METAPHYSICS

BOOK VI
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATING BEING

CONTENTS

LESSON 1: The Method of Investigating Being as Being. How This Science Differs from the Other Sciences
LESSON 2 The Being Which This Science Investigates
LESSON 3 Refutation of Those Who Wished to Abolish the Accidental
The True and the False as Being and Non-Being. Accidental Being and Being in the Sense of the True Are Excluded from This
LESSON 4
Science

LESSON 1

The Method of Investigating Being as Being. How This Science Differs from the Other Sciences

ARISTOTLES TEXT Chapter 1: 1025b 3-1026a 32

[1025] [3] , 532. The principles and causes of beings are the object of our search,
. , [5] and it is evident that [we must investigate the principles and causes
, of beings] as beings. For there is a cause of health and of its recovery;
and there are also principles and elements and causes of the objects
. of mathematics; and in general every intellectual science, to whatever
degree it participates in intellect, deals with principles and causes:
 either with those which are more certain or with those which are
simpler.

533. But all these sciences single out some one thing, or some
, [10] , particular class, and confine their investigations to this, but they do
, , not deal with being in an unqualified sense, or as being. Nor do they
, make any mention of the whatness itself of things. But proceeding
from this, some making it evident by means of the senses, and others
: taking it by assuming it [from some other science], they demonstrate
[15] , with greater necessity or more weakly the essential attributes of the
. class of things with which they deal. For this reason it is evident that
, there is no demonstration of a things substance or whatness from
. such an inductive method, but there is another method of making it
known. And similarly they say nothing about the existence or non-
existence of the class of things with which they deal, because it
belongs to the same science to show what a thing is and whether it
exists.

534. And since the philosophy of nature is concerned with some class
( [20] of being (for it deals with that kind of substance in which there is a
), ( principle of motion and rest), it is evident that it is neither a practical
, , nor a productive science. For the principle of productive sciences is
, : in the maker, whether it be intellect or art or some kind of power; but
), [25] the principle of practical sciences is prohaeresis in the agent, for the
, , object of action and that of choice are the same. Thus if every science
, is either practical, productive or theoretical, the philosophy of nature
. will be a theoretical science. But it will be theoretical of that kind of
being which is subject to motion, and of that kind of substance which
is inseparable from matter in its intelligible structure for the most part
only.
 , 535. Now the essence and the conceptual expression of the way in
[30] . which a thing exists must not remain unknown, because without this
. our investigation will be unfruitful. And regarding things defined, or
( their whatness, some are like snub and others like concave. And these
), . [1026] [1] differ, because snub is conceived with sensible matter (for snub is a
, concave nose), whereas concave is conceived without sensible
, , , ( matter. But all physical things are spoken of in a way similar to snub,
, ), for example, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone and animal in general; leaf,
, [5] root, bark and plant in general (for the definition of none of these is
, . without motion but always includes matter). Thus it is clear how we
, : must investigate and define the essence in the case of physical things,
and why it also belongs to the natural philosopher to speculate about
one kind of soul-that which does not exist without matter. From these
facts, then, it is evident that the philosophy of nature is a theoretical
science.

: 536. But mathematics is also a theoretical science, although it is not

, , yet evident whether it deals with things which are immobile and
[10] , . separable from matter. However, it is evident that mathematics
speculates about things insofar as they are immobile and insofar as
they are separable from matter.

, 537. Now if there is something which is immobile, eternal and

, ( separable from matter, evidently a knowledge of it belongs to a
) , . theoretical science. However, it does not belong to the philosophy of
, [15] nature (for this science deals with certain mobile things), or to
: mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For the philosophy of
. , nature deals with things which are inseparable from matter but not
: . immobile. And some mathematical sciences deal with things which
are immobile, but presumably do not exist separately, but are present
as it were in matter. First philosophy, however, deals with things
 which are both separable from matter and immobile. Now common
causes must be eternal, and especially these; since they are the causes
of the sensible things visible to us.

, , , 538. Hence there will be three theoretical philosophies: mathematics,

the philosophy of nature, and theology.

( [20] , 539. For it is obvious that, if the divine exists anywhere, it exists in
), this kind of nature.

. 540. And the most honorable of the sciences must deal with the most
, honorable class of things. Therefore the theoretical sciences are more
. desirable than the other sciences.

541. But someone will raise the question whether first philosophy is
[25] ( universal or deals with some particular class, i.e., one kind of reality;
, for not even in the mathematical sciences is the method the same,
, ): because both geometry and astronomy deal with a particular kind of
nature, whereas the first science is universally common to all.

, 542. Therefore, if there is no substance other than those which exist

: , [30] in the way that natural substances do, the philosophy of nature will
, : be the first science; but if there is an immobile substance, this
, substance will be prior, and [the science which investigates it will be]
. first philosophy, and will be universal in this way. And because it
will be first and about being, it will be the function of this science to
investigate both what being is and what the attributes are which
belong to it as being.
 COMMENTARY
Postquam philosophus in quarto huius ostendit, quod haec scientia
considerat de ente et de uno, et de his quae consequuntur ad ens
inquantum huiusmodi, et quod omnia ista dicuntur multipliciter, et in
quinto huius eorum multiplicitatem distinxit, hic incipit de ente
determinare, et de aliis quae consequuntur ad ens.
Dividitur autem pars ista in duas. In prima ostendit per quem modum haec
scientia debet determinare de ente. In secunda incipit de ente determinare,
scilicet in principio septimi, ibi, ens dicitur multipliciter.
Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit modum tractandi de
entibus, qui competit huic scientiae per differentiam ad alias scientias. In
secunda removet a consideratione huius scientiae ens aliquibus modis
dictum, secundum quos modos ens non intenditur principaliter in hac
scientia, ibi, sed quoniam ens simpliciter.
Prima autem pars dividitur in duas. In prima parte ostendit differentiam
huius scientiae ad alias, per hoc, quod considerat principia entis
inquantum est ens. Secundo, quantum ad modum tractandi de huiusmodi
principiis, ibi, quoniam vero physica. Circa primum duo facit.
How it differs from other sciences in treating of being
1144. Having shown in Book IV (535) of this work that this science
considers being and unity and those attributes which belong to being as
such, and that all of these are used in several senses; and having
distinguished the number of these in Book V (843; 885) of this work,
here the Philosopher begins to establish the truth about being and those
attributes which belong to being.
This part is divided into two sections. In the first he explains the
method by which this science should establish what is true about being.
In the second (1247) he begins to settle the issue about being. He does
this at the beginning of Book VII (The term being is used in many
senses).
The first part is divided into two sections. In the first he explains the
method of treating beings, which is proper to this science, by showing
how it differs from the other sciences. In the second (1170 he excludes
certain senses of being from the investigation of this science, namely,
those senses which are not the chief concern of this science (Being in
an unqualified sense).
The first part is again divided into two sections. In the first he shows
how this science differs from the others because it considers the
principles of being as being. In the second (1152) he shows how this
science differs from the others in its method of treating principles of
this kind (And since the philosophy of nature). In regard to the first
he does two things.
Primo ostendit quomodo haec scientia convenit cum aliis in
consideratione principiorum; dicens, quod ex quo ens est subiectum in
huiusmodi scientia, ut in quarto ostensum est, et quaelibet scientia debet
inquirere principia et causas, sui subiecti, quae sunt eius inquantum
huiusmodi, oportet quod in ista scientia inquirantur principia et causae
entium, inquantum sunt entia. Ita etiam est et in aliis scientiis. Nam
sanitatis et convalescentiae est aliqua causa, quam quaerit medicus. Et
similiter etiam mathematicorum sunt principia et elementa et causae, ut
figurae et numeri et aliarum huiusmodi quae perquirit mathematicus. Et
universaliter omnis scientia intellectualis qualitercumque participet
intellectum: sive sit solum circa intelligibilia, sicut scientia divina; sive
sit circa ea quae sunt aliquo modo imaginabilia, vel sensibilia in
particulari, in universali autem intelligibilia, et etiam sensibilia prout de
his est scientia, sicut in mathematica et in naturali; sive etiam ex
universalibus principiis ad particularia procedant, in quibus est operatio,
sicut in scientiis practicis: semper oportet quod talis scientia sit circa
causas et principia.
Quae quidem principia aut sunt certiora quo ad nos sicut in naturalibus,
quia sunt propinquiora sensibilibus, aut simpliciora et priora secundum
naturam, sicut est in mathematicis. Cognitiones autem quae sunt
sensitivae tantum, non sunt per principia et causas, sed per hoc quod
ipsum sensibile obiicitur sensui. Discurrere enim a causis in causata vel e
contrario, non est sensus, sed solum intellectus. Vel certiora principia
dicit ea quae sunt magis nota et exquisita. Simplicia autem ea, quae magis
superficialiter exquiruntur, sicut est in scientiis moralibus, quorum
principia sumuntur ex his quae sunt ut in pluribus.
1145. First, he shows how this science agrees with the other sciences
in its study of principles. He says that since being is the subject of this
kind of science, as has been shown in Book IV (529-30), and every
science must investigate the principles and causes which belong to its
subject inasmuch as it is this kind of thing, we must investigate in this
science the principles and causes of beings as beings. And this is also
what occurs in the other sciences. For there is a cause of health and of
its recovery, which the physician seeks. And similarly there are also
principles, elements and causes of the objects of mathematics, as figure
and number and other things of this kind which the mathematician
investigates. And in general every intellectual science, to whatever
degree it participates in intellect, must always deal with causes and
principles. This is the case whether it deals with purely intelligible
things, as divine science does, or with those which are in some way
imaginable or sensible in particular but intelligible in general; or even
if it deals with sensible things inasmuch as there is science of them, as
occurs in the case of mathematics and in that of the philosophy of
nature. Or again whether they proceed from universal principles to
particular cases in which there is activity, as occurs in the practical
sciences, it is always necessary that such sciences deal with principles
and causes.
1146. Now these principles are either (1) more certain to us, as occurs
in the natural sciences, because they are closer to sensible things, or (2)
they are simpler and prior in nature, as occurs in the mathematical
sciences. But cognitions which are only sensory are not the result of
principles and causes but of the sensible object itself acting upon the
senses. For to proceed from causes to effects or the reverse is not an
activity of the senses but only of the intellect. Or more certain
principles means those which are better known and more deeply
probed, and simple means those which are studied in a more
superficial way, as occurs in the moral sciences, whose principles are
derived from those things which occur in the majority of cases.

Secundum ibi, sed et omnes ostendit differentiam aliarum scientiarum ad
istam quantum ad considerationem principiorum et causarum; dicens,
quod omnes istae scientiae particulares, de quibus nunc facta est mentio,
sunt circa unum aliquod particulare genus entis, sicut circa numerum vel
magnitudinem, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Et tractat unaquaeque
circumscripte de suo genere subiecto, idest ita de isto genere, quod non
de alio: sicut scientia quae tractat de numero, non tractat de magnitudine.
Nulla enim earum determinat de ente simpliciter, idest de ente in
communi, nec etiam de aliquo particulari ente inquantum est ens. Sicut
arithmetica non determinat de numero inquantum est ens, sed inquantum
est numerus. De quolibet enim ente inquantum est ens, proprium est
metaphysici considerare.
Et, quia eiusdem est considerare de ente inquantum est ens, et de eo quod
quid est, idest de quidditate rei, quia unumquodque habet esse per suam
quidditatem, ideo etiam aliae scientiae particulares nullam mentionem,
idest determinationem faciunt de eo quod quid est, idest de quidditate rei,
et de definitione, quae ipsam significat. Sed ex hoc, idest ex ipso quod
quid est ad alia procedunt, utentes eo quasi demonstrato principio ad alia
probanda.
Ipsum autem quod quid est sui subiecti aliae scientiae faciunt esse
manifestum per sensum; sicut scientia, quae est de animalibus, accipit
quid est animal per id quod apparet sensui, idest per sensum et motum,
quibus animal a non animali discernitur. Aliae vero scientiae accipiunt
quod quid est sui subiecti, per suppositionem ab aliqua alia scientia, sicut
geometria accipit quid est magnitudo a philosopho primo. Et sic ex ipso
quod quid est noto per sensum vel per suppositionem, demonstrant
scientiae proprias passiones, quae secundum se insunt generi subiecto,
circa quod sunt. Nam definitio est medium in demonstratione propter
1147. But all these (533).
Second, he shows how the other sciences differ from this science in
their study of principles and causes. He says that all these particular
sciences which have now been mentioned are about one particular
class of being, for example, number, continuous quantity or something
of this kind; and each confines its investigations to its subject genus,
i.e., dealing with this class and not with another; for example, the
science which deals with number does not deal with continuous
quantity. For no one of the other sciences deals with being in an
unqualified sense, i.e., with being in general, or even with any
particular being as being; for example, arithmetic does not deal with
number as being but as number. For to consider each being as being is
proper to metaphysics.
1148. And since it belongs to the same science to consider both being
and the whatness or quiddity, because each thing has being by reason
of its quiddity, therefore the other particular sciences make no mention
of, i.e., they do (~) not investigate, the whatness or quiddity of a thing
and the definition signifying it. But (+) they proceed from this, i.e.,
from the whatness itself of a thing, to other things, using this as an
already established principle for the purpose of proving other things.
1149. Now some sciences make the whatness of their subject evident
by means of the senses, as the science which treats of animals
understands what an animal is by means of what is apparent to the
senses, i.e., by means of sensation and local motion, by which animal
is distinguished from non-animal. And other sciences understand the
whatness of their subject by assuming it from some other science, as
geometry learns what continuous quantity is from first philosophy.
Thus, beginning from the whatness itself of a thing, which has been
made known either by the senses or by assuming it from some other
quid. Modus autem demonstrationis est diversus; quia quaedam
demonstrant magis necessarie, sicut mathematicae scientiae, quaedam
vero infirmius, idest non de necessitate; sicut scientiae naturales, in
quibus multae demonstrationes sumuntur ex his quae non semper insunt,
sed frequenter.
Alia translatio habet loco suppositionis, conditionem. Et est idem sensus.
Nam quod supponitur, quasi ex conditione accipitur: et quia principium
demonstrationis est definitio, palam est ex tali inductione, quod
demonstratio non est de substantia rei, idest de essentia eius; nec de
definitione, quae significat quid est res; sed est aliquis alius modus, quo
definitiones ostenduntur; scilicet divisione, et aliis modis, qui ponuntur in
secundo posteriorum.
Et sicut nulla scientia particularis determinat quod quid est, ita etiam nulla
earum dicit de genere subiecto, circa quod versatur, est, aut non est. Et
hoc rationabiliter accidit; quia eiusdem scientiae est determinare
quaestionem an est, et manifestare quid est. Oportet enim quod quid est
accipere ut medium ad ostendendum an est. Et utraque est consideratio
philosophi, qui considerat ens inquantum ens. Et ideo quaelibet scientia
particularis supponit de subiecto suo, quia est, et quid est, ut dicitur in
primo posteriorum; et hoc est signum, quod nulla scientia particularis
determinat de ente simpliciter, nec de aliquo ente inquantum est ens.
science, these sciences demonstrate the proper attributes which belong
essentially to the subject-genus with which they deal; for a definition is
the middle term in a causal demonstration. But the method of
demonstration differs; because some sciences demonstrate with greater
necessity, as the mathematical sciences, and others more weakly, i.e.,
without necessity, as the sciences of nature, whose demonstrations are
based on things that do not pertain to something always but for the most
part.
1150. Another translation has condition in place of assumption, but
the meaning is the same; for what is assumed is taken, as it were, by
stipulation. And since the starting point of demonstration is definition,
it is evident that from this kind of inductive method there is no
demonstration of a things substance, i.e., of its essence, or of the
definition signifying its whatness; but there is some other method by
which definitions are made known, namely, the method of elimination
and the other methods which are given in the Posterior Analytics, Book
IV.
1151. And just as no particular science settles the issue about the
whatness of things, neither does any one of them discuss the existence
or nonexistence of the subject-genus with which it deals. This is
understandable, because it belongs to the same science to settle the
question of a things existence and to make known its whatness. For in
order to prove that a thing exists its whatness must be taken as the
middle term of the demonstration. Now both of these questions belong
to the investigation of the philosopher who considers being as being.
Therefore every particular science assumes the existence and whatness
of its subject, as is stated in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. This is
indicated by the fact that no particular science establishes the truth
about being in an unqualified sense, or about any being as being.

