Int Environ Agreements (2015) 15:179197

DOI 10.1007/s10784-013-9229-y

ORIGINAL PAPER

Comparative typological study of change in global

environmental regimes

Kenji Kamigawara

Accepted: 22 October 2013 / Published online: 12 November 2013

Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract Many global environmental agreements have shown diverse changes in their
long-term implementation. Comparative studies on international regimes are limited, and
research on change in such regimes is not well developed. A comparative typological study
of change in global environmental regimes is presented in this paper. Ernst B. Haass
three models of change is chosen as a framework to explain change in the regimes. The
models are (1) incremental growth, (2) turbulent nongrowth, and (3) managed interde-
pendence. They reflect the shift of power balance among member states and their
knowledge of policies. The models are applied to five case studies covering the Ramsar,
CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna), Basel, Ozone, and Climate regimes, which have been in effect for over 15 years.
The three models help explain diverse changes in those regimes. Five factors, (1) shift of
power balance and political leadership, (2) the scope of the regime (narrow or wide), (3)
institutional legacy, (4) consensual knowledge and conflict of political value, and (5)
learning between rival groups, have made major contribution to the change in those
regimes.

Keywords Global environmental regimes
Change
Models
E. B. Haas

Knowledge

1 Introduction

Many environmental agreements have been adopted globally, but have seen diverse
changes in their long-term implementation. The number of comparative studies on inter-
national regimes is limited. Major works in this field focused on regime effectiveness

K. Kamigawara (&)
School of Environmental Science, The University of Shiga Prefecture, 2500, Hassaka-cho, Hikone,
Shiga 522-8533, Japan
e-mail: 2t95f6@bma.biglobe.ne.jp; kamigawara.k@ses.usp.ac.jp

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180 K. Kamigawara

(Haas et al. 1995; Young 1999; Miles et al. 2002; Breitmeier et al. 2006). Several of these
studies suggest that international environmental regimes start modestly and then grow in
effectiveness (Haas et al. 1995; Young 1999; Miles et al. 2002). Generally, I accept this
gradualist tendency; however, it does not reflect the complicated reality of change in
international environmental regimes (Young 2010). Research on regime change is not well
developed (Breitmeier et al. 2006; Young 2010). Young (2010) is the only study, other
than a leaders versus laggards study (Chasek et al. 2006), that focuses on regime change
in more than three international environmental regimes. However, the scope of Youngs
(2010) study is different from that of this paper, which focuses exclusively on global
regimes.1
I present a comparative typological study of changes experienced by global environ-
mental regimes. In the second section, Ernst B. Haass three models of change is chosen
as a framework to explain change in global environmental regimes. In the third section, the
models are applied to five case studies on changes in global environmental regimes: the
Ramsar, CITES, Basel, Ozone, and Climate regimes.

2 Three models of change

2.1 Explanatory framework

2.1.1 States and their regimes

States seek to solve a global environmental problem collectively and collaborate inter-
nationally to institutionalize global environmental regimes. Collaboration does not occur
unless the costs of acting jointly are considered less than the costs of individual action.
Learning, in the context of regime construction, is the cumulative recognition of
knowledge necessary for realizing joint gains (Haas 1980, 390). Policy makers have to
compare long-term joint gains and short-term individual economic costs. Global envi-
ronmental regimes are supported by consensual knowledge, which is provided by episte-
mic communities (Haas 1980). Political objectives and technical knowledge combine to
conceptualize interests (Haas 1990). Policy makers can define their interests by consulting
epistemic communities and sufficiently popular advocacy networks.2 An epistemic com-
munity is a community of experts who share political values and a common understanding
of causal models (Haas 1990). An advocacy network is a nongovernmental organization
(NGO) activist-centered network motivated by values rather than by material concerns or
professional norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2). Power is used to translate interests into
policy. In the environmental regime, ballot and financial resources are major elements of
power. Political actors can exercise influence using technical knowledge and value-based
discourses.

1
Young (2010) discusses the regimes of a limited number of developed countries and a regional system in
addition to global regimes.
2
E. B. Haas mentioned only epistemic communities, but not advocacy networks, so I slightly modified his
models accordingly.

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Comparative typological study 181

2.1.2 Three models

I chose Haass (1990) three models as the framework to explore changes in global envi-
ronmental regimes. Haass three models clearly reflect the reality of the United Nations
(UN) politics. He conceptualized three models of change in global organizations: (1)
incremental growth, (2) turbulent nongrowth, and (3) managed interdependence.
In the incremental growth model, a dominant coalition of like-minded states rules an
organization. Ideological conflicts among member states are limited. This model features
the successive augmentation in an organizations programs as actors add new tasks to older
ones without any change in the organizations decision-making dynamics.
In the turbulent nongrowth model, the former dominant coalition of states loses control
of the organization when challenged by a new coalition of states. Many actors profess
several clashing interests. There is no agreed overall theory. This model involves major
change in the organizations decision making. The ends become incoherent, and internal
consensus on both ends and means disintegrates.
In the managed interdependence model, a reexamination of purposes is produced by
knowledge-mediated decision-making dynamics. Certain key countries in formerly dom-
inant coalitions have become seriously dissatisfied with turbulent nongrowth as Haas
(1990, 129) notes, Those who had been the most prominent defenders of rival solutions
now turn themselves into an inner circle of reformers committed to a new approach. The
mellowing of antagonistic ideologies is produced when the epistemic community intro-
duces consensual knowledge into the bargaining.
Haas (1990) suggested that most UN agencies began with the incremental growth model
and then fell into turbulence, and cases of managed interdependence are limited.

