Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Journal of the History of Ideas.
http://www.jstor.org
BY STUART L. CAMPBELL*
287
located in social psychology and politics. Based upon the old adage, plus
qa change, plus c'est la meme chose, Pareto's sociology provided a the-
oretical weapon for those who conspired to subvert leftist and Marxian
attempts to transform man's condition. Aron wrote that in Paretoan
sociology:
The terrain is changed in order to avoid the Marxist solution. The economic
and social structure is placed on a secondary level. Class struggle remains; its
reality is not denied. Rather, [its existence] confirms the necessity for an absolutist
regime. Yet, [class struggle] is defined in terms of a psychology more individual
than collective, in a manner that makes it eternal, identical in all climates and
societies. This substitution made, there is no longer any means of demonstrating
the superior truth of a cause .... But, no such demonstration is needed. Violence
becomes the title of success and success a guarantee of right. The exaltation of
elites and their creative will replaces the analysis of historical tasks and takes
the place of a program.3
Or, as Aron put the matter even more succinctly, "In order to arrive at
the cynical and fascist attitude of Pareto, it suffices to substitute for the
hope and prediction of revolution, which suppresses class, the idea that
class struggle is as eternal as history itself."4
In general, during the prewar period Aron treated fascism as symp-
tomatic of a European crisis resulting from liberalism's inability to guar-
antee bourgeois preeminence. Pareto's theory, in short, served the needs
of a weakened and frightened bourgeoisie which-having lost faith in
progress and no longer able to pretend that its interests served the com-
munity-surrendered the state to a new and violent elite prepared to
suppress the revolutionary left. A witness to the ensuing struggle between
fascists and Marxists, Aron felt a clear affinity with the latter even though
he refused to endorse fully their social and political philosophy.5
Aron, on the other hand, did grant a certain descriptive value to
Paretoan sociology insofar as it provided an insight into the operation
of fascism. He argued, for example, that Pareto's description of a properly
logical and empirical politician traced the profile of a certain kind of
fascist leader, i.e., the demagogue prepared to manipulate the sentiments
of the masses while remaining "consciously hypocritical" toward the
values being espoused: "We have here, make no doubt of it, a type of
fascist leader, that of the intellectual or demi-intellectual, one freed of
prejudices and who above all scorns intellectuals. All the theories of the
6
"La Sociologie," 29. In a paper presented in 1939 to the Societe Francaise de
Philosophie and published after the war as "Etats democratiques et etats totalitaires,"
Bulletin de la Societe de Philosophie,40 (1946), 42-92, Aron argued that Pareto's emphasis
upon the role of elites provided an important insight into the operation of fascism since,
once in power, the movement derived its character from the nature of its leadership. An
abridged English translation by Anthony Nazzaro has appeared:"Democratic States and
Totalitarian States," Salmagundi, #65 (Fall 1984), 26-50.
7
Aron, "Le Machiavelianism, doctrine des tyrannies modernes," La France libre,
Nov. 1940, and "Le Romanticisme de la violence," La France libre, April 1941. Both
were later included in a collection of Aron's wartime writings, L'Homme contre les tyrans
(Paris, 1946), 11-21 and 22-36.
8L'Homme contre les tyrans, 16.
9 Aron, "L'Avenir des religions seculieres," La France libre, July 1944. This article
also appears in another collection of Aron's wartime writings, L 'Age des empires (Paris,
1945), 287-318.
10Aron's Le Grand Schisme (Paris, 1948) provides the most important expression of
these concerns in the immediate postwar period.
"
Aron, "Histoire et politique," Revue de metaphysiqueet de morale (1949); the article
is reprinted in R. Aron, Polemiques (Paris, 1955), 174-95, and is translated in Miriam
Conant (ed.), Politics and History: Selected Essays of Raymond Aron (New York, 1978),
237-48. I have used Conant's translation. Aron's reference to Burnham concerns the
latter's The Machiavellians: Defenders of Liberty (New York, 1943). Aron arranged for
the book's inclusion in the Libert6de l'esprit series he directed for Calmann-Levy:James
Burnham, Les Machiavelians: D6fenseurs de la liberte, trans. Helene Claireau (Paris,
1949).
