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  • Aquina's Commentary Metaphysics, Prologue

    Transféré par

    ibitsarcihimeidoh
    59 vues6 pages
    In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum expositio - Thomas' great work on Aristotle's great work - was probably written 1270-1272, although other sources say 1268. It was one of a series of commentaries on Aristotle, written late in Thomas' career, after he had been sent to Paris in November 1268 for a second period as regent master in Theology, where he became involved in a sharp doctrinal polemic that had just been triggered off by the Latin Averroists. These works include In libros De anima expositio (1268-1271), In libros posteriorum Analyticorum expositio (1268), and In VIII libros Physicorum (1268-1271). Thomas' commentary is one of the first in the Latin West, although there were at least two earlier commentaries by Albert the Great and Richard Rufus of Cornwall. Thomas was also probably the first to use the new translation by William of Moerbeke. According to a tradition originating in the later Middle Ages, William knew Thomas Aquinas and was commissioned by him to make some of the translations. But there is no contemporary record of the friendship or the commissions. If they did meet, it is likely this was during the three or four years Aquinas was working at Orvieto, i.e. not before the election of Pope Urban IV in August 1261, who invited Aquinas to serve at the Papal court, and 1265, when Aquinas left for Rome. William's translation of De motu animalium is cited by Thomas in Summa Contra Gentiles, probably completed in 1264. The commentary is worth reading if only as a good introduction to and explanation of Aristotle's very difficult work. As well as that, the use of parallel text helps us understand the technical Latin terminology used by the scholastic writers in their frequent references to Aristotle. The 'recovery' of Aristotle by the middle of the thirteenth century was a momentous event in the history of the Western intellectual tradition. Though William's contribution to this was not as significant as is sometimes claimed, his work undoubtedly helped in forming a clearer picture of Greek philosophy, and particularly of Aristotle's doctrine, than was depicted by the Arabic versions which they had hitherto relied on, and which had distorted or obscured the relation between Platonic and Aristotelian systems of philosophy. His translation of the Metaphysics was some time before 1272.

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    In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum expositio - Thomas' great work on Aristotle's great work - was probably written 1270-1272, although other sources say 1268. It was one of a series of commentaries on Aristotle, written late in Thomas' career, after he had been sent to Paris in November 1268 for a second period as regent master in Theology, where he became involved in a sharp doctrinal polemic that had just been triggered off by the Latin Averroists. These works include In libros De anima expositio (1268-1271), In libros posteriorum Analyticorum expositio (1268), and In VIII libros Physicorum (1268-1271). Thomas' commentary is one of the first in the Latin West, although there were at least two earlier commentaries by Albert the Great and Richard Rufus of Cornwall. Thomas was also probably the first to use the new translation by William of Moerbeke. According to a tradition originating in the later Middle Ages, William knew Thomas Aquinas and was commissioned by him to make some of the translations. But there is no contemporary record of the friendship or the commissions. If they did meet, it is likely this was during the three or four years Aquinas was working at Orvieto, i.e. not before the election of Pope Urban IV in August 1261, who invited Aquinas to serve at the Papal court, and 1265, when Aquinas left for Rome. William's translation of De motu animalium is cited by Thomas in Summa Contra Gentiles, probably completed in 1264. The commentary is worth reading if only as a good introduction to and explanation of Aristotle's very difficult work. As well as that, the use of parallel text helps us understand the technical Latin terminology used by the scholastic writers in their frequent references to Aristotle. The 'recovery' of Aristotle by the middle of the thirteenth century was a momentous event in the history of the Western intellectual tradition. Though William's contribution to this was not as significant as is sometimes claimed, his work undoubtedly helped in forming a clearer picture of Greek philosophy, and particularly of Aristotle's doctrine, than was depicted by the Arabic versions which they had hitherto relied on, and which had distorted or obscured the relation between Platonic and Aristotelian systems of philosophy. His translation of the Metaphysics was some time before 1272.