2.2 The applicability of the models to the regimes

One can doubt the applicability of studies of international organizations to a study of global
environmental regimes. However, E. B. Haas developed his three models using his studies
on international regimes (Haas 1990). In this paper, legal regimes are discussed, but the
paper excludes informal regimes such as the Seven Sisters cartel, which once dominated
the international oil market. International organizations and both global environmental
regimes discussed in this paper are multilateral institutions that promote the common
interests of international society. They are established by public international law and are
composed of and ruled by many states; their representatives meet periodically and are
supported by permanent secretariats.

3 Application of the three models in global environmental regimes

Applicable cases that used Haas models were selected from global environmental regimes
that are open to all countries and have been in effect for more than 15 years. They are the
Ramsar, CITES, Basel, Ozone, and Climate regimes.

3.1 The Ramsar regime

Dominated by Western states and supported by stable epistemic communities, the Ramsar
regime began with the incremental growth model. Developing states became the majority
in the regime and the scope of the discussion expanded rapidly toward sustainable

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development. However, the regime was firmly based on an epistemic community whose
poles were the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN) and the International Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau [IWRB, now
Wetland International (WI)]. This regime could shift to the managed interdependence
model, but not to the turbulent nongrowth model.

3.1.1 Until adoption

As early as 1962, a draft international convention on wetlands was under consideration by

the IUCN and IWRB. It was mainly negotiated by European countries (Boardman 1981).
The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat,
so-called the Ramsar Convention, was adopted in 1971. Since the adoption, IUCN has
functioned as the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention, supported by IWRB. This has
prevented the regime from falling afoul of UN politics, which are characterized by North
South conflict.

3.1.2 COP1

At the first conference of the contracting parties (COP) to the Ramsar Convention in 1980,
only 20 parties attended and 11 were OECD countries.3 OECD countries were dominant.
This situation continued until the fourth COP in 1990. The principle of wise use was
enshrined in the convention text and became the basic concept of the regime. Two expert
groups with close ties, IUCN and IWRB (now WI), have served as the poles of the
epistemic community. Institutional development, such as the introduction of a rule of
budget and establishment of the Standing Committee, had progressively advanced until the
fifth COP in 1993. Until then, the Ramsar regime conformed to the incremental growth
model, which was supported by the dominant group using consensual knowledge provided
by the stable epistemic community.

3.1.3 COP6 and COP7

By the seventh COP in 1999, the number of parties had increased; 106 parties attended and
only 28 were OECD countries. Demands from developing countries intensified and dis-
cussions of the COP expanded rapidly toward sustainable development. There were two
reasons for change. First, developing states had become the majority in the COP. Second,
the COP participants wanted the Ramsar regime to play a role in the management of global
environmental issues such as conservation of biodiversity and adaptation to climate
change. The COP discussions became more controversial (IISD 1999). At this stage, the
Ramsar regime conformed to the managed interdependence model, in which conflicting
groups reached compromise based on the changing knowledge supplied by the epistemic
community.

3.1.4 COP9 and COP10

At the tenth COP in 2008, the number of parties attending was 106 and only 27 were
OECD countries. The agenda also expanded to include issues of climate change and
biofuel, which led to the NorthSouth conflict. However, this did not make the regime

3
In this paper, the OECD countries include Liechtenstein.

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Comparative typological study 183

turbulent. Wise use continued to be the basic concept described in the Strategic Plan
20092015 adopted at the tenth COP. In response to the expanded scope of the regime, the
epistemic communities supporting it had increased. The International Water Management
Institution (IWMI) had become an international organizations partner at the ninth COP
in 2005 (IISD 2005, 11). In response to increasing demands to the Secretariat from parties,
it was decided that the ad hoc working group should consider whether the Secretariat
continue to be performed by IUCN or be integrated into the UN (IISD 2008). The scope of
the regime has expanded rapidly, but no severe conflicts among the parties regarding the
basic ideas of the regime were observed. At this stage, the Ramsar regime conformed to the
managed interdependence model (Table 1).

3.2 The CITES regime

Dominated by Western states and supported by a stable epistemic community, the CITES
regime began with an incremental growth model. The number of developing states
increased, and they became the majority. In response to wide-scale African elephant
poaching, the ivory trade management preferred by the epistemic community was chal-
lenged by an advocacy network, which included humane organizations. Powerful Western
states joined the advocacy network and defeated the epistemic community. The regime
then fell into the turbulent nongrowth model. After a long confrontation, the two rival
groups started a dialog supported by the epistemic community and a partial compromise
was made based on new consensual knowledge. The scope of the discussion expanded to
include fishery species and timber species. The CITES regime now conforms to an unstable
managed interdependence model.

