Beliefs About Academic Knowledge

P1: GVQ/GMX/GCX/GOQ P2: GMX
Educational Psychology Review [jepr] PP250-344730 August 20, 2001 11:50 Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Educational Psychology Review, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 2001 (

c 2001)
Beliefs About Academic Knowledge

Michelle M. Buehl1,2 and Patricia A. Alexander1
Individuals beliefs about knowledge (i.e., epistemological beliefs) have be-

come the focus of inquiry in the educational and psychological literatures.
Based on an analysis of those literatures, we first propose that epistemologi-
cal beliefs are multidimensional and multilayered. That is, individuals possess
general beliefs about knowledge, as well as beliefs about more specific forms of
knowledge (e.g., academic knowledge). Second, we examine the relationship
between epistemological beliefs and learning in order to understand why such
beliefs are important to educators. Third, we question whether beliefs about
academic knowledge are truly general (i.e., unwavering across academic do-
mains) or have a character reflective of the domain to which they are associated
(i.e., domain specific). Finally, we explore some of the common problems in
the research and suggest topics for future study.
KEY WORDS: knowledge; epistemology.
INTRODUCTION
The role and influence of an individuals beliefs have been widely recog-
nized in the educational and psychological literatures. For example, with re-
spect to motivation, studies have demonstrated that students beliefs about
their successes or failures affect their subsequent effort and performance
(Dweck, 1986). Similarly, examinations of students belief systems in rela-
tion to reading and text materials, as well as scientific concepts, have revealed
that held beliefs will influence students behavior and processing of infor-
mation (Garner and Alexander, 1994).
1 College
of Human Development, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.
2 Correspondence should be addressed to College of Human Development, University of
Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742-1131; e-mail: buehlm@wam.umd.edu.
385
1040-726X/01/1200-0385$19.50/0
C 2001 Plenum Publishing Corporation
386 Buehl and Alexander
For instance, the conceptual change literature proposes that altering

students nave and intuitive conceptions involves more than cold cogni-
tion. That is, beliefs, values, attitudes, and motivations play a crucial role
in how students approach and process information (Pintrich et al., 1993).
Further, such factors can be advantageous, encouraging students to adopt
more informed and sophisticated views. Or, they can be detrimental, re-
sulting in misconceptions and resistance to new information (Alexander,
1992; Gardner, 1991). Given their power, understanding students beliefs
about knowledge can provide insights into their learning and motivation.
Thus, within the educational literature, students beliefs about knowledge
(i.e., epistemological beliefs) have become the focus of expanding inquiry.
Epistemology, the study of knowledge and knowing, has long been one
of the cornerstones of philosophy. The term, derived from the Greek epis-
teme (i.e., knowledge) and logos (i.e., explanation), has remained a taproot
of philosophical inquiry for centuries. Among the foundations of episte-
mological study are questions pertaining to the nature and form of human
knowledge and questions about the processes by which such knowledge is
verified, justified, or argued.
For example, around 400 BC, Plato explored the elemental compo-
nents of knowledge through his dialogues, such as Theaetus. He posited that
knowledge consists of truth, belief, and justification. That is, to be called
knowledge, a proposition must be true. For example, the statement Hu-
mans are living organisms has factual legitimacy. Further, if an individual
purports to know humans are living organisms, he or she must also believe
in the truthfulness of that statement. However, the final element needed to
qualify a statement as knowledge is evidence that ones belief in the truth
and validity of the statement is justified. In other words, we must be able
to show data to validate the claim that humans are indeed living organisms
(e.g., reproduce, breathe).
Kant (1958) also explored the parameters of knowledge in his critiques
when he distinguished the rational from the empirical. Specifically, Kant
distinguished between a priori knowledge (i.e., what we know prior to expe-
rience) and a posteriori knowledge (i.e., what we know based on experience).
He went on to argue for the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge that
is (a) logically necessary, (b) not derivable from particular sensations and
experiences, (c) presupposed in all our experiences, and (d) contributed by
our minds. Such a priori knowledge is then viewed as a filter through which
all experience is interpreted.
Philosophical treatises on the nature and form of knowledge have con-
tinued unabated. However, the twentieth century bore witness to three im-
portant transformations in epistemological inquiry. First, in the writings of
William James (1890), Charles S. Peirce (1877), John Dewey (1916), and
Knowledge Beliefs 387
others (e.g., Whitehead, 1967), we observe a decidedly psychological turn

in issues related to knowledge and knowing. Additionally, with this psycho-
logical orientation came a particular concern for the relationship between
knowledge and schooling. That is, philosophers began to write directly and
extensively about the relationship between schooling and epistemology, as
with Deweys Democracy and Education (1916) and Whiteheads Aims of
Education (1967).
This newfound concern for the relationship of formal learning to per-
ceptions of knowledge and knowing was understandable from the standpoint
of pragmatism. For pragmatists like Peirce and Dewey, knowledge is instru-
mental and the veracity of knowledge is indeterminable solely on the bases of
abstract criteria, such as those espoused by Plato or Kant. Rather, knowledge
could only be understood in relation to the experience in which it was nested.
Therefore, as the nature of the human experience became more central to
philosophical discourse, questions about knowledge and knowing were cast
in relation to a specific and common human experience schooling. Philoso-
phers and psychologists, thus, became concerned not only with what it means
to know or the process of knowing, but also in how continued schooling
might transform individuals beliefs (Dewey, 1916). Reciprocally, questions
arose as to how beliefs about knowledge impacted students academic per-
formance or altered their approach to learning (Chinn and Brewer, 1993).
Another transformation in contemporary epistemological inquiry, and
the one on which we focus this review, is the empirical testing of epistemo-
logical beliefs (Qian and Alvermann, 1995). That is to say, questions about
knowledge and knowing were no longer simply debated by philosophers.
Instead, the epistemological conceptions of students, teachers, and other
lay people were qualitatively and quantitatively assessed and studied. How-
ever, particularly in early work, individuals beliefs about knowledge and
knowing were addressed as part of larger efforts to understand peoples
experiences and cognitions (e.g., Perry, 1970). Consequently, within the ed-
ucational literature, individuals epistemologies were not the primary focus
of investigations and sometimes not explicitly studied.
In fact, as is often the case in these literatures, the philosophical roots
that undergird much of the empirical study of individuals epistemologies
are not identified or well described (Alexander et al., 1996). Further, when
researchers describe their work, the philosophical bases for what makes the
beliefs epistemological are rarely articulated. Instead, the resulting mea-
sures become the guiding frameworkmicrocontexts that delimit or color
the participants responses and, thereby, the notions of epistemological be-
liefs discussed in the literature (Perry, 1970; cf. Duell and Schommer, this
volume). For that reason, it is essential to look carefully at the way in which
beliefs about knowledge and knowing are assessed and discussed.
In this review, we first address definitional issues related to the assess-

ment and study of individuals knowledge beliefs. We then examine the
role of those beliefs in learning, as well as question whether beliefs about
academic knowledge are truly general (i.e., unwavering across academic do-
mains) or have a character that is reflective of the domain to which they are
associated (i.e., domain specific).
CHARACTERIZING EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS
Although the study of epistemology has a long tradition, its latest con-
figuration, the empirical investigation of individuals beliefs about the nature
and justification of knowledge, presents certain obstacles to researchers. For
example, much like an iceberg, the bulk of such beliefs is not directly acces-
sible, but instead submerged from clear view. This makes it difficult to assess
their true depth and character.
The inaccessibility of epistemological beliefs may be attributed to sev-
eral factors. For instance, most people do not regularly discuss epistemo-
logical questions such as What is knowledge? Individuals beliefs systems
then may not be widely explored or fully developed. This is not particularly
surprising considering that within the classroom, where much of our formal
knowledge is transmitted/acquired/constructed, what it means to know or
how knowledge is justified is rarely part of classroom discourse (Alexander
et al., 1996). Consequently, although individuals may hold beliefs about
knowledge and knowing, they lack the language to fully articulate their
conceptions. Assessment of epistemological beliefs thereby requires one to
identify and uncover what lies well beneath the surface. Such a process can
be quite difficult, particularly with young children (diSessa, 1985).
In addition to difficulties associated with bringing individuals episte-
mological beliefs into clear view, researchers must also contend with dis-
entangling beliefs about knowledge and knowing from each other. The
philosophical literature identifies different kinds of knowledge (e.g., proposi-
tional knowledge and a priori knowledge; Ryle, 1949; Searle, 1992). Similarly,
in the educational and psychological literatures, varied forms and levels of
knowledge have been investigated (e.g., procedural, declarative, and condi-
tional; Alexander et al., 1991). Through such extensive study, beliefs about
the unidimensional character of knowledge have been supplanted with a
view of knowledge as multidimensional and multilayered (Alexander et al.,
1991). Further, these varying facets of knowledge can work in concert or in
opposition.
For instance, an individuals knowledge base consists of knowledge that
is both informally and formally acquired. Academic knowledge, obtained
through formal schooled experiences, can either complement or contradict
experiential or informal knowledge (Alexander and Murphy, 1998). Given