12 Aron, Preface to George Kennan, La Diplomatie armricaine, trans. Helene Claireau
... one can garner rules of human wisdom: if all elites are tempted to abuse
their power, the most tolerable ones are those whose divisiveness deprives them
of authority. There is no perfect society, but there are degrees of imperfection.
Often the prophets of perfection are precisely those who construct the most
oppressive societies. To attain the absolutely sound end, the prophets of the
absolute requireunlimited power. They persecute millions of human beings guilty
of not recognizing in the new regime the accomplishment of the human vocation.
A person with no other goal than to lessen as much as possible the ills inseparable
from the human condition, and who does not forget the existence of wickedness,
will do more for the welfare of his fellow humans. The breed of optimists produces
the likes of Robespierre and Trotsky-the breed of pessimists a Talleyrand or
a Louis Philippe.'3
During the early postwar period, Aron went beyond supporting Burn-
ham's attempt to establish Pareto's liberal credentials. In a work that
experienced a succes de scandale, The Opium of the Intellectuals (1955),
Aron relied heavily upon Paretoan categories without referring to the
sociologist by name.14 The book, an attack upon French communisant
intellectuals, accused its targets of allowing ideology to blind them to
political reality. Despite claims to the contrary, Marxism, as implemented
by the Soviet Union, had brought not liberation but a reorganized society
controlled by a new and ruthless elite. Hierarchy and exploitation re-
mained, with the proletariat at the bottom of the social ladder.
The very title of Aron's polemic revived the Paretoan theme of so-
cialism as a manifestation of man's ubiquitous religious impulse. Aron
even referred to Marxism as a Christian heresy, whose adherents strove
to establish heaven on earth (ibid., 258). The attempt to organize utopia
had brought predictable, but frightening, results: a totalitarian system in
which economic authority, ideological control, and political power were
placed in the hands of a single and unified elite (ibid., 93).
In the attempt to explain how intelligent people confused Communist
propaganda with Soviet reality, Aron followed Pareto's example by ex-
plaining such behavior in terms of sentiment. He indicted French leftist
intellectuals of bad faith, while in fact leaving himself open to the charge
of psychological reductionism. Describing his leftist colleagues as "em-
bittered" over the diminished status of France as a world power, Aron
accused them of employing ideology to camouflage their pique. Accus-
tomed to a global audience and resentful that their importance had
declined with that of France, they-so Aron's argument ran-had turned
13
"History and Politics," 245. In "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," British
Journal of Sociology, 1, #1 (1950), 1-16, and #2 (1950), 126-43, Aron attempted to
employ for practical use the ideas of both Marx and Pareto. In the latter case he argued
that France suffered the effects of an excessively divided elite, a condition that weakened
the state and left the community open to Communist destabilization. The article is
reproduced in Lewis Coser (ed.), Political Sociology (New York, 1967), 48-100.
14
Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, trans. Terence Martin (New York, 1962).
their wrath against the two major symbols of their predicament, capi-
talism and the United States. Their feelings, Aron observed,
arenot in the least esoteric,not in the least aliento the restof theircompatriots.
The man in the streetis all too disposedto resentmentagainstthe too-powerful
ally, all too proneto the bitternessarisingfromnationalweakness,to nostalgia
for past glory and hope for a differentand betterfuture.But the intellectuals
oughtto restrainthesepopularemotions,oughtto show the inescapablereasons
for permanentsolidarityand interdependence.Insteadof fulfillingthe role of
guides,they prefer,especiallyin France,to betraytheir mission,to encourage
the ignorantfeelingsof the massesby adducinghypocriticaljustificationsfor
them. In fact theirquarrelwith the UnitedStatesis a way of rationalizingtheir
own guilt (ibid., 258).
