Space Case Neg - DDI 2016 BAM

Strategy notes in progress
Some CT teams read a space weapons adv with economic collapse and space
war as two scenarios + a space economy adv (with a mining internal link);
other teams just read the weaponization adv.
If you read the security k, you need to take out the first arg on the
militarization adv Frontline and should add in more defensive arguments.
You need to make sure that the argument that its inevitable you change the
tags to make sure that you make some arg that the alt could solve for the
perceived interests.
Didnt do frontlines for KQ space aff b/c no one running it in the Wednesday
debates
We didnt include a Wolfe CP bc we donthave cards for a net benefit to it.
This still need a lot of extensions for battle ready blocks
Advantage Frontlines
KQ Space Militarization
1. Turn increase in cooperation with China hurts US
national security without increasing tech and
tracking benefits to the US and erodes US position
relative to China by increasing Chinas tech and
economic development
Listner, 2014 (Michael, an attorney and the founder and principal of
Space Law and Policy Solutions, a think tank and consultation firm that
concentrates on legal and policy matters relating to space security and
development, Commentary | Two Perspectives on U.S.-China Space
Cooperation, Space News, July 14, http://spacenews.com/41256two-
perspectives-on-us-china-space-cooperation/, accessed 7/21/16 DDI SP)
One definition of cooperation in terms of ecology is the beneficial but
inessential interaction between two species in a community. Considering the
nature of geopolitics, this is an apt definition for cooperation between
states and forms a good basis for analysis in particular when discussing outer
space cooperation between the United States and the Peoples Republic of
China. Utilizing this definition, two questions arise: First, would outer space
cooperation between the United States and China be beneficial to the
national security interests of the United States? Second, is outer space
cooperation with China essential to the national security interests of the
United States? Not surprisingly, national security is a focal point of the
analysis given the inherent nature of states to consider their own interests
before those of another, especially given that the United States and China are
geopolitical competitors. When states, including geopolitical competitors,
cooperate, there is always an unspoken premise that aside from the stated
political goal each participant will have the unstated goals of reaping short-
and long-term benefits of resources belonging to the other. In terms of
cooperation between China and the United States, any stated goal of
cooperation would implicate technology, intellectual property, scientific
methodologies and funding. Given this presupposition, does China possess an
advantage in any of these areas that would benefit the national security
interests of the United States in a partnership? The answer is to both
questions is cumulatively no. China has made significant strides in its space
program, and its accomplishments follow in the footsteps of the outer space
activities performed by the United States. China does have the perception of
momentum in its space program and uses current technology to facilitate its
achievements, but it still lags behind. Cooperation with China would reap no
tangible benefits in terms of technology for the United States and in fact
would risk exposing outer space technology and methodologies that China
could appropriate under the guise of cooperation and incorporate into its own
space and military programs. There is precedent for this concern from Chinas
participation in the Galileo satellite navigation system. Chinas technical
partnership with the European Union on the Galileo project led to its
application on Chinas indigenous Beidou Phase 2 satellite navigation system.
The accuracy of the Beidou signal came as a surprise to its European partners
as such accuracy was unlikely to be obtained without taking shortcuts. Thus,
what began as a cooperative effort between the European Union and China
led to China reaping the technological benefit with the resultant national
security implications. Such would be the case with a cooperative effort with
the United States. Any effort would expose U.S. technology, and it stands to
reason that no matter what safeguards were put in place China would acquire
and benefit from that technology. Not only would the United States not
benefit from a cooperative effort it would also sacrifice its technological
advantage and compromise its national security. - See more at:
http://spacenews.com/41256two-perspectives-on-us-china-space-
cooperation/#sthash.t7E60GSD.dpuf The same rationale applies to funding.
Past cooperative efforts with geopolitical competitors has left the United
States footing a substantial amount of the bill. Cooperative efforts with the
Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation have been and continue to be
funded substantially by the United States with the other party to the
cooperative agreement reaping most of the benefit. Projects such as the
Apollo/Soyuz rendezvous mission during the Cold War and the current
engagement with the international space station are examples where the
United States has provided a disproportionate amount of funding. The current
arrangement with the ISS in particular has seen the Russian Federation
receiving substantial economic benefit from funding of modules, revenue
generated from commercial activities, including space tourism, and revenue
received from ferrying of NASA astronauts. It is conceivable that China would
reap a similar economic benefit to the detriment of the United States in
cooperative outer space activities. The likelihood is great that China would
insist that any arrangement entered into be funded disproportionately by the
United States. This in turn would take away from other programs, inflate the
national deficit and even require more borrowing from China, which would
have a cumulative effect on the national and economic security of the United
States with little or no benefit.
And, erosion of US position increases the risk of great

power conflict
Hoffman, 2016 (Frank, a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense
University where his research focuses on US defense strategy and future
conflict, Storm Surge? The Tides of War Roll Back In, Modern War Institute
at West Point, February 8, http://mwi.usma.edu/storm-surge-the-tides-of-war-
roll-back-in/, accessed 7/21/16 DDI SP)
American Engagement. A dominant factor in preserving order and stability
over the last 20 odd years has been the unipolar character of the
international system. The dominant position of the United States, especially
in economic and military power, is the last generations most significant
geopolitical characteristic. Some scholars suggest that American
retrenchment would be a positive strategic move today. But the U.S.
intelligence community forecasts that a declining U.S. willingness to engage
and lead, or a slipping capacity to serve as a global security provider would
be a key factor contributing to instability. This is not an argument for a
perpetual Unipolar era or even American primacy, but it is a warning about a
possible change in a key variable in tomorrows security environment. Geo-
political Competition. Pinkers factors overlook the major driver that most
security studies scholars use to explain conflict between states. The
prevailing post-Cold War power structure, the so-called unipolar moment,
contributed much to subdued levels of interstate conflict and war over the
past generation. Alterations to the current power system by Chinas
significant economic development and its rapid military modernization could
conceivably produce a great power competition that erupts into a war . As in
the case of Norman Angells flawed assessment a century ago, we need to
factor in human agency and the potential for miscalculation. In the emerging
multipolar system, with different players in different dimensions (political,
military, socio-cultural, and economic) and less relative power difference
between states, we will likely see a greater propensity for regional
challengers to attempt to resolve outstanding political grievances . As noted
by another scholar, Historically, transition periods marked by hegemonic
decline and the simultaneous emergence of new great powers have been
unstable and prone to war. According to Harvards Graham Allison, in 12 out
of 16 cases the emergence of rising powers produced conflict with the
existing predominant powers. The tragedy of great power conflict can still be
avoided, but not by ignoring the problem.
2. No internal link - China cant militarize space

Sankaran 14 (Jaganath Sankaran is an Associate with the International
Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom Project at the Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Universitys Kennedy School
of Government, Chinas Deceptively Weak Anti-Satellite Capabilities, Nov
13, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinas-deceptively-weak-anti-satellite-
capabilities/, CMR) //ddi gc
Unlike the U.S., China has a very limited satellite tracking capability, most of
which are based in its territory and possibly a few ships. A first
order technical analysisassuming China cannot pre-determine a point of
interceptsuggests it would be extremely difficult for China to successfully
execute an ASAT operation without extensive tracking capability. This is due
to the difference between the velocity of the target satellite and the ASAT
missile. The satellite is traveling at approximately 7.5 km/s. In the
approximately three minutes of boost available to the missile, the satellite
travels a distance of 1,350 km. For a successful intercept, in the same three
minutes the ASAT missile will have to travel up to the altitude of the satellite
(say 800 km) and, at the same time, compensate for the 1,350 km the
satellite traverses using its lateral acceleration forces. Unlike ISR satellites,
GPS and military communication satellites are completely invulnerable to
Chinas current missile arsenal. Even Chinas most powerful missiles, its solid-
fueled Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) would not be able to reach
an altitude of 20,000 km where GPS satellites operate, much less the 36,000
km where U.S. military communications satellites operate. In order to reach
higher orbit satellites, China would have to build new and more powerful
ICBMs. Even if China manages to develop such an ICBM, it certainly will not
be able to easily proliferate a large number of them without imposing
substantial financial strain on itself. Alternatively, China can use its liquid-
fueled space launch vehicles. However, even if Chinese space launch vehicles
could reach these higher orbits in time to intercept U.S. satellites, executing a
number of these launches in quick succession is close to impossible. Its
infrastructure limits such a venture. For example, China launched a total of
eight annual space launches to orbits higher than LEO in 2012, nine in 2011,
eight in 2010, two in 2009 (with one failure), and four in 2008. In the last five
years the two quickest back-to-back launches to orbits higher than LEO
occurred with a gap of 15 days. Finally, unlike the ICBMs which can be quickly
fired, liquid-fueled space launch vehicles take time to fuel and these
preparations are very visible. If the U.S. anticipates and observes China
preparing for an ASAT attack, it could destroy the launch vehicles during the
preparation stages. However, even if Chinese space launch vehicles could
reach these higher orbits in time to intercept U.S. satellites, executing a
preparation stages
Advantage empirically denied or they have no impact

either the plan just replicates what the SQ has tried or it
doesnt solve because it doesnt do anything different
than the SQuo
Smith 15, Marcia S. Smith is the founder and editor of
SpacePolicyOnline.com and President of Space and Technology Policy Group,
Before that she was a specialist in aerospace and telecommunications policy
at the Congressional Research Service She also was Executive Director of the
U.S. National Commission on Space, 26-Jun-2015, "U.S., China Agree to
Bilateral Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue," SpacePolicy,
http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/u-s-china-agree-to-bilateral-civil-
space-cooperation-dialogue/dao:7/20/16//DDIMN
During recent meetings with Chinese officials, Secretary of State John Kerry
agreed to establish a "U.S.-China Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue." A State
Department spokesman says the first meeting will be held before the end of
October, but could not provide any other details. The lengthy list of
"outcomes" from the seventh round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED) held in Washington, DC June 22-24, 2015, includes a section
on cooperation in science, technology and agriculture. Under that heading,
the two countries agreed as follows: "101. Space: The United States and
China decided to establish regular bilateral government-to-government
consultations on civil space cooperation. The first U.S.-China Civil Space
Cooperation Dialogue is to take place in China before the end of October
Separate from the Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue, the two sides also
decided to have exchanges on space security matters under the framework
of the U.S.-China Security Dialogue before the next meeting of the Security
Dialogue." The agreement also says (section 102) that the two countries will
continue bilateral consultations on satellite collision avoidance and the long-
term sustainability of space as part of the new U.S.-China Civil Space
Cooperation Dialogue. Elsewhere in the list (section 31), the State
Department says that the two countries decided to "enhance communication
and coordination in the multilateral frameworks of the region , such as the
East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum." As part of those activities,
they will undertake joint projects in three areas, one of which is space
security (the others are oil spill response and earthquake emergency
response). Also, section 106 reports that the two countries "enhanced
cooperation and exchange in space weather monitoring programs, forecasts
and services."
4. No solvency debris and collisions inevitable

Guterl 9
(Fred, Earth is being engulfed in a dense cloud of hazardous debris that
won't stop growing Newsweek , July 31, 2009
http://www.newsweek.com/space-junk-biggest-hazard-satellites-81551
//ddi gc
Many experts now believe that even if all space littering were to stop
completely, the number of stray objects would continue to increase for
centuries. The reason: debris is now so dense that objects will continue to
crash into each other, creating even more objects, expanding the rubbish
cloud geometrically. "We've been saying for years that these things are going
to happen," says Nicholas Johnson, head of NASA's Orbital Debris Program
Office. "Until they happen, it's hard to get people's interest." NASA engineer
Don Kessler predicted the current situation with uncanny accuracy back in
1978. At the time, rockets carrying astronauts or communications satellites
would discard upper stages like empty beer cans, often without having
completely burned up their fuel. Several rockets exploded spontaneously in
orbit, with no immediate consequences except to add to the orbiting debris.
Each time an astronaut lost a bolt or a wrench, the object would take its place
in the debris cloud. The Soviet Union may have been the most egregious
polluter. In the 1970s and '80s, it launched 32 radar satellites, designed to
track the positions of U.S. Navy ships, each powered by its own nuclear
reactor. Kessler ran the calculations, and the results came as a surprise.
When one object slams into another, he found, they splinter into hundreds of
pieces, each moving like a projectile at high speed. "Everybody had had this
concept, probably from science fiction, of things floating together in space,"
he says. "People just hadn't thought about it." By about 2000, he predicted,
collisions between satellites would start to outpace other forms of space
accidents.
5. No time frame for the advantage no evidence about

how cooperation will allow for the destruction of the
debris safely or the preservation of the norms against
space mil
6. No space war China wants peaceful space use
McKenzie, 15
David McKenzie is an award-winning international correspondent for CNN based in
Johannesburg, South Africa. May 29, 2015. Chinese astronaut calls for cooperation, access to
International Space Station CNN http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/28/asia/china-space-mckenzie/
(DDI AGH)
China wants greater cooperation with other nations in space, particularly the United States, the
country's most experienced astronaut has told CNN in an exclusive interview. Fifteen nations including the United States, Russia and Japan
China's involvement has always been a non-

cooperate on International Space Station missions, but
starter because of longstanding resistance from U.S. legislators. "As an astronaut, I have
a strong desire to fly with astronauts from other countries. I also look forward to going to the International Space Station," Commander Nie
Space is a family affair, many countries are developing their

Haisheng told CNN. "...
space programs and China, as a big country, should make our own
contributions in this field." The comments came during a wide-ranging and exclusive interview with the three-person crew
of the Shenzhou-10 mission inside Space City, the center of China's space program, near Beijing last month. In 2011, Congress passed an act
to bar NASA from having any bilateral contact with individuals of the Chinese space program because of national security fears. "Every time it
gets mentioned at all anywhere near Congress, it gets shut down immediately," space analyst Miles O'Brien told CNN. "There is tremendous
skepticism there about China. It is viewed as a foe, it is viewed as a government that seeks to take our intellectual property -- our national
China said that outer space had become an

secrets and treasure." In a white paper released Tuesday,
area of "strategic competition." "The Chinese government has always

advocated the peaceful use of outer space, it opposes space weaponization
and an arms race in outer space. This position will not be changed ," Wang Jin, a
spokesman for the Ministry of Defense, said. A recent report for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission said China's improving space capabilities had

"negative sum consequences for U.S. military security." But Nie discounted those fears. "The
United States and Russia started their space programs early. They are the pioneers," he said. He says foreign astronauts are welcome to visit
Chinese expect to finish their space station by

China's own space station once it is launched. The
2022 -- around the time International Space Station runs out of funding,
potentially leaving China as the only country with a permanent presence in
space. China launched its manned space program in 1992. It initially borrowed and bought a great deal of Russian technology, primarily
by replicating their Soyuz space craft -- which they dubbed the Shenzhou. But it has been steadily checking off the boxes in manned space
flight. In 2003, it put its first man in space. In 2008, it completed its first space walk. And in 2013 Nie and his crew completed the country's
With support from the highest

longest space mission to date and twice docked with the Tiangong-1 space lab.
echelons of the ruling Chinese Communist Party and exceptionally deep

pockets, most analysts believe China's space program could become a world
leader.
KQ Space colonization Frontline
Space colonization is not pressing and just as susceptible
to problems from space facing Earth
Williams 10 (Lynda, M.S. in Physics and a physics faculty member at
Santa Rose Junior College, Irrational Dreams of Space Colonization, Peace
Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 22.1, Spring, pg 5-6)
According to scientific theory, the destruction of Earth is a certainty. About
five billion years from now, when our sun exhausts its nuclear fuel, it will
expand in size and envelope the inner planets, including Earth, and burn
them into oblivion. So yes, we are doomed, but we have five billion years,
plus or minus a few hundred million, to plan our extraterrestrial escape. The
need to colonize the moon or Mars to guarantee our survival is not pressing.
There are also real risks due to collisions with asteroids and comets, although
none are of immediate threat and do not necessitate extraterrestrial
colonization. There are many Earth-based technological strategies that can
be developed in time to mediate such astronomical threats, such as
gravitational tugboats that drag the objects out of range. The solar system
could also potentially be exposed to galactic sources of highenergy gamma
ray bursts that could fry all life on Earth; any moon or Mars base would face a
similar fate. Thus, human-based colonies on the moon or Mars would not
protect us from any of these astronomical threats in the near future.
Space Colonization is impossible and is a self-fulfilling

prophecy to their impacts
Life on Earth is more urgently threatened by the destruction of the biosphere
and its life-sustaining habitat due to environmental catastrophes such as
climate change, ocean acidification, disruption of the food chain, bio-warfare,
nuclear war, nuclear winter, and myriads of other manmade doomsday
possibilities. If we accept these threats as inevitabilities on par with real
astronomical dangers and divert our natural, intellectual, political, and
technological resources from solving these problems into escaping them, will
we be playing into a self-fulfilling prophesy of our own planetary doom?
Seeking spacebased solutions to our earthly problems may actually
exacerbate the planetary threats we face. This is the core of the ethical
dilemma posed by space colonization: should we put our resources into
developing human colonies on other worlds to survive natural and manmade
catastrophes, or should we focus all of our energies on solving and mitigating
the problems that create these threats on Earth? What do the prospects of
colonies or bases on the moon and Mars offer? Both the moon and Mars host
extreme environments that are uninhabitable to humans without very
sophisticated technological lifesupport systems beyond any that are feasible
now or will be available in the near future. Both bodies are subjected to
deadly levels of solar radiation and are void of atmospheres that could
sustain oxygen-based life forms such as humans. Terra-forming either body is
not feasible with current technologies and within any reasonable time frames
(and may, in any case, be questioned from an ethical and fiscal point of
view). Thus, any colony or base would be restricted to living in space
capsules or trailer parklike structures that could not support a sufficient
number of humans to perpetuate and sustain the species in any long-term
manner.
All missions to mars colonization assure death
A moon base is envisioned as serving as a launch pad for Martian
expeditions, so the infeasibility of a lunar base may prohibit trips to Mars,
unless they are launched directly from Earth or via an orbiting space station.
Mars is, in its closest approach, 36million miles from Earth and would require
a nine-month journey with astronauts exposed to deadly solar cosmic rays.
Providing sufficient shielding would require a spacecraft that weighs so much
that it becomes prohibitive to carry enough fuel for a roundtrip. Either the
astronauts get exposed to lethal doses on a roundtrip, or they make a safe
one-way journey and never return. Regardless, it is unlikely that anyone
would survive a trip to Mars. Whether or not people are willing to make that
sacrifice for the sake of scientific exploration, human missions to Mars do not
guarantee the survival of the species, but rather, only the death of any
member who attempts the journey.
Space debris and lack of unity prevents colonization

