Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016) 98e107

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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa

The metaphor of epigenesis: Kant, Blumenbach and Herder

Daniela Helbig a, Dalia Nassar b, *
a
Unit for the History and Philosophy of Science, The University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
b
Philosophy Department, The University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Over the last few decades, the meaning of the scientic theory of epigenesis and its signicance for
Available online 6 July 2016 Kants critical philosophy have become increasingly central questions. Most recently, scholars have
argued that epigenesis is a key factor in the development of Kants understanding of reason as self-
Keywords: grounding and self-generating. Building on this work, our claim is that Kant appealed to not just any
Kant; epigenetic theory, but specically Johann Friedrich Blumenbachs account of generation, and that this
Epigenesis;
appeal must be understood not only in terms of self-organization, but also in terms of the demarcation of
Metaphor;
a specic domain of inquiry: for Blumenbach, the study of life; for Kant, the study of reason. We argue
Analogy;
Biology;
that Kant adopted this specic epigenetic model as a result of his dispute with Herder regarding the
Blumenbach; independence of reason from nature. Blumenbachs conception of epigenesis and his separation of a
Herder; domain of the living from the non-living lent Kant the tools to demarcate metaphysics, and to guard
Transcendental deduction reason against Herders attempts to naturalize it.
2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Over the last few decades, Kants interest in the life sciences and
the role of the life sciences in the development of his critical phi-
losophy have attracted greater scholarly attention. One strand of
investigation, opened up by Timothy Lenoir in 1982, examines the
crucial role of the life sciences in the Critique of Judgment and the
inuence of Kants views on the life sciences themselves.1 A second
strand has argued that key ideas from the life sciences played
pivotal roles in the development of Kants earlier writings, espe-
cially the Critique of Pure Reason.2 Kants interest in the competing
theories of generationdpreformation and epigenesisdis regarded
as an especially signicant interpretative tool for understanding the
origin, meaning, and role of the pure concepts of the understand-
ing. Thus, Kants statements about the birth place of the pure
concepts, and his correlative use of terms such as Keime (seeds) and
Anlagen (predispositions)3 to describe their development, have led
some interpreters to suggest that Kant used the preformationist
model of generation in order to explicate the generation of the pure
concepts of the understanding.4 In the second edition of the
Critique of Pure Reason, however, Kant adds that the legitimacy of
the categories can only be established by thinking of them in terms
of a system of the epigenesis of pure reason.5 Accordingly, other
commentators have claimed that by 1787 Kant rejected the meta-
phor of preformation, and instead introduced that of epigenesis to
explicate the non-empirical and non-arbitrary character of the
categories.6
While the disagreement over Kants favored biological model is
explicit, his metaphorical use of these models in the context of the
generation of the pure concepts of the understanding has gone
largely unproblematized. According to Phillip Sloan, biological
models of explanation ground7 Kants cognitive theory; they
constitute its scientic foundation.8 Taking the primacy of sci-
entic investigation as a given, Sloan sees Kant as altering his
theory of reason when this foundation shifts. Gnter Zller, by
contrast, regards the purpose of the use of the terms preformation
and epigenesis as more decorative than functional: doctrines of

* Corresponding author.
5
E-mail addresses: daniela.helbig@sydney.edu.au (D. Helbig), dalia.nassar@sydney. Kant (1781/1787), B167.
6
edu.au (D. Nassar). This is the key claim made by Zller (1988). Although Mensch (2013) agrees
1
Lenoir (1982). with Zllers understanding of the signicance of the metaphor of epigenesis, she
2
See Sloan (2002), Zller (1988), and especially Mensch (2013), whose book- demonstrates that Kants turn to epigenesis came much earlier than 1787. She does
length study of the topic of epigenesis in the pre-critical writings and the rst not, however, explicitly address the question of whether there was a transition in
Critique has generated new interest in Kants use of the term. Kants thinking between 1781 and 1787.
3 7
Kant (1781/1787), A66/B90-91. Sloan (2002), 22.
4 8
Sloan (2002). Sloan (2002), 24.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.05.003
0039-3681/ 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
 D. Helbig, D. Nassar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016) 98e107
reason are illustrate[d] by means of an analogy, or guratively
represented by them.9 Neither approach, however, captures the
signicance of the appearance of language borrowed from the life
sciences in crucial parts of the Critique of Pure Reason, whether in
the Transcendental Analytic or the Transcendental Deduction.
The rst aim of this paper is to clarify the role of the metaphors
of generation in the critical philosophy. We argue that Kants 1787
reference is to a specic epigenetic theory, that of Johann Friedrich
Blumenbach rather than Caspar Friedrich Wolff, and that its
metaphorical use in the context of Kants theory of cognition carries
wider programmatic connotations, which cannot be grasped by
taking the analogy with biological generation to be either a natu-
ralistic blueprint, or a mere illustration. Blumenbachs vitalistic
theory of epigenesis, and its central notion of Bildungstrieb, func-
tioned as one of the emerging demarcations of the subject area of
the life sciences, thereby clearly distinguishing it from the physical
sciences. In various contexts, Kant warned against the confusion of
the problems of metaphysics with those of the special sciences, and
he had a keen interest in mapping the boundaries of those special
disciplines.10 His use of Blumenbachs theory as a metaphor in the
context of his conception of reason must therefore be understood
not simply in terms of the self-organization or spontaneity of
reason,11 but also in terms of the demarcation of a specic domain
of inquiry: for Blumenbach, that of the study of life; for Kant, that of
the study of reason.
More specically, we argue that Kant introduced the metaphor
of epigenesis into his theory of reason in 1787 as a result of his
dispute with Herder about the independence of reason from nature,
followed by his explicit adoption of epigenesis as a scientic theory
of generation in the Critique of Judgment in 1790. Blumenbachs
separation of a domain of the living from the non-living in terms of
his notion of Bildungstrieb lent Kant the conceptual tools by which
to demarcate metaphysics as the study of reason, and thus to guard
the domain of reason against Herders attempts to naturalize it. We
show that it was following his review of Herders Ideen zur Philos-
ophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784e5) that Kant felt the
need to emphasize both the independence of reason from nature
and the distinctiveness of the study of reason from the study of
nature, i.e., to distinguish reason as an object that cannot be studied
by means of the natural sciences or anthropology. It was on account
of this, we contend, that the specic articulation of epigenesis put
forward by Blumenbach became central in the second edition of the
rst Critique.
Our re-contextualization of Kants employment of the metaphor
of epigenesis does not, however, imply that he did not make critical
use of the term in the Transcendental Deduction. Rather, and in
concert with research that draws on the idea of epigenesis to un-
derstand the activity of reason, we argue that by comparing Kants
rst published use of the termdin his review of Herders Ideend-
with the parenthetical remark he makes in the Deduction, it be-
comes clear that the epigenesis of pure reason involves the
limitation of what is and what is not possible in experience, anal-
ogous to the limitation that Kant regards as necessary in natural
generation, and which he formulates in response to Herder. It is
through the notion of epigenesis as a form of limitation (on possible
9
Zller (1988), 88.