3.2.1 Until adoption

Consideration of the CITES regime was begun at the recommendation of the General
Assembly of IUCN in 1963 (IUCN 1964). In 1973, CITES was adopted in Washington,
DC, which mainly reflected the interests of Western countries (Holdgate 1999). IUCN,
commissioned by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), functioned as the
Secretariat of CITES until 1984 (Wijnstekers 2001). This commission further strengthened
the relationship between IUCN and CITES, which prevented the regime from being
embroiled in UN politics such as NorthSouth conflict.

3.2.2 COP1 to COP3

At the first COP to CITES in 1976, only 24 parties attended and 9 were OECD countries.
Until the mid-1980s, Western countries and their experts tended to dominate the CITES
meetings (Bonner 1993). Institutional development continued as the regime introduced a
rule for contribution to the budget, adopted the listing criteria for Appendixes, and
developed a compliance-monitoring system.
After 1980, developing countries started to complain about the listing of some of their
species in Appendix I, which should include species threatened with extinction. Those
claims were resolved by partial adjustments, such as the introduction of a quota system for
panthers in 1983, but the regimes fundamental ideas were not reconsidered (Sand 1997;
Curlier and Andersen 2002). At this stage, the CITES regime conformed to the incremental
growth model.

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Table 1 Change in the Ramsar regime
Juncture
Number of parties attended
Influence, leadership, and
conflict among the parties
Consensual knowledge
Poles of epistemic community
Model
184
1st COP (1980) 7th COP (1999) 10th COP (2008)
20 (OECD 11) 106 (OECD 28) 106 (OECD 27)
Western countries had Developing countries were the majority. Developing countries were the majority. OECD countries
dominant influence Demands of the developing countries intensified. kept superior influence. NorthSouth conflict appeared
OECD countries kept superior influence on the climate change and biofuel issues
Ecology centered Sustainable Development centeredwise use Sustainable Development centeredwise use
wise use
IWRB, IUCN IWRB, IUCN, Bird international IWRB, IUCN, Bird international, IWMI
Incremental growth Managed interdependence Managed interdependence
K. Kamigawara
Comparative typological study 185

3.2.3 COP7 to COP10

From the mid-1980s, disputes between conservationists and preservationists became

apparent. Conservationists supported the idea of sustainable development (sustainable use),
which was introduced by the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN et al. 1980). Preser-
vationists promoted prohibition of the use of wildlife-based resources, which was endorsed
by humane groups (Bonner 1993). From the mid-1980s, poaching caused a decrease in
African elephant populations in east and central Africa, but elephant populations in
southern African countries were stable or increasing. In 1989, the African Elephant and
Rhino Specialist Group (AERSG) in IUCN split over the issue of the ivory trade and
stopped functioning as a pole of the epistemic community. Instead, Kenyan expert David
Western and some mainly the UK-based researchers organized the Ivory Trade Review
Group (ITRG) and proposed a ban on the ivory trade. The advocacy network, ITRG, and
humane groups exercised a strong influence on Western mass media. Experts in southern
African countries lacked sufficient communication abilities to confront the advocacy
network with their views (Bonner 1993; Western 2002).
At the seventh COP in 1989, 92 parties attended and 21 were OECD countries. At this
stage, OECD countries were not in the majority, but the major Western countries had
superior influence because of their strong knowledge base and communication abilities.
The USA and Kenya, in cooperation with several humane groups, promoted the trans-
ference of the entire African elephant population to Appendix I from Appendix II, which
meant enforcing the African elephant ivory trade ban. This policy was opposed by southern
African countries, the Secretariat of CITES, and IUCN, who were at the core of the
epistemic community supporting the regime. They claimed that southern African coun-
tries elephant populations were stable or increasing. This amendment was adopted by
voting with a procedure to consider a future proposal by the African states to transfer their
African elephant populations to Appendix II as a compromise (TRAFFIC 1989). This was
a severe setback for the epistemic community. In 1990, following a petition on the African
elephant dispute by environmental NGOs supported by the USA, the UNEP Executive
Director dismissed the Secretary General of CITES (Sand 1997). At this stage, the CITES
regime conformed to the turbulent nongrowth model.
It was obvious that southern African elephant populations did not meet the listing
criteria of Appendix I. Members of the epistemic community, which included prominent
members of the Standing Committee of CITES, senior officers of the Secretariat, and the
Secretary General of IUCN, tried to accommodate the wishes of the southern African
countries. Supported by the epistemic community, African states began policy dialog
meetings (Sharp 1997; Mofson 2000).
At the tenth COP in 1997, member states decided to transfer the southern African
countries elephant populations to Appendix II from Appendix I. Based on that decision, a
limited and experimental export of ivory was allowed (TRAFFIC 1997). At this stage, the
CITES regime shifted to the unstable managed independence model, in which confronted
groups made a tentative compromise based on the newly developed common under-
standing. The situation is still unstable because Kenya and some other countries have not
changed their stance on opposing the reopening of the ivory trade.