Deinde cum dicit quoniam vero ostendit differentiam huius scientiae ad
alias, quantum ad modum considerandi principia entis inquantum est ens.
Et quia ab antiquis scientia naturalis credebatur esse prima scientia, et
quae consideraret ens inquantum est ens, ideo ab ea, quasi a manifestiori
incipiens, primo ostendit differentiam scientiae naturalis a scientiis
practicis. Secundo differentiam eius a scientiis speculativis, in quo
ostenditur modus proprius considerationis huius scientiae, ibi, oportet
autem quod quid erat esse.
Dicit ergo primo, quod scientia naturalis non est circa ens simpliciter, sed
circa quoddam genus entis; scilicet circa substantiam naturalem, quae
habet in se principium motus et quietis: et ex hoc apparet quod neque est
activa, neque factiva. Differunt enim agere et facere: nam agere est
secundum operationem manentem in ipso agente, sicut est eligere,
intelligere et huiusmodi: unde scientiae activae dicuntur scientiae
morales. Facere autem est secundum operationem, quae transit exterius
ad materiae transmutationem, sicut secare, urere, et huiusmodi: unde
scientiae factivae dicuntur artes mechanicae.
Quod autem scientia naturalis non sit factiva, patet; quia principium
scientiarum factivarum est in faciente, non in facto, quod est artificiatum;
sed principium motus rerum naturalium est in ipsis rebus naturalibus. Hoc
autem principium rerum artificialium, quod est in faciente, est primo
intellectus, qui primo artem adinvenit; et secundo ars, quae est habitus
intellectus; et tertio aliqua potentia exequens, sicut potentia motiva, per
quam artifex exequitur conceptionem artis. Unde patet, quod scientia
naturalis non est factiva.
1152. And since the philosophy of nature (534).
Here he shows how this science differs from the other sciences in its
method of considering the principles of being as being. And since the
philosophy of nature was considered by the ancients to be the first
science and the one which would consider being as being, therefore,
beginning with it as with what is more evident, he shows, first (534),
how the philosophy of nature differs from the practical sciences; and
second (535), how it differs from the speculative sciences, showing also
the method of study proper to this science.
He says, first (534), that the philosophy of nature does not deal with
being in an unqualified sense but with some particular class of being,
i.e., with natural substance, which has within itself a principle of
motion and rest; and from this it is evident that it is neither a practical
nor a productive science. For action and production differ, because
action is an operation that remains in the agent itself, as choosing,
understanding and the like (and for this reason the practical sciences
are called moral sciences), whereas production is an operation that
passes over into some matter in order to change it, as cutting, burning
and the like (and for this reason the productive sciences are called
mechanical arts).
1153. Now it is evident that the philosophy of nature is not a (~)
productive science, because the principle of productive sciences is in
the maker and not in the thing made, which is the artifact. But the
principle of motion in natural bodies is within these natural bodies.
Further, the principle of things made by art, which is in the maker, is,
first, the intellect which discovers the art; and second, the art which is
an intellectual habit; and third, some executive power, such as the
motive power by which the artisan executes the work conceived by his

Et per eamdem rationem patet quod non est activa. Nam principium
activarum scientiarum est in agente, non in ipsis actionibus, sive moribus.
Hoc autem principium est prohaeresis, idest electio. Idem enim est agibile
et eligibile. Sic ergo patet, quod naturalis scientia non sit activa neque
factiva.
Si igitur omnis scientia est aut activa, aut factiva, aut theorica, sequitur
quod naturalis scientia theorica sit. Ita tamen est theorica, idest
speculativa circa determinatum genus entis, quod scilicet est possibile
moveri. Ens enim mobile est subiectum naturalis philosophiae. Et est
solum circa talem substantiam, idest quidditatem et essentiam rei, quae
secundum rationem non est separabilis a materia, ut in pluribus; et hoc
dicit propter intellectum, qui aliquo modo cadit sub consideratione
naturalis philosophiae, et tamen substantia eius est separabilis. Sic patet,
quod naturalis scientia est circa determinatum subiectum, quod est ens
mobile; et habet determinatum modum definiendi, scilicet cum materia.
Deinde cum dicit oportet autem hic ostendit differentiam naturalis
scientiae ad alias speculativas quantum ad modum definiendi: et circa hoc
duo facit. Primo ostendit differentiam praedictam. Secundo concludit
numerum scientiarum theoricarum, ibi quare.
art. Hence it is evident that the philosophy of nature is not a productive
science.
1154. And for this reason it is evident that it is not a (~) practical
science; for the principle of practical sciences is in the agent, not in the
actions or customary operations themselves. This principle is
prohaeresis, i.e., choice; for the object of action and that of choice
are the same. Hence it is evident that the philosophy of nature is neither
a practical nor a productive science.
1155. If, then, every science is either practical, productive or
theoretical, it follows that the philosophy of nature is a (+) theoretical
science. Yet it is theoretical, or speculative, of a special class of
being, namely, that which is subject to motion; for mobile being is the
subject matter of the philosophy of nature. And it deals only with that
kind of substance, i.e., the quiddity or essence of a thing, which is for
the most part inseparable from matter in its intelligible structure. He
adds this because of the intellect, which comes in a sense within the
scope of the philosophy of nature, although its substance is separable
from matter. Thus it is clear that the philosophy of nature deals with
some special subject, which is mobile being, and that it has a special
way of defining things, namely, with matter.
1156. Now the essence (535).
Here he shows how the philosophy of nature differs from the other
speculative sciences in its method of defining things; and in regard to
this he does two things. First, he explains this difference. Second
(1166), he draws a conclusion about the number of theoretical sciences.
(Hence there will be).
Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit modum proprium definiendi
naturalis philosophiae; dicens, quod ad cognoscendum differentiam
scientiarum speculativarum adinvicem, oportet non latere quidditatem
rei, et rationem idest definitionem significantem ipsam, quomodo est
assignanda in unaquaque scientia. Quaerere enim differentiam
praedictam sine hoc, idest sine cognitione modi definiendi, nihil facere
est. Cum enim definitio sit medium demonstrationis, et per consequens
principium sciendi, oportet quod ad diversum modum definiendi,
sequatur diversitas in scientiis speculativis.
Sciendum est autem, quod eorum quae diffiniuntur, quaedam definiuntur
sicut definitur simum, quaedam sicut definitur concavum; et haec duo
differunt, quia definitio simi est accepta cum materia sensibili. Simum
enim nihil aliud est quam nasus curvus vel concavus. Sed concavitas
definitur sine materia sensibili. Non enim ponitur in definitione concavi
vel curvi aliquod corpus sensibile, ut ignis aut aqua, aut aliquod corpus
huiusmodi. Dicitur enim concavum, cuius medium exit ab extremis.
Omnia autem naturalia simili modo definiuntur sicut simum, ut patet in
partibus animalis tam dissimilibus, ut sunt nasus, oculus et facies, quam
similibus, ut sunt caro et os; et etiam in toto animali. Et similiter in
partibus plantarum quae sunt folium, radix et cortex; et similiter in tota
planta. Nullius enim praedictorum definitio potest assignari sine motu:
sed quodlibet eorum habet materiam sensibilem in sui definitione, et per
consequens motum. Nam cuilibet materiae sensibili competit motus
proprius. In definitione enim carnis et ossis, oportet quod ponatur calidum
et frigidum aliquo modo contemperatum; et similiter in aliis. Et ex hoc
palam est quis est modus inquirendi quidditatem rerum naturalium, et
definiendi in scientia naturali, quia scilicet cum materia sensibili.
In regard to the first he does three things. First, he exposes the method
of definings things which is proper to the philosophy of nature. He says
that, in order to understand how the speculative sciences differ from
each other, the quiddity of a thing and the way in which the conceptual
expression, i.e., the definition signifying it, should be expressed in
each science, must not remain unknown. For in seeking the aforesaid
difference without this, i.e., without knowing how to define things,
our search would be unfruitful. For since a definition is the middle term
in a demonstration, and is therefore the starting-point of knowing the
difference between the speculative sciences must depend on the
different ways of defining things.
1157. Now concerning things which are defined it must be noted that
some are defined like snub and others like concave. And these two
differ because the definition of snub includes sensible matter (since
snub is merely a curved or concave nose), whereas concavity is defined
without sensible matter. For some sensible body, such as fire or water
or the like, is not included in the definition of concave or curved. For
that is said to be concave whose middle curves away from the ends.
1158. Now all natural things are defined in a way similar to snub, as is
evident both of those parts of an animal which are unlike, for example,
nose, eye and face; and of those which are alike, for example, flesh and
bone; and also of the whole animal. And the same is true of the parts of
plants, for example, leaf, root and bark; and also of the whole plant. For
no one of these can be defined without motion; but each includes
sensible matter in its definition, and therefore motion, because every
kind of sensible matter has its own kind of motion. Thus in the
definition of flesh and bone it is necessary that the hot and cold be held
to be suitably mixed in some way; and the same is true of other things.
From this it is evident what the method is which the philosophy of

Et propter hoc etiam de anima, quaedam speculatur naturalis,
quaecumque scilicet non definitur sine materia sensibili. Dicitur enim in
secundo de anima, quod anima est actus primus corporis physici organici
potentia vitam habentis. Anima autem secundum quod non est actus talis
corporis non pertinet ad considerationem naturalis, si qua anima potest a
corpore separari. Manifestum est ergo ex praedictis quod physica est
quaedam scientia theorica, et quod habet determinatum modum
definiendi.
Secundo ibi, sed est et mathematica ostendit modum proprium
mathematicae; dicens quod etiam mathematica est quaedam scientia
theorica. Constat enim, quod neque est activa, neque factiva; cum
mathematica consideret ea quae sunt sine motu, sine quo actio et factio
esse non possunt. Sed utrum illa de quibus considerat mathematica
scientia, sint mobilia et separabilia a materia secundum suum esse, adhuc
non est manifestum. Quidam enim posuerunt numeros et magnitudines et
alia mathematica esse separata et media inter species et sensibilia, scilicet
Platonici, ut in primo et tertio libro habitum est; cuius quaestionis veritas
nondum est ab eo perfecte determinata; determinabitur autem infra.
Sed tamen hoc est manifestum, quod scientia mathematica speculatur
quaedam inquantum sunt immobilia et inquantum sunt separata a materia
sensibili, licet secundum esse non sint immobilia vel separabilia. Ratio
enim eorum est sine materia sensibili, sicut ratio concavi vel curvi. In hoc
ergo differt mathematica a physica, quia physica considerat ea quorum
nature uses in investigating and defining the quiddity of natural things;
i.e., it involves sensible matter.
1159. And for this reason the philosophy of nature also investigates one
kind of soulthe kind that is (+) not defined without sensible matter.
For in Book II of The Soul he says that a soul is the first actuality of a
natural organic body having life potentially. But if any soul can exist
(~) separately from a body, then insofar as it is not the actuality of such
a body, it does not fall within the scope of the philosophy of nature.
Therefore it is evident from the above that the philosophy of nature is
a theoretical science, and that it has a special method of defining things.
1160. But mathematics (536).
Second, he exposes the method proper to mathematics. He says that
mathematics is also a speculative science; for evidently it is neither a
practical nor a productive science, since it considers things which are
devoid of motion, without which action and production cannot exist.
But whether those things which mathematical science considers are
immobile and separable from matter in their being is not yet clear. For
some men, the Platonists, held that numbers, continuous quantities and
other mathematical objects are separate from matter and midway
between the Forms and sensible things, as is stated in Book I (157) and
in Book III (350). But the answer to this question has not yet been fully
established by him, but will be established later on.
1161. However, it is evident that mathematical science studies some
things insofar as they are immobile and separate from matter, although
they are neither immobile nor separable from matter in being. For their
intelligible structure, for example, that of concave or curved, does not
contain sensible matter. Hence mathematical science differs from the
definitiones sunt cum materia sensibili. Et ideo considerat non separata,
inquantum sunt non separata. Mathematica vero considerat ea, quorum
definitiones sunt sine materia sensibili. Et ideo, etsi sunt non separata ea
quae considerat, tamen considerat ea inquantum sunt separata.
Tertio ibi, si vero est ostendit modum proprium scientiae huius; dicens
quod, si est aliquid immobile secundum esse, et per consequens
sempiternum et separabile a materia secundum esse, palam est, quod eius
consideratio est theoricae scientiae, non activae vel factivae, quarum
consideratio est circa aliquos motus. Et tamen consideratio talis entis non
est physica. Nam physica considerat de quibusdam entibus, scilicet de
mobilibus. Et similiter consideratio huius entis non est mathematica; quia
mathematica non considerat separabilia secundum esse, sed secundum
rationem, ut dictum est. Sed oportet quod consideratio huius entis sit
alterius scientiae prioris ambabus praedictis, scilicet physica et
mathematica.
Physica enim est circa inseparabilia et mobilia, et mathematica quaedam
circa immobilia, quae tamen non sunt separata a materia secundum esse,
sed solum secundum rationem, secundum vero esse sunt in materia
sensibili. Dicit autem forsan, quia haec veritas nondum est determinata.
Dicit autem quasdam mathematicas esse circa immobilia, sicut
geometriam et arithmeticam; quia quaedam scientiae mathematicae
applicantur ad motum sicut astrologia. Sed prima scientia est circa
separabilia secundum esse, et quae sunt omnino immobilia.
philosophy of nature in this respect, that while the philosophy of nature
considers things whose definitions contain sensible matter (and thus it
considers what is not separate insofar as it is not separate),
mathematical science considers things whose definitions do not
contain sensible matter. And thus even though the things which it
considers are not separate from matter, it nevertheless considers them
insofar as they are separate.
1162. Now if there is something (537).
Third, he exposes the method proper to this science. He says that, if
there is something whose being is immobile, and therefore eternal and
separable from matter in being, it is evident that the investigation of it
belongs to a theoretical science and not to a practical or productive
one, whose investigations have to do with certain kinds of motion.
However, the study of such being does not belong to the philosophy of
nature, for the philosophy of nature deals with certain kinds of beings,
namely, mobile ones. Nor likewise does the study of this being belong
to mathematics, because mathematics does not consider things which
are separable from matter in being but only in their intelligible
structure, as has been stated (1161). But the study of this being must
belong to another science which is prior to both of these, i.e., prior to
the philosophy of nature and to mathematics.
1163. For the philosophy of nature deals with things which are
inseparable from matter and mobile, and mathematics deals with
certain immobile things although these are not separate from matter in
being but only in their intelligible structure, since in reality they are
found in sensible matter. And he says presumably because this truth
has not yet been established. Further, he says that some mathematical
sciences deal with immobile things, as geometry and arithmetic,
because some mathematical sciences are applied to motion, as

Necesse vero est communes causas esse sempiternas. Primas enim causas
entium generativorum oportet esse ingenitas, ne generatio in infinitum
procedat; et maxime has, quae sunt omnino immobiles et immateriales.
Hae namque causae immateriales et immobiles sunt causae sensibilibus
manifestis nobis, quia sunt maxime entia, et per consequens causae
aliorum, ut in secundo libro ostensum est. Et per hoc patet, quod scientia
quae huiusmodi entia pertractat, prima est inter omnes, et considerat
communes causas omnium entium. Unde sunt causae entium secundum
quod sunt entia, quae inquiruntur in prima philosophia, ut in primo
proposuit. Ex hoc autem apparet manifeste falsitas opinionis illorum, qui
posuerunt Aristotelem sensisse, quod Deus non sit causa substantiae
caeli, sed solum motus eius.
Advertendum est autem, quod licet ad considerationem primae
philosophiae pertineant ea quae sunt separata secundum esse et rationem
a materia et motu, non tamen solum ea; sed etiam de sensibilibus,
inquantum sunt entia, philosophus perscrutatur. Nisi forte dicamus, ut
Avicenna dicit, quod huiusmodi communia de quibus haec scientia
perscrutatur, dicuntur separata secundum esse, non quia semper sint sine
materia; sed quia non de necessitate habent esse in materia, sicut
mathematica.
astronomy. But the first science deals with things which are separable
from matter in being and are altogether immobile.
1164. Now common causes must be eternal, because the first causes of
beings which are generated must not themselves be generated,
otherwise the process of generation would proceed to infinity; and this
is true especially of those causes which are altogether immobile and
immaterial. For those immaterial and immobile causes are the causes
of the sensible things evident to us, because they are beings in the
highest degree, and therefore are the cause of other things, as was
shown in Book II (290). From this it is evident that the science which
considers beings of this kind is the first of all the sciences and the one
which considers the common causes of all beings. Hence there are
causes of beings as beings, which are investigated in first philosophy,
as he proposed in Book I (36). And from this it is quite evident that the
opinion of those who claimed that Aristotle thought that God is not the
cause of the substance of the heavens, but only of their motion, is false.
[against Ibn-Rushd]
1165. However, we must remember that even though things which are
separate from matter and motion in being and in their intelligible
structure belong to the study of first philosophy, still the philosopher
not only investigates these but also sensible things inasmuch as they
are beings. Unless perhaps we may say, as Avicenna does, that
common things of the kind which this science considers are said to be
separate from matter in being, not because they are always without
matter, but because they do not necessarily have being in matter, as
the objects of mathematics do.
1166. Hence there will be (538).
Deinde cum dicit quare tres concludit numerum scientiarum theoricarum;
et circa hoc tria facit. Primo concludit ex praemissis, quod tres sunt partes
philosophiae theoricae, scilicet mathematica, physica et theologia, quae
est philosophia prima.
Deinde cum dicit non enim secundo assignat duas rationes quare haec
scientia dicatur theologia.
Quarum prima est, quia manifestum est, quod si alicubi, idest in aliquo
genere rerum existit aliquod divinum, quod existit in tali natura, scilicet
entis immobilis et a materia separati, de quo considerat ista scientia.
Deinde cum dicit et honorabilissimam secundam rationem ponit quae
talis est. Honorabilissima scientia est circa honorabilissimum genus
entium, in quo continentur res divinae: ergo, cum haec scientia sit
honorabilissima inter omnes, quia est honorabilior theoricis, ut prius
ostensum est,- quae quidem sunt honorabiliores practicis, ut in primo
libro habitum est -, manifestum est, quod ista scientia est circa res divinas;
et ideo dicitur theologia, quasi sermo de divinis.
He draws a conclusion as to the number of theoretical sciences. And
in regard to this he does three things. First, he concludes from what has
been laid down above that there are three parts of theoretical
philosophy: mathematics, the philosophy of nature, and theology,
which is first philosophy.
1167. For it is obvious (539).
Second, he gives two reasons why this science is called theology.
The first of these is that it is obvious that if the divine exists
anywhere, i.e., if something divine exists in any class of things, it
exists in such a nature, namely, in the class of being which is immobile
and separate from matter, which this science studies.
1168. And he most honorable (540).
He gives the second reason why this science is called theology; and the
reason is this: the most honorable science deals with the most
honorable class of beings, and this is the one in which divine beings are
contained. Therefore, since this science is the most honorable of the
sciences because it is the most honorable of the theoretical sciences, as
was shown before (64)and these are more honorable than the
practical sciences, as was stated in Book I (35)it is evident that this
science deals with divine beings; and therefore it is called theology
inasmuch as it is a discourse about divine beings.
1169. But someone will (541).
Deinde cum dicit dubitabit autem tertio movetur quaedam quaestio circa
praedeterminata: et primo movet eam, dicens, quod aliquis potest
dubitare, utrum prima philosophia sit universalis quasi considerans ens
universaliter, aut eius consideratio sit circa aliquod genus determinatum
et naturam unam. Et hoc non videtur. Non enim est unus modus huius
scientiae et mathematicarum; quia geometria et astrologia, quae sunt
mathematicae, sunt circa aliquam naturam determinatam; sed philosophia
prima est universaliter communis omnium. Et tamen e converso videtur,
quod sit alicuius determinatae naturae, propter hoc quod est separabilium
et immobilium, ut dictum est.
Deinde cum dicit si igitur secundo solvit, dicens quod si non est aliqua
alia substantia praeter eas quae consistunt secundum naturam, de quibus
est physica, physica erit prima scientia. Sed, si est aliqua substantia
immobilis, ista erit prior substantia naturali; et per consequens
philosophia considerans huiusmodi substantiam, erit philosophia prima.
Et quia est prima, ideo erit universalis, et erit eius speculari de ente
inquantum est ens, et de eo quod quid est, et de his quae sunt entis
inquantum est ens: eadem enim est scientia primi entis et entis communis,
ut in principio quarti habitum est.
LESSON 2
The Being Which This Science Investigates
[objection] Third, he raises a question about a point already established.
First, he states the question, saying that someone can inquire whether
first philosophy is universal inasmuch as it considers being in general,
or whether it investigates some particular class or a single nature. Now
this does not seem to be the case. For this science and the mathematical
sciences do not have one and the same method; because geometry and
astronomy, which are mathematical sciences, deal with a special nature,
whereas first philosophy is universally common to all. Yet the reverse
seems to be true, namely, that it deals with a special nature, because it
is concerned with things which are separable from matter and
immobile, as has been stated (1163).
1170. Therefore, if (542).
Second, he answers this question, saying that if there is no substance
other than those which exist in the way that natural substances do, with
which the philosophy of nature deals, the philosophy of nature will be
the first science. But if there is some immobile substance, this will be
prior to natural substance, and therefore the philosophy which
considers this kind of substance, will be first philosophy. And since it
is first, it will be universal; and it will be its function to study being as
being, both what being is and what the attributes are which belong to
being as being. For the science of the primary kind of being and that of
being in general are the same, as has been stated at the beginning of
Book IV (533).
 ARISTOTLES TEXT Chapter 2: 1026a 33-1027a 28