10
As Kant puts it in his essay on the use of teleological judgment: I have become
totally convinced that through the mere separation of what is heterogeneous and
what previously had been left in a mixed state, often a new light is cast upon the
science . which opens up many authentic sources of cognition where one would
not at all have expected them . (Kant (1788), AA 8, 162). The aim of the scientist,
he continues, must be to challenge the carelessness of letting the boundaries of the
sciences run into each other.
11
Zller (1988); Mensch (2013).
99
experience, on natural development) that the metaphor can be
regarded as playing a crucial role in the Transcendental
Deduction.12
Our aims are thus twofold. In the rst instance, we seek to offer a
new perspective on Kants interest in Blumenbach, via Herder, and
to show how Kants use of biological metaphors should be under-
stood neither as naturalistically nor as illustratively, but as both a
reection and instrumentalization of emerging disciplinary dis-
tinctions in the natural sciences. In the second, we suggest a new
way by which the metaphor of epigenesis can help us to better
understand the Transcendental Deduction. Our reinterpretation is
based on a clear distinction between Wolffs and Blumenbachs
versions of epigenesis. On that basis, Kants use of epigenesis to
describe his conception of the mind speaks not only to the
deduction of the categories, but also to long-standing questions
regarding Kants understanding of the unity of reason.
1. Kant on scientic theories of generation prior to the
Critique of Pure Reason
Long before his much-cited endorsement of Blumenbachs
formulation of an epigenetic theory, Kant occasionally discussed
the competing theories of generation, epigenesis and preformation.
However, these discussions occur in a number of different contexts.
They weigh the various problems Kant sees with both of the the-
ories, but their primary goal is neither to espouse one theory over
the other as a scientic explanation of the generation of living
beings, nor to use them metaphorically to explicate problems
outside the life sciences.13 Against this background, the shift in the
Critique of Judgment in 1790 is signicant. In this latter work, Kant
explicitly distinguishes two different contexts in which theories of
generation are relevant to him, and endorses epigenesis in both.
Firstly, he declares Blumenbachs epigenetic theory to provide an
appropriate scientic explanation for generation, having a great
advantage . on experiential grounds over preformation.14 Sec-
ondly, Kant emphasizes the theorys cognitive appeal in stating that
reason is favorably disposed to this [epigenetic] explanation. This
second aspect is independent of the rst. It would hold even if one
did not recognize the alleged experiential superiority.15
The endorsement of a specic explanatory model in the life
sciences thus coincides with a claim about reasons dispositions. A
brief review of Kants discussion of epigenetic and preformationist
theories in the years leading up to the use of metaphors of gener-
ation in the Transcendental Analytic at A66/B90-1 may serve to
demonstrate the absence of his commitment to either theory as a
scientic explanation of generation. Such a commitment only
comes, as we will argue, when it coincides with a specic rear-
ticulation of the role of reason in Kants systematic philosophy.
Kant discusses the generation of plants and animals as early as
1763 in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of
the Existence of God. Here he distinguishes broadly between a view
12
We thus aim to elaborate and expand upon the work of Zller (1988) and
Mensch (2013) on the signicance of the notion of epigenesis for the Transcen-
dental Deduction.
13
Our conclusion is in line with Reinhard Lws, who argues that Kant did not
take a consistent position on these questions (Lw, 1980, 168). In particular, we
agree with his problematisation of Kants endorsement of epigenesis. However, our
intention here is different from Lws: we do not seek to determine Kants position
regarding epigenesis and preformation, but to emphasize that he saw no need to
take such a position on the problem of generation as a scientic problem prior to
1790.
14
Kant (1790), AA 5, 424.
15
Kant (1790), AA 5, 424. See McLaughlins (1982) critical contextualization of this
claim, placing it in the context of bourgeois theories of society in the 17th and 18th
centuries (371).
100 D. Helbig, D. Nassar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016) 98e107
of ontogeny as the quantitative evolution (Auswickelung) of a su-
pernaturally given form, and a view which grants individuals the
capacity of qualitatively generating rather than merely unfolding
their structural form.16 Although Kant does not name them as such,
the former view corresponds to the theory of preformation, pre-
vailing through the rst half of the 18th century and prominently
represented by Albrecht von Haller and Charles Bonnet.17 The latter
view can, in turn, be described as epigenetic, and its rst 18th-
century representative was Caspar Friedrich Wolff (whom Kant
does not mention). It was, however, preceded by anti-
preformationist views as articulated by Pierre Louis de Mau-
pertuis, and the Comte de Buffon (whom Kant does mention).18
Both preformationist and anti-preformationist views, Kant
contends, are deeply problematic in that they each contain an
arbitrary (willkrlich) element.19 He nds sarcastic words for both.
The arbitrariness of preformation consists in positing a supernat-
ural origin of generation instead of admitting that this origin might
be scientically explicable. Kant mocks this move by invoking the
reproduction of yeast: while as equally ill-understood as the
problem of explaining higher organisms, this problem does not
seem to prompt any explanatory recourse to alleged supernatural
causes. Buffons and Maupertuiss non-preformationist theories, in
contrast, do not posit any such supernatural origins, but they too
contain arbitrary elements. Kant locates these in the attempts to
counter the difculties in accounting for the origin of qualitatively
new structure according to mechanical laws. Maupertuis addresses
the problem of generating structure by the introduction of attrac-
tive forces and particles in the seminal uid of the parents, whereas
Buffon posits the existence of a so-called moule intrieure, or in-
ternal mould, responsible for the formation of the newly generating
body. Kant criticizes both in one and the same breath, suggesting
that the inner forms of Herr Buffon, which self-assemble according
to the opinion of Herr von Maupertuis, are either as incompre-
hensible as the thing itself, or [.] arbitrary inventions.20
Thus facing a choice between preformation as a theory of su-
pernaturally given, and anti-preformationism as a theory of arbi-
trarily invented form, Kant concludes that it is perhaps impossible
to make out which difculty is the greatest.21 He is perfectly
explicit in stating the point of his discussion of the two theories of
generation: not to endorse one of them over the other as a scientic
(naturphilosophische) theory, but to sort out the weightier meta-
physical reasons at stake in deciding between them.22 The
weightier reason for him, unsurprisingly, is to avoid any recourse to
the supernatural in the philosophy of nature.
However, this does not amount to an endorsement of the spe-
cic anti-preformationist theories of Maupertuis and Buffon, which
he has just ridiculed. Instead, it is a methodological demanddand
16
Kant (1763), AA 2, 114.