The technological hurdles prohibiting practical space colonization of the moon
and Mars in the near future are stratospherically high; the environmental and
political consequences of pursuing these lofty dreams are even higher. There
are no international laws governing the moon or the protection of the space
environment. The Moon Treaty, created in 1979 by the United Nations,
declares that the moon shall be developed to benefit all nations, that no
military bases could be placed on the moon or on any celestial body, and
bans altering the environment of celestial bodies. To date, no space-faring
nation has ratified this treaty, meaning the moon, and all celestial bodies
including Mars and asteroids, may be up for the taking. If a nation did place a
military base on the moon, they could potentially control all launches from
Earth. The moon is the ultimate military high ground. How can we, as a
species, control the exploration, exploitation, and control of the moon and
other celestial bodies if we cannot even commit to a legal regime to protect
and share its resources? Since the space age began, the orbital environment
around Earth has become crowded with satellites and space debris, so much
so that circumterrestrial space has become a dangerous place with an
increasing risk of collision and destruction. Thousands of pieces of space junk,
created from past launches and space missions, orbit the Earth at the same
distance as satellites, putting them at risk of collision. Every time a space
mission is launched from Earth, debris from the rocket stages is added to
orbital space. In 2009, there was a disastrous collision between an Iridium
satellite and a piece of space junk that destroyed the satellite. In 2007, China
blew up one of its defunct satellites to demonstrate its antiballistic missile
capabilities, increasing the debris field by 15 percent. The United States
followed suit a few months later when, in February 2008, it used its ship-
based antiballistic missile system to destroy one of its own satellites that had
reportedly gone out of control. There are no international laws prohibiting
antisatellite actions. Every year, since the mid-1980s, a treaty has been
introduced into the UN for a Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
(PAROS), with all parties, including Russia and China, voting for it, except for
the United States and Israel. How can we hope to pursue peaceful and
environmentally sound space exploration without international laws in place
that protect space and Earth environments, and guarantee that the space
race to the moon and beyond does not foster a war over space resources?
Indeed, if the space debris problem continues to grow unfettered, or if such a
thing as a space war were ever to occur, then space would become too
trashed for further launches to take place without a great risk of destruction.
We need to focus on Earth or risk a self-fulfilling prophecy

of our doom

The private development of space is growing at a flurried pace. Competitions
such as the X-Prize for companies to reach orbit and the Google Prize to land
a robot on the moon have helped create a new desire for space travel in
many citizens throughout the world. The reality is that there are few
protections for the environment and the passengers of these flights of fancy.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which regulates space launches, is
under a Congressional mandate to foster the industry. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to have objective regulation of an industry when it enjoys
government incentives to profit. We have much to determine on planet Earth
before we launch willy-nilly into another space race that would inevitably
result in environmental disaster and include a new arms race in the heavens.
If we direct our intellectual and technological resources toward space
exploration without consideration of the environmental and political
consequences, what is left behind in the wake? The hype surrounding space
exploration leaves a dangerous vacuum in the collective consciousness of
solving the problems on Earth. If we accept the inevitability of the destruction
of Earth and its biosphere, then it is perhaps not too surprising that many
people grasp at the last straw and look toward the heavens for solutions and
a possible resolution. Many young scientists are perhaps fueling the prophesy
of our planetary destruction by dreaming of lunar and/or Martian bases to
save humanity, rather than working on the serious environmental challenges
that we face on Earth. Every space-faring entity, be they governmental or
corporate, faces the same challenges. Star Trek emboldened us all to dream
of space as the final frontier. The reality is that our planet Earth is a perfect
spaceship and may be our final front-line. We travel around our star, the sun,
once every year, and the sun pulls us around the galaxy once every
250,000,000 years through star systems, star clusters, and gas clouds that
may contain exosolar planets that host life or that may be habitable for us to
colonize. The sun will be around for billions of years and we have ample time
to explore the stars. It would be wise and prudent for us as a species to focus
our intellectual and technological knowledge into preserving our spaceship
for the long voyage ahead so that, once we have figured out how to make life
on Earth work in an environmentally and politically sustainable way, we can
then venture off the planet into the new frontier of our dreams.
Space exploration could kill us all through space radiation

Page 4-8-11 Lewis Page is a writer for the A Register- The A Register
[Deep=space travel bad for astronauts tickers, say boffins
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/04/08/deep_space_ticker_risk/]
Deep-space travel could be bad for the heart, report boffins. This has been
established by blasting mice with an ion beam from a powerful atom-
smasher, causing the luckless murines to develop artery damage of the sort
that might result from exposure to powerful cosmic space radiation. "Cosmic
radiation is very different from X-rays and other radiation found on Earth,"
says Dr Dennis Kucik, pathology prof. "The radiation risks of deep-space
travel are difficult to predict, largely because so few people have been
exposed." In fact, the only people who have ever travelled beyond the Earth's
protective magnetic fields are the 24 US astronauts who landed on or orbited
the Moon during the Apollo missions of the 1960s and 70s. It's pretty difficult
to draw any conclusions from what happens among such a a small group: but
Kucik and his colleagues nonetheless suspected for other reasons that one
particular type of cosmic radiation - to wit, the hail of high-energy iron ions
which permeates space beyond Earth orbit - could have noticeable health
effects once more people go into deep space for longer periods. The
scientists thought that iron ions might cause thickening of artery walls, aka
atherosclerosis. In order to test this hypothesis, they needed ideally to send
some test mice into deep space, but this would naturally be expensive and
time-consuming. However, it is possible to generate iron-ion radiation of the
sort found out in the big black here on Earth, by using a powerful particle
accelerator. Accordingly, Kucik and his colleagues placed a group of mice in a
beam of high-velocity iron ions blasted out of a suitable atom-smasher at the
Brookhaven lab in New York*. They found that the ion bombardment did
indeed cause negative health effects of the sort expected. "At 13 weeks it
was surprising and quite remarkable that we already could see permanent
damage an irreversible thickening of the artery walls where it had been
exposed to radiation," says Kucik's fellow boffin Janusz Kabarowski. The
scientists say that high-velocity iron ions are a particular headache for
spacecraft and space-suit designers. Other kinds of space radiation can be
blocked using shielding: for instance, quite thin lead sheets will stop X-rays.
But when iron ions hit metallic shields, they can generate secondary radiation
on the other side which may be just as bad.
Space colonisation could wipe out the human species

through alien germs
Wickramasinghe 10 (Chandra, Ph.D., Centre for Astrobiology, Cardiff
University, UK; Journal of Cosmology, Are Intelligent Aliens a Threat to
Humanity? Diseases (Viruses, Bacteria) From Space, May 2010,
http://journalofcosmology.com/Aliens106.html)
On the panspermia hypothesis the genetic components that led to life on
Earth are omnipresent in the galaxy, so the same or similar genes that
arrived here would also arrive at the surfaces of other planets (Hoyle and
Wickramasinghe, 1982; Joseph, 2009; Joseph and Schild 2010). Every niche in
every habitable planet in the galaxy would then be colonized with unity
probability thus leading to the widespread occurrence of microbial life. The
fraction that eventually evolves into higher life is debatable, but with
identical genetic structures delivered to a multitude of similar environments
and planetary niches self-similar patterns of evolution and a convergence of
evolution could be expected. In terrestrial life for instance, the evolution of
the eye is achieved independently at least thrice. Intelligence of the kind
humans process may be argued to have some measure of survival advantage
in that a greater capacity to understand our environment would lead to
greater skills at manipulating it to our advantage. On this basis high levels of
intelligence could be understood as a cosmic evolutionary imperative. It is
also unwise to regard ourselves homo sapiens sapiens as the culmination
of this evolutionary process. With just a million years or so of human
evolution towards it would seem that the experiment of intelligence has
scarcely begun on Earth. Thus creatures endowed with higher levels of
intelligence could well be commonplace in the Universe. Let us next estimate
the number of habitable planets in our Galaxy. With about 500 exoplanets
discovered thus far mostly within ~ 30 pc of us, it would be reasonable to
conjecture that about 25% of main sequence stars are endowed with planets.
Most of the planets that have been observed, however, are of Jupiter mass,
and a large fraction orbit stars in a binary pair. It is difficult to estimate the
number of planets that are in non-binary systems and therefore in stable
orbits. It is only in such cases that one could expect evolution that leads to
higher life and eventually intelligence. At a reasonable guess one might
expect to find billion such planets corresponding to 1% of main sequence
stars. The number of planets N carrying intelligent life in the Galaxy could
now be derived from a simplified form of Drakes equation: Nn L(yr)/t(yr)
Here n is the total number of habitable planets in the galaxy, L is the average
lifetime in years of an intelligent civilization, and t is the main sequence age
of a star. With t 5 x 109 yr and n 109 we then have N15L (yr) The
prospects for visitations from ETI, benign or otherwise, depends on the value
of L we choose for the lifetime of intelligent or superintelligent life on a
planet. An upper limit would of course be defined by a main sequence
lifetime, ~ 109 yr, but more realistically it will be shorter. Our human
experience on Earth over the past century does not give much confidence in
choosing much higher values of L than say 500 yr. In this case we have N =
100 as the steady-state grand total of advanced intelligent civilizations
throughout the galaxy. Such pessimism is based on the simple fact that
todays nuclear arsenals of the world have enough fire power to extinguish all
life on the planet, and it is difficult to imagine that this would not be an
eventual outcome of unbridled human greed for power and control. However,
if the next stage in the evolution of intelligence is to adopt a strategy of non-
violent co-existence, then it could be that L will be much higher. For
arguments sake, taking L to have an optimistically high value of ~108 years,
the number of planets endowed with intelligent life becomes 2x107 and their
mean separation in the galactic disc ~ 10pc. If we are thinking of space-
faring intelligent aliens being optimistically able to travel at a tenth of the
speed of light, the average crossing time between adjacent civilizations will
be ~ 300yr. If one now considers the expansion of a single power-hungry
civilization, colonization might proceed in an expanding wavefront across the
set of habitable planets as shown in Fig. 1. If to the crossing time (at one
tenth the speed of light) of 300 years we add a recuperation time of say ~
700 years, each step in the expanding wavefront would take ~ 1000 years,
and to cross the entire galaxy would take a few million years. (This is a
variant of the argument used earlier by Enrico Fermi to argue that if
intelligent life exists elsewhere we should have been colonized already.) This
argument, however, is based on the assumption that the behavior of
superintelligent space colonizers could be modeled on predator-prey
relationships found in lower life on the Earth, as well as on the history of our
own colonization and conquest of more primitive tribes. Even with the most
favourable set of assumptions the model is suspect however. With the
numerical values chosen in this example, our space colonisers would need to
have biological generation time (mean life-span) considerably in excess of
ours. Otherwise, we have to posit that the potential predator embarks on a
space voyage that benefits not its own generation but several generations
into the future. No example exists on Earth where this model applies, either
naturally in the living world, or in a sociological context. Indeed our modern
politicians find it difficult to plan for the well-being of society beyond even a
few electoral terms of office! Colonisation of a galaxy via the process of
directed panspermia (Crick and Orgel, 1973) offers a much better prospect.
An advanced technological civilization facing the prospect of imminent
extinction may well decide to package its genetic heritage within microbes,
including viruses, and launch them out into space. They might even consider
targeting comets of their own planetary system as a first staging post, where
gene packages might become amplified in vast numbers. The spread across
the galaxy would then be greatly facilitated. No expensive rocket system is
needed. The genetic packages are of the right sizes for their propulsion by
the radiation pressure of starlight to be guaranteed (Wickramasinghe and
Wickramasinghe, 2003; Wickramasinghe, Wickramasinghe & Napier, 2010).
Although a large fraction of such space travelling genes will perish in transit,
the reassembly of surviving genes on habitable planets would lead indirectly
to galactic colonization. The real risk to humanity of alien life may be in the
form of viral and bacterial genomes arriving at the Earth which are
sometimes pathogenic (Joseph and Wickramasinghe 2010). Fred Hoyle and
the present author have argued the thesis of Diseases from Space over
several decades (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, 1979, 1982, 1990; Hoyle et al,
1985; Wickramasinghe et al, 2003). Despite criticisms that have often been
made against this concept the basic arguments remain cogent to the present
day (Joseph and Wickramasinghe 2010). With increasing evidence to support
the view that life could not have arisen indigenously on the Earth, the idea
that the evolution of life is modulated by genes arriving from comets has
acquired a new significance. Darwinian evolution operates in an open system
where new genes continue to be added from a cosmic source. Pandemics of
viral and bacterial disease become an inevitable part of this thesis. One could
argue that if not for such genetic additions from outside, evolution would
have come to a standstill a long time ago (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, 1982;
Joseph and Wickramasinghe 2010). In this context it should be noted that the
human genome has recently been found to contain more than 50 percent of
its content in the form of well defined inert viral genes. It is possible to
understand this data if our ancestral line of descent over a few million years
had suffered a succession of near-culling events following outbreaks of viral
pandemics (Joseph and Wickramasinghe 2010). On each such occasion only a
small breeding group survived the members of which had assimilated the
virus into their reproductive line. Expanding wavefront of galactic
colonisation. Hoyle and the present author have cited numerous instances
from the history of medicine where outbreaks of pandemic disease could be
elegantly explained in terms of space incident viruses. Even the modern
scourge of influenza is likely to be driven by periodic injections of genetic
components from space. Aspects of the epidemiology of influenza otherwise
remains difficult to explain (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, 1979, 1991). In
conclusion, we note that the aliens we have to fear are not superintelligent
creatures arriving in space ships and intending to conquer and subdue us, but
sub-micron sized viral invaders that may threaten the very existence of our
species.
CT Space Weaponization Frontline [economy
and space war impacts]
national security without increasing tech and tracking
benefits to the US and erodes US position relative to
China by increasing Chinas tech and economic
development

power conflict

preparation stages
3. Advantage empirically denied or they have no impact

than the SQuo
and services."

Guterl 9
//ddi gc
accidents.
5. No time frame for the advantage no evidence about

space mil
McKenzie, 15
(DDI AGH)


secrets and treasure." In a white paper released Tuesday, China said that outer space had become an




leader.
CT Space Economy Advantage
1. No solvency no evidence that we have adequate
technology to mine asteroids at best, even if they win
that cooperation creates tech magically they cant win
that the time frame for the advantage outweighs the DA.
2. No internal link and no solvency - the plan does not
resolve international mining rights disputes
Vid Beldavs, 12-7-2015, international Lunar Decade Working Group,
FOTONIKA-LV, Space Technology and Science Group Oy (STSG) "The Space
Review: Prospects for US-China space cooperation," The Space Review,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1
Exclusive mining rights will need to be defined within an international regime
that governs territory, such as the Moon, to which sovereign rights do not
apply under the Outer Space Treaty. Insofar as lunar water has been identified
as a possible resource to reduce the costs of reaching Mars, this issue will
need to be resolved before the lunar water can be mined. China is among the
states that show interest in lunar water. This legislation cannot guarantee US
companies superior technology or exclusive mining rights or use of shared
infrastructure in cislunar space that can reduce communications,
transportation and operating costs. No country or company has mined the
Moon or an asteroid, or has had industrial operations of any kind in space.
Mining technologies may, in fact, be more advanced in countries such as
Australia and Canada than in the US. In fact, space mining conferences held
in Australia and in Canada have attracted significant attendance by mining
companies and the equipment industries that serve them. Notwithstanding
the ambitious plans of Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources, it is
not at all clear that they will possess superior technology for space mining to
other potential competitors including from China, India, Japan, Korea, Russia,
or the EU. No one has yet processed materials in space other than lab-scale
experiments. China and India, which have both mounted large-scale industrial
projects, may have a body of industrial process know-how that is already
competitive with US capabilities to process asteroid or lunar materials into
products. There are multiple other aspects of industrial development in space
where knowledge and technologies exist somewhere in the world where the
US may not have an inherent competitive advantage. The future that is being
created through the new law will create more competitive opportunities for
US commercial space companies. But, this legislation cannot guarantee them
superior technology or exclusive mining rights or use of shared infrastructure
in cislunar space that can reduce communications, transportation and
operating costs.
3. NO internal link to the impact no resource wars and if
there is one, the time frame for solving too long to stop
rush for resources
4. no impact to resource wars countries will cooperate
to avoid resource conflicts
MS Space War Advantage Frontline
national security without increasing tech and tracking
benefits to the US and erodes US position relative to
China by increasing Chinas tech and economic
development

power conflict

preparation stages
3. Advantage empirically denied or they have no impact

than the SQuo
and services."