, 543. Being in an unqualified sense has various meanings, of which one

, [35] , is the accidental, and another the true (and non-being may signify the
, ( false); and besides these there are the categorical figures, for example,
, , , , , the what, of what sort, how much, where, when, and anything else
), [1026] [1] which signifies in this way; and besides all of these there is the
: potential and the actual.

, 544- Since being is used in many senses, then, we must speak first of
, . : the accidental, because there is no speculation about it. And this is
[5] indicated by the fact that there is no science, either practical or
. speculative, that investigates it. For one who builds a house does not
( : simultaneously cause all traits that are accidental to the completed
, house, since these are infinite in number. For nothing prevents the
: [10] completed house from being pleasant to some, harmful to others,
), useful to others, and different, as I may say, from all other things, none
, of which the art of building produces. And similarly neither does the
. geometrician speculate about things which are accidents of figures in
this way, nor whether a triangle differs from a triangle having two right
angles.

: 545. And this is understandable, because the accidental is in a sense

. being only in name.

[15] 546. Hence in a way Plato was not wrong when he said that sophistry
. deals with non-being. For the arguments of the sophists, as I may say,
, are concerned chiefly with the accidental; [for example, they ask]
, , whether the musical and the grammatical are the same or different; and
, , , , whether musical Coriscus and Coriscus are the same; and whether
 [20] , everything which is but has not always been has come to be, so that if
: . one who is musical has become grammatical, then one who is
grammatical has become musical; and all other such arguments. For
the accidental seems to be close to non-being.

: 547. Now this is also clear from these arguments: there is generation
, . and corruption of those things which are in another way, but not of
those things which are by accident.

[25] 548. Yet concerning the accidental it is necessary to state further, so

, : far as it is possible, what its nature is and by what cause it exists; and
. perhaps at the same time it will also become evident why there is no
science of it.

, 549. Therefore, since there are some beings which always are in the
same way and of necessity (not necessity in the sense of compulsion,
, [30] , but in the sense of that which cannot be otherwise), and others which
, : are neither of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the
principle and this the cause of the accidental.

[32] , 550. For that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call the
. , accidental. For example, if there should be cold and wintry weather
, , [35] during the dog days, we say that this is accidental; but not if the
. weather is sultry and hot, because the latter occurs either always or for
( ), . the most part, whereas the former does not. And it is accidental for a
, [1027] [1] man to be white, for this is so neither always nor for the most part; but
, it is not accidental for him to be an animal. And it is accidental if a
. builder produces health, because it is not a builder but a physician who
, : , , [5] is naturally fitted to do this; but it is accidental for a builder to be a
, . [] physician. Again, a confectioner, aiming to prepare something
 , : palatable, may produce something health-giving; but not according to
the confectioners art. Hence we say that it was accidental. And while
. there is a sense in which he produces it, he does not produce it in a
primary and proper sense. For there are other powers which sometimes
are productive of other things, but there is no art or determinate power
which is productive of the accidental; for the cause of things which are
or come to be by accident is also accidental.

, 551. Hence, since not all things are or come to be of necessity and
[10] , : always, but most things occur for the most part, the accidental must
, exist; for example, a white man is neither always nor for the most part
, ( , musical. But since this occurs only occasionally, it must be accidental;
): otherwise everything would be of necessity. Hence matter is the
. [15] , contingent cause of the accidental, which happens otherwise than
. ; usually occurs. And we must take as our starting point this question:
. Is there nothing that is neither always nor for the most part, or is this
, , impossible? There is, then, besides these something which is
; , contingent and accidental. But then there is the question: Does that
which occurs for the most part and that which occurs always, have no
existence, or are there some beings which are eternal? These questions
must be investigated later (1055)

[20] : 552. However, it is evident that there is no science of the accidental,

for all scientific knowledge is of that which is always or for the most
; , part; otherwise how could one be taught or teach anyone else? For a
thing must be defined either as being so always or for the most part;
, [25] , : for example, honey-water is beneficial in most cases to those with a
: fever. But with regard to what happens in the other cases, it will be
. impossible to state when they occur, for example, at the new moon;
, . for whatever happens at the new moon also happens either always or
for the most part; but the accidental is contrary to this. We have

that there is no science of it.
COMMENTARY
Hic ostendit de quibus entibus principaliter haec scientia tractare intendit;
et circa hoc tria facit. Primo repetit modos quibus aliquid dicitur ens.
Secundo determinat naturam entis secundum duos modos de quibus
principaliter non intendit, ibi, quoniam itaque multipliciter dicitur ens.
Tertio ostendit quod de his modis entis principaliter non intendit, ibi,
quoniam autem complexio.
Dicit ergo primo, quod ens simpliciter, idest universaliter dictum, dicitur
multipliciter, ut in quinto est habitum. Uno modo dicitur aliquid ens
secundum accidens. Alio modo dicitur ens, idem quod verum
propositionis; et non ens, idem quod falsum. Tertio modo dicitur ens quod
continet sub se figuras praedicamentorum, ut quid, quale, quantum et
cetera. Quarto modo praeter praedictos omnes, quod dividitur per
potentiam et actum.
explained, then, what the accidental is, and by what cause it exists, and
This science is not about accidental being.
1171. Here Aristotle indicates with what beings this science chiefly
intends to deal; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he
recalls the ways in which things are said to be; second (1172), he
establishes the nature of the two kinds of being with which he is not
chiefly concerned (Since being); and third (1241), he shows that it is
not his chief aim to consider these two kinds of being (But since
combination).
Accordingly he says, first, that being in an unqualified sense, i.e., in a
universal sense, is predicated of many things, as has been stated in
Book V (885). In one sense being means what is accidental; and in
another sense it means the same thing as the truth of a proposition (and
non-being the same as the falseness of a proposition); and in a third
sense being is predicated of the things contained under the categorical
figures, for example, the what, of what sort, how much, and so on; and
in a fourth sense, in addition to all of the above, being applies to what
is divided by potentiality and actuality [modes].
1172. Since being (544).
Deinde cum dicit quoniam itaque determinat de modis entis quos
praetermittere intendit. Et primo de ente per accidens. Secundo de ente
quod est idem quod verum, ibi, quod autem ut verum et cetera.
Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod de ente per accidens non
potest esse aliqua scientia. Secundo determinat ea quae sunt consideranda
circa ens per accidens, ibi, attamen dicendum est et cetera.
Dicit ergo primo, quod, cum ens multipliciter dicatur, ut dictum est, primo
dicendum est de ente per accidens; ut quod minus habet de ratione entis,
primo a consideratione huius scientiae excludatur. Hoc autem dicendum
est de eo, quod nulla speculatio cuiuscumque scientiae potest esse circa
ipsum. Et hoc probat dupliciter.
Primo per signum; dicens, signum esse huius quod de ente per accidens
non possit esse speculatio, quia nulla scientia quantumcumque sit
studiosa aut meditativa, ut alia translatio habet, idest diligenter inquisitiva
eorum quae ad ipsam pertinent, invenitur esse de ente per accidens. Sed
nec etiam practica quae dividitur per activam et factivam, ut supra dictum
est, neque scientia theorica.
Et hoc manifestat primo in practicis scientiis, quia ille qui facit domum,
si facit eam, non facit ea quae insunt domui factae, nisi per accidens, cum
illa sint infinita, et sic non possunt cadere sub arte. Nihil enim prohibet
domum factam esse istis voluptuosam, idest delectabilem, illis scilicet qui
in ea prospere vivunt: aliis autem nocivam qui scilicet occasione domus
aliquod detrimentum incurrunt. Et aliis utilem qui in domo aliquod
Here he deals with the senses of being which he intends to exclude
from this science. First (1172), he deals with accidental being; and
second (1223), with being which is, identical with the true [logical].
In regard to the first he does two things. First he shows that there can
be no science of the accidental. Second (1180), he establishes the things
that must be considered about accidental being (Yet concerning the
accidental).
He says, first, that since being is used in many senses, as has been stated
(1170), it is necessary first of all to speak of accidental being, so that
anything which has the character of being in a lesser degree may first
be excluded from the study of this science. And with regard to this kind
of being it must be said that no speculation of any science can be
concerned with it; and he proves this in two ways.
1173. He does this first by giving a concrete indication. He says that
the impossibility of there being any speculation about accidental being
is indicated by the fact that no science, howsoever investigative it
may be, or thoughtful as another translation says, i.e. no matter how
carefully it investigates the objects which come within its scope, is
found to deal with accidental being. No practical science (and this is
divided into the science of action and productive science, as was said
above [1152]) is concerned with it, nor even any speculative science.
1174. He makes this evident, first, in the case of the practical sciences;
for one who builds a house, granted that he builds it, is only an
accidental cause of those things which are accidental to the completed
house, since these are infinite in number and thus cannot come within
the scope of art. For nothing prevents the completed house from being
pleasant, or delightful, to those who dwell there happily; harmful
emolumentum conquirunt, et etiam esse alteram et dissimilem omnibus
entibus. Nullius autem eorum, quae per accidens insunt domui, factiva est
ars aedificativa; sed solum est factiva domus, et eorum quae per se insunt
domui.
Et deinde ostendit idem in scientiis speculativis: quia simili modo nec
geometria speculatur ea quae sunt accidentia figuris sic, idest per
accidens, sed solum illa quae accidunt figuris per se. Speculatur enim hoc
quod triangulus est habens duos rectos, idest tres angulos aequales duobus
rectis; sed non speculatur, si aliquid alterum, utputa lignum vel aliquid
huiusmodi, est trigonum. Haec enim per accidens conveniunt triangulo.
Secundo ibi, et hoc probat idem per rationem; dicens, quod rationabiliter
hoc accidit quod scientia non speculatur de ente per accidens; quia
scientia speculatur de his quae sunt entia secundum rem; ens autem
secundum accidens est ens quasi solo nomine, inquantum unum de alio
praedicatur. Sic enim unumquodque est ens inquantum unum est. Ex
duobus autem, quorum unum accidit alteri, non fit unum nisi secundum
nomen; prout scilicet unum de altero praedicatur, ut cum musicum dicitur
esse album, aut e converso. Non autem ita, quod aliqua res una
constituatur ex albedine et musico.
to those who suffer some misfortune occasioned by it; useful to those
who acquire some profit from it; and also different from and unlike
all other things. But the art of building does not produce any of the
things which are accidental to a house, but only produces a house and
the things which are essential to it.
1175. Then he shows that the same thing is true in the case of the
speculative sciences, because similarly neither does geometry
speculate about those things which are accidents of figures in this
way, i.e., accidentally, but only about those attributes which belong
essentially to figures. For it speculates about a triangle being a figure
having two right angles, i.e., having its three angles equal to two right
angles; but it does not speculate whether a triangle is anything else,
such as wood or something of the sort, because these things pertain to
a triangle accidentally.
1176. And this is understandable (545)
Second, he proves the same thing by means of an argument. He says
it is reasonable that no science should speculate about accidental being,
because a science studies those things which are being in a (+) real
sense, but (~) accidental being is in a sense being only in name,
inasmuch as one thing is predicated of another. For each thing is a being
insofar as it is one. But from any two things which are accidentally
related to each other there comes to be something that is one only in
name, i.e., inasmuch as one is predicated of the other, for example,
when the musical is said to be white, or the converse. But this does not
happen in such a way that some one thing is constituted from whiteness
and the musical.
1177. Hence in a way (546).
Unde Plato quod autem ens per accidens sit quasi solo nomine ens, probat
dupliciter. Primo per auctoritatem Platonis. Secundo per rationem.
Secunda ibi, palam autem et cetera.
Dicit ergo, quod propter hoc quod ens per accidens quodammodo est ens
solo nomine, ideo Plato quodammodo non male fecit cum ordinando
diversas scientias circa diversa substantia, ordinavit scientiam
sophisticam circa non ens. Rationes enim sophisticorum maxime sunt
circa accidens. Secundum enim fallaciam accidentis fiunt maxime
latentes paralogismi.
Et ideo dicitur in primo elenchorum, quod secundum accidens faciunt
syllogismos contra sapientes; ut patet in istis paralogismis, in quibus
dubitatur utrum diversum an idem sit musicum et grammaticum. Ut fiat
talis paralogismus. Musicum est aliud a grammatico; musicum autem est
grammaticum, ergo musicum est alterum a se. Musicum enim est aliud a
grammatico, per se loquendo; sed musicus est grammaticus per accidens.
Unde non est mirum si sequitur inconveniens, non distincto quod est per
accidens ab eo quod est per se. Et similiter si sic dicatur: Coriscus est
alterum a Corisco musico: sed Coriscus est Coriscus musicus; ergo
Coriscus est aliud a se. Hic etiam non distinguitur quod est per accidens
ab eo quod est per se. Et similiter si dicatur: omne quod est et non fuit
semper, est factum: sed musicus ens est grammaticus et non fuit semper:
ergo sequitur quod musicus ens grammaticus sit factus, et grammaticus
ens musicus. Quod quidem est falsum; quia nulla generatio terminatur ad
hoc quod est grammaticum esse musicum; sed una ad hoc quod est
grammaticum esse, alia ad hoc quod est musicum esse. Patet etiam, quod
in hac ratione, prima est vera de eo quod est per se, sed in secunda
assumitur quod est ens per accidens. Et similiter est in omnibus talibus
rationibus, quae sunt secundum fallaciam accidentis. Videtur enim ens
per accidens, esse propinquum non enti. Et ideo sophistica, quae est circa
apparens et non existens, est praecipue circa ens per accidens.
He proves in two ways that accidental being is in a sense being only in
name. He does this, first, on the authority of Plato; and second (1179),
by an argument.
He says that since accidental being is in a sense being only in name,
Plato in a way was not wrong when, in allotting different sciences to
different kinds of substance, he assigned sophistical science to the
realm of non-being. For the arguments of the sophists are concerned
chiefly with the accidental, since hidden paralogisms have the fallacy
of accident as their principal basis.
1178. Therefore in the first book of the Sophistical Refutations it is said
that in arguing against wise men the sophists construct syllogisms that
are based on the accidental. This is evident, for example, in these
paralogisms in which the question is raised whether the musical and the
grammatical are the same or different. Let us construct such a
paralogism. The musical differs from the grammatical; but the musical
is the grammatical; hence the musical differs from itself. For the
musical differs from the grammatical essentially speaking, but the
musical is the grammatical by accident. Little wonder then that an
absurd conclusion follows, for what is accidental is not distinguished
from what is essential. And it would be similar if we were to speak thus:
Coriscus differs from musical Coriscus; but Coriscus is musical
Coriscus; therefore Coriscus differs from himself. Here too no
distinction is drawn between what is accidental and what is essential.
And it would be the same if we were to say: everything which is and
has not always been, has come to be; but the musical is grammatical
and has not always been so; therefore it follows that the musical has
become grammatical and that the grammatical has become musical. But
this is false, because no process of generation terminates in the
grammatical being musical, but one process of generation terminates in
a man being grammatical and another in a man being musical. It is also