17
See Roe (1981), ch. 2, on Hallers conversion from epigenesis to preformation in
the 1750s.
18
Kants omission of Wolff s name not just here but in any other of his writings
has been discussed at length; see Lw (1980), 176. Wolff and Blumenbach both
explicitly use the term epigenesis to describe their respective, and different, the-
ories (see below). Maupertuis and Buffon do not use this term, and it remains a
matter of debate whether or not it is appropriate to label their views as epigenetic.
Wolff and Blumenbach each postulate a force responsible for the generation of a
qualitatively new structure, whereas Buffons explanation of this new structure
relies on spatial arrangements of matter that preexist the newly generated or-
ganism. For Sloan (2002), this makes Maupertuis and Buffon mechanistic epi-
geneticists (6); for Mensch (2013), Buffons internal mould smells too strongly of
preformationism to count him among the epigeneticists (chapter 2).
19
Kant (1763), AA 2, 115.
20
Kant (1763), AA 2, 115.
21
Kant (1763), AA 2, 114.
22
Kant (1763), AA 2, 115.
only that, as Kant stressesdto rethink the possible action of forces
in living things23:
My intention here is only to show the necessity to grant the
things of nature more of a possibility than is commonly done to
produce their consequences according to general laws.24
It is worth noting that Wolffs explicitly epigenetic theory (dis-
cussed below) in its reliance on a force, as opposed to Buffons and
Maupertuiss anti-preformationist accounts, could bedalthough
Kant does not do sodinterpreted as an attempt to fulll just such a
methodological demand in seeking to show how general laws
might account for the generation of high structural complexity.
In his rst mention of the actual term epigenesis in notes dated
1772e1776, Kant identies it with the organic as opposed to the
mechanical or chemical, and as such with the idea of an an
animating spirit in plants and animals:
The question is whether there is an organic formative nature
(epigenesis) or only one which produces form (bildet) me-
chanically and chemically. It seems: to that belongs a spirit
because of the unity of the relation of all parts, according to their
generation, to every single such part. But isnt there a spiritually
animating essence in animals and plants too. In such a way one
would even have to assume an animating spirit in the primor-
dial chaos in order to explain the various animals which can
now only reproduce.25
This usage of the term epigenesis is sufciently broad and yet
idiosyncratic to rule out the possibility that Kant is discussing the
contemporaneous epigenetic theory that had actually been put
forward by the time he was writing. Wolff s epigenetic Theoria
generationis from 1759 is decidedly anti-animistic in postulating a
vis essentialis that accounts for the structure of plants and animals
by the secretion of nutritive uids; the functional unity of their
different parts is a by-product rather than the result of the action of
a soul or spirit.
If Kants usage of the term is not aligned with Wolff s, what
might his sources be? Maupertuiss Systme de la nature. Essai sur la
formation des corps organiss (1751) claims the impossibility of ac-
counting for an organisms functional unity as a result of a uniform
and blind force, and posits a principle of intelligence to resolve
this problem, similar to what we call desire, aversion, memory.
However, and even if he may have left Kant unconvinced, Mau-
pertuis insisted that there was a difference between his principle of
intelligence and an animating spirit in the sense of a sensitive
soul.26 Another potential source for Kants allusion to an animating
principle is Georg Ernst Stahl (from whom Wolff had distinguished
his views explicitly).27 In the Dreams of a spirit-seer, Kant had
defended Stahls organic explanation as being often closer to the
truth than
23
Thus we disagree with Claude Pichs reading of this passage as an obvious
adoption of the biological theory of epigenesis (Pich [2001], 186). Firstly, we do
not see Kant endorsing the specic theories he sarcastically discusses as arbitrary;
we only see him arguing that bad non-preformationist theories are on safer
metaphysical grounds than preformationist ones. Secondly, applying the broad la-
bel epigenetic to the specic non-preformationist theories Kant exposes here
erases the decisive difference with his later endorsement of Blumenbachs epige-
netic theory as based on not just a force, but a drive.
24
Kant (1763), AA 2, 115 (our translation).
25
Kant (1772e1776), AA 17, 591 (our translation).
26
Maupertuis (1984 [1751]), 146e147.
27
See Roe (1981), 109.
 D. Helbig, D. Nassar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016) 98e107
. Hofmann, Boerhaave and others, who do not consider
immaterial forces, who stick to mechanical causes and in that,
follow a more philosophical method.28
Kant thus broadly aligns the term epigenesis with an organic
process of formation that bears animistic connotations, and uses
the term to acknowledge the problem of the relation between the
organically formative on the one hand, and the mechanical on the
other. This is, however, neither a discussion of an actually existing
theory of epigenesis (Stahl did not offer such a theory), nor an
endorsement of the idiosyncratically animistic articulation of
epigenesis as a viable explanatory option in natural philosophy.
When he takes up the problem of epigenetic ontogeny again in
notes dated 1776e78, Kant still presents epigenesis as requiring the
assumption of a soul; however, this soul must understood as a
non-localized part of the intelligible world in order to avoid
animistic implications:
For epigenesis we have to assume that the soul belongs to the
intelligible world; that it does not have a location in space, that,
once an organized body has come into being through concep-
tion, it has in itself the condition to be ensouled (beseelt) by the
intelligible, vitalizing (belebend) principle; and that in this body
the soul is present not locally, but virtually.29
In his private remarks on Eberhards Preparations for natural
theology, and thus in a theological context, Kant discusses phy-
logeny rather than ontogeny with regard to the necessity of
assuming supernatural effects.30 Here, he now uses the term
epigenesis in a more conventional way:
The preservation of species can either be regarded as natural,
or it requires a supernatural inuence. In the rst case the
origin of species is to be regarded as natural too: for every
generation is to be regarded as a new origin insofar as there
are so many foreign causes which can modify or change the
formative force that, were it not for a counteracting principle
following general laws, the regularity of reproduction could
not be explained from a disposition once created. Particularly
if one assumes epigenesis.
A hypothetical endorsement of epigenesis thus renders a
natural origin of species more plausible insofar as the theory
purports to explain the generation of every single member of the
species as a renewed origin (Ursprung) without recourse to
supernatural causes, and thus provides a model for how the rst
such origin could be conceived. Kants earlier metaphysical
argument in favor of non-preformationist theories is reiterated
here with explicit reference to epigenesis as a mode of expla-
nation. And yet, this move only posits an epigenetic theory for
the sake of the theological argument, and does not amount to an
explicit espousal of epigenesis over other theories in the life
sciences.
By the late 1770s, then, Kant has publicly engaged with
epigenesis and preformation on a methodological meta-level, and
privately considers both the difculties of epigenesis as an
explanatory strategy in ontogeny, and its phylogenetic implications.
