DGAC-INDONESIA List of Airworthiness Directives 2010

DGAC-INDONESIA List of Airworthiness Directives 2010 PAGE - 1
Sort by Type 23-Jul-2007
No. Number Reference

Applicability Subject
A/C EQUIP. OF CABIN SAFETY& INTERIOR

1 10-02-009 EASA AD 2009-0278
Type H1-10 AIR Halon (BCF) portable fire "Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers -
extinguishers, SICLI P/N 1708337B4, serial Identificaton / Replacement". This AD to prevent
numbers (s/n) as listed in Appendix I of tthis contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used againts a
AD. fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the
safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This AD requires the
identification and removal from service of certain batches of
fire extinguishers and replacement with serviceable units.
2 10-11-024 EASA AD 2010-0229
ASI-500 Life Raft Deployment System The affected Aero Seats and System STC modifies the
System (S-76A, S-76B, S-76C helicopter) helicopter by introduction of the externally mounted life raft
deployment system. Deploying the system is accomplished
by means of handle which is accesible to the pilot or co-pilot.
Recent hangar testing has result in failures of the deployment
handle. This AD to prevent delay or failure of deployment of
the life raft.
AEROSPATIALE ATR 42 & ATR 72

3 10-01-010 EASA AD 2009-0242
ATR42-200, ATR-42-300, ATR-42-320, "Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Certification
ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101, Maintenance Requirements and Critical Design
ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, Configuration Control Limitations (Fuel Tank Safety)". The
ATR72-211, ATR72-212 and ATR72-212A assessment showed that it was necessary to introduce specific
aeroplanes, all serial numbers. fuel system related Maintenance Significant Item (MSIs) and
Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation (CDCCL)
items in order to preserve the fuel tank system ignition
source prevention features from any configuration alterations
that could occur during maintenance actions, repair or
modifications. Failure to preserve those critical igniton
source prevention features could result in a fuel tank
explosion. Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs)
and Structural Significant Items (SSIs) are requisites of the
design approval. Failure to comply with the CMRs and SSIs
requirements nullifies the design approval because any non-
compliance could result in a catastrophic failure.
4 10-01-011 EASA AD 2009-0276
ATR42-200, ATR42-300, ATR42-320, "Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers -
ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101, Identification / Replacement". The result of the ongoing
ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, investigation have now established that LyonTech
ATR72-211, ATR72-212, and ATR72- Engineering Ltd, a UK-based company, has supplied further
212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if consignments of Halon 1211 (BCF) to L'Hotellier that do not
equipped with L'Hotellier Halon 1211 meet the required specification. This Halon 1211 has
(BCF) fire extinguishers, Part Number (P/N) subsequently been used to fill certain P/N 863521-01
863521-01, serial number (s/n) as listed in portable fire extinguisher that are now likely to be installed
L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863521-26- in or carried on board ATR aeroplanes. The contaminated
001. nature of this gas, when used against a fire, may provide
reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety of the
aeroplane and it occupants. In addition, extinguisher
activation may lead to the release of toxic fumes, possibly
causing injury to aeroplane occupants. This AD requires the
fire extinguisher and replacement with serviceable units.
by ssi

5 10-01-011R1 EASA AD 2009-0276R1
ATR42-200, -300, -320, -400, -500, ATR72- " Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers -
101, -201, -102, -202, -211, -212, and - Identification / Replacement ". This AD to prevent
212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used against a
equipped with L'Hotellier Halon 1211 fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the
(BCF) fire extinguishers, Part Number (P/N) safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This AD requires the
863521-01, serial numbers (s/n) as listed in identification and removal from service of certain bacthes of
L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863521-26- fire extinguishers and replacement with serviceable units.
001. This AD has been revised to extend the compliance time.
6 10-04-007-U EASA AD 2010-0063-E
ATR 72-212A aeroplanes, manufacturer "Flight Controls Rudder Pedal Rods Inspection /
serial numbers (MSN) 886, 897, 901, 902, Replacement".
903, 904 and 906. This AD is issued to prevent failure of the rudder pedal rod,
possibly resulting in reduced control of the aeroplane. In
combination with an engine failure or during a landing or
take-off under crosswind conditions, such a failure could
lead to loss of control of the aeroplane. This Emergency AD
requires inspection of the four rudder pedal rods, to detect a
lower than acceptable outer diameter at each rod end, and
replacement of any rods that fail the inspection criteria.
7 10-04-009 EASA AD 2010-0061
ATR42-200, ATR42-300, ATR42-320, Fire Protection Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers
ATR42-400, ATR42-500, ATR72-101, Identification / Replacement .
ATR72-201, ATR72-102, ATR72-202, This AD is issued to prevent contamination nature of Halon
ATR72-211, ATR72-212, and ATR72- 1211 gas, when used against a fire, may provide reduced fire
212A aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if suppression, endangering the safety of safety of the aircraft
equipped with L'Hotellier Halon 1211 and its occupants. This AD retains the requirements of
(BCF) fire extinguishers, Part Number (P/N) DGCA AD 10-01-011R1 ( EASA AD 2009-0276R1), which
863521-01, serial number (s/n) as listed in is superseded, and expands the applicability by referencing
L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) 863521-26- the corrected LHotellier SB 863521-26-001.
001 Revision 2 dated 04 February 2010.
8 10-07-010 EASA AD 2010-0138
ATR 42-200, -42-300, -42-320, -42-400 Stabilizers Elevator Inboard Hinge Fitting Lower Stop
and -42-500 aeroplanes, all Manufacturer Angles Inspection / Replacement.
Serial Number (MSN) up to MSN 643
inclusive, and ATR 72-101, -72-102, -72- One ATR operator has experienced in-flight elevator travel
201, -72-202, -72-211, -72-212 and 72- limitations with unusual effort being necessary on pitch axis
212A aeroplanes, all MSN up to MSN 728 to control the aeroplane, while the pitch mistrim message
inclusive. appeared on the ADU display. The elevators seemed to be
jammed. During the post-flight inspection, it was discovered
that the LH elevator lower stop assembly was broken at the
level of the angles, which may have prevented the elevator to
respond normally to the flight control input.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to

reduced control of the aeroplane.
This AD requires a one-time inspection of the elevator hinge

fittings and the reporting of all findings.
AGUSTA
by ssi

9 10-04-006-U EASA AD 2010-0059-E
A119 and AW119 MKII helicopters, all "Tail Rotor Drive - Tail A case of nonformity has been
serial number, if equipped with tail rotor discovered in the tail rotor 90o gearbox installed on an
90o gearbox (TGB) Part Number (P/N) 109- AW119MKII helicopter where a bushing (P/N) 109-0135-14-
0440-06-103 101 was missing, if not detected and corrected, could cause
abnormal vibration of the tail rotor controls possibly leading
to their damage and consequences loss of the yaw control
function.
This AD requires an inspection of the TGB (tail rotor
gearbox) assembly P/N 109-0440-06-103 to verify the
installation of the bushing. If the bushing is not installed, this
AD requires the replacement of the TGB assembly with
serviceable part, while if the bushing is found installed, this
AD requires the re-identification of the TGB P/N by
installing an additional nameplate.
AIRBUS A318 A319 A320 AND A321

10 07-10-016R1 EASA AD 2007-0276R1
Airbus A319, -A320 and -321 aeroplanes. "Equipment / Furnishing - 80VU Rack Attacments -
Inspection / Repair / Replacement". This AD is issued to
resived of DGCA AD No. 09-06-010-U (EASA AD 2009-
0125-E), to introduce the new reinforced lower central
support as an optional terminating action to the repetitive
inspections.
11 07-10-016R1 EASA AD 2007-0276R1
Airbus A319, -A320 and -A321 aeroplanes. "Equipment / Furnishing - 80VU Rack Attachments -
Inspection / Repair / Replacement". This AD is to prevent
damage to the lower laterial fittings and central support
fitting of the 80VU rack. In the worst case scenario a
complete failure of the 80VU fittings combination with a
high load factor or strong vibration could lead to failure of
the rack structure or computer or disconnection of the cable
harnesses to one or more computers located in the 80VU.
During critical phase of flight the multiple system
failure/reconfirguration may consitute an unfafe condition.
DGCA AD 07-10-016 (EASA AD 2007-0276) has been
revised to introduced the new reinforced lower central
support as an optional terminating action to the repetitive
inspection.
12 08-02-022R1 EASA AD 2008-0034R1
Airbus Model A320-211, A320-212, A320- Hydraulic Power Ram Air Turbine (RAT) Gerotor
214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, Pump - Replacement
A320-232, A320-233 aeroplanes, all This AD is issued to reduce the Applicability to certain A320
manufactures serial numbers, if equipped models only, Airbus A318, A319 and A321 series aeroplanes
with Hamilton Sundstrand/ Dowty Ram Air are basically equipped with Sundstrand RATs (per Airbus
Turbine (RAT) Part Number (P/N) modification 22803) and there is no option for those
680203037 with a Serial Number (S/N) aeroplanes to install a Hamilton Sundstrand (formerly
from 0101 to 0354inclusive, except Dowty) RAT.
aeroplanes which have received Airbus
modification 27189 in production or Airbus
Service Bulletin (SB) A320-29-1100 in
service, and without having received Airbus
modification 28413 in production.
by ssi

13 08-03-006R1 EASA AD 2008-0051R1
Airbus A320-111,A320-211,A320- Fuel/Electrical Power Prevention of fuel Tank
212,A320-214,A320-231,A320-232,and Exploision Risks Electrical Cables Modification.
A320-233 aeroplanes,all certified models, DGCA France AD F-2004-173 was issued to require the
all serial numbers, except aeroplanes that modification of the cable route of trailing edge, aft of the
have received Airbus modification 22626 in rear spar and wing tip, in according with the instruction of
production or Aibus Service Bulletine (SB) the airbus SB A320-24-1062 revision 05.
A320-24-1062 at revision 06 in service. However , additional work introduced by Airbus SB SB
A320-24-1062 Revision 05 was not included as part of the
normal accomplishment instruction s, and therefore this
additional work may not have been accomplished.
DGCA AD issued DGCA AD 08-03-006, retaining the
requirement of DGCA France AD F-2004-173 (EASA
Approval no.2004-10570),which was superseded and
required the accomplishment of the additional work in
accordance with the instruction of the Airbus SB A320-24-
1062 Revision 06.
This AD has been revised to reduce the applicability of this
AD and to clarify that the accomplishment of Airbus SB
A320-24-1062 Revision 05, including the instruction
reference as additional work in paragraph 3.B.(3) or
3.B.(4) of that SB,as applicable to aeroplane configuration ,
constitutes an acceptable method of compliance with
requirements of this AD.
14 08-11-010R1 EASA AD 2008-0199R1
Airbus A320 aeroplanes. "Hydraulic Power - Auxiliary Hydraulic Power - Ram Air
Turbine (RAT) Ejection Jack - Replacement". To avoid
failure of the ejection jack that may prevent the effective
deployment and use of the RAT in emergency conditions.
15 10-02-008 EASA AD 2010-0027
Airbus A321 aeroplanes, -211, -212, -231 "Fuel - Fuel Tank Harness Ring Tags - Inspection". A
and -232 models, manufacturer serial manufacturing quality non-conformity has been identified
number : 3051, 3067, 3070, 3075, 3081, that resulted in the under-crimping of ring tags on a batch of
3098, 3106, 3112, 3120, 3126, and 3130. In-tank Fuel Harnesses. This AD requires a one time
inspection to check the integrity of the ring tags and
peformance of corrective actions as necessary.
16 10-04-013 EASA AD 2010-0071
Airbus A319-100 and A320-200 aeroplanes, "Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Damage Tolerant
all manufacturer serial numbers. Airworthiness Limitations Items - ALS Part 2 -
Amendment". This AD retains the requirements of DGCA
AD No. 06-06-042 (EASA 2006-0165), which is superseded,
and requires the implementation of more restrictive
maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations.
17 10-04-013R1 EASA AD 2010-0071R1
Airbus A319-132, -A320-212, -A320-216, - Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Damage Tolerant
A320-231 and -A320-232 aeroplanes, all Airworthiness Limitation Items - ALS Part 2 - Amendment".
manufacturer serial numbers. This AD retains the requirements of DGCA AD No. 10-04-
013 (EASA 2010-0071) which is revised and requires the
implementation of more restrictive maintenance
requrements/airworthiness limitations as specified in
reference AD. This AD has been revised to clarify the special
compliance times defined in Table 1 of reference AD.
by ssi

18 10-05-013 EASA AD 2010-0091
Airbus A319-100, A320-200 aeroplanes, all "Stabilizer Elevators - Inspection".
manufacturer serial numbers. It has been reported that some elevators may have been
moved from the aeroplane on which they were originally
fitted to another aeroplane, and spare parts may have been
installed without being traced with regard to the ALI
Document requirements. Consequently, those elevators might
not have been inspected within the applicable required time
frame as per ALI task 552007 requirements.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires the
identification of the elevators installed on the aeroplane to
determine whether these elevators have been inspected
within the applicable required time frame as per ALI task
552007. If this has not been done, this AD requires the
accomplishment of that inspection and, depending on
findings, associated corrective action(s).
19 10-05-013R1 EASA 2010-0091R1
Airbus A319 and A320 aeroplanes. Stabilizer Elevator Inspection.
This AD revises the requirements of DGCA AD 10-05-013
(EASA AD 2010-0091) which is require the identification of
the elevators installed on the aeroplane to determine whether
these elevators have been inspected within the applicable
required time frame as per ALI task 552007. If this has not
been done, this AD requires the accomplishment of that
inspection and, depending on findings, associated corrective
action(s).
20 10-07-025 EASA AD 2010-0120
Airbus A318, -A319, -320 and -321 "Hydraulic Power - Hamilton Sundstrand Ram Air Turbine
aeroplanes. Balance Weight Screws - Inspection / Replacement". To
avoid loss of RAT functionality, that in combination with
double engine failure or a total loss of normal electrical
power generation, could result in loss control of the
aeroplane. Also, this AD requires the replacement of the set
of balance weights screws before the next operational or
functional check of the RAT assembly.
21 10-08-001 EASA AD 2010-0149
Airbus A320-214, -216, -232 and -233 "Flight Controls - Elevator Aileron Computer (ELAC)
aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers System Power Supply - Modification". In case of emergency
on which Airbus Modification (MOD) electrical configuration combined with a green and yellow
38310 has been embodied in production. hydraulic system loss, during landing phase (nose landing
gear extended), the roll control would only be provided by
the left aileron. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to
an asymmetrical landing configuration, resulting in reduced
controlof the aeroplane. This AD required a modification of
the electrical installation of ELAC2 and THS Motor 1 power
supply, restoring the aeroplanes to the pre-mod 38310
configuration.
by ssi

22 10-08-002 EASA AD 2010-0148
Airbus A319, A320 and A321 aeroplanes. "Equipment & Furnishings - DASELL Lavatory Walls -
Inspection / Repair". It has been reported that cracks have
been detected due to corrosion on the lower part of the
lavatory wall. If this corrosion becomes too extensive, the
wall onto which one or two cabin attendant seats are attached
may not support the required load cases and maylead to
injury and/or prevent the attendants from carrying out their
safety duties.
23 10-08-011 EASA AD 2010-0164
Airbus A319 and A320 aeroplanes. "Stabilizers - Rudder Side Shell Skin - Inspection". This AD
is retains the requirements of DGCA AD 09-07-001 (EASA
AD 2009-0141) which is superseded and requires: - a local
ultrasonic inspection for reinforced area instead of the local
thermography inspection, which is maintaind for non-
reinforced areas, and - additional work performance for
rudder on which this thermography inspection has been
performed in the reinforced are, and - additional work
performance for some rudders on which an additional area
requiring inspections is defined. This AD also addresses the
populations of rudders affected by AOT A320-55-1039 and
Airbus SB A320-55-1035, A320-55-1036 and A320-55-1037
were not included in DGCA AD 09-07-001 (EASA AD 2009-
0141).
24 10-10-001 EASA AD 2010-0177
Airbus A319-111,A319-112,A319- Fuel system Additional Centre Tanks Manhole Cover
113,A319-114,A319-115,A319-131,A319- Seal - Replacement .
132,A319-133,A320-211,A320-212,A320- - Following an automatic ACT fuel transfer failure on an
214,A320-215,A320-216,A320-231,A320- A319 , it was noted that the ACT manhole cover seals were
232,A320-233,A321-111,A321-112,A321- extruded , allowing leakage.
131,A321-211,A321-212,A321-213,A321- - This Condition , if not corrected , can leadto fuel and/ or
231,and A321-232 aeroplane, If equipped vapour leakage , possibly resulting in combustible fuel
with one more Additional Centre Tank(s) vapour / air mixture in the cargo compartment , which would
(ACT(s)) with a Part Number (P/N) listed constitute a fire risk.
in Appendix 1 - DGAC France AD F-2004-038 was issued to require the
replacement of the ACT manhole cover and its seal in
accordance with SB A320-28-1105, but this modification
has proved not to be fully effective. Therefore , it is
necessary to replace the seal material and change the
installation process in order to prevent such seal material and
change the installation process in order to prevent such seal
deformation and possibility of leakage.
- For the reason described above, this AD supersedes DGCA
France AD F-2004-038 ( EASA Approval 2004-2110) and
requires the replacement of the existing manhole seal with a
new seal.
by ssi

25 10-11-004 EASA AD 2010-0209
Airbus A319 and A320 aeroplanes. Flight Controls / Wings Inboard Flap Trunnion and
Sliding Panel - Inspection .
Several A320 operators reported wear damage on the
unprotected area of the inboard flap trunnion. This wear
damage is generated by the hook of the sliding panel which
moves out the protection pad during flap operation.
The inboard flap trunnion wear associated with a drive
failure at flap track 2 or associated with a hard jam at flap
track 1 could lead to the loss of inboard flap surface control.
Consequently, a free moveable flap could detach from the
wing, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane and
injury to persons on the ground.
26 10-12-004 EASA AD No. 2010-0210
Airbus A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, This AD is issued to prevent both left Hand (LH) and Right
A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320- Hand (RH) off-wing exits being unserviceable which, during
215, A320-216, A320-231 and A320-232 an emergency, would impair the safe evacuation of
aeroplanes models, all manufacturer serial occupants, possibly resulting in personal injuries. this AD
numbers, if equipped with Air Cruisers / requires the modification of the OWS enclosures on both
Aerazur Part Number (P/N) D31865- sides and this AD has been republished to delete A321
109,P/N D31865-110, P/N D31865-209, or aeroplanes from the applicability, which included by mistake.
P/N D31865-210 off-wing Escape Slides
(OWS).
AIRBUS A330 SERIES

27 09-09-013R1 EASA AD 2009-0202R1
AIRBUS A330 aeroplanes, all "Navigation - Pitot Probe Quick-Disconnect Union - Torque
manufactures serial numbers. If fitted with Check". Several reports have recently been receive of loose
Goodrich Pitot Probes P/N 0851HL, having pneumatic quick-disconnect unions on Goodrich pitot
s/n 267328 through 270714 inclusive probes P/N 0851HL. These may be the the results of mis-
torque of the affected unions at equipment manufacturing
level. Investigations are still on-going to determine the root
cause(s).
This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an air leak,
resulting in incorrect total pressure measurement and
consequent erronous Calibrated Airspeed (CAS)/MACH
parameters delivered by the Air Data Computer (ADC). This
AD is revised in order to exclude from the torque-check
required those pitot probes marked with a red torque check-
mark.
28 09-11-013-U EASA AD 2009-0237-E
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - "Oxygen - Oxygen Containers - Inspection". In-service
202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, - experience has shown cases where several oxygen containers
321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343 could not fully open, investigation have revealed that these
aeroplanes. All manufacturer serial numbers events are due to an insufficient clearence between the
on which Airbus modification 48809 has oxygen container and the adjacent panels (Passenger Service
been embodied in production, if delivered Unit (PSU), space or filler panels). Incorrect opening of the
before 26 October 2009. oxygen container could lead to non deployment of oxygen
masks, this condition, if not detected and corrected, could
prevent passengers from being supplied with oxygen in case
of in flight cabin depressurization, which would constitute an
unsafe condition. This AD require a one-time inspection of
the oxygen container and adjacent panels installation and
corrective actions, as necessary, to ensure and adequate
clearence between these.
by ssi