that knowledge is both multidimensional and multilayered, it is conceivable
that beliefs about such knowledge are similarly multidimensional and mul-
tilayered. That is, individuals may possess general beliefs about knowledge,
but still hold distinct beliefs about more finely specified forms of knowledge.
For example, beliefs about academic knowledge may well have a character
distinct from ones general epistemological beliefs. Moreover, beliefs rela-
tive to knowledge in one domain (e.g., mathematics) could conceivably vary
from beliefs relative to another domain (e.g., history). This premise of mul-
tidimensional and multilayered epistemological beliefs guided our analysis
of the existing literature.
Additionally, because academic knowledge is typically acquired in the
context of a school environment, students beliefs about academic knowl-
edge may be reciprocally affected by other relevant belief systems, such as
those pertaining to learning, intelligence, and teaching. When general ques-
tions are asked about formally-acquired knowledge, it is possible that these
other beliefs are simultaneously evoked. Similarly, when broad questions
about learning, intelligence, and teaching are posed, beliefs about knowledge
may surface.
For example, it is difficult to pose direct epistemological questions to
early elementary students (Buehl and Alexander, 2000). Yet, if these young
children are asked to teach someone about a subject, such as mathemat-
ics, perceptions about schooled knowledge may emerge. Thus, although
some items or questions may not necessarily be explicitly epistemological in
nature, they may provide an indirect, yet rich avenue to individuals episte-
mological beliefs. Moreover, attempting to examine beliefs about schooled
knowledge in a manner divorced from the broader academic context in which
they reside may distort understanding of the constructs under study. How-
ever, this circuitous route to beliefs may not only increase the likelihood of
accessing related beliefs (e.g., beliefs about learning, intelligence, and teach-
ing), but also contribute to the definitional problems that plague this area
of research (Hofer and Pintrich, 1997). In light of these nested conditions,
it is our contention that authors should either separate epistemological be-
liefs from other related belief systems in their measures or disentangle such
beliefs in their analyses and interpretations.
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS
Initial Perspectives of William Perry
The current empirical approach to epistemology in the educational lit-

erature owes much to the groundbreaking work of William Perry (Perry,
1970; cf. Duell and Schommer, this volume). However, Perry never con-
ceptualized his work as the study of students epistemologies. Instead, as a
professor at Harvard University, Perry (1970) was interested in the moral
and intellectual development of college students. To understand such devel-
opment more fully, Perry interviewed male students over the course of their
undergraduate education. Although these interviews were open-ended and
relatively unstructured, Perry noticed trends in the students descriptions of
their college experiences. Based on those responses, Perry developed what
he referred to as a scheme for students intellectual development.
Specifically, Perry determined that students adopt varied perspectives
toward knowledge and learning. Further, these varied perspectives were as-
sociated with different levels of educational experience. For example, fresh-
man often adopted a dualistic position in which knowledge was seen as
either right or wrong. In contrast, more advanced students expressed rather
relativistic views, discussing the contextual nature of knowledge. As a step
beyond relativism, Perry also suggested that students often align themselves
or make a personal commitment to a particular area of study. He, however,
did not fully explore this premise.
Although Perry did not present his work as the study of students epis-
temological beliefs, his conceptions of dualistic and relativistic perspectives
incorporated beliefs about the structure and nature of knowledge, as well as
the source and justification of that knowledge. Further, Perry did not explic-
itly set out to assess beliefs about academic knowledge. That is, his primary
purpose was to document the experience of undergraduates. The interviews
were conducted in an academic setting, but the open-ended and nondirec-
tive format of the interviews did not ensure that academic experiences were
the sole focus.
Specifically, each interview began with the question Would you like
to say what has stood out for you during the year? Students frequently
discussed the challenges they encountered in their academic work, but they
also discussed experiences related to their social life, extracurricular activ-
ities, and jobs. Because of the focus on students learning experiences, the
beliefs described by Perry likely address aspects of academic knowledge as
well as general epistemological beliefs.
Expanding Perrys Conceptualization
Much of the research considered in this review traces back to Perrys

study (Perry, 1970), either by setting out to counter his claims (Belenky
et al., 1986) or by expanding on his initial conceptions (King and Kitchener,
1994). For example, Belenky et al. (1986) criticized Perry for focusing solely
on males. In response to his work and drawing on the writings of others
such as Carol Gilligan (1982), Belenky and colleagues examined womens

perspectives of truth, knowledge, and authority. They interviewed a diverse
sample of 135 women. Although 90 women were college-educated, different
ages as well as varied ethnic and class backgrounds were represented; a factor
absent in Perrys work. The researchers began each interview in a manner
similar to one conducted by Perry with the question What stands out for you
in your life over the last few years? The interview also included specific
questions addressing gender, relationships, education, and ways of knowing.
The approach of Belenky et al. (1986) diverged from Perry in several
respects. First, the initial question is broader than the one used by Perry and,
given the diverse nature of their sample, it was not situated in an academic
context. Second, specific aspects of womens lives were targeted, in contrast
to Perrys nondirective questions. Finally, with respect to questions about
ways of knowing, the more educated women received a longer and more
detailed series of questions than did the less educated women. This was not
necessary in Perrys work as all participants were at various points in their
college education.
Initially, Belenky et al. attempted to apply Perrys scheme to the
womens responses. However, after failing in this attempt, Belenky et al.
proposed a new classification scheme to incorporate those responses. They
held that womens conceptions of and relationships to knowledge related
more to the metaphor of voice than to the metaphor of perspectives
applied by Perry (1970). They further identified five possible epistemolog-
ical perspectives. Specifically, women who adopt a perspective of silence
feel voiceless, powerless, and mindless in relation to knowledge and truth,
whereas women with a position of subjective knowing view knowledge as
personal and private. This subjective knowing is based more on intuition
and feeling than articulated thoughts and well-defended ideas. Other epis-
temological perspectives focus more on an investment in a powerful and
knowing authority (received knowing), the validation of knowledge claims
(procedural knowing), and the contextual and relativistic nature of knowl-
edge (constructed knowing).
Belenky and colleagues did not claim that these perspectives were dis-
tinctly female (Goldberger, 1996). Instead, the researchers sought to inter-
ject issues of voice and personal experience into Perrys conceptualizations.
Additionally, like Perry (1970), Belenky et al. (1986) did not intend to as-
sess epistemological beliefs per se. Yet, the characterization of responses
expanded our understanding of general beliefs about knowledge.
Subsequent classifications of individuals beliefs about knowledge and
knowing have also resembled the perspectives proposed by Perry, although
based on populations more varied with regard to age and educational
background. For example, both King and Kitchener (1994) and Kuhn (1991)
sampled individuals from a broad age range (i.e., adolescents through se-
nior citizens) and focused on general epistemological beliefs that underlie
reasoning in nonacademic contexts.
Kuhn (1991) elicited beliefs about knowledge in her attempt to un-
derstand the reasoning that occurs in everyday lives. That is, she presented
individuals in their teens, 20s, 40s, and 60s with three ill-structured prob-
lems (i.e., what causes prisoners to return to crime, what causes children to
fail in school, and what causes unemployment). Kuhn asked participants to
state and justify their positions. Participants were also asked to generate and
rebut an opposing view, offer a solution to the problem, and discuss their
epistemological standards.
Kuhn uncovered three epistemological views in participants responses
pertaining to the certainty of expertise (i.e., absolutist, multiplist, and eval-
uative). Further, the views she proposed closely correspond to the classifi-
cation systems developed by others (e.g., King and Kitchener, 1994; Perry,
1970). Specifically, individuals with absolutist views conceive of knowledge
as certain and absolute, whereas multiplists are more skeptical of certainty
and more likely to hold all views as equally valid. In contrast, individuals
with an evaluative stance deny the certainty of knowledge but recognize that
viewpoints can be compared and evaluated on their relative merits. Given
the age range of the participants, as well as the nonacademic nature of the
problems used to assess individuals reasoning and beliefs, Kuhns classifi-
cation system pertains to more general knowledge beliefs. However, what
makes the views she specifies epistemological in nature is never explicitly
addressed.
King and Kitchener (1994) also take a more general approach to the
study of epistemology. In their efforts to understand the processes used in
argumentation, King and Kitchener interviewed more than 1700 individu-
als (i.e., over 150 high school students, 1,100 college students, 200 graduate
students, and over 150 nonstudent adults) over the course of 15 years. They
found that individuals assumptions and beliefs about knowledge were re-
lated to how they chose to justify their beliefs. Their resulting seven stage Re-
flective Judgment Model (RJM) included descriptions of individuals views
of knowledge and conceptions of justification at each stage. The stages they
suggest closely mirror those proposed by Perry (1970) and actually elaborate
upon Perrys notion of epistemological views beyond relativism. However,
the purpose of their work was to understand processes individuals use to
make interpretative arguments and judgments and thus did not focus solely
on developing a theory of epistemological beliefs.
The data used to develop the RJM were obtained from the Reflective
Judgment Interview. Specifically, participants were presented with four dif-
ferent ill-structured problems and a series of follow-up questions designed
to assess various aspects of their beliefs about knowledge and justification of