Guterl 9
//ddi gc
accidents.
5. no time frame for the advantage no evidence about

space mil
McKenzie, 15
(DDI AGH)


China said that outer space had become an

secrets and treasure." In a white paper released Tuesday,





leader.
MS Relations Advantage Answer
1. no internal link - Space doesnt solve- no spillover
Pollpeter et al, University of California-San Diego,
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Deputy
Director, 2015
[Kevin, Eric Anderson Research Analyst on the Study of Innovation and
Technology in China for the Institute On Global Conflict And Cooperation,
Jordan Wilson U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Security
and Foreign Affairs Policy Analyst, Fan Yang with an MPIA from the School of
International Relations and Pacific Relations (IR/PS) at UC San Diego, March 2,
2015, Institute On Global Conflict And Cooperation, China Dream, Space
Dream Chinas Progress in Space Technologies and Implications for the United
States, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China
%20Dream%20Space%20Dream_Report.pdf, Accessed June 28, 2016, LAR]
The importance of Chinas space diplomacy should not be overstated , however.
Cooperation in space do not drive relations on Earth. International
cooperation on space activities usually follows progress in the overall
relationship and is more of an indicator of the state of a relationship than a
critical component. Although Chinas increasing space power does play a role in advancing its
diplomatic interests, there is no evidence that it has directly produced tangible
political benefits in other areas besides space.
2. no solvency - South china sea hurts relations and the

new ruling makes it worse
Apps 2016
Peter Apps, Reuters global affairs columnist, writing on international affairs,
globalization, conflict and other issues. He is founder and executive director
of the Project for Study of the 21st Century think tank, Before that, he spent 12
years as a reporter for Reuters covering defense, political risk and emerging markets;
PS21,7-14-2016, "Commentary: Can Washington prevent war in Southeast
Asia?," Reuters, (DDI AGH)
relations between China, its regional neighbors and
The problem, of course, is that
Washington are currently also seriously deteriorating . Outright conflict on that front
probably remains less likely than a more limited war involving North Korea, although it would also be
cataclysmic. As perhaps the worlds preeminent trading and exporting nation, Beijing has little appetite for
international isolation on the scale of North Korea. But it also has very real ambitions, growing military
capability and a government that has placed the quest for ever-growing geopolitical power at the heart of
decision by the International Court of
its domestic legitimacy. In that sense, this weeks
Arbitration in the Hague over Chinas maritime boundaries may be something
of a turning point, and not in a good way . China largely boycotted the
process, which it said had little legitimacy. The problem for Beijing, however, is that most
of the countries do take it seriously and the court roundly rejected Beijings
assertions to rights to most of the South China Sea. Chinese regular and auxiliary
maritime and other forces have already taken up a relatively assertive position on
some of the disputed islands and shoals, and there seems little prospect of
them are withdrawing anytime soon . The court judgment, however, may ramp
up the confidence of nations like the Philippines to take a much more
aggressive approach themselves, with potentially seriously destabilizing
consequences. Its not necessarily all bad news. While the tribunal did
conclude that Beijing had trampled on the territorial rights of the Philippines,
it also suggested that some disputed areas such as Scarborough Shoal could
be shared, for example when it came to fishing rights. That might offer a path
to cooperation or it could just make confrontation more likely. Last year, a poll of
leading national security experts put the risk of a conventional or nuclear war between the United States
and China as marginally lower than the risk of a similar clash between NATO and Russia. That probably
the risk of states like the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam --
remains the case but
many U.S. Treaty allies -- finding themselves in a fight may well be higher. If
peace is based around consensus, the direction of travel in Asia this year
seems to be entirely the wrong way.
3. NO impact to science diplomacy no reason why

science creates more peace
4. Multiple points of friction in SQ relations are complex
no reason even if they win science diplomacy does this
spillover to solve the rest of the their impact evidence
Glaser, 2014 (Bonnie S. Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman Chair in China
Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "US-CHINA RELATIONS
Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge." Southeast Asian Affairs
(2014): 76-82. ProQuest.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1650876560/A406786705834EF3PQ/1?
accountid=36295, DDI TM)
Friction over political and economic issues is commonplace in the US-China
relationship. In the past few years, Washington and Beijing have bickered over
the exchange rate of the renminbi; China's unwillingness to condemn North
Korea's sinking of the South Korean vessel the Cheonan or its shelling of
Yeonpyong Island; and Beijing's veto of United Nations Security Council
resolutions aimed at imposing sanctions on Syria, to name only a few issues .
In most cases, US-China differences over specific issues do not spill over into other areas and threaten to set back the
In the foreseeable future, the majority of issues on which
entire bilateral relationship.
the US and China disagree are also not likely to threaten the overall
relationship. There are, however, a few potential matters that could send US-China ties into a tailspin.
Solvency frontlines
CT Solvency Frontline [if read space economy
and weaponization]
1. No solvency cant solve space economy or
cooperation without multiple other steps that the plan
doesnt do and the US cant do alone Wolfe amendment,
ISIS changes,
A self-sustaining space economy is one where investment generates positive
returns. The breakthrough to a self-sustaining space economy would mark a
historical inflection point where investment in space is businesses will start to
see exponential growth. Achieving that breakthrough is in the interests of all
participating states insofar as that will mark the point at which significant
gains in the benefits of space to all of Earths people will exceed the
investment required to achieve them. To engage China as a strategic partner
in the opening of the space frontier the following actions are needed: The
Wolf Amendment needs to be annulled. The Administration needs to take
steps to engage China in space collaboration. In the longer term this would
include measures such as the Space Development Investment Bank.
Immediate steps would include collaboration on remote sensing for disaster
relief, space debris research, and space situation awareness. Appropriate
steps in the intermediate term would include measures such as opening ISS
and its successor facilities to China. The International Lunar Decade could
provide a unifying framework for international collaboration in space
development through 2030.
2. No solvency entrenched mutual mistrust prevents

cooperation from improving trust they never get to the
benefits their evidence talks about
Cheng, 2014 (Dean, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center,
Heritage Foundation, Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation,
Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate, Heritage Foundation, April 9,
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2014/04/prospects-for-us-china--
space-cooperation, accessed 7/21/16 DDI SP)
Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation with the
PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited. Chinas past
experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures (SinoSoviet
cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.China cooperation in the 1980s until
Tiananmen, and SinoEuropean space cooperation on the Galileo satellite
program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint RussianChinese
PhobosGrunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a go-
it-alone approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is
significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial
complex in expanding cooperation.[10] Moreover, as long as Chinas
economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values space
efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures making
international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most other
spacefaring states. If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation
in Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones. Chinas
space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world. Even such
basic data as Chinas annual space expenditures is lacking with little
prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important, Chinas decision-making
processes are little understood, especially in the context of space. Seven
years after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, exactly which organizations
were party to that decision, and why it was undertaken, remains unclear.
Consequently, any effort at cooperation would raise questions about the
identity of the partners and ultimate beneficiarieswith a real likelihood that
the PLA would be one of them. It is possible that the Chinese could be
induced to be more transparent when it comes to space, although the
unwillingness of Beijing to engage in substantive discussions on space during
the last several Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED) would cast doubt
on this. But this would argue for a go-slow approach, at best. There is room
for greater interaction, especially in the sharing of already collected data,
such as geodesy information. As both sides set their sights on the moon,
exchanges of data about lunar conditions and the lunar surface and
composition all might help create a pattern of interaction that might lower
some of the barriers to information exchange. Even there, however, concerns
on both sides about information security and electronic espionage, etc., is
likely to raise serious doubts about how freely one should incorporate data
provided by the other side.
3. China says no and the plan doesnt create any

additional incentives for cooperation to overcome Chinese
interests in no cooperation
Bao 07
(Bao Shixiu, senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations
Institute for Military Thought Studies, winter 2007 Deterrence Revisited:
Outer Space,
http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/31976/ichaptersection_singl
edocument/a45d6b69-2986-4346-910b-3b052230ea3e/en/cs5_chapter1.pdf,
World Security Institute 2007) //ddi gc
This position operates on several faulty premises. The first is that the United
States is the only country that has national interests at stake in space,
implying that China does not have deep national security interests in space or
that Chinas space assets do not need to be protected. The Chinese
government has expressed its desire to develop space peacefully on many
occasions, and has pursued treaties to ban weapons and weapon-testing in
space. But China also has deep interests, both now and in the future, to
exploit space, which are vital to its comprehensive national power and its
economic and scientific development and therefore its greater national
security. Leaving aside the issue of using space for military purposes, China
cannot entrust the protection of its interests in space to another country, no
matter their rhetoric or intentions. If the security of the United States requires
the absence of that same security for China, then the logic is inherently
imbalanced, unfair and one that China cannot accept. The peaceful use of
space should not be confused with a lack of national security interests or the
deep underlying need to protect them.
CT Solvency Frontline [If read only
weaponization]
1. No solvency cant solve cooperation without multiple
other steps that the plan doesnt do and the US cant do
alone Wolfe amendment, ISIS changes,


additional incentives for cooperation
China says no: Despite agreements in the past china will
not will not entrust the protection of its interests in space
to the United States
Bao 07
Outer Space,
MS Solvency Frontline
1. No solvency cant solve space economy or
cooperation without multiple other steps that the plan
doesnt do and the US cant do alone Wolfe amendment,
ISIS changes,


additional incentives for cooperation to overcome Chinese
interests in no cooperation
Bao 07
Outer Space,
Offcase 1nc arguments
DAs
TPP Good Politics 1nc link [need rest of shell]
US-China space cooperation requires significant political

capital resistance to cooperation proves
Weeden and He, Secure World Foundation Technical
Advisor and Institute of World Economics and Politics
Assistant Research Fellow, 2016
(Brian and Xiao, U.S-China Strategic Relations in Space, NBR Special Report
#57,
http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-
China_April2016.pdf DDI -TM)
However,there are significant challenges to work through in this area. On the U.S.
side, Congress will continue to have significant concerns over technology
transfer and the potential spillover benefits that civil cooperation could have
for the PLA. Both countries also currently have different goals and objectives
for their human spaceflight programs. The United States is focused on extending the ISS
through 2024 and plans to send humans to an asteroid and Mars by the 2030s.62 Although China also has
long-term interests in the moon and Mars, its primary focus for the next two decades is building and
Rather than proposing a specific
operating its own space station in earth orbit, Tiangong 3.
destination or goal for civil space cooperation, the United States and China
should instead focus on developing a clear strategy for engagement that
mixes both top-down and bottom-up joint initiatives .63 The objectives and
potential benefits and risks of the strategy should be well-defined and clearly
explained to national interest groups. Top-down initiatives involving high-profile
activities such as human spaceflight will require significant involvement
and political capital from national leaders to overcome bureaucratic
inertia and resistance to cooperation. Bottom-up approaches involving low-profile
areas of cooperation such as collaborative scientific research and missions will require organizational
champions on both sides.
India DA 1nc
Unique Link - India perceives strong US-China relations as
zero-sum. Close Us China ties erodes India and US
relations
Madan 2015 (Tanvi ,ellow in the Project on International Order and
Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, The U.S.-
India Relationship and China, January 20, 2015, 7/14/2016
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationship-
and-china-madan; DDI AH)
Today, both India and the U.S. have relationships with China that have
elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially, conflictthough in
different degrees. Each country has a blended approach of engaging China,
while preparing for a turn for the worse in Chinese behavior. Each sees a role for the
other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good relationship with the other sends a signal to China, but neither wants to
provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the other and China. Each also recognizes that Chinaespecially
uncertainty about its behavioris partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there have been three
imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in
the context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that
American concerns about the nature of Chinas rise are responsible for some of the interest in India. New Delhis own
China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range
of partnerships (external balancing)and it envisions a key role for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight
another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does .
But India
and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it comes to China.
Both sides remain uncertain about the others willingness and capacity to
play a role in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, Indian policymakers worry both
about a China-U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict.
There is concern about the reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S.
will end up choosing China because of the more interdependent Sino-
American economic relationship and/or leave India in the lurch. Some in the
U.S. also have reliability concerns about India. They question whether the
quest for strategic autonomy will allow India to develop a truly strategic
partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about the gap between
Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for supporting Indias rise is to help
demonstrate that democracy and development arent mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationaleand
Indias importancefades away. As things stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the others relationship with
New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S.
China being too hot or too coldthe Goldilocks view. For
relationship is seen as freezing India out and impinging on its interests. It
would also eliminate one of Washingtons rationales for a stronger
relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing
the region and forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any deterioration in Sino-
Indian relations might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian
bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral
spheres.
US China space cooperation represents a realignment in

policy that alienates India harming relations
Pakhomov 15
(Evgeniy, The Dragon vs. the Elephant, Brics Magazine, 7/15/16

http://bricsmagazine.com/en/articles/the-dragon-vs-the-elephant; DDI AH)
It is hard to imagine now that New Delhi and Beijing were once considered good
friends, and even spoke amiably of a close partnership. In 1951, India turned a blind
eye to the Chinese armys takeover of Tibet and limited its reaction to formal
statements bilateral relations seemed to be more important to New Delhi. The
famous slogan, Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai! (Indians and Chinese are brothers!), that
remained popular for many years first appeared during that period. However, the
Chinese dragon and the Indian elephant soon abandoned that brotherly sentiment
each country started taking decisive steps to assert their right to leadership in Asia.
As early as 1962, the first armed conflict broke out on the Chinese-Indian border
when each country began to carve up the Himalayan foothills and it became clear
that the bhai-bhai era had run its course. Military forces on both sides of the border
even now continue to monitor each other nervously. From time to time, there are
reports of border violations in mountainous areas by troops from both sides. At the
official level, India and China still speak of cooperation, but in reality, it is the
Peoples Republic and not Pakistan that India views as its most serious potential
adversary. Yet in recent years, neither of these two Asian heavyweights has ventured
to sever relations entirely, and the standoff has extended to the economic domain.
After becoming the worlds biggest assembly line, China moved ahead, owing to its
ability to copy nearly any Western technological novelty. India, on the other hand, has
left China behind in offshore programming, thanks to its successes in the IT sector.
Meanwhile, both countries are making a great effort to maintain the image of a
superpower they have both acquired nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers and are
now building their own supersonic fighter jets and ballistic missiles, each with a
watchful eye on the other. And now, the dragon and the elephant are poised to move
their rivalry into space.
Erosion of relations bad - strong US India Relations by

allow for pressure for restraint saves millions of lives
India Pakistan most likely conflict for escalation
Barno and Bensahe 15
(David and Nora, THE PINK FLAMINGO ON THE SUBCONTINENT: NUCLEAR
WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, War on the Rocks, NOVEMBER 3 2015,
online:http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-pink-flamingo-on-the-
subcontinent-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan/, DDI TM)
A pink flamingo is the term recently coined by Frank Hoffman to describe
predictable but ignored events that can yield disastrous results . Hoffman
argues that these situations are fully visible, but almost entirely ignored by policymakers. Pink flamingos stand in stark contrast to black
swans the unpredictable, even unforeseeable shocks whose outcomes may be entirely unknown. The tense nuclear
standoff between India and Pakistan may be the most dangerous
pink flamingo in todays world. The Indian subcontinent home to both India and
Pakistan remains among the most dangerous corners of the world, and
continues to pose a deep threat to global stability and the current world order. Their 1,800-mile
border is the only place in the world where two hostile, nuclear-
armed states face off every day. And the risk of nuclear conflict has
only continued to rise in the past few years, to the point that it is now a very real
possibility. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they gained
independence in 1947, including one that ended in 1971 with Pakistan losing approximately half its territory (present-day Bangladesh).
Today, the disputed Line of Control that divides the disputed
Kashmir region remains a particularly tense flash point. Both the
Kargil crisis of 1999 and the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by
Pakistan-supported militants brought both nations once again to the
brink of war. Yet unlike earlier major wars, these two crises occurred
after both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed states. Quick
and forceful diplomatic intervention played a pivotal role in
preventing a larger conflict from erupting during each crisis. These
stakes are even higher, and more dangerous, today. Since 2004, India has
been developing a new military doctrine called Cold Start, a limited
war option designed largely to deter Islamabad from sponsoring
irregular attacks against New Delhi. It involves rapid conventional
retaliation after any such attack, launching a number of quick
armored assaults into Pakistan and rapidly securing limited
objectives that hypothetically remain below Pakistans nuclear
threshold. In accordance with this doctrine, the Indian military is meant to mobilize half a million troops in less than 72 hours. The
problem is, unlike its neighbors India and China, Pakistan has not renounced the first use of
nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have stated that they

may have to use nuclear weapons first in order to defend against a
conventional attack from India. Therefore, both to counter Cold Start
and help to offset Indias growing conventional superiority, Pakistan
has accelerated its nuclear weapons program and begun to field short-range, low yield
tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Some observers now judge this nuclear program to be the fastest growing in the world. Pakistan
will reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build more

than 200 nuclear warheads more than the United Kingdom plans to have by that time. It is not simply the
pace of the buildup that should cause concern. Pakistans arsenal of short-range tactical nuclear weapons is a game-changer in other ways.
Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons on its own soil if

necessary to counter Cold Starts plan for sudden Indian armored
thrusts into Pakistan. The introduction of these weapons has altered
the long-standing geometry between the two nuclear powers, and
increases risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange in a crisis. Beyond
the risks of runaway nuclear escalation, Pakistans growing tactical
nuclear weapons program also brings a wide array of other
destabilizing characteristics to this already unstable mix: the necessity to position
these short-range weapons close to the border with India, making them more vulnerable to interdiction; the need to move and disperse these
the prospects of local commanders

weapons during a crisis, thereby signaling a nuclear threat; and
being given decentralized control of the weapons a use it or lose

it danger if facing an Indian armored offensive. Furthermore, large
numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations
increases the risk that some will fall into the hands of violent
extremists. A terrorist group gaining control of a nuclear weapon
remains one of the most frightening potential spinoffs of the current
arms race. Perhaps the most dangerous scenario that could lead to
catastrophe is a replay of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. In
November 2008, 10 terrorists launched attacks that left 166 people
dead before the last of attackers were finally killed by Indian security forces almost 60 hours after the attacks began. By that time, there
was strong evidence that the attackers were Pakistani and belonged to a Pakistan-supported militant group. Indian public outrage and
humiliation were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure

from the United States and immense restraint exerted by then-
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was an Indian retaliatory
strike averted. The chances of such Indian government restraint in a
similarly deadly future scenario are unlikely. Experts such as Stephen Cohen of the Brookings
Institution and former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill agree that if there were another Mumbai, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
would not step back from using military force in response, unlike his predecessors. Indian public opinion would demand retaliation, especially
after the unpopular degree of restraint exercised by the Singh government after the Mumbai attacks. But there remains no meaningful senior-
level dialogue between the two states last Augusts planned meeting between the two national security advisers was cancelled after
disagreements about Kashmiri separatists. There may be little the United States or the world can do to forestall this conflict still looming just
over the horizon. Nevertheless, the tremendous dangers of this situation require U.S. policymakers to devote more time and energy in trying
to do so, and some small steps may help. The United States should work hard to catalyze confidence-building measures between the two
sides, seeking to open more peacetime channels to create dialog and potential conflict mediation options for the future. Neither nations
military currently has any direct communications. Quiet, off-the-record meetings between senior military leaders would help lessen tensions
and establish some degree of mutual dialog and understanding before a crisis erupts. The United States should also sponsor unofficial tabletop
exercises involving representatives of each side to explore how escalation in a nuclear conflict could unfold. The United States should also
reach out to current (and former) civil and military decision-makers on both sides to develop and grow bilateral relationships that could prove
vital in the next crisis. Both the United States and NATO should also emphasize the limited battlefield utility of TNW, as well as their well-
researched estimates of the damage that would have been wrought by using them to defend Western Europe from a Soviet armored invasion.
And the United States should continue to encourage Pakistan to slow its fielding of tactical nuclear weapons, and keep them under tight
central control well away from vulnerable forward-deployed positions. The lack of any tangible results from the U.S. governments recent
A nuclear war between India and

outreach to Pakistan on this topic should only encourage renewed efforts.
Pakistan would dramatically alter the world as we know it. The

damage from fallout and blast, the deaths of potentially millions,
and the environmental devastation of even a few weapons
detonations would suddenly dwarf any other global problem. There
are no shortage of conflicts and crises around the world demanding
the attention of policymakers in Washington and other capitals. But
the stakes of a war between two of the worlds most hostile nuclear
powers deserves attention before the next inevitable flare-up. Taking a
series of modest steps now to try to avert the worst outcomes from this dangerous pink flamingo hiding in plain sight is an investment well
worth making.
Japan DA 1NC
A. The US Japan alliance is strong now.
Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart February 9, 2016 Congressional
Research Service The U.S.-Japan Alliance The U.S.-Japan Alliance Emma
Chanlett-Avery Specialist in Asian Affairs Ian E. Rinehart Analyst in Asian
Affairs https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf
The asymmetric arrangement of the U.S.-Japan alliance has moved toward a more
balanced security partnership in the 21st century. Unlike 25 years ago, the SDF is now
active in overseas missions, including efforts in the 2000s to support U.S.-led coalition
operations in Afghanistan and the reconstruction of Iraq. Japanese military contributions to
global operations like counter- piracy patrols relieve some of the burden on
the U.S. military to manage every security challenge. Advances in SDF
capabilities give Japan a potent deterrent force that complements the capabilities of U.S.
forces, for example in anti-submarine warfare. Due to the co-location of U.S. and Japanese
command facilities in recent years, coordination and communication have become
more integrated. The United States and Japan have been steadily enhancing
bilateral cooperation in many aspects of the alliance , such as ballistic
missile defense, cybersecurity, and military use of space . As Japan
sheds its self-imposed restrictions on the use of military force (in particular the
constraints on collective self-defense) and the two countries implement their revised bilateral defense
the opportunities for the U.S. and Japanese militaries to operate as a
guidelines,
combined force will grow. Alongside these alliance improvements, Japan
continues to pay nearly $2 billion per year to defray the cost of stationing
U.S. forces in Japan. In 2015, Japan and the United States agreed to maintain Japans host nation
support at approximately the same level for the next five years.
B. Bilateral cooperation on space key to the alliance.