3.2.4 COP15

At the fifteenth COP in 2010, 158 parties attended and only 32 were OECD countries. The
influence of developing countries became stronger. In the 1990s, discussions in the CITES

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186 K. Kamigawara

regime expanded to fishery species and timber species. However, no consensus was
reached on the sharing of roles between the CITES regime and the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), and regional
fishery regimes. From the beginning, expert groups, mainly gathering at IUCN [and also
later Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce (TRAFFIC)], supported the
CITES regime with their knowledge. However, in accordance with the expansion of the
scope of discussions in the CITES regime, knowledge from expert groups meeting at FAO,
ITTO, and similar organizations is now required (Wijnstekers 2001; FAO 2010).
The idea of sustainable use was officially prescribed in the CITES Strategic Vision
adopted in 2000, although preservation has kept some influence in the regime. Disputes on
specific issues have continued, mainly concerning fishery species, timber species, and
African elephants. However, these issues have not brought the COP as a whole into serious
conflict. At this stage, the CITES regime conformed to the unstable managed interde-
pendence model (Curlier and Andersen 2002) (Table 2).

3.3 The Basel regime

During the negotiation process of the Basel regime, the influence of the epistemic com-
munity, the OECD expert group on waste, decreased because it was challenged by the
advocacy network for total ban. This advocacy network expanded to include the
European Union (EU) and gained a tentative victory in COP3. However, the total ban
amendment has not entered into force because it has been concluded by insufficient states
and the confrontation between the two rival groups continued. Finally, through the
IndonesianSwiss country-led initiative, the rival groups started a policy dialog sup-
ported by a newly formed epistemic community to reach a compromise based on new
consensual knowledge. The Basel regime changed to the managed interdependence model.

3.3.1 Until adoption

There were complicated processes involving international organizations on the trans-

boundary movement of hazardous wastes, discussed simultaneously by the EU, OECD, and
UNEP (Zito 2000). In all these three forums, definitions of hazardous and waste and
the distinction between recycling materials and wastes created difficult problems
because they depend on participant perspectives and situations. The vagueness of termi-
nology was a major cause of confusion in the Basel regime. Initially, negotiations on the
convention under UNEP were based on knowledge of the OECD waste management policy
group, an epistemic community who supported trade management based on the prior
informed consent (PIC) procedure. In the course of the negotiations, several African
countries were persuaded by Greenpeace to assume a confrontational position from the
perspective of the NorthSouth conflict. They argued for a total ban on exporting haz-
ardous wastes from developed countries to developing countries and opposed the PIC
procedure. The OECD expert group gradually lost influence after several African countries
and Greenpeace began to emphasize ethical views (Kempel 1999). The Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their disposal was
adopted in 1989. Several African countries expressed strong frustration at the adoption of
the Basel Convention, which included the PIC procedure (Tolba and Rummel-Bulska
1998). Even at the negotiation stage, the Basel regime conformed to the turbulent non-
growth model.

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 Table 2 Change in the CITES regime
Comparative typological study

Juncture 1st COP (1976) 7th COP (1989) 15th COP(2010)

Number of the parties
attended
Influence, leadership and
conflict among the parties
Consensual knowledge
Poles of epistemic
community
Model
24 (OECD 9) 92 (OECD 21) 158 (OECD 32)
Western countries had Developing countries were Developing countries were the majority. OECD countries kept
dominant influence the majority. The USA and superior influence. Western countries, pushing fishery and
some Western countries exercised strong forestry issues, were opposed by several major developing
influence. South African countries countries, and Japan concerning fishery issues
along with Japan challenged the above
Suppressive control of No dominant one (sustainable Sustainable use (preservation has kept some influence)
trade use vs. preservation)
IUCN IUCN, TRAFFIC (challenged by humane IUCN, TRAFFIC, FAO (challenged by humane NGOs)
NGOs), AERSG split
Incremental growth Turbulent nongrowth Unstable managed interdependence
187

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188 K. Kamigawara

3.3.2 COP1

At the first COP to the Basel Convention in 1992, 28 parties attended and only 8 were
OECD countries. OECD countries were the minority and could not control the meeting.
Tolba, the UNEP Executive Director, proposed a total ban on the export of hazardous
wastes from developed countries to developing countries, which would have changed the
core element of the Basel Convention. This suggestion resulted in serious disputes (Tolba
and Rummel-Bulska 1998). At this stage, the Basel regime conformed to the turbulent
nongrowth model.
During the political process at the EU after the first COP, the coalition of Denmark, EU
Parliament, and Greenpeace gained a victory over the UK and Germany, who opposed the
total ban proposal. Later, the EU as a whole accepted the total ban policy (Zito 2000;
Liefferink and Andersen 2005).

