G.R. No. 115634.

April 27, 2000

Petitioners: FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT
of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and
CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA
FACTS: On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law
Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2)
motor vehicles: (1) Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733
loaded with 1,026 board feet of illegally sourced lumber, driven
by one Pio Gabon and owned by Jose Vargas; (2) Motor Vehicle
with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with 1,224.97 board feet of
illegally-sourced lumber, driven by one Constancio Abuganda and
owned by Manuela Babalcon.
The drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper
documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized
and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-PENR) Office in
Catbalogan. Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused
to accept the receipts. PENR Officer Felipe Calub then filed a
criminal complaint against Abuganda for violation of Section 68
[78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order
277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly
taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR.
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles was again
apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR. It was loaded
with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board
feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub filed a criminal complaint
against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several
John Does for violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry
Code.
In the two criminal cases, however, Abegonia and Abuganda
were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Subsequently, respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle
owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for
the recovery of possession of the 2 impounded vehicles with an
application for replevin against the petitioners before the RTC of
Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin
and issued the corresponding writ in an order. Petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.
On June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary
Restraining Order.
The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge
from conducting further proceedings in the civil case for replevin
and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to
take the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the
custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest
products seized are kept in a secured place and protected from
deterioration, said property being in custodia legis and subject to
the direct order of the Supreme Court. In a Resolution issued on
September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to
respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition.
CA ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant
to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said
conveyance in custodia legis. The authority to confiscate illegally
obtained forest products of the Department Head of the DENR or
his duly authorized representative is not absolute and unqualified.
It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies. The DENR
AO No. 59, series of 1990, prescribes the guidelines in the
confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the
commission of offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D.
No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277.
CA noted that the petitioners failed to observe the procedure
outlined in DENR AO No. 59. They were unable to submit a report
of the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to
the owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings
and recommendations to the Secretary. Therefore, in failing to
follow such procedure, the subject vehicles could not be
considered in custodia legis.
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by
petitioners based on the claim that the subject vehicles were
validly seized and held in custody because they were contradicted
by its own findings.
ISSUE: Whether the motor vehicle seized by the DENR is in
custodia legis.
RULING: The provision on section 78 of the Revised Forestry
Code makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and
punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as
prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest
products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit
evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest
products was duly presented. These products were illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78]
of the Revised Forestry Code.
A warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load
was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry
Code.
Petitioners' failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
AO No. 59 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a
report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to
the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the
seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles,
forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the
DENR. When one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and
impounded for the second time, the petitioners again were not
able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private
respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of
replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon
their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It
would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and
hearing before said seizure could be effected under the
circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and
the seizure was in accordance with law, the subject vehicles were
validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an
action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of
legal process and considered in the custody of the law.
The petition is granted, and the decision of the CA is set
aside. The order issued by the RTC of Catbalogan and the Writ of
Replevin issued are annulled.
G.R. No. 108619. July 31, 1997
Petitioner: EPIFANIO LALICAN
Respondents: HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC
Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: On July 23, 1991, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa
City filed an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended by Executive Order No. 277, against petitioner
Epifanio Lalican, Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo
before the Regional Trial Court. All the accused pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged.
Petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an
offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber
and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that
"timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams,
planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not
apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and
standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal
documents required by existing forest laws and regulations.
Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be
quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection of the law.
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground
that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor
to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that
the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or
derivative after the timber is cut." The prosecution asserted that
the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a
question of law.
The lower court issued an Order quashing the information. It
held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not
artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes
the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a
forest product while Sec. 3(aa) considers "lumber" as a finished
wood product.
The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the
Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is
not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and
manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to
facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a
person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally
liable is an absurd interpretation of the law. The prosecution
underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused
presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February
10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin
indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio
Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not
equipped with certificates of transport agreement. The accused
also could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber
sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for
transportation from one point to another.
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration
contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is
erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from
"sawn lumber."
On June 10, 1992, the lower court declared that from the law
itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the
possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only
but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is
not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof
without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which
includes "wood" in the definition of forest products.
Petitioner sought the reconsideration but the lower court
denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
setting aside the quashal order and in denying his motion for
reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither
specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other
forest products."
ISSUE: Whether a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is
excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as
defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, to
warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense
or a "nonexistent crime."
RULING: Punished Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277 are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection,