There was, on the other hand, a second concern that followed from
Aron's anti-Communism. Although eager to acknowledge what he con-
sidered to be a primary Machiavellian/Paretoan insight, the inevitability
of oligarchy, Aron nonetheless demanded that more be said. The oli-
garchic principle having received its due, certain questions immediately
arose: e.g., how did various elites employ their power, and what structural
restrictions limited the exercise of their authority? Aron responded that
while the Soviet elite was essentially unified and political in character,
Western elites, drawn from diverse sources, necessarily allowed for the
political pluralism essential to liberty.19For Aron, Pareto employed a
generalizing approach that too easily avoided such distinctions. In a word,
whatever the merits of Paretoan sociology, Aron remained unwilling-
the industrial society notwithstanding-to ignore certain specifics that
seemed to make the Soviet experience a special case.
By the 1960s, extensive postwar use of Paretoan categories led Aron
to a new and more favorable assessment of Pareto.20Aron at the same
time returned to various themes presented during the previous decade,
particularly those concerning Pareto's value as a counterweight to Marx-
ian exaggerations, and he accordingly described Pareto as a political and
Machiavellian thinker who had "amended"Marxism to take into account
the political dimension.21In a similar vein Aron argued that Pareto,
sensitive to the multifaceted character of social reality, had tried to grasp
the interdependence of the several components of social dynamics-
residues, derivations (i.e., ideology), social diversity, and economic in-
terests-rather than try to reduce social causation to a single factor.22
Aron also portrayed the author of the Treatise as an observer who
possessed remarkableforesight concerning the character of the twentieth
century, viz., that it would be an era marked by violent elites struggling
for political power. Drawing upon this Paretoan insight, Aron delivered
a message to liberals hesitant to face the harsh realities that characterized
recent history:
For Pareto, the societies of western Europe were governed by plutocratic elites
belonging to the family of foxes, excessively dominated by the instinct for
combination and increasingly incapable of employing the force necessary for
governing societies. He saw the emergence of new elites which would utilize
more force than ruse ... Pareto would have certainly recognized in the fascist
or Communist elites those violent elites belonging to the family of lions and
which take possession of power in decadent societies.23
23Les
Etapes, 470.
24Ibid., 493-94, n. 17.
25 Aron noted that: "Extremist in tone and
style, aggressive toward everything and
all, Pareto in the final analysis professes moderate opinions. The regime the least bad,
and also the least possible (or the least durable), combines in appropriate proportions,
residues of the first and second class, intellectual liberties for the privileged and moral
and patriotic values for the people." Etudes politiques, 128.
26Aron, "Lectures de Pareto," Contrepoint, #13 (1974), 175-91. The article was
originally presented as a paper the previous year in Rome at the Academia dei Lincei.
An English translation, entitled "Interpreting Pareto," appeared in Encounter, 47 (No-
vember 1976), 43-53. I have used the French version.
27
"Lectures de Pareto," 181 and 189.
the meaning of his political odyssey through the most recent age of
Europeandisorder.Duringthose fifty years,Aron was seldomand never
permanentlyof one mind as he contemplatedthe meaningof Vilfredo
Pareto.Unableto escapeambivalence,Aron towardsthe end of his life
ultimatelysettledthe questionby projectinghis indecisionuponthe object
of his study:there were four Paretos.
Alfred University.
A specialCambridgeseries...
IDEASIN CONTEXT
WolfLepenies, Richard Rorty, Jerome B. Schneewind,
Quentin Skinner, Editors
The books in this series discuss the emergenceof variousintellectualtraditions.The authorsdissolve arti-
ficial distinctionsamong the historyof philosophy,the varioussciences, literature,and society and politics.
Private Vices, Public Benefits
BernardMandeville'sSocial and PoliticalThought
M.M. Goldsmith
In thisexaminationof the socialandpoliticalthoughtof BernardMandeville,Goldsmithshowshow Mande-
ville proposedself-love as the mechanismof social developmentand attributedcivilizationto selfishness.
Hardcover$29.95
Philosophy in History
Essays in the Historiographyof Philosophy
Richard Rorty, Jerome B. Schneewind, Quentin Skinner, Editors
The sixteen essays in this volume addressthe relationshipbetweenphilosophyand its historyand ask what
purposethe history of philosophyshould serve.
Hardcover$39.50 Paper$9.95
CAMBRIDGE
32 East 57th
UNIVERSITY
New NY 10022
PRESS
Street, York,