29 10-02-001 EASA AD 2010-0016
Airbus A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, - "Navigation - Thales Avionics Angle of Attack (AoA)
301, -302, -303, -322, -323, -341, -342, - Probe - Inspection / Replacement". This AD to prevent oil
343 aeroplanes models, all manufacturer residue on incorrect cleaning of the machining oil during the
serial numbers, if equipped with Thales manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low
Avionics AoA probe having part number temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in
(P/N) C16291AA. cruise) causing lag of AoA vane movement. If not corrected,
and if two three AoA probes were simultaneously affected
and provided wrong indications of the AoA to a similar
extent, it could lead to a late activation of the angle of attack
protection, which in combination with flight at high angle of
attack would constitute an unsafe condition. This AD
requires a one time inspection of the Thales Avionics AoA
probe P/N C16291AA in order to identify the suspect parts
and to remove them from service.
30 10-02-001R1 EASA AD 2010-0016R1
Airbuss A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, - " Navigation -Thales Avionics Angle of Attack (AoA)
301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, - Probe - Inspection / Replacement". This AD to prevent oil
342 and -343 aeroplanes models, all residue on incorrect cleaning of the machining oil during the
manufacturer serial number, if equipped manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low
with Thales Avionics AoA probe having temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in
part number (P/N) C16291AA. cruise) causing lag of AoA vane movement. If not corrected,
and if two or three AoA probes were simultaneously affected
and provided wrong indications of the AoA to similar extent,
it could lead to a late activitation of the angle of attack
protection, which in combination with flight at high angle
attack would constitute an unsafe condition.This AD requires
a one time inspection of the Thales Avionics AoA probe P/N
C16291AA. This AD revision is issued to specify that the
indication of the affected AoA probes is also possible in
accordance with aeroplanes maintenance records data analisy.
31 10-02-002 EASA AD 2010-0021
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -301, - " Stabilizers - Rudder Side Shell Skin - Inspection ". Surface
302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and - defects were visually detected on the rudder of an A319 and
343, all manufacturer serial numbers. an A321 in-service aeroplanes. Investigation has determined
that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to
areas that had been reworked in production. The
investigation confirmed that the defects were as a result of de-
bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. An extended
de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the
structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads
to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the
controllability of the aeroplane. This AD retains the
reqiurement of DGCA AD 09-07-007, which is superseded,
and in addition requires for the vacum loss hole restoration: -
a local ultrasonic inspection for reinforced areas instead of
the local thermography inspection, which is maintained for
non-reinforced areas, and - an additional work for aeroplanes
on which this thermography inspection has been performed
in the reinforced area.
by ssi

32 10-02-003 EASA AD 2010-0018
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, -201, -202, -203, - Fuel- Wing Tank Fuel Pressure Switch Replacement
223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, - An A330 experienced an uncommented engine #1 in flight
323, -341, -342 and -343 models, all spool down, which occurred while applying fuel grafity feed
Manufacturer Serial Numbers, equipped procedure, in response to low pressure indications from all
with Part Number (P/N) HTE69000-1 wing fuel boost pumps, in both left and right wings.
tank pressure switches installed at The investigation revealed that the wing tank pressure
Functional Item Number (FIN) locations switches P/N HTE69000-1 had frozen due to the water
74QA1, 74QA2, 75QA1, and 74QA2. accumulated in their external part, causing spurious low
pressure indications.
As per procedure, the main pumps are then switched off,
increasing the level of unavailable fuel. This, in combination
with very low fuel quantity or another independent trapped
fuel failure scenarios, can lead to fuel starvation on the
affected engine(s). This condition , if not corrected , could
lead to a potential unsafe condition.
This AD requires the replacement of all four wing tank
pressure switches associated to main pumps by new one with
a more robust design preventing water accumulation and
freezing
33 10-02-007 EASA AD 2010-0024
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - Wing Centre Wing Box Keel Beam Fastener Holes at
202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, - Frame FR40 Inspection.
321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all This AD, which supersedes DGCA AD No. 06-10-019
manufacturer serial numbers, except those (EASA AD 2006-0315R1):
on which Airbus modification 55306 or - Retains the inspection requirements of DGCA AD No. 06-
55792 has been embodied in production. 10-019 (EASA AD 2006-0315R1)
- Extends the AD applicability to aeroplanes which have
embodied Airbus modification 49202, and
- Modifies the inspection thresholds and intervals.
34 10-03-005 EASA AD 2010-0034
AIRBUS A330 aeroplanes. Landing Gear - Nose Landing Gear (NLG) Main Fitting and
Sliding Tube - Inspection
During the overhaul of two different Nose Landing Gears

(NLG), cracks were found on the main fitting of one and the
sliding tube of the other. Investigations concluded that the
cracks initiated as a result of residual stress in the parts
following damage due to impact during towing incidents.
The failure of the main fitting or sliding tube could lead to
NLG collapse.
To prevent the above unsafe condition, this AD requires a

one-time inspection followed by repetitive inspection of the
main fitting and sliding tube of the NLG serial numbers
listed in the Applicability section of this AD:
- One time Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) of the
affected areas to detect any crack,
- Repetitive Detailed Visual Inspection (DVI) of the affected
areas to detect any damage of the surface protections or
corrosion.
35 10-03-011-U EASA AD 2010-0042-E
Airbus A330 aeroplanes. Fuel - Main Fuel Pump System - Water Scavenge System -
Deactivation / Dispatch Restriction.
by ssi

36 10-03-012 EASA AD 2010-0048
Airbus A330 aeroplanes. "Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Certification
Maintenance Requirements - ALS Part 3 - Amendment".
This Airworthiness Limitations are currently distributed in
the Airbus A330 Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS).
The Airworthiness Limitations applicable to the Certification
Maintenance Requirements (CMR) are given in Airbus A330
ALS Part 3. The Revision 2 of Airbus A330 ALS Part 3
introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or
airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with this revision
constitues an unsafe condition. This new AD retains the
requirements of DGCA AD 08-08-002, which is superseded,
and requires the implementation of the new or more
restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness
limitations as specified in Airbus A330 ALS Part 3 revision
02.
37 10-05-002 EASA AD 2010-0081]
Airbus A330-243, A330-341, A330-342 "Flight Controls - Elevator Servo Controls Solenoid Valve O-
aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers. ring Seals - Replacement & Airplane Flight Manual / Master
MEL - Temporary Revision & Flight Controls - Elevator
Servo Controls - Modification & Flight Controls - Primary
and Secondary Computers - Modification". This AD is issued
to supersedes DGCA AD No. 07-01-010 (EASA AD No.
2007-0009), which this AD requires the embodiment of the
latest software standard on the three Flight Control Primary
Computers (FCPC) and on the two Flight Control Secondary
Computers (FCSC), which cancels the operational
requirements of paragraph (3.1) 0f the reference AD.
38 10-05-004 EASA AD 2010-0083
Airbus A330-243, -341, -342 aeroplanes. "Fuel - Fuel Pump Non-Return Valve (NRV) - Operation
Test". Multiple NRV failures in combination with certain
trapped fuel cases could potentially increase the quantity of
unusable fuel on the aeroplane, possibly leading to fuel on
starvation which could result in engines in flight shut down
and would constitute an unsafe condition.
- To prevent and detect this condition , EASA AD 2008-0209
( DGCA AD 08-12-001) required repetitive operational tests
to check the correct operation of NRV and to apply the
associated corrective actions.
- This AD retains the requirements of EASA AD 2008-0209
(DGCA AD 08-12-001) which is superseded, and requires
for aeroplanes which have replaced a NRV to perform an
additional operational test to confirm that corrective
maintenance action has been successful for the affected
collector cell.
39 10-05-009 EASA AD 2010-0089
Airbus A330-201, -202, -243, -341 and -342 "Indicating & Recording Systems - Flight Warning
aeroplanes. Computer (FWC) - Software Installation". Require all
holders of type certificates for transport aircraft after 01
January 1958 with capacity of 30 passengers or more, or a
payload of 3.402 kg or more, to carry out a definition review
against explotion hazards. To be compliant with
SFAR88/JAA INT/POL 25/12 requirements, this AD
requires the installation of the update FWC software standard
which ensures correct operation of the APU bleed leak
detection system before each flight.
by ssi

40 10-06-001 EASA AD 2010-0086
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - "Electric and Electronic Common Installation - Hydraulic
202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, - Pump Electrical Motor Connectors - Modification". Several
321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all A330 operators have reported in service occurences of
manufacturer serial numbers, except those hydraulic pump electrical motor connector internal arching,
on which the three Airbus modifications resulting in : - Either false hydraulic system overheat
58773 and 55923S18878 and 45968 have Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) and -
been embodied in production. And/or hydraulic pump electrical motor malfunction.
Investigations have shown that, due to the manufacturing
tolerances of the cables and the connectors rear Grommet,
there is a possible path for fluid ingress, resulting in
connector internal arching and hydraulic system malfunction.
In addition, as the connectors are located in areas adjacent to
fuel tanks, such arching assocociated with the presence of a
fuel leakage could lead to an uncontrolled fire. This AD
requires modification of the three hydraulic pump electrical
motor connectors associated to the Blue, Yellow and Green
hydraulic systems.
41 10-06-001R1 EASA AD 2010-0086R1
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - "Electric and Electronic Common Installation - Hydraulic
202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, - Pump Electrical Motor Connectors - Modification". Several
321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all A330 operators have reported in service occurences of
manufacturer serial numbers, except htose hydraulic pump electrical motor connector internal arcing,
on which Airbus modifications 58773 and resulting in :
45968 have been embodied in production. - Either false hydraulic system overheat Electronic
Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM)
- And/or hydraulic pump electrical motor malfunction.
Investigations have shown that, due to the manufacturing

tolerances of the cables and the connectors rear.
Grommet, there is a possible path for fluid ingress, resulting
in connector internal arcing and hydraulic system
malfunction. In addition, as the connectors are located in
areas adjacent to fuel tanks, such arcing assocociated with
the presence of a fuel leakage could lead to an uncontrolled
fire.
This AD requires modification of the three hydraulic pump
electrical motor connectors associated to the Blue, Yellow
and Green hydraulic systems. This revises is issued to delete
Airbus modifications 55923S18878 and 55924S19452 from
the applicability of this AD.
by ssi

42 10-07-009 EASA AD 2010-0127
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - Stabilizers Rudder Side Shell Skin - Inspection.
202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -
321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all Investigation has determined that the defects reported on
manufacturer serial numbers. both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked
in production. The investigation confirmed that the surface
defects were a result of de-bonding between the skin and
honeycomb core.
An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may

degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the
rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and
reduces the controllability of the aeroplane.
This AD addresses the rudder population that has also been

reworked in production but is not part of DGCA AD 10-02-
002 (EASA AD 2010-0021) applicability.
43 10-07-022 EASA AD 2010-0132
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -243, - "Fuel Main Fuel Pump System - Water Scavenge System
243F, -341, -342 and -343, all manufacturer Deactivation / Dispatch Restriction".
serial numbers on which Airbus During a recent in-service event the flight crew of a Trent
modification 56966H16199 has been 700 powered A330 aircraft reported a temporary Engine
embodied in production or Airbus Service Pressure Ratio (EPR) shortfall on engine 2 during the take-
Bulletin A330-28-3105 off phase of the flight. The ENG STALL warning was set.
has been embodied in service. The flight crew followed the standard procedures which
included reducing throttle to idle. The engine recovered and
provided the demanded thrust level for the remainder of the
flight.
Based on previous industry-wide experience, the
investigation of the event has focused on the possibility for
ice to temporarily restrict the fuel flow. While no direct fuel
system fault has been identified,the operation of the water
scavenge system at Rib 3 cannot be excluded as being a
contributory factor. Testing and analysis are continuing to
identify the root cause of the event. The scenario of ice being
shed and causing a temporary blockage in the engine fuel
system may lead to a temporary fuel flow restriction to the
engine. This may result in a possible engine surge or stall
condition, and in the engine not being able to provide the
commanded thrust.
This AD, which supersedes DGCA AD 10-03-011U (EASA
AD 2010-0042-E) retaining its requirements, is issued to
extend the applicability to the newly certified model A330-
243F.
44 10-07-023 EASA AD 2010-0109
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - "Flight Controls - Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) -
202, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -301, - Dispatch restriction and Operational Test". To prevent a
302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and - transient loss of elevator control during takeoff rotation.
343, all serial numbers.
45 10-07-024 EASA AD 2010-0131
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - "Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Safe Life
202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, - Airworthiness Limitation Items - ALS Part 1 - Amendment".
321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all The revision 04 of Airbus A330 ALS Part 1 introduces more
manufacturer serial numbers. restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness
limitations. Failure to comply with this revision constitus an
unsafe condition.
by ssi

46 10-07-027 EASA AD 2010-0103
Airbus A330 aeroplanes. "Electrical and Electronic Common Installation - Cable
Loom Installation - Modification". It was noticed in
production that the distance between the wire harnessess
5376VB/2M and 53377VB/1M which are above left-hand
(LH) and right-hand (RH) DOOR 4, and the air conditioning
duct could be too small. This could result in collision
between the flexible air conditioning hose and wire
harnessess. This condition, if not correctred, could lead to the
short circuit of wires dedicated to oxygen, which, in case of
emergency, could result in large number of passenger oxygen
masks not being supplied with oxygen, possibly causing
personal injuries. For the reasons described above, this AD
requires the installation of a protective sleeve and and
additional bracket to maintain the appropriate distance
between wires.
47 10-07-030 EASA AD 2010-0145
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - "Hydraulic Power - High Pressure Manifold Check Valve -
202, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -301, - Inspection". An A330 operator experienced a low level of the
302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and - yellow hydraulic circuit due to a loose of check valve part
343, all manufacturer serial numbers. number (P/N) CAR401. During the inspection on the other
two hydraulic systems, the other three CAR401 check valves
were also found to be loose with their lock wire broken in
two instances. Investigations are on-going to determine the
root cause of this event. This AD, which supersedes DGCA
AD 09-10-014-U (EASA AD 2009-0223-E) retaining its
requirements, is issued to extend the applicability to the
newly certified models A330-243F.
48 10-09-004 EASA AD 2010-0174
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - "Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Damage Tolerant
202, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -301, - Airworthiness Limitation Items - ALS Part 2 - Amendment".
302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and - The airworthiness limitations are distributed in the airbus
343, all manufacturer serial numbers. A330 Airworthiness Limitation Section (ALS). The issued
17 of A Airbus A330 ALI Document introduces more
restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness
limitations. Failure to copmly with this issue constituse an
unsafe condition.
49 10-10-008 EASA AD 2010-0205
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - Landing Gear Main Landing Gear (MLG) Retraction
202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, - Bracket - Replacement.
321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and -343, all During fatigue testing of the MLG, three failures of the
manufacturer serial numbers. retraction bracket occurred before the calculated life
limitation. Further analysis has confirmed that those failures
were do to fatigue initiated by fretting between the bush and
lug bore.
The failure of the retraction bracket, if not detected, could
lead to a MLG extension with the no damping resulting in
MLG structural damage.
by ssi

50 10-11-002 EASA AD 2010-0192
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - Flight Controls Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator
201, -203, -223, -223F, -243, -243F, -301, - Screw/Nut Assembly Inspection / Lubrication.
302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342 and - Several cases of transfer tube disconnection from the ball-nut
343, all manufacturer serial numbers. of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer ac
Tuator (THSA) part number (P/N) 47172 and 47147-400
were detected on the ground during greasing and
maintenance.
This condition is caused by water ingress into the ball-nut
resulting in the jamming of the ball transfer circuit when the
water freezes.
51 10-11-003 EASA AD 2010-0191
Airbus A330 aeroplanes. Flight Controls Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC)
PRIM 3 Dispatch Restriction / Modification.
During a Back-up Control Module (BCM) retrofit campaign
in accordance with EASA AD 2006-0313 requirements,
some BCMs have been found with loose gyrometer screws.
52 10-11-006 EASA AD 2010-0187
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -243, - Exhaust Thrust Reverser Opening Mechanism
243F, -341, -342 and -343 all manufacturer Inspection .
serial numbers. During flight tests, unexpected fatigue high loads were
measured on the hinges integrated on the 12 oclock beam
which form the upper extreme edge of the thrust reverser unit
C duct. This situation, if not corrected, could lead to the
separation of the thrust reverser from the aeroplane and
therefore to damage of the aeroplane and hazards to persons
or property on the ground.
DGAC AD F-1997-118-047 was issued to prevent structural
damage of the thrust reversers. This AD, which supersedes
DGAC AD F-1997-118-047R2 retaining its requirements, is
issued to extend the applicability to the newly certified model
A330-243F.
53 10-11-007-CN EASA AD 2010-0083-CN
Airbus A330 aeroplanes, models -201, - -Fuel Fuel Pump Non-Return Valve (NRV) Operational
202, -203, -243 and -341 all manufacturer Test
serial numbers. -It has been assessed that multiple NRV failures in
combination with certain trapped fuel cases could potentially
increase the quantity of unusable fuel on the aeroplane,
possibly leading to fuel starvation which could result in
engines in-flight shut down and would constitute an unsafe
condition. To prevent and detect this condition, DGCA
issued DGCA AD 10-05-004 (EASA AD 2010-0083). Based
on in service experience, mainly on the results of the
operational test required by DGCA AD 10-05-004
(EASA AD 2010-0083), Airbus has performed a safety
analysis on the NRV to check if the safety objectives are met.
This analysis of the Collector Cell motive flow line NRV,
taking into account all failure scenarios, concludes that the
previous non compliance can be alleviated. Consequently, no
unsafe condition exists any more on the affected NRV.
For the reasons described above, DGCA AD 10-05-004
(EASA AD 2010-0083) is cancelled..
by ssi

54 10-11-009 EASA AD 2010-0191
Airbus A330 aeroplanes. "Flight Control Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC)
PRIM 3 Dispatch Restriction / Modification".
During a Back-up Control Module (BCM) retrofit campaign
some BCMs have been found with loose gyrometer screws.
This AD issued is to prevent a lack of design robustness of
the BCM when the aeroplane is in control back up
configuration, an oscillation of the BCM output order may
cause degradation of the BCM piloting laws, potentially
leading to erratic motion of the rudder and possible
subsequent impact on the Dutch Roll, which constitutes an
unsafe condition. This AD requires the installation of:
- A new BCM on A330 series aeroplanes fitted with
electrical rudder,and
- An improved PFTU on A330 series aeroplanes fitted with
an electrical rudder,
Which, once installed, eliminate the root cause of the unsafe
condition and cancel the operational limitation
55 10-12-008 EASA AD 2007-0070R1
Airbus A330 aeroplanes To prevent the aeroplane to deviate from its steered direction
and/or allow an uncontrolled corrosion propagation of the
main fitting barrel due to presence of water that could freeze
the grease and thus jam the gearboxes or the Rotary Variable
Differential Transformer (RVDT) of the streering system.
56 10-12-013 EASA AD No.2010-0173R1
Airbus A330 aeroplanes model A330-200 -Uncontained APU generator failures on ground have
series and A330-300 series , all manufacture occurred on Airbus A330 Aeroplane in service. Prelimary
serial number , except those on which investigation confirmed that these failures have resulted in
Airbus modification 56985 has been structural damage to the APU compartment and, in one case,
embodied in production. to the stabilizer compartment. Loose APU generator part can
lead to damage to the APU firewall , reducing its fire
extinguishing capability and potentially leading to a
temporary uncontrolled fire. The investigation showed a
sequence of events where a collapse of the Drive End
Bearing (DEB) lead to an uncontained failure.
-EASA issued Emergency AD 2007-0188-E, requiring
repetitive inspections of the APU generator Scavenge filter
element and filter housing and the APU generator Drain plug
for signs of small debris coming from the APU generator
failure.
-Consequently , EASA issued AD2008-0017, superseding
AD2007-0188R1 and requiring the following additional
action : a visual inspection of the APU generator seal plate
fitting, and following MMEL item 36-11-01 or 24-22-01
rectification and inspection time a new serviceable APU
generator or APU is installed and airplane.
- EASA issued AD2008-0017R1 to call the inspection refer
to required indicated compliance times,for A330 aeroplanes,
when operated within the provision of MMEL item 36-11-01
further to ETOPS certification of A330 APU.
-EASA AD2008-0173 retained the requirement of EASA
AD2008-0017R1, which was supersedes, and added the
rquirment to install secondary housing on the APU generator.
-This revision 1 is issued to clarify that both initial and
repetitive inspection are not required the installation of
secondary APU generator housing on an aeroplane.
by ssi