However, when not working on a meta-level but engaging directly
and publicly with questions of phylogeny and heredity in his 1775
28
Kant (1766), AA 2, 331 (our translation).
29
Kant (1776e78), AA 18, 189/190.
30
Kant (1776e78), AA 18, 574.
101
On the different human races, Kants account of natural genera-
tion is a version of preformationism.31 The assumption of pre-
formed germs (Keime) as well as predispositions (Anlagen) is the
only means, he argues, by which to explain both differences be-
tween species and heritable differences within species, i.e., adap-
tation. For insofar as chance or general mechanical laws cannot
bring forth such adaptations, e.g. to climate, it follows that
different species must have within them germs and natural pre-
dispositions which allow them both to maintain their species line
as well as adapt to new conditions.32 The original species is
equipped with the potential to adapt to any external condition, but
it is contingent upon these conditions which predisposition is
expressed (ausgewickelt). Sloan has characterized this view as a
combination of preformation with environmentalism.33
Against the background of these varied earlier discussions,
Kants usage of biological terms of generation in the 1781 edition of
the rst Critique stands out as markedly different: in contrast to the
earlier methodological debates or attempts at developing a theory
of heredity, this usage is clearly metaphorical in character. Keime,
seeds, is the word Kant uses to describe both the generation of the
pure concepts of the understanding in the Transcendental Analytic,
and the development of the special sciences in the Architectonic of
Pure Reason.34 In the 1787 edition, Kant retains both passages, and
thus maintains the metaphorical vocabulary of categories as pre-
formed seeds and dispositions, which develop on the occasion of
experience. However, in the Transcendental Deduction he adds a
competing metaphor from the life sciences: the now well-known
claim of the epigenesis of pure reason.35
Given this ambiguity within the B edition, it is perhaps not
surprising that commentators have reached contradictory answers
to the question which biological mode of explanation informs
Kants cognitive theory. After all, his many different earlier dis-
cussions of both epigenesis and preformation offer numerous
passages to support either argumentdtypically by emphasizing the
methodological support for epigenesis, or the usage of pre-
formationism in the race essay, respectively.36 But it seems to us
that these arguments skate too lightly over the difference in context
and usage. Even if Kant had endorsed either theory as scientically
superior prior to 1790, it would still remain unclear how an
endorsement of the scientic theory affects its metaphorical usage
in the theory of cognition. However, we have no such endorsement.
Furthermore, such a discussion does not do justice to Kants use of
biological language outside of its original context. To understand
what makes Kants employment of the metaphor of epigenesis
poignant, we turn to its usage in the contemporaneous life sciences
and to Kants rst published discussion of the term in his review of
Herder.
31
McLaughlin (2007).
32
Kant (1775), AA 2, 435.
33
Sloan (2002), 240.
34
Thus, the aim of the Transcendental Analytic is to pursue the pure concepts
into their rst seeds (Keime) and predispositions (Anlagen) in the human under-
standing, where they lie ready (vorbereitet), until with the opportunity of experi-
ence, they are developed (entwickelt) and exhibited in their clarity by the very same
understanding liberated from empirical conditions attaching to them (Kant (1781/
1787), A66/B91). And in the Architectonic: No one attempts to bring about a sci-
ence without a grounding idea for that science. However, in elaborating that idea
the schema, even the denition given to that science initially, rarely ever corre-
sponds to that idea; because it lies like a seed (Keim) in reason, a seed in which all
parts are still very much wrapped up (eingewickelt) and lie hidden barely accessible
to microscopic observation (Kant (1781/1787), B861; our translation).
35
Kant (1781/1787), B167.
36
Sloan (2002) and Zller (1988), respectively.
102 D. Helbig, D. Nassar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016) 98e107
2. Blumenbach: Bildungstrieb and generic preformation
Both in his oft-cited letter from August 1790 to Blumenbach, and
in x81 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant singles out a specic
formulation among the broad eld of theories associated with the
label epigenesis. In doing so, he draws explicit attention to the
difference between Blumenbachs concept of Bildungstrieb and a
mere formative force, Bildungskraft. What is the nature of this
distinction, which was drawn in the 1789 revised edition of ber
den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschft, but can be traced back
to Blumenbachs earliest writings on the same topic in 1781?
From the very rst treatises on the Bildungstrieb in 1780 and
1781, Blumenbach had emphasized the difference between his new
concept of a formative drive and all other forces of nature,
stating as his result
that there lies within all living creatures from human beings
down to the maggot, from the cedar to mold, a special, innate
drive that remains active through their lifetime, initially to make
them take their shape, then to retain it, and, if possible, to
restore this shape when destroyed. A drive (or tendency or
striving, whichever one wishes to call it) that is entirely different
both from the general properties of [material] bodies, and from
the other forces specically peculiar to organized bodies37; and
that seems to be one of the primary causes of all generation,
nutrition, and reproduction; and which, in order to prevent any
misinterpretation, and in order to distinguish it from all other
natural forces, I shall here call the formative drive (nisus
formativus).38
In particular, he warned, the Bildungstrieb should not be
confused with Wolffs essential force. Wolff s epigenetic account
of generation (Theoria generationis, 1759) relies on the notion of a
vis essentialis, a non-teleological force which primarily serves
nutritive purposes. Its organizing effect is construed as a by-
product of its chemical and mechanical interactions with the
environment.39 This intentional alignment of the process of organic
with inorganic organization is precisely the opposite of Blu-
menbachs move, which locates the source of the generation of
organic structure in organic matter alone. Thus, his epigenetic
theory is built upon the notion of a formative drive, rather than
force, that is unique to and inherent in all living creaturesdand
those alone. Blumenbach realizes that the formative drive might
easily be confused with Wolffs vis essentialis, given that they both
are responsible for the effects because of which we ascribe life to
[plants and animals] [weswegen wir [Panzen und Tieren] ein Leben
zuschreiben].40 However, in contrast to Wolffs, Blumenbachs
vitalistic epigenetic theory locates the difference between the
living and the non-living in the formative drive.
If this point remains implicit in the earlier edition, Blumenbach
emphasizes it all the more strongly in the 1782 edition of his Hand-
buch der Naturgeschichte, and in the revised 1789 edition of the trea-
tise on the Bildungstrieb. Both the distinction between drive and
mere force, and between the domain of the living and the non-living
become more pronounced. When Blumenbach states that no one can
be more profoundly persuaded than I am of the massive gap which
37
In the 1789 edition, Blumenbach species those as contractibility, irritability,
sensibility etc., i.e. as the mechanical forces described by Haller and others as being
at work in the physiological functioning of the animal bodies. Blumenbach (1789),
25.
38
Blumenbach (1781), 12 (our translation).
39
See Witt (2008) for a recent discussion.
