Use of IGOs by great powers:

International institutions are more than a vehicle for the great powers and
sometimes provides assurances to members of treatment in a distinctive
manner, yet they are still used by world powers to serve their own interests
through various means, from creation of League of Nations to United Nations
and NATO; we observe a trend of either constraining certain countries from
exercising power or giving other powers an upper hand over there rivals as
wed observe under this case study of NATO.

NATO; A case study:

The United States adopted a relatively anarchic institution (NATO) as its
security arm in the Western order. This institution sired an organization
replete with its own command structure, procedures and national troop
allocations. Moreover, the development of this institution occurred prior to
the creation of the bipolar order. The US uses NATO to project and enhance
its power. In other words, access to power for other states within the
American empire and concomitant restraint of hegemonic power produces a
denser more complex order than seen under balance of power and
hegemony.

Excluding Rivals:
Admittedly, the United States has sought to elicit support via either the
United Nations or via a coalition of forces for some of these actions. NATO,
today, may still serve the same function it did on its creation - engaging
America, binding Germany and excluding Russia. However, the likely
extension of NATO eastwards, and the eventual inclusion of Russia may
contribute to a unified, democratic, peaceful and, stable Europe. NATO
offers little security and assurances as to how America exercises power.
American behaviour provides little evidence of self-restraint in the absence
of countervailing power. NATO itself acts as a countervailing force and
provides assurances to members of treatment not only from America but
from member states. The continued inclusion of European states should
further foster stability with new member states influenced not simply via
American power but through the institution of security as encapsulated by
NATO.
 US Relations with Libya:
Beginning in 1969, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi determined Libya's foreign
policy. His principal foreign policy goals were Arab unity, elimination of Israel,
advancement of Islam, support for Palestinians, elimination of outside
particularly Westerninfluence in the Middle East and Africa, and support for
a range of "revolutionary" causes. After the 1969 coup, U.S.-Libyan relations
became increasingly strained because of Libya's foreign policies supporting
international terrorism and subversion against moderate Arab and African
governments. Gaddafi closed American and British bases on Libyan territory
and partially nationalized all foreign oil and commercial interests in Libya.
Libya under Gaddafi went through a multidimensional foreign policy system.
Libyas foreign policy was very transitional. It was largely influenced by
dynamic variables such as Economic factors, Religious factors, Political and
Social Factors. Perhaps, of all the Western countries Libya (under Gaddafi)
ever had dealings with, the United States stands out as the most prominent.
The US had already developed a significant economic and military presence
on its soil even before Libya was granted independence by the United
Nations in 1951. This presence was deepened when oil was discovered in
large commercial reserves in Libya in 1963. As a result, US oil companies
gained great concessions, and a further enhanced US military presence was
established.

While ties initially deepened and the Libyan government remained loyal to
the US policy in the region, Libyas revolutionary coup in 1969 abolished the
pro-US monarchy, leading to a restructuring of relations. Overcoming the
uncertainties of regime change, US-Libyan relations continued to witness
positive improvements in political and economic spheres. This was in despite
of evidence that the coup leaders desired the end of the US military
presence. As a consequence of this desire, Libyas authoritarian ruler,
Muammar Gaddafi, shifted policies, as he sought to undermine US interests.
Aided by huge oil wealth, Gaddafi sponsored multiple terrorist groups from
1979, causing the U.S to retaliate by cutting diplomatic relations and impose
sanctions for two decades. When the Gaddafi regime abandoned this policy
in 2003, Libya embarked on domestic reform, restoring relations with the US.
However, as popular protests swept the country in early 2011, the US ended
its rapprochement with Gaddafi, assisting the rebels in the destruction of his
regime.

GADDAFIS FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS

The huge revenue pouring into Gaddafis purse gave him the false perception
that he was capable of acting as he wished with impunity. Therefore, it would
be safe to say that Gaddafi pursued a relatively adventurous foreign policy.
Gaddafi sponsored world terror groups to fulfil his self-image and role as a
world rebel. An increase in terrorist activities was evident throughout the
1980s and 1990s. Such escalation of Gaddafis anti-US activities led the US
to push for further international sanctions against his regime. Moreover, the
US retaliated by bombarding Gaddafis house in April 1986 and it was
actively involved in attempting to destabilize his regime by aiding domestic
opposition. These efforts were intensified after Gaddafi was accused in 1991
of a terrorist attack on an American civilian airliner over the town of
Lockerbie.

It appears that accusing Libya served many purposes, including isolating the
Gaddafi regime and eventually removing him from power. It also appears
that the Gaddafi regime had to accept responsibility for the actions of its two
citizens implicated in the Lockerbie affair at the same time it was embarking
on a political strategy to restructure its priorities in a changing global
environment. Therefore, the Gaddafi regime abandoned its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) activities and in 2003 engaged in direct negotiations with
the U.S and the UK (Tobey). Libya sought to liberate itself from the severe
effects of international sanctions and their impact on the domestic
environment. However, the US change of policy was not completely divorced
from the re-evaluation of its own priorities as far as Libya was concerned.
The Bush administration in 2001 decided that energy security dictated a re-
evaluation of its relationship with Libya. With backing from oil giants, the
administration sought to lift sanctions so that US investments could
recommence in Libya.