those beliefs. Although the majority of the participants were college students,
the ill-structured problems were not necessarily of a schooled nature. That
is, the problems concerned how the Egyptian pyramids were built, the objec-
tivity of news reports, how humans were created, and the safety of chemical
additives in food.
King and Kitcheners extensive testing and analysis of the RJM revealed
that educational activities tended to improve reasoning on ill-structured
tasks and that older and more educated individuals tended to receive higher
scores. Thus, similar to Perry (1970), King and Kitchener (1994) proposed a
developmental progression of beliefs that appears related to educational ex-
periences. Similar to Kuhn (Kuhn, 1991), they sampled a wide range of ages
and did not situate their questions in an academic context. Consequently, we
view King and Kitcheners RJM as reflective of more general epistemological
beliefs.
In contrast to Kuhns (Kuhn, 1991) and King and Kitcheners (King and
Kitchner, 1994) attention to individuals beliefs about knowledge as a general
construct, Baxter Magoldas work has a decidedly academic focus (Magolda,
1987, 1992). Her work was influenced by Perrys interest in understanding
students perspectives on learning in college as well as Belenky et al.s allusion
to potential gender differences (Belenky et al., 1986). In a longitudinal study,
Baxter Magolda interviewed 101 college students (50 males and 51 females)
in their first year of college to understand their ideas about learning as
a student (p. 411). Interviews were conducted again in the participants
sophomore, junior, and senior years of college, as well as the year after their
graduation. Seventy students completed interviews during all 5 years.
The interview questions referred specifically to learning and classroom
experiences, were semistructured, and allowed students to voice their opin-
ions freely. For example, the opening question (i.e., Tell me about the most
significant aspect of your learning experience in the past year.) reflected
Perrys and Belenky et al.s open-ended approach but focused on students
school experiences. Additional questions addressed students beliefs about
the role of the learner, peers, and instructor, as well as evaluation and the
nature of knowledge (e.g., What do you expect from [the instructors] to
help you learn effectively?). Baxter Magolda also developed the Measure
of Epistemological Reflection (MER), which consisted of short answer ques-
tions, as a means to triangulate the interview data.
Similar to Belenky et al. (1986), Baxter Magolda tried unsuccessfully to
apply Perrys scheme to students responses. Consequently, she proposed her
own developmental framework, the Epistemological Reflection Model. This
model described four different ways of knowing characterized by what she
referred to as different epistemic assumptions. That is, absolute knowing was
characterized by the belief that knowledge is certain and absolute, whereas

transitional knowers saw knowledge as partially certain and partially uncer-
tain. For independent knowing, knowledge is perceived as uncertain, and
all alternative beliefs as justified. This contrasts with contextual knowing,
where knowledge can be judged on the basis of evidence in a particular
context.
Among the work just discussed, Baxter Magoldas assessment of beliefs
is the most academically focused. Yet, in the development and articulation of
her model, Baxter Magolda addressed a number of beliefs that were not nec-
essarily epistemological in nature (i.e., beliefs about the role of the learner,
peers, and instructor, and beliefs about evaluation). She clarifies the rationale
for such questions when she explains that each of the four proposed ways
of knowing are characterized by a core set of epistemic assumptions. Those
assumptions are believed to impact particular expectations of the learner,
peers, and instructor in learning settings, as well as to an understanding of
how learning should be evaluated and how educational decisions are made.
(p. 29). Thus, it appears that the nonepistemological questions are used to
tap into students underlying epistemic assumptions.
However, instead of distilling students beliefs about knowledge from
these broad responses, Baxter Magolda includes beliefs about the role of
the learner, peers, and instructor, and beliefs about evaluation in her overall
descriptions of each way of knowing. Even though such beliefs are indeed
important and informative, it seems misleading to use the term Epistemo-
logical Reflection Model when so many other belief systems are intertwined.
General Trends
Particular trends are evident in the research that followed Perrys initial
work. First, whether through longitudinal (e.g., Baxter Magolda, 1992; Perry,
1970) or cross-sectional studies (e.g., King and Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1991),
there was an interest in the changes that occur in individuals beliefs over
time. Overall, differences were associated with age and educational experi-
ences. Second, most of the judgments made about individuals beliefs about
knowledge were derived from interviews and open-ended questions. More-
over, epistemological beliefs were not always the explicit target of such ques-
tions and interviews. Rather, as with the work of Perry and Baxter Magolda,
understanding students perceptions of the college learning experience was
the primary focus from which students epistemological beliefs arose. Third,
the researchers do not specifically examine students beliefs in relation to
learning outcomes. Some have discussed the educational implications of their
work or theorized about the impact of such beliefs. However, the specific
relationship between epistemological beliefs and learning has not been well
examined. Finally, each theorist proposed a series of qualitatively different

perspectives of knowledge and knowing that individuals may espouse. Those
perspectives were treated as rather discrete categories. Although some con-
sidered the fluidity of the perspectives, aspects of knowledge beliefs are not
separately addressed and knowledge, as discussed in this literature, is thus
perceived as unidimensional.
Marlene Schommer: A New Conceptualization of Beliefs
Some epistemological beliefs research has diverged from the aforemen-

tioned trends. Schommers (Schommer, 1990) interest in how students be-
liefs about the nature and acquisition of knowledge impacted their approach
to learning led her to dispute the unidimensional conception of beliefs for-
warded in the literature. Instead, she held that individuals epistemological
beliefs are a system of beliefs composed of more or less separate dimensions.
She proposed a system of five different epistemological dimensions related
to the structure, certainty, and source of knowledge, as well as the speed and
control in the acquisition of knowledge (Schommer, 1990). The first three
dimensions, structure, certainty, and source of knowledge, were extracted
from Perrys work, whereas the dimensions related to the speed and control
of knowledge acquisition were derived from Dwecks (Dweck and Legget,
1988) work on beliefs about intelligence and Schoenfelds (Schoenfeld, 1983)
work on the students beliefs about mathematical learning.
To assess these dimensions, Schommer (1990) developed and validated
a paper and pencil measure, the Schommer Epistemological Questionnaire
(SEQ). A total of 263 college students, primarily first-year students and
sophomores from a junior college and a large university, responded to the
items using a five-point Likert scale. These items were conceptually grouped
into 12 different subscales believed to be related to Schommers proposed
dimensions. Factor analytic techniques indicated that the 12 subscales of this
measure loaded onto four independent factors.
Those factors were reflective of four of the five dimensions Schommer
initially proposed and were labeled according to the most nave viewpoint
they represented. For example the first factor, Innate Ability, related to the
individuals control over knowledge acquisition (e.g., The really smart stu-
dents dont have to work hard to do well in school.). Positions ranged from
being fixed at birth to a skill that can be learned. The second factor, Simple
Knowledge, pertained to the structure of knowledge (e.g., Things are sim-
pler than most professors would have you believe.). Positions on this factor
ranged from knowledge as a collection of unrelated pieces of information
to knowledge as a series of highly interrelated ideas. The third factor, Quick
Learning, concerned the acquisition of knowledge (e.g., Successful students
learn things quickly.). Positions ranged from learning quickly or not at all to
learning gradually over time. The fourth factor, Certain Knowledge, related
to beliefs about the certainty of knowledge (e.g., The only thing that is cer-
tain is uncertainty itself.). Positions ranged from knowledge as absolutely
certain to knowledge as tentative and conditional.
Schommer confirmed these factors in follow-up studies with relatively
large samples of high school (N = 1,182) and college students (N = 424;
Schommer, 1993; Schommer et al., 1992). As with Perry, she found evidence
of developmental trends in students beliefs. For example, in a cross-sectional
study, first-year high-school students believed more in the simplicity and cer-
tainty of knowledge, the innateness of ability, and the quickness of learning
than did high school seniors (Schommer, 1993). That is, the younger students
held less sophisticated and more nave views than the older students. Also,
in a longitudinal study, Schommer et al. (1997) assessed 69 students beliefs
in their first and final years of high school. Results supported a develop-
mental model, as students held more nave beliefs in their first year of high
school than in their senior year. Differences were found across the four fac-
tors (i.e., Certain Knowledge, Simple Knowledge, Innate Ability, and Quick
Learning).
Even though Schommers work revolutionized conceptualizations and
assessments of epistemological beliefs, her work has not escaped criticism.
Some have questioned Schommers four factors (e.g., Hofer and Pintrich,
1997; Qian and Alvermann, 1995). For example, in their item-based factor
analysis, Qian and Alvermann (1995) administered the SEQ to 212 ninth-
and tenth-grade high-school students, similar in age to the sample previously
used by Schommer (1993). However, they found that only 32 of Schommers
63 items demonstrated significant factor loadings. Moreover, those items
loaded onto only three factors, not the four Schommer identified. Specifically,
Schommers Innate Ability and Quick Learning factors emerged, but the
items relating to the structure and certainty of knowledge loaded on a single
factor, which Qian and Alvermann (1995) referred to as Simple-Certain
Knowledge.
In their detailed review of epistemological theories, Hofer and Pintrich
(1997) also questioned Schommers conceptualization of epistemological
beliefs, particularly with regard to the dimensions related to the speed (i.e.,
Quick Learning) and the control of knowledge acquisition (i.e., Innate
Ability). According to Hofer and Pintrich, those factors were reflective of
students beliefs about intelligence. As an alternative, the researchers pro-
posed a four dimensional model of epistemological beliefs encompassing
certainty of knowledge, simplicity of knowledge, source of knowledge, and
justification for knowing. Hofer (2000) subsequently developed a measure
to assess these dimensions, which we consider later in this review.
Overall, we agree with Hofer and Pintrich (1997) that some of the items
and resulting factors of the SEQ were not strictly epistemological in nature.
Schommer acknowledged the influence of Dwecks research on beliefs about
intelligence and Schoenfelds research on beliefs about mathematical learn-
ing. However, in her analyses and discussion these influences are subsumed
under the general heading of epistemological beliefs, rather than discussed
as associated belief systems. As with Hofer and Pintrich (1997), we view this
as confounding our understanding of epistemological beliefs.
Additionally, with regard to the level of specificity, Schommer assessed
high-school and college students epistemological beliefs to determine their
effect on learning. Given this purpose, the student sample, and the academic
context under which the beliefs were assessed, we would consider these
investigations to be explorations of students academic knowledge beliefs.
However, the items on the SEQ have a multilayered character. Some items
are related to knowledge as a general construct (e.g., I dont like movies that
dont have an ending. and Self help books are not much help.), whereas
others pertain to academic knowledge (e.g., The really smart students dont
have to work hard to do well in school. and Being a good student gener-
ally involves memorizing facts.). Thus, academic knowledge beliefs are not
solely assessed.
Despite the criticisms and issues with the SEQ, the contribution of
Schommers work to the literature cannot be understated. That is, the de-
velopment of the SEQ, a paper and pencil measure, ushered in a new line of
epistemological beliefs research by permitting the efficient testing of large
samples. In addition, large sample studies allowed the application of more
advanced statistical techniques in analyzing and modeling beliefs. Perhaps
more importantly, the relatively easy assessment of large samples allowed
researchers to examine epistemological beliefs in relation to other cognitive
processes and learning outcomes.
EXAMINING KNOWLEDGE BELIEFS IN RELATION