40
Blumenbach (1781), 17 (our translation).
nature has implemented between the animated, and the inanimate
creation, between the organized, and unorganized creatures, he
takes the vitalist point as a premise rather than a problem: there is a
difference in kind between animate and inanimate matter.41 The
formative drive only acts in animate matter and cannot account for
the transition from inanimate to animate matter. But once active, it
will generate structure that had not been present before its action.
Such spontaneous generation is a characteristic of animate matter,
present to various degrees throughout its life but ceasing with it:
there is no such thing in nature as preformed germs: rather, a
special drive becomes active in the previously raw and un-
formed matter of generation, once it has matured and reached
its place of destination, and then remains active life-long.42
In the 1789 edition, Blumenbach also adds the clarication that
the spontaneous generation of structure does occur in inanimate
matter, such as crystals, as the result of a formative forceeebut a
force lacks the teleological connotation of the drive that sets
animate matter apart. The substantive distinction translates into a
normative and programmatic one for Blumenbach. As suggested by
the fruitful comparison between the generation of structure in
inanimate and animate matter, one can indeed legitimately
employ the phenomena of either of these two major parts of
creation for explaining phenomena of the other.43 As an explan-
atory strategy, however, this move relies on a prior distinction
between the subject matter of biology and physics, as we would say
retrospectively, and anticipates a process of institutionalized
disciplinary division that had just begun when Blumenbach was
writing.44 The coincidental, multiple coinings of the term biology
around the turn of the century are taken to be suggestive of such a
trend of disciplinary division.45 It is in this broader institutional
context in which Blumenbach suggests, as a result of his own
research as a professor at the Faculty of Medicine in Gttingen, an
epistemically productive division of labor in the sciences. Seen from
this perspective, Blumenbachs notion of the Bildungstrieb de-
marcates a limited domain of inquiry for the life sciences.
A second limiting move, this time not on domains of inquiry but
on the action of the formative drive itself, is Blumenbachs argu-
ment for the constancy of species in his Beitrge zur Naturgeschichte
(1780 and later editions). It takes species to be representations of
possible forms of the organization of matter. In every single newly
generated individual, the Bildungstrieb acts on the specic physio-
logical composition of matter passed down from the parent gen-
eration. Crucially, this composition limits the possible results of
formative action. As Peter McLaughlin argues, For Blumenbach,
epigenesis of the individual implies generic preformation.46 Just
like the distinction between Bildungskraft and Bildungstrieb, this
implication did not escape Kants attention; indeed, Kant proved
himself to be a perceptive commentator in characterizing epigen-
esis as a system of generic preformation in the Critique of Judg-
ment.47 The specic form to be reached in epigenetically described
41
Blumenbach (1789), 71.
42
Blumenbach (1789), 24.
43
Blumenbach (1789), 72.
44
This disciplinary diversication is one of the characteristics of 18th-century
science. Approaching the question from the study of experimental practice rather
than from an institutional perspective, Klein and Lefvre date the introduction of
organic substances as those created by the processes of life as occurring around
1790. Klein and Lefvre (2007), ch. 13.
45
McLaughlin (2002).
46
McLaughlin (1982), 17e18.
47
Kant (1790), AA 5, 423.
 D. Helbig, D. Nassar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016) 98e107 103

ontogenesis is always prescribed, and in that sense limited, by between Herders portrayal of epigenesis, as endorsed by Kant, and
virtue of the individuals being part of a species. Blumenbachs formulation, is striking. Herder emphasizes Blu-
menbachs point that the formative force is a principle of life, not
a force that might act in organic or inorganic matter. But the sim-
3. 1787
ilarities of vocabulary go further.
In the rst volume of the Ideen (1784), Herder contends that no
There is a noticeable difference between Kants views of
eye has seen preformed germs, and goes on to state that if a being
epigenesis qua scientic theory in the late 1780s and 1790, on the
possesses organic forces [wirkende organische Krfte], then it can
one hand, and his notes from the 1770s and early 1780s, on the
generate itself [so erzeugt es selbst].53 Blumenbach, in the 1781
other. In 1787 Kant made use of the phrase the epigenesis of pure
version of his treatise, had pointed to the fact that the perfection
reason, and in 1789 he published the essay On the use of teleo-
[Vollkommenheit] of our magnication lenses is no good news for
logical principles in philosophy in which he rst mentions Blu-
the yet unseen preformed germs, and continues to describe the
menbachs Handbuch. The idea of Bildungstrieb, Kant writes in the
action of epigenesis instead: in the raw matter of the future
essay, brought so much light into the doctrine of generations, not
creature, after its due period of preparation, the formative drive
to inorganic matter but only to the members of organized be-
is stirred and can begin the formation of the hitherto unformed
ings,48 thus emphasizing Blumenbachs distinction between
matter.54 In his review of Herder, Kant reiterates the language of
organic and inorganic matter. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant
matter as prepared: what accounts for generation is an action
identies Blumenbach with epigenesis, and epigenesis with
inherent to, and limited to, this kind of matter, i.e. organic matter.
immanent natural development. Epigenesis considers nature . as
Kant does, however, have one reservation regarding Herders
itself producing [als selbst hervorbringend] rather than merely as
take on epigenesis:
developing [als entwickelnd] those things that can initially be rep-
resented as possible only in accordance with the causality of ends, if the cause organizing itself from within were limited by its
and thus with the least possible appeal to the supernatural, leaves nature only perhaps to a certain number and degree of differ-
everything that follows from the rst beginning to nature.49 Thus ences in the formation of a creature (so that after the institution
Kant singles out two different reasons for his endorsement of of which it were not further free to form yet another type under
Blumenbachs theory of epigenesis as a scientic theorydand in so altered circumstances), then one could call this natural vocation
doing, incisively highlights Blumenbachs main programmatic of the forming nature also germs or original predispositions,
points. Firstly, and in line with his long-standing methodological without thereby regarding the former as primordially implanted
demands, Blumenbachs version of epigenesis did not require any machines and buds that unfold themselves only when occa-
appeal to divine or supernatural forces. As a scientic theory, his sioned (as in the system of evolution), but merely as limitations,
account specically emphasizes the immanent development, or in not further explicable, of a self-forming faculty, which latter we
Kants words, regards nature as self-producing (selbst hervor- can just as little explain or make comprehensible.55
bringend). Secondly, in its limitation to organic matter, it had a
clearer demarcation of explanatory scope than Wolffs theory.