or removal of timber or other forest products from the places
therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains
no definition of either timber or lumber. While timber is included
in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
lumber is found in paragraph (aa) which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine
or combination of machine used for the processing of
logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer,
plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp,
paper or other finished wood product.
 This simply means that lumber is a processed log or
processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the
term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after
being prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is
a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or
processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemus."
To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in
Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not
be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited
by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat
compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene
the plain words of the law. After all, the phrase "forest products" is
broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is
manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would
merely result in tautology.
Stress must be given to the term wood embodied in the
definition of forest product. If we are to follow the rather
tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber,
then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He
could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into
lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an
interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If
lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood.
It is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest
products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the
law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or
possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without
lawful authority.
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely
abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The
petition simply has no legal basis.
G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000
Petitioner: PERFECTO PALLADA
Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon
received reports that illegally cut lumber was being delivered to
the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in
Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and
trading.
DENR officers, assisted by the Philippine National Police,
raided the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia with a
warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes
cut by a chain saw. Petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L.
Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17,
1992 as proof that the company had acquired the lumber by
purchase. The DENR officers did not give credit to the receipts
because R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long
been suspended. Also, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain
saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill
operator.
The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all
in all, constituted 29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in
total. The seizure order was served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada
as general manager of the company, but he refused to
acknowledge it.
The raiding team returned for the remaining lumber.
Company president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias
Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a
suspension of the operations to enable them to seek a lifting of
the warrant. The motion was filed with the court which issued the
warrant but the motion was denied. The remaining lumber was
confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse
had been seized. As before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to
sign for the seizure orders issued by the DENR officers.
Petitioner together with Noel Sy, Francisco Tankiko and Isaias
Valdehueza, were charged with violation of 68 of P.D .No. 705, as
amended.
Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber
and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their
attachments should have been considered in establishing the
legality of the company's possession of the lumber. In support of
his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang
Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. It is likewise argued that the
irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be taken
against petitioner because the documents came from lumber
dealers. In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary
Receipts, being public documents, should be accorded the
presumption of regularity in their execution.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the certificate of timber origin was not the
proper document to justify petitioner's possession of the squared
timber or flitches; (2) Whether the presence of erasures in the
certificate of timber origin renders them valueless as evidence.
RULING: (1) The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence
to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since
the lumber held by the company should be covered by
Certificates of Lumber Origin as stated in BFD Circular No. 10-83
where it expressly states that the issuance of a separate
certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint
accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and
to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."
The contention that the term timber includes lumber has
no, merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is
merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber"
embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling
in that case that the phrase possess timber or other forest
products" in 68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who
possess timber and forest products without the documents
required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess
lumber are not liable. Indeed, different certificates of origin are
required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products.
(2)The trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in
convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and
defects found in the documents presented by the petitioner.
These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in
which they are found not only questionable but invalid and,
justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same.
What render these documents without legal effect are the
patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not
have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any
case, as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the
lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities,
and he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He
cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is
concerned, the documents are regular and complete.
The presence of glaring irregularities negates the
presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR
officials concerned. The presumption invoked by petitioner applies
only when the public accomplished, documents are, on their
faces, regular and properly accomplished.
G.R. No. 136142. October 24, 2000
Plaintiff-appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Accused: ALFONSO DATOR and BENITO GENOL (Acquitted)
Accused-appellant: PASTOR TELEN
FACTS: Police officers confiscated pieces of lumber from an Isuzu
cargo for failure of the driver, accused Benito Genol, to show the
required documents for the proper transport of the pieces of
lumber consisting of 41 pieces of Dita lumber and 10 pieces of
Antipolo lumber with a total volume of 1,560.16 board feet.
Pastor Telen, owner of lumber, testified that the lumber will
be used in renovating his residence. Boy Leonor, who was the
Officer in Charge of CENRO Maasin, Southern Leyte allegedly
allowed Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only.
According to Telen, Leonor assured him that a written permit
was not anymore necessary before he could cut the Dita trees,
which are considered soft lumber from the private land of his
mother, provided the trees would be used exclusively for the
renovation of his house and that he shall plant trees as
replacement, which he did by planting Gemelina seedlings. The
trial court convicted Pastor Telen of violation of Sec 68 of PD No.
705. Telen appealed.
ISSUE: Whether a Legal Documents or a Permit is still required for
cutting/transporting the soft lumber.
RULING: The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Telen.
Telen was charged with the crime of violation of Section 68
of PD No. 705, a special statutory law, and which crime is
considered mala prohibita. In the prosecution for crimes that are
considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the
law has been violated. The motive or intention underlying the act
of the appellant is immaterial for the reason that his mere
possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations
gave rise to his criminal liability.
Under the DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987,
a certification from the CENRO concerned to the effect that the
forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable
and disposable land must still be secured to accompany the
shipment. The appellant failed to do. Thus, he is criminally liable
under Section 68 of PD No. 705 necessitating prior acquisition of
permit and legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations.
G.R. No. 161798. October 20, 2004
Petitioner: PICOP RESOURCES, INC.
Respondents: HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 5,
Butuan City, et al.
FACTS: PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-
billion peso pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City,
Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued Pulpwood and
Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave PICOP the
exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost
130,000 hectares of forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao
Forest Reserve.

