Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Scott Campbell
Susan S. Fainstein
Compiling a reader in planning theory presents a tricky dilemma: one can either
cautiously reprint the early postwar classics (thereby duplicating several past
anthologies including Faludi's popular 1973 reader), or else run the risk of
prematurely elevating otherwise transient ideas. We take a different path; we have
selected a set of readings -- both "classic" and recent -- that best address the pressing
and enduring questions in planning theory.
Second, the boundary between planners and related professionals (such as real estate
developers, architects, city council members) is not mutually exclusive: planners don't
just plan, and non-planners also plan.
Third, the field of planning is divided among those who define it according to its
object (land use patterns of the built and natural environments) or its method (the
process of decision-making).
Fourth, many fields are defined by a specific set of methodologies; yet planning
commonly borrows the diverse methodologies from many different fields, and so its
theoretical base cannot be easily drawn from its tools of analysis.
Taken together, this considerable disagreement over the scope and function of
planning and the problems of defining who is actually a planner obscure the
delineation of an appropriate body of theory. Whereas most scholars can agree on
what constitutes the economy and the polity -- and thus what is economic or political
theory -- they differ on the content of planning theory.
Beyond this intention, we aim at establishing a theoretical foundation that not only
provides a field with a common structure for scientific inquiry, but also a means for
defining what planning is -- especially in the intimidating company of more
established academic disciplines. Theory allows for both professional and intellectual
self-reflection. It tries to make sense of the seemingly unrelated, contradictory aspects
of urban development and creates a rational system with which to compare and
evaluate the merits of different planning ideas and strategies. It also allows planners to
translate their specific issues into more general social scientific theoretical language
so that planning may both export and import ideas with other disciplines.
In this light, we view planning theory as a series of debates. Here are six of them:
(1) these formative years where the pioneers (Howard, Burnham, etc.) did not yet
identify themselves as planners (late 1800s - ca. 1910);
(2) the period of institutionalization, professionalization and self-recognition of
planning, as well as the rise of regional and federal planning efforts (ca. 1910 - 1945);
and
This story, often repeated in introductory courses and texts, is useful in several ways.
This multiplicity of technical, social and aesthetic origins explains planning's eclectic
blend of design, civil engineering, local politics, community organization and social
justice. Its status as either a quasi-, secondary or pubescent profession is explained by
its development as a 20th Century, public-sector, bureaucratic profession, rather than
as a late 19th Century, private-sector profession such as medicine (Hoffman 1989).
At the most basic level, this framework gives the story of planning -- at least modern
professional planning -- a starting point. Planning emerges as the 20th Century
response to the 19th Century industrial city (Hall 1988). It also provides several
foundational texts: Howard's Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform (1898),
Charles Robinson's The Improvement of Towns and Cities or the Practical Basis of
Civic Aesthetics (1901), and Daniel Burnham's plan for Chicago (1909), as well as
several defining events: the Columbia Exposition in Chicago (1893) that launched the
City Beautiful Movement, the construction of Letchworth, the first English Garden
City (1903), and the first national conference on city planning, held in Washington,
D.C. (1909).
Yet this tale of planning's birth is also problematic. As the years go by and the
planning pioneers pass away, the story is simplified and unconditionally repeated.
Contingent or coincidental events and texts are elevated to necessary steps in the
inevitable and rational development of modern planning. Even the best of tellers can
succumb to repeating this tale of the "great men of planning history." This uncritical
acceptance of these early years of planning oddly juxtaposes with the soul-searching
in the postwar period, especially after the fall of the 1960s "Great Society" and urban-
renewal weariness created a crisis of confidence. The result is an essentialistic life-
cycle model of planning's birth, growth, maturation and mid-life crisis -- a model that
largely excludes the political, economic and cultural forces that continuously
transform both planning ideology and practice.
One path out of this debilitating historicism is to bridge the benign folklore of early
planning history and the current skepticism through a reassessment of planning's
history, where both past and present are retold with the same critical (and sometimes
revisionist) voice. Richard Foglesong's Planning the Capitalist City (1986) and Robert
Fishman's Bourgeois Utopias: the rise and fall of suburbia (1987) are but two of the
better examples. One can certainly fault some critical histories for also being narrow-
minded, where the historic logic of capital replaces the heroicism of "the great men of
planning history." The challenge is to write a planning history that encourages not
only an accurate, but also a critical, subtle and reflective understanding of
contemporary planning practice. An effective planning history helps the contemporary
planner shape his or her complex professional identity.