TO LEARNING OUTCOMES
In the work of Baxter Magolda (1992) and Schommer (1990), previ-

ously described, we witness a decidedly academic focus in the way beliefs
are conceptualized and assessed. Further, the development of pencil and
paper measures, such as the SEQ, afforded researchers a means to statis-
tically relate students beliefs about knowledge to other constructs. Thus,
researchers have begun to investigate the relationships between beliefs and
various learning outcomes.
This literature establishes that beliefs are related to students strategy
use (Ryan, 1984), comprehension (Schommer, 1990; Schommer et al., 1992),
and academic performance (Ryan, 1984; Schommer, 1993). For example,

using seven items from Perrys Adherence scale (Perry, 1970; cf. Duell and
Schommer, this volume), Ryan (1984) classified 91 college students as be-
ing highly dualistic or highly relativistic. Students also described how they
knew when they understood material presented to them. The highly dual-
istic students, who saw knowledge as either right or wrong, reported that
they reached understanding when they could recite the facts. In contrast,
students classified as highly relativistic (i.e., believing that knowledge is con-
text dependent) stated they understood the material when they could apply
it to another situation. Additionally, students with relativistic views received
higher grades in an introductory psychology course than did students with
dualistic beliefs about knowledge, thereby linking students epistemological
beliefs to academic performance.
Similarly, in a series of studies, Schommer and colleagues (Schommer,
1990; Schommer et al., 1992) examined the relationship between belief fac-
tors from the SEQ, comprehension, and metacomprehension. Specifically,
Schommer (1990) examined how the beliefs of 86 junior college students
affected their comprehension. Students read a text passage and were tested
on their ability to master the material and draw conclusions. Students
confidence in their comprehension was also assessed, as a measure of
metacomprehension.
Regression analysis, controlling for verbal ability, prior knowledge, and
gender, revealed that certain aspects of students beliefs were related to
the outcome measures. That is, students who believed that learning occurs
quickly or not at all (Quick Learning) tended to draw oversimplified con-
clusions from the text. Belief in the quickness of learning was also related
to students poor performance on the mastery test and overestimation of
their comprehension. Additionally, students who expressed that knowledge
is certain (Certain Knowledge) tended to draw more absolute and definitive
conclusions than did students who regarded knowledge as more tentative.
Schommer thus concluded that epistemological beliefs affect the way stu-
dents process information and monitor their comprehension.
In a later study, Schommer and colleagues (1992) explored the relation-
ship between epistemological beliefs and comprehension, explicitly focusing
on how beliefs about the structure of knowledge related to the comprehen-
sion of integrated text material. Specifically, college students, primarily in
their first and second year of college, read a highly integrated text from a
statistics book. Measures assessing mastery of the material, prior knowl-
edge, and use of study strategies were administered. Students confidence in
understanding the passage was also assessed.
Regression analyses were conducted controlling for prior knowledge
and gender. Students belief in the simplicity of knowledge was a significant
predictor of both their comprehension, as assessed by the mastery test, and

their metacomprehension, as assessed by the confidence rating. Specifically,
the more students regarded knowledge as a collection of isolated facts, the
worse they performed on the mastery test and the more they overrated their
ability to comprehend the text. These relationships were significant when
grade-point average and age were controlled for as well. Further, a path
analysis revealed that students beliefs about the simplicity of knowledge had
a direct effect on test performance, as well as an indirect effect mediated by
test-preparation strategies. Examination of the link between epistemological
beliefs and strategy use provides insight as to why these beliefs are related
to academic performance (Schommer, 1993).
Other aspects of students information processing have been examined
in the literature. For example, Qian and Alvermann (1995) used the SEQ to
examine the relationships between epistemological beliefs, learned helpless-
ness, and conceptual change in 212 ninth to twelfth graders. Using multiple
regression analyses, the researchers found that epistemological beliefs were
significantly related to learned helplessness. However, because the belief
factors explained only about 5% of the variance in learned helplessness,
the researchers concluded that the relationship was inconclusive. The re-
sults also revealed that students beliefs about the simplicity and certainty
of knowledge, along with their beliefs about the speed of learning, predicted
the level of conceptual change they experienced.
Other studies support Qian and Alvermanns (Qian and Alvermann,
1995) finding that epistemological beliefs are related to how students inte-
grate and acquire new knowledge (Kardash and Scholes, 1996; Rukavina and
Daneman, 1996). For instance, Kardash and Scholes (1996) were concerned
with how students epistemological beliefs about the certainty of knowledge,
the strength of their beliefs regarding the AIDS-HIV relationship, and need
for cognition impacted their ability to write conclusions based on mixed and
inconclusive evidence.
To examine this issue, 78 college students, primarily juniors and seniors,
read an inconclusive text about the relationship between AIDS and HIV
and completed measures designed to assess their beliefs and prior knowl-
edge about HIV and AIDS, their predisposition to engage in effortful cog-
nitive processing (i.e., need for cognition; Petty and Caccioppo, 1981), and
their ability to write a concluding paragraph for the text. The researchers
also administered 42 items from the SEQ that most closely corresponded
to the structure and certainty of knowledge and the speed of acquisition.
A series of correlational and multiple regression analyses revealed that the
more students believed in the uncertainty of knowledge, the more likely
they were to express the inconclusive nature of contradictory evidence on a
controversial topic (Kardash and Scholes, 1996). In contrast, students who
viewed knowledge as certain were more likely to misinterpret contradictory

evidence.
In their efforts to understand text and learner characteristics that un-
derlie the successful integration and comprehension of competing scientific
theories, Rukavina and Daneman (1996) examined the role of students be-
liefs about the structure of knowledge. Specifically, 122 students (82 tenth-
and twelfth-grade high school students and 40 college undergraduates) were
presented with a series of texts that discussed competing scientific theories
either in the same text or in different texts. The students also completed a se-
ries of measures designed to assess their acquisition of scientific knowledge,
working memory span, and their epistemic beliefs.
For the assessment of students knowledge beliefs, Rukavina and
Daneman (1996) used 12 items from Schommers SEQ that addressed the
complexity or simplicity of knowledge, as well as items addressing whether
knowledge is a series of facts or integrated ideas. Students were classified as
having mature or immature knowledge beliefs, depending on whether their
score for those items fell above or below the mean beliefs score. Students
with mature beliefs believed in the complex, integrated nature of knowl-
edge, whereas students with immature beliefs viewed knowledge as a simple
collection of isolated facts.
A series of ANOVAs indicated that students knowledge beliefs played
a significant role in learning and integrating text material. That is, students
with mature beliefs about the complexity and integration of knowledge
demonstrated greater knowledge acquisition overall than students with im-
mature beliefs. Further, students with immature beliefs learned more from
texts that presented the theories together in an integrated fashion, as com-
pared to when the theories were presented in separate texts. Students with
mature beliefs, however, performed equally well on a mastery test regard-
less of how the information was presented (Rukavina and Daneman, 1996).
Based on these results, the authors concluded that students beliefs about
the complex and integrated nature of knowledge facilitate the learning and
integration of new information.
Trends Related to Knowledge Beliefs and Learning
Particular trends in this area of research are noteworthy. First, these

studies suggest that students beliefs about knowledge play a powerful role
in their academic performance and knowledge acquisition. Second, the re-
searchers tended to use paper and pencil questionnaires, particularly the
SEQ or portions thereof, to assess such beliefs and examine their role in the
learning process. Third, in each of these studies, researchers refer to the as-
sessed beliefs as epistemological or epistemic beliefs without discussing why
the beliefs are epistemological or what other learning beliefs may have been
simultaneously assessed. This is somewhat less of an issue for the studies by
Kardash and Scholes (1996) and Rukavina and Daneman (1996) given the
specific aspects of the SEQ they selected. Finally, in each of the cited studies,
knowledge beliefs are related to students performance at various academic
tasks. However, in the assessment of student beliefs, a specific domain or
body of knowledge is not used as a reference point.
Despite these distinctions, the literature is characterized by a growing
interest in how students beliefs are related to their learning and develop-
ment. Therefore, instead of merely examining beliefs or learning in isolation,
researchers explored the relationships between these phenomena. This ap-
proach to the study of students knowledge beliefs became a catalyst for
looking at beliefs in more specific contexts, that is, in relationship to specific
subject-matter areas.
DETERMINING THE SPECIFICITY

OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS
The issue of domain-specificity in the epistemological belief research

reflects an even greater move toward the contextualization of individu-
als knowledge beliefs. That is, in the research discussed so far, researchers
seemingly assumed that epistemological beliefs were independent of specific
domains of knowledge. However, as the following studies convey, there is
evidence to suggest that epistemological beliefs may vary depending on the
domain under consideration.
Domain-Based Studies of Epistemological Beliefs
The literature suggests that domains differ in terms of their structure

and content (Alexander, 1992; Frederiksen, 1984; Spiro and Jehng, 1990).
By domain, we mean recognized fields of study associated with academic
realms (e.g., history or science). Academic domains and their related prob-
lems have been described as more well-structured or more ill-structured
(Kitchener, 1983). Although all domains consist of both well-structured
and ill-structured problems, particularly at the expert level, domains can be
classified on the basis of which type of problems are more common. More
well-structured domains deal more often with problems or tasks that have
agreed-upon solutions derived from algorithm procedures, as is common-
place in mathematics or physics (Frederiksen, 1984; Stewart, 1987). In con-
trast, the problems and issues in more ill-structured domains, such as history
or reading, are generally solved through more heuristic procedures (Spiro
et al., 1994; Wineburg, 1996). Ill-structured domains also tend to be more

multidimensional than well-structured domains, requiring greater flexibility
in ones thinking (Spiro et al., 1996). Thus, the processing and types of knowl-
edge needed for solving problems in well-structured and ill-structured do-
mains may well vary, either because of their inherent nature (Schwab, 1964),
educational conventions (Stodolsky, 1988), or some combination of both.
It would seem probable, therefore, that individuals beliefs about knowl-
edge would similarly vary in accordance with the degree of structuredness
presumed to exist among domains.
Several researchers have engaged in the study of students epistemologi-
cal belief within a particular domain of study. Specifically, diSessa (1993) pro-
vided an indepth analysis of undergraduates intuitive beliefs about physics.
In his work, diSessa interviewed students as they attempted to solve specifi-
cally designed physics questions. Two case studies depicted how students in-
tuitive beliefs about physics influenced how they approached and interacted
with the material (diSessa, 1985). diSessa (1985) noted that both students
performed well in an introductory physics course. However, their views of
physics imposed certain constraints in terms of how the students attended to
and processed the presented material. For example, the one student, termed
a Results Man, viewed physics in terms of numbers and equations, focus-
ing more on achieving the right answer to a problem than understanding
the underlying concepts. This student encountered difficulty when it was
necessary to understand the finer nuances of the equations. Additionally, he
resisted using mathematical proofs and derivations, even with prompts from
his instructor. Instead, this student relied almost solely on numerical results.
In contrast, another student, whose goal was real understanding, focused
more on developing a qualitative understanding of the material and less on
the quantitative formulas.
Similar analyses conducted in other fields (e.g., mathematics:
Schoenfeld, 1983; history: Wineburg, 1991) have produced intriguing por-
trayals of domain-specific thinking along with pertinent recommendations
for instruction. However, because these studies focused on the understand-
ing of knowledge in only one domain, they do not directly address the ques-
tion of cross-domain differences in epistemological beliefs. Therefore, we do
not consider those at length in this review.
Between-Subject Analysis of Epistemological Beliefs
Some support for variation in epistemological beliefs by domain comes

from comparative studies of beliefs relative to students academic major
(Jehng et al., 1993; Lonka and Lindblom-Ylanne,
1996; Paulsen and Wells,
1998). For example, Jehng and colleagues (1993) examined 386 college
students epistemological beliefs in relation to their educational level and

area of study. Students majoring in social science or arts and humanities
(i.e., soft fields) were distinguished from students majoring in business or
engineering (i.e., hard fields). To assess students beliefs, Jehng et al. (1993)
administered a modified version of the SEQ. Specifically, they included
Schommers proposed dimension of Omniscient Authority, which had not
been previously identified in the literature, and they replaced Schommers
Simple Knowledge dimension with a new dimension termed Orderly Pro-
cess. This dimension related to beliefs about the linearity or nonlinearity
of the learning process. Jehng et al. (1993) found that students majoring in
soft fields believed less in the certainty of knowledge, relied more on their
own reasoning abilities, and were less likely to view learning as an orderly
process than students majoring in hard fields.
Paulsen and Wells (1998) also employed Schommers belief framework
and administered an unmodified version of the SEQ to examine differences
among students of various academic majors. However, instead of classifying
students majors on the single dimension (e.g., soft versus hard), Paulsen and
Wells (1998) used Biglans taxonomy (Biglan, 1973a,b) to characterize 290
college students majors along two dimensions: soft versus hard (e.g., hu-
manities versus engineering) and applied versus pure (e.g., education versus
natural sciences). Based on these classifications, the researchers determined
that students majoring in hard fields viewed knowledge as more certain
than did students majoring in soft areas of study. Additionally, students
in applied fields were more likely to believe in the simplicity and certainty
of knowledge, as well as the quickness of learning as compared to students
majoring in pure fields.
Finally, in contrast to the previous studies, Lonka and Lindblom-Ylanne
(1996) employed the dualist/relativist classification developed by Perry
(1970) to compare the epistemological beliefs of medical and psychology
students who were at the beginning (i.e., first-year students) or end (i.e.,
fifth-year students) of their courses of study. The researchers found that al-
though the majority of students expressed relativistic views of knowledge,
there were statistically more dualistic medical students and more relativistic
psychology students. Overall, this investigation along with the prior studies
suggest important variations in epistemological beliefs by academic domains.
In these studies, researchers examined the beliefs of students from var-
ied academic backgrounds and found evidence of differences. However,
there are several aspects of this work that should be noted. First, these studies
used different taxonomies to classify and group students. Second, the studies
also varied in how they identified and assessed students epistemological be-
liefs, making direct comparisons of the results more difficult. Third, all three
studies employed instruments that assessed students general beliefs about
knowledge and did not focus on academic knowledge beliefs or domain-

specific beliefs. Consequently, it is unclear if the observed differences were
due to differences in students overall epistemological beliefs, or if students
from varied majors based their responses on different bodies of knowledge.
Within-Subject Investigations of the Domain-Specificity

of Epistemological Beliefs
We identified four studies that offered a within-student analysis of epis-

temological beliefs. Three of these four studies provide support for the hy-
pothesis that beliefs about knowledge vary by domain. The fourth study
suggests that epistemological beliefs are relatively independent of academic
domain.
Stodolsky et al. (1991): Young Students Views

of Mathematics and Social Studies
Stodolsky et al. (1991) were not explicitly concerned with students epis-
temologies but they succeeded in unearthing within-student differences in
epistemological beliefs by academic domains. The purpose of their work
was to describe fifth graders attitudes, perceptions, and dispositions toward
mathematics and social studies. Differences in students perceptions were ex-
pected because of distinctions in the knowledge and goals of each domain,
as well as related variations in mathematics and social studies instruction.
For example, mathematics instruction typically focuses on specific algorithms
with the sequence of topics more structured and well defined. In contrast, so-
cial studies instruction often involves various types of activities (e.g., projects,
role playing, or reading), addresses a number of different academic goals,
and incorporates more group work (Stodolsky, 1988).
To determine if such pedagogical patterns would be reflected in stu-
dents perceptions and attitudes toward these areas of study, Stodolsky et al.
(1991) interviewed 60 fifth graders. Each student first answered questions
about one domain (e.g., mathematics) and then the other domain (e.g., social
studies). The order of domain presentation was counterbalanced. To estab-
lish a context for these questions, children were asked to imagine that the
movie character E.T. had arrived at their school and did not know what was
happening. The interview then proceeded with a specific sequence of ques-
tions. In this discussion, however, we focus on the first and last questions, as
these are the most related to students knowledge beliefs. Specifically, in the
first question students were asked to tell E.T. what mathematics (social stud-
ies) was. The final set of questions addressed students beliefs about learning.
The interviewer asked if mathematics (social studies) could be learned alone