Hoff 2016 (Rachel Hoff Director of Defense Analysis American Action
Forum, Next Steps for U.S. Japan Security cooperation, June,
http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Hoff-Next-steps-US-Japan-
security-cooperation.pdf)sw
In addition to these rising regional challenges, new threats have emerged in
cyber and outer space. The threats in these two domains have changed
dramatically since the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines were last revised in the
1990s. The dependence upon information systems and consequent
vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyber-attack present new concerns,
both for governments and for private industry, as both state and non-state
actors engage in malicious behavior. Space-based assets provide critical
support to security surveillance and intelligence operations. Counter-space
and anti-satellite threats aimed to deny access to these important assets
pose a major threat to a wide range of capabilities. Each of these situations
demands greater bilateral efforts from the United States and Japan to deter
mutual threats and secure shared interests. Both regionally and in the global
commons, the deteriorating security environment has added new urgency to
overcoming obstacles to greater cooperation between these two important
allies.
C. Lack of confidence is US security guarantees causes

Japanese proliferation.
Fitzpatrick, 16, Mark Executive Director, The International Institute For
Strategic Studies-Americas, previously US Department of State Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation, Asias Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan. Routledge, 2/12/2016.
http://www.cpdnp.jp/pdf/disarmament/WS%20flyer-2016.02.12.pdf.
The single-most important variable affecting Japans continued non-nuclear
posture is the credibility of the US extended deterrence. Credibility is a highly
subjective criterion, depending on perceptions more than reality . Over the years,
US credibility in the eyes of some Japanese variously has been threatened by US loss in Vietnam, force
reductions in the region, the Guam Doctrine, withdrawal from the Philippines, inability to prevent China
from becoming nuclear-armed and failure to stop North Koreas nuclear programme. Polls in 1969, 1971
and 1996 found that fewer than half of Japanese respondents believed the US would come to Japans
defence if it were exposed to extreme danger.140 Most recently ,
the credibility of the nuclear
umbrella has come under question due to US defence budget austerity , a
reduced emphasis on nuclear deterrence, the failure to stop Russian aggression in
Ukraine and Obamas decision not to employ military force against Syria after it
ignored his red line on chemical weapons use. Japanese strategists understand that the
Ukraine and Syria cases did not involve US security commitments . More analogous
to Japans situation would be US failure to come to the assistance of a defence partner, such as if China
threatened Taiwan.The concerning scenario need not involve conflict . If
Washington were to cut Taiwan adrift in deference to greater US national interests, as some
American pundits have argued (see Chapter Three), it would give the Japanese reason to
question the durability of the US commitment in their own case. The fact that the US
does not have a treaty commitment to defend Taiwan, as distinct from the commitment to Japan, would
Chinas ever-growing dominance as a US trade
probably be lost in terms of perceptions.
partner already gives rise to nightmares in Japan that the US might someday
choose China over Japan.
D. ImpactJapanese prolif causes arms races in Asia

leads to nuclear war
Cimbala 15 (Stephen J. Cimbala professor of Political Science, Penn State
Brandywine. Nuclear Weapons and Anticipatory Attacks: Implications for
Russia and the United States, 16 March 2015,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2015.998121)
The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with
geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities
in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational
experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of
complex political, social, and cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility
of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear
weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of
nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless ,
the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that
marked the Cold War, in part because the military and political discipline
imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists but also because states in
Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.6 The spread of ballistic
missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East
with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live
close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.
The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental
range to strike at one anothers vitals, but short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India
and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially strategic effects. China shares borders with
Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and
China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles
between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will
be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally
armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-
bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional
ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads,
potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first-strike
vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision
pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of
possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and
proliferation on the part of policy makers and academic theorists . For policy
makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction
from a European center of gravity (in the 20th century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity
This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the
(in the present century).7
effect that wars of mass destruction are now pass , on account of the emergence of the
Revolution in Military Affairs and its encouragement of information-based warfare.8 Together with this,
there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or
coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are
exceptional and potentially obsolete.9 The spread of WMD and
ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the
obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare . For
theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might be fully compatible with international
stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less sustainable than hitherto.10
Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order to
accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in
the present century have made several plausible arguments based on
international systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states
more risk averse as opposed to risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of
foreign policy objectives. Second, if states nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to
reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives of states with respect to the existing international
order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to overturn the existing balance of power;
status quo-oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing distribution of power, and
These
therefore slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions.
arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history
of nuclear policy in the first nuclear age roughly corresponding to the Cold
War.11 Pessimists who predicted that some 30 or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of
the century were proved wrong. However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for
the control of nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe . The military and
security agenda of the Cold War was dominated by the United States and the
Soviet Unionespecially with regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual
deterrence based on second-strike capability and the deterrence rationality
according to American or allied Western concepts might be inaccurate
guides to the avoidance of war elsewhere .12 In addition, powers favoring nuclear
containment in general may fall short of disagreement in specific political cases. As Patrick M. Morgan has
noted, there is insufficient agreement among states on how serious it (nuclear proliferation) is and on
what to do about it.13
Neolib K 1NC
The 1ac is a misframing of politics that reproduces
neoliberal globalization China and the US are not
distinct political units, but are instead nodes within a
transnational network of production the aff deepens
transnational linkages between the US and China but
maintains a political grammar of state sovereignty that
makes regulation of neoliberalism impossible
Pan 14 (Chengxin, Senior Lecturer in International Politics @ Deakin U.,
Australia, Rethinking Chinese Power: A Conceptual Corrective to the Power
Shift Narrative Asian Perspective 38, pp. 396-400)
A main driving force behind the perceived power shift to China is believed to
be the rise of its economic power. Conventional assessments of Chinese
economic power rely heavily on data about Chinas economic capabilities , such as
its GDP, industrial output, bilateral trade, foreign reserves, and investment. These assessments also assume that such
capabilities, being the properties of the Chinese state, necessarily reflect Chinese power. As Ian Bremmer
observes,
The [Chinese] bureaucracy uses select privately owned companies to dominate key industries. They use sovereign wealth funds, created
from the countrys enormous reserves of foreign currency, to direct huge flows of capital. In sum, Chinas political leaders are using markets to
create wealth that can be used to maximize state control of the next phase of the countrys developmentand their own chances of political
survival. This is a form of capitalism in which the state uses markets primarily for political gain. (2010, 63)
Here Bremmer refers to a range of national economic capabilities as indicators of state power. While such capabilities as sovereign wealth
funds and foreign reserves in China are no doubt impressive, including them as part of Chinese national economic power is misleading.
, many so-called Chinese economic power indicators cannot be

For a start
characterized as Chinese, let alone as belonging to the Chinese

state. The Chinese state no doubt has played a crucial role in Chinas
economic rise. But the more relevant questions are what role the Chinese state has played, and to what effect. A related question
is whether the Chinese state itself has undergone transformation. I return to the last point later. For now, one effect of the
Chinese governments economic reform and opening-up policy has clearly

been the integration of the Chinese economy into the global economy, particularly
through its linkages to global production networks (GPNs). Much attention has now been paid to how this integration may affect Chinese
foreign policy, but what it means for our understanding of Chinese power is yet to be clearly delineated.2
The Contingency of Chinese Economic Power in Global Production Networks
The global production networks of which China is now an integral part can
serve as a useful framework within which to understand the global, hence
contextual and interdependent, nature of Chinese power. GPNs are a form of
contemporary capitalist development that involves the disaggregation of stages of production
and consumption across national boundaries, under the organizational structure of densely networked
firms or enterprises (Gereffi, Korzeniewicz, and Korzeniewicz, 1994, 1). Within such networks, as Kenichi Ohmae (1995, 3) argues, firms
or corporations are less shaped and conditioned by reasons of state than by the
desireand the needto serve attractive markets wherever they exist and to tap attractive pools of resources
wherever they sit. As manifested in the presence of foreign direct investment (FDI) and transnational production activities in China, the GPNs
are now an indispensable part of the Chinese economyso much so that what is traditionally considered
Chinese power has become less Chinese and more structural and
contingent in nature (Pan 2009a).
Much has been made, for example, about China as the worlds workshop; its rise
as a manufacturing powerhouse has been a frequent reference point in the power-shift discourse. Yet the ubiquitous Made in China products
are not as reliable an indicator of Chinas economic power as they are made out to be. As GPNs allow the components and parts of a product
the
to be made in different countries or even different continents, it is now rare to find a finished product made in one place alone. Thus,
Made in China label is often a misnomer and should best be read as

Assembled in China. Chinas cheap labor costs and massive labor reserves (its comparative advantage) often make it a
logical place for Western-based multinational corporations to outsource the labor-intensive assembly work, the final stage of production in
, the Made in China label

which various imported components are put together. In this sense
exaggerates Chinas manufacturing power while masking the

increasingly transnational nature of production that ostensibly takes place within China
(Lampton 2008).
Apples iPod is a familiar example. A group of California researchers revealed that China, where the device was assembled, added only a few
dollars of value to the product. Japan, which supplied the display, and the United States, where two critical microchips were made, contributed
far more value. And of course there is Apple itself, at once the creator, designer, and marketer; it accounted for much of the iPods value and
reaped the lions share of the profit (Gee 2008). Even in many labor-intensive product categories, the Made in China phenomenon still does
not quite live up to its already dubious reputation (Barboza 2006).
Chinas massive trade surpluses with the United States and other
developed countries do not accurately reflect Chinas economic power
either. To use the iPod example again, when a $300 iPod is imported from China to the United States, the US Customs Service records
its estimated factory value of $150 as an import from China. That figure is counted toward Chinas ballooning trade surplus with the United
States. But as just mentioned, only a few dollars are value-added in China. According to one study, on average China accounts for only 20.4
percent of the total value of products in its exports to the world, and only 17.1 percent of its exports to the United States. Therefore, only its
value-added portion should count toward Chinas real trade surplus (Lau et al. 2009).
In this sense, Chinas apparent dominance in exports points not so much to its rapid rise as an economic superpower as to the countrys
unique and contingent structural position in GPNs as the manufacturing conduit. Through this conduit, the main culprit
for the US trade deficit has merely shifted from Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast
Asian countries to China. In the late 1980s, about 40 percent of Japans and South Koreas total trade was with the United
States, but now both countries exports to the United States are less than half that percentage (Parisot 2013). While China runs
surpluses with demand countries in North America and Europe, it runs

deficits with supplier states in East Asia (Breslin 2005).
Chinas weapons of mass production look not
Thus, what Peter Navarro (2007) calls
only less impressive or formidable, but also less Chinese. This

weapon, instead of being part of Chinas economic arsenal, is produced and
wielded jointly by transnational corporations that rely on China for outsourcing and off-
shoring. Take, for example, the China price, Chinas primary weapon of mass production. Like Made in China, the China price is another
misnomer. While it commonly refers to Chinese manufacturers price, which is often 30 to 50 percent below that of their US counterparts that
make the same product, this China price is in fact made in part in the United States and elsewhere. With the United States as the worlds
biggest consumer market, its gigantic purchasing power enables global retailers such as Walmart to go around the world in search of the
cheapest prices for its price-conscious customers. Between 2001 and 2007, Walmarts China imports, which were bigger than those of the
United King- dom or Russia, increased from $9 billion to $27 billion (Mitchell 2012). In this process, Walmart has not only contributed to
southern China becoming the fastest-growing manufacturing region of the world but has also set a new global cost standard for products
manufactured there. As the director of international trade for the American Textile Institute tellingly revealed, You dont tell Wal- mart your
price. Walmart tells you (Bonacich and Hardie 2006, 177). If a Chinese supplier cannot meet the dictated price, Walmart simply goes to
another (and more willing) supplier. Therefore, a case may be made that the much-maligned China price is actually the Walmart price.
While other scholars (Lampton 2008) have used similar stories to argue that Chinese power as a seller has been exaggerated, my point here is
that in GPNs it has become increasingly difficult to speak of Chinese power. In

acknowledging Chinas current weaknesses, Lampton leaves the door open for a future stronger China in manufacturing and innovation. In his
view, Chinese power continues to serve as an unproblematic unit of analysis (2008, 9899).
The structural and contingent nature of Chinas perceived manufacturing

power can be equally applied to Chinas financial power. Chinas massive
foreign currency reserves (mostly in US dollars), some fear, could quickly turn
into Chinese hard power, which prompted then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton to wonder how the United States could
get tough on its banker. Yet the fact that China parks its huge reserves in US
dollars says much about the financial structural power enjoyed by
the United Statesthe so-called seigniorage privileges (Arrighi 2007; Parisot 2013). To be sure, this US power is
not a pure state property; rather, it is a form of structural power. As Peter Gowan
(2005, 416) argues, Large dollar reserves in East Asia do not mark a structural power
shift in the international economy. As demonstrated through Asian countries reactions to the global financial
crisis, the United States still functions as organiser of both American and global
capitalism (Parisot 2013, 1165). Acutely aware that the current world currency order is still dominated by the US dollar, many
Chinese scholars understand that unless this order is reformed to better reflect Asias financial interests, the much-hyped Chinese or Asian
century will remain elusive no matter how impressive Asias foreign currency reserves are (Huang 2010).
Chinas integration into the globalized economy is highly

Also worth considering is that
uneven. Most FDI and transnational economic activities take place along
Chinas southeast coast; its vast inland areas are much less internationally connected, resulting in what Breslin (2000,
205) calls Chinas partial re-engagement with the global economy. Such partial integration not only highlights the rise of local and regional
economic actors within China, it also breaks down the hold that national states have over both economic growth and political imaginaries
(Agnew 2010, 579). In recent years, some Chinese companies, such as CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) and Huawei, have
attracted worldwide attention for their deep pockets, growing clout, and global reach, as well as alleged links with the Chinese government
and even the military. Yet such so-called national champions have become increasingly globalized actors. Thirty percent of CNOOC shares are
held by foreign entities, and 25 percent of Chinas Construction Bank shares are in the hands of foreign investors (Wang Zhile 2007).
Far from being a strong arm of a mercantilist strategically focused state, CNOOC is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and is subject to a
variety of US Security and Exchange Commission filing and public disclosure requirements. While its aborted bid for the California-based
Unocal in 2005 was widely seen as the opening shot in an emerging struggle between China and the United States for limited global energy
resources, its acquisition search was supported by none other than Goldman Sachs and J. P. Morgan. Moreover, a host of other international
Just as many US
advisory firms provided specific legal, accounting, and human resourcesrelated services (Steinfeld 2010, 177).
firms are becoming no longer purely American (Huntington 2004), many Chinese
companies are becoming less Chinese, which indicates a decoupling
between transnational businesses and the traditional nation-state in
which they originate.
Space cooperation is a mechanism for expanded US