57 10-12-017 EASA AD 2010-0253
Airbus A330 and A340 aeroplanes To prevent an unsafe condition due to failure to comply with
the revision 4 of Airbus A330 ALS part 1 and revision 5 of
Airbus A340 ALS Part 1 that introduces more restrictive
maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations.
58 10-12-025 EASA AD No. 2010-0264
Airbus A330-202, A330-243, and A330- Time Limits and Maintenance Checks Certification
341 aeroplanes Maintenance Requirements ALS Part 3 Amendment
This AD supersedes DGCA AD No. 10-03-012 (EASA AD
2010-0048) and requires the implementation of the new or
more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or
airworthiness limitations are specified in Airbus A330 ALS
Part 3 revision 03.
59 10-12-027 EASA AD No. 2010-0267
Airbus A330-243, A330-341 and A330-342 Flight Control Wing Tip Brakes (WTB) Operational
aeroplanes manufacturer serial numbers Test
(MSN), up to MSN 0220 inclusive From result Inspection by supplier of Wing Tip Brake
(WTB) units revealed that the drive shaft was found free to
rotate and the braking worn. This condition, if not detected
and corrected, could, in some specific failure cases, result in
loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires a one-time
Operational Test of the Wing Tip Brake (WTB)/Pressure Of
Brake (POB) performance on the flap and slat systems to
detected any dormant failure and, depending on finding,
associated corrective action.
AIRTRACTOR Inc
60 10-09-013 FAA AD 2010-17-18
Air Tractor AT-802 and AT-802A This AD to detect and correct cracks in the wing main spar
airplanes, all serial numbers (SNs) lower cap at the center splice joint, which could result in
beginning with -0001, that are: failure of the spar cap and lead to wing separation and loss of
- Certificated in any category; control of the airplane.
- Engaged in agricultural dispersal
operations, including those airplanes that
have been converted from fire fighting to
agricultural dispersal or airplanes that
convert between fire fighting and
agricultural dispersal;
- Not equipped with the factory-supplied
computerized fire gate (part number (P/N)
80540);
- Not engaged in only full-time fire fighting.
BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ SERIES
by ssi

61 09-03-017R1 EASA AD 2009-0070R1
BAe and AVRO 146-RJ Aeroplanes. Fuselage External Forward Fuselage Inspection /
Repair.
During the period 2001/2002, skin cracking was found

adjacent to the butt joint forward of frame 19 when unrelated
in-service maintenance inspections of the forward fuselage
structure were being completed. The cracks emanated from
chemically-etched pockets on the internal surface of the skin.
The then current MRB inspection requirements were not
adequate to address cracking in multiple adjacent bays,
which could compromise the structural integrity of the
fuselage in the event that the multiple cracks joined into a
single crack. This AD is revised to acknowledge the issuance
of Bae Systems (Operations) Limited ISB.53-167 Revision 3,
which allows the repetitive inspection intervals to be
extended and introduces grace periods to carry out the initial
inspections.
62 09-10-006R1 EASA AD 2009-0205R1
BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes, all "Flight Control - Aileron Interconnect Cable Pulley Guards -
serial numbers, except those modified to Installation". This AD is issued to revises DGCA AD No. 09-
frighter configuration in accordance with 10-006 (EASA AD 2009-0205). To excude aeroplanes from
BAe Systems modfication No. the Applicability that have been modified to freighter
HCM50200B. configuration in accordance with BAE System modification
No. HCM50200B. This AD requires the installation of
additional guards, bolts and nuts on the aileron interconnect
cable pulleys atframe 29 (left and right).
63 10-04-014 EASA AD 2010-0072
BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes, all Landing Gear Nose Landing Gear Main Fitting
models, all serial numbers, if equipped with Inspection/Replacement".
a Nose Landing Gear (NLG) which has To prevent undetected crack was present at the time of
been modified in accordance with Messier- embodiment of M-D SB 146-32-150, it could continue to
Dowty (M-D) Service Bulletin (SB) 146-32- grow while the NLG is in service and could lead to the
150, and which had that modification failure of the main fitting and possible collapse of the NLG.
carried out after the NLG accumulated more This AD requires the introduction of repetitive NDT
than 5000 flight cycle (FC). inspection on NLG main fitting following embodiment of M-
This AD also applies to aeroplanes with D SB 146-32-150.
NLG units installed on which M-D SB 146-
32-150 has been accomplished by Messier
Service facility in Sterling, Virginia, USA,
only after it has been established on that
NLG units, in accordance with the
instructions of M-D SB 146-32-173.
64 10-04-014R1 EASA AD 2010-0072R1
BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes. "Landing Gear - Nose Landing Gear Main Fitting -
Inspection / Replacement". This AD is issued to reduce the
applicability of the original issue of this AD by referring only
to the embodiment of part B or Part C of the M-D SB 146-32-
150. Indeed, NLGs with M-D SB 146-32-150, Part A,
embodied are not affected by this AD.
by ssi

65 10-11-001 EASA AD 2010-0201
BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplanes, all Landing Gear Main Landing Gear Shock Absorber Lower
models, all serial numbers. AttachmentPins Inspection / Replacement.
Pin failures were do to corrosion, if not detected and
corrected , could lead to a MLG collapse on the ground or
during landing and consequently damage to the aeroplane or
injury to the occupants.
66 10-11-008 EASA AD 2010-0202
BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ aeroplane. "Landing Gear Nose Landing Gear Main Fitting
Inspection / Replacement".
This AD issued is to prevent a crack that found at the top of
the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) oleo, BAe Systems
(Operations) Ltd (BAE Systems) issued Inspection Service
Bulletin (ISB) ISB.32-158. Undetected cracks could lead to
failure of the NLG Main Fitting and collapse of the NLG.
With that view, BAE Systems issued ISB.32-158 to
implement this repetitive 300 FC inspection on all NLG main
fittings regardless of their modification standard. ISB.32-158
supersedes existing ISBs A32-180 and 32-181, initially with
no closing. This AD requires repetitive NDT inspections of
all NLG main fittings and. If cracks are found, replacement
of the NLG with a serviceable unit.
BAE ATP
67 10-03-004 EASA AD 2010-0035
BAE ATP aeroplanes, all serial numbers. "Flight Controls - Aileron and Rudder Tab Hinge Pins -
Inspection". To avoid restricted movement of the tab control
and consequent reduced control of the aeroplane due to
migration of a tab hinge pin out of the hinge.
68 10-12-005 EASA AD 2010-0249
BAE ATP aeroplanes To correct design of the lower aileron chain drive sprocket
that could result in the loss of the pilot and/or copilot aileron
control system and consequently reduce the controllability of
the aeroplanes
by ssi

69 10-12-028 EASA AD 2010-0263
ATP Aeroplanes Stabilizers Elevator Clearance Inspection / Measurement
/ Report
Incidents have been reported concerning ATP aeroplanes

where, after the application of thickened anti-icing fluids,
increased elevator control forces were experienced during
take-off.
The ATP elevator has an elliptical nose balance over part of

the span (from the root to mid-span and out towards the tip).
Investigation of these occurrences showed that thickened anti-
icing fluid may close the gap between the leading edge of the
elevator and the horizontal stabilizer and contaminate the
lower surface of the elevator.

loss of the aerodynamic balance over the affected elevator
section, changing the elevator and tab hinge moments and
increasing the necessary control forces to achieve rotation.
This AD requires an inspection of both elevators for

evidence of rubbing, measurement of the gap between
elevator and horizontal stabilizer, the reporting of findings to
BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd. and, depending on findings,
repair actions.
BEECHCRAFT - B 200 & 390

70 10-03-002 FAA AD 2010-05-10
Beechcraft King Air B300 and B300C This AD to detect and correct the installation of an incorrect
airplanes. bus bar, which could result in failure of the pitot heat
annunciators to illuminate. This failure could lead to
moisture freezing on the pitot tube(s) and cause erroneous
flight instrument indication.
71 10-05-012 FAA AD 2010-10-10
Beechcraft Model 390 airplanes, serial To detect and correct improper installation of the MOV and
numbers RB-248, that are certificated in any spark gap wiring, which could result in overload of the MOV
category. in a lightning strike and allow electrical energy to continue to
the essential bus and disable equipment that received power
from essential bus.The disabled equipment could include the
autopilot, anti-skid system, hydraulic indicator, spoiler
system, pilot primary flight display, audio panel, or the 1 air
data computer. This failure could lead to a significant
increase in pilot workload during adverse operating
conditions.
72 10-10-007 FAA AD 2010-17-15
Beechcraft Model 390 airplanes, serial This AD to detect and replace starter generators with
numbers RB-4 through RB-257, RB-259 deficient armature insulating materials. This condition could
through RB-265, RB-268, and RB-269, that result in the loss of operation of one or both starter
are certificated in any category. generators with consequent loss of all non-battery electrical
power.
BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 206
by ssi

73 10-03-006 CF-2010-07
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) "Non-Conforming Tail Rotor Disc Assembly". This AD
Model 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3 issued to determined that operating a helicopter with new tail
and 206L-4 helicopters. rotor disc assembly P/N 101584-1 or -2 installed may result
in loss of control of the helicopter. This directive mandates to
removal from service tail rotor disc assembly P/N 101584-1
and -2.

74 10-11-022 FAA AD 2010-24-52
Bell Helicopter Textron Model 212 This AD is prompted by a crack found on a fitting after a
recent accident. Subsequently, five additional fittings from
two different manufacturing lots were found to have the
same type crack. A crack fitting could result in failure of the
fitting, loss of main rotor blade, and subsequent loss of
control of the helicopter.
75 10-12-019-U FAA AD 2010-26-52
Bell Helicopter Textron 204B, 205A, 205A- -This AD was prompted by another incident which the tail
1,205B,212,412,412CF dan 412EP rotor blade (blade) tip weight separated from a blade during
helicopter flight causing vibration. This unsafe condition lead to the
determination that additional blades could be affected and
should be added to the applicability.
-The action specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss
of the blade tip weight , loss of a blade , and subsequent loss
of control of the helicopter
-This AD supersedes FAA AD 2007-19-53 ( DGCA AD 07-
11-10 )
76 10-12-020-U FAA EAD 2010-25-51
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Model 212 Main Rotor Hub
helicopters certificated in any category This AD supersedes DGCA AD No.10-11-022 (FAA EAD
2010-24-52), and is prompted by the need to require
performing a magnetic particle inspection (MPI) on
additional serial-numbered main rotor hub inboard strap
fittings. The action specified by ref AD are intended to
prevent failure of a fitting, loss of a main rotor blade, and
loss of control of the helicopter.

77 10-10-004 CF-2010-33
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Ltd. Model Over-torque of Tailboom Attachment Hardware.
407 helicopter serial number 53000 through A review of the tailboom attachement installation has
53990. determined that the torque value of the tailboom attachment
bolts specified in the maintenance manual and applied during
manufacturing, exceeded the torque range recommended for
the bolts.
This situation, if not corrected, can lead to bolt failure,
detachment of the tailboom and loss of control of the
helicopter. To correct the problem, the tailboom attachment
hardware has to be replaced.

78 10-05-015 FAA AD 2010-10-16
Bell Helicopter Textron Model 412 and This AD to prevent failure of a crosstube and subsequent
412EP helicopters. collapse of the landing gear.
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79 07-09-018R1 CF-2007-22R1
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) "Vertical Fin - Installation Upgrade". This AD is issued to
Model 427 helicopters serial numbers 56001 supersedes of DGCA AD No. 07-09-018 (CF-2007-22).
through 56073, 56077, 58001 and 58002.
80 10-07-001 CF-2010-17
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC), "Tail Rotor Driveshaft Hanger Bearing Bracket - Cracking
Model 427 Helicopter, All serial numbers. Due To Tooling Mark". Tail rotor driveshaft hanger bearing
braket part number (P/N) 427-044-223-101 has been found
cracked due to fatigue. It has been determined that the
fatigue cracking was initiated by a tooling mart left during
manufacture. The existence of tooling marks on the bracket
could lead to bracket failure, loss of tail rotor drive and,
consequently,loss of control of the helicopter.
81 10-10-003 CF-2010-32
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Ltd. Model Over-torque of Tailboom Attachment Hardware.
427 helicopter serial number 56001 through A review of the tailboom attachment installation has
56084, 58001 and 58002. determined that the torque value of the tailboom attachment
bolts specified in the maintenance manual and applied during
manufacturing, exceeded the torque range recommended for
the bolts.
This situation, if not corrected, can lead to bolt failure,
detachment of the tailboom and loss of control of the
helicopter. To correct the problem, the tailboom attachment
hardware has to be replaced.
82 10-12-003 CF-2007-21R1
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) From result reports that balance weight departing from the
helicopter models 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L- tail rotor blades during flight. The cause has been narrowed
1, 206L-3, 206-4, 407, 427 and 430 down to missing weight screws. This failure can happen at
any time. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to loss
of control of the helicopter. This AD is issued to extends
applicability of this directive to cover the affected blades.

83 10-04-012 CF-2010-11
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Model 430 "Transmission Planetary Pinion Gear Damage". Significant
helicopters serial number 49001 through mechanical damage to the transmission sungear and
49129. planetary pinion gears has been attributed to a planetary
system misalignment caused by an excessive mast bending.
This condition, if not corrected, may lead to failure of the
transmission and loss of control of the helicopter. To prelude
excessive mast bending, and consequent damage to the
transmission planetary pinion gears and matting gears,
revised VNE limits are imposed together with revised
restricted center of gravity envelopes and secondary VNE
limits.
84 10-09-001-U CF-2010-29
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Models 430 "Servo Actuator". It has been determined that the output
helicopters with hydraulic servo actuators piston rod assemblies of the hydraulic servo actuators may be
Part Number (P/N) 222-382-001-107. corroded and, consequently, prone for corrosion cracking.
Also in one case, an unapproved repairs was found on the
piston rod. This situation, if not corrected, could result in a
loss of control of the helicopter.
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BOEING 737-SERIES
85 FAA AD 2010-15-06
Boeing Model 737-800, -900 and -900ER This AD to detect and correct a loose bearing in the aft lug of
series airplane; certificated in any category. the elevator tab control mechanism, which could result in
unwanted elevator and tab vibration. The consequent
structural failure of the elevator or horizontal stabilizer could
result in loss of aircraft control and structural integrity.
86 07-03-007 FAA AD 2010-05-13
Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400 This AD to prevent rapid decompression of the airplane due
and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any to fatigue cracks resulting from scribe lines on pressurized
category. fuselage structure.
87 08-05-015R1 FAA 2008-10-10R1
Boeing Model 737-800, and -900 series This AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside
airplanes, certificated in any category, with fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or
an original standard airworthiness certificate maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable
or original export certificate of airworth fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank fire or explosion and
issued before March 31, 2006 consequent loss of the airplane.
88 08-05-016R1 FAA 2008-10-09R1
Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400 This AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside
and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alternations, repair, or
category. maintenance action, which, in combination with flammable
fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and
consequent loss of the airplane.
89 10-01-004 FAA 2009-20-11
Boeing Model 737-300, -400 dan -500 This AD to prevent a potential of ignition sources inside fuel
series airplanes, certificated in any category, tanks, which in combination with flammable fuel vapors,
equipped with a digital transient suppresion could result in a fuel tank fire or explosion and consequent
device (DTSD) installed in accrodance with loss of the airplane.
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)
ST00127BO.
90 10-01-007 FAA 2009-26-04
Boeing Model 737-800 and -900 series This AD to prevent cracking of the forward trunnion pin,
airplanes, certificated in any category, as which could result in facture of the pin and consequent
identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-32- collapse of the MLG.
1376, Revision 2, dated August 6, 2008.
91 10-01-012 FAA 2009-26-03
Boeing Models 737-300, -400, -500 series This AD to prevent a standby static inverter from
airplanes, Boeing Models 737-800 series overheating, which could result in smoke in the flight deck
airplanes and Boeing Models 747-400 series and cabin and loss of the electrical standby power system.
airplanes.
92 10-01-014 FAA AD 2010-01-09
Boeing Model 737-300, -400 and -500 This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the
series airplanes, certificated in any category; fuselage skin panels at the chem-milled steps, which could
as identified in Boeing Alert Service result in sudden fracture and failure of the fuselage skin
Bulletin 737-53A1301, dated September 3, panels, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.
2009.
by ssi

93 10-01-016 FAA AD 2010-01-08
This AD applies to Boeing Model 737-600, - This AD to prevent cracks from propagating from drill starts
700, and -800 series airplanes, certificated in the free flange, vertical web, and radius between the free
in any category, as identified in Boeing flange and vertical web of the lower stringers of the wing
Alert Service Bulletin 737-5A1294, dted center section lower stringers, which could cause a loss of
April 23, 2007. structural integrity of the wing center section and may result
in a fuel leak.
94 10-01-019 FAA AD 2010-02-04
Boieng Model 737-800, -900, and -900ER This AD prevent the failure of the valve in the closed
series airplanes, certificated in any category; position, open position, or partially open position, which
as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 737- could result in engine fuel flow problems and possible and
28-1272, dated October 31, 2008. possible uncontrolled fuel leak or fire.
95 10-03-007 FAA AD 2010-05-13
Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400 This AD to prevent rapid decompression of the airplane due
and -500 series airplane, certificated in any to fatigue cracks resulting from scribe lines on pressurized
category. fuselage structure.
96 10-03-010 FAA AD 2010-06-51
Boeing Model 737-800, -900, and -900ER this AD to detect and correct a loose bearing in the aft lug of
series airplanes; certificated in any category. the elevator tab control
mechanism, which could result in unwanted elevator and tab
vibration. The consequent structural
failure of the elevator or horizontal stabilizer could result in
loss of aircraft control and structural
integrity.
97 10-05-001 FAA AD 2010-09-05
Boeing Model 737-800, -900 and -900ER This AD to detect and correct a loose bearing in the aft lug of
series airplanes; certificated in any category. the elevator tab control mechanism, which could result in
unwanted elevator and tab vibration. Consequent structural
loss of structural integrity and aircraft control.
98 10-07-016 FAA AD 2008-01-01
1. Boeing Model 737-200, -300. -400, -500 This AD issue to prevent failure of this feature, which could
and -800 series airplanes, Modified in jeopardize flight safety.
accordance with STC ST01143SE, as
identified in Jamco SB 52-2295 Rev.1 dated
October 10, 2007.
2. Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes,
Modified in accordance with STC
ST01194SE, as identified in Jamco SB 52-
2303 Rev.1 dated October 10, 2007.
99 10-07-028 FAA AD 2010-14-06
Boeing Model 737-200, -300, -400 and -500 This AD to prevent the in-line flow indicators of the
series airplanes, certificated in any category; passenger oxygen masks from fracturing and separating,
as identified in Boeing Special Attention which could inhibit oxygen flow to the masks and
Bulletin 737-35-1099, Rev 1 dated April 23, consequently result in exposure of the passengers and cabin
2009. attendants to hypoxia following a depressurization event.
100 10-08-004 FAA AD 2010-15-08
Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400 This AD to detect and correct cracked, corroded, or fractured
and -500 series airplanes, certificated in any carriage spindles and to prevent severe flap asymmetry,
category. which could result in reduced control or loss of
controllability of the airplane.
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101 10-09-008 FAA AD 2010-16-06
Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500 and -800 This AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can
series airplanes. cause the low-pressure flex-hoses of the crew oxygen system
to melt or burn, resulting in oxygen system leakage and
smoke or fire.
102 10-09-009 FAA AD 2010-17-19
Boeing Model 737-800, -900 and -900ER This AD to detect and correct discrepancies in the aft attach
series airplanes; certificated in any category. lugs of the elevator tab control mechanism, which could
result in elevator and tab vibration. Consequent structural
loss of structural integrity and aircraft control.
103 10-09-011 FAA AD 2010-17-14
Boeing Model 737-200 series airplanes, This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of certain
certificated in any category; line numbers 1 fuselage frames and stub beams, and possible severed
through 848 inclusive. frames, which could result in reduced structural integrity of
the frames. This reduced structural integrity can increase
loading in the fuselage skin, which will accelerate skin crack
growth and result in rapid decompression of the fuselage.
104 10-09-014R1 FAA AD 2010-17-05
Boeing Model 737-600, -700,-700C, -800 This AD to prevent pump housingburn-through due to
and -900 series airplane, certificated with electrical arcing, which could create a potential ignition
any category, as identified in Boeing Alert source inside a fuel tank. This condition, in combination with
Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, Revision 1, flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion
dated May 28, 2009. and consequent loss of the airplane.
105 10-12-010 FAA AD 2010-24-11
Boeing Model 737-800 and -900 series This AD result from a design review of the fuel tank system.
airplane, certified in any category This AD is issued to prevent arching at certain fuel tank
fastener in the event of a lightning strike or fault current
event, which combination with flammable fuel vapors, could
result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane.
106 10-12-026 FAA AD No. 2010-24-01
Boeing Model 737-900ER series airplane Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 57:
Wings
This AD result from reports of cracks emanating from the
keyway of the fuel tank access hole. DGCA is issuing this
AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could result in
the loss of the lower wing skin load path and consequent
structural failure of the wing.
BOEING 747 SERIES