3.3.3 COP3 to COP5

In 1995, the number of parties attending the third COP in 1995 increased: 80 parties
attended and 21 were OECD countries. The USA was not a participating party and attended
as an observer.4 The majority of the G77 and the EU led by Denmark pushed for the total
ban policy and OECD countries were split. After a long, severe dispute, the total ban
amendment was adopted over the opposition of Japan, Canada, Australia, and others, and
also despite the negative position of India and South Africa among other countries.
However, as of August 2013, the amendment has not entered into force because insufficient
countries have ratified it.
At the fifth COP in 1999, the Protocol on Liability and Compensation was adopted after
difficult discussions over 5 years. However, only a few countries have ratified it. E. B.
Haas observed older rules fall into disrepute and new ones lack legitimacy in the
turbulent nongrowth model (Haas 1990, 110). At this stage, the Basel regime conformed to
the turbulent nongrowth model; programs had increased, but the purposes and the measures
taken lacked integrity.

3.3.4 COP9 and COP10

At the ninth COP in 2008, 93 parties attended and 26 were OECD countries. The Indo-
nesianSwiss country-led initiative, which was designed to encourage the two groups in
conflict over the total ban policy to achieve a compromise, was adopted. After meetings
between 2009 and 2010, the recommendations included two elements and were adopted at
the tenth COP in 2010. The first element was the clarification of the conditions for
effectuation of the total ban amendment long disputed by the parties. The second element
authorized a technical expert group to develop a framework for the environmentally sound
management of hazardous wastes, upon which the anti-total ban group had insisted. The
technical expert group reported to the eleventh COP in 2013. This expert group had
technically rational discussions of the issues and formed the core of a new epistemic
community. After a long gridlock, the Basel regime conformed to the managed interde-
pendence model with a compromise between the confronting parties supported by a new
epistemic community (Table 3).

4
The USA had not ratified the convention by the end of July 2013. This has affected the balance between
the EU and other OECD countries.

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Comparative typological study 189

Table 3 Change in the Basel regime

Juncture 1st COP(1992) 3rd COP (1995) 10th COP (2010)
Number of 28 (OECD 8) 80 (OECD 21) 93 (OECD 26)
parties
attended
Influence, OECD countries versus several EU and G77 versus non-EU IndonesianSwiss
leadership and African countries led G77 OECD countries initiative made
conflict among a compromise
the parties
Consensual Management of international No dominant one (total ban vs. Environmentally
knowledge trade by PIC procedure management of international sound
(challenged by total ban) trade by PIC procedure) management
Poles of the No dominant one (OECD expert No dominant one (OECD IndonesianSwiss
epistemic group was challenged by the countries split and the pole of initiative
community Greenpeace centered advocacy the advocacy network was meetings
network) Greenpeace)
Model Turbulent nongrowth Turbulent nongrowth Managed
interdependence

3.4 The Ozone regime

After an unsuccessful period, the USA and the Director General of UNEP exercised strong
leadership with support from the epistemic community to overcome the NorthNorth and
NorthSouth conflicts. This means that the Ozone regime began in the managed interde-
pendence model. The Ozone regime continued learning through its Assessment Panels,
which became the poles of its epistemic community. The Ozone regime has retained the
managed interdependence model.

3.4.1 Until adoption

In 1977, the USA and Canada proposed to prohibit chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as aerosol
propellants in developed countries. However, this effort ended unsuccessfully in 1980
(Andersen and Sarma 2002; Parson 2003). In 1981, negotiations on a convention on the
Ozone layer started under UNEP. At that time, Ozone-depletion mechanisms were not well
understood and quantitative modeling was weak. The negotiations were mainly held
among developed countries and the USA and the Secretary General of UNEP exercised
strong leadership. In March 1985, the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone layer
was adopted, but the participants could not agree on concrete regulatory measures. At the
end of 1985, the first comprehensive international assessment report on the Ozone layer
was released by UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). This led
people to recognize the need for international regulations of CFCs (Andersen and Sarma
2002; Parson 2003). A quasi-bilateral negotiation between the USA and the EU followed.
A group of officials in the US Department of State, the US environmental protection
agency (EPA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and UNEP led by
Tolba exercised strong leadership. This group could be called an epistemic community
(Haas 1996). In 1987, the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the Ozone layer
was adopted. The Montreal Protocol stipulated concrete measures on regulation with the
provision of a grace period for developing countries. In 1988, the International Ozone
Trends Panel Report was published by WMO and accepted as an international authoritative

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190 K. Kamigawara

scientific assessment that led states to recognize the need to strengthen regulations (Parson
2003).
From the negotiation stage, the Ozone regime conformed to the managed interdepen-
dence model, in which the confronting groups made compromises in learning and using
rapidly changing scientific knowledge.

3.4.2 MOP1 and MOP2

At the first Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (MOP) in 1989, 31 parties attended and
20 were OECD countries. At this stage, OECD countries were the majority. However,
demands from developing countries became stronger (Benedick 1998). A compromise was
achieved between developed and developing countries at the second MOP in 1990 with the
establishment of the Ozone Layer Multilateral Fund to support implementation of the
Protocol in developing countries. Based on the Protocol, expert groups called Assessment
Panels were established, and they published their first reports in 1989. Since then, their
reports have continuously provided consensual knowledge. In accordance with their
reports, regulatory measures have been strengthened (Canan and Reichman 2002).
At this stage, the Ozone regime conformed to the managed interdependence model, in
which the confronting parties compromised in learning and using rapidly changing sci-
entific knowledge.

