rice paddies are located;
(c)Portions of the property planted to (sic) corn and vegetables;
(d)Portions of the property where the houses of the plaintiff and/or his children are built and
located;
(e)Portion of the property which, according to the defendants, had been, before the filing of
the complaint in this case, worked on by Victorino Macaya and returned by him to the
defendants, through Atty. Perpetua Bocanegra, with an area of more or less one hectare;
(f)Portions burned by the plaintiff."
Upon accomplishment thereof, said Clerk of Court is hereby directed to submit his report
as well as his sketch plan for further disposition of the Court.
On June 27, 1977, the Clerk of Court submitted his "REPORT", which is as follows:
"In compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court dated June 20, 1978, undersigned
together with Mr. Victor Flores of this Branch, proceeded to Barrio Payong, Quezon City on
June 23, 1978, to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding involved in this case. . .
." 60 (Emphasis supplied)
The findings of the LRA that Barrio Payong does not exist is based merely on LRA's
evaluation of the documents. In contrast, the findings of the Court of Agrarian Relations
that the property of the Spouses Tiongson is located in Barrio Payong, Quezon City, is
based on ocular inspection. The majority opinion adopts the findings of the LRA. This issue,
however, should be threshed out by the proper trial court in an action directly attacking
the validity of the Torrens title of Manotok, et al.
The Applicability of Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco
In ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel Manotok, et al.'s title and the LRA to reconstitute
the title of the Heirs of Barque, the Court of Appeals relied on Ortigas & Company Limited
Partnership v. Velasco. 61 The Court of Appeals ruled that it would be unjust to the Heirs of
Barque to initiate a new proceeding before the RTC for the sole purpose of seeking the
cancellation of Manotok, et al.'s title.
The Heirs of Barque claim that the pendency of the cases for a long period of time justifies
the application of the Ortigas case in their favor. On the other hand, Manotok, et al. argue
that if ever the Ortigas case is applicable, it will apply in their favor since this Court in a prior
decision 62 involving tenancy relationship affirmed their right to the property in question.
The Ortigas case is not authority to deprive Manotok, et al. of their right to a direct
proceeding before the proper court concerning the validity of their Torrens title. In Ortigas,
the Court ruled that a remand of the case would be pointless and unduly circuitous, and that
to defer adjudication on the matter would be unwarranted and unjust. This is because the
records showed that Ortigas' titles had already been upheld and affirmed in three other
cases, involving either the original registration or direct attacks on the titles, decided in
1906, 1985 and 1987. 63 The Court ruled that Ortigas' documents of ownership have been
passed upon, sanctioned and sustained by the Court more than once. This peculiar
circumstance is absent in the cases before us.
However, the Ortigas case, which the Heirs of Barque insist applies to the present cases, is
authority to hold that the Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for reconstitution filed by the Heirs of Barque. The Court
held in Ortigas: 64
. . . So, too, this Court has stressed "that lands already covered by duly issued existing
Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their
issuance under section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing
by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. . . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
This is the specific ruling in Ortigas that applies to the present cases.
In summary, the Heirs of Barque filed before the Register of Deeds an administrative
petition to reconstitute their allegedly destroyed TCT. The Register of Deeds, as
reconstituting officer, denied the petition of the Heirs of Barque because, based on official
records, the property involved is already registered under the Torrens system in the name of
Manotok, et al. The LRA affirmed the Register of Deeds, stating that only the proper trial
court could cancel the TCT of Manotok, et al. although the LRA believed that the TCT of
Manotok, et al. was a sham. The LRA recognized that in an administrative reconstitution, the
decision of the reconstituting body is either to deny or approve the reconstitution of the
applicant's title, never to cancel the Torrens title of a third party. However, on appeal, the
Court of Appeals declared the TCT of Manotok, et al. void and the TCT of the Heirs of Barque
valid. Clearly, the Court of Appeals deprived Manotok, et al. of their property without due
process of law. The Court of Appeals blatantly disregarded Section 48 of PD 1529 and
Section 19 of BP Blg. 129 which confer on the proper trial court exclusive original jurisdiction
to cancel a Torrens title in an action directly attacking the validity of the Torrens title. The
Court should not countenance this gross injustice and patent violation of the law.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petitions and set aside the 24 February 2004 Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 66642 and the 7 November 2003
Amended Decision and the 12 March 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66700. The Land Registration Authority must defer its ruling in Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-
A [97] until after the proper Regional Trial Court shall have rendered a final judgment on the
validity of the titles of the parties.