LAND TITLES

AND DEEDS

Submitted by:
BARNES, John Michael
BILOG, Kathleen
DE LA ROSA, Camille
SEMBRANO, Patricia Mae
TABANDA, Mikael Lorenzp

LLB 2C

Discussion:
 The heirs of Pucay claim that when the presidential proclamation was issued
declaring the land as a Government Center Reservation, their predecessors-in-interest and
themselves had been in continuous and exclusive possession since time immemorial. One of
the modes of acquiring ownership of land is by possession of the land since time
immemorial1, occupants of lands who, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in possession of the land for such length of time justifies the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain and that it had been private property,
even before the Spanish Conquest.2

The 2,000-square meter portion of the area that was part of the presidential
proclamation as a reservation is deemed to never have been a part of the public domain,
through the occupation by the Heirs of Pucay themselves and their predecessors-in-interest
by way of continuous and exclusive possession and ownership. It is evident that they are
eligible for a native title. Thus the Heirs of Pucay has a valid title over 2,000-square meter
portion of the area reserved.

In the case of Cornie Macay, the sale between her and the Heirs of Pucay is a valid
sale subject to the rules and regulations laid down by Republic Act No. 8371 also known also
known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997. Section 8 clearly stated the rights to
ancestral lands: a) Right to transfer land/property. Such right shall include the right to
transfer land or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to
customary laws and traditions of the community concerned and b) Right to Redemption. In
cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of any agreement
or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of
the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor
ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15)
years from the date of transfer.

However, Manny Villa as an intruder does not acquire any rights from the vacant lot
within the land of Heirs of Pucay. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into
ownership, must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. 3
Possession not in the concept of owner cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive
prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation
has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character executed due to
license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive
prescription. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter
how long performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription. 4

As to Richard Alimba, he claimed to be and his predecessors-in-interest has

occupied as owners, openly, exclusively, continuously and adversely, said land since the

1 Land titles and deeds, Gregorio G. Bilog Jr. p. 20

2 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 SCRA 693; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands 75 PHIL. 890
3 Lamsis v. Dong-e, G.R. No. 175763, April 11, 2012
4 Esguerra v. Manantan, G.R. No. 158328, February 23, 2007
year 1920, however his right to the land has stopped upon the declaration of the land as a
Government Center Reservation. An unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse
possession. Where property is still unclassified, the possession of the applicants, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership.5 Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the state, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain.6 The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel
of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection
and are usually respected, but where the president, as authorized by law, issues a
proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this
terminates any rights to previously acquired in such lands by a person who was settled
thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase.

The occupation of Richard Alimba as owner, openly, exclusively, continuously, and

adversely from 1920 until the declaration as a reserve on 1925, cannot ripen into private
ownership. Thus Alimba has no valid title over the 500-square meter portion of the
reservation.

Neither could Philip Kate nor Ryan Saya could acquire title over the 200 square
meter portion and subsequently apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Section 48(b) of the PLA. This is because an applicant who, by himself or had predecessors
in interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership
for 30 years prior to the issuance of PD 1073 or at least since May 8, 1947 may apply for
judicial confirmation.7 In the case at hand, the possession reckoned from 1950. Therefore,
they cannot be said to have acquired title over the portion subject of the claim.

In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic8, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of
an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not
automatically convert said property into private property or release it from the public
domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for
public service or development of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and
thus, may not be acquired by prescription.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition
by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared

5 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83609, October 26, 1989
6 Menguito v. Republic, G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000
7 Republic v. Remnan Enterprises, G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014

8 G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009

by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration
shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up
acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as
patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the
classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the
completion of the prescriptive period.

With regard to the 200 sq. m. which was occupied and improved by Philip Kate since
1950, it was stated under R.A. 10023 (Free Patent Act to Residential Lands), that actual
occupants of lands of 200 sq. m. for 10 years in highly urbanized city like Baguio can be
given a title through the law. This include zoned as residential areas including townsites as
defined under the Public Land Act. Since Philip Kate and Ryan Saya had occupied the subject
lots for more than 10 years, they can apply for a valid title to the lots. Tax Declaration is not
ipso facto an evidence absolute ownership of a piece of land. It will only serve as an
evidence of claim. However, there was not even an iota of genuineness of the Tax
Declaration. Thus, Both Philip Kate and Ryan Saya cannot claim valid and legal ownership of
the 200 sq. m. lot.

In the case of Andry Javier occupation of the 300 sq. m. is within the purview of Sec.
14 (Par. 1) of PD. 1529 as he has or his predecessors-in-interest has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereat for 35 years, more than 5 years of
the statutory requirement of 30 years reckoned from June 12, 1945.

Bernardo Tan being a purchaser for value and in good faith, of the 100-square
meter land of Bert Sacla and the included land of Andry Javier of 50-square meters. The sale
is valid up to the extent of the land of Bert Sacla only. The land of Andry Javier which was
included to the sale between Sacla and Tan is invalid because Andry Javier is a lawful owner,
and Bernardo Tan cannot encroach to his land. The mere possession of a certificate of title
does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein
for he does not by virtue of said certificate of title alone become the owner of the land
illegally included.9

9 Vda. De Recinto v Inciong