Palam autem secundo probat idem per rationem, dicens, quod etiam ex
his rationibus, quibus utuntur sophistae, palam est, quod ens per accidens
est propinquum non enti. Nam eorum, quae sunt entia alio modo quam
per accidens, est generatio et corruptio: sed entis per accidens non est
neque generatio neque corruptio. Musicum enim una generatione fit, et
grammaticum alia. Non est autem una generatio grammatici musici, sicut
animalis bipedis, vel sicut hominis risibilis. Unde patet, quod ens per
accidens non vere dicitur ens.
Deinde cum dicit attamen dicendum determinat de ente per accidens
secundum quod est possibilis de eo determinatio. Quamvis enim ea,
quibus convenit esse per accidens, non cadant sub consideratione alicuius
scientiae, tamen ratio huius quod est esse per accidens, per aliquam
scientiam considerari potest. Sicut etiam licet id quod est infinitum,
secundum quod est infinitum, sit ignotum, tamen de infinito secundum
quod infinitum aliqua scientia tractat.
evident that in this argument the first statement is true of something that
has being essentially, whereas in the second something is assumed that
has being only by accident. And it is similar in all such argument based
on the fallacy of accident. For accidental being seems to be close to
non-being; and therefore sophistics, which is concerned with the
apparent and nonexistent, deals chiefly with the accidental.
1179. How this is also clear (547).
Second, he proves the same thing by an argument. He says that it is
also evident, from these arguments which the sophists use, that the
accidental is close to non-being; for there is generation and corruption
of those things which are beings in a different way than the accidental
is, but there is neither generation nor corruption of the accidental. For
the musical comes to be by one process of generation and the
grammatical by another, but there is not one process of generation of
the grammatical musical as there is of two-footed animal or of risible
man. Hence it is evident that accidental being is not called being in any
true sense.
1180. Yet concerning the accidental (548).
He now establishes the truth about accidental being insofar as it is
possible to do so. For even though those things which are properly
accidental do not come within the scope of any science, still the nature
of the accidental can be considered by some science. This is also what
happens in the case of the infinite; for even though the infinite as
infinite remains unknown, still some science treats of the infinite as
infinite.
Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo determinat ea, quae sunt consideranda circa
ens per accidens. Secundo excludit quamdam opinionem, per quam
removetur ens per accidens, ibi, quod autem sint principia et esse et
cetera.
Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit, quod est dicendum de ente per
accidens inquantum contingit de ipso tractare, tria; scilicet quae est eius
natura, et quae est eius causa; et ex his erit tertium manifestum, quare eius
non potest esse scientia.
per accidens; dicens, quod quia in entibus quaedam sunt semper similiter
se habentia ex necessitate (non quidem secundum quod necessitas ponitur
pro violentia, sed prout necessitas dicitur secundum quam non contingit
aliter se habere, ut hominem esse animal); quaedam vero non sunt ex
necessitate, nec semper, sed sunt secundum magis, idest ut in pluribus. Et
hoc, scilicet ens ut in pluribus, est causa et principium quod aliquid sit per
accidens. In rebus enim quae sunt semper, non potest esse aliquid per
accidens; quia solum quod est per se potest esse necessarium et
sempiternum, ut etiam in quinto habitum est. Unde relinquitur, quod
solum in contingentibus potest esse ens per accidens.
Deinde cum dicit quoniam igitur prosequitur tria praedicta. Et primo quae
sit causa entis.
In regard to this he does two things. First, he settles the issue regarding
those points which should be investigated about accidental being.
Second (1191), he rejects an opinion that, would abolish accidental
being (Now it is evident).
1181. In regard to the first he does two things. First (548), he says that
there are three points which must be discussed about accidental being,
insofar as it is possible to treat of it, namely, (1) what its nature is, and
(2) what causes it; and from this the third will become evident, (3) why
there can be no science of it.
1182. Therefore, since there are (549).
He discusses these three points. (2) First, he shows what the cause of
the accidental is. He says that there are some beings which always are
in the same way and of necessity (not in the sense in which necessity is
taken to mean compulsion, but in the sense of that which cannot be
otherwise than it is, as Man is an animal); and there are other beings
which are neither always nor of necessity, but for the most part, i.e., in
the majority of cases, and this, i.e., what occurs in the majority of
cases, is the principle and the cause of the accidental. For in the case of
those things which always are there can be nothing accidental, because
only that which exists of itself can be necessary and eternal, as is also
stated in Book V (839). Hence it follows that accidental being can be
found only in the realm of contingent things.
1184. For that which (550).
[not in Rowan] Then, when he says For therefore, he takes up the
aforesaid. And first, what is the cause of being.
Contingens autem ad utrumlibet, non potest esse causa alicuius
inquantum huiusmodi. Secundum enim quod est ad utrumlibet, habet
dispositionem materiae, quae est in potentia ad duo opposita: nihil enim
agit secundum quod est in potentia. Unde oportet quod causa, quae est ad
utrumlibet, ut voluntas, ad hoc quod agat, inclinetur magis ad unam
partem, per hoc quod movetur ab appetibili, et sic sit causa ut in pluribus.
Contingens autem ut in paucioribus est ens per accidens cuius causa
quaeritur. Unde relinquitur, quod causa entis per accidens sit contingens
ut in pluribus, quia eius defectus est ut in paucioribus. Et hoc est ens per
accidens.
Secundo ibi, quod enim ostendit naturam entis per accidens, dicens: ideo
dico quod id quod est in pluribus est causa entis per accidens, quia quod
non est semper neque secundum magis, hoc dicimus esse per accidens. Et
hoc est defectus eius quod est in pluribus, ut si fuerit hiems idest tempus
pluviosum et frigus sub cane, idest in diebus canicularibus, hoc dicimus
esse per accidens. Non tamen si tunc fuerit aestuatio, idest siccitas et
calor. Hoc enim est semper vel ut in pluribus, sed illud non. Et similiter
dicimus hominem esse album per accidens, quia hoc non est semper nec
in pluribus. Hominem vero per se dicimus esse animal, non per accidens,
quia hoc est semper. Et similiter aedificator facit sanitatem per accidens,
quia aedificator non est aptus natus facere sanitatem inquantum
huiusmodi, sed solus medicus. Aedificator autem facit sanitatem
inquantum accidit eum esse medicum; et similiter opsopios, idest cocus
coniectans, idest intendens facere voluptatem, idest delectationem in
cibo, faciendo aliquem cibum bene saporatum, facit aliquid salubre.
Cibus enim bonus et delectabilis quandoque est utilis ad sanitatem. Sed
hoc non est secundum artem opsopoieticam, idest pulmentariam, quod
faciat salubre, sed quod faciat delectabile. Et propter hoc dicimus hoc
accidere.
1183. But that which is contingent, or open to opposites, cannot as
such be the cause of anything. For insofar as it is open to opposites it
has the character of matter, which is in potency to two opposites; for
nothing acts insofar as it is in potency. Hence a cause which is open to
opposites in the way that the will is, in order that it may act, must be
inclined more to one side than to the other by being moved by the
appetible object, and thus be a cause in the majority of cases. But that
which takes place in only a few instances is the accidental, and it is this
whose cause we seek. Hence it follows that the cause of the accidental
is what occurs in the majority of cases, because this fails to occur in
only a few instances. And this is what is accidental.
Second (1), he exposes the nature of accidental being; and he speaks
thus: that which exists for the most part is the cause of the accidental,
because we call that accidental which is neither always nor for the most
part. And this is the absence of what occurs for the most part; so that
if there should be wintry weather, i.e., a period of rain and cold,
during the dog days, i.e., in the days of the dog star, we say that this
is accidental. But we do not say this if the weather is sultry during
that time, i.e., if there is a period of drought and heat; for the latter
occurs always or almost always, but the former does not. Similarly we
say that it is accidental for a man to be white, because this is so neither
always nor for the most part. But we say that man is an animal
essentially, not accidentally, because this is so always. And similarly a
builder causes health accidentally, because a builder inasmuch is he is
a builder is not naturally fitted to cause health, but only a physician can
do this. However, a builder may cause health inasmuch as he happens
to be a physician. Similarly a confectioner, or cook is aiming, i.e.,
intending, to prepare something palatable, or delightful in the line of
food, may make something health-giving when he prepares a tasty dish.
For food which is good and delightful sometimes promotes health. But
it is not according to the confectioners art, i.e., the culinary art, that

Et notandum quod in primo exemplo fuit ens per accidens secundum
concursum in eodem tempore. In secundo per concursum in eodem
subiecto, sicut album cum homine. In tertio secundum concursum in
eadem causa agente, sicut aedificator et medicus. In quarto secundum
concursum in eodem effectu, sicut in pulmento salubre et delectabile.
Quamvis autem cocus faciat pulmentum delectabile, tamen hoc fit per
accidens salubre. Cocus quidem facit modo quodam salubre secundum
quid; sed simpliciter non facit, quia ars operatur per intentionem. Unde
quod est praeter intentionem artis, non fit ab arte per se loquendo. Et ideo
ens per accidens, quod est praeter intentionem artis, non fit ab arte.
Aliorum enim entium, quae sunt per se, sunt quandoque aliquae potentiae
factivae determinatae; sed entium per accidens nulla ars neque potentia
determinata est factiva. Eorum enim quae sunt aut fiunt secundum
accidens, oportet esse causam secundum accidens, et non determinatam.
Effectus enim et causa proportionantur adinvicem; et ideo effectus per
accidens habet causam per accidens, sicut effectus per se causam per se.
Et quia supra dixerat quod ens ut in pluribus est causa entis per accidens,
consequenter cum dicit quare quoniam ostendit qualiter ex eo quod est in
pluribus, est ens per accidens; dicens, quod, quia non omnia ex necessitate
et semper existunt et fiunt, sed plurima sunt secundum magis, idest ut in
pluribus, ideo necesse est esse quod est secundum accidens, quod neque
est semper neque secundum magis, ut hoc quod dico, albus est musicus.
Quia tamen aliquando fit, licet non semper nec ut in pluribus, sequitur
he produces something health-giving, but something delightful. And
for this reason we say that this is accidental.
1185. And it should be noted that in the (1) first example the accidental
came about insofar as two things happen to occur at the same time; in
the second, (2) insofar as two things happen to be present in the same
subject, as white and man; in the third, (3) insofar as the same efficient
cause happens to be a twofold agent, as a builder and a physician; and
in the fourth, insofar as the effect happens to be twofold, as health and
pleasure in the case of food; for while a cook prepares a pleasing dish,
nevertheless this happens to be health-giving by accident. In fact a cook
prepares something health-giving only in a secondary sense but not in
a primary and proper sense, because an art operates through knowledge.
Hence whatever lies outside the knowledge of an art is not produced
primarily and properly by that art. Therefore the accidental, which lies
outside the knowledge of an art, is not produced by art. For there are
certain determinate powers which sometimes are productive of other
beings which have being in the proper sense of the term, but there is no
art or determinate power which is productive of beings in an accidental
sense. Now the cause of those things which are or come to be by
accident must be an accidental cause and not a proper cause. For effect
and cause are proportionate to each other; and therefore whatever is an
accidental effect has only an accidental cause, just as an effect in the
proper sense has a cause in the proper sense.
1186. And since he had said above (1182) that the cause of the
accidental is what occurs for the most part, therefore when he says
Hence, since not all, he shows how the accidental exists as a result of
what occurs for the most part. He says that, since not all things are or
come to be always and of necessity, but most things happen for the
most part, i.e., in the majority of cases, therefore (#) the accidental
must exist; and this is what does not occur always or for the most part,
quod fit per accidens. Si enim non fieret aliquando id quod est in
paucioribus, tunc id quod est in pluribus nunquam deficeret, sed esset
semper et ex necessitate, et ita omnia essent sempiterna et necessaria;
quod est falsum. Et, quia defectus eius quod est ut in pluribus, est propter
materiam, quae non subditur perfecte virtuti agenti ut in pluribus, ideo
materia est causa accidentis aliter quam ut in pluribus, scilicet accidentis
ut in paucioribus: causa inquam non necessaria, sed contingens.
Habito autem, quod non omnia sunt necessaria, sed aliquid est nec semper
nec secundum magis, principium hoc oportet hic sumere, utrum nihil sit
nec semper, nec secundum magis. Sed hoc patet esse impossibile; quia,
cum id quod est ut in pluribus, sit causa entis per accidens, oportet esse et
id quod est semper, et id quod est ut in pluribus. Igitur quod est praeter
utrumque dictorum, est ens secundum accidens.
Sed utrum iterum id quod est ut in pluribus inest alicui, quod autem est
semper nulli inest, aut etiam sunt aliqua sempiterna, considerandum est
posterius in duodecimo; ubi ostendet quasdam substantias esse
sempiternas. Sic igitur per primam quaestionem quaeritur, utrum omnia
sint per accidens. Per secundam vero, utrum omnia possibilia, et nihil
sempiternum.
Deinde cum dicit quod autem ostendit tertium praemissorum; scilicet
quod scientia non sit de ente per accidens. Quod quidem dicit esse palam
as when I say The white man is musical. Yet because this sometimes
happens, although not always or in the majority of cases, it follows that
this comes about by accident. For if that which occurs only occasionally
were never to occur, then that which occurs in the majority of cases
would never fail to occur but would be always and of necessity. Thus
all things would be eternal and necessary. But this is false. And since
that which occurs in the majority of cases fails to occur because of
matter (which is not completely subject to the active power of the agent,
as happens in the majority of cases), then matter is the cause of that
which happens to be otherwise than usually occurs, i.e., of what
happens only occasionally. This cause, I say, is not a necessary cause
but a contingent one.
1187. Granted that not all things are necessary but that there is
something which is neither always nor for the most part, then we must
take as our starting-point the question whether there is nothing that is
neither always nor for the most part. But obviously this is impossible;
for since that which occurs for the most part is the cause of the
accidental, then both that which always is and that which is for the most
part must exist. Hence anything besides the things just mentioned is an
accidental being.
1188. However, the question whether that which occurs for the most
part is found in some being, and whether that which occurs always is
not found in any being, or whether there are some things which are
eternal, must be dealt with later in Book XII (2488), where he will show
that there are some substances which are eternal. Hence in the first
question he asks whether all things are accidental; and in the second,
whether all things are contingent and nothing is eternal.
1189. Here he establishes the third point, namely, that there is no
science of the accidental. He says that this is evident from the fact that
ex hoc, quod omnis scientia est aut eius quod est semper, aut eius quod
est in pluribus. Unde cum ens per accidens nec sit semper, nec sit in
pluribus, de eo non poterit esse scientia. Primam sic probat. Non enim
potest aliquis doceri ab alio, vel docere alium, de eo quod nec est semper,
nec ut frequenter. Hoc enim de quo est doctrina oportet esse definitum aut
per hoc quod est semper, aut per hoc quod est in pluribus. Sicut quod
melicratum, idest mixtum ex aqua et melle, utile est febricitantibus,
determinatum est ut in pluribus.
Sed quod est praeter hoc, idest praeter id quod est semper et magis, non
potest dici quando fiat, sicut quod fiat in tempore novilunii. Quia quod
determinatur fieri in tempore novilunii, vel est semper, vel ut in pluribus.
Vel potest esse hoc quod dicitur de nova luna aliud exemplum, eius
scilicet quod determinatur semper; et quod addit, aut in pluribus fit, addit,
propter differentiam eius per accidens, quod nec sic nec sic est. Unde
subdit quod accidens sit praeter hoc, scilicet praeter ens semper et ens ut
magis. Et haec minor est rationis principalis superius positae. Ulterius
autem epilogando dicit quod dictum est, quid est ens per accidens, et quae
est causa eius, et quod de eo non potest esse scientia.
LESSON 3
Refutation of Those Who Wished to Abolish the Accidental
ARISTOTLES TEXT Chapter 3: 1027a 29-1027b 16
every science is concerned with what is either always or for the most
part. Therefore, since the accidental occurs neither always nor for the
most part, there will be no science of it. He proves the first thus: one
cannot be taught by another or teach another about something which
does not occur either always or for the most part; for anything that may
be taught must be defined on the grounds that it is so either always or
for the most part; for example, that honey-water (a mixture of honey
and water) is beneficial to those with a fever, is defined as something
that occurs for the most part.
1190. But with regard to what happens in the other cases, i.e., in the
case of things which are neither always nor for the most part, it cannot
he said when they will occur, for example, at the time of the new moon;
for whatever is destined to happen at that time also happens either
always or for the most part. Or his statement about the new moon can
be another example of something that is defined as occurring always;
and he adds the phrase or for the most part because of the way in
which the accidental differs, because it does not occur in either of these
ways. Hence he adds that the accidental is contrary to this, i.e.,
contrary to what occurs always or for the most part. And this is the
minor premise of the principal argument used above. In bringing his
discussion to a close he mentions the points which have been explained,
namely, what the accidental is, and what its cause is, and that there can
be no science of it.
 [30] 553. Now it is evident that there are principles and causes which are
, . , , generable and corruptible without generation and corruption; for if
this were not the case, everything would be of necessity, i.e., if there
. ; : must be some cause, and not an accidental one, of that which is
, . . generated and corrupted. For if we ask: Will this thing exist or not?
, [1027] [1] It will if some second thing happens; but if the latter does not, neither
[ ] , : will the former. And this second thing will happen if some third thing
: : , does. And thus it is evident that when time is continually taken away
. : : [5] from a limited period of time, one will finally come to the present
: moment. Hence this man will die either from illness or violence if he
. , goes out; and he will do this if he gets thirsty; and this will happen if
: , : something else does. And in this way one will come to what exists
, : now, or to something that has already happened; for example, he will
, [10] . , , go out if he gets thirsty, and this will happen if he eats highly seasoned
. , food, and this is either the case or not. Therefore it will be from
. necessity that he dies or does not die. And similarly if one jumps back
to something that has already happened, the same argument applies;
for thisI mean what has already happenedis already present in
something. Therefore everything that will be, will be of necessity; for
example, one who lives shall die; because some part of the process
has already been completed, as the presence of contraries in the same
body. But whether he will die from illness or violence has not yet been
determined, unless something else will have happened.