The Department of Environmental and Natural Resources

(DENR) through its officers, rendered three Memoranda,
designating the PICOP as DENR depository and custodian for
apprehended forest products and conveyances within its
concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and
PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
containing "Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of
Private Tree Plantation." The MOA provided that field
validation/verification of applications for Certificates of Private
Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR,
the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to
these Memoranda, petitioners security personnel were deputized
as DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and
conveyance used in the commission of illegal logging and the
forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.

In the course of the enforcement of the Memoranda,

petitioner PICOP, through its security personnel, had on numerous
occasions apprehended within its concession and tree plantation
area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were
kept in PICOPs impounding area.

A class suit was initiated among the members of UFAB

asking for preliminary mandatory Injunction. They further asked
for the declaration of the memoranda null and void and sought to
restrain the DENR and those who are participants from enforcing
the memoranda.

The RTC ordered Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw and

abrogate the enforcement of the Memorandum and to refrain and
desist from implementation. PICOP was also ordered to release
the confiscated falcata logs and vehicles to the owners, or to the
CENRO-Bislig or the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao
del Sur, where the administrative and criminal proceedings were
ongoing.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized

confiscated products by the virtue of MOA regarding the
Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree
Plantation.

RULING: Petitioner PICOP Resources Inc. had no right or interest

to protect in the confiscated forest products and conveyances.
PICOPs compound was used only as a depository for the
confiscated logs and conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum.
While it claimed that some of the confiscated forest products may
have come from its concession area, PICOP admitted that the
ownership of the confiscated products was still to be determined
in the cases pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of
the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. Hence, PICOPs
interest in the confiscated forest products was merely contingent
and cannot be material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner contends that private respondents intrusion was

in violation of petitioners PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These
license agreements gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-
manage and develop forest lands, and recognized petitioner as
owner of the trees and other products in the concession area. In
filing this petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting
proprietary interest pursuant to these license agreements.

