Daoang vs.

Municipal Judge of San Nicolas

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)

Facts:

On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors
Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an
opposition to the said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate
daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses
were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of
Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held:

The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt,
are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in
the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The children thus mentioned
have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is
that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the
present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy,
cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.
Eliseo Silva v. Belen Cabrera
Case No. 146
G.R. No. L-3629 (March 19, 1951)FACTS:
Respondent filed an application with the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public
convenience, to be able to operate an ice plant in the City ofLipa. Petitioner, owner of another ice plant
already in the same area, opposedRespondents application, claiming that public convenience did not need
another ice plant. Atty. Aspillera was delegated by the Commissioner to receive testimonyand
conduct hearing of the contest; thereafter the Commission en banc rendered
ad e c i s i o n t h a t R e s p o n d e n t w a s a l l o w e d t o o p e r a t e t h e i c e p l a n t . Af t e r w h i c h , Petitioner
claimed that under the law, no one except the Commissioner may hear contested cases.
ISSUE:
W/N delegation to Atty. Aspillera to hear the case is lawful.
HELD:
No, the delegation is unlawful. Although Sec. 32 of Public Service Act allowsthe Commission to
delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive evidence or take testimony, Sec. 3 of the same act provides
that in (1) all contested cases and (2)cases involving fixing of rates, the reception of evidence may
only
be delegated toone of the Commissioners.T h u s , t h o u g h t h e
l a w m a k e s i t i n c o n v e n i e n t o r c u m b e r s o m e f o r t h e Commission to handle contested cases, where
the law is clear, the Commission nor the Court may not disregard, circumvent, or interpret the law any
other way. Plus,you have to look at the entire Act, and not just specific provisions, in applying
thelaw.
People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in aninformation dated 14
August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Codein connection with Section 2692 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 andas further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to
possession of firearm on ground of being asecret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27
November 1963, the lower courtrendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to
imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated
tothe Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor isexempt from the
requirement of having a license of firearm
Held:
The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached partsof firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be usedin the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms arein possession of such public officials and public
servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are
regularly and lawfully issued toofficers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincialtreasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails.It is
the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretationcome only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate withoutthem. The law cannot be any clearer,
there being no provision made for a secret agent.Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is
misplaced, and the case no longer speakswith authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It
may be note that in Peoplev. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the
appointmentof the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns
anddetection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer equivalent evento a member
of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case,therefore, the conviction
must stand.The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment
Cebu Portland Cement Company, vs. Mun. of Naga, Cebu, et. al.
plaintiff-appellant defendants-appellees

Facts:
T h e T r e a s u r e r o f t h e M u n . o f N a g a , C e b u c o l l e c t e d f r o m C e b u P o r t l a n d C e m e n t Compan
y (CPCC) municipal license tax imposed by the Amended Ordinance No. 21 oncement factories located in the same
municipality.The demands made by the Treasurer were not entirely successful and resulted to
ther e m e d i e s p r o v i d e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 2 3 0 4 o f t h e R e v i s e d A d m i n i s t r a t i v e C o d e . T h e Treas
urer gave CPCC 10 days to settle the account.The Treasurer also notified the Plant Manager of CPCC that he
was distraining 100,000bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of their municipal license tax in the total amount
of P h p 2 0 4 , 3 0 0 . 0 0 . A t f i r s t t h e P l a n t M a n a g e r d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e l e t t e r b u
t acknowledged the distraint in the afternoon of the same day he was notified.The Treasurer signed the receipt of the goods under the
authority of 2304 of the RevisedAdministrative Code & shall sell the same at a public auction to the highest bidder.
Theproceeds thereof shall be utilized in part of the satisfaction of the municipal license tax &penalties CPCC owes
to the municipality of Naga, Cebu.The Notice of Sale was posted by the Treasurer & stated that the public sale
shall be onJuly 27, 1962. However, no sale was held on the date specified & in the
appealeddecision, that there was a stipulation by the parties where the auction took place
onJanuary 30, 1962.