market access and commercial penetration of China the
plan reproduces neoliberal globalization by transforming
space itself into a site of economic exchange
Marilyn Dudley Flores and Thomas Gangale 2007, Professor at Sonoma
State University, Bachelor in aerospace engineering from the University of
Southern CaliforniaThe Globalization of Space The Astrosociological
Approach (http://www.astrosociology.com/Library/PDF/Contributions/Space
%202007%20Articles/Globalization%20of%20Space.pdf)//DBirz
THE primary author coined the phrase globalization of space in the 1990s in lectures and
presentations, thus the term was conceived in the sociological record . And, though texts
and journal articles on sociology are full of studies of the phenomenon of globalization, sociologists are not
aerospatial events that made possible the extent of
serious about the study of those
modern globalization. And, although it is in their purview, they do not keep track of advancements
in the aerospace industry that can provide clues to where globalization is taking human societies. On the
other hand, the globalization of space is referenced by a host of organizations connected to the
aerospace community (i.e., NASA, the Air Force Academy, et al.). However, to the reverse of the
sociological community, aerospace organizations have little concept of social factors
at varying levels of analysis that can provide clues to where human societies are heading in space a
destination that may likely impact aerospace industries. A. About Globalization When the primary author
first presented the notion of a globalization of space, at a sociology conference, she bumped into the
a
tussling that goes on over the term globalization. In many quarters, the term is perceived as
deliberate evil economic process, paraded as natural progress, on the part of connivers
in the Western world to lower trade tariffs to zero (neoliberal manipulators) and to
construct a U.S. foreign policy that is aggressive, even militaristic
(neoconservative manipulators). When the term is not understood as that, then it is seen as an effort on
forces of globalization to make profits and
the part of connivers to harness the natural social
dominate the world. We understand the term in this way: Globalization is the growing
interconnectedness of all people and their societies on a worldwide scale. It is an emergent
multidimensional phenomenon of which issues of economy are only a portion. Although the evolutionary
track of globalization can be traced back many centuries, the awareness of the process is relatively recent,
which may account for the quibbling over what it is. A kind of global consciousness has emerged as a
function of rapid transportation from one continent to another and of information technology. In what has
been characterized as the fifth phase of globalization, begun in the late sixties and which continues
The
today, global consciousness has increased, aided by space exploration (Robertson 1992).1
American space program has, for years, been keen to show consumers how it
enhances their lives through such spin-offs as Velcro and Teflon. But, the truth of the
matter is, engaging the space environment has done far more than giving us a few nifty
materials. It has done nothing short of putting the quantum leap into the
globalization process. B. Space and Globalization Space exploration cultivated the process of
miniaturization of instrumentation. The early rockets could carry only a small payload. Weight reduction
was imperative, and the miniaturization of equipment of every kind, including computers, was one of the
more obvious solutions (Nolan and Lenski 1999, p. 227).2 Miniaturization made possible the cascade of
advances in computer and satellite technology. It is a bit of an irony that the fifth, or current, phase of
globalization has been called The Uncertainty Phase, for the satellite, landmark instrument of space
exploration, allows humans to reflect upon their global image. And, not much is hidden from its detection.
It extends the reach and awareness of humankind. Satellite imagery allows us to predict the weather on a
global scale. Comsats give us the capacity for instantaneous and easy communication nearly anywhere in
the world. A poignant example was the climber on Everest who phoned his wife back home as he lay dying.
The satellite is a tool of the global economy. For instance, it tells us if Sri Lanka will have a good tea crop
this year and will, therefore, be able to meet its foreign debts. It processes a host of financial transactions.
As an instrument of the Cold War, the satellite aided the end of it by speeding up the process of
globalization across several broad categories of interactive phenomena: information technology, ecological
effects, social movements and organizations, concern for equal rights, global recognition, the quest for
breakthrough ideas, and economic growth. These things have been identified as the key patterns of
interaction driving the globalization process (Peterson, Wunder, and Mueller 1999, pp. 16-19).3 The
computer has been heralded as the landmark invention of the advanced industrial way of life. But, it is the
satellite and all that it could do in Earth orbit that provided much impetus behind computer technology.
Computers were necessary to the guidance of the rockets that were the satellites delivery systems; they
were needed to track the satellites; and they were needed to process the huge amount of data that came
from them. The computer and the satellite are the heart and soul of information technology (IT).
Of the categories
Information technology. This is the technology of communication and information.
of things that drive the globalization process, this one is the most seminal. For,
it increases the frequency of human interactions at an exponential rate . The
speed of social change is itself partly a function of the speed and ease of these interactions. Rapid
exchange and processing of information contribute to the global erosion of hierarchical structures.
Hierarchical structures are the hallmark of tribalism, nationalistic movements, entrenched governmental
bureaucracies, and most corporations. This is not to say that the erosion of hierarchical structures will lead
to chaos and disorder, as in the total destruction of law and order. What it will lead to is the kind of chaos
that physicists and mathematicians speak of, the mathematical chaos that underpins a reordering of a
system. The reason the process of globalization is said to be at an uncertain stage has to do with this. With
the Cold War over, world societies are experiencing a renegotiation of global civil order. There lies the
uncertainty. The Cold War was all about who would dominate the process of globalization. Fresh in the
minds of all cold warriors was World War II. The familiar fear of a one-world order imposed by a leader
like Hitler got carried over to the fear of global dictatorial hierarchy imposed by the West or the Eastern
Bloc, the inheritors of the Heartland of the 1940s world. After the war, paranoia ran high on both sides,
each thinking the other was gaining the upper hand, fueled by the megatonage each possessed in their
nuclear arsenals. The fear of world domination was incompletely salved by the fear
of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). And, what would deliver this Mutually Assured Destruction? None
other than rockets on suborbital trajectories bound for targets like New York and Moscow, the dreaded
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM),
courtesy of space research and development.
The only winners in that war
In the end, the process of globalization itself ended the Cold War.
were the societies that had a more open stance toward globalization. The old
fear of Mutually Assured Destruction has given way to the uncertainty of the re-negotiation period. Non-
state actors want in on the renegotiations. They are not a new historical phenomenon. Typically, their
troublemaking for state actors had a limited geographic range. But, now they can hook up over the
Internet, jet to face-to-face confabs, sneak money around electronically, videograph their bombings and
beheadings and videostream them to a world audience, and franchise out with the rapidity of fingers on a
keyboard. The Cold War is over what now? What now, indeed. Information technology and all the other
things that drive the globalization process are breeding the new social forms that will make up the re-
negotiating global civil order. A world order that, in the decades and centuries to come, will find itself
extending off the planet. Ecological Effects. The struggle to understand the ecology of the planet has
certainly led to new social forms. Stewart Brand labeled the space satellite an engine of the ecology
movement (Drexler and Peterson 1991, p. 6).4 Imaging the planet, a direct product of space exploration,
has enabled our larger awareness of the biosphere. How like fetal imaging it has been! When fetal imaging
became possible, the rights of the unborn were championed on a massive scale and abortion issues
became a social problem. How like that process has been the images of the Earth from space. While
conservation of regional resources was certainly a forerunner of todays environmental movement,
conservationism flowered into modern environmentalism owing to imagery from space and other
instruments and processes of space research and development. The first truly global social movement is
environmentalism. And, such movements have led to new social forms. And, we may expect other social
forms to emerge as we grapple with the truly huge national boundarycrossing (transnational) problems of
the decline side of oil, the epochal climate change that comes with global warming, and natural disasters
in ever-increasing populated areas. Social Movements and Organizations. Whether we are speaking of
more established social movements and organizations or emerging ones, none of these would be able to
meet their goals today without information and communications technologies. High-tech industries have
spurred trends in networking and cooperative organization. A spin-off of the environmental movement is
an understanding of how ecosystems are organized and these are turned to for models for the human
ecology. We speak of the organic growth of non-state actor organizations. And, as most commentators on
globalization have remarked, much about the social formations of our modern world is characterized by
network structures diffused from both the biological world and the worlds of broadcasting and the World
Wide Web. Concern for equal rights. With communication that permeates national boundaries, there is an
awareness among people throughout the world of each others living conditions. While globe-trotting
journalists and early radio and television did plenty toward this end, satellite broadcasting and the Internet
have brought a hard reality, a sense of urgency, and a next-door-neighborliness that Marshall McLuhan
called in the sixties the global village. The global village has never been so real as it is now. The
atrocities of those nationalities that battled in the Balkans were like atrocities against your own neighbors.
This breeds a concern for equal rights that doesnt require the nicety of abstract thought to comprehend. It
comes from a concrete level of seeing something as it happens with ones own eyes. And, from this, we
learn to care not only for those getting hurt and disrespected in distant places, but for all individuals in all
places in all aspects of their lives, their pains and their joys. Global recognition was once reserved for
nation-states and rare others. It is now being extended to the individual. This process gets at the taproot of
innovation. While modern communication and transportation have made available the teachings and
technologies of the worlds cultures to nearly everyone, it also makes available the wacko ideas of Rudy
the Skinhead and Leroy Bandanna, as well as Joe Six-Pack making a better mousetrap in his basement. Of
course, some shoppers in the great Mall of Ideas will not be able to discern the bad merchandise from the
good and roll their carts down the aisles of intellectual and evolutionary dead-ends. But, most folks will not
be suckered. They will know the difference between the teachings of Martin Luther and the writings of the
Unabomber; the teachings of the Buddha and the ravings of teenage boys in trench coats with guns in
their book bags. They will shop and compare, and most importantly, compare notes. It is a mathematical
inevitability that deeper global understanding in all its many facets and those yet to be discovered will
emerge. The quest for breakthrough ideas is in no danger of being called off. The quest for breakthrough
ideas. The infrastructure that has spread from the satellite and the computer is the Gutenberg Press of our
time. And, it was all made possible by the human exploration of space. One such truly breakthrough idea is
molecular nanotechnology that could, virtually overnight, change technology as we know it.
Nanotechnology techniques can construct materials and alter the structure of matter at a molecular level.
Nanotechnology is the logical extension of the miniaturization effort that began in the early days of space
exploration. While we are nowhere near that overnight transition, we are certainly able to conceptualize
about nanotechnology and its applications now. Without computer technology inspired by space
exploration, we could not ever develop nanotechnology. Thats because this technology will require a vast
quantity of data to be processed and a great deal of memory storage. What about economic growth and
the global economy as we know it in the present? This is usually the phenomenon that most people
associate with globalization. It emerges from of all these categories of interactive phenomena. Only an
interdependent global economy could provide the capital mass or the financial avenues to bankroll the
application of breakthrough ideas, truly effective global organizations, the enhancement of each individual,
to assess the environmental degradation and climatic shift of a whole planet and repair it, and to extend
the human ecology to other venues. C. The Globalization of Space Space exploration does not
stand apart from the globalization process. It is part and parcel of the thing it has
magnified. The globalization process, therefore, requires us to re-think the exploration of space.
Societies leapfrogging to advanced industrial status like China and India are getting in on outer space
production. And, because they have many blueprints to follow from those societies that have gone before,
they can be expected to make a sharp gradient of progress once they get going. Will they cooperate with
each other and with a variety of others or compete one-against-all? One thing is certain: the two traditional
competitors of the Cold War and the Space Race are doing a lot more cooperation these days, as are their
many allies. There is an historic trail to their collaborations, stepping to increasingly longer duration space
missions. Anymore, long-duration space operations are necessary to almost anything of value done in
space, regardless of it being a robotic or manned mission. Mastering long-duration space exploration is a
prerequisite to human permanency in space, which is nothing short of the expansion of the human ecology
off the Earth. Yet, on the verge of longer-duration missions, as in a manned mission to Mars by the United
States, conceptualized for the 1980s, events of American history intervened namely in the form of the
decisions of the Nixon administration. In the meantime, the potential for global manmade destruction in
the form of nuclear madness has been replaced with the decline side of oil, global warming, and large-
scale natural disasters in ever-increasing populated areas. Nukes are no longer the concern they once
were, but Nature and how humans stand in relation to her sure are. Once again, humanity wonders if it will
survive. The things that matter most now are the answers to these questions: How do we power this
world system of increasingly advanced industrial societies without petroleum? How do we mitigate, adjust
to, or solve for rising sea levels and other direct and indirect effects of global warming? How do we
mitigate natural disasters that occur in parts of the world becoming ever more populated and
infrastructured? How does globalized space help answer those questions? This is the significance of the
inquiry into the globalization of space. If space exploration can play a large role in the answers to those
questions, it will be able to get out of first gear and lead to the expansion of the human ecology on this
world and in places off the Earth. Space must become demonstrably relevant to a wider global audience
interested in survival. It no longer can be about just Tang, Teflon, and Velcro or even just about ICBMs and
spy satellites. It has to be about making the scientific and technological explorations to ensure energy
production, to guarantee surviving and thriving during an epochal climate change, and offsetting natural
disasters. In a departure from the authors usual framework, let us introduce you to our methods of inquiry
at this juncture. They are as follow.
Neoliberal globalization generates a governance gap that

causes extinction the structural contradiction between
transnational production networks and a nation-state
political imaginary creates uncontrollable ecological and
economic feedback loops regulating the effects of
globalization fails, only structural transformation solves
Ehrenfeld 5,
(David, Dept. of Ecology, Evolution, and Natural Resources @ Rutgers
University, The Environmental Limits to Globalization, Conservation Biology
Vol. 19 No. 2 April 2005)
The known effects of globalization on the environment are numerous and highly
significant. Many others are undoubtedly unknown. Given these circumstances, the first question that suggests itself is: Will
globalization, as we see it now, remain a permanent state of affairs (Rees 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003a)?
The principal environmental side effects of globalizationclimate change,
resource exhaustion (particularly cheap energy), damage to agroecosystems, and
the spread of exotic species, including pathogens (plant, animal, and human)are
sufficient to make this economic system unstable and short-lived. The
socioeconomic consequences of globalization are likely to do the same. In my book The
our ability to manage global systems, which
Arrogance of Humanism (1981), I claimed that
depends on our being able to predict the results of the things we do , or even to
understand the systems we have created, has been greatly exaggerated. Much of our alleged
control is science fiction; it doesnt work because of theoretical limits that we ignore at our peril. We live in a dream world
in which reality testing is something we must never, never do, lest we awake. In 1984 Charles Perrow explored the reasons why we have
trouble predicting what so many of our own created systems will do, and why they surprise us so unpleasantly while we think we are
managing them. In his book Normal Accidents, which does not concern globalization, he listed the critical characteristics of some of todays
complex systems. They are highly interlinked, so a change in one part can affect
many others, even those that seem quite distant. Results of some processes feed back
on themselves in unexpected ways. The controls of the system often
interact with each other unpredictably. We have only indirect ways of finding out
what is happening inside the system. And we have an incomplete understanding of some of the systems processes. His
example of such a system is a nuclear power plant, and this, he explained, is why system-wide accidents in nuclear plants cannot be predicted
globalization is a similar system, also subject to

or eliminated by system design. I would argue that
catastrophic accidents, many of them environmentalevents that we

cannot define until after they have occurred, and perhaps not even then. The
comparatively few commentators who have predicted the collapse of globalization have generally given social reasons to support
their arguments. These deserve some consideration here, if only because the environmental and social consequences
of globalization interact so strongly with each other. In 1998, the British political economist John Gray, giving scant attention to environmental
There is nothing
factors, nevertheless came to the conclusion that globalization is unstable and will be short-lived. He said,
in todays global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from
highly uneven economic development within and between the worlds diverse
societies. The result, Gray states, is that The combination of [an] unceasing stream
of new technologies, unfettered market competition and weak or fractured social
institutions has weakened both sovereign states and multinational

corporations in their ability to control important events. Note that Gray claims that not only nations but also multinational
corporations, which are widely touted as controlling the world, are being weakened by globalization. This idea may come as a surprise,
Neither governments nor

considering the growth of multinationals in the past few decades, but I believe it is true.
corporations are even remotely capable of controlling the

giant
environmental or social forces released by globalization, without

first controlling globalization itself. Two of the social critics of globalization with the most dire
predictions about its doom are themselves masters of the process. The late Sir James Goldsmith, billionaire financier, wrote in 1994, It must
surely be a mistake to adopt an economic policy which makes you rich if you eliminate your national workforce and transfer production
It is the poor in the rich

abroad, and which bankrupts you if you continue to employ your own people....
countries who will subsidize the rich in the poor countries . This will
have a serious impact on the social cohesion of nations. Another free-trade billionaire, George
Soros, said much the same thing in 1995: The collapse of the global marketplace would be a
traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet I find it easier to imagine than the
continuation of the present regime. How much more powerful these statements are if we factor in the
environment! As globalization collapses, what will happen to people, biodiversity, and ecosystems? With respect to people, the gift of
prophecy is not required to answer this question. What will happen depends on where you are and how you live. Many citizens of the Third
World are still comparatively self-sufficient; an unknown number of these will survive the breakdown of globalization and its attendant chaos.
In the developed world, there are also people with resources of self-sufficiency and a growing understanding of the nature of our social and
environmental problems, which may help them bridge the years of crisis. Some species are adaptable; some are not. For the non- human
residents of Earth, not all news will be bad. Who would have predicted that wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), one of the wiliest and most
evasive of woodland birds, extinct in New Jersey 50 years ago, would now be found in every county of this the most densely populated state,
and even, occasionally, in adjacent Manhattan? Who would have predicted that black bears (Ursus americanus), also virtually extinct in the
recoveries are unusual

state in the mid-twentieth century, would now number in the thousands (Ehrenfeld 2001)? Of course these
rare bright spots in a darker landscape. Finally, a few ecological systems may
survive in a comparatively undamaged state; most will be stressed to the breaking point, directly or
indirectly, by many environmental and social factors interacting unpredictably. Lady Luck, as always, will have much to say. In his book The
Collapse of Complex Societies, the archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988) notes that collapse, which has happened to all past empires, inevitably
results in human systems of lower complexity and less specialization, less centralized control, lower economic activity, less information flow,
lower population levels, less trade, and less redistribution of resources. All of these changes are inimical to globalization. This less-complex,
I do not think, however,

less-globalized condition is probably what human societies will be like when the dust settles.
that we can make such specific predictions about the ultimate state of the
environment after globalization, because we have never experienced
anything like this exceptionally rapid, global environmental damage before.
History and science have little to tell us in this situation. The end of the current economic system and
the transition to a postglobalized state is and will be accompanied by a

desperate last raid on resources and a chaotic flurry of
environmental destruction whose results cannot possibly be told in
advance. All one can say is that the surviving species, ecosystems, and resources will be greatly impoverished compared with what we
have now, and our descendants will not thank us for having adopted, however briefly, an economic system that consumed their inheritance
Environment is a true bottom lineconcern for its

and damaged their planet so wantonly.
condition must trump all purely economic growth strategies if both the
developed and developing nations are to survive and prosper. Awareness of
the environmental limits that globalized industrial society denies or ignores
should not, however, bring us to an extreme position of environmental
determinism. Those whose preoccupations with modern civilizations very real social problems cause them to reject or minimize
the environmental constraints discussed here ( Hollander 2003) are guilty of seeing only half the picture. Environmental scientists sometimes
fall into the same error. It is tempting to see the salvation of civilization and
environment solely in terms of technological improvements in efficiency of energy extraction
and use, control of pollution, conservation of water, and regulation of environmentally harmful activities . But such needed
developments will not be sufficientor may not even occur without

corresponding social change, including an end to human population growth and the
glorification of consumption, along with the elimination of economic
mechanisms that increase the gap between rich and poor. The
environmental and social problems inherent in globalization are completely interrelated
any attempt to treat them as separate entities is unlikely to succeed in easing
the transition to a postglobalized world. Integrated change that combines environmental awareness, technological innovation,
and an altered world view is the only answer to the life-threatening problems
exacerbated by globalization (Ehrenfeld 2003b). If such integrated change occurs in time, it will likely happen partly
by our own design and partly as an unplanned response to the constraints imposed by social unrest, disease, and the economics of scarcity.
With respect to the planned component of change, we are facing , as eloquently

described by Rees (2002), the ultimate challenge to human intelligence and self-awareness, those vital
qualities we humans claim as uniquely our own. Homo sapiens will either. . .become fully human or wink out ignominiously, a guttering candle
in a violent storm of our own making. If change does not come quickly, our global civilization will join Tainters (1988) list as the latest and
Is there anything that could slow globalization

most dramatic example of collapsed complex societies.
quickly, before it collapses disastrously of its own environmental and social

weight? It is still not too late to curtail the use of energy, reinvigorate local
and regional communities while restoring a culture of concern for each other,
reduce nonessential global trade and especially global finance (Daly & Cobb
1989), do more to control introductions of exotic species (including
pathogens), and accelerate the growth of sustainable agriculture. Many of the
needed technologies are already in place. It is true that some of the damage to our environmentspecies
extinctions, loss of crop and domestic animal varieties, many exotic species introductions, and some climatic change will be beyond repair.
Nevertheless, the opportunity to help our society move past globalization in an

orderly way, while there is time, is worth our most creative and passionate
efforts. The citizens of the United States and other nations have to understand that our global economic
system has placed both our environment and our society in peril, a peril
as great as that posed by any war of the twentieth century. This understanding, and the actions
that follow, must come not only from enlightened leadership, but also from grassroots consciousness
raising. It is still possible to reclaim the planet from a self-destructive

economic system that is bringing us all down together, and this can be a task that bridges the
divide between conservatives and liberals. The crisis is here, now. What we have to do has become
obvious. Globalization can be scaled back to manageable proportions only in
the context of an altered world view that rejects materialism even as it
restores a sense of communal obligation. In this way, alone, can we achieve real homeland security, not just
in the United States, but also in other nations, whose fates have become so thoroughly entwined with ours within the global environment we
share.
The judge should vote negative to endorse a

transformative politics of framing
The political grammar of the modern state system is

unjust and reproduces the worst effects of neoliberal
globalization transformative frame setting recognizes
politics exceeds nation-states and operates through
global flows of capital altering the frame of politics is a
pre-requisite to resolving the governance gap produce by
neoliberalism
Fraser 13
(Nancy Fraser, Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social
Science and professor of philosophy at The New School in New York City,
Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis,
pgs. 190-206)
the Keynesian-Westphalian frame gave a distinctive

Although it went unnoticed at the time,
shape to arguments about social justice. Taking for granted the modern
territorial state as the appropriate unit, and its citizens as the pertinent subjects, such
arguments turned on what precisely those citizens owed one another. In the eyes of some, it
sufficed that citizens be formally equal before the law; for others, equality of opportunity was also required; for still others, justice demanded
that all citizens gain access to the resources and respect they needed in order to be able to participate on a par with others, as full members
of the political community. The argument focused, in other words, on what should count as a just
ordering of social relations within a society. Engrossed in disputing the what
of justice, the contestants apparently felt no need to dispute the who. With the Keynesian-
Westphalian frame securely in place, it went without saying that the who was the national citizenry. Today, however, the
Keynesian-Westphalian frame is losing its aura of self-evidence. Thanks to heightened

awareness of globalization, many observe that the social processes shaping their lives
routinely overflow territorial borders. They note, for example, that decisions taken in one territorial
state often impact the lives of those outside it, as do the actions of transnational corporations, international currency speculators, and large
institutional investors. Many also note the growing salience of supranational and international organizations, both governmental and
nongovernmental, and of transnational public opinion, which flows with supreme disregard for borders through global mass media and
cybertechnology. The result is a new sense of vulnerability to transnational forces.