It is clear that PICOP has no material interest to protect in

the confiscated forest products and conveyances. It has no
subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing
agreements, which need to be protected by annulling the writ of
injunction issued by the trial court. Petitioner PICOP also cannot
claim the right to retain custody of the apprehended logs and
conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of the
DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository,
PICOP Resources Inc. merely holds the confiscated products and
conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative or
criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending.
G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990
Petitioner: FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC.
Respondents: THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN
PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION
FACTS: In 1986, petitioner sent letters to the Office of the
President and to the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) seeking
the reinstatement of its timber license agreement (TLA No. 87),
which was cancelled in August 1983 along with nine other
concessions, during the Marcos administration. It alleged that
after the its TLA was cancelled without being given the
opportunity to be heard, its logging area was re-awarded to other
logging concessionaires without a formal award or license, as
these entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of
deposed President Marcos.
The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract
within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a
privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or
welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated
against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires
whose licenses were revoked in 1983. It also emphasized the fact
that there was currently a total log ban being imposed on the
subject areas.
After the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the
Office of the President, but the petition was denied on the ground
that the appeal was prematurely filed, the matter not having been
terminated in the MNR. Hence, petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to
overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors.
RULING: The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari
within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner
susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches.
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years
before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
attacking the validity of the Bureaus actions in 1983 and 1984.
Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction,
was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts
which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes
unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches.
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these
orders will not lie. There is a more significant factor which bars
the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and
against public respondents.
A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies. More so, the interests of a private
logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on
the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. The Court
recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the
government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to
preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties
who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and
do not vest in the qualified entities a permanent or irrevocable
right to the particular concession area and the forest products.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by
the Chief Executive when national interests require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process
of law clause.
G.R. No. 152160. January 13, 2004
Petitioner: VIRGILIO BON
Respondent: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: In 1990, at Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, the accused cut, gather and
manufacture into lumber four narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree,
and one amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft.
and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge
and consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without
having first obtained from proper authorities the necessary permit
or license and legal supporting documents, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government and the owner in the amount
of P25,000.00.
The accused pleaded not guilty. The prosecution stated that
Teresita owned the agricultural land on which the accused
unlawfully cut the trees. It was supported by an investigation
conducted by the barangay captain and a witness named
Narvaez. The accused in response, denied the accusations.
The court ruled in favor of the prosecution and convicted the
accused violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Also, the CA
upheld the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty.
RULING: Yes. It is undisputed that no direct evidence was
presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the only matrix
from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings
of guilt. Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as
long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain
that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
In its assessment of the evidence, the regional trial court
(RTC) considered the following proven facts and circumstances:
x x x Accused Virgilio Bon, being the tenant is in actual
possession and control over the land, fruit trees and big
trees. Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw
the lumber. He admitted before the barangay tanod,
Julian Lascano, with other witnesses present, that he
ordered the cutting of the trees, and the sawing by his
son-in-law, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission
was corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the one hired by
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the lumber. His
extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against
him as it was voluntary and not under custodial
investigation.
 The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the
following circumstances sufficiently proved petitioners culpability:
x x x (1) Petitioner Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence
of Manuel Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad
Legaspi that he caused the cutting of the questioned
trees; (2) on February 12, 1990, Petitioner Virgilio Bon
and his son, x x x Rosalio Bon, went to private
complainant, demanding [that] the latter x x x pay the
value of the questioned trees which they had cut; (3) on
February 13, 1990, Petitioner Virgilio Bon went to
private complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the
trees.
A review of the records shows that the fact of the alleged
cutting, gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was
proven by the prosecution through the following pieces of
documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps, and the
investigation report of an officer of the Community Environment
and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for
the cutting of the trees, and the CENROs computation of the
value of the timber generated from the felled trees.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1786. August 28, 2003
Complainant: ALFREDO Y. CHU
Respondent: JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, Ninth Judicial Region, Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur
FACTS: In 1999, Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO) Michael F. dela Cruz of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region IX, applied for
a search warrant with Judge Tamin. Dela Cruz claimed that Chu
was in possession of "forest products of dubious origin" in