Issue
1.Whether the distraint was valid.
2.Whether the auction sale was valid

H e l d : With respect to the claim that the auction sale held on January 30, 1962 pursuant to the distraint was
null and void for being contrary to law because not more than twenty days have elapsed from the date of notice,
it is believed that the defendant Municipality of Naga and Municipal Treasurer of Naga have substantially
complied with the requirements provided for by Section 2305 of the Revised Administrative Code. From the
time that the plaintiff was first notified of the distraint on July 6, 1961 up to the date of the sale on January 30,
1962, certainly, more than twenty days have elapsed. If the sale did not take place, as advertised, on July 27,
1961, but only on January 30, 1962, it was due to the requests for deferment made by the plaintiff which unduly
delayed the proceedings for collection of the tax, and the said taxpayer should not be allowed now to complain
that the required period has not yet elapsed when the intention of the tax collector was already well-publicized
for many months."9 The reasonableness of the above observation of the lower court cannot be disputed. Under
the circumstances, the allegation that there was no observance of the twenty-day period hardly carries
conviction.
United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social Security Commission
Case No. 293G.R. No. L-26712-16 (December 27, 1969)
FACTS:
Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax for their operations. Nevertheless,
upon knowledge thereof, they paid their premiumremittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty
fees since they did not knowthat they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances, claiming
that theassessed penalties were inequitable. Respondent said that their organization isembraced in
the Social Security Act; therefore the assessed penalties are imposedon them.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the SocialSecurity Act to condone,
waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law for latepayment of remittances.
HELD:
Respondent has no such authority. Petition is dismissed on the ground that inthe absence of an express provision
in the Social Security Act vesting Respondent thep o w e r t o c o n d o n e p e n a l t i e s , i t h a s
n o l e g a l a u t h o r i t y t o c o n d o n e , w a i v e , o r relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances
mandatorily imposed under theSS Act. The reason of the law is to develop, establish gradually and perfect a
socialsecurity system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people to provideemployees
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death. Goodfaith and bad faith are
irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of
the legislature is equally plain, there isno room for interpretation.
Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Phil.