Faced with global warming, the spread of AIDS, international terrorism, and superpower unilateralism, many believe that their chances for
living good lives depend at least as much on processes that trespass the borders o f territorial states as on those contained within them. Under
it has ceased to be
these conditions, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame no longer goes without saying. For many,
axiomatic that the modern territorial state is the appropriate unit for
thinking about issues of justice. Nor can it pass by default that the citizens of such states are the pertinent
subjects. The effect is to destabilize the previous structure of political claims-making and therefore to change the way we argue about social
claims for redistribution increasingly

justice. This is true for both major families of justice claims. In todays world,
eschew the assumption of national economies. Faced with transnationalized

production, the outsourcing of jobs, and the associated pressures of the race to the
bottom, once nationally focused labor unions look increasingly for allies abroad. Inspired by the
Zapatistas, meanwhile, impoverished peasants and indigenous peoples link their struggles against
despotic local and national authorities to critiques of transnational corporate

predation and global neoliberalism. Finally, WTO protestors, Occupy movements,
and indignados directly target the new governance structures of the global
economy, which have vastly strengthened the ability of large corporations
and investors to escape the regulatory and taxation powers of territorial
states. In the same way, movements struggling for recognition increasingly look beyond the territorial state. Under the slogan womens
rights are human rights, for example, feminists throughout the world are linking struggles against local patriarchal practices to campaigns to
minorities, who face discrimination within territorial states, are

reform international law. Meanwhile, religious and ethnic
reconstituting themselves as diasporas and building transnational publics

from which to mobilize international opinion. Finally, transnational coalitions of human-rights activists
have worked to build new cosmopolitan institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, which can punish state violations of human
dignity. In such cases, disputes about justice are exploding the Keynesian- Westphalian
frame. No longer addressed exclusively to national states or debated
exclusively by national publics, claimants no longer focus solely on relations
among fellow citizens. Thus, the grammar of argument has altered.
Whether the issue is distribution or recognition, disputes that used to focus
exclusively on the question of what is owed as a matter of justice to
community members now turn quickly into disputes about who should count
as a member and which is the relevant community. Not just the what but also the
who is up for grabs. Today, in other words, arguments about justice assume a double guise. On
the one hand, they concern first-order questions of substance , just as before: How
much economic inequality does justice permit, how much redistribution is required, and according to
which principle of distributive justice? What constitutes equal respect, which kinds of differences merit public recognition, and by which
means? But above and beyond such first-order questions, arguments about justice
today also concern second-order, meta-level questions: What is the proper
frame within which to consider first-order questions of justice? Who are the
relevant subjects entitled to a just distribution or reciprocal recognition in the given case? Thus, it is not only the
substance of justice, but also the frame, which is in dispute.3 The result is a major challenge
to our theories of social justice. Preoccupied largely with first-order issues of distribution and/or recognition, these theories have so far failed to
develop conceptual resources for reflecting on the meta-issue of the frame. As things stand, therefore, it is by no means clear that they are
capable of addressing the double character of problems of justice in a globalizing age.4 In this essay, I shall propose a strategy for thinking
about the problem of the frame. I shall argue, first, that in order to deal satisfactorily with this problem, the theory of justice must become
three-dimensional, incorporating the political dimension of representation, alongside the economic dimension o f distribution and the cultural
dimension o f recognition. I shall also argue, second, that the political dimension of representation should itself be understood as
encompassing three levels. The combined effect o f these two arguments will be to make visible a third question, beyond those o f the what
and the who, which I shall call the question o f the how. That question, in turn, inaugurates a paradigm shift: what the Keynesian-
Westphalian frame casts as the theory o f social justice must now become a theory of post-Westphalian democraticjustice.
1. FOR A THREE-DIMENSIONAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: ON THE SPECIFICITY OF THE POLITICAL Let me begin by explaining what I mean by justice
the most general meaning of justice is

in general and by its political dimension in particular. In my view,
parity of participation. According to this radical-democratic interpretation o f the principle of equal moral worth,
justice requires social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in
social life. Overcoming injustice means dismantling institutionalized obstacles
that prevent some people from participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction. Previously, I have
analyzed two distinct kinds of obstacles to participatory parity , which correspond to two
distinct species of injustice.5 On the one hand, people can be impeded from full
participation by economic structures that deny them the resources they need in order to interact with others as
peers; in that case they suffer from distributive injustice or maldistribution. On the other hand,
people can also be prevented from interacting on terms of parity by

institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing; in that case they
suffer from status inequality or misrecognition. 6In the first case, the problem is the class structure of society, which
corresponds to the economic dimension of justice. In the second case, the problem is the status order, which corresponds to the cultural
dimension.7 In modern capitalist societies, the class structure and the status order do not neady mirror each other, although they interact
causally Rather, each has some autonomy vis-a-vis the other. As a result, misrecognition cannot be reduced to a secondary effect of
maldistribution, as some economistic theories of distributive justice appear to suppose. Nor, conversely, can maldistribution be reduced to an
epiphenomenal expression of misrecognition, as some culturalist theories of recognition tend to assume. Thus, neither recognition theory
alone nor distribution theory alone can provide an adequate understanding of justice for capitalist society. Only a two-dimensional theory,
encompassing both distribution and recognition, can supply the necessary levels of social- theoretical complexity and moral-philosophical
this two-dimensional
insight.8 That, at least, is the view of justice I have defended in the past. And
understanding of justice still seems right to me as far as it goes. But I now believe that it does not go far
enough. Distribution and recognition could appear to constitute the sole dimensions of ustice only insofar as the Keynesian-Westphalian
frame was taken for granted. Once the question of the frame becomes subject to
contestation, however, the effect is to make visible a third dimension of justice , which
was neglected in my previous workas well as in the work of many other philosophers.9 The third dimension of justice is the
political. Of course, distribution and recognition are themselves political in the sense o f being contested and power-laden; and they
have usually been seen as requiring adjudication by the state. But I mean political in a more specific, constitutive sense, which concerns the
The political in this sense

constitution of the states jurisdiction and the decision rules by which it structures contestation.
furnishes the stage on which struggles over distribution and recognition are
played out. Establishing criteria of social belonging, and thus determining who counts as a member, the political dimension ofjustice
specifies the reach of those other dimensions: it tells us who is included in, and who excluded from, the circle of those entitled to a just
the political dimension likewise sets the procedures for

distribution and reciprocal recognition. Establishing decision rules,
staging and resolving contests in both the economic and the cultural dimensions: it tells us not only who can make
claims for redistribution and recognition, but also how such claims are to be
mooted and adjudicated. Centered on issues of membership and procedure, the political dimension of
justice is concerned chiefly with representation. At one level, which pertains to the boundary-
setting aspect of the political, representation is a matter of social belonging; what is at issue here is inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
community of those entitled to make justice claims on one another. At another level, which pertains to the decision-rule aspect, representation
concerns the procedures that structure public processes o f contestation. At issue here are the terms on which those included in the political
community air their claims and adjudicate their disputes.10 At both levels, the question can arise as to whether the relations of representation
are just. One can ask: Do the boundaries of the political community wrongly exclude some who are actually entitled to representation? Do the
community's decision rules accord equal voice in public deliberations and fair representation in public decision-making to all members? Such
issues of representation are specifically political. Conceptually distinct from both economic and cultural questions, they cannot be reduced to
the latter, although, as we shall see, they are inextricably interwoven with them. To say that the political is a conceptually distinct dimension of
justice, not reducible to the economic or the cultural, is also to say that it can give rise to a conceptually distinct species of injustice. Given the
there can be distinctively political obstacles to

view of justice as participatory parity, this means that
parity, not reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, although (again) interwoven with

them. Such obstacles arise from the political constitution of society, as opposed to
the class structure or status order. Grounded in a specifically political mode of social ordering, they can only be adequately grasped through a
theory that conceptualizes representation, along with distribution and recognition, as one of three fundamental dimensions of justice. If
representation is the defining issue of the political, then the characteristic political injustice is
misrepresentation. Misrepresentation occurs when political boundaries and/or decision rules function to wrongly deny
some people the possibility o f participating on a par with others in social interaction including, but not only, in political arenas. Far from
being reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, misrepresentation can occur even in the absence o f the latter injustices, although it is
usually intertwined with them. We can distinguish at least two different levels of misrepresentation. Insofar as political decision rules wrongly
deny some o f the included the chance to participate fully, as peers, the injustice is what I call ordinary-political misrepresentation. Here,
where the issue is intraframe representation, we enter the familiar terrain of political science debates over the relative merits of alternative
electoral systems. Do single- member-district, winner-take-all, first-past-the-post systems unjusdy deny parity to numerical minorities? And if
so, is proportional repre sentation or cumulative voting the appropriate remedy?" Likewise, do gender-blind rules, in conjunction with gender-
based maldistribution and misrecognition, function to deny parity o f political participation to women? And if so, are gender quotas an
appropriate remedy?12 Such questions belong to the sphere of ordinary-political justice, which has usually been played out within the
misrepresentation, which concerns the

Keynesian-Westphalian frame. Less obvious, perhaps, is a second level of
boundary-setting aspect of the political. Here the injustice arises when the
communitys boundaries are drawn in such a way as to wrongly exclude some
people from the chance to participate at all in its authorized contests overjustice. In such cases,
misrepresentation takes a deeper form, which I shall call misframing. The deeper character of
misframing is a function of the crucial importance of framing to every question of social justice. Far from being of marginal importance,
frame-setting is among the most consequential of political decisions.

Constituting both members and nonmembers in a single stroke, this decision
effectively excludes the latter from the universe of those entitled to
consideration within the community in matters o f distribution, recognition, and ordinary-political representation. The result can be
a serious injustice. When questions of justice are framed in a way that wrongly
excludes some from consideration, the consequence is a special kind of meta-
injustice, in which one is denied the chance to press first-order justice
claims in a given political community. The injustice remains, moreover, even when those excluded from one political community are
included as subjects of justice in another as long as the effect of the political division is to put some relevant aspects of justice beyond their
reach. Still more serious, of course, is the case in which one is excluded from membership in any political community. Akin to the loss o f what
Hannah Arendt called the right to have rights, that sort o f misframing is a kind of political death. '3 Those who suffer it may become
objects of charity or benevolence. But deprived o f the possibility of authoring first-order claims, they become non-persons with respect to
It is the misframing form of misrepresentation that globalization has

justice.
recently begun to make visible. Earlier, in the heyday of the postwar welfare state, with the Keynesian-Westphalian
frame securely in place, the principal concern in thinking about justice was distribution. Later, with the rise of the new social movements and
multiculturalism, the center o f gravity shifted to recognition. In both cases, the modern territorial state was assumed by default. As a result,
the political dimension of justice was relegated to the margins. Where it did emerge, it took the ordinary-political form of contests over the
decision rules internal to the polity, whose boundaries were taken for granted. Thus, claims for gender quotas and multicultural rights sought
to remove political obstacles to participatory parity for those who were already included in principle in the political community.14Taking for
granted the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, they did not call into question the assumption that the appropriate unit of justice was the territorial
state. Today, in contrast, globalization has put the question of the frame squarely on the political agenda. Increasingly subject to contestation,
the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is now considered by many to be a major vehicle of

injustice, as it partitions political space in ways that block many who
are poor and despised from challenging the forces that oppress
them. Channeling their claims into the domestic political spaces of relatively
powerless, if not wholly failed, states, this frame insulates offshore powers from
critique and control.15 Among those shielded from the reach of justice are more powerful
predator states and transnational private powers, including foreign investors
and creditors, international currency speculators, and transnational

corporations.16 Also protected are the governance structures of the
global economy, which set exploitative terms of interaction and then
exempt them from democratic control.'7 Finally, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is self-insulating;
the architecture of the interstate system protects the very partitioning of
political space that it institutionalizes, effectively excluding
transnational democratic decision-making on issues of justice.'8 From this perspective,
the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is a powerful instrument of injustice, which
gerrymanders political space at the expense of the poor and
despised. For those persons who are denied the chance to press
transnational first-order claims, struggles against maldistribution and
misrecognition cannot proceed, let alone succeed, unless they are joined with
struggles against misframing. It is not surprising, therefore, that some consider misframing the defining injustice of a
globalizing age. Under these conditions of heightened awareness of misframing, the political dimension of justice is hard to ignore. Insofar as
globalization is politicizing the question o f the frame, it is also making visible an aspect of the grammar of justice that was often neglected in
the previous period. It is now apparent that no claim for justice can avoid presupposing some notion of representation, implicit or explicit,
insofar as none can avoid assuming a frame. Thus, representation is always already inherent in all claims for redistribution and recognition.
The political dimension is implicit in, indeed required by, the grammar of the concept of justice. Thus, no redistribution or recognition without
representation.19 In general, then, an adequate theory of justice for our time must be three-dimensional. Encompassing not only redistribution
and recognition, but also representation, it must allow us to grasp the question of the frame as a question of justice. Incorporating the
economic, cultural, and political dimensions, it must enable us to identify injustices of misframing and to evaluate possible remedies. Above
all, it must permit us to pose, and to answer, the key political question of our age: how can we integrate struggles against maldistribution,
misrecognition, and misrepresentation within a post- Westphalian frame? 2. ON THE POLITICS OF FRAMING: FROM STATE- TERRITORIALITY TO
SOCIAL EFFECTIVITY? So far I have been arguing for the irreducible specificity of the political as one o f three fundamental dimensions of
justice. And I have identified two distinct levels of political injustice: ordinary-political misrepresentation and misframing. Now, I want to
examine the politics of framing in a globalizing world. Distinguishing affirmative from transformative approaches, I shall argue that an
adequate politics of representation must also address a third level: beyond contesting ordinary-political
aim to democratize the

misrepresentation, on the one hand, and misframing, on the other, such a politics must also
process of frame-setting. I begin by explaining what I mean by the politics of framing. Situated at my second
level, where distinctions between members and nonmembers are drawn, this politics concerns the boundary-setting aspect of the political.
the politics of framing

Focused on the issues of who counts as a subject of justice, and what is the appropriate frame,
comprises efforts to establish and consolidate, to contest and revise, the authoritative
division of political space. Included here are struggles against misframing, which aim to dismande the obstacles that
prevent disadvantaged people from confronting the forces that oppress them with claims ofjustice. Centered on the setting and contesting o f
frames, the politics o f framing is concerned with the question o f the who. The politics of framing can take
two distinct forms, both of which are now being practiced in our globalizing world.20 The first approach,
which I shall call the affirmative politics of framing, contests the boundaries
of existing frames while accepting the Westphalian grammar of frame-setting.
In this politics, those who claim to suffer injustices of misframing seek to redraw the boundaries of existing territorial states or in
some cases to create new ones. But they still assume that the territorial state is the appropriate unit within which to pose and resolve disputes
about justice. For them, accordingly, injustices of misframing are not a function of the general
principle according to which the Westphalian order partitions political space.
They arise, rather, as a result of the faulty way in which that principle has been
applied. Thus, those who practice the affirmative politics o f framing accept that the principle o f state-territoriality is the proper basis
for constituting the who of justice. They agree, in other words, that what makes a given collection of
individuals into fellow subjects of justice is their shared residence on the

territory of a modern state and/or their shared membership in the political community that corresponds to such a
state. Thus, far from challenging the underlying grammar of the Westphalian order, those who practice the affirmative politics o f framing
that principle is contested, however, in a second version

accept its state-territorial principle.21 Precisely
of the politics of framing, which I shall call the transformative approach. For
proponents of this approach, the state-territorial principle no longer affords an
adequate basis for determining the who of justice in every case. They concede, of course, that
that principle remains relevant for many purposes; thus, supporters of transformation do not propose to eliminate state-territoriality entirely.
But they contend that its grammar is out of sync with the structural causes of
many injustices in a globalizing world, which are not territorial in
character. Examples include the financial markets, offshore factories,
investment regimes, and governance structures of the global economy , which
determine who works for a wage and who does not; the information networks of global media and
cybertechnology, which determine who is included in the circuits of communicative power and who is not; and the bio-politics
of climate, disease, drugs, weapons, and biotechnology , which determine who will live long and
who will die young. In these matters, so fundamental to human well being, the forces that perpetrate injustice
belong not to the space of places, but to the space of flows.22 Not
locatable within the jurisdiction of any actual or conceivable territorial state, they
cannot be made answerable to claims of justice that are framed in terms o f
the state-territorial principle. In their case, so the argument goes, to invoke the state-
territorial principle to determine the frame is itself to commit an injustice. By
partitioning political space along territorial lines, this principle
insulates extra- and non-territorial powers from the reach of justice.
In a globalizing world, therefore, it is less likely to serve as a remedy for misframing than as means of inflicting or perpetuating it. In general,
the transformative politics of framing aims to change the deep grammar