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 ("PD 705"),
as amended. The judge issued a warrant ordering the seizure of
several pieces of mangrove lumber from Chus fishpond.
With the warrant, CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law
enforcement agents, seized from complainant Chu 576 pieces of
pagatpat lumber (mangrove specie) with an estimated value
of P183,790.
On September 22, 1999, complainant Chu obtained a copy of
the complete records of the issuance of the search warrant. On
September 24, 1999, complainant Chu again obtained, for the
second time, a copy of the complete records of the case, certified
by Clerk of Court Lumapas. These certified copies did not contain
any transcript of respondent judges examination of CENRO dela
Cruz or his witnesses as required under the law. Thus,
complainant Chu filed this administrative complaint.
Complainant Chu pointed out that this was the fifth time that
respondent judge issued, under questionable procedure, search
warrants against him for violation of PD 705. Complainant Chu
recalled that on November 10, 1998, respondent judge issued
four search warrants against him (Search Warrant Nos. 281 to
284), authorizing the seizure from his compound of pagatpat
lumber worth more than P1.5 million. Complainant Chu alleged
that the records of the four warrants did not also contain any
transcript of the required examination of witnesses. He moved to
quash the four warrants. The judge, however, denied the motion
on the ground that he had in fact conducted such examination but
the record of the "deposition" was "misfiled in another case folder
through inadvertence."
Judge asserted that at around 1:15 p.m. of September 9,
1999, he personally examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma
("Cuaresma"), allegedly a witness of dela Cruz, before issuing the
warrant. He claimed that a transcript of the examination was
included in the records of the search warrant. However, he
forwarded the records to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for his request for the transfer of the case to the RTC. In
lieu of the original copy, the judge attached to his Indorsement an
alleged computer printout of the transcript, claiming that the time
and date of its encoding was verifiable in the computer files in his
office.
The Court directed the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Pagadian City, Zamboanga del Sur to: (1) verify f whether the
judge examined any witness before issuing the search warrant
and (2) secure from Clerk of Court her explanation on the
apparent discrepancy between the copy of the records of the
search warrant, as forwarded to the OCA and as obtained by
complainant Chu.
Pagadian City Executive Judge Franklyn A. Villegas stated
that he verified the records of the search warrant. He found on
page 5 of the records a copy of the transcript of the examination
conducted by Judge Tamin on Cuaresma. He attached in his report
the explanations of respondent judge and Clerk of Court Lumapas.
In his explanation, the judge reiterated the claim he made in
his Indorsement. However, respondent judge alleged, for the first
time, that the legal researcher in his office who prepared the
duplicate copy issued to complainant on September 22, 1999
failed, through "pure inadvertence," to recopy such transcript. The
judge attributed such omission to the fact that at that time, the
pages of the records were not yet "physically paged."
In its Report, the OCA found respondent judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law and recommended the imposition of
a P5,000 fine. The judge apparently believes that searching
questions need not be in writing. However, jurisprudence states
that there must be the deposition in writing and under oath of the
complainants and his witnesses; and searching questions should
be propounded by the examining Judge.
ISSUE: Whether the Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law
RULING: The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits
submitted as stated under the law and the Constitution.
Under the law, the issuance of a search warrant is justified
only upon a finding of probable cause. In determining the
existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must
examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be
under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in
the form of searching questions and answers.
 Respondent judge explained that in issuing Search Warrant
No. 364, he complied with the rule that he must "personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses."
Respondent judge stated, however, that the certified copies of the
records obtained by complainant did not include the transcript of
his examination because the clerical staff in his office who
prepared the certified copies inadvertently failed to do so. This
explanation fails to persuade us.
The Court uphold the OCAs findings that respondent judge,
failed either to examine any witness before issuing Search
Warrant No. 364 or to reduce the examination in writing. His
omission renders him liable for gross ignorance of the law.
When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court on search warrant issuance,
not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993
Petitioners: JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO,
all surnamed OPOSA, minors, et al.
Respondents: THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in
his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66.
FACTS: An action was filed by several minors represented by their
parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of their
generation as well as those generations yet unborn. It was filed
against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), seeking to have him cancel all the
timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease
from accepting and approving more timber license agreements.
The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens
patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the respondent in
allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff
minors and succeeding generations.
The original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by
the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. The RTC Judge
sustained the motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in
filing a class suit to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests.
RULING: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations to come.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because
of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as
state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file
a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and
harmony of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes
at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.
G.R. No. L-46772. February 13, 1992
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH
VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES
FACTS: This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the CFI
of Quezon dismissing the information filed. The private
respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of
logs, defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines, in an information which read:
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion
to quash the information on two grounds, to wit: (1)
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
and, (2) that the information does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form. The Trial court
dismissed the information on the grounds invoked and
the reconsideration sought was denied. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the information charged an offense.
RULING: Yes. The Court agree with the petitioner that the
information substantially alleged all the elements of the crime of
qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705.
While it was admitted that the information did not precisely