FACTS:
Appellants' applied for an urban real estate loan which was approved by appellee bank on April80, 1953. they
executed the mortgage contract on
March 23, 1954
, and that the release of thea m o u n t o f t h e s a i d l o a n o f P 1 9 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 w a s t o b e m a d e i n
i n s t a l m e n t s s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n conditions. That the loan obtained from DBP is to be received in several releases and to
be paidlater in instalments, under the terms and conditions specified in the loan agreement. That
thef i r s t r e l e a s e o f P 4 , 2 0 0 w a s m a d e o n A p r i l 2 9 , 1 9 5 4 , a n d t h e o t h e r r e l e a s e s w e r e m a
d e subsequent thereafter, then the balance of the loan were all availed of and received by him later than June, 1953.
Rodriguez paid the instalments as they fell due. When a balance of about P14,000.00 remained
unpaid, quijano offered to pay for the said outstanding balance with hisback pay certificate pursuant to Republic
Act. No. 897, The Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953.The Bank refused to accept the said tender of payment in
certificate on the ground that the loanwas not incurred before on June 20, 1953.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897,
the Amendatory Act of Julie 20, 1953 to Republic Act 304.Whether or not there is a room for interpretation or construction.
HELD:
Thus even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, when said law limited the applicabilityof back pay
certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," thisCourt has ruled that obligations
contracted after its enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot comewithin its purview.WHEREFORE, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed. No costs.Clear and unambiguous provisions of law offer no room for interpretation or
construction. TheSupreme Court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty
is theapplication of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only whensuch literal
application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need beresorted to where a
provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and
unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary.
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC. VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURTOF TAX
APPEALS, G.R. No. L-28463, May 31, 1971FACTS:
From December 1963 to July 1964, Republic Flour Mills (petitioner) exported Pollard and/or bran
which was loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade whileanchored near the breakwater.
The Commissioner of Customs and The Court of Tax Appeals(respondent) assessed the petitioner by way of
wharfage dues on the said exportations in thesum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under protestIn
this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would want the Court to interpret the words products of the
Philippines found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code,as excludingbran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on
the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which isimported in the Philippines, they are merely waste
from the production of flour. Another mainargument of the petitioner is that no government or private
wharves or government facilities were utilized in exporting such products. In that way, it would not be liable at all for the
wharfagedues assessed under such section by respondent Commission of
Customs.O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e s t a n d o f r e s p o n d e n t C o m m i s s i o n e r o f C u s t o m s w a s t h a t p
etitioner was liable for wharfage dues upon receipt or discharge of the exported goods by avessel engaged in
foreign trade regardless of the non-use of government-owned or private wharves. Respondent Court
of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate provision of the Tariff
and Customs Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law
RULING/HELD:
As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, "There shall be levied,collected and paid on all articles
imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of thePhilippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of two
pesos per gross metric ton as a
feef o r w h a r f a g e . " a p p e a r s t o b e q u i t e p r e c i s e . S e c t i o n 2 8 0 2 r e f e r s t o w h a t i s i m p o r t e d
a n d exported.The objective of this act must be carried out. Even if there is doubt to the meaning of thelanguage employed, the
interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas
motivated by the same desire to be excluded
fromt h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e Tar i f f a n d C u s t o m s C o d e w o u l d l i k e w i s e b e e n t i t l e d t o s y m p a t
h e t i c consideration. It was desirable then that the gates to such efforts at unjustified restriction of thecoverage
of the Act are kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear
legislative mandateThe decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed withcosts
against petitioner.
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1
took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment(Labor
Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusivecollective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plantof the
Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firmbefore the
same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued anotice of strike
against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said localunion; unfair labor
practice; nonpayment of living allowances; and employment of oppressive alienmanagement personnel
without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with
the trial court against the officers and members of theunion, for damages for obstruction of private property
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/orrestraining order. The union filed a motion for the dismissal and
for the dissolution of the restrainingorder, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to
Batas Pambansa 227 (LaborCode, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied.
Hence, the petition forcertiorari.
Issue:
Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.
Held:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation comeonly after it
has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.Jurisdiction over the subject
matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority whichorganizes the court; and it is given
only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred bylaw in words that do not admit of doubt.
Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derivedexclusively from the statutes of the forum, the
issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statutein force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of
Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction;since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the
jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers orclaims for damages arising from employer-employee
relations to the labor arbiters after PresidentialDecree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts,
and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 madeno change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters with respect to moneyclaims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee
relations; Article 217 is to beapplied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is
therein provided forexplicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional
trial court judgenow, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he
entertained thesuit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.The Supreme Court, thus,
granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 orderissued by the court a quo. It
granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, orwhoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to
which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on thecivil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for
the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent therestraining order issued on 5 August 1982.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA
RAILROADCOMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs.MANILA RAILROAD COMPA
NY, respondentappellee.

FACTS:-mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court,

petitioner-appellant would seek a reversal of such decision relying onwhat it considered to be a right
granted by Section 62 of theRepublic Act No. 2023,
more specifically the first two paragraphsthereof:(1) A member of a cooperative may, notwithstanding the
provisionsof existing laws, execute an agreement in favor of the co-operativeauthorizing his employer to deduct
from the salary or wages payableto him by the employer such amount as may be specified in theagreement and
to pay the amount so deducted to the co-operative insatisfaction of any debt or other demand owing from the
member tothe co-operative. (2) Upon the exemption of such agreement the employer shall if sorequired by the
co-operative by a request in writing and so long assuch debt or other demand or any part of it remains unpaid,
makethe claimant and remit forth with the amount so deducted to the co-operative."
-petitioner contends that under the above provisions of Rep.Act 2023, the loans granted by credit union
to its membersenjoy first priority in the payroll collection from therespondent's employees' wages and
salaries.
-Court ruled in favor of respondent
and held that:there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 hereinabovequoted which provides that
obligation of laborers and employeespayable to credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction fromthe
employees' wages and salaries. Theonly effect of Rep. Act 2023 is to compel the employer todeduct from the
salaries or wages payable to members of theemployees' cooperative credit unions the employees' debts
tothe union and to pay the same to the credit union.if Rep. Act 2023 had been enacted,the employer could
not becompelled to act as the collecting agent of the employees'credit union for the employees' debt to his
credit union but tocontend that the debt of a member of the employeescooperative credit union as having
first priority in the matter of deduction, is to write something into the law which does not appear. The
mandatory character of Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel theemployer to make the deduction of the
employees' debt fromthe latter's salary and turn this over to the employees' credit union but this
mandatory character does not convert the creditunion's credit into a first priority credit.If the legislative intent in
enacting pars. 1 and 2 of Sec. 62 of Rep. Act 2023 were to give first priority in the matter of payments
to theobligations of employees in favor of their credit unions, then, the lawwould have so expressly declared.
Thus, the express provisions of the New Civil Code, Arts. 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislativeintent on
preference of credits.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners interpretation of RA 2023 is correct?