then,
of frame-setting in a globalizing world. This approach seeks to supplement the state-territorial principle of the
Westphalian order with one or more post-Westphalian principles. The aim is to overcome injustices of misframing by changing not just the
boundaries of the who of justice, but also the mode of their constitution, hence the way in which they are drawn.23 What might a post-
Westphalian mode of frame-setting look like? Doubtless it is too early to have a clear view. Nevertheless, the most promising candidate so far
isthe all-affected principle. This principle holds that all those affected by a given
social structure or institution have moral standing as subjects of justice in relation
to it. On this view, what turns a collection of people into fellow subjects of justice is
not geographical proximity, but their co-imbrication in a common structural or institutional
framework, which sets the ground rules that govern their social interaction, thereby shaping their respective life possibilities, in
patterns of advantage and disadvantage.24 Until recently, the all-affected principle seemed to coincide in the eyes of many with the state-
territorial principle. It was assumed, in keeping with the Westphalian world picture, that the common framework that determined patterns of
advantage and disadvantage was precisely the constitutional order of the modern territorial state. As a result, it seemed that in applying the
state-territorial principle, one simultaneously captured the normative force o f the all-affected principle. In fact, this was never truly so, as the
long history of colonialism and neocolonialism attests. From the perspective of the metropole, however, the conflation of state- territoriality
with social effectivity appeared to have an emancipatory thrust, as it served to justify the progressive incorporation, as subjects o f justice, o f
the subordinate classes and status groups who were resident on the territory but excluded from active citizenship. Today, however, the idea
that state-territoriality can serve as a proxy for social effectivity is no longer plausible. Under current conditions, ones chances to live a good
life do not depend wholly on the internal political constitution of the territorial state in which one resides. Although the latter remains
undeniably relevant, its effects are mediated by other structures, both extra- and non-territorial, whose impact is at least as significant.25 In
general, globalization is driving a widening wedge between state

territoriality and social effectivity. As those two principles increasingly diverge, the effect is to reveal the
former as an inadequate surrogate for the latter. And so the question arises: is it possible to apply the
all-affected principle directly to the framing of justice, without going through the
detour of state-territoriality?26 This is precisely what some practitioners o f transformative politics are attempting to do.
Seeking leverage against offshore sources of maldistribution and
misrecognition, some globalization activists are appealing directly to the all-
affected principle in order to circumvent the state-territorial partitioning of
political space. Contesting their exclusion by the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, environmentalists and
indigenous peoples are claiming standing as subjects of justice in
relation to the extra- and non-territorial powers that impact their
lives. Insisting that effectivity trumps state-territoriality, they have joined development activists, international feminists, and others in
asserting their right to make claims against the structures that harm them, even when the latter cannot be located in the space of places.
Casting off the Westphalian grammar of frame-setting, these claimants are applying the all-affected principle directly to questions of justice in
a globalizing world.27 In such cases, the transformative politics of framing proceeds

simultaneously in multiple dimensions and on multiple levels.28 On one level,
the social movements that practice this politics aim to redress first-order injustices
of maldistribution, misrecognition, and ordinary-political misrepresentation. On a second level, these
movements seek to redress meta-level injustices of framing by reconstituting

the who of justice. In those cases, moreover, where the state-territorial principle serves more to indemnify than to
challenge injustice, transformative social movements appeal instead to the all-affected principle. Invoking a post-Westphalian principle, they
are seeking to change the very grammar of frame-settingand thereby to reconstruct the meta-political foundations of justice for a globalizing
world. But the claims of transformative politics go further still. Above and beyond their other
Rejecting
claims, these movements are also claiming a say in what amounts to' a new, post-Westphalian process of frame-setting.
the standard view, which deems frame-setting the prerogative of states and
transnational elites, they are effectively aiming to democratize the process by
which the frameworks of justice are drawn and revised. Asserting their right to
participate in constituting the who of justice, they are simultaneously transforming the how by which I mean the accepted procedures
transformative movements are

for determining the who.29At their most reflective and ambitious,
demanding the creation of new democratic arenas for entertaining arguments

about the frame. In some cases, they are creating such arenas themselves. In the World Social Forum,
for example, some practitioners of transformative politics have fashioned a transnational public sphere where they can participate on a par
with others in airing and resolving disputes about the frame.30In this way, they are prefiguring the possibility o f new institutions of post-
Westphalian democratic justice.11 The democratizing dimension of transformative politics points to a third level of political injustice, above
and beyond the two already discussed. Previously, I distinguished first-order injustices of ordinary-political misrepresentation from second-
order injustices of misframing. Now, however, we can discern a third-order species of political injustice, which corresponds to the question o f
the how. Exemplified by undemocratic processes of frame-setting, this injustice consists in the failure to institutionalize parity of
participation at the meta-political level, in deliberations and decisions concerning the who. Because what is at stake here is the process by
Meta-political
which first-order political space is constituted, I shall call this injustice meta-political misrepresentation.
misrepresentation arises when states and transnational elites monopolize the

activity of frame-setting, denying voice to those who may be harmed in the process and blocking creation
of democratic fora where the latters claims can be vetted and redressed. The effect is to
exclude the overwhelming majority of people from participation in the meta-discourses that determine the authoritative division of political
space. Lacking any institutional arenas for such participation, and submitted to an undemocratic approach to the how, the majority is denied
struggles against
the chance to engage on terms of parity in decision-making about the who. In general, then,
misframing are revealing a new kind of democratic deficit. Just as globalization has
made visible injustices of misframing, so transformative struggles against neoliberal
globalization are making visible the injustice of meta-political

misrepresentation. Exposing the lack of institutions where disputes about the who can be democratically aired and resolved,
these struggles are focusing attention on the how. By demonstrating that the absence of such
institutions impedes efforts to overcome injustice, they are revealing the

deep internal connections between democracy and justice. The effect is to
bring to light a structural feature of the current conjuncture: struggles for
justice in a globalizing world cannot succeed unless they go hand in
hand with struggles for meta-political democracy. At this level too, then, no redistribution
or recognition without representation.
Security K 1NC
China has been constructed in Americas imagination as
either as an inferior and backwards nation needing the
paternalistic correction or threatening savages that seek
to uproot the US primacy
Turner 14
(Oliver Turner, Hallsworth Research Fellow at the University of Manchester,
PhD from the University of Manchester, April 2014, American Images of
China: Identity, Power, Policy, Chapter 3 p 20-25)
The world is a product of interpretation, and interpretations are
vulnerable to disagreement and conflict. 53 Accordingly, the evil and
threatening Fu Manchu represents a particular truth about China in
equal measure to the genial and Americanised Charlie Chan. This
precludes a strictly positivistic logic of explanation, the purpose of
which is to search for a singular, definitive understanding of what
China represents at any given moment. Instead, a logic of
interpretation, which concerns itself less with identifying causality
within international relations than it does with interrogating the
consequences of representational processes, is required. 54 This is
what enables the transference from why to how questions described
in the introduction, since the principal concern is not why the United
States has chosen to engage in certain practices towards China, but
how those practices have been made possible through the historical
production of subjective truth.Social constructivist and postcolonial IR
scholars are now among the most active in formulating the types of
(how) questions about representation and the interrelations of power
and knowledge around which this analysis is conducted. 55 A key
source of inspiration is Edward Saids Orientalism , in which it is argued
that, for centuries, the identity of the global East has been constructed
and reconstructed (as exotic, threatening, technologically inferior, etc.)
so as to enable its domination by the West. 56 As such, the Asian
region (like any other) is less an objective, natural reality than it is a
product of Western imaginations. 57 It exists for the West, or so it
appears in the mind of the Orientalist.The imaginative geography of
China has always been constructed within American imaginations, for
American imaginations, to enable particular courses of US China policy.
Yet while China has always been the product of American discourse
and representation, the argument here is not that ideas are the
primary or even singular drivers of international affairs. Crucially, the
intention is to emphasise the co-constitution of the ideational and
material worlds. As Alexander Wendt explains,the claim is not that
ideas are more important than power and interest, or that they are
autonomous from power and interest. Power and interest are just as
important and determining as before. The claim is rather that power
and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make
them up. 58 To suggest, then, that American understandings about
China simply shift and evolve as a result of external developments
most notably of Chinas behaviour, which, as illustrated in the review
of the literature above, has been a strong tendency of many authors
and thus that they can be attributed little or no consequence to the
dynamics of Sino-US relations and the formulation of US China policy,
is fundamentally misguided. Increases in Chinas military capabilities
today, for example, do matter (see Chapters 5 and 6). What is
important, however, is not simply the emergence of those capabilities,
but that China which so many people (rightly or wrongly) consider
potentially dangerous now possesses them. Like China, India has a
large standing army, nuclear weapons, an increasing defence budget
and so on, but it is rarely perceived as a threat to the United States.
The UKs 500 nuclear weapons are considered less threatening to
American interests than North Koreas (unsophisticated and unreliable)
five. 59 Unavoidably, then, identity also matters. Discourses and
imagery define, to varying extents, what China is and how it must be
approached, regardless of its intentions or observable behaviour.
American images of China are understood here to be the products of
discourse about that land and its people. Michel Foucault described
discourse as the general domain of all statements, representing
either a group of individual statements, or a regulated practice which
accounts for a number of statements. 60 American discourses of China
are thus envisioned as the articulation of ideas about that country in
the broadest possible sense. Ultimately, American images of China
constitute the discursive construction of truth or reality about it. Of
course, imagery in the form of art or photography, for example, is
overtly visual rather than discursive, yet, like that of the world around
us, its meaning will always be interpreted and articulated through
language. For the purposes of this analysis American images and
representations of China are considered synonymous. This is an
assumption reinforced by Szalay et al., who argue that images are
selective, often affect-laden representations of reality. 61Peter Hays
Gries explains that Americans look at China as though staring at the
inkblots of a Rorschach test, revealing more about themselves than
about China itself. 62 This central role of American identity in the
construction of China is reiterated by Jesperson: [American] images of
China have largely come from Americans assumptions about
themselves, he argues. 63 As outlined already in this chapter, the
relevant literatures as a whole do little to support this claim. However,
the identity of any actor is meaningless without the presence of
another because meaning itself is created in discourse. 64 This mutual
constitution of opposing identities, of self and other, is articulated by
David Campbell: identity whether personal or collective is not fixed
by nature . . . rather, identity is constituted in relation to difference.
But neither is difference fixed by nature . . . Difference is constituted in
relation to identity. 65While the extent to which discourses remain
stable over time varies, American images of China whether enduring
or not have been manufactured from perceptions of the identity of
the United States itself. 66 However, the four key constructions of
China examined with particular focus throughout this book Idealised,
Opportunity, Uncivilised and Threatening China are examples of
images which have endured because, to reaffirm, their production and
reproduction can be traced to among the most intrinsic components of
American identity. These types of images can be likened to Saids
notion of Latent Orientalism: an underlying and almost unconscious
collectivity of shared ideas and beliefs about the global East which has
preserved a unanimity, stability and durability of representation. 67
As will be shown, Idealised China became established from
understandings about a more scientifically enlightened and advanced
United States. Uncivilised China has always been produced in relation
to presumed superior standards of American civilisation. Opportunity
China exists primarily for particular American ideals of free
international trade and open markets. Threatening China has been
produced to confirm the need to secure the United States from
external threat. In a broad sense, the identity of the United States has
traditionally been defined in part by an imagined commitment to the
values of democracy, personal liberty and the free market. 68 This
constitutes what has been termed a democratic-capitalist ideology, or
ethos. 69 It is shown that images of China have frequently been
produced from these understandings, such as Uncivilised China, which
has been conceived as uncivilised because it lacks these commitments
and qualities. In addition, historically the United States has been
conceived as a pre-dominantly White/Caucasian society. 70 This
constitutes another powerful site from which China and the Chinese, as
non-White, have been produced. 71 Robert Blauner vividly describes
the power and longevity of the race issue within the United States,
likening it to a gritty old boxer who just wont stay down. 72 The
dominance of the White American population, he argues, has resulted
in the internal colonialism of non-Whites like the Chinese who, to
varying extents, inhabit imbalanced power relations which favour the
former. 73 This analysis shows that Chinese in America have been
historically beholden to political and economic arrangements over
which they have had little control. In Orientalism Said argued that
during the nineteenth century, all Europeans were racist or
ethnocentric. 74 The argument here is not that the Chinese have been
the consistent and uniform victims of American racism; it is that race is
a political, rather than a natural, category, and powerful discourses
have racially objectified the Chinese as a non-White other without
necessarily implying racist sentiment. Of course, classificatory labels
such as White and non-White are often unhelpful and even
meaningless. Indeed, Homi Bhabha challenges neat delineations
between cultures on the basis that they exist in a state of perennial
mixedness. 75 Yet identities are frequently and crudely contrasted
with others and, to reaffirm, American images of China (racial or
otherwise) need not be informed and/or sophisticated to circulate.
What is important is that they do circulate, with the capacity to
represent selected realities about China and its people. This analysis
also demonstrates the historical persistence of embedded
understandings even into the twenty- first century that China
represents a cultural inferior of the United States. Such perceptions
have not been unique, uniform or timeless, yet, as Michael Shapiro
observes, the process of making others foreign most commonly
ensures their status as less-than-equal subjects. 76 Ikechi Mgbeoji
argues that Western (particularly European) colonialism habitually
propagated the truth that the only route for the non-West to become
less inferior was to aspire to the standards of the West. 77 A
comparable dynamic is revealed throughout the chapters that follow,
through ingrained expectations that China must lessen its imagined
inferiority by conforming to American expectations.In this sense,
American images of China have often been produced within a
paternalistic structure, wherein the actions of the latter as the parental
authority are understood to represent the best interests of the former .
78 These enduring assumptions are explained in part with reference to
implicit American understandings of exceptionalism, and of the
United States as a redeemer nation with a responsibility to advance
its Enlightenment values abroad. 79 American governmental papers,
notes Bruce Kuklick, have always advanced a vision of the world rooted
in Protestantism and the Enlightenment. 80 In this analysis, American
exceptionalism is most emphatically demonstrated by the construction
of China through negation, a strategy used to deny the history of
foreign others and construct (or deconstruct) their geographies as a
blank spaces, or tabula rasas, waiting to be filled. 81
The china threat is one borne out of necessity as US

strategic planners need to justify their existence the
scenario depicted by the aff is not reality but a self
reflection of United States imperial past
Pan 12 Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin
University, Australia, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics Western
Representations of Chinas Rise 2012, Pg 48 - 51
The China threat paradigm is a discursive construct closely linked
with Western/American colonial desire and historical experience. It
reflects the inability or at least unwillingness of the Western/American
self to make sense of China beyond their own fear and realpolitik
trajectories. In doing so, its ethnocentric representation of China provides
the West with a measure of strategic familiarity and moral certainty,
thus reaffirming the self-imagination of the West. The imagination of
an external threat or Other has long been instrumental to the
formation and maintenance of self-identity .31 In the logic of what Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri call colonialist representations, the difference of the Other, first having been
pushed to the extreme, can be inverted in a second moment as the foundation of the Self. In
other words, the evil, barbarity, and licentiousness of the colonized Other are what make possible
the goodness, civility, and propriety of the European Self. They go on to say that Only through
opposition to the colonized does the metropolitan subject really become itself.32 The threatening
imagery of wilderness in the early periods of American nation-building served a similar purpose
in that it helped maintain Americas New World mythology. As James Robertson notes, there is
no New World without wilderness. If we are to be true Americans (and thus part of that New World
and its destiny), there must be wilderness. The symbol is an imperative for our real world.33
The construction of self-identity through the discourses of threat,
Otherness and wilderness perhaps culminated in the poetics and
politics of the Cold War, an important moment in the (re)production of
American identity.34 In this process, discourses of international relations
and foreign policy played a central role. They helped create and police
boundaries and Otherness so that a unified self could be identified and
protected. As Campbell notes, The constant articulation of danger
through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a states identity
or existence: it is its condition of possibility. While the objects of concern
change over time, the techniques and exclusions by which those objects are constituted as
dangers persist.35 In this sense, although the Cold War was a pivotal moment in the
Western/American construction of threat, such a discursive practice is not confined to the Cold
War.36 It is, as noted before, embedded in the modern quest for certainty, and the Cold War
mentality is only a historically specific manifestation of that ongoing modern colonial desire. Not
surprisingly then, the Cold Wars end did little to disrupt the discursive ritual of constructing
Otherness. If anything, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Evil Empire demanded
more threats, simply because their very absence would become a threat to the coherence and
unity of the West/the US. Without clearly identifiable enemies, there can be no overarching
ontology of security, no shared identity differentiating the national self from threatening others,
no consensus on whatif anything should be done. 37 For this reason, Mearsheimer quite
accurately predicted that we will soon miss the Cold War.38 Mearsheimers prediction certainly
rang true within a number of US government agencies and institutions, most notably the
Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose very identity and institutional certainty
had hinged on fighting the Cold War Communist Other .
If the Communist threat no
longer existed, the Pentagon would find it a lot harder to justify its
massive military spending, if not its very raison dtre. More importantly, if history had
indeed been won and there was little left to fight for, would the moral leadership of the US as a
force for good in the world still be in demand?39 In the words of Huntington: if
there is no
evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it
mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national
interests?40 Would the West, a highly artificial construct, be able to
survive?41 Worse still, might the rest of the world, now no longer in
need of the indispensable nation, break loose or even turn around
and resent the latters hegemony? In this context, it became imperative
for the West to continue invoking threat, which would also
help counter the internal danger of declining strength,
flagging will and confusion about our role in the world . 42 Hence
the persistent colonial desire for a threatening Other, which by now is not only a source of
paranoia, but also one of secret fascination. Clearly mindful of this Western paradoxical affection
Arbatov, Director of a Moscow think tank, told a US audience the
for enemy, Georgi
year before the collapse of the Berlin Wall: We
are going to do something terrible
to youwe are going to deprive you of an enemy.43 Arbatov was no
doubt correct to imply that for the US living without an identity-defining enemy would be terrible
indeed, but he only got half right. For the enemy qua enemy to the US is often not determined
by that enemy itself. Rather, as noted before, it is primarily a category in the colonial desire built
into the modern American selfimagination. Consequently, To prove that we are menaced is of
course unnecessary it is enough that we feel menaced.44 That is, it is not up to the enemy to
decide whether or not it can cease to be an enemy. While the USSR as a specific threat might
have gone, the emotional substitute of fear in the Western/American self-imagination lived on,
the post-Cold
always eager and able to find its next monster to destroy. As a consequence,
War period witnessed a proliferation of freshly minted threats , ranging
from Robert Kaplans famous Coming Anarchy thesis through Mearsheimers Back to the Future
scenario to Huntingtons clash of civilizations prediction. 45 Meanwhile the emergence of the
Iraq threat in the waning days of the Cold War temporarily allowed George Bush Snr. to regain a
for many anxious
whole plateful of clarity about good and evil, right and wrong.46 Yet,
strategic planners, to best demonstrate why the US should remain an
indispensable nation, the most indispensable enemy had to be
China. The beauty of this mega threat lies in its apparent ability to
satisfy the colonial desire of Western/American self on both strategic
and moral grounds. Strategically, Chinas vast size would be the most
obvious and convenient justification for the often expensive strategic
programmes pursued by Washington. This was true even in the midst of the Cold
War when Americas main obsession was with the Soviet Union. In 1967, President Lyndon B.
Johnson ordered his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to build an antiballistic-missile (ABM)
system. McNamara was personally opposed to such a system, believing that it could be easily
countered by a slight increase in the number of Soviet offensive missiles. But unable to challenge
the Presidents order, McNamara gave a speech, which, after stating all the reasons why an ABM
was a bad idea, concluded that the US still needed one to defend against an attack by China.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke walked into McNamaras office later that day and
asked, China bomb, Bob? McNamara simply replied: What else am I going to blame it on?47
The end of the Cold War has only further cemented Chinas role as the
indispensable threat. Representing a most suitable strategic target for
the tools at hand, China, as Bruce Cumings explains, has basically become a
metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its
bearings [since the end of the Cold War] and that requires a formidable
renegade state to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran
lacks necessary weight).48 Only in the aftermath of September 11
was China temporarily let off the hook, when terrorism in general, and the more
tangible Axis of Evil in particular, served an essentially similar function of reassuring American
As well as helping sustain the military-industrial
self-identity and certainty.49
complex, the China threat also has moral and political utility for the
vitality of Western self-image. Beijings continued existence as an authoritarian regime
contributes both to the self-congratulatory image of democratic peace in the West in general,
and to the need for American leadership and moral authority in particular. Insofar as China
reminds us that history is not close to an end,50 the US-led West can continue to be called upon
by the oppressed for moral leadership. Facing a China-led coalition of the worlds despotic
regimes, the enlargement of the Western self to form a league of democracies can be relatively
the moral challenge
easily justified, perhaps even with a measure of urgency.51 In short,
posed by China serves as a valuable discursive site where the
Western/American self can continue to be coherently imagined,
constructed and enacted
Securitization imposes itself as the nexus of state activity