or if students needed someone to teach it to them. Students also ranked pro-
cesses (e.g., listening or memorizing) and sources (e.g., teacher or textbook)
potentially used to acquire knowledge in that domain.
A content analysis of students responses revealed greater consensus in
students definitions of mathematics than in their definitions of social studies.
Specifically, the children typically defined mathematics in terms of arithmetic
operations (e.g., addition or subtraction) and numbers. Other concepts in-
cluded in student responses were fractions and decimals, measuring, and
doing problems. In contrast, definitions of social studies were harder for
children to articulate, more varied, and more diffused than the definitions
of mathematics. For example, most students defined social studies in terms
of a specific person, place, event, or historical period. Some equated social
studies with history, geography, or learning about different people or cul-
tures whereas others defined social studies in relation to common activities,
such as reading.
Overall, students believed they could learn social studies on their own
(n = 23) but that they needed someone to teach them mathematics (n = 30).
However, a substantial number (mathematics: n = 23; social studies: n = 13)
gave mixed responses. That is, these children indicated that within each do-
main some topics could be learned individually but other topics had to be
explicitly taught. When asked to elaborate on their beliefs, students most
often reported that they could learn social studies from reading books but
that teachers help to expand on the text information. In contrast, students
held that the teacher was necessary to learn mathematics because some-
one had to explain the right techniques, correct wrong answers, and offer
assistance when needed. However, students felt that once they knew the
procedures to follow (e.g., addition or multiplication), they could learn math-
ematics on their own.
Further, students viewed the teacher as the primary source of knowl-
edge for mathematics. Textbooks and parents were also cited as common
sources of information. The processes students selected for learning mathe-
matics, such as hearing an explanation or being told what to do reflected
a dependency on these sources. For social studies, students also cited the
teacher as a crucial source of information and described textbooks or other
books as useful. The processes students chose for learning social studies also
reflected a degree of independence and individual activity such as looking
things up. Thus, students not only defined mathematics and social stud-
ies differently, but they also relied on rather distinct sources and cognitive
processes to acquire relevant knowledge.
Yet, there are certain limitations to this study. First, the study did not
specifically address epistemological beliefs. Consequently, it is necessary to
infer students epistemological beliefs from their responses to broad ques-

tions. Second, apparent differences could have been due to students lack of
clarity with regard to social studies. Despite these issues, the findings suggest
that elementary students hold different beliefs about knowledge in the two
domains. Thus, there is evidence that early in their academic careers, stu-
dents begin to differentiate knowledge and knowing in different areas and
that these differences are based on students experiences.
Schommer and Walker (1995): Domain Independence

or Dependence of Epistemological Beliefs
Schommers work has focused primarily on high school and college stu-
dents who presumably have more defined conceptions of knowledge than
elementary students. As previously described, Schommers (1990) pioneer-
ing research on the multidimensionality of epistemological beliefs operated
on the implicit assumption that epistemological beliefs exist independent of
a specific domain. Schommer and Walker (1995) set out to test this assump-
tion in two empirical studies.
For these studies, Schommer and Walker recruited college students from
a large psychology class required for undergraduates. In the first study, the
researchers assessed students epistemological beliefs about mathematics
and social science using a modified version of the SEQ. Specifically, the
SEQ was modified by providing the students the following directive:
While you are completing this survey think about mathematics (social sciences), such
as algebra, geometry, and statistics (psychology, sociology, and history). There are no
right or wrong answers for the following questions. We want to know what you really
think. (p. 426)
Reminders as to the target domain, mathematics or social science, were also

inserted at the top of each page. Students then completed the SEQ twice,
once for each domain.
Two separate analyses were conducted to determine if epistemological
beliefs are domain specific or domain general. First, a regression analysis
revealed that the social science factors were significantly predicted by both
the noncorresponding and corresponding mathematics factors. Further, the
mathematics factors explained between 31 and 50% of the variance in the
social science factors.
Second, the consistency of students beliefs about mathematics and so-
cial studies was examined. Using the median value for each belief factor (e.g.,
Certain Knowledge or Innate Ability) as a cut-point, students beliefs about
mathematics and social science were classified as consistently above or be-
low the median for each factor. For example, if a students beliefs about the
simplicity of knowledge were above the median for mathematics and below
the median for social science (or vice versa), the individual was classified as
inconsistent on that factor. Chi-square analyses were significant for all four
factors. Specifically, the consistency rate for each of the factors across math-
ematics and social science ranged from 68 to 79%. According to Schommer
and Walker (1995), this level of consistency, as well as the regression re-
sults, were indicative of similarities among students epistemological beliefs
relative to mathematics and social science.
A second study was conducted to verify and expand upon the findings
of the first study. As before, students responded to two modified versions
of the SEQ. However, to ensure that students were thinking in terms of
the target domain, every third item explicitly mentioned either mathemat-
ics or social science with additional reminders inserted throughout the in-
strument. A control group also completed the modified SEQ twice for the
same domain to use a criterion for the degree to which epistemological be-
liefs are similar across domains. Students also read a passage from either
an introductory statistics or psychology textbook and completed a passage
comprehension test.
Similar analyses on the data gathered in the second study offered some
support for the domain independence of epistemological beliefs. As before,
the corresponding mathematics factors significantly predicted the social sci-
ence factors. However, the noncorresponding mathematics factors signif-
icantly predicted only two of the four social science factors. Also, as be-
fore, the majority of students demonstrated consistency for the four factors
(5770%). An added dimension to the second study was the use of a control
group. Specifically, the researchers expected the within-domain correlations
for the control group to be larger than the cross-domain correlations for
the noncontrol students. Examination of the correlations for the control
and noncontrol group supported this hypothesis for two of the four factors,
Certain Knowledge and Simple Knowledge. The authors interpreted this
finding as evidence that students considered the different domains in com-
pleting the instrument. They also noted that this pattern refutes a strong
domain-independent viewpoint.
Students beliefs were also used to predict performance on the pas-
sage comprehension test both within and between domains. Results in-
dicated that domain-specific epistemological beliefs predicted compre-
hension performance similarly across domains. That is, the less students
believed in the certainty of knowledge for mathematics or social science,
the better they performed on the social science passage test. Similarly, the
less students believed about the simplicity of knowledge in mathematics
or social science, the better they performed on the mathematics passage
test.
Overall, Schommer and Walker interpreted the results of the two stud-
ies to support the hypothesis that epistemological beliefs are predominately
domain independent. However, they noted that the evidence only supported
a moderate domain-independence stance given that the correlations of stu-
dents responses to the SEQ across domains were not as strong as the cor-
relations between students responses to the SEQ within the same domain.
Even given the tentative conclusions drawn from Schommer and
Walkers investigation, there are several methodological concerns we wish
to raise (Schommer and Walker, 1995). First, the domains of study chosen
do not seem parallel. That is, although both mathematics and social science
represent formal areas of study, social science is a label for a composite
of domains, including economics, history, and geography (Alexander, 1992).
Second, there are questions about the modifications made to the SEQ. For in-
stance, it is questionable if the students responded to the questionnaire with
the appropriate domain in mind. Although Schommer and Walker (1995)
attempted to control for this in the second study, the SEQ was not developed
to assess domain-specific beliefs. Further, as previously discussed, the SEQ
also does not focus solely on academic knowledge beliefs. Thus, the lack of
specificity in the measure may have contributed to the apparent similarities
in beliefs.
A third concern relates to the nature of the reading comprehension task.
In our judgment, the passage comprehension test appears to be a rather
domain-general task. Similar processes are used to read a text regardless
of whether it pertains to statistics, psychology, or music. Perhaps the use
of more domain-specific tasks (e.g., solving mathematics word problems or
interpreting a historical document) would have yielded different results.
Given these concerns, domain-specific differences in epistemological beliefs
may well have been unintentionally masked in these two studies.
Hofer (2000): Dimensionality and Disciplinary Differences
In her work on epistemological beliefs, Hofer (2000) addressed some

of the concerns with the Schommer and Walker (1995) study. Her goal was
to understand the dimensionality of epistemological beliefs and potential
disciplinary variations. For this purpose, Hofer developed an instrument
to measure discipline-specific beliefs. By discipline-specific beliefs, she was
referring to potential variations in students conceptions of knowledge rela-
tive to specific academic disciplines (i.e., science and psychology). Discipline
knowledge has been described as more foundational bodies of knowledge
to which domain knowledge relates (Alexander et al., 1991). Thus, the dis-
cipline of science can be reflected in an array of domains, such as biology,
chemistry, or physics.
Based on a review of the epistemological belief research, Hofer and