, 554. It is evident, then, that this process goes back to some principle,
. but that this does not go back to anything else. Therefore this will be
the principle of everything that happens by chance, and there will be
no cause of its generation.
 [15] , 555. But to what kind of principle and what kind of cause such a
, process of reduction leads, whether to matter or to a final cause or to
. a cause of motion, must be given careful consideration. Let us dismiss
accidental being, then, for it has been dealt with at sufficient length.

COMMENTARY

Chance and providence

Postquam philosophus determinavit de ente per accidens, hic excludit
quamdam opinionem, per quam tollitur totum ens per accidens. Quidam
enim posuerunt, quod quicquid fit in mundo habet aliquam causam per
se; et iterum quod qualibet causa posita, necesse est sequi effectum eius.
Unde sequebatur quod per quamdam connexionem causarum omnia ex
necessitate acciderent, et nihil esset per accidens in rebus. Et ideo hanc
opinionem philosophus intendit destruere: et circa hoc tria facit.
1191. Having drawn his conclusions concerning accidental being, the
Philosopher now rejects an opinion that would completely abolish this
kind of being. For some men held that whatever comes to pass in the
world has some proper cause, and again that given any cause its effect
necessarily follows. Hence, as a result of the connection between
causes it would follow that everything in the world happens of necessity
and nothing by chance. Therefore the Philosophers aim is to destroy
this position; and in regard to this he does three things.

Primo enim destruit praedictam opinionem. Secundo infert quamdam First, he destroys this position. Second (1201), he draws a conclusion
conclusionem ex praedictis, ibi, palam ergo quia usque ad aliquod et from his discussion (It is evident). Third (1202), he poses a question
cetera. Tertio movet quamdam quaestionem quae ex praedictis that arises out of this discussion (But to what kind of principle).
occasionatur, ibi, sed ad principium quale.