107 10-01-013 FAA AD 2010-01-01
Boeing Model 747-400, 747-400D, and 747- This AD to prevent the loss of structural integrity of the
400F sreies airplanes; certificated in any fuselage, which could result in rapid depressurization of the
category. airplane.
108 10-01-020 FAA AD 2010-01-02
Boeing Model 747-400, and -400D series This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking in the
airplanes, certificated in any category; as specified fuselage stringers, which, if left undetected, could
identified in Boeing Srevice Bulletin 747- result in fuselage skin cracking that reduce the structural
53A2484, Revision 1, dated February 12, integrity of the skin panel, and consequent rapid
2009. depressuruzation of the airplane.
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109 10-03-003 FAA AD 2010-05-03
Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes. This AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking at multiple
adjacent locations in the subject areas, which could connect
to form large cracks and result in reduced structural integrity
leading to rapid decompression and consequent loss of
control of the airplane.
110 10-07-008 FAA AD 2010-14-07
Boeing Model 747-400 airplanes, This AD to prevent fatigue cracking of the body station (BS)
certificated in any category; line numbers 1 2598 bulkhead structure, which could result in inability of
through 1307 inclusive. the structure to carry horizontal stabilizer flight loads, and
loss of controllability of the airplane.
111 10-07-017 FAA AD 2010-13-12
Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, This AD is issued to prevent damage to the fuel pumps
certificated in any category; as identified in caused by electrical arcing that could introduce an ignition
Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28A2261, source in the fuel tank which, in combination with flammable
dated February 19, 2009. fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and
consequent loss of the airplane.
112 10-07-018 FAA AD 2010-14-08
Boeing Company Model 747-400, 747- This AD is issued to prevent uncommanded operation of
400D, 747-400F series airplanes, certain override/jettison pumps which could cause overheat,
certificated in any category; as identified in electrical arcs, or frictional sparks, and could lead to ignition
Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28A2280, source inside a fuel tank. This condition, in combination with
Revision 1, dated November 25, 2009, and flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion
747-28A2281, Revision 1, dated November and consequent loss of the airplane.
25, 2009.
113 10-07-029 FAA AD 2010-14-01
Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes This AD to prevent a potential electrical arc from igniting the
identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747- BMS 8-39 polyurethane foam insulation on the duct
21A2421, Revision 2, dated December 19, assemblies of the ECS, which could propagate a small fire
2006 and 747-400F series airplanes and lead to a larger fire that could spread throughout the
identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747- airplane through the ECS.
21A2422, Revision 2, dated November 16,
2006.
114 10-07-031 FAA AD 2010-14-07
Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, This AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could
certified in any category; as identified in grow and resultin a severed intercostal. If an intercostal is
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- severed, cracks could develop in the adjacent frame structure
53A2750, dated August 27, 2009. and skin, resulting in a rapid loss of cabin pressure.
115 10-08-010 FAA AD 2010-16-05
Boeing Model 747-400, -400D and -400F This AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can
series airplanes, certificated in any category; cause the low-pressure flex-hoses of the crew oxygen system
line numbers 1 through 1229 inclusive. to melt or burn, resulting in oxygen system leakage and
smoke or fire.
116 10-11-016 FAA 2009-19-06
Boeing 747-400 series airplanes, certified in From result report that the current design of the flight deck
any category; as identified in Boeing door is defective. This AD is issued to prevent failure of this
Service Bulletin 747-52-2293, dated equipment, which could jeopardize flight safety
September 4, 2009
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117 10-11-017 FAA AD No. 2010-20-08
Model 747-400 series airplanes, certified in These AD results from reports of cracked that have been
any category, line numbers 1 through 1419 found in the strap and inner chord of the forward edge frame
inclusive, except airplanes that have been of the number 5 main entry door cutouts, between stringers
modified into 747-400 large cargo freighter 16 and 23. This AD issue to detect and correct such cracks,
configuration. which could damage to the adjacent body structure and could
result in depressurization of the airplane in flight.
118 10-11-020 FAA AD No. 2010-20-12
Boeing Company Model 747-400, 747- Electrical hot short from a source outside the fuel quantity
400D, and 747-400F series airplane, indicating system (FQIS) to the densitometer wiring from
certificated in any category; as identified in causing failure of the FQIS densitometer resistors, which
the service bulletin listed in Boeing Service could result in an ignition source inside the center or
Bulletin 747-28A2266, Revision 1, dated horizontal stabilizer fuel tanks.
December 10, 2009 and Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 747-28A2267, dated
December 18, 2008.
BOLKOW BO-105 SERIES

119 10-04-003 EASA AD 2010-0049
BO 105 A, BO 105 C, BO 105 D, BO 105 "Rotor Flight Control Cyclic Stick Locking Device -
LS A-1, BO 105 LS A-3and BO 105 S Modification".
helicopters, all variant, all serial number and This AD is issued to supersedes DGCA AD 09-04-006
MBB-BK 117 A-1, MBB-BK 117 A-3, (EASA AD 2009-0079) and adds the BO 105 LS A-3
MBB-BK 117 A-4, MBB-BK 117 B-1, helicopters helicopters to the Applicability. This AD has
MBB-BK 117 B-2, MBB-BK 117 C-1 been republished to correct the Applicability, making this
helicopters, all serial numbers. consistent with the certified Models as specified in the TCDS
EASA R.011.
120 10-07-002 EASA AD 2010-0128
BO 105 C, BO 105 D and BO 105 S Engine Power Turbine Speed Operational Limitation.
helicopters, all variants as specified in
Appendix 1 of reference AD, all serial Several third stage turbine wheel failures have been reported
numbers, if equipped with Roll Royce on Roll Royce Corporation (RRC) 250 series engines.
Corporation (formerly Allison, Detroit Investigation by RRC has determined that detrimental
Diesel Allison) 250-C20 series engines, vibrations can occurs within a particular range of turbine
except helicopters that have been modified speeds, which are potential contributing factor to these
in accordance with ECD VTOL retrofit kit failures. This condition if not corrected could result in loss of
105-80037. engines power, possibly resulting in an emergency landing
and consequent injuries to helicopter occupants.
To address this unsafe condition, RRC issued Commercial

Engine Bulletin (CEB) A-1400, now at Revision 3, to
introduce an operational limitation to avoid engine N2 steady-
state operation in a certain speed range(86.5% - 95.5%) for
more than 60 seconds in single or cumulative events for
engines with the third stage turbine wheel P/N 23065833
installed. In response, Eurocopter Deutschland (ECD) issued
ASB BO105-60-110, now at revision 1, to introduce the
same operating limitation for BO 105 helicopters with the
affected engines installed.
This AD requires the introduction of a placard and the

amendment of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM).
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121 10-07-033 EASA AD 2010-0153
Eurocopter BO 105 helicopters. "Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Main Rotor Blades
with Bolted Lead Inner Weight - Life Limitation". T o
determine the life limit of 2500 flight hours (FH) for M/R
blades due to inner weight deformation during operation.
BOLKOW KAWASAKI-HELICOPTER
122 10-06-002 EASA AD 2010-0096
Model MBB-BK117C-2 Helicopters, all "Airworthiness Limitations - Tail Rotor Intermediate Gear
serial numbers, if equipped with a Tail Box (IGB) Bevel Gear - Reduced Life Limit". To prevent
Rotor IGB that has a bevel gear Part significant reduction of the lifetime of IGB bevel gears,
Number (P/N) 4639 310 065 installed. potentially resulting in failure of the IGB and consequent
loss of control of the helicopter. This AD require the
implementation of a revised life limit on the effected bevel
gears and adds those s/n by referencing the latest Revision of
ECD Alert Service Bulletin (ASB).
123 10-12-029-U EASA AD No. 2010-0270-E
MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters Auto Flight Three-axis-Autopilot Automatic Level-off
Function Revised Flight Manual Procedure
This AD issued is to prevent the problem on autopilot of
MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters, concerning the automatic
level-off function, which is normally only triggered upon
ground proximity detection. The automatic level-off may
erroneously be triggered when radar altitude falls below
2500 feet. When this occurs, the ALT mode reference is
wrongly set to either a meaningless high value or to a low
value equivalent to 65 feet above ground. This condition, if
not detected and corrected, could lead to a descent below the
minimum safety altitude. This AD requires operators to
amend the applicable Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM)
Supplement and to inform the flight crews accordingly.
124 10-12-030-U EASA AD No. 2010-0268-E
MBB-BK117 C-2 helicopters Electrical Power Starter/Generator Switch Off Revised
Flight Manual Procedure
EASA have received reports that on some MBB-BK117 C-2
helicopters, a too high current flow was detected when one
generator was deactivated (e.g. during the Engine Power
Check).
This situation is, if not detected corrected, could lead to
failure of the generator, likely resulting in loss of electrical
power and inducing loss of systems that are necessary for
safe flight.
This AD requires the introduction of additional Rotorcraft
Flight Manual (RFM) procedures, to include visual
monitoring of the electrical power display GEN AMPS on
the Vehicle and Engine Mulfunction Display (VEMD)
during switching of a generator.
This AD is considered to be an interim an interim measure,
pending the development of a final solution that will prevent
this particular mode of generator failure; further AD action
cannot be excluded.
CFM INTERNATIONAL ENGINE
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125 10-01-018 FAA AD 2010-01-05
CFM 56-7B engines in accordance with This AD to prevent failure of the LP turbine rear frame from
"applicability" section in reference AD. low-cycle-fatigue cracks. Failure of the LP turbine rear frame
could result in engine separation from the airplane, possibly
leading to loss of control of the airplane.
126 10-07-011 FAA AD 2010-13-09
CFM International CFM565, 5B, and 7B This AD is issued to prevent uncontained failure of the stage
series turbofan engines with stage 3 low 3 LPT disk and damage to the airplane.
pressure turbine (LPT) disks part number
(P/N) 3360020060, installed with the
following serial numbers (S/Ns),
DE255844, DE256388, DE256622,
DE256623, DE256625, DE256627,
DE256628, DE256631, and DE256637. The
5 and 5B series engines are installed on,
but not limited to, Airbus A318, A319,
A320, and A321 airplanes, and the 7B
series engines are installed on, but not
limited to, Boeing 737 series airplanes.
127 10-12-009 EASA AD 2010-0212
CFM56-5B1/3, CFM56-5B2/3, CFM56- -Engine Fan Blade Replacement
5B3/3, CFM56-5B4/3, CFM56-5B5/3, -During quality inspections at blades manufacturer, a non-
CFM56-5B6/3, CFM56-5B7/3, CFM56- conforming fan blades geometry was detected. The quality
5B8/3, CFM56-5B9/3, CFM56-5B3/3B1, investigation isolated a production batch which is potentially
CFM56-5B4/3B1 engines if equipped with affected by this issue. For those potentially affected fan
Fan Blades Serial Numbers as listed in CFM blades, in case of Foreign Object Damage, it could lead to an
International Service Bulletin (SB) CFM56- In Flight Shut Down of the engine following liberation of fan
5B S/B 72-0777. blade upper panel.
These engines are known to be installed on, -This AD requires replacement of the potentially affected fan
but not limited to, Airbus A318, A319, blades with a serviceable blade.
A320 and A321 aeroplanes.
DC-9 ( MD..) SERIES

128 10-12-022 FAA AD No. 2010-25-04
McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model DC- Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28:
9-31, DC-9-32 (VC-9C), DC-9-32F (C-9A, Fuel
C-9B), DC-9-33F, DC-9-34, DC-9-34F, DC- This AD result from fuel system reviews conducted by the
9-41, DC-9-51, DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9- manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent possible
82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), and DC-9- sources of ignition in a fuel tank caused by an electrical fault
87 (MD-87), MD-88, and MD-90-30 in the fuel boost pumps. An ignition sources in the fuel tank
airplanes; certificated in any category as could result in a fire or an explosion and consequent loss of
identified in Boeing Service Bulletins DC9- the airplane.
28-212 and MD 90-28-010, both revision 1,
both dated June 16, 2009.
129 10-12-032 FAA AD 2010-25-04
McDonnel Douglas Corporation Model DC- This AD is issued to prevent possible sources of ignition in a
9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), and MD- fuel tank caused by an electrical fault in the fuel boost
90-30 airplanes; certified in any category; as pumps. An ignition source in the fuel tank could result in a
identified in Boeing Services Bulletin DC9- fire or an explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
28-212 and MD90-28-010, both revision 1,
both dated June 16, 2009
DE HAVILLAND DHC-8 SERIES
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130 02-08-003R1 CF-2002-26R2
Bombardier DHC-8 aircraft, Models 301, Flap Drive Actuator Assembly .
311, 314 and 315, serial numbers 003 and - To introduced new lubrication tools and specified the use of
subsequent. Aeroshell 17 grease in order to improve lubrication of the
All installed flap drive actuators, Part flap actuators and consequently reduce the possibility of
Numbers 734181, 734374 and 755216, are component wear, it also revised the applicability and
subject to this revision, irrespective of serial compliance time criteria for the actuator backlash checks.
number. - To provides the following alternative grease and backlash
check instructions:
a.Alternative grease Syn-Tech NS-5806-G for lubrication of
the flap actuators
b.Alternative instructions, section 05-50-98 of the Aircraft
Maintenance Manual (AMM), for determination of next
backlash check interval.
c.Alternative instruction, Task Number 2750/18 in the
Maintenance Task Card Manual (MTCM), for the repeat
backlash checks.
131 10-01-005 CF-2009-46
DHC-8 Series 100, -200 and -300 with "Landing Gear Alternate Extension Access Panel - Potential
serial numbers 003 through 658. Failure to Open" . There have been reports of failure of the
access panel latch assembly as a consuquence of repeated
closure of the access panel involving the use of excessive
force. Failure of the latch assembly can result in the access
panel being jammed in the closed position, and require
mechanical prying to open. An undetected or un corrected
latch failure condition in the access panel can prevent
immediate access the landing gear alternate extension system
by the flight crew during an emergency. This AD require the
replacement of the existing latch assembly with a stronger
modified latch assembly.
132 10-01-006 CF-2009-45
Bombardier Inc. DHC-8 Aircraft, Models "Aileron Terminal Quadrant Support Bracket Cracking".
301,311,314, and 315, Serial Numbers 100 Several cases of aileron terminal quadrant support bracket
through. that were manufactured using sheet metal have been found
cracked on DHC-8 Series 300 aircraft. Investigation revealed
that the failure of the support bracket was due to fatigue.
Failure of the aileron terminal quadrant support bracket could
result in adverse reduction of aircraft roll control. This AD
mandate the replacement of the aileron terminal quadrant
support bracket with new and improved machined part.
by ssi

133 10-06-004 CF-2010-16
DHC-8 series 300, serial numbers 003 "Cockpit Windshield Lower Frames - Potential for
through 566. Corrosion". Trapped water on the bottom of the cockpit
windshield frames (or lower windshield frames) that result in
either corrosion or water ingress into the cockpit. In one
occurrence, the trapped water caused severe corrosion of
numerous anchor nuts that secure the windshield to the lower
windshield frame, such that the intended fastening function
was seriously compromised.
Corrosion of the lower windshield frames, including the

anchor nuts that secure the windshield to the aircraft
structure, can result in a serious structural degradation
possibly leading to the loss of the windshield during flight.
Also, water could leak into the cockpit and cause either a
malfunction or failure of the electrical and electronics system
in the area of the cockpit instrument panels.
The lower windshield frames do not have drain provisions to

prevent moisture of water run-off from the consideration of
the windshield from being trapped. The consequences of
trapped water in the lower windshield frames can result in
unsafe conditions, as noted above. This Directive mandates
the installation of a drain system of the lower windshield
frames.
DIAMOND
134 10-08-009 EASA AD 2010-0155
DA 42 and DA 42 M aeroplanes, all serial "Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear Damper-to-Trailing
numbers. Arm Joints - Inspection / Replacement". To detect and
correct cracks on MLG Damper-to-Trailing Arm Joints that
may lead failure of the joint and subsequent damage or
malfunction of the MLG, possibly resulting in damage to the
aeroplane during landing and injury to occupants.
135 10-08-009R1 EASA AD 2010-0155R1
DA 42 and DA 42 M aeroplanes, all serial "Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear Damper-to-Trailing
numbers. Arm Joints - Inspection / Replacement". To prevent crack on
DA 42 Main Landing Gear (MGL) Damper to Trailing Arm
joints during standard maintenance. Depending on
environmental-, operating- and runway conditions, the
effected Main Landing Gear joints, Part Number (P/N) D60-
3217-23-5X (4 different lengths are available), is susceptible
to cracking.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, may lead to
failure of the joints and subsequent damage or malfunction of
the MLG, possibly resulting in damage to the aeroplane
during landing and injury occupants. This AD required the
repetitive inspection interval has been amended, to allow
inspection to be done at the regular 100 flight hours
inspections.
by ssi

136 10-11-023 EASA AD 2010-0235
Diamond Aircraft DA 40 and DA 42 Doors Rear Passenger Door Retaining Bracket
Replacement
Diamond Aircraft Industries conducted analyses and

structural tests to determine the root cause of the door
opening in flight. The conclusions were that the primary
locking mechanism provided adequate strength to react to the
loads in flight. It was also determined that the root cause was
the crew not properly securing the rear passenger door by the
main locking mechanism prior to flight. Damage to the
hinges has been caused primarily by external loads (wind
gust conditions) while the aeroplane was parked.
This condition, if not corrected, could result in the rear
passenger door opening and departing the aeroplanes in
flight.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires
implementation of amendment of the AFM procedures for
flight with the door unlocked/open, and replacement of the
passenger door retaining bracket with an improved part
DORNIER AIRCRAFT
137 09-09-007 EASA AD 2009-0194
Dornier Model 328-100 aeroplanes, all "Wings - Lower Inner Panel - Inspection / Repair /
serial numbers; and Model 328-300 Modification". Cracks at the lower wing panel rear trailing
aeroplanes, all serial numbers. edge inboard of flap lever arm 1 (rib 5). This condition, if not
corrected, could lead to structural failure of the affected wing
panel, possibly resulting in the wing separating from the
airlane with consequent loss of control. This AD retains the
inspection and repair requirements of EASA AD 2008-0087-
E, adds repetitive inspection and requirement to modify both
the LH and RH ing panel rear trailing edges from rib 3 to rib
9.
138 10-04-002 EASA 2010-0054
Dornier 328 aeroplanes. Flight Control Tab to Actuator Linkage Reduced
Inspection Intervals".
This AD is issued to reduced inspection interval, specifically
for the Flight control tab to actuator link CMR repetitive
inspection, which have been identified as mandatory actions
for continued airworthiness. Failure of these component or
their constituent part could lead reduced control of the
aeroplane. This AD requires the implementation of the
effected reduced inspection intervals and associated
corrective actions into te operators approved maintenance
program.
by ssi

139 10-07-014 EASA AD No. 2010-0134
Model 328-100 aeroplanes, all serial "Stabilizers-Rudder Tab Fixation Brackets - Inspection".
numbers During maintenance, it has been discovered that at the
installation of the fixation brackets for rudder spring tabs and
trim tabs an incorrect installation of the fixation brackets may
have occurred. It is possible that the fixation bracket
assembly may be incorrectly orientated and as a result the
position of the helicoil inserts on the fixation bracket may be
incorrect.If the orientation of the fixation bracket is reversed
or upside down the screws may not reach into the helicoil
thread to a sufficient depth. An incorrect installation, if not
detected and corrected, could lead to an in-flight failure of
the fixation brackets for rudder spring tabs and trim tabs
resulting in and reduced control of the aeroplane. To address
this potential unsafe condition, the TC Holder has developed
a one time inspection to detect and correct any incorrect
installations of the fixation brackets for rudder spring tabs
resulting in and reduced control of the airplane. This AD
requires a one-time inspection of all rudder trim and spring
tab fixation brckets, the correction of any parts that are
incorrectly installed and the reporting of all findings to the
TC Holder. This AD is considered to be an interim action
and an improved design bracket attechment is expected to be
developed.
140 10-09-007 EASA AD 2010-0169
Dornier Model 328-100 aeroplanes, all "Equipment & Furnishings - Flight Compartment Door
serial numbers. Locking Device - Replacement". An incident has been
reported with a Dornier 328-100 aeroplanes, where the right-
hand (RH) power lever jammed in flight-idle position during
the landing roll-out. The aeroplane was stopped by excessive
braking.
EUROCOPTER - EC 135
141 EASA AD No. 2010-0213 (Corrected 03 December 2010)
142 EASA AD 2010-0227
143 10-01-001 EASA 2009-0272