In this comment, Kant anticipates his later formulation of generic
While we do not know for certain when Kant rst read Blu-
preformation by suggesting that the main explanatory advantage of
menbach, his rst published mention of the term epigenesis
preformation, which Kant had used in his 1775 race essay, can be
appeared in his 1785 review of Herders Ideen, which owed a great
accommodated by an epigenetic theory, with one caveat: the limi-
deal to Blumenbach.50 It was also in this review that Kant rst
tation of form. Thus he stresses a point that (pace Kant) Herder had
formulates a viable conception of epigenesis, which remained at
failed to emphasize in his account of epigenesis, but which Blu-
the core of his later account of epigenesis in the Critique of Judg-
menbach had clearly made in the Handbuch der Naturgeschichte: the
ment. In the review, Kant provides numerous quotations from the
form to be reached in ontogenic development is limited phyloge-
Ideen, some commentary on these quotations, and nally a brief,
netically. It is also clear that Kant does not consider the language of
albeit highly critical, response to Herders methodology and his
germs to be inherently in contradiction with that of epigenesis: in
conception of reason. This highly critical attitude toward Herders
the terminology he uses here, germs correspond to Blumenbachs
methodology strongly contrasts with Kants more tempered reac-
prepared matter rather than primordially implanted machines.
tion to Herders views of epigenesis.
This looseness of terminology explains why Kant does not see a need
Kant begins the review by noting Herders disagreement with
to remove the language of Keime and Anlagen in the 1787 edition of
the word epigenesis. The prex epi, Herder explains, mislead-
the Transcendental Analytic.56
ingly implies action from outside of newly generated material. For
It is important that Kants rst published use of the term
this reason, Herder offers the alternative term Bildung to imply
epigenesiseein a quotation from Herdereecoincides with the one
formation that is internal to nature. Kant quotes Herder: It is Bil-
moment in his review of the Ideen where Kants tone is not entirely
dung (genesis), an effect of inner forces for which nature had pre-
critical, but surprisingly agreeable. Kants reworking of Herders
pared a mass to which they give their form, in which they are to
conception of epigenesis is, in turn, strikingly similar to Blu-
make themselves visible.51 Kant is not averse to this point. Rather,
menbachs formative drive. It thus seems that Kants interest in
he writes that the reviewer fully concurs [ihm der Recensent vllig
epigenesis in the late 1780s was prompted by Herder, and
beitritt] with Herders notion of Bildung, which Kant describes as a
principle of life, which appropriately modies itself internally in
accordance with differences of the external circumstances [inner-
lich nach Verschiedenheit der ueren Umstnde].52 The parallel 53
Herder (1784/1785 [1989]), 6, 171 (our translation).
54
Blumenbach (1781), 42.
55
Kant (1785), AA 8, 62e63 (emphasis added on limited and limitation).
48
Kant (1788), AA 8, 180. 56
For this reason, and in contrast to the majority of the scholarship, we do not
49
Kant (1790), AA 5, 424. think that Kant was actually offering two competing or paradoxical formulations in
50
Richards (2002), 225. the 1787 edition of the rst Critique. Given that he came to conceive of epigenesis
51
Kant (1785), AA, 8, 50. along Blumenbachian lines, he did not regard the language of Keim and Anlage as
52
Kant (1785), AA, 8, 62. inherently opposed to epigenesis. See n. 1 above.
104 D. Helbig, D. Nassar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016) 98e107
specically coincides with Blumenbachs version of epigenesis.57
What appeals to Kant in this conception of epigenesis is its two
inbuilt limitations. Blumenbachs formative drive is restricted to
the domain of the living, and he construes it as a genuinely
formative, yet inherently limited faculty acting within that domain.
In x81 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant explicitly calls this impli-
cation of Blumenbachs epigenetic theory generic preformation. It
is this conception of epigenesis as Bildung with limits that Kant
invokes metaphorically in the second edition of the rst Critique.
4. Reason and Herders Ideen
Herders Ideen played a key role in Kants formation on at least
two counts. As we have shown, it was in the review that Kant rst
formulated a viable conception of epigenesis as a scientic theory.
It was also in the context of the review that he recognized the
epistemic signicance of epigenesis as a metaphor for his theory of
reasoneeleading him to employ the metaphor in 1787.
A key claim of Herders Ideen is that reason is nothing but
something received, a learned proportion and direction of ideas
and forces to which the human being is formed through its orga-
nization and way of life . This means, he continues, that reason
is not innate. . . 58 Rather, it develops over time and is thus
necessarily historical. It is, furthermore, effected by its natural (and
historical) environment, such that a proper understanding of
reason involves understanding its natural history.
The study of reason that Herder enumerates in the Ideen radi-
cally differs from the picture Kant had offered in the rst Critique.
According to Herders account, to grasp reason, one must trace its
development and emergence in history, andeein deep contrast to
Kants transcendental conditions of possibilityeedistinguish the
natural conditions of its possibility. One such condition, Herder
argues, is uprightness. Importantly Herders explication of the
development of reason does not amount to an explanation of the
generation of reason through the coming together of isolated parts
whose emergence (and individual existence) is entirely contingent
(i.e., dependent on a variety of environmental circumstances).
Rather, his view is that the development of reason goes hand in
hand with the development of the whole organism, such that it is
impossible to speak of reason as independent of the other parts of
the human organism.
Thus Herder writes that every creature is suitably organized to
live and move in its element . every creature . has its own, a new
world.59 He offers several examples to clarify what he means,
illustrating how in each case, the animal or plant is structured ac-
cording to its needs, and its complexity is commensurate with its
particular situation and environment. In the case of the human
being, Herder begins by noting that uprightness is specically hu-
man, adding that this is not an accident but accords with the
structure and shape of the human body:
the foot of man is more rm and broad: he has a great long toe,
while the ape has only a thumb; his heel too is on a level with
the sole of his foot. All the muscles acting in this position are
adapted to it. The calf of the leg is enlarged; the pelvis is drawn
backwards; the hips are spread outwards from each other; the
57
This is in contrast to both Sloan and Zller, who do not specically identify
Herder (and Kants reworking of Herder in the review) with Blumenbach. Rather,
Sloan (2002) sees Herder as promoting a Wolfan version of epigenesis, while
Zller (1989) sees Kants comments in the review as evidence of Kants familiarity
with Wolffs and Blumenbachs concept of epigenesis (81). On Herders familiarity
with Blumenbachs work, see Richards (2002), 225e6 and Nisbet (1970), 196.
58
Herder (1989), p. 144; see also p. 93.
59
Herder (1989), p. 89.
spine is less curved; the breast is widened; the shoulders have
clavicles; the hands have ngers endowed with the sense of
feeling; to crown the structure, the receding head is exalted on
the muscles of the neck . 60
It is on account of the whole organismeeits structure, the re-
lations between its parts, and its relation with its environmentee
that, Herder goes on to explain, uprightness becomes possible.