Pintrich (1997) proposed a new model of beliefs that incorporated dimen-
sions related to the nature of knowledge (i.e., the certainty of knowledge
and the simplicity of knowledge) and the nature of knowing (i.e., the source
of knowledge and the justification for knowing). In this empirical study,
Hofer (2000) set out to assess those dimensions by developing a new mea-
sure. Further, to gauge disciplinary differences, the measure was designed to
be discipline specific. The Discipline-Focused Epistemological Belief Ques-
tionnaire (DEBQ) consisted of 27 items that students responded to using
a 5-point Likert scale. Each item on the questionnaire refers to the field or
the subject matter as the frame of reference (e.g., In this field, knowledge
is certain.).
For this study, 326 first-year students from an introductory psychology
class completed the questionnaire twice, once for psychology and once for
science. To establish the validity of the DEBQ, students also responded to
a shortened version of the SEQ developed through an item-based factor
analysis (Qian and Alvermann, 1995). Hofer also examined the relationship
between students academic performance and epistemological beliefs. To do
so, she obtained the cumulative semester GPA, and psychology and science
course grades for 148 students simultaneously enrolled in the psychology
course and an introductory science course.
Exploratory factor analyses of the psychology and science DEBQ data
revealed four similar factors for both disciplines. Examination of those items
with loadings greater than 0.30 indicated that the factors related to (a)
certainty/simplicity of knowledge (e.g., Most of what is true in this sub-
ject is already known.), (b) justification of knowing: personal (e.g., First
hand experience is the best way of knowing something in this field.), (c)
source of knowledge: authority (e.g., If you read something in a textbook
for this subject, you can be sure that it is true.), and (d) attainability of truth
(e.g., Experts in this field can ultimately get to the truth.). This emergent
factor structure only partially supported Hofers hypotheses. For example,
Hofer hypothesized that separate factors related to the certainty of knowl-
edge and the simplicity of knowledge would emerge. Instead, those items
loaded on a single factor. Also, the factors related to the justification of
knowledge and the source of knowledge did not represent the breadth Hofer
had expected. Finally, the factor related to the attainment of truth was unex-
pected. In terms of validity, three of the four factors on Hofers measure (i.e.,
certainty/simplicity of knowledge, source of knowledge, and attainability of
truth) were significantly correlated with the certainty/simplicity of knowl-
edge factor from the SEQ-M.
With respect to discipline differences, a series of dependent t tests
indicated significant differences in students beliefs about psychology and
science. That is, students considered science knowledge to be more certain

and unchanging and less justified by personal experience than knowledge
in psychology. Further, for science, authority and expertise were viewed as
the source of knowledge and truth was perceived as being more attainable
than for psychology. However, there were statistically significant correla-
tions between the corresponding factors across domains. Thus, although
Hofers findings support the existence of discipline-specific epistemologi-
cal beliefs, the correlations across disciplines, as well as correlations with
Schommers general measure of beliefs (Schommer, 1990), indicate that
there may be both a domain-specific and a domain-general aspect to episte-
mological beliefs.
Finally, Hofer found that both students domain-specific and domain-
general beliefs were related to their overall academic performance and their
course-specific performance. Specifically, the more students believed in the
certainty/simplicity of psychology or science knowledge, the lower their cu-
mulative GPA and their psychology course grade. Domain-general beliefs
in the certainty/simplicity of knowledge were also negatively related to stu-
dents GPA, psychology grade, and science grade. These findings support
the domain-specificity of epistemological beliefs to a point.
Unlike Schommer and Walker (1995), Hofer (2000) used a measure
explicitly developed to focus on academic knowledge beliefs, as well as
domain-specific beliefs. However, the use of first-year college students is a
limitation. That is, the students may vary in their exposure to the focus ar-
eas (i.e., psychology and science). As part of their high-school curriculum,
students would have received instruction in science. However, it is unlikely
that students would have been similarly exposed to psychology. Thus, some
of the demonstrated differences may reflect varying levels of exposure.
Also, with respect to the choice of academic areas, it should be noted that
psychology and science are not parallel in terms of their breadth. Although
psychology can be split into different areas (e.g., clinical, developmental,
and educational), the term science encompasses a broader array of fields
to which high-school students may have been exposed, including biology,
chemistry, and physics. Perhaps the selection of chemistry or biology as the
target field would have resulted in more parallel comparisons.
Buehl, Alexander, and Murphy (2001): Academic

Domain-Specific Beliefs
Similar to Hofer (2000), we felt that the findings of the Schommer and
Walker (1995) study were hampered by the lack of a measure specifically
devised to test for domain-specific beliefs. Thus, we set out to develop and val-
idate a domain-specific measure, the Domain-Specific Belief Questionnaire
(DSBQ), based to some degree on the SEQ. In this measure, we focused on

mathematics, a more well-structured area of study, and history, which is con-
sidered to be more ill-structured (VanSledright and Frankes, 1998). Based
on high school curricula and university requirements, we felt confident that
students would have been exposed to mathematics and history.
Initially, 182 undergraduate, predominately juniors and seniors, re-
sponded to a series of items using a 10-point Likert scale ranging from
strongly disagree (0) to strongly agree (9). The items were designed to tap into
Schommers four dimensions as well as potential domain differences (e.g.,
product vs. process). Additionally, each item could apply to either domain
with the change of a single word (e.g., There are links between mathemat-
ics and other disciplines, and There are links between history and other
disciplines.). We also created two versions of each item. One worded posi-
tively and one worded negatively (e.g., A math problem can be approached
several different ways, and There is only one way to approach a math
problem, respectively). Given the large number of items, 164, created by
this process, we split the items into two conceptually parallel groups of 82
each with an equal number of mathematics and history items.
Students responses were examined and analyzed using exploratory
factor analytic techniques, and 38 items were retained. Specifically, two
apparently domain-specific factors emerged from the items. That is, the
mathematics and history items loaded on separate factors. This finding was
significant for two reasons. First, the domain-specific factors provide support
for the notion that epistemological beliefs are highly domain specific. Sec-
ond, although the measure was initially framed around the SEQ, we did not
find support for Schommers four-factor structure. However, we did notice
that within each domain some items were more conceptually related than
others. For instance, some items related to the acquisition of knowledge
within each domain, whereas others pertained to cross-domain linkages. We
speculated that perhaps with a larger sample size, two factors within each
domain would emerge.
From these 38 retained items, 12 (6 mathematics and 6 history) were se-
lected to be represented in both positive and negative form to assess internal
consistency. These 50 items were administered to the sample of 633 college
students. Given the results of the previous exploratory factor analysis that as-
certained two factors, students responses were submitted to a confirmatory
factor analysis.
Confirmatory factor analysis appeared to be the best choice of analysis
because it tests alternative models. We first developed a model based on
a four-factor structure. That is, for each domain (i.e., mathematics and his-
tory), we proposed two factors (a) Need for Effort in Acquiring Knowledge
and (b) Integration of Information and Problem-Solving. After eliminating
items that were not conceptually related to these factors and allowing error
for parallel mathematics and history items to covary (e.g., There are links
between mathematics and other disciplines, and There are links between
history and other disciplines.), the model had relatively good fit.
We then compared this particular model to a series of alternative mod-
els. For example, we compared the four-factor domain-specific model to a
single-factor model. This single-factor model, representative of a unidimen-
sional, domain-general view of epistemological beliefs, demonstrated poor
fit to the data. We also compared the four-factor domain-specific model
to a two-factor domain-general model, a two-factor domain-specific model,
and a three-factor mixed model (i.e., two domain-specific factors and one
domain-general factor). Based on these comparisons, we determined that
the fit of the four-factor domain-specific model was significantly better than
the fit of the alternative models. This four-factor model was also confirmed
with another sample of 523 college students. The fit of the model to these
new data was also good (Buehl et al., 2001).
Additionally, we also compared students beliefs about mathematics and
history for two factors. Two paired t tests revealed that students differed in
their beliefs about mathematics and history knowledge. Specifically, students
believed that more effort is required to gain knowledge in mathematics than
history and that mathematics knowledge is more integrated with knowledge
in other areas than history knowledge.
Together, the results of the confirmatory factor analysis and the across-
domain comparisons suggested that academic epistemological beliefs are
largely domain specific. That is, we explicitly tested the domain-specific
model against several other models, including a domain-general model, to
find that the domain-specific model provided the best fit of the data. Further,
we expanded upon previous research by selecting domains that were more
comparable with respect to their breadth and familiarity.
However, this study was limited in the sense that it did not examine the
relationship between the domain-specific epistemological beliefs and exter-
nal criteria (e.g., student grades or test scores). We have since administered
the DSBQ, along with a series of domain-specific motivation measures, and
are presently analyzing the relationship between domain-specific epistemo-
logical beliefs and domain-specific motivational beliefs. Preliminary analysis
indicates that there are significant relations among these variables (Buehl,
2000), providing further evidence of domain-specific beliefs.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of this review was to examine how epistemological be-

liefs have been discussed in the educational literature. This exploration
addressed definitional issues, the relationship between epistemological be-