Eurocopter EC 135 P1 (CDS), EC 135 P1 "Main Rotor - Sliding sleeve - Pre-Flight Check
(CPDS), EC 135 P2 (CPDS), EC 135 T1 Amendment". During two separate pre-flight checks on EC
(CDS), EC 135 T1 (CPDS), EC 135 T2 135 helicopters in 2005, it was detected that one of the plain
(CPDS) helicopters, all serial numbers. journal bearings of the sliding sleeve had moved to the
outside of the sliding sleeve. This condition, if not detected
and corrected, could lead to a complete shift of the plane
journal bearing to the inside or outside, creating the
possibility of a limited movement of the collective, which
could result in reduced control of helicopter. This AD retains
the requirements of LBA AD D-2005-233, which is
superseded, and altrnative method to comply, by amending
the FLM with the appropriate revision that contains the AD
requirement with regard to the pre flight check procedures.
by ssi

144 10-04-008 EASA AD 2010-0058
Eurocopter EC 135 P1(CDS), EC 135 Rotor Flight Controls Tail Rotor, Cyclic and Collective
P1(CPDS), EC 135 P2(CPDS), EC 135 Control Levers Inspection / Repair .
P2+, EC 135 T1(CDS), EC 135 T1(CPDS), During accomplishment of an inspection on a MBB BK117
EC 135 T2(CPDS), EC 135 T2+ C-2, bearings were detected which had not been correctly
helicopters, all serial number(s/n), and fixed. This condition, if not detected and corrected, may
MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters, all s/n. cause the affected control lever to shift in the axial direction.
This AD requires implementation of a modification that
introduces new washers and bushings, which allows for
extended inspection intervals. In accordance with ECD
standard practice, a deviation of up to 10% of compliance
time is allowed, although not accumulative.
145 10-09-002R1 EASA 2010-0183R1
Eurocopter EC 135 series helicopters, if "Equipment / Furnishings - Spectrolab Nightsun XP
equipped with Spectrolab Nightsun XP Searclight - Inspection / Removal". A incident has been
Gimbal Assemblies P/N 033295 series used reported by a Maintemance Organisation of Vibration
on Nightsun XP System P/N 033338 series. associated with the Nightsun XP Searchlight. Investigation
revealed that the Gimbal Azimuth Top Hex Nut was loose.
To avoid possibly damage to the helicopter or injury to
persons on the ground. This AD requires repetitive pre-
flightchecks to verify correct installation and, if
discrepancies are detected, the removal of the searchlight unit
from the helicopter.
146 10-09-002-U EASA AD 2010-0183-E
Eurocopter MBB-BK117 C-2, EC 135 "Equipment / Furnishings - Spectrolab Nightsun XP
series helicopters and Agusta Model AB139 Searchlight - Inspection / Removal". An incident has been
and AW139 helicopters, if equipped with reported by a Maintenance Organisation of vibration
Spectrolab Nightsun XP Gimbal Assemblies associated with the Nightsun XP Searchlight. Investigation
P/N 033295 series used on Nightsun XP revealed that the Gimbal Azimuth Top Hex Nut was loose.
System P/N 033338 series. To avoid possibly damage to the helicopter or injury to
persons on the ground.
147 10-09-003 EASA 2010-0154
Eurocopter EC 135 and BK 117 C-2 "Optional Equipment - External Mounted Hoist System -
helicopters. Visual Check / Replacement". During a recent pre-flight
check of the external mounted hoist on a MBB-BK 117 C-2
helicopter, cracks were detected on the boom support P/N
44307-500. This condition, if not corrected, would impair the
structural strength of the boom, potentially leading to failure
of the boom support. This could result in loss of the boom
and attached loads, endangering helicopter operation and
possibly causing injuries to persons on the ground. Boom
supports with P/N 44301-500 and P/N 44307-500-1 are of
similar design to P/N 44307-500 on which the cracks were
detected and are therefore also affected by this unsafe
condition.
by ssi

148 10-10-006-U EASA AD 2010-0207-E
Eurocopter EC 135, EC 365 and MBB- Indicating And Recording Systems Instrument Control
BK117 C-2 helicopters. Panel Flight Limitation/Modification
- Recent flight test have revealed that, on certain instrument
control panels (ICP), the force required to turn some of the
BARO rotary knobs so low that an unintentional turning of
these rotary knobs cannot be ruled out.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, would likely
produce erroneus altitude information, thereby increasing the
pilots workload during cross-check with the stand-by
instrument and could, during flight under instrument Flight
Rules (IFR), possibly results in loss altitude, increasing the
risk of flight into terrain.
This AD requires, the identification of the affected ICPs,
implementation of a flight limitation on helicopter that have
these installed, and modification of each affected ICP to
correct the friction of The BARO rotary knob. After
modification, the flight limitation is no longer required and
can be removed from the helicopter
149 10-11-012 EASA AD 2010-0213
Eurocopter EC 135 all helicopters. Main Rotor Drive Main Transmission Housing Upper
Part - Modification.
- A recent inspection has show that, on some of housing
upper parts for the main transmission FS108, the by pass
inlet in the oil filter area has not been manufactured in
accordance with applicable design specification .
- This condition , if not corrected , could adversely affect the
oil filter by pass function , which is essential for continued
safe flight.
- For the reason described above , this AD requires a
temporary modification of each affected P/N 4649 301 034
main transmission upper part by installing a corrugated
washer , which will establish an equivalent structural design
for the oil supply to the by pass.
- This AD required rework of the oil filter area to bring the
effected part (back) within the applicable design
specification.
by ssi

150 10-11-012R1 EASA AD No. 2010-0213
Eurocopter EC 135 helicopters: EC135 -Main Rotor Drive Main Transmission Housing Upper
P1(CDS), EC135 P1(CPDS), EC135 Part - Modification.
P2(CPDS), EC135 P2+, EC135 T1(CDS), -A recent inspection has show that, on some of housing
EC135 T1 (CPDS), EC135 T2(CPDS), upper parts for the main transmission FS108, the by pass
EC135 T2+, all serial numbers, if equipped inlet in the oil filter area has not been manufactured in
with a Main transmission FS108 housing accordance with applicable design specification. This
upper part, Part Number (P/N) 4649 301 condition , if not corrected , could adversely affect the oil
034. filter by pass function , which is essential for continued safe
flight. For the reason described above, this AD requires a
temporary modification of each affected P/N 4649 301 034
main transmission upper part by installing a corrugated
washer , which will establish an equivalent structural design
for the oil supply to the by pass.
-This AD required rework of the oil filter area to bring the
effected part (back) within the applicable design
specification.
-This AD has been republished to remove a part serial
number (1028) from Appendix 1 of this AD and to correct
paragraphs (2) and (3) as stated in Required action and
Compliance Time section of the EASA AD No. 2010-0213.
151 10-11-012R1 EASA AD No. 2010-0213 (Corrected 03 December 2010)
EC 135 P1(CDS), EC 135 P1(CPDS), EC Main Rotor Drive Main Transmission Housing Upper
135 P2(CPDS, EC 135 P2+, EC 135 T1 Part - Modification
(CDS), EC 135 T1(CPDS), EC 135 T2 A recent inspection has shown that, on some of the housing
(CPDS), EC 135 T2+ helicopters, all serial upper parts for the main transmission FS108, the bypass inlet
numbers, if equipped with a Main in the oil filter area has not been manufactured in accordance
Transmission FS108 housing upper part, with the applicable design specification.
P/N 4649 301 034. This condition if not corrected, coult adversely affect the oil-
filter bypass function, which is essential for continued safe
flight.
For the reason described above, this AD requires a temporary
modification of each affected P/N 4649 301 034 main
transmission upper part by installing a corrugated washer,
which will establish an equivalent structural design for the oil
supply to the by pass. This AD also requires rework of the oil
filter area to bring the affected parts (back) within the
applicable design specifications. This revision to remove a
part serial number (1028) from Appendix 1 of the reference
AD and to correct paragraphs (2) and (3) for consistency.
by ssi

152 10-12-018-E EASA AD No. 2010-0247-E
EC 135 P1 (CPDS), EC135 P2 (CPDS), EC Light Instrument Lightighting Display Brigthness for
135 P2+, EC 135 T1 (CPDS), EC 135 T2 Flight in Night Vision Google (NVG) Mode - Reduction
(CPDS), EC 135 T2+, serial numbers (s/n) Recent reviews have revealed that, when the INSTR
0642 through 0999 inclusive, if equipped LIGHT potentiometer is at certain positions, the diodes in
with optional NVG system, and the NVG system may overheat. This could lead to failure of
MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters, s/n 9004 the instrument and overhead panel lighting and, depending
through 9450 inclusive in, if equipped with on the position of the potentiometer, the background lighting
the optional NVG system with the secured of Caution and Advisory Display (CAD), Vehicle and
toogle switch Part Number (P/N) Engine Monitoring Display (VEMD), Primary Flight Display
845UN01F4AD0A (and asssociated wiring (PFD) and the Navigation Display (ND) may suddenly
changes), either installed during production, increase to maximum brightness.
or in-service in accordance with ECD This condition, if not corrected, would likely impair the
Swervice Bulletin (SB) MBB-BK117 C-2- visibility of the flight crew, possibly resulting in loss of
33-006. control of the helicopter. This AD requires an amandement
of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS) to
implement a procedure for flights in NVG mode, to set the
background lighting of CAD, VEMD, PFD and ND to an
acceptable minimum level.
153 10-12-033 EASA AD No. 2010-0237R2
MBB-BK 117 C-2 and EC135 helicopters EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS SPECTROLAB
NIGHTSUN XP SEARCHLIGHT
INSPECTION/REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT
An incident has been reported by a Maintenance
Organisation of vibration associated with the Nightsun XP
Searchlight. Investigation revealed that the Gimbal Azimuth
Top Hex Nut was loose. If not detected and corrected, could
lead to a gap between the rubber edging of the top shroud
and the Gimbal frame, resulting in degradation of pointing
accuracy and stability performance and pose excessive
vibration. If the nut were to entirely disengage, the
Searchlight/Gimbal could disconnect from the helicopter and
remain attached solely by the internal cable harness or
separate totally, possibly resulting in damage to the
helicopter or injury to persons on ground.
EUROCOPTER AS-332 SERIES

154 09-12-016R1 EASA AD 2009-0263R1
Eurocopter AS 332 C, C1, L, L1 and L2 "Equipment & Furnishings - Emergency Flotation Gear -
helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped Inpection / Repair /Replacement". The pipes connecting the
with emergency flotation gear which have emergency flotation gear cradle distribution tube to the two
forward and rear cradles not marked with a compartments which did not inflate were obstructed with the
letter "V" near the plug(s) and have serial prptective product which is used to protect the inside of the
number (S/N) as listed in table 1 of cradle. The original issue of this AD required an inspection
reference AD. of the inlet cones of the supply pipes connected to each of the
front and rear emergency flotation gear cradle distribution
tubes (hereafter refered to as inflation pipes of each front and
rear cradle) and the necessary corrective action, depending
on findings. Since this AD was published, the cradle internal
protection aplication process has been modified in
production. Therefore, this AD is revised to limit its
applicability to cradles manufactured prior to this production
improvement.
by ssi

155 10-01-002 EASA 2009-0271
Eurocopter AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 "Equipment & Furnishings - Hydraulic Hoist Cable -
L1, and AS 332 L2 helicopters, all serial Limitation / Modification". An incident has been reported of
numbers, if equipped with a hoist beam P/N a hydraulic hoist cable jamming against the base of the
330A87-2345 (dash number -00 to -06 supporting strut of a dual hoist tray installation. The jamming
inclusive), in combination with a tray- occorred during a rescue at sea, while the load was lifted and
mounted single or double hoist, and which subject to large oscillations. The load was transferred to the
do not embody modification (MOD) back-up electrical hoist and safely brought onboard.
332A081113.00. SA 330 J helicopters, all However, when jamming againts the hoist supporting strut,
serial numbers, if equipped with a hoist the hydraulic hoist cable damaged the back-up electrical
beam P/N 330A87-2345 (dash number -00 hoist power supply harness which is routed through that area,
to -06 inclusive), in combintaion with a tray- resulting in a short circuit that fused and ruptured the
mounted single. hydraulic hoist cable. - This condition, if not corrected, could
lead to further incidents of hoist cable jamming and
consequent cable failure, possibly resulting in personal
injuries and/or damage to the helicopter. This AD retain the
requirements of DGCA AD No. 2009-08-010-U, which
superseded, adds require action (s) for AS 332 helicopters
equipped with a RH side sliding door P/N 332A22-1165-01,
and extends the complication time to install an approved
protection of the base of the hoist assembly for those AS 332
helicopter and for SA 330 J helicopters to 30 June 2010.
156 10-01-003 EASA 2009-0275-E
AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L, AS 332 "Fuselage-Intermediate Gear Box (IGB) Fairing Gutter -
L1 and AS 332 L2 helicopters, all serial inspection / Replacement". A helicopter experienced
numbers, if modified during production separation of the IGB fairing gutter, resulting in interference
with MOD 0725356 (installation of a gutter with the tail rotor inclined drive shaft. This condition,if not
on the IGB fairing) or in-service with corrected,can lead to failure of drive shaft,causing loss of the
Eurocopter AS332 Service Bulletin (SB) tail rotor drive and consequent reduced control of the
53.01.10 (at any revision). EC 225 LP helicopter. DGCA AD 08-12-009-U (EASA AD 208-0219-
helicopters, all serial numbers. E) superseding DGCA AD O7 -04-006-U (EASA AD 2007-
0090-E) whose requirements were retaind, to expand the
applicibility to include other AS 332 helicopter models, and
to require more extensive repetitive inspections of the IGB
fairing gutter and, in case of discrepencies, replacement of
damage parts. In addition, this AD provided an optional
terminating action as offered by Eurocopter with in-service
modification for improvement of gutter attachment on IGB
fairing (SB 53.01.56 for AS332 helicopter respectively) or
equivalent production MOD 0726599 and after modification
of a helicopter accordingly, the repetitive inspections of AD
were no longer required for that helicopter. Since DGCA AD
08-12-009-U (EASA AD 2008-0219-E) was published, crack
occurrences on the gutter of two helicopters after
embodiment of the terminating action have been reported.
This AD, which supersedes DGCA AD 08-12-009-U (EASA
AD 2008-0219-E), re-estabilishes the repetitive inspection of
the IGB fairing gutter for all helicopters, irrespective of
modification status, and reduces the inspection interval. In
addition, depending on finding, some corrective actions in
accordance with the instructions of Europcopter AS332 SB
53.01.56 have now become part the of required actions of
this AD.
by ssi

157 10-02-006 EASA AD 2009-0183-CN
Eurocopter model AS332, AS365, AS350, "Equipment / Furnishing - D'Lok Hook of the Rescue Hoist -
SA330, EC155 series, Eurocopter Inspection / Removal from Service / Replacement". This AD
Deuthschland GmbH model EC 135, MBB- to cancel DGCA AD No. 09.07.017-U (EASA AD 209-
BK117 helicopter, Sikorsky Aircraft 01783-E). The Federal Aviation Administration, which is the
Corporation S-76 series, All serial numbers, state of Design Authority for the lifesavings system Corp. D-
if equipped with Lifesaving System D-Lok Lok Hook installed on certain Goodrich and Breeze-Eastern
Hooks with part number (P/N) 410-A or rescue hoist assemblies, has issued AD 2010-03-02. EASA
410-F and identified as part of lot number has decided to adopt this FAA AD, whose applicablity is
208 or 1108. broader than DGCA AD No. 09.07.017-U (EASA AD 2009-
01783-E), as it affects all rotorcraft where the D-Lok Hook
might be installed.
158 10-03-008R1-U EASA 2010-0043R1-E
EUROCOPTER AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS Hydraulic Power - Hydraulic Pumps - Identification /
332 L, AS 332 L1 and AS332 L2 Replacement .
Helicopters, all serial numbers. This AD to prevent hydraulic fluid leak from the hydraulic
pump casing and has shown that the liner of the
compensating piston was incorrectly positioned. It could
result in loss of the RH and Left Hand (LH) hydraulic power
systems and consequently may lead to the loss of helicopter
controllability. This AD is revise to correct which pump can
be installed in replacement of the above mentioned
deterioration pumps.
159 10-03-008-U EASA AD 2010-0043-E
Eurocopter AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 "Hydraulic Power - Hydraulic Pumps - Identification /
L, AS 332 L1 and AS 332 L2 helicopters, Replacement". From information that loss of the Right Hand
all serial numbers. (R/H) hydraulic power system on an AS332 L2 helicopter,
the pilot saw the hydraulic system "Low Level" warning
comes on during the approach phase. Investigation has
revealed a hydraulic fluid leak from the hydraulic pump
casing and has shown that the liner of the compensasting
piston was incorrectly positioned. If this condition occurs on
both pumps of a helicopter, it could result in loss of the RH
and Left Hand(LH) hydraulic power systems and
consequently may lead to the loss helicopter controllability.
This Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) requires the
identification of the pumps that are currently installed on the
helicopters, and the accomplishment of corrective actions
(replacement) as necessary.
by ssi

160 10-07-013-U EASA AD 2010-0117-E
Eurocopter AS 332 C helicopter. "Rotors Flight Controls-Main Rotor Servocontrols End
Fitting Ball Joints-Inspections/Replacement". The slipping of
the ball joint of the servocontrol lower end fitting does not
significantly affect the service life of this end fitting while
the slipping of the ball joint of the servocontrol upper end
fitting can lead to a significant reduction in the service life of
this end fitting. This last condition, if not corrected, could
likely lead to damage of the upper end fitting ball joints of
the main rotor servocontrols and possibly resulting in failure
of upper end fittings. can lead to a significant reduction in the
service life on this end fitting.This last condition, if not
corrected, could likely lead to damage of the upper end
fitting ball joints of the main rotor servocontrols and possibly
resulting in failure of upper end fittings. For the reasons
stated above, this AD requires an inspection of the upper end
fitting ball joints of the main rotor servocontrols and the
necessary corrective action (replacement), depending on
findings.
161 10-11-025 EASA AD 2010-0234
AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L. AS 332 -Time Limits / Maintenance Checks Airworthiness
L1, AS 332 L2 Limitations Amendment / Implementation.
-The airworthiness limitations applicable to the helicopter
models specified in the applicability paragraph of this
Airworthiness Directive are given in the following
EUROCOPTER and EASA-approved Airworthiness
Limitations Section (ALS) revisions as stated in AD
reference reason section.
-EUROCOPTER has issued the above ALS normal revision
as stated in AD reference reason section to introduce new
or more restrictive continued airworthiness requirements. As
per the definition of the requirements contained in the ALS,
failure to comply with one of these ALS revisions could lead
to an unsafe condition. Consequently, compliance with these
new Airworthiness Limitations has been identified as
mandatory actions for continued airworthiness. For this
reason, this AD requires complying with the Airworthiness
limitations as specified in EUROCOPTER ALS documents
listed in AD reference reason section.
by ssi