The duality between planning and the market is a defining framework in planning
theory. A person's opinion of planning reflects his or her assumptions about the
relationships between the private and public sectors -- and how much the government
should "intrude". The safe stance in planning has been to see its role as making up for
the periodic shortcomings of the private market (Moore 1978; Klosterman -- this
volume). This approach creates a neat and tidy division between the public and private
worlds, each with their unique comparative advantages. It treats planning as the
patient understudy who fills in when the market fails but never presumes to
permanently replace the market or change the script of economic efficiency. This
legitimacy significantly limits creative or redistributive planning efforts, but it does
make a scaled-down version of planning palatable to all but the most conservative
economists (Friedman 1962).
3. "Rules of the Game": What values are incorporated within planning? What
ethical dilemmas do planners face?
This growing complexity and uncertainty in the planner's stance between the public
and private sectors also questions traditional ethical assumptions. As planners
increasingly work in the private and quasi-private sectors, do the planners' clients
become privatized as well? As Peter Marcuse's essay in this volume nicely outlines, a
planner's loyalty is torn between serving employers, fellow planners, and the public.
In this contested terrain of loyalties, what remains of the once-accepted cornerstone of
planning: serving the public interest?
Another ethical dimension arises from the difficulties surrounding the planner's role as
expert. Questions concerning the proper balance between expertise and citizen input
arise in issues like the siting of highways and waste disposal facilities, when particular
social groups must bear the costs. They are played out, as Frank Fischer discusses
(this volume), when experts seek to quantify risk, placing a monetary values on
human life. They show up, as Martin Wachs (1982) argues, in the assumption used by
model builders when they forecast the future impacts of public facilities. Critics of
those purporting to use scientific expertise to justify policy doubt the legitimacy of the
methods they employ, arguing that technical language disguises the values being
interjected and functions to obscure who wins and who loses. But the development of
technical forecasting methods nevertheless is necessary if planners are to fulfill their
responsibility of designing policies for the long term.
The most powerful planners are those who can marshall the resources to effect change
and get projects built (Doig -- this volume, Caro 1974, Walsh 1978). They bend the
role of the planner and alter the traditional separation between the public and private
sectors. The resulting public-private partnerships (planners as developers) make the
planner more activist (Squires 1989); yet they also strain the traditional identity of the
public planner and make many idealistic planners squirm. How else can one explain
the uncomfortable mixture of disgust and envy that planners felt towards Robert
Moses, who as the head of various New York City agencies had far more projects built
than had all the traditional city planners he disparaged?
The assault on comprehensive planning continued into the 1970s and 1980s. Strategic
planning rejected comprehensive planning's impossibly general goals and instead
embraced the lean and mean strategies from the business and military sectors
(Swanstrom 1987). By contrast, equity planning emerged as a less combative form of
advocacy planning that allowed planners to serve the interests of the poor from within
the system (Krumholz -- this volume).
There are problems with writing a tidy obituary for comprehensive planning, however.
First, many planners continue to use the comprehensive approach as the model of their
work, both because they continue to believe in it, and because they find the
alternatives to be inadequate (Dalton 1986). The primary task for many planners
continues to be the writing and revising of comprehensive plans for their
communities.
If the death notice of comprehensive planning may thus be premature, it may also
misunderstand its actual rise and fall. Planning theorists at times presume a kind of
naive, golden era of comprehensive rational planning during the early postwar years
that may never have actually existed. In constructing the history of planning, planners
arguably are guilty of after-the-fact revisionism in their labelling of comprehensive
planning. Planners may have falsely interpreted the planning theory disputes since the
1960s as the fall-out from the schism of a once-united field, rather than as simply a
reflection of a young, diverse field seeking to define itself during a turbulent era.
This is not to deny the power of the comprehensive planning debate; but it should be
seen as one of several important debates that shaped the identity of the young field of
planning theory. Unfortunately, much of this debate over comprehensiveness took
place inside a theoretical vacuum. Planners often argued about the proper role of
planning based simply on the merits of the concepts themselves (e.g., large vs. small
scale; top-down vs. bottom-up), while underestimating the larger political-economic
forces that shaped and constrained planning. As such, the articulation and eventual
challenge to comprehensive planning was part of a larger expansion beyond land-use
planning into social and economic policy.