Dicit ergo primo, quod palam erit ex sequentibus quod principia et causae
generationis et corruptionis aliquorum sunt generabilia et corruptibilia,
idest contingit generari et corrumpi sine generatione et corruptione, idest
sine hoc quod sequatur generatio et corruptio. Non enim oportet, quod si
generatio alicuius rei vel corruptio est causa generationis aut corruptionis
rei alterius, quod posita generatione vel corruptione causae, de necessitate
He says, first, that it will be evident from the following remarks that the
principles and causes of the generation and corruption of some things
are generable and corruptible, i.e., they are capable of being
generated and corrupted, without generation and corruption, i.e.,
generation and corruption taking place. For if the generation or
corruption of one thing is the cause of the generation or corruption of
sequatur generatio vel corruptio effectus: quia quaedam causae sunt
agentes ut in pluribus: unde eis positis, adhuc potest impediri effectus per
accidens, sicut propter indispositionem materiae, vel propter occursum
contrarii agentis, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi.
Sciendum tamen, quod Avicenna probat in sua metaphysica, quod nullus
effectus sit possibilis in comparatione ad suam causam, sed solum
necessarius. Si enim posita causa, possibile est effectum non poni, et poni,
id autem quod est in potentia inquantum huiusmodi reducitur in actum
per aliquod ens actu, oportebit ergo quod aliquid aliud a causa faciat ibi
sequi effectum in actu. Causa igitur illa non erat sufficiens. Et hoc videtur
contra id, quod philosophus hic dicit.
Sed sciendum, quod dictum Avicennae intelligi debet, supposito quod
nullum impedimentum causae adveniat. Necesse est enim causa posita
sequi effectum, nisi sit impedimentum, quod quandoque contingit esse
per accidens. Et ideo philosophus dicit, quod non est necessarium
generationem sequi vel corruptionem, positis causis generationis vel
corruptionis.
Si enim non est verum hoc quod dictum est, sequetur, quod omnia erunt
ex necessitate, si tamen cum hoc quod dictum est, quod posita causa
necesse est sequi effectum, ponatur etiam alia positio, scilicet quod
cuiuslibet quod fit et corrumpitur, necesse sit esse aliquam causam per se
et non per accidens. Ex his enim duabus propositionibus, sequitur omnia
esse de necessitate. Quod sic probat.
another, it is not necessary that the generation or corruption of the effect
necessarily follows when the generation or corruption of the cause
takes place, because some causes are active only for the most part.
Therefore, granted that these causes exist, their effect can be hindered
accidentally, either because the matter is not disposed, or because an
opposing agent interferes, or because of some such reason.
1192. Yet it must be noted that Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics that
no effect is possible in relation to its own cause but only necessary. For
if when the cause is posited it is possible for its effect not to follow, and
it does follow (and the potential as such is made actual by some actual
being), then something else besides this cause will have to cause the
actual effect to follow. Therefore this cause was not sufficient. This
appears to be contrary to what the Philosopher says here.
1193. But it must be noted that Avicennas statement should be
understood to apply only if we assume that no obstacle interferes with
the cause. For given the cause its effect must follow unless there is
some obstacle, and sometimes this occurs accidentally. Hence the
Philosopher says that generation and corruption need not follow when
the causes of generation and corruption are posited.
1194. For if this statement were not true, it would follow that all things
would be of necessity, granted that along with this statement: given the
cause the effect must follow, another position is also maintained,
namely, that there must be some proper cause, and not merely an
accidental one, of each thing which is generated and corrupted. For
from these two propositions it follows that all things are of necessity.
He proves this as follows.
Si enim quaeratur de aliquo, utrum sit futurum vel non, sequitur ex
praedictis, quod alterum sit de necessitate verum: quia si omne quod fit
habet causam per se suae factionis, qua posita necesse est ipsum fieri,
sequetur quod res illa, de qua quaeritur utrum sit futura, fiat, si sit hoc
quod ponitur causa eius; et si illud non fuerit, quod non fiat. Et similiter
oportet dicere, quod ista causa erit futura, si aliquod aliud quod est causa
eius, erit futurum.
Constat autem, quod tempus quantumcumque futurum accipiatur, sive
post centum annos, sive post mille, est finitum, incipiendo a praesenti
nunc usque ad illum terminum. Cum autem generatio causae praecedat
tempore generationem effectus, oportet quod procedendo ab effectu ad
causam auferamus aliquid de tempore futuro, et appropinquemus magis
ad praesens. Omne autem finitum consumitur aliquoties ablato quodam
ab ipso. Et ita sequitur quod procedendo ab effectu ad causam, et iterum
ab illa causa ad eius causam, et sic deinceps, auferatur totum tempus
futurum cum sit finitum, et ita perveniatur ad ipsum nunc.
Quod quidem patet in hoc exemplo. Si enim omnis effectus habet aliquam
causam per se, ad quam de necessitate sequitur, oportet quod iste de
necessitate moriatur, vel per infirmitatem, vel per violentiam, si exit
domum suam. Exitus enim a domo eius invenitur causa esse mortis eius,
vel violentiae; puta si exiens domum invenitur a latronibus et occiditur;
vel per infirmitatem; puta si exiens de domo ex aestu incurrit febrem et
moritur. Et eodem modo hoc erit ex necessitate, scilicet quod exeat
domum ad hauriendum aquam si sitit. Nam sitis invenitur esse causa ut
exeat domum ad hauriendum aquam. Similiter per eamdem rationem hoc
erit de necessitate, scilicet quod sitiat, si aliquid aliud erit quod est causa
sitis: et ita sic procedens de effectu ad causam perveniet ad aliquod quod
1195. If it is asked whether a thing will be or not, it follows from the
above remarks that one or the other is true of necessity; because if
everything that is generated has a proper cause which produces it, and
if given the cause its effect must ensue, then it follows that that thing
about which it was asked whether it will exist or not, will come to be if
its cause is held to exist; and if that cause will not exist, neither will its
effect. And similarly it will be necessary to say that this cause will exist
if some other thing which is its cause will exist.
1196. Further, it is evident that regardless of the amount of future time
that may be taken, whether after a hundred or a thousand years, the
amount of time beginning from the present moment up to that point is
limited. However, since the generation of a cause is prior in time to the
generation of its effect, then by proceeding from effect to cause we
must subtract some part of future time and come closer to the present.
But every limited thing is used up by having some part of it constantly
taken away. Thus by proceeding from an effect to its cause and again
from that cause to its cause and so on in this way, it follows that the
whole period of future time is used up, since it is limited, and in this
way the present moment is reached.
1197. This is clear in the following example. If every effect has some
proper cause from which it follows of necessity, then this man must die
of necessity, either from illness or violence, if he leaves the house. For
his leaving the house is found to be the cause of his death by either
violence (for example, if on leaving the house he is discovered by
robbers and is killed), or illness (for example, if on leaving the house
because he is hot he contracts a fever and dies). And in the same way it
will also happen of necessity that he leaves the house in order to draw
water from a well if he is thirsty; for thirst is the cause of his leaving
the house in order to draw water. And similarly by the same argument
it will also happen of necessity that he is thirsty if there is something
nunc est, idest in aliquod praesens, vel in aliquod factorum, idest in
aliquod praeteritorum. Sicut si dicamus quod sitis erit si comedit
mordicantia vel salsa, quae faciunt sitim: hoc autem, scilicet quod
comedat salsa vel non comedat, est in praesenti. Et ita sequitur quod
praedictum futurum, scilicet quod iste moriatur vel non moriatur, ex
necessitate erit.
Cum enim quaelibet conditionalis vera sit necessaria, oportet quod ex quo
antecedens est positum, quod consequens ex necessitate ponatur. Sicut
haec est vera, si Socrates currit, movetur. Posito ergo quod currat, necesse
erit ipsum moveri, dum currit. Si autem quilibet effectus habet causam
per se, ex qua de necessitate sequitur, oportet quod sit illa conditionalis
vera, cuius antecedens est causa et consequens effectus. Et licet inter
causam, quae nunc est praesens, et effectum qui erit futurus, quandoque
sint plurima media, quorum unumquodque est effectus respectu
praecedentium, et causa respectu sequentium; tamen sequitur de primo ad
ultimum, quod conditionalis sit vera cuius antecedens est praesens et eius
consequens quandoque futurum. Sicut hic, si comedit salsa, occidetur.
Antecedens autem ponitur, ex quo praesens est; ergo de necessitate erit
quod occidatur. Et ita omnia alia futura erunt necessaria, quorum causae
proximae vel remotae, sunt praesentes.
Et similis ratio est si aliquis procedens ab effectibus ad causas, supersiliat
ad facta, idest ad praeterita, hoc est dicere si reducat effectus futuros in
aliquam causam praeteritam non praesentem; quia hoc quod praeteritum
est iam est secundum aliquem modum. Hoc autem dico inquantum est
factum vel praeteritum. Licet enim vita Caesaris non sit nunc ut in
else which causes his thirst; and thus by proceeding from effect to cause
in this way one comes to something which exists now, i.e., to some
present thing or to something that has already happened, i.e., to some
past event. For example, if we were to say that a man will be thirsty if
he eats highly seasoned or salty food which makes him thirsty, his
eating or not eating salty food is in the present. Thus it follows that the
aforesaid future event, namely, that this man will die or not die, will
happen of necessity.
1198. For since every conditional proposition is a necessary one, then
granted the antecedent the consequent must follow; for example, this
conditional proposition is true: If Socrates runs, he moves. Therefore,
granted that he runs, he must be moving so long as he runs. But if any
effect has a proper cause from which it follows of necessity, then that
conditional proposition must be true of which the antecedent is the
cause and the consequent is the effect. And although there are
sometimes several intermediates between a cause which exists at the
present moment and an effect which will exist in the future (each of
which is an effect in relation to those preceding it and a cause in relation
to those following it), nevertheless it follows from first to last that any
conditional proposition is true whose antecedent is present and whose
consequent exists at some future time, for example, the proposition: If
a man eats salty food, he will be killed. Now the antecedent refers to
what is present, and therefore it will be by necessity that he is killed.
And in this way all other future events whose proximate or remote
causes exist in the present will be necessary.
1199. The same argument applies if one in proceeding from effects to
causes jumps back to something that has already happened, or to past
events, that is to say, if one traces future effects back to some past cause
that is not present; for that which is past nevertheless still is in some
sense. I say this insofar as it has occurred, or is past. For even though
praesenti, est tamen in praeterito. Verum enim est Caesarem vixisse. Et
ita nunc est ponere verum esse antecedens conditionalis, in cuius
antecedente est causa praeterita, et in consequente est causa futura. Et sic
sequetur, cum omnes effectus futuros oporteat redigere in tales causas
praesentes vel praeteritas, quod omnia futura ex necessitate eveniant.
Sicut nos dicimus quod viventem fore moriturum est necessarium
absolute, quia sequitur de necessitate ad aliquid quod iam factum est,
scilicet duo contraria esse in eodem corpore per commixtionem. Haec
enim conditionalis est vera: si aliquod corpus est compositum ex
contrariis, corrumpetur.
Hoc autem est impossibile, quod omnia futura ex necessitate eveniant.
Ergo illa duo sunt impossibilia, ex quibus hoc sequebatur; scilicet quod
quilibet effectus habeat causam per se, et quod causa posita necesse sit
effectum poni. Quia ex hoc ipso sequeretur quod iam dictum est, quod
quorumlibet effectuum futurorum essent aliquae causae iam positae.
Sicut corruptionis animalis, iam sunt aliquae causae positae. Sed quod
iste homo moriatur per infirmitatem vel violentiam, nondum habet
aliquam causam positam ex qua de necessitate sequatur.
Deinde cum dicit palam ergo infert quamdam conclusionem ex praedictis;
dicens: ergo ex quo non quodlibet, quod fit, habet causam per se, palam,
quod in futuris contingentibus, effectus futuri reductio ad causam per se,
vadit usque ad aliquod principium; quod quidem principium non
reducitur in aliquod principium adhuc per se, sed ipsum erit cuius causa
erit quodcumque evenit, idest causa casualis, et illius causae casualis non
erit aliqua alia causa; sicut iam praedictum est, quod ens per accidens non
Caesars life is not now, in the present, nevertheless it is in the past,
because it is true that Caesar has lived. Thus it is possible to hold as
true now the antecedent of a conditional proposition in whose
antecedent clause there is a past cause and in whose consequent clause
there is a future effect. And thus since all future effects must be traced
back to such present or past causes, it follows that all future events
happen of necessity. For example, we say that it is absolutely necessary
that one now living is going to die, because this follows of necessity in
reference to something that has already come to pass, namely, that there
are two contraries in the same body by reason of its composition; for
this conditional proposition is true, If a body is composed of
contraries, it will be corrupted.
1200. But it is impossible that all future events should happen of
necessity. Therefore the two premises from which this conclusion
would follow are impossible, namely, that any effect has a proper
cause, and that given the cause its effect must follow. For from this
would follow the position already mentioned, namely, that there are
some causes already posited for any future effect; for example, some
causes have already been posited for the corruption of an animal. But
no cause has yet been posited from which it will follow of necessity
that this man will die either from illness or violence.
1201. It is evident (554).
He draws a conclusion from the foregoing discussion. He says that,
since not everything which comes to be has a proper cause, it is
therefore evident that in the case of future contingent events the
reduction of a future effect to some proper cause goes back to some
principle, and that this principle is not reduced to some other proper
principle but will be the cause of everything that happens by chance,
i.e., an accidental cause, and that there will be no other cause of that
habet causam neque generationem. Verbi gratia, quod iste occidatur a
latronibus habet causam per se quia vulneratur; et hoc etiam habet causam
per se, quia a latronibus invenitur; sed hoc non habet nisi causam per
accidens. Hoc enim quod iste qui negotiatur, ad negotium vadens, inter
latrones incidat, est per accidens, ut ex praedictis patet. Unde eius non
oportet ponere aliquam causam. Ens enim per accidens, ut supra dictum
est, non habet generationem, et ita eius generationis causam per se
quaerere non oportet.
Deinde cum dicit sed ad principium movet quamdam quaestionem
occasionatam ex dictis. Dixit enim supra immediate, quod causae entium
per accidens reducuntur usque ad aliquod principium, cuius non est
ponere aliam causam. Et ideo hic inquirit de hac reductione, vel anagoge,
quod idem est, ad quale principium et ad qualem causam debeat fieri,
idest ad quod genus causae vel principii: scilicet utrum ad aliquam
causam primam, quae sit causa sicut materia; aut ad aliquam, quae sit
causa sicut finis, cuius gratia aliquid fit; aut ad aliquam, quae sit causa
sicut movens. Praetermittit autem de causa formali, quia quaestio hic
habetur de causa generationis rerum, quae fiunt per accidens. In
generatione autem, forma non habet causalitatem, nisi per modum finis.
Finis enim et forma in generatione incidunt in idem numero. Hanc autem
quaestionem hic motam non solvit: sed supponit eius solutionem ab eo
quod est determinatum in secundo physicorum. Ibi enim ostensum est
quod fortuna et casus, quae sunt causae eorum quae fiunt per accidens,
reducuntur ad genus causae efficientis. Ergo concludit ex praemissis,
quod praetermittendum est loqui de ente per accidens, ex quo
determinatum est sufficienter secundum id quod de eo determinari potest.
accidental cause; just as we have already said (1184) that accidental
being has no cause and is not generated. For example, the cause of this
man being killed by robbers is a proper cause, because he is wounded
by robbers; and this also has a proper cause, because he is found by the
robbers; but this has only an accidental cause. For if on his way to work
this man is wounded by robbers, this is accidental, as is evident from
the foregoing; and therefore it is not necessary to posit a cause for this.
For that which is accidental is not generated, and thus it is not necessary
to look for some proper cause which produces it, as was said above.
1202. But to what kind of principle (555).
Here he poses a question arising out of the foregoing discussion; for he
has just said above that the causes of those beings which are accidental
are ultimately reduced to some principle for which it is impossible to
give another cause. Hence he inquires here about this process of
reduction or , which means the same as to what kind of
principle and what kind of cause it should be reduced,, i.e., to what
class of cause or principle, whether to some first cause which is a
material cause, or to one which is a final cause (or that for the sake of
which a thing comes to be), or to one which is a mover. He omits the
formal cause because the question here involves the cause responsible
for the generation of things that come to be by accident. But in the
process of generation a form has no causal role except that of an end,
because in the process of generation the end and the form are identical.
Now he does not answer the question which is raised here, but assumes
its solution from what has been established in Book II of the Physics;
for it was shown there that fortune and chance, which are the causes of
things that come to be by accident, are reduced to the class of efficient
cause. Hence he concludes from the above that we must omit any
discussion of accidental being, because the truth concerning it has been
established as completely as it is possible to do so.
Attendendum est autem quod ea quae philosophus hic tradit, videntur
removere quaedam, quae secundum philosophiam ab aliquibus ponuntur,
scilicet fatum et providentiam. Vult enim hic philosophus, quod non
omnia quae fiunt, reducantur in aliquam causam per se, ex qua de
necessitate sequantur: alias sequeretur, quod omnia essent ex necessitate,
et nihil per accidens esset in rebus. Illi autem, qui ponunt fatum, dicunt,
contingentia, quae hic fiunt, quae videntur per accidens, esse reducibilia
in aliquam virtutem corporis caelestis, per cuius actionem ea quae
secundum se considerata per accidens fieri videntur, cum quodam ordine
producantur. Et similiter illi, qui ponunt providentiam, ea quae aguntur
hic, dicunt esse ordinata secundum ordinem providentiae.
Ex utraque igitur positione duo videntur sequi, quae sunt contraria his,
quae hic philosophus determinat: quorum primum est: in rebus nihil fit
per accidens neque a fortuna neque a casu. Quae enim secundum aliquem
ordinem procedunt, non sunt per accidens. Sunt enim vel semper vel in
maiori parte. Secundum autem est, quod omnia ex necessitate eveniant.
Si enim omnia ex necessitate eveniunt quorum causa vel ponitur in
praesenti, vel iam est posita in praeterito, ut ratio philosophi procedit,
eorum autem quae sunt sub providentia vel fato causa ponitur in praesenti,
et iam posita est in praeterito, eo quod providentia est immutabilis et
aeterna, motus etiam caeli est invariabilis: videtur sequi quod ea quae sunt
sub providentia vel fato, ex necessitate contingant. Et ita, si omnia quae
hic aguntur, fato et providentia subduntur, sequitur quod omnia ex
necessitate proveniant. Videtur ergo quod secundum intentionem
philosophi non sit ponere neque providentiam neque fatum.
Ad horum autem evidentiam considerandum est, quod quanto aliqua
causa est altior, tanto eius causalitas ad plura se extendit. Habet enim
1203. It must be noted, however, that the doctrine of the Philosopher
set forth here seems to do away with certain things which some thinkers
hold in philosophy, namely, fate and providence. For here the force of
the Philosophers argument is that not all that occurs may be traced
back to some proper cause from which it follows of necessity,
otherwise it would follow that everything in the world would be of
necessity and nothing by accident. But those who posit fate say that the
contingent events occurring here, which appear to be accidental, can be
traced back to some power of a celestial body, whose activity produces
in a certain order those things which, viewed in themselves, seem
accidental. And similarly those who posit providence say that whatever
occurs here is ordained by the order of providence.
1204. From both of these positions, then, there seem to follow two
conclusions which are opposed to what the philosopher establishes
here. (1) The first is that nothing in the world happens accidentally
either by fortune or by chance; for those things which occur in a certain
order are not accidental, since they occur either always or for the most
part. (2) The second is that all things happen of necessity. For if all
those things whose cause is placed in the present or has been placed in
the past occur of necessity, as the Philosophers argument maintains,
and if the cause of those things which come under providence or fate is
placed in the present or has already been placed in the past (because
providence is unchangeable and eternal, and the motion of the heavens
is also invariable), it seems to follow that those things which come
under providence or fate happen of necessity. Thus if everything that
occurs here is subject to fate and providence, it follows that everything
happens of necessity. Therefore according to the mind of the
Philosopher it seems impossible to posit either fate or providence.
1205. In clearing up this difficulty it must be noted that the higher a
cause the more extensive is its causality, for a higher cause produces its
causa altior proprium causatum altius quod est communius et in pluribus
inventum. Sicut in artificialibus patet quod ars politica, quae est supra
militarem, ad totum statum communitatis se extendit. Militaris autem
solum ad eos, qui in ordine militari continentur. Ordinatio, autem quae
est in effectibus ex aliqua causa tantum se extendit quantum extendit se
illius causae causalitas. Omnis enim causa per se habet determinatos
effectus, quos secundum aliquem ordinem producit. Manifestum igitur
est, quod effectus relati ad aliquam inferiorem causam nullum ordinem
habere videntur, sed per accidens sibiipsis coincidunt; qui si referantur ad
superiorem causam communem, ordinati inveniuntur, et non per accidens
coniuncti, sed ab una per se causa simul producti sunt.
Sicut floritio huius herbae vel illius, si referatur ad particularem virtutem,
quae est in hac planta vel in illa, nullum ordinem habere videtur,- immo
videtur esse accidens -, quod hac herba florente illa floreat. Et hoc ideo,
quia causa virtutis huius plantae extendit se ad floritionem huius, et non
ad floritionem alterius: unde est quidem causa, quod haec planta floreat,
non autem quod simul cum altera. Si autem ad virtutem corporis caelestis,
quae est causa communis, referatur, invenitur hoc non esse per accidens,
quod hac herba florente illa floreat, sed esse ordinatum ab aliqua prima
causa hoc ordinante, quae simul movet utramque herbam ad floritionem.
Invenitur autem in rebus triplex causarum gradus. Est enim primo causa
incorruptibilis et immutabilis, scilicet divina; sub hac secundo est causa
incorruptibilis, sed mutabilis; scilicet corpus caeleste; sub hac tertio sunt
causae corruptibiles et mutabiles.
own proper higher effect, which is more general and extends to many
things. For example, in the case of the arts it is evident that the political
art, which is higher than the military art, has jurisdiction over the entire
political community, whereas the military art has jurisdiction only over
those things which fall within the military sphere. But the order found
in the effects of a cause extends only so far as the causality of that cause
extends, for every cause in the proper sense has definite effects which
it produces in a certain order. It is evident, then, that (a) when effects
are referred to lower causes they seem to be unrelated and to coincide
with each other accidentally, but (b) that when they are referred to some
higher common cause they are found to be related and not accidentally
connected but to be produced simultaneously by one proper cause.
1206. For example, if the blossoming of one plant is referred to a
particular power in this plant and the blossoming of a second plant is
referred to a particular power in that plant, there seems to be no reason
(indeed it seems to be accidental) why the first plant should blossom
when the second does. And this is true, because the cause of the power
of the first plant extends to the blossoming of this plant and not to that
of the second, so that while it causes the first plant to blossom, it does
not cause it to blossom at the same time as the second. But if this is
attributed to the power of a celestial body, which is a universal cause,
then we find that the first plant blossoms when the second does, not by
accident, but by the direction of some first cause, which ordains this
and moves each plant to blossom at the same time.
1207. Now we find three grades of causes in the world. (1) First, there
is a cause which is incorruptible and immutable, namely, the divine
cause; (2) second, beneath this there are causes which are incorruptible
but mutable, namely, the celestial bodies; and (3) third, beneath this
there are those causes which are corruptible and mutable.
Hae igitur causae in tertio gradu existentes sunt particulares, et ad
proprios effectus secundum singulas species determinatae: ignis enim
generat ignem, et homo generat hominem, et planta plantam.
Causa autem secundi gradus est quodammodo universalis, et
quodammodo particularis. Particularis quidem, quia se extendit ad
aliquod genus entium determinatum, scilicet ad ea quae per motum in esse
producuntur; est enim causa movens et mota. Universalis autem, quia non
ad unam tantum speciem mobilium se extendit causalitas eius, sed ad
omnia, quae alterantur et generantur et corrumpuntur: illud enim quod est
primo motum, oportet esse causam omnium consequenter mobilium.
Sed causa primi gradus est simpliciter universalis: eius enim effectus
proprius est esse: unde quicquid est, et quocumque modo est, sub
causalitate et ordinatione illius causae proprie continetur.
Si igitur ea quae hic sunt contingentia, reducamus in causas proximas
particulares tantum, inveniuntur multa fieri per accidens, tum propter
concursum duarum causarum, quarum una sub altera non continetur, sicut
cum praeter intentionem occurrunt mihi latrones. (Hic enim concursus
causatur ex duplici virtute motiva, scilicet mea et latronum). Tum etiam
propter defectum agentis, cui accidit debilitas, ut non possit pervenire ad
finem intentum; sicut cum aliquis cadit in via propter lassitudinem. Tum
etiam propter indispositionem materiae, quae non recipit formam
intentam ab agente, sed alterius modi sicut accidit in monstruosis partibus
animalium.
Therefore causes in this (3) third grade are particular causes and are
determined to proper effects of the same kind; for example, fire
generates fire, man generates man, and plants generate plants.
1208. Now a cause belonging to the (2) second grade is in one sense
universal and in another particular. It is particular because it extends
to some special class of beings, namely, to those which are generated
by motion; for it is both a cause of motion and something that is moved.
And it is universal because its causality extends not only to one class
of changeable things but to everything that is altered, generated and
corrupted; for that which is first moved must be the cause of everything
that is subsequently moved.
1209. But the cause belonging to the (1) first grade is universal
without qualification, because its proper effect is existence. Hence
whatever exists, and in whatever way it exists, comes properly under
the causality and direction of that cause.
1210. If, then, we attribute all contingent events here to particular
causes only, many things will be found to occur accidentally. This will
be so for a number of reasons. (1) First, because of the conjunction of
two causes one of which does not come under the causality of the other,
as when robbers attack me without my intending this; for this meeting
is caused by a twofold motive power, namely, mine and that of the
robbers. (2) Second, because of some defect in the agent, who is so
weak that he cannot attain the goal at which he aims, for example, when
someone falls on the road because of fatigue. (3) Third, because of the
indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the form intended
by the agent but another kind of form. This is what occurs, for example,
in the case of the deformed parts of animals.
Haec autem contingentia, si ulterius in causam caelestem reducantur,
multa horum invenientur non esse per accidens; quia causae particulares
etsi non continentur sub se invicem, continentur tamen sub una causa
communi caelesti; unde concursus earum potest habere aliquam unam
causam caelestem determinatam. Quia etiam virtus corporis caelestis et
incorruptibilis est et impassibilis, non potest exire aliquis effectus
ordinem causalitatis eius propter defectum vel debilitatem ipsius virtutis.
Sed quia agit movendo, et omne tale agens requirit materiam
determinatam et dispositam, potest contingere quod in rebus naturalibus
virtus caelestis non consequatur suum effectum propter materiae
indispositionem; et hoc erit per accidens.
Quamvis igitur multa, quae videntur esse per accidens reducendo ipsa ad
causas particulares, inveniantur non esse per accidens reducendo ipsa ad
causam communem universalem, scilicet virtutem caelestem, tamen
etiam hac reductione facta, inveniuntur esse aliqua per accidens, sicut
superius est habitum a philosopho. Quando enim agens aliquod inducit
effectum suum ut in pluribus, et non semper, sequetur, quod deficiat in
paucioribus, et hoc per accidens est. Si igitur corpora caelestia effectos
suos inducunt in inferiora corpora, ut in pluribus, et non semper, propter
materiae indispositionem, sequetur, quod ipsum sit per accidens, quod
virtus caelestis effectum suum non consequatur.
Licet etiam ex hoc inveniantur aliqua per accidens, facta reductione ad
corpus caeleste: quia in istis inferioribus sunt aliquae causae agentes,
quae possunt per se agere absque impressione corporis caelestis, scilicet
animae rationales, ad quas non pertingit virtus corporis caelestis (cum sint
formae corporibus non subiectae), nisi forte per accidens, inquantum
scilicet ex impressione corporis caelestis fit aliqua immutatio in corpore,
et per accidens in viribus animae, quae sunt actus quarumdam partium
1211. But if these contingent events are traced back further to a celestial
body, we find that many of them are not accidental; because even
though particular causes are not contained under each other, they are
nevertheless contained under one common celestial cause. Hence their
concurrence can be attributed to one definite celestial cause. Again,
since the power of a celestial body is incorruptible and impassible, no
effect can escape from the sphere of its causality because of any defect
or weakness of its power. But since it acts by moving, and since every
agent of this kind requires a matter which is properly determined or
disposed, then in the case of natural beings it can happen that the power
of a celestial body fails to produce its effect because the matter is not
disposed; and this will be accidental.
1212. Therefore, even though many things which seem to be accidental
when traced back to these particular causes are found not to be
accidental when traced back to a common universal cause, namely, to
a celestial body, yet even when this reduction has been made some
things are found to be accidental, as the Philosopher stated above
(1201). For when an agent produces its effect for the most part but not
always, it follows that it fails in a few instances; and this is accidental.
If, then, the celestial bodies cause their effects in these lower bodies for
the most part but not always, because the matter is not properly
disposed, then it follows that, when the power of a celestial body fails
to produce its effect, this happens accidentally.
1213. There is also another reason why things happen accidentally even
if causality is traced back to a celestial body. It is that in the sphere of
lower bodies there are some efficient causes which can act of
themselves without the influence of a celestial body. These causes
are rational souls, to which the power of a celestial body does not
extend (since they are not forms subjected to bodies), except in an
accidental way, i.e., inasmuch as the influence of a celestial body
corporis, ex quibus anima rationalis inclinatur ad agendum, licet nulla
necessitas inducatur, cum habeat liberum dominium super passiones, ut
eis dissentiat. Illa igitur, quae in his inferioribus inveniuntur per accidens
fieri reducendo ad has causas, scilicet animas rationales, prout non
sequuntur inclinationem, quae est ex impressione caelesti, non
invenientur per se fieri per reductionem ad virtutem corporis caelestis.
Et sic patet, quod positio fati, quae est quaedam dispositio inhaerens rebus
inferioribus ex actione corporis caelestis, non removet omnia ea quae sunt
per accidens.
Sed si ulterius ista contingentia reducantur in causam altissimam divinam,
nihil inveniri poterit, quod ab ordine eius exeat, cum eius causalitas
extendat se ad omnia inquantum sunt entia. Non potest igitur sua
causalitas impediri per indispositionem materiae; quia et ipsa materia, et
eius dispositiones non exeunt ab ordine illius agentis, quod est agens per
modum dantis esse, et non solum per modum moventis et alterantis. Non
enim potest dici, quod materia praesupponatur ad esse, sicut
praesupponitur ad moveri, ut eius subiectum; quinimo est pars essentiae
rei. Sicut igitur virtus alterantis et moventis non impeditur ex essentia
motus, aut ex termino eius, sed ex subiecto, quod praesupponitur; ita
virtus dantis esse non impeditur a materia, vel a quocumque, quod
adveniat qualitercumque ad esse rei. Ex quo etiam patet, quod nulla causa
agens potest esse in istis inferioribus, quae eius ordini non subdatur.
produces some change in the [human] body, and accidentally in the
powers of the soul which are actualities of certain parts of the body, by
which the rational soul is disposed to act. However, no necessity is
involved, since the souls dominion over the passions is free inasmuch
as it may not assent to them. Therefore in the sphere of lower bodies
whatever things are found to happen accidentally when reduced to these
causes, i.e., rational souls, insofar as they do not follow the inclination
produced by the influence of a celestial body, will not be found to be
generated in any essential way by being traced back to the power of a
celestial body.
1214. Thus it is evident that to posit fate, which is a certain disposition
present in lower bodies as a result of the activity of a celestial body, is
not to do away with everything that happens by chance.
1215. But if these contingent events are traced back further to the
highest, divine cause, it will be impossible to find anything that lies
outside its sphere of influence, since its causality extends to all things
insofar as they are beings. Hence its causal activity cannot be thwarted
as a result of the matter being indisposed, because matter itself and its
dispositions do not lie outside the domain of this agent, since He is the
agent who gives things their being and not merely moves and changes
them. For it cannot be said that matter is presupposed as the subject of
being as it is presupposed as the subject of motion; it is rather part of
the essence of a thing. Therefore, just as the power of changing and
moving is not hindered by the essence of motion or its terminus but by
the subject which is presupposed, in a similar fashion the power of the
one giving being is not hindered by matter or anything which accrues
in any way to the being of a thing. From this it is also evident that in
the sphere of lower bodies no efficient cause can be found which is not
subject to the control of this first cause.
Relinquitur igitur quod omnia, quae hic fiunt, prout ad primam causam
divinam referuntur, inveniuntur ordinata et non per accidens existere;
licet per comparationem ad alias causas per accidens esse inveniantur. Et
propter hoc secundum fidem Catholicam dicitur, quod nihil fit temere
sive fortuito in mundo, et quod omnia subduntur divinae providentiae.
Aristoteles autem hic loquitur de contingentibus quae hic fiunt, in ordine
ad causas particulares, sicut per eius exemplum apparet.
Nunc autem restat videre quomodo positio fati et providentiae non tollit
a rebus contingentiam, quasi omnia ex necessitate eveniant. Et de fato
quidem manifestum est per ea quae dicta sunt. Iam enim est ostensum,
quod licet corpora caelestia et eorum motus et actiones quantum in ipsis
est necessitatem habeant, tamen effectus eorum in istis inferioribus potest
deficere, vel propter indispositionem materiae, vel propter animam
rationalem quae habet liberam electionem sequendi inclinationes, quae
sunt ex impressione caelesti, vel non sequendi: et ita relinquitur, quod
huiusmodi effectus non ex necessitate, sed contingenter proveniant. Non
enim positio causae caelestis est positio causae talis, ad quam de
necessitate sequatur effectus, sicut ad compositionem ex contrariis
sequitur mors animalis, ut in litera tangitur.
Sed de providentia maiorem habet difficultatem. Providentia enim divina
falli non potest. Haec enim duo sunt incompossibilia, quod aliquid sit
provisum a Deo, et non fiat: et ita videtur, quod ex quo providentia iam
ponitur, quod eius effectum necesse sit sequi.
Sed sciendum est, quod ex eadem causa dependet effectus, et omnia quae
sunt per se accidentia illius effectus. Sicut enim homo est a natura, ita et
omnia eius per se accidentia, ut risibile, et mentis disciplinae susceptibile.
1216. It follows, then, that everything which occurs here insofar as it is
related to the first divine cause, is found to be ordained by it and not to
be accidental, although it may be found to be accidental in relation to
other causes. This is why the Catholic faith says that nothing in the
world happens by chance or fortuitously, and that everything is subject
to divine providence. But in this place Aristotle is speaking of those
contingent events which occur here as a result of particular causes, as
is evident from his example.
1217. It now remains to see how the affirming of fate and providence
does not eliminate contingency from the world, as though all things
were to happen of necessity. From the things that have been said above
it is evident that fate does not do away with contingency. For it has been
shown already that, even though the celestial bodies and their motions
and activities are necessary, nevertheless their effects in these lower
bodies can fail either because the matter is not disposed or because the
rational soul may freely choose to follow or not follow the inclinations
produced in it by the influence of a celestial body. Thus it follows that
effects of this sort do not happen of necessity but contingently; for to
posit a celestial cause is not to posit a cause of such a kind that its effect
follows of necessity, as the death of an animal is a result of its being
composed of contraries, as he mentions in the text.
1218. But there is greater difficulty with regard to providence, because
divine providence cannot fail; for these two statements are
incompatible, namely, that something is foreknown by God, and that it
does not come to pass. Hence it seems that, once providence is posited,
its effect follows of necessity.
1219. But it must be noted that an effect and all of its proper accidents
depend on one and the same cause; for just as a man is from nature, so
also are his proper accidents, such as risibility and susceptibility to
Si autem aliqua causa non faciat hominem simpliciter sed hominem
talem, eius non erit constituere ea quae sunt per se accidentia hominis,
sed solum uti eis. Politicus enim facit hominem civilem; non tamen facit
eum mentis disciplinae susceptibilem, sed hac eius proprietate utitur ad
hoc quod homo fiat civilis.
Sicut autem dictum est, ens inquantum ens est, habet causam ipsum
Deum: unde sicut divinae providentiae subditur ipsum ens, ita etiam
omnia accidentia entis inquantum est ens, inter quae sunt necessarium et
contingens. Ad divinam igitur providentiam pertinet non solum quod
faciat hoc ens, sed quod det ei contingentiam vel necessitatem. Secundum
enim quod unicuique dare voluit contingentiam vel necessitatem,
praeparavit ei causas medias, ex quibus de necessitate sequatur, vel
contingenter. Invenitur igitur uniuscuiusque effectus secundum quod est
sub ordine divinae providentiae necessitatem habere. Ex quo contingit
quod haec conditionalis est vera, si aliquid est a Deo provisum, hoc erit.
Secundum autem quod effectus aliquis consideratur sub ordine causae
proximae, sic non omnis effectus est necessarius; sed quidam necessarius
et quidam contingens secundum analogiam suae causae. Effectus enim in
suis naturis similantur causis proximis, non autem remotis, ad quarum
conditionem pertingere non possunt.
Sic ergo patet, quod cum de divina providentia loquimur, non est
dicendum solum, hoc est provisum a Deo ut sit, sed hoc est provisum a
Deo, ut contingenter sit, vel ut necessario sit. Unde non sequitur
secundum rationem Aristotelis hic inductam, quod ex quo divina
providentia est posita, quod omnes effectus sint necessarii; sed
necessarium est effectus esse contingenter, vel de necessitate. Quod
mental instruction. However, if some cause does not produce man in an
absolute sense but such and such a man, it will not be within the power
of this cause to produce the proper attributes of man but only to make
use of them. For while the statesman makes man a citizen, he does not
make him susceptible to mental instruction. Rather he makes use of this
property in order to make a citizen of him.
1220. Now, as has been pointed out (1215), being as being has God
himself as its cause. Hence just as being itself is subject to divine
providence, so also are all the accidents of being as being, among
which are found necessity and contingency. Therefore it belongs to
divine providence not only to produce a particular being but also to give
it contingency or necessity; for insofar as God wills to give contingency
or necessity to anything, He has prepared for it certain intermediate
causes from which it follows either of necessity or contingently. Hence
the effect of every cause is found to be necessary insofar as it comes
under the control of providence. And from this it follows that this
conditional proposition is true: If anything is foreknown by God, it
will be.
1221. However, insofar as any effect is considered to come under its
proximate cause, not every effect is necessary; but some are necessary
and some contingent in proportion to their cause. For effects are likened
in their nature to their proximate causes, but not to their remote causes,
whose state they cannot attain.
1222. It is evident, then, that when we speak of divine providence we
must say that this thing is foreseen by God not only insofar as it is but
also insofar as it is either contingent or necessary. Therefore, just
because divine providence is held to exist, it does not follow, according
to the argument which Aristotle gives here, that every effect happens
of necessity, but only that it must be either contingent or necessary. In
quidem est singulare in hac causa, scilicet in divina providentia. Reliquae
enim causae non constituunt legem necessitatis vel contingentiae, sed
constituta a superiori causa utuntur. Unde causalitati cuiuslibet alterius
causae subditur solum quod eius effectus sit. Quod autem sit necessario
vel contingenter, dependet ex causa altiori, quae est causa entis
inquantum est ens; a qua ordo necessitatis et contingentiae in rebus
provenit.
fact this applies solely in the case of this cause, i.e., divine providence,
because the remaining causes do not establish the law of necessity or
contingency, but make use of this law established by a higher cause.
Hence the only thing that is subject to the causality of any other cause
is that its effect be. But that it be either necessary or contingent depends
on a higher cause, which is the cause of being as being, and the one
from which the order of necessity and of contingency originates in the
world.