liefs and learning, as well as the domain-specificity of such beliefs. In our
examination of the literature, we also identified certain problems or pitfalls
with this area of research.
First, we suggested that epistemological beliefs are multidimensional
and multilayered in nature, a premise supported by the psychological re-
search (e.g., Baxter Magolda, 1992; Belenky et al., 1986). Specifically, studies
were found to focus more on the global construct of knowledge or on more
specific forms, such as schooled or academic knowledge. For example, given
the nature of their sample and the questions asked, Belenky et al. (1986)
addressed more general knowledge beliefs, whereas Baxter Magolda (1992)
focused on students beliefs about academic knowledge.
Second, the studies we reviewed indicated that epistemological beliefs
are significantly related to other learning outcomes. For instance, students
beliefs assessed with Schommers general measure were significantly related
to the comprehension of text (Schommer, 1990; Schommer et al., 1992) as
well as to students conceptual change (Qian and Alvermann, 1995). Fur-
ther, as indicated by Schommer and Walker (1995), beliefs about knowledge
in one domain (e.g., mathematics) can predict beliefs and performance in
another domain (e.g., social science).
Finally, our review of the literature revealed that epistemological beliefs
indeed can be characterized both as domain general and domain specific.
That is, when broad questions about knowledge do not specify a domain,
a rather consistent progression in individuals knowledge beliefs is discern-
able (e.g., King and Kitchener, 1994; Perry, 1970). The multidimensional
and multilayered nature of epistemological beliefs that we forward in this
review suggests that those beliefs can also be assessed at varying levels
(see Fig. 1). Specifically, we have considered general epistemological be-
liefs, academic knowledge beliefs, and domain-specific beliefs. Considerable
support for these nested forms comes from the between-subject and within-
subject analyses of students epistemological beliefs across various academic
domains.
For example, the between-subject comparisons of Jehng et al. (1993),
Paulsen and Wells (1998), and Lonka and Lindblom-Ylanne (1996) indicate
that students majoring in different academic areas vary in terms of their
general epistemological beliefs. This suggests that different fields of study
may promote diverse epistemological stances or may attract students with a
particular view of knowledge.
The within-subject studies provide additional clarification of this issue.
Specifically, there is evidence that students hold different views about knowl-
edge depending on the academic domain under consideration. However,
for these beliefs to emerge, they must be assessed at the both the overall
Fig. 1. Proposed multilayered nature of epistemological beliefs.
academic and domain-specific level. That is, studies employing domain-

specific measures found evidence of domain-specificity of beliefs. In con-
trast, when Schommers general measure of epistemological beliefs was em-
ployed, distinct differences were not apparent. This may be attributed to a
measure that was not designed to assess academic epistemological beliefs
per se, let alone domain-specific beliefs. Thus, as with the intelligence litera-
ture, the level of specificity identified apparently relates directly to the goal
and specificity of the measures.
Additionally, there is evidence that individuals domain-specific beliefs
vary as a function of domain structuredness. For example, students tend to
view knowledge in more well-structured domains (e.g., mathematics) as bet-
ter defined and integrated than knowledge in more ill-structured domains
(e.g., social studies, Stodolsky et al., 1991, or history, Buehl et al., 2001). Indi-
viduals with expertise in these areas may contend that all areas of study have
a certain ill-structured nature, implying that differences in beliefs are merely
reflections of pedagogical differences (Pickering, 1995). It is not presently
possible to determine if the emerging differences are attributable to the in-
herent nature of domains, the way they are taught, or some combination
thereof.
We do not claim, however, that beliefs are solely domain-specific. In-

stead, we view the different types of beliefs to be related to each other.
This is supported by the significant positive relationships between beliefs
assessed with domain-general and domain-specific instruments (Buehl et al.,
2001; Hofer, 2000). Nor does the domain-specificity of beliefs weaken or
overshadow general and academic knowledge beliefs.
This conclusion that epistemological beliefs can simultaneously have a
general and specific character coincides with recent trends regarding knowl-
edge discussed in the broader educational research literature (Alexander
and Murphy, 1998). Specifically, in recent years educational researchers have
become more interested in how learning and development changes with the
situation or context (e.g., Resnick et al., 1991; Rogoff, 1990). This interest has
led to the formulation of more particularized questions related to the role
of such contextual features. Greater specification and particularization of
measurement have correspondingly developed to address those contextual
questions.
Our examination of the literature also identified specific problems that
plague this area of research. For instance, the empirical study of individuals
epistemological beliefs neglects the philosophical roots that could inform
how beliefs are defined and assessed in the educational literature. This lack
of a sound theoretical foundation contributes to the vague, inaccurate, or
broad use of the term epistemology.
The mislabeling of beliefs as epistemological may also arise from the
use of general questions or specific items that tap into related systems of be-
liefs. For example, to determine students beliefs about knowledge, Baxter
Magolda probed students beliefs about the role of the learner, instructors,
and peers in learning. All of these beliefs were then included in her Epis-
temological Reflection Model. Although the exploration of such nonepiste-
mological beliefs may be necessary to unearth individuals epistemologies,
greater care is needed to disentangle those notions from more central beliefs
about knowledge.
Based on the findings of this review, we believe there are several aspects
of students epistemologies that warrant examination and can be viewed as
an effort to get to the roots of epistemology. For one, there may be merit
to reconsidering the philosophical foundations of epistemology in relation
to current empirical and psychological investigations of beliefs. Such a focus
may reveal additional aspects of beliefs that can inform our understanding of
individuals beliefs. Additionally, it would provide a richer context in which
to place the current studies of epistemology.
Second, the issue of how students epistemological beliefs initially take
shape has not been well researched. Although evidence suggests that stu-
dents beliefs change over time, studies have focused primarily on older
students (Perry, 1970; Schommer et al., 1997). Thus, we do not know when
these beliefs take root. Nor, is it clear how epistemological beliefs change as
a result of maturation or educational experience.
Third, students views of knowledge appear to reflect instructional prac-
tices (Stodolsky, 1988; Stodolsky et al., 1991). Yet, we know little about the
influence of classroom instruction on students beliefs. That is, how does the
practice of teaching a specific subject influence students beliefs about how
that domain is constituted? Knowledge of how students beliefs are shaped
by instruction may assist teachers in making informed decisions about prac-
tices that foster epistemological beliefs that are more adaptive for learning
and critical thinking. Given these issues, it appears that the educational lit-
erature would benefit by reexamining the source both in terms of how epis-
temology is discussed in the philosophical literature, as well as how the roots
of epistemological beliefs emerge and are cultivated through educational
experiences.
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Beliefs About Academic Knowledge

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Educational Psychology Review, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 2001 (

Beliefs About Academic Knowledge

Individuals beliefs about knowledge (i.e., epistemological beliefs) have be-

386 Buehl and Alexander

For instance, the conceptual change literature proposes that altering

Knowledge Beliefs 387

others (e.g., Whitehead, 1967), we observe a decidedly psychological turn

388 Buehl and Alexander

In this review, we first address definitional issues related to the assess-

CHARACTERIZING EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS

Knowledge Beliefs 389

experiential or informal knowledge (Alexander and Murphy, 1998). Given

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS

Initial Perspectives of William Perry

The current empirical approach to epistemology in the educational lit-

390 Buehl and Alexander

Expanding Perrys Conceptualization

Much of the research considered in this review traces back to Perrys

Knowledge Beliefs 391

such as Carol Gilligan (1982), Belenky and colleagues examined womens

392 Buehl and Alexander

Knowledge Beliefs 393

to assess various aspects of their beliefs about knowledge and justification of

394 Buehl and Alexander

characterized by the belief that knowledge is certain and absolute, whereas

Knowledge Beliefs 395

examined. Finally, each theorist proposed a series of qualitatively different

Marlene Schommer: A New Conceptualization of Beliefs

Some epistemological beliefs research has diverged from the aforemen-

396 Buehl and Alexander

Knowledge Beliefs 397

EXAMINING KNOWLEDGE BELIEFS IN RELATION

In the work of Baxter Magolda (1992) and Schommer (1990), previ-

398 Buehl and Alexander

and academic performance (Ryan, 1984; Schommer, 1993). For example,

Knowledge Beliefs 399

predictor of both their comprehension, as assessed by the mastery test, and

400 Buehl and Alexander

viewed knowledge as certain were more likely to misinterpret contradictory

Trends Related to Knowledge Beliefs and Learning

Particular trends in this area of research are noteworthy. First, these

Knowledge Beliefs 401

DETERMINING THE SPECIFICITY

The issue of domain-specificity in the epistemological belief research

Domain-Based Studies of Epistemological Beliefs

The literature suggests that domains differ in terms of their structure

402 Buehl and Alexander

et al., 1994; Wineburg, 1996). Ill-structured domains also tend to be more

Between-Subject Analysis of Epistemological Beliefs

Some support for variation in epistemological beliefs by domain comes

Knowledge Beliefs 403

students epistemological beliefs in relation to their educational level and

404 Buehl and Alexander

knowledge and did not focus on academic knowledge beliefs or domain-

Within-Subject Investigations of the Domain-Specificity

We identified four studies that offered a within-student analysis of epis-

Stodolsky et al. (1991): Young Students Views

Knowledge Beliefs 405

The interviewer asked if mathematics (social studies) could be learned alone

406 Buehl and Alexander

infer students epistemological beliefs from their responses to broad ques-

Schommer and Walker (1995): Domain Independence

Reminders as to the target domain, mathematics or social science, were also