Importantly, he notes that uprightness is not essential to being
human, as is evident in children or humans who live among ani-
mals. Nonetheless, the very structure of the human body makes
uprightness possible. This means that uprightness is something
acquired in the right conditions. The same, Herder contends, holds
for reason. Thus, as one of the chapter titles so clearly puts it, the
human being is organized for reason [Der Mensch ist zur Vernunft-
fhigkeit organisiert].61 In other words, reason is possible given the
structure and environment of the human being. As such, it is not
something with which we are simply born. Rather, reason must be
developed in the right circumstances. Thus, even if rationality in
the human being is not entirely contingent (the structure of the
human body makes rational thought possible, in contrast to other
animals who lack this structure), it is also not entirely independent
of these circumstances. It is, in other words, not self-grounding;
rather, it is inextricably linked both to the total structure of the
human being and the environment.
In his review of Herder, Kant sees this move as a kind of natu-
ralization of reason. The review begins with an enumeration of
Herders key claims, including the claims that alteration of the
animals and of the human being [is] in accordance with the cli-
mates and that organization pervades all of nature, including dead
or inanimate nature, such as the ice crystal or snowake.62 Kant
emphasizes Herders use of the terms organic and organic force,
noting that Herder does not reckon with germs . but rather with
an organic force [Kraft], in plants as much as animals.63 This force,
Kant goes on, underlies all of creation manifesting itself differently
in different beings. It is the transformation of this one force, Kant
maintains, that determines differences between beings. In the hu-
man being, Kant continues, this force is manifest at the erect gait.
While Kants characterization of Herders account emphasizes
uprightness in a way that overlooks Herders holistic understand-
ing of development, the point that Kant wants to draw out and
which he nds most problematic holds: for Herder, reason is not
innate but acquired, and its acquisition depends on the natural
development of the human being in general. As such, it can be
studied in the same way that other aspects of the human organ-
ismeeand of nature in generaleecan be studied. It can be studied,
in other words, through the comparative method that Herder
employed in the Ideen and which he designated as anthropology.
It is Herders naturalization of reason and his corresponding
elimination of the task of metaphysics (and its replacement by
anthropology) that Kant found deeply problematic. In turn, it is in
light of these problematic views that Kant went on to develop and
put to use the notion of the epigenesis of pure reason as a met-
aphor in explicating the character of the categories. Kants pro-
grammatic aim in the adoption of that metaphor mirrors
Blumenbachs in insisting on a separate domain of inquiry for the
life sciences: just as Blumenbach had argued that the generation of
structure in animate matter is the result of a capacity inherent to
60
Herder (1989), 112.
61
Herder (1989), 116.
62
Kant (1785), AA 8, 47.
63
Kant (1785), AA 8, 48.
 D. Helbig, D. Nassar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016) 98e107
animate matter and animate matter alone, and thereby created a
distinctive domain of knowledge, so Kant sought to show that the
development of the categories employed by reason can only be
explained within an independent theory of reason, and not as the
product of natural-historical processes. Their development cannot
be explained through the action of natural forces, nor can it be
derived from nature, just as the generation of organization in
animate matter cannot be explained as the action of mere formative
forces (as in inorganic matter such as crystals) but only as that of a
formative drive. Where Blumenbach establishes a domain of the
study of life, Kant sought to reafrm metaphysics as the singular
domain for the study of reason.
5. B166-168
The signicant passages in the second edition of the Critique of
Pure Reason, in which Kant mentions the epigenesis of pure
reason, and uses the notion to describe the only possible way by
which to understand the relation between the categories and
experience, comes toward the end of the Transcendental Deduction
at B167. Kant introduces the notion of epigenesis here in a paren-
thetical remark, following a dismissal of an alternative way by
which to understand the relation between experience and con-
cepts. He writes:
Now there are only two ways in which a necessary agreement of
experience with the concepts of its objects can be thought:
either the experience makes these concepts possible or these
concepts make the experience possible. The rst is not the case
with the categories (nor with pure sensible intuition); for they
are a priori concepts, hence independent of experience (the
assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of generatio
aequivoca). Consequently only the second way remains (as it
were a system of the epigenesis of pure reason): namely that the
categories contain the grounds of the possibility of all experi-
ence in general from the side of the understanding.64
It is important to begin by emphasizing the exact way in which
Kant is invoking epigenesis here; he is not stating that the mind is a
biological organism, which develops according to the laws of bio-
logical epigenesis. Rather, his claim is that epigenesis offers a model
by which to understand the workings of the mind, more specif-
ically, the relationship between the categories and experience.
After he invokes this model, Kant goes on to reject a third model,
which he identies with a kind of preformation-system of pure
reason.65 Such a picture of the mind, he explains, implies that the
categories were neither self-thought [selbsgedachte] a priori rst
principles of our cognition nor drawn from experience, but were
rather subjective predispositions for thinking.66 From this, it is
evident that the epigenetic model means that the categories are
self-thought. This contrasts with the very rst option he had
offered, in which the categories are merely empirical, drawn from
experience. In turn, the nal (third) option that Kant offers (and
identies with preformation) contrasts with the rst two in that
the categories are neither self-thought, nor drawn from experience,
but rather implanted [eingepanzt] in the mindeeas one would
imagine the germs are implanted in the natural organism. In other
words, the preformation-system of pure reason implies some-
thing like innate ideas.
64
Kant (1781/1787), B166-7.
65
Kant (1781/1787), B167.
66
Ibid.
105
Kant rejects this third option because in such a case the cate-
gories would lack the necessity that is essential to their concept. He
elaborates via example: the concept of cause, which asserts the
necessity of a consequent under a presupposed condition, would be
false if it rested only on subjective necessity, arbitrarily implanted in
us, of combining certain empirical representations according to
such a rule of relation.67 Precisely because they are arbitrarily
implanted in us, Kant contends, innate ideas do not bear any ne-
cessity with regard to their concept. That is to say, the necessity is
not inherent to the concept, but external to it: they lack the ne-
cessity that essentially belongs to their concept.68 Thus, they
cannot produce objectively valid knowledge.
This might seem like an odd claim. Why, one might ask, would
innate ideas not deliver objective knowledge? Gnter Zller has
responded to this question by focusing on the distinction between
innate ideas and the a priori categories born out of the self-
generating character of reason. The claim is that insofar as reason
is self-grounding and self-generating, the categories must be un-
derstood not as original or innate, but as acquired in and through
the activity of thinking.69 This contrasts with the innatist view,
which rests on mere coincidence, due to some divine prear-
rangement.70 The categories are not arbitrary, then, because they
are the self-thought products of the activity of thinking itself.
Although Zller is right to emphasize the self-generating char-
acter of reason, and on that basis distinguish the categories from
innate ideas, the notions of self-generation and self-thought
alone do not fully explicate the character of the categories, account
for their objective validity, or distinguish the specicity (and
thereby the real signicance) of Kants use of the metaphor of
epigenesis.71 For Zller, Kants conception of epigenesis amounts to
the self-generation of reason, and can thus be modeled on either
Wolffs or Blumenbachs theories.72 As we have argued, however,
already in 1785, Kant had formulated a conception of epigenesis
that mirrors Blumenbachseea conception that distinctively em-
phasizes limitation on two counts: the delimitation of living from
non-living beings, and phylogenetic limitation. The real import of
Kants metaphor, then, cannot simply be the notion of self-
generation, but rather generation with limitation.