Both sides, the US and Gaddafi, could claim great success for the new policy.
Relations gradually moved from one success to another and the circle of
common interests widened, particularly with regard to the war on terror,
fighting Muslim extremism, and pursuing the global network of trafficking in
nuclear materials. The gains that the US was able to realise from restoring
relations with Gaddafi were considerable. The US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice visited Tripoli and she was entertained by Gaddafi. The
visit provided a diplomatic seal of approval, while issues of human rights and
democracy were clearly pushed to the background or swept under the
carpet.

LIBYAS FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MUAMMAR GADDAFIS REGIME

Gaddafi particularly became involved in state-sponsored terrorism that
brought Libya into a direct confrontation with the US and its interests.
Gaddafi incited violence against the US as early as December 1979, when
the US embassy in Tripoli was attacked and set on fire.

The United States reacted by unilaterally cutting diplomatic relations with

Libya in 1981. The last two decades of the twentieth century saw the US
impose severe economic sanctions on Libya; however these harsh measures
only resulted in Gaddafi intensifying his anti-US actions. Gaddafi continued
with targeting U.S interests and personnel; such as his responsibility for
deadly acts against US nationals at the La Belle discotheque in Berlin in
1986. Gaddafi became US public enemy number one and the target of US air
raids on Tripoli during April 1986, signalling a new phase of direct animosity.

Libya under Muammar Gaddafi passed through series of severe tensions and
strains in her relationship with the outside world. This strained relationship
was so particular with the west (especially United States). Although prior to
the Libyan civil war of 2011, the relations with the west was restored in the
early 21st Century. Gaddafi appeared to rehabilitate his image with the west
particularly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq when it was felt he feared the
prospect of a similar incursion on his country. He backed up his words of
condemnation for Al Qaeda and decommissioned his weapons of mass
destruction, which then British Prime Minister Tony Blair described as a
courageous decision. Contrast that reaction and the 2007 meeting
between Blair and Gaddafi in which the PM warmly embraced the Libyan
autocrat with a recent television interview in which Blair fully advocated the
removal of the Colonel from power, explaining the reasons for his change in
views.

"The Libya Model":

In 2003 Libya began to make policy changes with the open intention of
pursuing a Western-Libyan dtente. The Libyan government announced its
decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs and pay
almost $3 billion in compensation to the families of Pan Am Flight 103 and
UTA Flight 772. Starting in 2003, the Libyan government restored normal
diplomatic ties with the European Union and the United States and has even
coined the catchphrase, "The Libya Model", an example intended to show the
world what can be achieved through negotiation rather than force when
there is goodwill on both sides.

On 31 October 2008, Libya paid $1.5 billion, sought through donations from
private businesses, to a fund that would be used to compensate both US
victims of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 and the 1986 bombing of
the La Belle disco in Germany. In addition, Libyan victims of US airstrikes that
followed the Berlin attack will also be compensated with $300 million from
the fund. US state department spokesman, Sean McCormack called the move
a "laudable milestone ... clearing the way for continued and expanding US-
Libyan partnership." This final payment under the US-Libya Claims
Settlement Agreement was seen as a major step towards improving ties
between the two, which had begun easing after Tripoli halted its arms
programmes. George Bush also signed an executive order restoring Libya's
immunity from terror-related lawsuits and dismissing pending compensation
cases.

Normalization of relations:
On 21 November 2008, the US Senate confirmed the appointment of Gene
Cretz to be the first US ambassador to Libya since 1972.

The 70s policy:

On 1 July 2011, Gaddafi threatened to sponsor attacks against civilians and
businesses in Europe in what would be a resumption of his policies of the
1970s and 1980s.

Development of Interest for Regime Change:

Judging from the breakdown of Gaddafis various foreign policies towards the
United States one would rightly observe that those policies were ephemeral
largely because of the different ideological approach from the two sides.
Gaddafi was more of a rigid Anti-US leader who openly showed his dislike for
the US System. In direct contrast to Gaddafis the US adopted a more
dynamic and flexible approach in relating with Gaddafi. This explains the
frequent changes that Gaddafis foreign policies underwent as pertaining to
the West. Gaddafi was too blinded to see he was making himself a puppet in
the hands of the US. They played warm and friendly just to get at the
wonderful benefits Libya had to offer. After they were done, they discarded
him; like a pack of old cards! The US eventually stirred up revolutions and
uprisings in Libya during which Gaddafi was kicked out of power and
eventually slain.

As bland as it might sound, Gaddafi was not a skilled power player. He

was mainly influenced by the power he possessed and the authority he
wielded. He could not detect certain antics played by the US. He soon fell.
Quickly! Ultimately, Gaddafis foreign policies were more egocentrically
based than rational.
 BIBIOGRAPHY
Vandewalle, Dirk (Ed), Libya Since 1969: Qadhafis Revolution Revisited, New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

Walt, Stephen M. What intervention in Libya tells us about the neocon-liberal

alliance, Foreign Policy, 2011.

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Technically Recoverable Shale Oil

and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in
41 Countries Outside the United States, 2013.

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Libya: Overview, 2014.

Zoubir, Yahia H., Libya in US foreign policy: from rogue state to good
fellow? Third World Quarterly, 23:1.

Obama, Barack, President Obamas Speech on Libya, The White House,

2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-speech-libya

Gaddafis Foreign Policy:

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