6. The Enduring Question of the Public Interest
Thirty years ago, the engaging debates of planning theory involved the conflicts
between comprehensive vs. incremental planning, objectivity vs. advocacy,
centralization vs. decentralization, top-down vs. bottom up leadership, and planning
for people vs. planning for place. These debates from the adolescence of planning
theory now seem a bit tired and bypassed. It is not that they have been conclusively
resolved, but rather that the field is so broadly scattered that each pole lives on. This
current eclecticism reflects the fragmentation of planning itself. Nevertheless, these
debates were arguably necessary for the intellectual development of the field, and the
young planning theorist still needs to read and understand these controversies.
What has endured is the persistent question of the public interest. Planning continues
to face the central controversy of whether there is indeed a single public interest, and
whether planners recognize and serve it. Incremental planners claimed its excessive
complexity prevented the planner from directly serving the comprehensive public
interest, while advocate planners argued that what was portrayed as the public interest
was merely the interests of the privileged. More recently, post-modernists have
challenged the universal master-narrative that gives voice to the public interest, seeing
instead a heterogeneous public with many voices and interests. Finally, the persistence
of fundamentalist thinking and community identity based on religious rather than
secular, municipal values undermines the ability to find a consensual public interest
(Baum 1994).
Yet planners have not abandoned the idea of serving the public interest, and rightly so.
Postmodernists provided planning with a needed break from its preoccupation with a
monolithic "public" (represented by Le Corbusier's and Robert Moses' love of the
public but disdain for people); yet a rejection of Enlightenment rationality, shared
values and standards leaves the planner without adequate guidance to serve this
fragmented population. Some have touted strategic planning and other borrowed
private-sector approaches as the practical path for planning, but these approaches
neglect the "public" in the public interest. A belief in the public interest is the
foundation for a set of values that planners hold dear: equal protection and equal
opportunity, public space, and a sense of civic community and social responsibility.
The challenge is to reconcile these benefits of a common public interest with the
diversity (postmodern and otherwise) that comes from many communities living side-
by-side. David Harvey (1992) looked to the generally held ideas of social justice and
rationality as a bridge to overcome this dilemma. The recent emphasis on the planner
as mediator may reflect a new approach to the public interest: an acceptance of the
multiplicity of interests, but an enduring common interest in finding viable, politically
legitimate solutions. Planners serve the public interest by negotiating a kind of multi-
cultural, technocratic pluralism. The recent interest in communicative action --
planners as communicators rather than as autonomous, systematic thinkers -- also
reflects this effort to renew planning's focus on the public interest (Innes 1994;
Forester 1989; Healey, this volume).
In the end, this question of the public interest is the leitmotif that holds together the
defining debates of planning theory. The central task of planners is serving the public
interest in cities, suburbs and the countryside. Questions of when, why and how
planners should intervene -- and the constraints planners face in the process -- all lead
back to defining and serving this public interest. Yet this public interest is changing.
The restructured urban economy, the shifting boundaries between the public and
private sectors, and the changing tools and available resources constantly force
planners to rethink the public interest. This rethinking is the task of planning theory.
The Readings
We have selected the readings for this volume to represent what we think are the
central issues in planning theory. In particular, they address the challenge and
dilemma of planning: What role can planning play in making the good city and region
within the constraints of a capitalist political economy and a democratic political
system? We approach this question primarily through texts that address specific
theoretical issues. However, we have also included several case studies that provide
vivid and concrete illustrations of this question. We do not attempt to outline a model
planning process. Rather, our effort is to place planning theory within its historical
context, its political economy and the surrounding urban and regional environment.
Planning theory is a relatively young field, and yet one can already speak of "classic
readings". Our guide has been to choose those readings -- both old and new -- that still
speak directly to contemporary issues. Most have been written in the past ten years,
though some articles from the 1960s are still the best articulation of specific debates.
Most draw upon experiences in the United States and Great Britain, though hopefully
their relevance extends far beyond these boundaries.
We have organized the reading into six sections. Each section is prefaced with a short
introduction to the main themes. We begin with the foundations of modern planning,
with both traditional and critical views of planning history. We then turn to two
interrelated questions: What is the justification for planning intervention? and How
should planners intervene? Regarding the political and economic justifications for
planning, we have selected readings that examine the neoclassical, institutional and
Marxist arguments. They place planners in the larger context of the relationship
between the private market and government (both the local and nation states).
Regarding the style of planning, the readings examine the dominant planning
approaches: comprehensive, incremental, advocacy, equity and strategic planning. The
readings also explore several emerging directions: postmodernism and communicative
planning. The case studies presented in the fourth section illustrate these opportunities
and constraints to planners in the United States and Great Britain.