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    59 vues6 pages

    Aquina's Commentary Metaphysics, Prologue

    Transféré par

    ibitsarcihimeidoh
    In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum expositio - Thomas' great work on Aristotle's great work - was probably written 1270-1272, although other sources say 1268. It was one of a series of commentaries on Aristotle, written late in Thomas' career, after he had been sent to Paris in November 1268 for a second period as regent master in Theology, where he became involved in a sharp doctrinal polemic that had just been triggered off by the Latin Averroists. These works include In libros De anima expositio (1268-1271), In libros posteriorum Analyticorum expositio (1268), and In VIII libros Physicorum (1268-1271). Thomas' commentary is one of the first in the Latin West, although there were at least two earlier commentaries by Albert the Great and Richard Rufus of Cornwall. Thomas was also probably the first to use the new translation by William of Moerbeke. According to a tradition originating in the later Middle Ages, William knew Thomas Aquinas and was commissioned by him to make some of the translations. But there is no contemporary record of the friendship or the commissions. If they did meet, it is likely this was during the three or four years Aquinas was working at Orvieto, i.e. not before the election of Pope Urban IV in August 1261, who invited Aquinas to serve at the Papal court, and 1265, when Aquinas left for Rome. William's translation of De motu animalium is cited by Thomas in Summa Contra Gentiles, probably completed in 1264. The commentary is worth reading if only as a good introduction to and explanation of Aristotle's very difficult work. As well as that, the use of parallel text helps us understand the technical Latin terminology used by the scholastic writers in their frequent references to Aristotle. The 'recovery' of Aristotle by the middle of the thirteenth century was a momentous event in the history of the Western intellectual tradition. Though William's contribution to this was not as significant as is sometimes claimed, his work undoubtedly helped in forming a clearer picture of Greek philosophy, and particularly of Aristotle's doctrine, than was depicted by the Arabic versions which they had hitherto relied on, and which had distorted or obscured the relation between Platonic and Aristotelian systems of philosophy. His translation of the Metaphysics was some time before 1272.

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    COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS

    by
    Thomas Aquinas
    translated by John P. Rowan
    Chicago, 1961

    html-edited by Joseph Kenny, O.P.


    with addition of Latin and Greek

    The English is a translation of the Latin.


    This varies considerably from the Greek of Aristotle.

    PROLOGUE
    THOMAS AQUINAS' OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
    Introduction (1-68) BOOK 1
    The work itself (69-2663)
    What previous philosophers said about causes (69-272)
    Determination of the truth (273-2663) BOOK 2
    With regard to universal truth (274-337)
    With regard to the truth about what belongs to this science (338-2663) BOOK 3
    Dialectical exposition of the problems (338-528)
    Demonstrative section 529-2663 BOOK 4
    List of things this science considers (529-748)
    Determination of these things (749-2663) BOOK 5
    The meanings of the terms used in this science (749-1143)
    Names signifying causes (749-841)
    Names signifying the subject of this science (842-1032)
    Names signifying attributes or aspects of the subject (1033-1143)
    Determination of the realities this science considers (1144-2663) BOOK 6
    The method of considering "being" in this science (1144-1244)
    The truth about "being" (1245-2663) BOOK 7
    The truth about "being as being" (1245-2145)
    "Being" (1245-1919)
    As it is divided by the ten categories (1245-1767)
    The need to focus on substance (1245-1269)
    The truth about substance (1270-1767)
    The method and order of discussion (1270-1305)
    Sensible substances (1306-1767)
    General and logical considerations (1306-1680)
    Considering the principles of sensible substances (1681-1767) BOOK 8
    As it is divided by potency and act (1768-1919) BOOK 9
    "One" and its concomitants (1920-2145) BOOK 10
    "One" in itself (1920-1982)
    In comparison with multitude (1983-2145)
    The first principles of being: separated substances (2146-2663) BOOK 11
    Preliminary considerations (2146-2415)
    Separated substances (2416-2663) BOOK 12
    Aristotle:
    BOOK 13
    BOOK 14
    Prooemium PROLOGUE