HELD: NO-that there isnothing in said provision from which it could beimplied that it gives top priority
to obligations of the nature of that payable to petitioner, and that, therefore, respondent company did not
violate the above-quoted Section 62 of Republic Act 2023.
- The applicable provision of
Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier,speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity.
RCPI vs NTC Case Digest
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) vs. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and JUAN A. ALEGRE
G.R. No. 93237 November 6, 1992

Facts: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through
petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and
brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte.

Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. So, private respondent filed a letter-
complaint against RCPI with National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request
for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company. Taking cognizance of the
complaint, NTC directed RCPI to answer the complaint and set the initial hearing.

NTC held that RCPI was administratively liable for deficient and inadequate service under Section 19(a) of
C.A. 146 and imposed the penalty of fine payable within thirty (30) days from receipt in the aggregate amount
of one thousand pesos.

Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review invoking C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates.

ISSUE: Whether or not Public Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) has jurisdiction to impose fines

HELD: The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it.

NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section 21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was
empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a public service to comply
with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission.
Petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued
by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission
applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded.

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's
Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to impose
administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to render
adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory and regulatory power of
the agency.
G.R. No. L-30642 (April 30, 1985)
Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation

FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased
claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation
Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out
in the complaint 'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the
protection of the lives of its employees working underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued
because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, which, Philex
insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between availing themselves of the workers
right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.
RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmens Compensation
Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became
cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only
after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules
and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmens
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy
was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The
case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners
be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)

FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election
was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within
one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a
regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006,
no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered
together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a
law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to include SK election
will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In
interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation
should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Padua (G.R. No. L-72873. May 28, 1987)

FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their
deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later, his sister
sold her share in a Con Pacto de Retro Sale. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the
said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife
built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.

One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that he
was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her
brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised
within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court
reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:

YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.The co-heirs in this case were
undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that
the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the
justifications for this exception.

While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to read
out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to the letter that killeth but to the spirit
that vivifieth, to give effect to the law makers will.
Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas vs CAGR No. 78687, January 31, 1989

Statutory Rule: Facts:The parents of Elena Salenillas, one of the petitioners, were grantees offree patent. The
subject property was later sold to Elena Salenillas and herhusband, petitioners in the instant case. On December
4, 1973, the property ofpetitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National bank as security for a loan ofP2,500.
For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclose by PNB and wasbought at a public auction by private
respondent. Petitioner maintains that theyhave a right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the Public
Land Act.Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified petitioner from beinglegal heirs vis-a-vis
the said property.

Issue:W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of thePublic Land Act.

Held: Yes. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "every conveyance ofland acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions shall be subject torepurchase by the applicant, his widow or legal heirs within a
period of five yearsfrom the date or conveyance." The provision makes no distinction between thelegal heirs.
The distinction made by respondent contravenes the very purpose ofthe act. Between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves thepurpose of the law should prevail.
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-
BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA,
ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T.
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA
PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-
DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC,
Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the
latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse
of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for
administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio
Pascual (although they contend that the term illegitimate children as described in art 992 should be construed
as spurious children).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural
children from the inheritance of the deceased.
HELD:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein
cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent
Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. IAC [G.R. No. L-72005. May 29, 1987]

Ponente: GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:

[P]rivate respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against
Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit,
private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the
posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru
petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were released. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent
Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent
Court. The respondent Court granted the petition of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner herein, raised
the issue to the Supreme Court. A temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the
order complaint of was issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the counterbond of
the petitioner.

HELD:

YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs against petitioner.

RATIO:

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general
words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule
requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other
so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the
application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law
makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it
and without regard to consequences.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned
unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment pending
appeal.