162 09-06-006R1 EASA AD 2010-0122R1
Eurocopter AS 350, EC 130, AS 365, EC Equipment / Furnishings Load Release Units Inspection
155, SA 330 and AS 332 / Modification / Limitation
Some cases of jamming of the load attachment ring on the

cargo hook in the open position have been reported. These
events were caused by the use of rings having incorrect size
for the SIREN load release units. This condition, if not
corrected, can lead to the loss of the hanging load.
DGCA AD 09-06-006 which issued on June 2009, required

for cargo hook operations the use of rings and shackles
within the specified tolerances, in accordance with the
instructions of the relevant Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin
(ASB). It also required to affix a locally-made placard on the
cargo hook, with instructions on the proper load hang-up
under the helicopter and to insert copies of ASB appendices
in the applicable Flight Manual pending availability of the
relevant revisions.
163 10-01-008 EASA 2009-0277
Eurocopter models AS 350 B, BA, B1, B2, "Fire Protection - Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers -
B3, BB, D and EC 130 B4 if equipped with Identification / Replacement". The Civil Aviation Authority
P/N 863520-00 portable fire extinguisher, of the United Kingdom (UK) has informed EASA that
serial numbers (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier significant quantities of Halon 1211 gas, determined to be
SB 863520-26-001. outside the required specification, have been supplied to the
aviation industry for use in fire extingushing equipment. The
result of the ongoing investigation have now established that
LyonTech Engineering Ltd, a UK-based company, has
supplied futrher consignments of Halon 1211 (BCF) to
L'Hotellier that do not meet the required specification. This
HALON 1211 has subsequently been used to fill certain P/N
863520-00 portable fire extinguishers that or now likely to be
installed in or carried on certain Eurocopter helicopters. The
Contaminated nature of this gas, when used againts a fire,
may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the safety
of the helicopter and its occupants. In addition, extinguisher
activation may lead to release of toxic fumes, possibly
causing injury to helicopter occupants. This AD requres the
indentification and removal from service of certain bacthes
of fire extinguishers and replacement with serviceable units.
164 10-01-008R1 EASA AD 2009-0277R1
Eurocopter helicopter models: AS 350 B, "Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers -
BA, B1, B2, B3, BB and D, and EC 130 B4, Identification / Replacement". This AD to prevent
if equipped with P/N 863520-00 portable contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used against a
fire extinguishers, serial numbers (s/n) as fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the
listed in L'Hotellier Service Bulletin (SB) safety of helicopter and its occupant. This AD requires the
863520-26-001. identification and removal from service certain bacthes of
Based on a reassessment of the risk of this unsafe condition
on helicopters, this AD has been revised to extend the
compliance time.
by ssi

165 10-01-017 EASA AD 2010-0006
Models AS 350 B, AS 350 BA, AS 350 BB, "Time Limit / Maintenance Checks - Tail Rotor (TR) Pitch -
AS 350 B1, AS 350 B2, AS 350 B3 and AS Change Links - Inspection". A case has been reported where
350 D helicopters, all serial numbers, if the pilot of an AS 350 helicopter felt slight vibration in the
equipped with TR picth-change links having pedal unit in flight. A few minutes later, vibration level
Part Number (P/N) 350A33-2100-00, increased and the pilot carried out a precautionary
350A33-2100-01, 350A33-2100-02, autorotation landing. After landing, it was discovered that
350A33-2100-03, 350A33-2100-04, 350- one TR pitch-change link was damaged, that the taill-boom
2121-00, 350-2121-01, 350-2121-02, 350- cone was missing and there was an impact mark on the tail-
2143-00, 350A33-2145-00 or 350A33-2145- boom. Further investigation of effected TR pitch-change link
01. has shown extensive wear on the ball-joint and failure of the
web of the ball-joint due to fatigue. The wear of effected TR
pitch-change link could have been discovered during a
regular check for no play in the links, which is scheduled at
intervals not exceeding 30 flight hours (FH) and to be
accomplished during check after the last flight of the lay
(ALF). This condition, if not detected and corrected, could
lead to loss of the anti-torque function, possibly resulting in
loss of control of thr helicopter. This AD is requires
repetitive inspections for no play in the TR pitch-change
links and corrective actions, depending on fendings.
166 10-05-003-U EASA AD 2010-0082-E
AS 350 B, BA, BB, B1, B2, and D Tail Rotor Drive Tail Gearbox (TGB) Control Levers
helicopters, all serial numbers, if equipped Inspection / Rework / Replacement .
with TGB control lever Part Number (P/N) To prevent reduce the structural strength of the TGB control
350A33-1058-00, P/N 350A33-1058-01, lever, possibly causing failure of the lever, which could
P/N 350A33-1058-02, P/N 350A33-1058- result in reduced control of the helicopter. This AD requires
03, except those marked with an X. repetitive inspections of the affected parts in order to detect
cracks and, depending on findings, rework or replacement

167 10-04-001-U EASA AD 2010-0052-E
Eurocopter AS365 N3 helicopters, all serial "Equipment / Furnishings External Life Raft Mooring Line
numbers, equipped with external life rafts Attachment Inspection / Rework".
P/N 245431-0 or 245434-0. To prevent the shackle of life raft mooring line was
incorrectly attached to life raft securing strap instead of being
secured to container fitting. The life craft could drift off,
when deployed and consequently prevent the passenger and
flight crew from transferring to life raft. This AD requires to
check the mooring line attachment point of each external life
raft installation and to accomplish the corrective action.
168 10-04-010-U EASA AD 2010-0064-E
Eurocopter SA 365 and AS 365 helicopters, "Fuselage - Frame No. 9 - Inspection / Repair". This AD is
all serial numbers. issued to retains the requirements of DGCA AD No. 09-06-
010-U (EASA AD 2009-0125-E), which is supersedes and
modifies the action compliance times according to helicopter
types.
by ssi

169 10-06-006R1 EASA AD 2010-0100R1
Eurocopter AS 365 and SA 365 helicopters. "Navigation - Vertical Gyro Unit Data Output - Operational
Limitation / Operational Procedure / Reinforcement". A slow
drift in the roll axis on the pilot's and co-pilot's horizon of the
flight control display occurred simultaneously during flight
on several helicopters equipped with the GV76-1 vertical
gyro unit installation in cargo compartement. Investigation
has shown that these drift were caused by a fault in the
vertical gyros unit installation in the rear cargo. For the
reason described above, DGCA AD 10-06-006-U was issued,
retaining the requirements of DGCA AD 09-11-014-U,
which was superseded, requiring the embodiment of the
modification 365P081895 which require to reinforce the
GV76-1 vertical gyro unit upper shelf by adding two
attachment points between the cargo floor and the horizontal
cross-members of the shelf which support to inforce the
GV76-1 units. Embodiment of the modification 365P081895
constitutes a terminating action for the operational limitation
imposed by this AD.
170 10-06-006-U EASA AD 2010-0100-E
Eurocopter AS 365 and SA 365 helicopters. Navigation- Vertical Gyro Unit Data Output Operational
Limitation/ Operational procedure /Reinforcement.
A slow drift in the roll axis on the pilots and co-pilots

horizon of the flight control display occured simultaneously
during flight on several helicopters equipped with the GV76-
1 vertical gyro unit installation in cargo compartement.
Investigation has shown that these drift were caused by a

fault in the vertical gyros unit installation in the rear cargo.
For the reason described above, this AD retains the

requirement of DGCA AD 09-11-014-U, was issued in order
to extend the applicability to SA365 N1 and AS 365 N2
helicopters and to any SA365 N1, AS 365 N2 and N3
helicopter equipped with vertical gyro units GV76-1 installed
on the rear RH rack.
by ssi

171 10-07-006-U EASA AD 2010-0116-E
AS 365 N3, EC 155B and B1 and SA 366 "Main Rotor Drive - Main Gearbox Oil Low Pressure Switch
G1 helicopters, all serial numbers, if Connection - Inspection / Rework / Operational Procedure".
equipped with Main Gearbox (MGB) fitted Eurocopter had received a report of crossed connection of the
with dual pump lubrication system that has low pressure switches of the MGB main lubrication system
been subject to removal/installation since 04 and auxiliary lubrication system. To differentiate between
November 2004. both electrical systems, they had been identified by means of
labels which, however, may become difficult to read due to
aging. In the event of a failure of one of the lubrication
systems, crossed connections will lead to illumination of the
failure warning light that corresponds to the other system.
Any continuation of flights in these conditions could lead to
a significant oil temperature increase in the MGB lubrication
system and result in damage to the integrity of the MGB.
This unsafe condition has been covered by DGCA AD 04-09-
013 (French (DGAC) AD F-2004-154). It mandated, pending
to a Eurocopter modification, to carry out a one-time
inspection to make sure that the pressure switches were not
cross-connected. Considering that the modification planned
initially as part of ALERT TELEX No. 00000197 was not
achieved, and to prevent any risk of pressure switch cross-
connection, DGAC AD 04-09-013 (French AD F-2004-154)
is superseded by this AD which mandates to inspect the
connections of the MGB oil pressure switches for helicopters
on which pump lubrication system has been subject to
removal and installation since 04 November 2004. In
addition, this AD requires to temporarily amend the RFM
and to inform flight crews accordingly.
EUROCOPTER EC 130
172 10-05-008-U EASA AD 2010-0088-E
EC 130 B4 helicopters all serial numbers, if Equipment and Furnishing Emergency Flotation Gear
delivered before 15 April 2010 and wiring Modification .
equipped with the floatation gear unit 1G , To prevent an uncontrolled in-flight deployment of the
Part Number (P/N) 350A63256300. emergency flotation gear could lead to an unexpected
deceleration and pitch down movement of the helicopter,
resulting in a deviation from the intended flight path and
reduced controllability of the helicopter. This AD requires a
visual inspection of the 1G unit and the associated
corrective actions, as applicable and modification of the
relevant flotation gear units.
173 10-12-016 EASA AD 2010-0258
EC 130 B4 Helicopters Windows-Centre Windshield-Inspection/Operating
Limitation/Replacement
Following report failures of the centre windshield panel in
flight the investigations have revealed that this failure was
caused by a crack which started in the blending radius
between the lower and upper sections of the windshield.
This unsafe condition, if not detected and corrected, could
lead to serious injury of the helicopter occupants.
EUROCOPTER SA-330 SERIES
by ssi

174 10-01-021 EASA AD 2010-0014
Eurocopter SA 330, AS 332, AS 350, SA "Equipment and Furnishings - Hoist Operator's Belt Snap
365, AS 365 and EC 155 helicopters. Hook - Replacement / Modification". This AD is issued to
supersedes DGCA AD No. 06-09-019 (EASA AD No. 2006-
0252) retaining its requirements, except for SE 3160, SA 316
B,C, and SA 319 B helicopters for which it is additionally
required to install a modified cable end-piece and a new
compliance times has been defined.
175 10-07-032-U EASA AD 2010-0147-E
Eurocopter SA 330 J helicopters, all serial "Rotors - Main Gear Box Oil Cooling Fan - Inspection /
numbers. Replacement". Eurocopter has been informed of the case of
rotor burst of the Main Gear Box (MGB) oil cooling fan
assembly. The investigation has show that some rotor blades
interfered with the upper area of the guide vane bearing
housing of the fan. The blade detecthed from the rotor,
impacting the MGB compartment environment and causing
puncture holes in the transmission deck. This interface was
due to internal degradation of the bearings of the fan rotor
shaft. This last condition, if not corrected, could lead to fan
rotor burst and possibly result to damage hydraulic pipes and
flight controls located nearby the MGB cooling fan. The
reason of this AD requires an inspection of the play between
a fan blade and the guide vane bearing housing. Furthermore,
it also requires the necessary replacement of the two bearings
of the fan rotor shaft, depending of findings.
EUROCOPTER-EC 155
176 10-04-011 EASA AD 2010-0040
EUROCOPTER EC 155 B and B1 Doors - Jettisoning System of the Pilots and Co-pilots
helicopters, all serial numbers, delivered Doors - Test / Rework.
before 01/01/2010 with pilots and co- To prevent the pilots and co-pilots door hinge studs is too
pilots doors equipped with jettisoning tight and leads to an abnormally high jettisoning load, which
option post MOD 0752C05. could reduce the ability of flight crew evacuation in the event
of an emergency situation. This AD requires to perform a
jettisoning test of the pilots and co-pilots doors and the
accomplishment of the relevant corrective actions (sanding
and greasing the door hinge studs) depending of the
outcomes of the test.
177 10-12-014 EASA AD 2010-0254
EC 135 helicopters Fuselage-Rear Structure/Tail Boom-Pre-Flight
Check/Inspection/Modification
During a pre-flight check on an EC 135 helicopter, a crack

was detected on the ring frame that connects the tail rotor
Fenestron housing to the rear structure tube (tail boom). The
crack ran alongside one rivet row over about one third of the
circumference of the ring frame. This condition, if not
corrected, could lead to crack propagation remaining
undetected, possibly resulting in loss of the Fenestron
structure and consequent loss of control of the helicopter.
To ensure an adequate safety level, the interval of the visual

inspection must be reduced from 100 flight Hours (FH) to 25
FH. In addition, the optional terminating action is to be made
mandatory.
by ssi

178 10-12-015 EASA AD 2010-0257
EC 155 Helicopters Windows-Jettisoning System of Hinged Cabin Door
Window-Rework
During a daily check on an EC155 helicopter under flight test

by Eurocopter, it was found that the window jettison load
exceeded the required load.
This condition, if not corrected, could prevent the jettisoning

of a window, possibly affecting the evacuation of passengers
in the event of an emergency situation.
This AD requires the accomplishment of a modification to

reduce the jettison load of the affected windows, the
implementation of a system enabling window jettisoning
from the outside, and to install exterior marking and standard
labels specific to windows jettisoning and use of emergency
exits.
179 10-12-021-U EASA AD 2006-0368 R1
SA 365 N, SA 365 N1, AS 365 N2, AS 365 Rotor Rotor Mast Nut Check / Replacement
N3, SA 366 G1, EC 155 B and EC 155 B1 To prevent complete failure of the mast nut, possibly
helicopters, all serial numbers, fitted with a resulting in failure of the rotor mast and consequent loss of
mast nut Part Number (p/n) 360A31-1020- control of the helicopter. This Emergency AD require
20 installed in main rotor mast assemblies. repetitive inspections of the mast nut, depending on findings,
This AD does not apply to helicopters that corrective action. This AD is republished to correct a
have modification (MOD) 0762B88 and/or typographical error in the replacement mast nut part numbers
MOD 0762C42 embodied in-production or referenced in this AD.
EUROCOPTER service Bulletin No. 62-
007 embodied in service as applicable to
helicopter type. Embodiment of these
modification consist in replacement of mast
nut P/N 360A31-1020-20 by mast nut P/N
365A31-2060-20 or P/N 365A31-2060-21,
as applicable to helicopter type.
FOKKER F 27 SERIES
180 10-06-007 EASA AD 2010-0113
F27 Mark 050, Mark 0502 and Mark 0604 "Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Maintenance
aeroplanes, all serial numbers. Requirement - Implementation". To retain the requirements
of CAA-NL AD NL-2002-061 R1 which is superseded, and
requires the implementation of the inspections and corrective
measures as specified in Fokker 50/60 MRB document at
revision 15, reports SE-525 and SE-622.
by ssi

181 10-08-007 EASA AD 2010-0157
F27 Mark 050, 0502 and 0604 aeroplanes, "Fuel - Fuel Quantity Probe & Wiring Installation -
all serial numbers. Inspection / Modification [Fuel Tank Safety]". - This AD has
published Special Federation Aviation Regulation (SFAR)
88 and JAA has published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12.
The Design review conducted by Fokker Services on the
Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 in response to these regulation
revealed that, with additional factors, this may result in an
ignition source in the wing tank vapour space.
- This condition , if not corrected, in combination with
flammable fuel vapours could result in a wing fuel tank
explotion and consequent lost of the aeroplane .This AD
requires a one-time inspection to check for the presence of a
rubber sleeve and cable tie near each FQP in both wing tanks
nd, depending on findings, the installation of sleeve and
cable tie.
182 10-10-002 EASA 2010-0182
Fokker F27 Mark 050, 0502 aeroplanes. Fuel- Fuel Pipes in Engine Nacelles Inspection /
Replacement [Fuel Tank Safety].
- This AD has published Special Federation Aviation
Regulation (SFAR) 88 and JAA has published Interim Policy
INT/POL/25/12. The Design review conducted by Fokker
Services on the Fokker 50 and Fokker 60 in response to these
regulation revealed that the clearance between parts of the
main landing gear (MLG) and the Fuel pipes may be
insufficient .
- This Condition , if not detected and corrected , could lead to
chafing , possibly resulting in fuel leakage and, in
combination with other factors, a fuel fire.
- For the reasons described above, this ADrequires actions to
ensure a minimum clearance is maintained between the parts
of the MLG and the fuel pipes in both nacelles.
183 10-10-005 EASA AD 2010-0200
FOKKER F27 and F28 aeroplanes. Lights - Emergency Lighting Tritium Exit Signs -
Inspection / Replacement ".
- As required by current certification standards, each
transport aeroplanes has passenger compartement exit signs
and emergency lighting strips installed to locate the
emergency exits. A number of these strips and signs are not
electrically powered, but are self iluminated by means of a
hydrogen isotope, known as Tritium. As this isotope decays
over time, these signs will loose their brightness.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in
insufficinetly bright exit signs and lighting strips, preventing
safe evacuation during an emergency, possibly resulting
ininjury to occupants.
This AD requires the inspection of the brigthness of all
Tritium exit signs and strips aand, depending on findings,
repalcement of insufficiently bright signs and lighting strips.
by ssi

184 10-11-013 EASA AD 2010-0197
F27 Mark 050 , 500, aero planes , serial Fuel Fuel Pipes in Engine Nacelles Inspection /
number 20133 through 20335, except those Replacement [ Fuel Tank Safety].
with in board fuel tanks installed. - FAA has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation
(SFAR) 88, and Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has
published interim policy INT/POL/25/12. The review
conducted by Fokker Service on the Fokker F50 and 60 Type
Design in response to these regulation revealed that clearance
between parts of the Main landing gear 9MLG) and fuel
pipes may be insufficient.
- This condition if not detected and corrected , could lead to
chafing , possibly resulting in fuel leakage and, in
combination with other factor a fuel fire.
- EASA issue AD 2010 0182 to required action to ensure
that minimum clearance is maintenance between the parts of
MLG and the fuel pipes in both nacelles.
- Since that AD was issued , it was discovered that aeroplane
serial numbers 20133 through 20142 were erroneously
omitted in original Fokker Service Bulletins (SB) and
consequently the AD did not apply to those aeroplanes.
- This condition if not corrected, for the reason this new AD
retains the requirements of AD 2010-0182, which is
superseded.
185 10-11-014 EASA AD 2010-0195
F27 mark 050 and F28 Aeroplanes Mark Fuel Fuel Pilot Valve Wiring - Modification [ Fuel Tank
1000, 3000, 4000 and F28 Mark 0100 all Safety].
serial number. FAA has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation
conducted by Fokker Service on the Fokker F50 and 60 Type
Design in response to these regulation revealed , under
certain failure conditions, a short circuit can develop in the
fuel pilot valve solenoid or in the wiring to the solenoid .
Such a short circuit may resulting an ignition source in the
wing tank vapor space.
186 10-12-023 EASA AD 2010-0261
F27 and F28 aeroplanes Lights Emergency Lighting Tritium Exit Signs
Inspection/Replacement As
required by current certification standards, each transport
aeroplane has passenger compartment exit signs and
emergency lighting strips installed to locate the emergency
exits. A number of these strips and signs are not electrically
powered, but are self illuminated by means of a hydrogen
isotope, known as Tritium. As this isotope decays over time,
these signs will loose their brightness.
To remain compliant with regulations, Tritium exit signs and
lighting strips should be replaced when their brightness has
deteriorated below accepted levels. Currently, the
Maintenance Review Board (MRB) Maintenance Planning
Document does not include an inspection task for signs and
strips containing Tritium. This condition, if not detected and
corrected, could result in insufficiently bright exit signs and
lighting strips, preventing safe evacuation during an
emergency, possibly resulting in injury to occupants.
FOKKER F 28 SERIES
by ssi

187 09-10-012R1 EASA AD 2009-0216R1
F28 Mak 0100 aeroplanes, all serial "Flight Controls - Horizontal Stabilizer Control Unit Dog-
numbers. link Attachement - Modification". During inspection of the
vertical stabilizer of F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes, one of the
bolts that connect the horizontal stabilizer control unit
actuator with the dog-links was found broken (one on the nut
side and one on the head side). In both occasions, the bolt
shaft was still present in connection and therefore the
horizontal stabilizer function was not affected. If a single
dog-link connection fails, the complete stabilizer load is
taken up by remaining dog-link connection. Any failed
connection should be detected and corrected at the next
scheduled inspection. Recent examination revealed that the
bolt (P/N 23233-1) failed due to stress corosion, attributed to
excessive bolt torque and requires to replace the affected P/N
23233-1 bolts with improved bolts Concurrently, the tie-wrap
must be removed. This AD is revises DGCA AD No. 09-10-
012 (EASA AD 2009-0216) to corrected the require action(s)
and compliance time(s) section.
188 09-10-016R1 EASA AD 2009-0221R1
F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 aeroplanes. "Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear (MLG) Piston -
Inspection / Replacement". To prevent loss of control of the
aeroplane during the landing roll-out as a result of MLG
failure.
189 10-03-009 EASA AD 2009-0269R1
Fokker F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes, all serial "Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear (MLG) - Modification /
numbers, if Messier-Dowty (formerly Replacement". This AD is issued to prevent probable both
Dowty-Rotol, Dowty Aerospace Gloucester) the main fitting and sliding member cracks is high
MLG units with Part Number (P/N) compressive stress during bracking at higher deceleration
201072011, P/N 201072012, P/N levels outside the reguler fatigue load spectrum. This
201072013, P/N 201072014, P/N condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to failure
201072015 or P/N 201072016 are installed. of the MLG, possibly resulting in loss of control of the
aeroplane during the landing rollout. This AD requires the
modification and reidentification of the affected MLG units,
or replacement of the affected MLG units with modified
units.
by ssi