allege that the taking of the logs in question was "without the
consent of the state," nevertheless, said information expressly
stated that the accused" illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry
away therefrom, without the consent of said owner and without
any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit,
sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can
grant the lease, license, license agreement or permit for
utilization of forest resources, including timber, then the
allegation in the information that the transportation of the logs
was "without any authority" under a license agreement, lease,
license or permit, is tantamount to alleging that the taking of the
logs was without the consent of the state.
When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec.
2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information hinges on
the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense defined in
the law. The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken
were owned by the state is not fatal. The fact that only the state
can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make
the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced
in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands.
 While it is only the state which can grant a license or
authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does
not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the cited
case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands
is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the
land includes everything found on its surface. Ownership is not an
essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D.
No. 705.Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true
owner of the forest products is not material, it was sufficient that
it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license
from the government.
G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996
Plaintiff-appelle: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Accused-appellant: WILSON B. QUE
FACTS: The Provincial Task Force on illegal logging received
information that a ten-wheeler truck with illegally cut lumber will
pass through Ilocos Norte. Ques truck was spotted and
discovered to contain coconut slabs with sawn lumber inserted in
between. He failed to give the cargos supporting documents: 1
certificate of lumber origin, 2 certificate of transport agreement, 3
auxiliary invoice, 4 receipt from the DENR, and 5 certification from
the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. All he
could show was a certification from the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan
that he legally acquired the coconut slabs.
ISSUES: (1) Whether there are no existing forest laws and
regulations which required certain legal documents for possession
of timber and other forest products; (2) whether the law only
penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the
possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting,
gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.
RULING: (1) No, appellant interprets the phrase existing forest
laws and regulations to refer to those laws and regulations which
were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277.
However, the suggested interpretation is strained and would
render the law inutile. The phrase should be construed to refer to
laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber
or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series
of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of
timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative
Order provides that the movement of logs, lumber, non-timber
forest products and wood-based or wood based shall be covered
with the appropriate Certificates of Origin. The transport of
lumber shall be accompanied by Certificate of Lumber Origin
(CLO).
(2) No. There are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished
under Section 68 of P.D. 705. In the first offense, one can raise as
a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting
or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the
authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense,
however, mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber
comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O 277
considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
G.R. No. 152989. September 4, 2002
ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al.
FACTS: Petitioner Roldan is the owner of a parcel of land
consisting of about 60,000 square meters which he bought from
Ildefonso O. Maglasang. Petitioner Roldan applied for a Private
Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed
road and poultry farm in his property. He also paid all the fees
required by the various government agencies.
While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner Roldan
was allegedly informed by some employees from the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he could
proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was
still awaiting approval. Consequently, petitioner Roldan proceeded
with the cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway. He used
the cut logs as materials to build his chicken cages.
About three weeks later, representatives of the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR
and personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner's place,
allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut trees
was conducted. The logs were not confiscated but were entrusted
to a barangay kagawad since there was allegedly no search
warrant at that time.
About two days later, the CENRO representatives came back
with members of the media and ISAFP charging illegal logging but
they failed to get the logs, again for alleged lack of search
warrant.
The CENRO group and ISAFP returned, this time armed with
a search warrant and proceeded to confiscate 872 pieces of sawn
lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled timber logs
with a total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.
A complaint for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended was
filed against herein petitioner by CENRO. A warrant for the arrest
of petitioner was then issued by the court a quo. In view thereof,
herein petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and the recall of his warrant of
arrest. Trial court denied the motion but reduced the
recommended bail of petitioner Roldan.
ISSUE: Whether the owner of a private land, the petitioner in this
case, is criminally liable under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting
trees within his own property.
RULING: YES, he is liable.
Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear
that the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty
of qualified theft. Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
were referred to only for the purpose of determining the
imposable penalties and not to define acts which constitute
qualified theft.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines provides:

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or

Other Forest Products Without License.- Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without
any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers
who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of
the government of the timber or any forest products
cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well
as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found.
The said law does not even distinguish whether the person
who commits the punishable acts under the aforementioned law
is the owner of the property, for what is material in determining
the culpability of a person is whether the person or entity
involved or charged with its violation possesses the required
permit, license or authorization from DENR at the time he or it
cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products.