    Sicut docet philosophus in politicis suis, quando aliqua plura ordinantur When several things are ordained to one thing, one of them must rule or
    ad unum, oportet unum eorum esse regulans, sive regens, et alia govern and the rest be ruled or governed, as the Philosopher, teaches in
    regulata, sive recta. Quod quidem patet in unione animae et corporis; the Politics. This is evident in the union of soul and body, for the soul
    nam anima naturaliter imperat, et corpus obedit. Similiter etiam inter naturally commands and the body obeys. The same thing is true of the
    animae vires: irascibilis enim et concupiscibilis naturali ordine per souls powers, for the concupiscible and irascible appetites are ruled in
    rationem reguntur. Omnes autem scientiae et artes ordinantur in unum, a natural order by reason. Now all the sciences and arts are ordained to
    scilicet ad hominis perfectionem, quae est eius beatitudo. Unde necesse one thing, namely, to mans perfection, which is happiness. Hence one
    est, quod una earum sit aliarum omnium rectrix, quae nomen sapientiae of these sciences and arts must be the mistress of all the others, and this
    recte vindicat. Nam sapientis est alios ordinare. rightly lays claim to the name wisdom; for it is the office of the wise man
    to direct others.

    Quae autem sit haec scientia, et circa qualia, considerari potest, si We can discover which science this is and the sort of things with which
    diligenter respiciatur quomodo est aliquis idoneus ad regendum. Sicut it deals by carefully examining the qualities of a good ruler; for just as
    enim, ut in libro praedicto philosophus dicit, homines intellectu men of superior intelligence are naturally the rulers and masters of
    vigentes, naturaliter aliorum rectores et domini sunt: homines vero qui others, whereas those of great physical strength and little intelligence are
    sunt robusti corpore, intellectu vero deficientes, sunt naturaliter servi: naturally slaves, as the Philosopher says in the aforementioned book in
    ita scientia debet esse naturaliter aliarum regulatrix, quae maxime a similar way that science which is intellectual in the highest degree
    intellectualis est. Haec autem est, quae circa maxime intelligibilia should be naturally the ruler of the others. This science is the one which
    versatur. treats of the most intelligible objects.

    Maxime autem intelligibilia tripliciter accipere possumus. Primo Now the phrase most intelligible objects can be understood in three
    quidem ex ordine intelligendi. Nam ex quibus intellectus certitudinem ways. First, from the viewpoint of the order of knowing; for those things
    accipit, videntur esse intelligibilia magis. Unde, cum certitudo scientiae from which the intellect derives certitude seem to be more intelligible.
    per intellectum acquiratur ex causis, causarum cognitio maxime Therefore, since the certitude of science is acquired by the intellect
    intellectualis esse videtur. Unde et illa scientia, quae primas causas knowing causes, a knowledge of causes seems to be intellectual in the
    considerat, videtur esse maxime aliarum regulatrix. highest degree. Hence that science which considers first causes also
    seems to be the ruler of the others in the highest degree.
    Secundo ex comparatione intellectus ad sensum. Nam, cum sensus sit Second, this phrase can be understood by comparing the intellect with
    cognitio particularium, intellectus per hoc ab ipso differre videtur, quod the senses; for while sensory perception is a knowledge of particulars,
    universalia comprehendit. Unde et illa scientia maxime est intellectualis, the intellect seems to differ from sense by reason of the fact that it
    quae circa principia maxime universalia versatur. Quae quidem sunt ens, comprehends universals. Hence that science is pre-eminently intellectual
    et ea quae consequuntur ens, ut unum et multa, potentia et actus. which deals with the most universal principles. These principles are
    Huiusmodi autem non debent omnino indeterminata remanere, cum sine being and those things which naturally accompany being, such as unity
    his completa cognitio de his, quae sunt propria alicui generi vel speciei, and plurality, potency and act. Now such principles should not remain
    haberi non possit. Nec iterum in una aliqua particulari scientia tractari entirely undetermined, since without them complete knowledge of the
    debent: quia cum his unumquodque genus entium ad sui cognitionem principles which are proper to any genus or species cannot be had. Nor
    indigeat, pari ratione in qualibet particulari scientia tractarentur. Unde again should they be dealt with in any one particular science, for, since
    restat quod in una communi scientia huiusmodi tractentur; quae cum a knowledge of each class of beings stands in need if such principles,
    maxime intellectualis sit, est aliarum regulatrix. they would with equal reason be investigated in every particular science.
    It follows, then, that such principles should be treated by one common
    science, which, since it is intellectual in the highest degree, is the
    mistress of the others.