190 10-06-008 EASA AD 2010-0112
F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 aeroplanes, Oxygen System Passenger Oxygen Masks
all serial numbers. Identification/Modification/Replacement.
It was discovered that the in-line flow indicators at several

oxygen-supply-lines of B/E Aerospace (formerly Puritan-
Bennett) passenger oxygen masks Part Number (P/N)
174080-xx were found broken.
Investigation revealed that P/N 118023-02 in line flow

indicators, installed on oxygen masks manufactured between
01 January 2002 and 01 March 2006, are weaker and can
fracture because of internal residual stresses caused by the
flow indicator joint design and manufacturing processes.

further cases of fracturing and separation of the in-line flow
indicators of the passenger oxygen masks, which could
inhibit oxygen flow of the masks and consequently result in
exposure of the passengers and cabin attendants to hypoxia
following a depressurization event.
This AD requires the identification of the affected masks and

modification of replacement with a serviceable unit.
191 10-07-019 EASA AD 2010-0139
F28 Marks 1000, 1000C, 2000, 3000, "Fuel Fuelling Control Panel Cam Inspection /
3000C, 3000R, 3000RC and 4000 Replacement / Functional Check [Fuel Tank Safety]".
aeroplanes, all serial numbers, if equipped Service experience has revealed situations where the power
with a Centre Wing Tank (CWT), and F28 switch of the Fuelling Control Panel (FCP) appeared to be
Mark 0100 aeroplanes, serial numbers ON with the access panel closed. The cam on the access
11244 through 11441. panel that should operate the power switch, if forgotten by
flight crew or maintenance staff, can pivot away during
closing of the panel, which may result in the switch staying
in the ON position. This condition, if not corrected, could
result in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of
the aeroplane.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires an
inspection of the cam and, depending on findings,
replacement with an improved part.Subsequently, this AD
requires repetitive functional checks of the cam
and,depending on findings, the necessary corrective actions.
by ssi

192 10-08-005 EASA AD 2010-0159
F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 aeroplanes, "Fuel - Wing Tank Overflow Valve Sence Line- & Wiring
all serial numbers. Conduit Hose Attachments - Inspection / Modification [Fuel
Tank Safety]". Prompted by an accident of Boeing 747-131
(Flight TWA), the Federal Aviation Regulation has published
Special Federation Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the
joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) have published Interim
Policy INT/POL/25/12. The review, conducted by Fokker
Service on the Fokker 100 and Fokker 70 type design in
response to these regulations, revealed that the fuel sense
line from the overflow valves may touch the adjacent fuel
quantity indication probe. Under certain conditions, this may
result in ignition source in the wing tank vapour space. This
AD requires a one time inspection to check the route and
clamping of the sence line hose and wiring conduit hose to
each wing tank overflow valve and depending on the finding,
the necessary corective actions.
193 10-08-006 EASA 2010-0156
FOKKER Mark 3000 and 400 aeroplanes, "Fuel - Outer Wing Upper Skin Panel Reinforcement
all serial numbers. Structure - Inspection / Rework [Fuel Tank Safety]".
Prompted by an accident of Boeing 747-131 (flight TWA),
the Federal Aviation Regulation has published Special
Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the joint
Aviation Authorities (JAA) have published Interim Policy
INT/POL/25/12. The dessign review, conducted by Fokker
Services on the Fokker 28 type design in response to these
regulations revealed that, under certain condition, an ignition
source may develop in the wing tank vapour space, due to
insuffucient clearance between the wiring along the fuel
quantity tank units (FQTU's) and the local reinforcing
structure around the upper skin cut-out. This AD requires a
one time inspection to investigate if clearance of 3 mm (0.12
inch) or more is available between the FQTU probes wiring
and the surrounding reinforcement structure of the wing
upper skin and corrective rework actions, depending on
finding.
by ssi

194 10-08-008 EASA AD 2010-0158
Fokker F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 "Fuel - Crossfeed Valve System and Fire Shut-off Valve
aeroplanes, serial numbers 11244 through System - Modification". - A recent safety review revealed
11585. that the fuel crossfeed valves cannot be controlled when only
emergency electrical power available.
- This Condition , if not corrected , could ( in combination
whit other factors) prevent an in-flight following a doble
engine flame-out event, possibly resulting in loss of the
aeroplanes.
- Another review revealed that an unwanted configuration
of the fuel fire shut off valve indication logic had been
introduced during production on a limited number of F28
Mark 0100 aeroplanes.
- Futhermore , most the current fuel crossfeed indication are
based on the crossfeed selection made by the flight crew and
not on the actual position of the crossfeed valve actuators. In
combination with other factors, the current crossfeed
indications may mislead flight crews, possibly resulting in
single engine in-flight shutdowns and/or unnecessary
precaution landings.
- This AD requires modification of crossfeed valve control
and power supply , of the crossfeed valve control indication
logic and power supply and of the fuel fire shut off valve
indication logic.
195 10-11-015 EASA AD 2010-0194
Fokker F28 Mark 1000 , 3000, 4000 Fuel Collector Tank Level Float Switch Wiring
aeroplanes , all serial numbers. Modification [ Fuel Tank Safety].
- FAA has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation
conducted by Fokker Service on the Fokker F28 Type
Design in response to these regulation revealed that, under
certain failure conditions, a short circuit may develop in
collector tank level float switch wiring . Such a short circuit
may result in an ignition source in the tank vapor space.
- This condition if not corrected, could result in a wing fuel
tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane.
by ssi

196 10-12-006 EASA AD 2010-0158R1
Fokker 28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes Serial A recent safety review revealed that the fuel crossfeed valves
Number 11244 through 11585 cannot be controlled when only emergency electrical power
is available. This condition, if not corrected, could (in
combination with other factors) prevent an in-flight engine re-
light following a double engine flame-out event, possibly
resulting in loss of the aeroplane. Another review revealed
that an unwanted configuration of the fuel fire shut-off valve
indication logic had been introduced during production on a
limited number of F28 Mark 0100 aeroplanes. Furthermore,
most of the current fuel crossfeed indications are based on
the crossfeed selection made by the flight crew and not on
the actual positions of the crossfeed valve actuators. In
combination with other factors, the current crossfeed
indications may mislead flight crews, possibly resulting in
single engine in-flight shutdowns and/or unnecessary
precautionary landings. For the reasons described above, this
AD requires modifications of the crossfeed valve control and
power supply, of the crossfeed indication logic and power
supply and of the fuel fire shut-off valve indication logic.
197 10-12-012 EASA AD No. 2010-0217
Fokker 28 mark 1000,3000,4000 -This AD has published Special Federation Aviation
aeroplanes,all serial number Regulation (SFAR) 88 and JAA has published Interim Policy
INT/POL/25/12. The Design review conducted by Fokker
Services on the Fokker 28 type design in response to these
regulation revealed that, on certain aeroplanes, an interrupted
shield contact may exist or develop between the housing of
an in-tank Fuel Quantity Indicator (FQI) cable plug and cable
shield of the shielded FQI system cables in the main and
collector fuel tank which can ,under certain condition ,form a
spark gap.
-This Condition , if not detected and corrected , may create
an inigtion source in the tank vapour space , possibly
resulting in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss
of the aeroplane.
-For the reasons described above, this AD requires for
certain aeroplanes , a one-time inspection to check for
presence of by -pass wire between housing of each in-tank
FQI cable plug and the cable shield and, depending on
findings , the installation of Critical Design Control
Limitations (CDCCL) task to make certain that the by-pass
wire remains installed.
-On later production aeroplanes, a different plug has been
introduced, Souriau (P/N)20P227-2. This plug has an
improved shield connection to necessary . This AD only
requires the implementation of CDCCL task to make certain
that this type of plug remains installed.
GIPPSLAND - GA 8 AIRVAN
by ssi

198 10-05-005 CASA AUSTRALIA AD/GA8/5 Amdt 3
All GA8 aircraft serial numbers GA8-00- "Horizontal Stabilizer Inspection". Inspection of a high time
004 and above, and GA8-TC 320 model, all aircraft has revealed cracks in the Horizontal Stabilizer rear
serial numbers. spar splice plate and inboard main ribs around the area of the
Horizontal Stabilizer rear pivot attachment. Additionally,
failure of some attach bolts in service may be due to
improper assembly. This AD issued to clarify the model
applicability. All requirements, accomplishment instructions
and illustrations are contained in the service bulletin.
199 10-05-014 CASA AUSTRALIA AD/GA8/5 Amdt. 4
All GA8 aircraft serrial numbers GA8-00- "Horizontal Stabiliser Inspection". Inspection of high time
004 and above, and GA8-TC 320 variant, all aircraft has revealed cracks in the Horizontal Stabilizer rear
serial numbers. spar splice plate and inboard main ribs around the area of the
Horizontal Stabilizer rear pivot attachment. Additionally,
failure of some attach bolts in service may be due to
improper assembly. This AD is issued to include an
applicability matrix (Table 1, page 2) in the compliance
section of the service bulletin for improved clarity. All
requirements, accomplishment instructions and ilustrations
are contained in the service bulletin.
200 10-09-010 GA8/3 Amdt2
GA8 - all serial numbers. "Forward Cargo Door Slide". To update the service bulletin
to remove any ambiguities that could have existed in the
previous revision to the referenced service bulletin. It also
provides an improved inspection method and a minor design
change to the cargo door slide (inclusion of slide backing
plate, castellated nut and split pin).
HONEYWELL INTERN. INC. ENGINE

201 10-04-004 FAA AD 2010-06-11
Honeywell International Inc. TFE731-2, This AD is issued to prevent an uncontained failure of
TFE731-2A, TFE731-2C, TFE731-3, second stage LPCR disc and/or a third stage LPCR disc due
TFE731-3A, TFE731-3AR, TFE731-3B, to cracks in the bore, which could result in damage to the
TFE731-3BR, TFE731-3C, TFE731-3CR, airplane.
TFE731-3D, TFE731-3DR, TFE731-3R,
TFE731-4, TFE731-4R, TFE731-5,
TFE731-5AR, TFE731-5BR, and TFE731-
5R series turbofan engines with certain
second stage low-pressure compressor rotor
(LPCR) discs, part number (P/N) 3072396-1
or 3075190-1, and/or certain third stage
LPCR disc, P/N 3072397-1 or 3075192-1,
installed. These engines are installed on, but
not limited to, the airplanes listed in table 1
of reference AD.
INTERNATIONAL AERO ENGINE
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202 10-04-005 FAA AD 2010-06-18
International Aero Engines (IAE) V2500- This AD to inspect for cracks in the vortex reducer. Cracks in
A1, V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2522-A5, the vortex reducer could result in an uncontained failure of
V2525-D5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, the HP compressor stage3-8 drum and subsequent damage to
V2527M-A5, V2528-D5, V2530-A5, and the airplane.
V2533-A5 turbofan engines with high-
pressure (HP) compressor stage 3-8 drums,
part numbers (P/Ns) 6A4900, 6A5467,
6A6473, 6A7383, 6A7384, 6A7385, and
6A7401, installed. These engines are
installed on, but not limited to Airbus A319,
A320, A321 series airplanes and Boeing
MD-90 airplanes.
IPTN CN235 SERIES

203 10-08-012 PTDI SB N235-57-213
CN235 airplanes, Model S/N N001 through "Replacement of the Spar and Support on the Out Flap".
N012; N014; N015; N041; N042. Cracks have been detected in the internal support P/N. 35-
15501/0101 and P/N. 35-15501-0201/0202 of Out Board
Flap 35-15501-0003/0004 attaching the structure of the outer
flaps to their rear supports and in the adjacent structure that
can cause failure of the flaps structure support and unsafe
condition.
This Airworthiness Directives give instruction to replace the

Spar P/N 35-15511-0005/0006 with (5) and (6), the Supports
P/N 35-15501-0101/0102 and 35-15501-0201/0202 with (1),
(2), (3) and (4) on Out Board Flap P/N 35-15501-0003/0004
and new identification the Out Board Flap with new label (7)
and (8) as mentioned on the PTDI SB N235-57-213, Issue
Original 20 Jul 2010.
LIBERTY
204 10-05-006 FAA AD 2009-08-05R1
Liberty Model XL-2 airplanes, serial To detect and correct cracks in the exhaust muffer, which
numbers 0007, 0009, and subsequent, that could result in carbon monoxide entering the cabin heating
are certificated in any category. system. This condition could lead to incapacitation of the
pilot.
MD-90 SERIES
205 10-03-001 FAA AD 2010-05-04
This AD applies to all McDonnell Douglas "Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 53:
Corporation Model MD-90-30 airplanes, Fuselage". This AD result from reports of cracked overwing
certificated in any category. frames. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such
cracking, Which could sever the frame, increase the loading
of adjacent frames, and result in damage to adjacent structure
and loss of overall structural integrity of the airplanes.
206 10-09-005 FAA AD 2010-16-11
MD-90-30 airplanes, certificated in any This AD to prevent corrosion and damage that could
category, as identified in Boeing Service compromise the integrity of the retract cylinder support
Bulletin MD 90-57-016, Revision 2, dated fitting for the MLG, which could adversely affect the
April 28, 2006. airplane's safe landing.
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207 10-11-018 FAA AD No. 2010-22-04
Model MD-90-30 airplanes, certified in any This AD issue to prevent loose, cracked, or missing fasteners
category, as identified in Boeing Alert in the engine aft support mount fittings, which could lead to
Service Bulletin MD90-54A003 Revision 2, separation of the support fittings from pylon, and could result
dated February 12, 2010. in separation of the engine from the airplane.
208 10-11-019 FAA AD No. 2010-21-16
MD-90-30 airplanes, certified in any Electrically shorted wires in the right wheel well and
category, as identified in Boeing Alert evidence o arcing on the auxiliary hydraulic pump power
Service Bulletin MD90-29A021, Revision cables, which are routed within the tire burst ares.
2, dated March 16, 2010
PIAGGIO P180
209 10-07-003 EASA AD 2010-0123
Model P.180 Avanti and P.180 Avanti II Oil Engine Oil Dipstick Inspection / Replacement.
aeroplanes, all serial numbers
Failure of engine oil dipstick installed on PT6A66 and
PT6A66B engines, were detected on P.180 aeroplanes, due
to moisture penetration into the dipstick and subsequent
corrosion, can cause incorrect reading of the engine oil low
level on the Refuel/Ground Test panel. If left uncorrected,
this situation could lead to in-flight engine failure(s).
This AD requires:
1. Repetitive visual checks of the engine oil level to prevent
an undetected low level condition;
2. Repetitive inspections of the oil dipsticks to detect faulty
units;
3. Replacement of faulty oil dipsticks of visual checks of the
oil level at reduced not to exceed intervals, unit replacement
of faulty units.
The engine TC Holder is currently developing a modification

that will address the unsafe condition identified in this AD;
once such modification is developed, approved and available,
further mandatory actions might be considered.
This Correction is issued to amend the AD number heading:
it was PAD, it is AD.
210 10-07-004 EASA AD 2010-0125
All model P.180 Avanti and P.180 Avanti II "Oil - Oil Cooling System Hose - Inspection / Replacement".
aeroplanes, if equipped with Hose Assembly A damaged fuel heater caused a fuel leakage in the engine
part number (P/N) 80-337276-001. nacelle; investigation revealed that the damage to the fuel
heater was due to chafing with an oil cooling system hose.
Piaggio Aero Industries (PAI) issued Service Bulletin (SB)
80-0175, which was applicable to all aeroplanes and
contained instructions for a repetitive inspection of the
affected parts and, if necessary, their replacement and/or for
the repositioning of oil/fuel tubing if minimum clearances
were not found. ENAC Italy issued PA 2002-335 to require
the accomplishment of these corrective actions.
This new AD, which supersedes ENAC Italy PA 2002-335,
is issued to grant the revised applicability and to include an
optional terminating action, which consists in replacing the
Hose Assembly P/N 80-337276-001 with the new P/N 80-
337284-001.
by ssi

211 10-07-015 EASA AD 2010-0126
P 180 Avanti II aeroplanes, serial numbers "Fuselage - Ceiling Rivets - Replacement". Due to a
from 1166 up to 1175 inclusive. manufacturing error, some rivets, required by drawings, were
not installed in the joints between two ceiling beams and the
rear pressurized bulkhead. If left uncorrected, long term
fatigue stress could locally weaken the structure,
compromising the fuselage structural integrity.
This AD requires the accomplishment of Piaggio Aero

Industries (PAI) Service Bulletin (SB) 80-0268 original
issue, which contains instructions to rework the affected area,
thus restoring the fuselage design strength as well as the
fatigue specifications of the structure.
212 10-08-003 EASA AD 2010-0146
P.180 Avanti aeroplanes, serial numbers "Fuselage - Forward Pressurized Bulkhead - Inspection /
(S/N) from 1004 up to 1033. Modification". In order to improve the safe fatigue life of the
aeroplane, the TC Holder of P.180 Avanti designed and
introduced in production a modification of the forward
pressurized bulkhead, and issued Piaggio Aero Industries
(PAI) Service Bulletin (SB) 80-0081 for retrofit of
aeroplanes in service. Piaggio Aero Industries issued SB 80-
0081 Revision 1, and subsequently Revision 2, to include
reference drawings and more detailed instructions for the
modification.
by ssi

213 10-12-024-U EASA AD 2010-0269-E
P.180 Avanti and Avanti II aeroplanes, Fuselage - Fuselage Drain Holes - Inspection / Rework /
serial numbers 1001, 1002, 1004, 1006 Functional Test
through 1204, 1206, 1207, 1209, 1210 and
1212. Prompted by reports of water accumulated in the lower part
of the fuselage on a number of Piaggio Model P.180
aeroplanes, which resulted in jamming of the flight controls,
on 17 December 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), the authority of the State of Registry of the affected
aeroplanes, issued Emergency AD 2011-01-51 to require an
immediate functional test of the fuselage drain holes and a
report of the results to the FAA. That AD was later
superseded, on 20 December 2010, by FAA Emergency AD
2011-01-53.
This condition, if not detected and corrected, could, when the

aeroplane reaches and holds an altitude where the
temperature is below the freezing point, cause the flight
controls to freeze and jam, possibly resulting in loss of
control of the aeroplane. Since these AD actions were taken,
Piaggio Aero Industries, the type design approval holder and
manufacturer of these aeroplanes, have published Alert
Service Bulletin (SB) 80-0324, which describes the same
inspection, testing and correction instructions as contained in
the FAA Emergency AD.
For the reasons described above, this AD requires the

inspection and functional testing of the fuselage drain holes,
corrective actions depending on findings, and reporting of
the findings to Piaggio Aero Industries.
This AD is considered to be an interim measure and,
depending on the results provided by operators, further AD
action may follow.
PILATUS AIRCRAFT
214 07-12-001R1 EASA AD 2007-0241R4
PC-6 aircraft, all models, Manufacturer "Wing - Wing Strut Fitting - Inspection / Replacement".
Serial Number (MSN) 101 through MSN Findings of corrosion, wear and cracks in the upper wing
999 inclusive and PC-6 aircraft, all models, strut fittings on some PC-6 aircraft have been reported in the
manufactured by Fairchil in the United past. It is possible that the spherical bearing of the wing strut
States of America, MSN 2001 through MSN fittings installed in the underwing can be loose in the fitting
2092 inclusive. or cannot rotate because of corrosion. In this condition, the
joint cannot function as designed and fatigue cracks may
then develop. Undetected cracks, wear and/or corrosion in
this area could cause failure of the upper attachment fitting,
leading to failure of the wing structure and subsequent loss
of control of the aircraft.
by ssi