This becomes clear when we examine the context of the met-
aphor. It appears in the Deduction, where Kant aims to justify the
categories. As numerous commentators have argued, this means
that he must show not only that the application of the categories is
67
Kant (1781/1787), B168; emphasis added.
68
Kant (1781/1787), B168.
69
And not, as is the case in Herder, through the overall development of the
natural organism in its environment. Zller quotes Kant: The Critique admits
absolutely no divinely implanted (anerschaffene) or innate (angeborene) represen-
tations. It regards them all, whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the
understanding, as acquired. Zller (1989), 227.
70
Zller (1989), 231. Zller explains that the innatist problem would not arise for a
theory of knowledge that is entirely based on innate ideas, without any input from
mind-external entities. It is only a theory of knowledge that regards knowledge as
the outcome of both something non-empirical and something empirical that re-
quires a distinction between necessary (a priori) and non-necessary (empirical)
ideas.
71
We agree with Mensch (2013) who has shown that the signicance of
epigenesis in the Transcendental Deduction goes beyond the claim that reason is
self-generating and the categories are self-thought; in addition, she argues,
epigenesis implies a transcendental afnity within cognition itself, an afnity
which grants unity to the experience of natures coherence (134). Our claim is
that this unity is achieved through limitation.
72
See n. 57. Precisely because Zller does not recognize the way in which Kant
reinterprets epigenesis as a form of generic preformation in the Herder review, he
misses the fact that by 1787 Kant is specically identifying epigenesis with generic
preformation (i.e., Blumenbach), such that its real import rests not simply in the
notion of self-generation, but also in the notion of limitation.
106 D. Helbig, D. Nassar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 58 (2016) 98e107
possible, but also that the categories constrain or limit experience,
such that it is this limiting capacity that ensure[s] that the logical
function of subject-predicate judgment is used in a certain way
.73 In other words, to demonstrate the objective validity of the
categories, Kant needs to show that, as products of the activity of
thought, the categories are also limiting forces of and on this
activity.74
Precisely because the categories are the self-thought prod-
ucts of the operation of the understanding, they are not originally
present in the mind but formed through the activity of thinking.
This formation, in other words, takes place according to the rule-
bound activity of the understanding. The categories are thus the
products of the mind applying itself according to its own rules.
The categories are therefore both the outcome of a rule of
thoughteesuch that they can be described as self-thoughtee
and the application of this rule onto experience. As the application
of this rule onto experience, the categories play a limiting func-
tioneethe carve out experience into entities that must always be
subjects or entities that are predicated of these subjects. And it is
this limiting function of the categories that warrants their objec-
tive validity: they non-arbitrarily impose cognitive parameters on
experience.
The manner in which the categories actually determine and
constrain our experience in certain ways is beyond the scope of this
paper. Our purpose is not to explain how this application occurs,
but rather to show that it is this rule-bounded and limiting char-
acter of the categories, mirroring the account of limited natural
generation that Kant had formulated in his review of Herder, which
led Kant to adopt the metaphor of epigenesis to explicate his
conception of the mind.75 The categories, then, to quote Kants
statement from the review, are limitations, not further explicable,
of a self-forming faculty [weiter nicht erklrliche Einschrnkungen
eines sich selbst bildenden Vermgens].76
The parallel between this conception of the pure concepts of the
understandingeeas the outcome of the rule-governed activity of
the understanding and the limiting application of this ruleeeand
Kants conception of epigenesis qua scientic theory is clear. As we
have argued, Kants understanding of epigenesis after 1785 involves
73
Guyer (1992), 131.
74
Zammito (2003) makes a similar point with regard to Zllers interpretation. As
he puts it, Spontaneity of the categories was not sufcient for Kants transcen-
dental deduction, he also needed their constitutive sovereignty over experience
(92). Zammito takes this to be the ability of the mind to produce new knowledge,
which is to say that the mind had to be a real cause (of knowledge) . leading him
to conclude that Kants epigenesis analogy . built intellectual causation (deter-
mination; constitution) into the fundamental structure of the transcendental
deduction of the possibility of experience. As Zammito notes, such a conception
waseeon Kants transcendental principleseeunacceptable; but Kant had, accord-
ing to Zammito, not fully understood the meaning of the analogy he was drawing,
because he was especially ignorant of the revolution in thinking about this phe-
nomenon inaugurated by Blumenbach in 1781 (93). We have tried to show that
this was indeed not the case, rather, that Kant did have a grasp of the revolution in
thinking brought about by Blumenbach, and that it was precisely on account of this
revolution that he came to adopt this metaphor. Thus, in contrast to Zammitos
interpretation of where the sovereignty of the categories comes from on an
epigenetic model, we argue that it has nothing to do with the production of new
knowledge (i.e., content), but rather with the (formal) application of the rules
inherent to thought.
75
Sloan (2002) thinks that Kants preference for preformation and his insistence
on the use of the language of preformation to speak about the activity of cognition
has to do with the limitations that the preformative theory places on the self-
structuring capacity of living beings (244e245). As we have shown, however,
Kants conception of epigenesis following his Herder review involves limitation,
such that in the 1787 edition of the rst Critique, he can invoke the metaphor of
epigenesis and imply limitation. Preformation, by contrast, is regarded as a deeply
problematic metaphor for the mechanism of cognition.
76
Kant (1785), AA 8, 63.
two key factors: the rst, which many have emphasized, concerns
the self-generating character of living beings and reason. The sec-
ond, much less noted aspect, involves limitation. It is precisely this
second aspect that attracted Kant to Blumenbachs specic
conception of epigenesis and that Kant formulated in his Herder
review.
As we have shown, for Blumenbach the term epigenesis in-
volves limitation on two levels. First, it involves the limitation of the
formative drive by the composition of the reproductive matter of a
given species. On the cognitive level for Kant, this implied the
limitations of the categories, insofar as they are the outcomes of
rules of thought and the application of these rules.
Limitation for Blumenbach also meant the delimitation of
biological entities as opposed to physical oneseewith the cor-
responding differentiation between biology and physics. For
Kant, too, epigenesis involved limitation on this level, specif-
ically, the delimitation and independence of the domain of
reason from the domain of nature. Metaphysics, as the study of
reason, is thus separated from natural history and anthropology.
As self-forming or self-born, reason is not born out of
something other than itself (i.e., natural forces) and thus cannot
be studied in the same way that other beings are studied. Contra
Herder, metaphysics for Kant is preserved as an independent
domain of study.
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