LESSON 4

The True and the False as Being and Non-Being.

Accidental Being and Being in the Sense of the True Are Excluded from This Science

ARISTOTLES TEXT Chapter 4: 1027b 17-1028a 6

( 556. Again, being in the sense of the true and non-being in the sense
): , , of the false [are not to be considered] since such being depends on
, [20] combination and separation, and these taken together form both parts
( of a contradiction. For truth resides in the affirmation of one side of a
, contradiction when there is combination, and in the negation when
: there is separation. But falsity consists in the reverse of this division.

, , 557. But how [the intellect] happens to understand [things which are
[25] ): combined and separated, whether] together or separately, pertains to
another discussion; and by understanding things together or separately
I mean understanding them not successively but insofar as they form a
unity.
 , 558. For what is true and what is false are not in things themselves, so
, , that what is good is true and what is evil is false, but only in the mind.
: And with regard to simple concepts and the whatness of things there is
, : neither truth nor falsity in the mind. Hence the things which must be
investigated about being and non-being in this sense must be
considered later on (806).

[30] 559. But since combination and separation exist in thought and not in
, ( things, and being in this sense is different from being in the proper
), senses (for these are either what a thing is, or of what sort, or how
much, or anything else that the mind combines or separates), then
, [1028] [1] being in the sense of what is accidental and being in the sense of what
, is true must be omitted from this science. For the cause of the former
, is the indeterminate, and of the latter some positive state of mind; and
. [ both of these pertain to the remaining class of being and do not indicate
[5] , .] the existence of any definite kind of being outside of the mind. For this
reason, then, let us exclude them from our study, and let us look for the
causes and principles of being as being. Now from our discussions of
the different meanings of words it is evident that being is used in
several senses (435).

COMMENTARY

The being of propositions is not the subject of this science.

Postquam determinavit philosophus de ente per accidens, hic determinat
de ente, quod significat veritatem propositionis: et circa hoc duo facit.
Primo determinat qualiter dicatur huiusmodi ens. Secundo removet
ipsum a principali consideratione huius scientiae, ibi, quoniam autem
complexio et cetera.
1223. Having drawn his conclusions about accidental being, the
Philosopher now settles the issue about the being which signifies the
truth of a proposition; and in regard to this he does two things. First
(556:C 1223), he determines the meaning of this kind of being. Second

Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit qualiter huiusmodi ens dicatur.
Secundo respondet cuidam quaestioni, ibi, quomodo autem quod simul
et cetera. Tertio manifestat quoddam quod dixerat, ibi, non est autem
verum et falsum in rebus et cetera.
Dicit ergo quod ens quoddam dicitur quasi verum, idest quod nihil aliud
significat nisi veritatem. Cum enim interrogamus si homo est animal,
respondetur quod est; per quod significatur, propositionem praemissam
esse veram. Et eodem modo non ens significat quasi falsum. Cum enim
respondetur, non est, significatur quod proposita oratio sit falsa. Hoc
autem ens, quod dicitur quasi verum, et non ens, quod dicitur quasi
falsum, consistit circa compositionem et divisionem. Voces enim
incomplexae neque verum neque falsum significant; sed voces
complexae, per affirmationem aut negationem veritatem aut falsitatem
habent. Dicitur autem hic affirmatio compositio, quia significat
praedicatum inesse subiecto. Negatio vero dicitur hic divisio, quia
significat praedicatum a subiecto removeri.
Et cum voces sint signa intellectuum, similiter dicendum est de
conceptionibus intellectus. Quae enim sunt simplices, non habent
veritatem neque falsitatem, sed solum illae quae sunt complexae per
affirmationem vel negationem.
Et quia praedictum ens et non ens, scilicet verum et falsum, consistit in
compositione et divisione, ideo similiter consistit circa partitionem
contradictionis. Unaquaeque enim contradictionum partiuntur sibi
invicem verum et falsum; ita quod altera pars est vera, et altera pars est
falsa. Cum enim contradictio ex affirmatione et negatione constituatur,
(1241), he excludes it from the principal study of this science (But
since combination).
In regard to the first he does three things. First, he determines the
meaning of this kind of being. Second (1227), he answers a question
(But how [the intellect]). Third (1230) he clarifies a statement which
he had made (For what is true).
He says, then, that in one sense being means what is true, i.e., it
signifies nothing else than truth; for when we ask if man is an animal,
the answer is that he is, by which it is meant that this proposition is true.
And in the same way non-being signifies in a sense what is false; for
when one answers that he is not, it is meant that the statement made is
false. Now this being which means what is true, and non-being which
means what is false, depend on combination and separation; for simple
terms signify neither truth nor falsity, whereas complex terms have truth
and falsity through affirmation or negation. And here affirmation is
called combination because it signifies that a predicate belongs to a
subject, whereas negation is called separation because it signifies that a
predicate does not belong to a subject.
1224. Further, since words are the signs of concepts, we must speak in
the same way about the concepts of the intellect; for those which are
simple do not have truth and falsity, but only those which are complex
through affirmation or negation.
1225. And since the being and non-being just mentionedthe true and
the falsedepend on combination and separation, they therefore also
depend on the division of a contradiction; for each part of a
contradiction separates the true and the false from each other so that one
part is true and the other is false. For since a contradiction is constituted
utraque autem harum ex praedicato sit et subiecto, praedicatum et
subiectum dupliciter se possunt habere. Aut enim sunt coniuncta in rerum
natura, sicut homo et animal; aut sunt disiuncta, ut homo et asinus.
Si ergo formantur duae contradictiones: una ex terminis coniunctis, ut,
homo est animal, homo non est animal; alia ex terminis disiunctis, ut,
homo est asinus, homo non est asinus, utramque contradictionem inter se
condividunt verum et falsum; ita quod verum pro parte sua habet
affirmationem in composito, idest in terminis coniunctis, et negationem
in disiuncto, idest in terminis disiunctis. Hae enim duae sunt verae, homo
est animal et homo non est asinus. Sed falsum pro sua parte habet
contradictionem partitionis, idest contradictoria eorum, quae cedunt in
partem veri. Habet enim falsum pro sua parte negationem in coniuncto,
et affirmationem in disiuncto. Hae enim duae sunt falsae, homo non est
animal, et homo est asinus.
Deinde cum dicit quomodo autem removet quamdam dubitationem, quae
posset occasionari ex dictis. Dixerat enim quod verum et falsum
consistunt in compositione et divisione, vocum quidem secundario,
intellectus autem primo et principaliter: omnis autem compositio vel
divisio plurium est: et ideo potest esse dubium, quomodo ista quae
componuntur et dividuntur, intellectus intelligat: utrum scilicet simul, aut
separatim. Sed dicit, quod hoc pertinet ad alium sermonem, scilicet ad
librum de anima.
of an affirmation and a negation, and each of these is constituted of a
predicate and a subject, then a predicate and a subject can be related to
each other in two ways; because they are either connected in reality, as
man and animal, or are unconnected, as man and ass.
1226. Hence, if two contradictions are formed, one from connected
terms, as Man is an animal and Man is not an animal, and another
from unconnected terms, as Man is an ass and Man is not an ass,
then truth and falsity divide each contradiction between themselves, so
that the true on its side resides in affirmation when there is
combination, i.e., in connected terms, and in negation when there is
separation, i.e., in unconnected terms. For these two propositions Man
is an animal and Man is not an ass are true. But the false on its side
resides in the reverse of this division, i.e., in the contradictory of those
statements which fall on the side of the true, because it consists in the
negating of connected terms and in the affirming of unconnected terms;
for these two propositions Man is not an animal and Man is an ass
are false.
1227. But how [the intellect] (557).
Here he dismisses a problem that could arise from the foregoing
remarks. For he said that the true and the false consist secondarily in
the combination and separation of words, but primarily and properly in
the combination and separation which the intellect makes. Now every
combination and separation involves a plurality, and therefore the
problem can arise how the intellect understands things which are
combined and separated, whether together or separately. But he says
that this pertains to another discussion, namely, to The Soul.
Et quia simul dupliciter dicitur, quandoque enim significat unitatem,
sicut dicimus simul esse secundum tempus quae sunt in uno et eodem
instanti: quandoque vero significat coniunctionem et vicinitatem eorum
quae consequenter se habent, sicut dicimus duos homines esse simul
secundum locum, quorum loca sunt coniuncta et consequenter se
habentia, et secundum tempus, quae se tempore consequuntur: ideo
exponit quaestionem motam, qua quaesivit utrum simul aut separatim
intelligat intellectus ea quae componuntur et dividuntur: dicens, quod
non intelligit simul secundum quod aliqua dicuntur esse simul, ut
consequenter se habent; sed secundum quod aliqua dicuntur esse simul
in eo quod fit aliquid unum.
Et in hoc innuitur solutio quaestionis. Si enim intellectus intelligat
hominem et animal unumquodque secundum se, ut sunt duo quaedam,
intelligit ea consequenter duabus conceptionibus simplicibus, non
formans ex eis affirmationem neque negationem. Cum autem ex eis
format compositionem vel divisionem, intelligit ambo ut unum,
inquantum scilicet ex eis aliquod unum fit: sicut etiam partes cuiuslibet
totius intelligit intellectus ut unum, intelligendo ipsum totum. Non enim
intelligit domum intelligendo prius fundamentum et postea parietem et
postea tectum; sed omnia ista intelligit simul, inquantum ex eis fit unum.
Similiter intelligit praedicatum et subiectum simul, inquantum ex eis fit
unum, scilicet affirmatio et negatio.
Deinde cum dicit non est autem. Manifestat quoddam quod dixerat
scilicet quod verum et falsum sint in compositione et divisione. Quod
quidem probat per modum cuiusdam divisionis. Eorum enim, quae
1228. Now together is used in two senses. (1) For sometimes it signifies
a unity, as when we say that those things which exist at one and the
same instant are together in time; and (2) sometimes it signifies the
connection and proximity of things which succeed each other, as when
we say that two men are together in place when their places are joined
and next to each other, and in time when their times succeed each other.
And since this is so, he therefore answers the proposed question which
asks whether the intellect understands things which are combined or
separated, together or separately, by saying that it does not understand
them together according as some things are said to be together (~)
insofar as they succeed each other, but (+) according as they are said to
be together insofar as they form one thing.
1229. And in this way he indicates the solution of this question. For (1)
if the intellect understands a man and an animal as they are in
themselves, as two distinct things, it understands them successively by
two simple concepts without forming an affirmation or a negation from
them. But (2) when it combines or separates them, it understands them
both as one thing, i.e., according as one thing is constituted from them;
just as the intellect also understands the parts of a whole as one thing by
understanding the whole itself. For the intellect does not understand a
house by understanding first the foundation and then the walls and then
the roof, but it understands all of these together insofar as one thing is
constituted from them. And in a similar way it understands a predicate
and a subject together insofar as one judgment is constituted from them,
namely, an affirmation or a negation.
1230. For what is true (558).
He explains a statement which he had made to the effect that truth and
falsity consist in combination and separation; and he proves this by
means of the process of elimination. For some of the things signified by
dicuntur voce, quaedam sunt in rebus extra animam, quaedam autem sunt
in anima tantum. Album enim et nigrum sunt extra animam; sed rationes
horum sunt in anima tantum. Posset autem aliquis credere, quod verum
et falsum sint etiam in rebus sicut bonum et malum; ita quod verum sit
quoddam bonum, et falsum sit quoddam malum: hoc enim oporteret si
verum et falsum essent in rebus. Verum enim quamdam perfectionem
naturae significat, falsum vero defectum. Omnis autem perfectio in rebus
existens, ad perfectionem et bonitatem naturae pertinet, defectus vero et
privatio ad malitiam.
Sed ipse hoc negat; dicens, quod verum et falsum non sunt in rebus, ita
quod verum rationis sit quoddam bonum naturae, et falsum sit quoddam
malum; sed sunt tantum in mente, idest in intellectu.
Intellectus autem habet duas operationes, quarum una vocatur
indivisibilium intelligentia, per quam intellectus format simplices
conceptiones rerum intelligendo quod quid est uniuscuiusque rei. Alia
eius operatio est per quam componit et dividit.
Verum autem et falsum, etsi sint in mente, non tamen sunt circa illam
operationem mentis, qua intellectus format simplices conceptiones, et
quod quid est rerum. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod verum et falsum, circa
simplicia et quod quid est, nec in mente est. Unde relinquitur per locum
a divisione, quod ex quo non est in rebus, nec est in mente circa simplicia
et quod quid est, quod sit circa compositionem et divisionem mentis
primo et principaliter; et secundario vocis, quae significat conceptionem
mentis. Et ulterius concludit, quod quaecumque oportet speculari circa
ens et non ens sic dictum, scilicet prout ens significat verum, et non ens
falsum, posterius perscrutandum est, scilicet in fine noni et etiam in libro
a word are found in things outside of the mind, but others are found only
in the mind. For white and black are found outside of the mind, but their
concepts are found only in the mind. Now someone might think that the
true and the false are also found in things, just as good and evil are, so
that the true is a kind of good and the false a kind of evil; for this would
be necessary if truth and falsity were found in things, since truth
signifies a certain perfection of nature, and falsity a defect. Moreover,
every perfection existing in things pertains to the perfection and
goodness of their nature, whereas every defect and privation pertains to
evil.
1231. But he denies this, saying that the true and the false are not found
in things in such a way that what is true on the part of reason is a kind
of natural good, and what is false a kind of evil, but they are found only
in the mind, or intellect.
1232. The intellect, however, has two operations. One of these is called
the understanding of indivisibles, and this is the operation by which the
intellect forms simple concepts of things by understanding the whatness
of each one of them. The other operation is that by which the intellect
combines and separates.
1233. Now while truth and falsity are in the mind, they do not pertain to
that operation by which the mind forms simple concepts and the
whatness of things. This is what he means when he says with regard to
simple concepts and the whatness of things there is neither truth nor
falsity in the mind. Hence as a result of this process of elimination it
follows that since truth and falsity are neither in things nor in the mind
when it apprehends simple concepts and the whatness of things, they
must pertain primarily and principally to the combination and
separation which the mind makes, and secondarily to that of words,
which signify the minds conceptions. Further, he concludes that
de anima, et in logicalibus. Tota enim logica videtur esse de ente et non
ente sic dicto.
Sciendum est autem, quod cum quaelibet cognitio perficiatur per hoc
quod similitudo rei cognitae est in cognoscente; sicut perfectio rei
cognitae consistit in hoc quod habet talem formam per quam est res talis,
ita perfectio cognitionis consistit in hoc, quod habet similitudinem
formae praedictae.
Ex hoc autem, quod res cognita habet formam sibi debitam, dicitur esse
bona; et ex hoc, quod aliquem defectum habet, dicitur esse mala. Et
eodem modo ex hoc quod cognoscens habet similitudinem rei cognitae,
dicitur habere veram cognitionem: ex hoc vero, quod deficit a tali
similitudine, dicitur falsam cognitionem habere.
Sicut ergo bonum et malum designant perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus:
ita verum et falsum designant perfectiones cognitionum.
Licet autem in cognitione sensitiva possit esse similitudo rei cognitae,
non tamen rationem huius similitudinis cognoscere ad sensum pertinet,
sed solum ad intellectum. Et ideo, licet sensus de sensibili possit esse
verus, tamen sensus veritatem non cognoscit, sed solum intellectus: et
propter hoc dicitur quod verum et falsum sunt in mente.
everything which must be considered about being and non-being in this
sense, namely, insofar as being signifies the true, and non-being the
false, must be considered later on, i.e., at the end of Book IX (1895),
and also in The Soul, and in his works on logic. For the whole of logic
seems to be devoted to the being and non-being spoken of in this way.
1234. Now it must be noted that any kind of knowing attains its
completion as a result of the likeness of the thing known existing in the
knowing subject. Therefore, just as the completion of the thing known
depends upon this thing having the kind of form which makes it to be
such and such a thing, in a similar fashion the completion of the act of
knowing depends upon the knowing subject having the likeness of this
form.
Moreover, just as the thing known is said to be good because it has the
form which it ought to have, and evil because it is defective in some
way, in a similar fashion the knowledge of the knowing subject is said
to be true because this subject possesses a likeness of the thing known,
and false because its knowledge falls short of such a likeness.
Therefore, just as good and evil designate perfections of things, in a
similar way truth and falsity designate perfections of knowledge.
1235. But even though in sensory perception there can be a likeness of
the thing known, nevertheless it does not belong to the senses to know
the formality of this likeness but only to the intellect. Hence, even
though the senses can be true in relation to sensible objects, they still
cannot know the truth, but only the intellect can do this. And this is
why it is said that truth and falsity are in the mind.
Intellectus autem habet apud se similitudinem rei intellectae, secundum
quod rationes incomplexorum concipit; non tamen propter hoc ipsam
similitudinem diiudicat, sed solum cum componit vel dividit. Cum enim
intellectus concipit hoc quod est animal rationale mortale, apud se
similitudinem hominis habet; sed non propter hoc cognoscit se hanc
similitudinem habere, quia non iudicat hominem esse animal rationale et
mortale: et ideo in hac sola secunda operatione intellectus est veritas et
falsitas, secundum quam non solum intellectus habet similitudinem rei
intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam similitudinem reflectitur, cognoscendo
et diiudicando ipsam. Ex his igitur patet, quod veritas non est in rebus,
sed solum in mente, et etiam in compositione et divisione.
Et si res dicatur aliquando falsa, vel etiam definitio, hoc erit in ordine ad
affirmationem et ad negationem. Dicitur enim res falsa, ut in fine quinti
habitum est, aut quae non est omnino, sicut diametrum
commensurabilem; aut quia est quidem, sed est apta nata videri aliter
quam sit.
Et similiter definitio dicitur falsa aut quia nullius, vel quia assignatur
alteri quam ei cuius est. In omnibus enim his modis patet quod falsum in
rebus vel in definitionibus dicitur, ratione falsae enunciationis de ipsis.
Et similiter patet de vero. Nam res dicitur vera, quando habet propriam
formam, quae ei ostenditur inesse. Et definitio vera, quae vere competit
ei cui assignatur.
1236. And although the intellect has within itself a likeness of the things
known according as it forms concepts of incomplex things, it does not
for that reason make a judgment about this likeness. This occurs only
when it combines or separates. For when the intellect forms a concept
of mortal rational animal, it has within itself a likeness of man; but it
does not for that reason know that it has this likeness, since it does not
judge that Man is a mortal rational animal. There is truth and falsity,
then, only in this second operation of the intellect, according to which
it not only possesses a likeness of the thing known but also reflects on
this likeness by knowing it and by making a judgment about it. Hence
it is evident from this that truth is not found in things but only in the
mind, and that it depends upon combination and separation.
1237. And if a thing is sometimes said to be false, and the same applies
to a definition, this will be so in reference to affirmation and negation.
For a false thing, as is said at the end of Book V (1128), means (a) one
that does not exist in any way (for example, the commensurability of a
diagonal) or (b) one that exists but is naturally disposed to appear
otherwise than it is.
Similarly a definition is said to be false either because it is not the
definition of any existing thing or because it is assigned to something
other than that of which it is the definition. For it is evident that falsity
is said to be in things or in definitions in all of these ways by reason of
a false statement made about them.
1238. The same thing is evident in the case of truth. For a thing is said
to be true when it has the proper form which is shown to be present in
it; and a definition is said to be true when it really fits the thing to which
it is assigned.
Patet etiam quod nihil prohibet verum esse quoddam bonum, secundum
quod intellectus cognoscens accipitur ut quaedam res. Sicut enim
quaelibet alia res dicitur bona sua perfectione, ita intellectus cognoscens,
sua veritate.
Apparet etiam ex his quae hic dicuntur, quod verum et falsum, quae sunt
obiecta cognitionis, sunt in mente. Bonum vero et malum, quae sunt
obiecta appetitus, sunt in rebus. Item quod, sicut cognitio perficitur per
hoc quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente, ita appetitus quicumque
perficitur per ordinem appetentis ad res appetibiles.
Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem excludit ens verum et ens per accidens
a principali consideratione huius doctrinae; dicens, quod compositio et
divisio, in quibus est verum et falsum, est in mente, et non in rebus.
Invenitur siquidem et in rebus aliqua compositio; sed talis compositio
efficit unam rem, quam intellectus recipit ut unum simplici conceptione.
Sed illa compositio vel divisio, qua intellectus coniungit vel dividit sua
concepta, est tantum in intellectu, non in rebus. Consistit enim in quadam
duorum comparatione conceptorum; sive illa duo sint idem secundum
rem, sive diversa. Utitur enim intellectus quandoque uno ut duobus
compositionem formans; sicut dicitur, homo est homo: ex quo patet quod
talis compositio est solum in intellectu, non in rebus. Et ideo illud, quod
est ita ens sicut verum in tali compositione consistens, est alterum ab his
quae proprie sunt entia, quae sunt res extra animam, quarum unaquaeque
est aut quod quid est, idest substantia, aut quale, aut quantum, aut aliquod
incomplexum, quod mens copulat vel dividit.
1239. It is also evident that nothing prevents truth from being a kind of
good insofar as the knowing intellect is taken as a thing. For just as
every other thing is said to be good because of its perfection, in a similar
fashion the intellect which knows is said to be good because of its truth.
1240. It is also evident from the statements made here that the true and
the false, which are objects of knowing, are found in the mind, but that
good and evil, which are the objects of appetite, are found in things. And
it is also evident that, just as the act of knowing attains its completion
as a result of the things known existing in the knowing subject, in a
similar fashion every appetite attains its completion as a result of the
ordering of the appetitive subject to its appetible objects.
1241. But since combination (559).
Here he excludes being in the sense of the true and being in the sense
of the accidental from the principal consideration of this science. He
says that combination and separation, on which truth and falsity depend,
are found in the mind and not in things; and that if any combination is
also found in things, such combination produces a unity which the
intellect understands as one by a simple concept. But that combination
or separation by which the intellect combines or separates its concepts
is found only in the intellect and not in things. For it consists in a certain
comparison of two concepts, whether these two are identical or distinct
in reality. For sometimes the intellect uses one concept as two when it
forms a combination, as when we say Man is man; and it is clear from
this that such a combination is found only in the intellect and not in
things. Therefore whatever is a being in the sense of the true, and
consists in such a combination, differs from those things which are
beings in the proper sense and are realities outside of the mind, each of
which is either what a thing is, i.e., substance, or of what sort, or how

Et ideo utrumque est praetermittendum; scilicet et ens per accidens, et
ens quod significat verum; quia huius, scilicet entis per accidens, causa
est indeterminata, et ideo non cadit sub arte, ut ostensum est. Illius vero,
scilicet entis veri, causa est aliqua passio mentis, idest operatio
intellectus componentis et dividentis. Et ideo pertinet ad scientiam de
intellectu.
Et alia ratio est, quia utrumque, scilicet ens verum et ens per accidens,
sunt circa aliquod genus entis, non circa ens simpliciter per se quod est
in rebus; et non ostendunt aliquam aliam naturam entis existentem extra
per se entia. Patet enim quod ens per accidens est ex concursu
accidentaliter entium extra animam, quorum unumquodque est per se.
Sicut grammaticum musicum licet sit per accidens, tamen et
grammaticum et musicum est per se ens, quia utrumque per se acceptum,
habet causam determinatam. Et similiter intellectus compositionem et
divisionem facit circa res, quae sub praedicamentis continentur.
Unde si determinetur sufficienter illud genus entis quod continetur sub
praedicamento, manifestum erit et de ente per accidens, et de ente vero.
Et propter hoc huiusmodi entia praetermittuntur. Sed perscrutandae sunt
causae et principia ipsius entis per se dicti, inquantum est ens. De quo
palam est ex his quae determinavimus in quinto libro; ubi dictum est,
quoties unumquodque talium nominum dicitur, quod ens dicitur
multipliciter, sicut infra in principio septimi sequetur.
much, or any of the simple concepts which the mind combines or
separates.
1242. Therefore both being in the sense of the accidental and being in
the sense of the true must be excluded from this science. For the cause
of the formerbeing in the sense of the accidentalis the
indeterminate, and therefore it does not come within the scope of art,
as has been shown (1174); and the cause of the latterbeing in the sense
of the trueis some positive state of mind, i.e., the operation of the
intellect combining and separating, and therefore it belongs to that
science which studies the intellect.
1243. Another reason for excluding them is that, while both of these,
namely, being in the sense of the true and accidental being, (+) belong
to some class of being, (~) they do not belong to being in the proper
sense, which is found in reality. Nor do they designate another kind of
being distinct from beings in the proper sense. For it is evident that
accidental being is a result of the coincidental connection of beings
which exist outside the mind, each of which is a being of itself. For even
though the grammatical musical has being only accidentally,
nevertheless both grammatical and musical are beings in the proper
sense, because each of these taken by itself has a definite cause.
Similarly the intellect combines and separates those things which are
contained in the categories.
1244. If, then, the class of being contained in the categories is
sufficiently dealt with, the nature of accidental being and being in the
sense of the true will be evident. And for this reason we must exclude
these types of being and investigate the causes and principles of beings
as beings in the proper sense. This is also evident from what has been
established in Book V (885), where, in discussing the different senses
of such terms, it was stated that being is used in many senses, as follows
below at the beginning of Book VII (1240).