3.4.3 MOP11

At the eleventh MOP in 1999, 129 parties attended and 28 were OECD countries. The G77
was the majority. After a confrontation, the G77 and OECD countries achieved consensus
on the replenishment of the Ozone Layer Multilateral Fund. OECD countries split on the
control measures on Ozone-depleting substances such as hydrochlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs). The EU took the lead and later the group reached a compromise on those issues.
At this MOP, discussions on hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which do not have Ozone-
depletion effects, but are strong global-warming greenhouse gases (GHGs), began because
the EU proposed the control of HFCs under the Montreal Protocol. However, the USA and
other countries opposed by indicating that control of GHGs was not included in the
Montreal Protocol mandate. A compromise could not be reached and Assessment Panels
were requested to discuss the issue.
The MOP made modest progress due to conflicts and difficulties (Parson 2003).
Assessment Panels continued to provide reliable technical advice. At this stage, the Ozone
regime continued to conformed to the managed interdependence model, in which the
conflicting groups made compromises in learning using changing scientific knowledge.

3.4.4 MOP23

The strengthening of regulations continues to slow down. Since 2000, the major contro-
versial issues have been those concerning methylbromide, HCFCs, and HFCs. At the
twenty-third MOP in 2011, 125 parties attended, 20 were OECD countries, while 14 OECD
countries did not attend. This attendance record reflects the decrease in political clout from
this regime. OECD countries pushed to phase out HFCs as GHGs, but China and India
strongly opposed this issue, arguing that it was out of the mandate of the Montreal
Protocol.

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Comparative typological study 191

At this stage, the Ozone regime continued to conformed to the managed interdepen-
dence model. Discussion on the fundamental purpose of the Ozone regime continued on
the issue of HFCs; however, this did not change the Ozone regime to the turbulent non-
growth condition (Table 4).

3.5 The Climate regime

Established to overcome NorthNorth and NorthSouth conflicts, the Climate regime was
supported by an epistemic community centered on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). Therefore, it began with the managed interdependence model. In the
Climate regime, consensual knowledge based on scientific understanding has become
strong. However, consensus on burden sharing has not increased, especially because the
two biggest GHGs emitters refused to accept their obligation of regulating GHGs emis-
sions based on a short-term economic consideration. Thus, the Climate regime fell into the
turbulent nongrowth model, especially after 2001.

3.5.1 Until adoption

Begun at the end of the 1980s, the international policy coordination on climate change
clearly showed NorthSouth and NorthNorth conflicts from the outset. Based on eco-
nomic considerations, the USA cautiously rejected the target and timetable approaches
(Hect and Tirpak 1995). The EU assumed an active position by challenging the USA.
Developing countries argued that the developed countries should take responsibility and
demanded financial and technical support. IPCCs first assessment reports were published
in 1990 and provided consensual knowledge for negotiations.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was
adopted in 1992, overcoming conflicts between North and South and among developed
countries. The UNFCCC stipulated common, but differentiated responsibility. A financial
mechanism to support developing countries was established. At that moment, the Climate
regime conformed to the managed interdependence model.

3.5.2 COP1

At the first COP to the UNFCCC in 1995, 116 parties attended and 23 were OECD
countries. At this stage, the G77 was the majority and had strong influence. Among OECD
countries, EU and non-EU countries were in conflict on control measures and objectives.
The COP adopted the Berlin mandate, which determined the modality of negotiations on a
legal instrument to be applied after 2000. The developing countries rejected any new
obligations. To avoid a split in the conference, the EU accepted this opinion and pressed
the USA and Japan to accept it. At this stage, the Climate regime was in transition between
the managed interdependence and the turbulent nongrowth models. The conflicting groups
reached a compromise weakened by the G77 refusal to take any new obligations.
During the Berlin mandate process, the OECD countries continued to split on emission
control measures and objectives. Climate change increased in importance as an interna-
tional political issue. Not only experts, but also Heads of State and Governments discussed
these issues during the Berlin mandate process.

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192 K. Kamigawara

Table 4 Change in the Ozone regime

Juncture 1st MOP (1989) 11th MOP (1999) 23rd MOP (2011)
Number of 31 attended (OECD 20) 129 attended (OECD 28) 125 attended (OECD 20)
the parties
to the
Protocol
attended
Influence, OECD countries dominated. G77 was the majority. G77 G77 was the majority. G77
leadership The USA exercised strong and OECD countries and OECD countries
and conflict leadership, confronted by confronted on financial confronted on financial
among the EC and Japan. G77 was in support. On controlling support. OECD countries
parties minority but became issues, OECD countries pushed to phase down
demanding on financial split, and EU took the HFCs as GHGs, opposed
support leadership by China and India
Consensual International Ozone Trend Reports of Assessment Reports of Assessment
knowledge Panel Report Panels Panel
Poles of The USA (Department of Assessment Panels Assessment Panels
epistemic State, EPA, NASA), UNEP
community
Model Managed interdependence Managed interdependence Managed interdependence

The IPCC published its second assessment reports in 1995, which provided consensual
knowledge for the Berlin mandate process. However, since the mid-1990s, the US lobbyist
groups had strengthened their attacks on IPCC (Bolin 2007; Oreskes and Conway 2010).