215 10-09-006 EASA AD 2010-0176
All model PC-6 series aeroplanes, all "Time Limits / Maintenance Checks - Airworthiness
Manufacturer Serial Numbers (MSNs) and Limitations Section - Amendment / Implementation". With
all PC-6 series aeroplanes, manufactured by the latest revision 12 of the AMM, a new chapter 04 has been
Fairchild in the United States of America, introduced in the AMM for PC-6 B2-H2 and B2-H4 models.
all MSNs. A new document for PC-6 B2-H2 and B2-H4 models has
been implemented as well. These documents include the
Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI)
which is maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness
limitations developed by Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. Failure to
comply with these MCAI constitutes an unsafe condition.
PIPER AIRCRAFT
216 10-07-007 FAA AD 2010-13-07
PA-32R-301T with Serial Number 3257001 This AD is isued to prevent failure of the V-band exhaust
through 3257311 coupling, which could cause the exhaust pipe to detach from
PA-46-350P with Serial Number 4622001 the turbocharger and could result in release of high
through 4622200 and 4636001 through temperature gases inside the engine compartment and
4636341 possibly cause in-flight fire. An in-flight fire could lead to
loss of control.
217 10-07-034 FAA AD 2010-15-10
PA-28-140, -150, -160, -180, -236, -151, - To detect and correct any incorrectly assembled control
161, -181, -201T and PA-34-200T, -220T. wheel shaft. This condition, if left uncorrected, could lead to
separation of the control wheel shaft, resulting in loss pitch
and roll control.
PRATT & WHITNEY ENGINE

218 10-03-013 FAA AD 97-17-04R1
Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-209, -217, - This AD to prevent fan hub failure due to tierod,
217C and -219 turbofan engines with front counterweight, or bushed hole cracking, which could result
compressor front hub (fan hub), part number in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
(P/N) 5000501-01, installed. These engines
are installed on, but not limited to,
McDonnel Douglas MD-80 series airplanes.
219 10-11-021 FAA AD 2010-21-17
Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-9,-9A,-11,-15,- This AD results from reports of failed fan blades. This AD is
17, and -17R turbofan engines. These issued to prevent high-cycle fatique cracking at the blade
engines are installed on, but not limited to, root, which could result in uncontained failures of first stage
Boeing 727, Boeing 737-200 series and fan blades and damage to the airplane.
McDonnell Douglas DC-9 airplanes.
ROBINSON R44 - HELICOPTER

220 10-12-002 FAA AD No. 2010-24-03
Model R22, R22 Alpha, R22Beta and R22 To prevent the tail rotor (T/R) control pedal bearing block
mariner helicopters, serial numbers (S/N) support (support) from breaking, which can bind the T/R
0002 through 3325, that have more than control pedals, resulting in a reduction of yaw control and
2200 hours total time in service (TIS) and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
R44, R44 II helicopters S/N 0001 through
1200, that have more than 2200 hours total
TIS, certificated in any category.
ROLLS ROYCE ENGINE
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221 10-05-007 EASA AD 2010-0060R1
TAY 650-15 Engines, serial numbers as Engine Low Pressure Turbine Discs Stage 2 and 3
listed in Rolls-Royce Deutschland Non- Inspection / Replacement.
Modification Alert Service Bulletin TAY- This AD was revised to clarify that the required initial
72-A1524, Revision 3, dated 24 March inspection should be accomplished prior to accumulating 11
2010, with Module M05300AA (LP 700 flight cycles (FC) of disc life and not the engine life. The
Turbine Module) installed. These engines repetitive inspections must be accomplished at intervals not
are known to be installed on, nut not limited exceeding 11 700 FC of the disc life as well. This AD
to, Fokker F28 Mark 0100 and Boeing 727 correction has been issued to amend one type in Type/Model
series aeroplanes. designation(s).
222 10-11-005 EASA 2009-0073R1
RB211 Trent 768-60, 772-60, 772B-60 and -Engine High Pressure (HP) Compressor Stage 1 to 4
772C-60 engines, all serial numbers, if a HP Rotor Discs and HP Compressor Rotor Shafts Inspection
Compressor Rotor Shaft, P/N FK22745, -During manufacture of a number of HP Compressor Stage 1
FK24031, FK26185, FK23313, FK25502, and 2 discs with axial dovetail slots, anomalies at the disc
FK32129, FW20195, FW20196, FW20197, post corners have been found. Fatigue crack initiation and
FW20638 or subsequent crack propagation at the disc post may result in
FW23711 is installed. These engines are release of two blades and the disc post. This may potentially
known to be installed on, but not limited to, be beyond the containment capabilities of the engine casings.
Airbus A330 series aeroplanes. Thus, these anomalies present at the disc posts constitute a
potentially unsafe condition. For the reasons described
above, this AD requires repetitive inspections of the axial
dovetail slots and follow-on corrective action, depending on
findings.
SIKORSKY S76 - HELICOPTER

223 10-04-015 FAA AD 2010-06-08
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76C To determine if a metallic foil shunt is installed in the
helicopters, serial numbers 760501 and floatation system, which could prevent the flotation system
760506 through 760761, with Option Code from deploying and could prevent the helicopter from staying
88051 Flotation System installed by a float long enough to enable emergency evacuation after a
Keystone Helicopter Corporation, water landing. This AD requires inspecting the emergency
certificated in any category. flotation system squib connector (flotation system connector)
to determine if a metallic foil shunt is installed.
224 10-05-010 FAA AD 2010-10-02
Sikorsky Model S-76A, B, and C "Main Rotor Servo Actuator". To detect leaking in a servo
helicopters, with a main rotor servo actuator actuator, which could lead to degraded servo actuator
in the reference AD. performace an subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
225 10-05-011-U FAA Emergency AD 2010-11-52
Sikorsky Model S-76A, B, and C This AD is prompted by reports of intermittent malfunction
helicopters, with LITEF LCR-100, part of the LITEF Attitude Heading and Reference Syatem
number (P/N) 145130-7100, Attitude (AHRS) units of the navigation system. This condition if not
Heading and Reference System (AHRS) corrected, could result in malfunction of the autopilots,
Unit installed, certificated in any category. inability to reset the autopilots, an uncommanded roll,
reduction in rotorcraft functional capabilities, inability of the
crew to perform the required tasks, and subsequent loss of
control of the helicopter. This AD requires installing placards
on the instrument panel to prohibit single pilot IFR and
singel pilot night flight, and reducing airspeeds to 120 KIAS
if both autopilots uncouple during IFR or night flight.
226 10-09-012 FAA AD 2010-17-16
Sikorsky Model S-76A and S-76C This AD to detect and correct an unbalanced or out-of-track
helicopters, with serial numbers 76005 tail rotor, which could lead to increased vibrations, a fatigue
throught 760578. crack, loss of a portion of the vertical stabilizer, and
subsequent los of control of the helicopter.
by ssi

227 10-12-001 FAA AD No. 2010-23-24
Model S-70A and S-70C Helicopters with a To prevent a tail rotor separating, loss of tail rotor control,
tail gearbox output bevel gear (gear), part and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
number 70358-06620, certificated in any
category.
SOCATA TBM 700 SERIES

228 09-11-002R1 EASA AD 2009-0238R1
TBM 700 aeroplanes, all models, from "Towing & Taxiing - Towing Bar Foam Pad - Removal /
serial number 331 to 530, 534 and 539 Replacement". It has been discovered that the foam inside the
included. towing bar box is not conformed to the certification
specification, and especially the flame resistance properties.
In case of fire in the front baggage compartment, the non
conformed foam could rapidly propagate the flames and/or
emit toxic fumes in the cabin. This AD revision is issued to
reduced the original AD applicability and to introduce the
optional installation of new foam pads in the tow bar stowage
box.
229 10-01-015 EASA AD 2010-0005
TBM 700 aeroplanes S/N 205, 240, 244 up "Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear Wheel Axle -
to 408 included, if equipped with main Inspection / Modification". A loss of braking on a TBM 850
landing gear wheel axle Part Number (P/N) (commercial denomination for TBM 700) due to a main
D67690 and one of the following bacth landing gear wheel attaching nut partly unscrewed has been
numbers: CZ49133, CZ52790, CZ58448, reported to socata. Such incident, if not corrected, could lead
CZ62189, CZ64034, CZ66207, CZ68039, to a wheel loss. The investigation revealed that this incident
CZ70959, CZ72975,CZ77612 nad CZ78218. was due to a wheel axle machining issue, concerning a few
production batches. This AD is issued to supersedes DGCA
Indonesian AD No 07-10-018 (DGCA France AD F-2007-
015) retaining its requirements, requires the inspection of the
main landing gear wheel axle batch number and if necesasry
replacement of locking washer.
230 10-02-005 EASA AD 2010-0012
TBM 700 aeroplanes, all variants, all serial "Fire Protection - Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers -
numbers, if equipped with Part Number Identification / Replacement". This AD to prevent
(P/N) 863520-00 portable fire extinguishers, contamination nature of Halon 1211 gas, when used againts a
serial numbers (s/n) as listed in L'Hotellier fire, may provide reduced fire suppression, endangering the
SB 863520-26-001. safety of the aircraft and its occupants. This AD requires the
231 10-06-003 EASA AD 2010-0090
SOCATA TBM 700 aeroplanes. "Oxygen - Chemical Oxygen Generator - Modification". To
avoid risk of generator fault with subsequent lack of oxygen
on crew and/or passenger.
232 10-07-026 EASA AD 2010-0130
SOCATA TBM 700 aeroplanes. "Air Conditioning - Alternator and Vapour Cycle Cooling
System Compressor Support and Drive Assembly - Removal
/ Replacement / Inspection / Modification". To address
failure that could lead to the loss of alternator and of the
vapour cycle cooling system and could also cause
mechanical damage inside the power plant compartment.
THIELERT ENGINE
by ssi

233 10-02-004 EASA AD 2010-0020
TAE125-01, all serial numbers, unless "Engine - Blow-by Oil Separator - Replacement". Service
already equipped with blow-by oil separator experience has shown that the small outlet of the blow-by
P/N 02-7250-18310R1, 02-7250R2, 02- separators P/N 02-7250-18100R1, 02-7250-18100R2, 02-
7250-18100R6, 02-7250-18100R7. 7250-18100R3, 02-7250-18100R4, 02-7250-18300R1, 02-
7250-18300R2, 02-7250-18300R3, 02-7250-18300R4, 02-
7250-18300R5 may cause a blow-by gas pressure increase
inside the crankcase of the engine in excess of the oil seal
design pressure limits. Leaking engine oil may adversely
affect the gearbox clutch or the engine lubrication system.
This condition, if not corrected, could lead to in flight cases
of engine power loss or ultimately shut down. To address and
correct this situation, TAE has developed a blow-by
separator of large diameter and published the Service
Bulletin (SB) TM TAE 125-0019 for the installation of the
improved blow-by oil separator. For the reason describe
above, This AD requires the accomplishment of the
corrective actions in accordance with SB TM TAE 125-0019.
234 10-07-012-U EASA AD 2010-0111-E
TAE 125 engines, referred to applicability "Engine - Clutch Assembly - Identification /Replacement".
section of the referenced AD. In-flight engine shutdown incidents have been reported on
aeroplanes equipped with TAE 125 engines. Preliminary
investigations showed that it was mainly the result of
nonconforming disc spring (improper heat treatment) used in
a certain production batch of the clutch. This condition, if not
corrected, could result in further cases of engine in-flight
shutdown and consequent loss of control of the aeroplanes.
This AD requires the identification of the affected P/N clutch
assemblies on TAE 125-01 and TAE 125-02-99 engines and
replacement with new clutch assemblies.
235 10-07-020 EASA AD 2010-0137
TAE 125-02-99, TAE 125-02-114, all serial "Engine - FADEC Software - Modification".
numbers. These engines are known to be Service experience has shown that a case of FADEC channel
installed, but not limited to, Diamond DA B manifold air pressure (MAP) sensor hose permeability is
40, DA 42, DA 42M, Apex DR-400, Cessna not always recognised as fault by the FADEC. The MAP
C172, and Piper PA28 value measured by the sensor may be lower than the actual
pressure value in the engine manifold, and limits the amount
of fuel injected into the combustion chamber and thus the
available power of the engine. A change in FADEC software
version 2.91 will change the logic in failure detection and in
switching to channel B (no automatic switch to channel B if
MAP difference between channel A and B is detected and
lowerMAP is at channel B).
These conditions, if not corrected, could lead to in-flight
cases of engine power loss or ultimately shutdown. To
address and correct this situation, TAE has developed a new
software version 2.91. This AD requires the installation of
software version 2.91.
236 10-07-021 EASA AD 2010-0136
TAE 125-02-99, TAE 125-02-114, all serial "Engine - Timing Chain - Replacement".
numbers Service experience has shown that fracture of the timing
These engines are known to be installed, but chain has occured due to chain wear. This condition, if not
not limited to, Diamond DA 40, DA 42, DA corrected, could lead to in flight cases of engine shutdown.
42M, Apex DR-400, Cessna C172, and To correct this situation, TAE has developed reinforced
Piper PA2 timing chains. This AD requires the replacement of the
timing chain.
by ssi

TURBOMECA ENGINE
237 10-06-005R1 EASA AD 2010-0101R1
Arriel 1A1,1B,1C, 1C2, 1D1, 1S1 "Engine - Module M03 (Gas Generator) - Post-TU347
turboshaft engines, all serial number if Second Stage Turbine Disc - Reduced Life Limit".
modified by TU347. Metallurgical non-conformities have been found when
Theses engine are known to installed on, but performing quality inspections during production of Arriel 1
not limited to, the following helicopters : Gas Generator (GG) second Stage Turbine Discs introduced
Eurcopter AS350 series, AS365 and SA365 by Turbomca Modification TU347 (P/N 0 292 25
series, Sikorsky S-76A series and C series. 040 0). Analysis has concluded that the approved life limit of
the post-TU347 GG second Stage Turbine Disc needs to be
reduced to 2 500 GG cycles.Exceeding the revised approved
life limit could result in a GG second Stage Turbine Disc
burst with uncontained high energy debris.
This AD requires compliance with the revised life limit of the
GG second Stage Turbine Disc by removing the module M03
(Gas Generator) or the GG second Stage Turbine fitted with
a GG second stage Turbine Disc which has reached or
exceeded the new life limit.
Since issuance of AD 2010-0101-E, turbomeca has
introduced a reinforced Eddy-current inspection which
provides a lower (improved) detection threshold of the
metallugircal non-conformities. This Reinforce Eddy-current
inspection, named CFR, combined with a revised analysis,
allow to increase the limit of the post-TU347 GG second
Stage Turbine Discs identified as CFR over the 2500 GG
life cycles of the non-CFR Discs.
238 10-06-005-U EASA AD 2010-0101-E
Arriel 1A1,1B,1C, 1C2, 1D1, 1S1 "Engine _ Module M03 (Gas Generator) - Post-TU347
turboshaft engines, all serial number if Second Stage Turbine Disc - Reduced Life Limit".
modified by TU347. Metallurgical non-conformities have been found when
Theses engine are known to be installed on, performing quality inspections during production of Arriel 1
but not limited to, the following helicopters Gas Generator (GG) second Stage Turbine Discs introduced
: Eurcopter AS350 series, AS365 and by Turbomca Modification TU347 (P/N 0 292 25
SA365 series, Sikorsky S-76A series and C 040 0). Analysis has concluded that the approved life limit of
series. the post-TU347 GG second Stage Turbine Disc needs to be
reduced to 2 500 GG cycles.Exceeding the revised approved
life limit could result in a GG second Stage Turbine Disc
burst with uncontained high energy debris.
This AD requires compliance with the revised life limit of the
GG second Stage Turbine Disc by removing the module M03
(Gas Generator) or the GG second Stage Turbine fitted with
a GG second stage Turbine Disc which has reached or
exceeded the new life limit.
by ssi

239 10-07-005 EASA AD 2010-0118
Arriel 1B turboshaft engines, if modified by "Engine - Module M03 (Gas Generator) - Second Stage
TU76 and not modified by TU148 and fitted Turbine Nozzle Guide Vane - Inspection/Replacement".
with repaired second stage Nozzle Guide During quality inspections in repair centre some 2nd stage
Vane. These engines are known to be Nozzle Guide Vanes (NGVs) to be installed on Pre TU148
installed on, but not limited to Eurocopter standard Arriel 1B were found not conforming to the
AS350 series helicopters. definition. The affected parts had been repaired and were
found drilled on the rear flange instead of the front flange.
This configuration corresponds to 2nd stage Turbine NGVs
to be installed on post-TU148 standard Arriel 1B engines.
This non compliance may only be found on post-TU76
standard 2nd stage Turbine NGVs (i.e. with flexible hub).
This non compliance would increase hot gas ingestion and
generate an increase of temperature in the Gas Generator
(GG) turbine rotor, potentially resulting in turbine damage
and an uncommanded in-flight shutdown. On a single-engine
helicopter, this could ultimately lead to an emergency
autorotation landing. To detect and correct this unsafe
condition, this AD requires accomplishing a daily check of
the engine. Furthermore, it requires contacting Turbomca
for checking applicability and, if necessary, to inspect the
2nd stage Turbine NGVs. If non serviceable parts are found,
it requires replacement with serviceable ones.
240 10-11-010 EASA AD 2010-0198
ARRIEL 2 series turboshaft engines. Engine Module M03 (Gas Generator) - Turbine Blade.
241 10-11-011 EASA AD 2010-0215
Turbomeca ARRIEL 2 series turboshaft Engine Fuel & Control High Pressure (HP)/Low Pressure
engines. (LP) Pump Metering Unit Low Pressure
Fuel Pump Impeller Drive - Inspection/Replacement".
- The uncoupling of the LP fuel pump impeller and the HP
fuel pump shaft report from ARRIEL 2engine which do not
incorporate modification TU147() Most cases the low fuel
pressure switch enlightened , the pilot active the aircraft
booster pump in accordance with the Flight Manual
Instructions and .
- AD 2009-0184 (DGCA AD 09-08-020) issued to required
ensuring that the LP fuel pump impeller was correctly driven
by the HP fuel pump shaft, to prevent any detachment of the
LP fuel pump impeller from the HP fuel pump shaft. Three
additional cases of uncoupling of the LP fuel pump impeller
and the HP fuel pump shaft encored in service with post
TU147 configuration
- This AD supersedes EASA AD 2009-0184 (DGCA AD 09-
08-020) partially its retaining its requirement [inspection of
certain HP/LP pump Metering Units post TU147 to ensure
that the LP fuel pump impeller ] is correctly driven by the HP
fuel pump any uncoupling.
242 10-12-031 EASA AD No. 2010-0273
Arriel 1B turboshaft engines, if modified by -Engine Module M03 (Gas Generator) Second Stage
TU76 or TU202, and not modified by Turbine Nozzle Guide Vane Inspection/Replacement.
TU148, and fitted with repaired second -This AD extends the applicability of DGCA AD 10-07-005
stage Nozzle Guide Vane. These engines are (EASA AD 2010-0118) to pre-TU148 and post TU-202
known to be installed on, but not limited to Arriel 1B engines.
Eurocopter AS350 series helicopters.
by ssi

DGAC-INDONESIA List of Airworthiness Directives 2010

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Sort by Type 23-Jul-2007

No. Number Reference

A/C EQUIP. OF CABIN SAFETY& INTERIOR

AEROSPATIALE ATR 42 & ATR 72

No. Number Reference

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to

This AD requires a one-time inspection of the elevator hinge

No. Number Reference

AIRBUS A318 A319 A320 AND A321

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

AIRBUS A330 SERIES

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

During the overhaul of two different Nose Landing Gears

To prevent the above unsafe condition, this AD requires a

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

Investigations have shown that, due to the manufacturing

No. Number Reference

An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may

This AD addresses the rudder population that has also been

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

BAe 146 and AVRO 146-RJ SERIES

No. Number Reference

During the period 2001/2002, skin cracking was found

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

Incidents have been reported concerning ATP aeroplanes

The ATP elevator has an elliptical nose balance over part of

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to

This AD requires an inspection of both elevators for

BEECHCRAFT - B 200 & 390

BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 206

No. Number Reference

BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 212

BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 407

BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 412

No. Number Reference

BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 427

BELL HELICOP. TEXTRON-MODEL 430

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

BOEING 747 SERIES

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference

BOLKOW BO-105 SERIES

To address this unsafe condition, RRC issued Commercial

This AD requires the introduction of a placard and the

No. Number Reference

CFM INTERNATIONAL ENGINE

No. Number Reference

DC-9 ( MD..) SERIES

DE HAVILLAND DHC-8 SERIES

No. Number Reference

No. Number Reference