    Tertio ex ipsa cognitione intellectus. Nam cum unaquaeque res ex hoc Third, this phrase can be understood from the viewpoint of the intellects
    ipso vim intellectivam habeat, quod est a materia immunis, oportet illa own knowledge. For since each thing has intellective power by virtue of
    esse maxime intelligibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia separata. being free from matter, those things must be intelligible in the highest
    Intelligibile enim et intellectum oportet proportionata esse, et unius degree which are altogether separate, from matter. For the intellect and
    generis, cum intellectus et intelligibile in actu sint unum. Ea vero sunt the intelligible object must be proportionate to each other and must
    maxime a materia separata, quae non tantum a signata materia belong to the same genus, since the intellect and the intelligible object
    abstrahunt, sicut formae naturales in universali acceptae, de quibus are one in act. Now those things are separate from matter in the highest
    tractat scientia naturalis, sed omnino a materia sensibili. Et non solum degree which abstract not only from signate matter (as the natural forms
    secundum rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut taken universally of which the philosophy of nature treats) but from
    Deus et intelligentiae. Unde scientia, quae de istis rebus considerat, sensible matter altogether; and these are separate from matter not only in
    maxime videtur esse intellectualis, et aliarum princeps sive domina. their intelligible constitution (ratio), as the objects of mathematics, but
    also in being (esse), as God and the intelligences. Therefore the science
    which considers such things seems to be the most intellectual and the
    ruler or mistress of the others.
    Haec autem triplex consideratio, non diversis, sed uni scientiae attribui Now this threefold consideration should be assigned to one and the same
    debet. Nam praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et primae science and not to different sciences, because the aforementioned
    causae essendi. Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias separate substances are the universal and first causes of being. Moreover,
    alicuius generis et genus ipsum: sicut naturalis considerat principia it pertains to one and the same science to consider both the proper causes
    corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat of some genus and the genus itself; for example, the philosophy of nature
    considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, considers the principles of a natural body. Therefore, it must be the office
    cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae. of one and the same science to consider the separate substances and
    being in general (ens commune), which is the genus of which the
    aforementioned substances are the common and universal causes.

    Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret, non From this it is evident that, although this science (metaphysics or first
    tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens philosophy) studies the three things mentioned above, it does not
    commune. Hoc enim est subiectum in scientia, cuius causas et passiones investigate any one of them as its subject, but only being in general. For
    quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae alicuius generis quaesiti. Nam the subject of a science is the genus whose causes and properties we seek,
    cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est finis ad quem consideratio and not the causes themselves of the particular genus studied; for a
    scientiae pertingit. Quamvis autem subiectum huius scientiae sit ens knowledge of the causes of some genus is the goal to which the
    commune, dicitur tamen tota de his quae sunt separata a materia investigation of a science attains. Now although the subject of this
    secundum esse et rationem. Quia secundum esse et rationem separari science is being in general, the whole of it is predicated of those things
    dicuntur, non solum illa quae nunquam in materia esse possunt, sicut which are separate from matter both in their intelligible constitution and
    Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam illa quae possunt sine in being. For it is not only those things which can never exist in matter
    materia esse, sicut ens commune. Hoc tamen non contingeret, si a that are said to be separate from matter in their intelligible constitution
    materia secundum esse dependerent. and being, such as God and the intellectual substances, but also those
    which can exist without matter, as being in general. This could not be
    the case, however, if their being depended on matter.

    Secundum igitur tria praedicta, ex quibus perfectio huius scientiae Therefore in accordance with the three things mentioned above from
    attenditur, sortitur tria nomina. Dicitur enim scientia divina sive which this science derives its perfection, three names arise. It is called
    theologia, inquantum praedictas substantias considerat. Metaphysica, divine science or theology inasmuch as it considers the aforementioned
    inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim substances. It is called metaphysics inasmuch as it considers being and
    transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post the attributes which naturally accompany being (for things which
    minus communia. Dicitur autem prima philosophia, inquantum primas transcend the physical order are discovered by the process of analysis, as
    rerum causas considerat. Sic igitur patet quid sit subiectum huius the more common are discovered after the less common). And it is called
    scientiae, et qualiter se habeat ad alias scientias, et quo nomine first philosophy inasmuch as it considers the first causes of things.
    nominetur. Therefore it is evident what the subject of this science is, and how it is
    related to the other sciences, and by what names it is designated.

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