3.5.3 COP3 to COP7

The US conservatives criticized the Berlin mandate, and in July 1997, the US Senate
adopted the ByrdHagel Resolution, which rejected the US conclusion on any legal
instruments that would not oblige developing countries to address climate change.5 This
resolution effectively made the US administration take a more cautious position and
prevented it from concluding the Kyoto Protocol.
At the third COP in 1997, 170 parties attended and 29 were OECD countries. The
negotiations were mainly held by the three biggest economies: the EU, USA, and Japan.
Based on the Berlin mandate, the G77 refused even voluntary participation in the Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
was adopted unanimously and stipulated differentiated emission objectives for developed
countries and mechanisms such as emissions trading. However, the Kyoto Protocol was a
result of fragile compromises, the US Administration lacked domestic political support,
and the G77 refused any new obligations.
In 2001, the Bush administration publicly announced that the USA would not ratify the
Kyoto Protocol, stressing the importance of American interests.6 At the seventh COP in
2001, the EU, Japan, and other developed countries reached a compromise to implement
the Kyoto Protocol without the US participation.

5
ByrdHagel Resolution, July 25, 1997. Available at http://www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html, last
visited September 24, 2013.
6
Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, March 28, 2001. Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.
php?pid=47500, last visited at November 21, 2012.

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Comparative typological study 193

The Climate regime gradually exhibited features of the turbulent nongrowth model. In
reality, the USA and G77 did not meaningfully participate in the Kyoto Protocol.7

3.5.4 COP15 and COP16

The influence of developing countries had increased in this field in accordance with the
shift of shares of GHGs emission between developed and developing countries. Since
2008, the emissions from developing countries have exceeded those of developed countries
(IEA 2011). Nevertheless, per capita emission in the developing countries is still sub-
stantially small compared with developed countries.
At the COP15 in 2009, 193 parties attended and 30 were OECD countries. The G77
continued to be the majority, refusing new obligations. Developed countries were asked to
continue the Kyoto Protocol. OECD countries continued to split. The USA continued to opt
out of discussions on the Kyoto Protocol. This COP was characterized by a high level of
participation with 115 Heads of State and Governments attending. However, this caused
procedural confusion and resulted in severe mistrust between parties (IISD 2009). This
COP failed to adopt a new legal framework for 2013 onwards; instead, leaders of the major
countries agreed on a voluntary framework called the Copenhagen Accord. In 2010, based
on the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun agreement was adopted on a voluntary basis at the
sixteenth COP. In my view, discussions on the legal instrument have returned to the
pledge and review scheme proposed in 19911992.
At this stage, the Climate regime had neither a dominant group nor an effective com-
promise among conflicting groups. The scientific common understanding had been
strengthened, but the political common understanding on burden sharing was not devel-
oped. Therefore, the Climate regime conforms to the turbulent nongrowth model (Table 5).

4 Conclusions

Diverse change in global environmental regimes can be described by applying Haass three
models, as shown by the five case studies discussed here.
The Ramsar regime began in the incremental growth model, which was dominated by
Western states and supported by stable epistemic communities. Developing states became
the majority and the scope of discussion in the Ramsar regime expanded rapidly toward
sustainable development. However, the Ramsar regime has been firmly based on an epi-
stemic community whose poles were IUCN and WI. The Ramsar regime could shift to the
managed interdependence model.
The CITES regime began in the incremental growth model, which was dominated by
Western states and supported by a stable epistemic community. Developing states became
the majority. In response to wide-scale African elephant poaching for their ivory, the
epistemic community was challenged by the advocacy network, which included humane
organizations. Powerful Western states joined the advocacy network and the epistemic
community was defeated. The CITES regime fell into the turbulent nongrowth model.
After a long confrontation, the two rival groups started a dialog supported by the epistemic
community and made a partial compromise based on the new consensual knowledge. The
scope of the discussion expanded to include fishery species and timber species. However,
no consensus was reached on the sharing of roles between CITES and other organizations

7
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, after the EU, Japan, and Russia concluded it.

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Table 5 Change in the Climate regime

Juncture 1st COP (1995) 7th COP (2001) 15th COP (2009)
Number of the 116 attended (OECD 23) 170 attended (OECD 29) 193 attended (OECD 30)
parties to the
convention
attended
Influence, G77 was the majority, refused G77 was the majority, G77 was the majority,
leadership new obligations. OECD refused new obligations. refused new obligations.
and conflict countries split (EU vs. non- The USA refused the The USA refused the
among the EU). EU supported G77s Protocol. Developed Protocol. High-level
parties position countries without the participation caused
USA reached a procedural confusion
compromise
Consensual IPCC Assessment Reports IPCC Assessment Reports IPCC Assessment Reports
knowledge (attacked by lobbyist (attacked by lobbyist
groups) groups)
No consensus on burden No consensus on burden No consensus on burden
sharing sharing sharing
Poles of IPCC IPCC IPCC
epistemic
community
Model Between managed Turbulent nongrowth Turbulent nongrowth
interdependence and
turbulent nongrowth

such as FAO. The CITES regime conforms to the unstable managed interdependence
model.
During the negotiation process for the Basel regime, the influence of the epistemic
community, the OECD waste expert group, was decreased by a challenge from the
advocacy network, which advocated for a total ban. The advocacy network expanded to
include the EU and obtained a tentative victory in the COP3. However, the total ban
amendment has not yet entered into force because insufficient states have ratified it, and the
confrontation between the two rival groups continued. Finally, by the IndonesianSwiss
country-led initiative, the rival groups started a dialog supported by new consensual
knowledge from a newly formed epistemic community and reached a compromise. The
Basel regime then changed to the managed interdependence model.
After an unsuccessful period for the Ozone regime, the USA and the Director General of
UNEP exercised strong leadership with support from the epistemic community to over-
come the NorthNorth and NorthSouth conflicts. The Ozone regime started from the
managed interdependence model and continued learning through their Assessment Panels,
which became the poles of their epistemic communities. The Ozone regime has kept the
managed interdependence model.
Supported by an epistemic community centered on the IPCC, the Climate regime was
established after resolution of the NorthNorth and NorthSouth conflicts. The Climate
regime started from the managed interdependence model and consensual knowledge on
scientific understanding has become strong. However, consensus on burden sharing has not
increased because of the short-term economic considerations of the major GHG-emitting
countries. Therefore, the Climate regime fell into the turbulent nongrowth model, espe-
cially after 2001.

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Comparative typological study 195

4.1 Discussion

Based on the five case studies, following five factors have made major contribution to
changes in the global environmental regimes.

4.1.1 Shift of power balance and political leadership

The number of state parties increases, which makes global environmental regimes more
heterogeneous. The voices of the developing states become stronger and OECD states
became the minority although they retain financial resource-based power. In this envi-
ronment, global environmental regimes lack the conditions for the incremental growth
model. After the mid-1980s, the OECD countries stopped being a like-minded group,
except where financial issues were concerned, mainly because the USA stopped taking a
leading role. The EU assumed the leading role, but this sometimes contributed to turbu-
lence (see Sects. 3.3.3, 3.5.2). Meanwhile, the G77 has kept its solidarity as a negotiation
group, even though economic diversity among them has increased rapidly.

4.1.2 The scope of the regime (narrow or wide)

The global environmental regime expands its scope to resolve more complicated issues.
This is a positive development of the regime; however, this makes discussion of issues
more complicated and more controversial. The expansion of scope can also be observed
among regimes from the Ramsar regime to the Climate regime. The Climate regime
concerns almost all aspects of social and economic activities and strongly links with energy
and macroeconomic policies. The expansion of stakeholders requires new consensual
knowledge and tends to make consensus building more difficult. If the scope of the global
environmental regime is narrow and technical, it is usually not perceived to affect the
states vital interests and its discussion should be delegated to technical experts. However,
when the scope of the regimes expand to cover major economic activities such as climate
change, several states tend to take cautious positions based on economic consideration and
perceived conflicts of national interests tend to occur. Policy makers have to consider the
long-term collective gain and short-term individual economic costs. In those cases,
political leaders need to participate in the negotiations.

4.1.3 Institutional legacy

The Ramsar and CITES regimes were negotiated mainly by like-minded experts under
respective transnational conservation organizations and served by IUCN as their Secre-
tariat. Therefore, they began in the incremental growth model. This institutional legacy
prevented these two regimes from being affected by NorthSouth politics. The other three
regimes were negotiated under the UN after 1980 and therefore did not conform to the
incremental growth model.

4.1.4 Consensual knowledge and conflict of political value

The global environmental regimes are supported by the consensual knowledge provided by
epistemic communities. In the Ozone regime, the Assessment Panels were organized and
they became the poles of their epistemic communities and successfully provided consen-
sual knowledge periodically. This success contributed to keeping the Ozone regime in the

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196 K. Kamigawara

managed interdependence model. On the other hand, the advocacy networks stress the
political value and take antagonistic approach. So they tend to contribute to turbulence in
the regimes. In the CITES and Basel regimes, their epistemic communities were defeated
by advocacy networks stressing ethical views supported by the major states. Those events
made the regimes change to the turbulent nongrowth model. The simplified appeals of
advocacy networks are more understandable than complicated explanations from the
epistemic communities. Communication with the public in the political arena is chal-
lenging for epistemic communities.

4.1.5 Learning between rival groups

The turbulent nongrowth model of the CITES and Basel regimes was overcome when
dissatisfied leading states in both rival groups started a dialog, which was supported by new
consensual knowledge from the epistemic community, and achieved compromise.

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