causes worldwide wars in the name of security, leading to
extinction.
Agamben, 2002
(Giorgio, Prof of Aesthetics @ U of Verona, Security and Terror, Theory and Event 5:4, Muse)
Neither Turgot and Quesnay nor the Physiocratic officials were

primarily concerned with the prevention of famine or the regulation of
production, but rather wanted to allow for their development in order
to guide and "secure" their consequences. While disciplinary power isolates
and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening and
globalisation; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security
wants to intervene in ongoing processes to direct them . In a word,
discipline wants to produce order, while security wants to guide disorder. Since measures
of security can only function within a context of freedom of traffic, trade, and individual
initiative, Foucault can show that the development of security coincides with the
development of liberal ideology. Today we are facing extreme and most
dangerous developments of this paradigm of security. In the course of
a gradual neutralisation of politics and the progressive surrender of
traditional tasks of the state, security imposes itself as the basic
principle of state activity. What used to be one among several decisive
measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth
century, now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation.
Security reasoning entails an essential risk. A state which has security
as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can
always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic . We should not
forget that the first major organisation of terror after the war, the Organisation de l'Arme
Secrte (OAS) was established by a French General who thought of himself as patriotic
and who was convinced that terrorism was the only answer to the guerilla phenomenon in
Algeria and Indochina. When politics, the way it was understood by theorists of the
"Polizeiwissenschaft" in the eighteenth century, reduces itself to police, the difference
between state and terrorism threatens to disappear. In the end it may lead to security and
terrorism forming a single deadly system in which they mutually justify and legitimate
each others' actions. The risk is not merely the development of a clandestine
complicity of opponents but that the hunt for security leads to a worldwide
civil war which destroys all civil coexistence . In the new situation -- created by
the end of the classical form of war between sovereign states -- security finds its end
in globalisation: it implies the idea of a new planetary order which is, in
fact, the worst of all disorders. But there is yet another danger. Because
they require constant reference to a state of exception, measures of
security work towards a growing depoliticization of society. In the long run, they are
irreconcilable with democracy. Nothing is therefore more important
than a revision of the concept of security as the basic principle of state
politics. European and American politicians finally have to consider the
catastrophic consequences of uncritical use of this figure of thought. It
is not that democracies should cease to defend themselves, but the
defense of democracy demands today a change of political paradigms
and not a world civil war which is just the institutionalization of terror .
Maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder
and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control . Today, there are
plans for all kinds of emergencies (ecological, medical, military), but
there is no politics to prevent them . On the contrary, we can say that politics
secretly works towards the production of emergencies. It is the task of
democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which
lead to hatred, terror, and destruction -- and not to reduce itself to
attempts to control them once they occur.
The alternative is a critical application of security theory.

We interrogate the interpretative power of policy elites to
control threat perception of the world by opening up
security discussions to dissenting voices and analyzing
securitization outside the narrow realm of the nation-
state
Charrett 09
(Catherine, masters in IR at the London School of Economics, A Critical
Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of
Writing Security, December 2009,
International Catalan Institute for Peace,
[http://icip.gencat.cat/web/.content/continguts/publicacions/workingpapers/arxius/wp7_ang.pdf],
DOA 7/14/16, DDI HRM)
The capacity to create truth regarding threats and the ability depict what
are deemed the necessary means to manage such threats awards the
securitizing actor, the state elite, an advantaged and position over the
securitization of an object. Krebs and Lobasz offer a thorough examination of the
securitization of terrorism, post-9/11 in the United States, which they affirm demonstrates the
by virtue of his
capacity of state elites to fix meanings and dominate policy. They argue that
institutional position as president, Bush[s] enjoyed an advantaged place in
the rhetorical competition over the meaning of 9/11. His bureaucratic
power allowed for the rhetorical coercion of the dissenting voices of
the Democrats, thus allowing for the particular securitization of terrorism
that later paved the way for the invasion of Iraq (Krebs and Lobasz 2007). The
critical application of securitization discussed here, therefore, is one in which
the power over the production of meaning is dismantled and assessed .
The security analyst does not merely observe existing security actors,
rather they critically evaluate the advantaged position of the actor and
critically engage with the securitization processes that may result from
this monopoly over the definition and construction of threats and security
discourses. Without this critical application of securitization the security
analyst is at risk of reproducing negative forms of securitization. Endowed with
this critical approach to securitization, the analyst can question security
policy based on it being a production of institutional power and can then
proceed with searching for and evaluating alternative approaches to
securitization. Apart from deconstructing the power relations inherent in
the securitizing speech act, it is argued that the security analyst must actively
seek out those who may be uttering alternative modes of securitization or those who
may be attempting to counter-securitize existing moves or measures. This
critical approach assists the securitization analyzer in overcoming the
normative dilemma of writing security by opening up the rhetorical
control over security. This not only helps to prevent negative securitization processes but
it also assists in fostering more productive and positive securitization acts. Foucault vitally
reminds us that in power relations there is necessarily the possibility of
resistance because if there were no possibilities of resistance [] there
would be no power relations at all (Campbell 1998: 511). Many who have engaged with
the CS theory of securitization have said that more attention needs to be paid to the
dissenting voices within securitizing process, as well as to acts that counter securitization
attempts occurring in everyday politics and social interactions. (Aradau 2004; Abrahamsen 2005;
Risley 2006; Bigo 2002). In his discussion of the securitization of immigration, Bigo points out
such spaces for resistance, whereby the securitization of migration finds itself at a point of
tension between globalization and territorialized devices of control. This space makes way for
local as well as transnational resistant movements in response to transnational security
technologies; he identifies the struggle against deportation in international zones of airports as
The role of the critical security analyzer
such a point of tension (Bigo 2002: 82).
would thus be to actively seek out such points of resistance and
examine how they may be used to counter the securitizing moves of state
elites. In order to assuage the normative dilemma of writing security the
critical security analyzer would thus disclose the power relations within the
securitizing process and recognize resistant movements, thus endowing the
marginalized with a voice that may go unnoticed with an uncritical
application of ST. This critical approach would therefore, help prevent negative
securitization processes by allowing the security analyst to counter traditional exclusionary and
power saturated securitization moves with those providing alternative or dissenting approaches .
For example, Bellamy et al. stress the importance of addressing moderate
Muslim leaderships proposed modes to countering violent extremism .
It is asserted here that by sincerely considering alternative manners to
tackling violent religious extremism, as well as by addressing the arguments of
those who have strongly disagreed with the GWoT as a specific mode of
securitizing terrorism, a less negative form of securitization than the
one currently being carried out can be developed . Bellamy et al. argue that
the GWoT as a specific mode of securitization served to explicitly exclude
dissenting approaches (Bellamy et al 2008: 23). Now that now that the
rhetorical control of the securitizing actor, in this case the elite security class of
the US, has been deconstructed, a critical securitization analyst can
engage with alterative utterances of security in order to construct a more
holistic and inclusionary approach to securitizing violent, religious extremism. Critics of
the CS conceptualization of securitization have noted that its focus on successful securitization
instances, usually voiced by state elites, causes the CS to miss out on failed or partially successful
speech acts (Risley 2006) as well as situations in which an actor finds him or herself incapable of
critical application of securitization allows the
voicing security needs (Hansen 1999). A
analyst to observe instances where securitization may be located at a
different level, such as at the individual, community, or global level. The
security analyst seeks out instances that may be voiced by environmental groups requesting
greater awareness regarding ecological issues or minorities concerned with racial profiling at
border controls, for example. The security analyst will also look for instances where security
measures may be required but are not voiced. Hansen discusses such situations in her
investigation into the social position of women in Pakistan, who, she argues, are generally
incapable of voicing the threat that honor killings pose to their individual security due to the fear
of exacerbating the situation. Hansen states that in such instances the securitization move is
witnessed through body, but the silenced utterances of security should not go unnoticed
(Hansen 1999). The critical securitization analyst is able to locate
oppressed or imagined referents and discuss how they might be
securitized. This critical approach to securitization opens up space for
greater discussion on securitizing processes by shifting the focus to securitization
moves found at sub- and supra-state levels and security needs being demonstrated in typically
marginalized areas. This broadened perspective assists the security analyst in overcoming the
normative dilemma of analyzing securitization processes by introducing approaches to security
expressed by alternative actors, which may have more constructive or positive outcomes.
CPs
Private Companies CP
Text: The United States federal government should fully
implement the elements of the Obama administrations
2010 National Space Policy that encourage, foster and
leverage the commercial space revolution.
Contention One is Competition CP avoids India and

Politics DAs
Contention Two is Solvency:

The counterplan revitalizes U.S. space leadership and is
key to overall space development
Weeden, Vice-Chair of the World Economic Forums Global Agenda Council
on Space Security, 2015
(Brian, Op-ed | American Leadership in Space 2.0, Space News, October 5,

http://spacenews.com/op-ed-american-leadership-in-space-2-0/, DDI TM)
A lot of rhetoric has been thrown around over the last several years about
how the United States is falling behind in space and ceding its leadership
role. This rather pessimistic assessment is largely based on the status of U.S.
government space programs. NASAs current human space exploration program is perceived as
a shadow of its glory days of the 1960s, and U.S. national security space capabilities no longer have the
same relative advantage over near-peers as in the late 1990s and early 2000s after the fall of the Soviet
Union. However, taking a broader perspective of space activities leads to a much
different conclusion: The United States is doing more in space than ever
before, and in ways that no other country can match. The main driver for this
new leadership is the commercial space sector , not the U.S. government. Instead of
attempting to recapture Space 1.0 leadership by focusing purely on
stronger U.S. government space programs, another possible strategy is to
develop a Space 2.0 approach and focus on encouraging, shaping and
leveraging the commercial space sector to help propel it into the future. This
new leadership approach is possible because we are currently in the
beginnings of a revolution in commercial space activities . The revolution is based on
a potent combination of Moores Law, spin-in technologies from the information technology (IT)
sector, and cloud computing that has enabled small-satellite technology to
change the price/performance ratio, fueled by a significant infusion of private
venture capital. These drivers have spurred the creation of dozens of new
American space companies and a rekindling of competitive spirit in many
legacy companies. The end result has been an infusion of fresh ideas, new approaches, increased
innovation and new excitement in the space world. Although its uncertain which
commercial space companies will emerge from the competition and actually
make it to space, we know for certain that humanity as a whole will benefit.
The commercial revolution in space is radically reducing the costs of
accessing data and services from satellites while simultaneously increasing the amount,
improved analytics are being
frequency and quality of information gathered. At the same time,
developed to turn the raw data into useful information and increasing
accessibility to a wider number of users . That in turn leads to more eyeballs examining
and investigating data, which leads to more new insights and applications that no one else thought of.
The end result is going to be vastly more knowledge about the world we live in and
socioeconomic benefits we cannot even dream of today. Unfortunately, almost all of the
focus by U.S. policymakers is on more government space programs as the answer
to dealing with an increasingly globally competitive space domain. Two of the biggest debates at
the moment involve NASA and national security space. Congress continues to
lament NASAs inability to recapture its former glory, while simultaneously bickering
with itself and the White House over which parochial interests should be included in NASAs $18 billion
The U.S. national security space community is grappling with the
annual budget.
revelation that many of its space capabilities are extremely vulnerable amid an
evolving threat environment. As a result, Congress has reprogrammed $8 billion of the roughly $110 billion
it plans to spend on military and intelligence space activities over the next five years towards increasing
The potential for the commercial space sector to be
space protection and space control.
a significant part of the answer to these challenges seems to be undervalued,
and in some cases may actually be seen as unwanted competition. The main driver, to
put it bluntly, is fear. Fear that the United States wont be able to control the technology. Fear that the
national security community will no longer be able to keep its activities in space as secret as they once
were. Fear that jobs will be reduced or relocated from traditional geographic centers. Fear that some
government organizations and agencies may no longer need to do the same missions, maintain the same
the U.S. government has established policies that
budgets, or even exist. As a result,
severely restrict, and in some cases even prohibit, certain types of commercial space
activities. It should be obvious that stopping, or even controlling, the commercial
space revolution is not a useful public policy option. Most of the technology
driving the revolution comes from smartphones, cloud computing and the broader IT sector. That
technologyis already globalized, and Cold War technology transfer restrictions are
increasingly ineffective in controlling space technology. Putting in place
stricter policy restrictions or prohibitions on what commercial companies can
do in space will only create greater incentives for the companies to relocate
to other countries that might have more attractive policies. The end result would be the
same global access to the capabilities, even less U.S. government ability to
control them, and the loss of the economic benefits from a robust domestic
industry.
Case extensions
Extension CT/MS Space
Weaponization Advantage
Frontline
Extension cooperation increase decreases US
position/increase risk of war
China space cooperation will give away our advantages
over defense and technology
Christopher Stone, 2-25-2013, Christopher Stone (B.A., M.A.) is a senior
space professional, Executive Agent for Space Staff, Pentagon, through Falcon
Research, Inc role of corporate Vice President of Falcon Research in 2010.
"The Space Review: US cooperation with China in space: Some thoughts to
consider for space advocates and policy makers," The Space Review,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2246/1 dao:7/20/16//DDI
Space is the ultimate high ground that has provided the U.S. with countless
security and economic advantages over the last 40 years. As the victor of the
Cold War space race with the Soviet Union, t he U.S. has held an enormous
advantage in space technology, defense capabilities, and advanced sciences
generating entirely new sectors of our economy and creating thousands of
private sector jobs. China has developed its own space program at a
surprising pace, having gone from launching their first manned spacecraft to
launching components for an advanced space station in just 10 years. But the
Chinese space program is being led by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA),
and to state the obvious, the PLA is not our friend as evidenced by their
recent military posture and aggressive espionage against U.S. agencies and
firms. 4 In addition to his concern about military aggressiveness and
advancing space efforts, he also has concerns about Chinese human rights
abuses as well. In response to the engagement efforts of the Administration
with Chinese space leaders (such as Office of Science and Technology Policys
Director Dr. John Holdren going to China several times, and NASA
Administrator Boldens trip to China), the Congressman decided to act:
Coop with China is incredibly dangerous and must be

avoided at all costs
Moskowitz 11, Clara Moskowitz, Space, Clara has a bachelor's degree in
astronomy and physics from Wesleyan University, and a graduate certificate
in science writing from the University of California, Santa Cruz. 9-27-2011,
"US & China: Space Race or Cosmic Cooperation?" Space,
http://www.space.com/13100-china-space-program-nasa-space-
race.html/dao:7/20/16//DDIMN
However, others warn there are significant dangers in extending an orbital
olive branch, especially if that includes sharing U.S. technology and
knowledge. "I think that is a path that runs a great deal of risk unless it's very
carefully managed," said Dean Cheng, a research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation, a conservative public policy think tank. "We don't know enough
about the Chinese space policy system and the very heavy military element
that permeates the Chinese space program. When we deal with China on
space, we are dealing with their military. That's not necessarily a bad thing,
but requires us to go in with our eyes open." Certain U.S. lawmakers have
objected strongly to space cooperation with China. "Most countries expanding
their space programs are strong U.S. allies that are primarily interested in
advancing science research or building a commercial space industry. The
Chinese, however, do not fall into this category," Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.) said
during a U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing in
May. Wolf argued that China's space activities are too tied to its military,
whose actions are often at odds with U.S. interests, and added that China's
human rights abuses shouldn't be rewarded with cooperation. "That is why I
included language in the Fiscal Year 2011 Continuing Resolution preventing
NASA and the Office of Science and Technology Policy from using federal
funds to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral
policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or
coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned
company,'" Wolf said.
The US abstains from space militarization on purpose to

keep its advantage
Jesse Coburn, 10-5-2015, is a journalist based in Brooklyn and Berlin. He
has written for The New York Times "Is space warfare inevitable?," Quartz,
http://qz.com/516141/is-space-warfare-inevitable//DDI
While many view US concerns about treaty proposals as legitimate, they have
also been subject to scrutiny. Disingenuous, is how Paul Meyer, a professor
of international studies at Simon Fraser University in Canada, describes the
US complaint that the treaty proposal doesnt consider ground-based satellite
weapons. It would be highly unlikely that the US would agree to the kind of
intrusive verification that would go along with an arms control regime that
also covered ballistic missile interceptors, Meyer tells Quartz, referring to
ground-based weapons that can also reach targets in space. Meyer also
challenges the US contention that the treaty proposal doesnt offer a clear
definition of a space weapon. Thats exactly the sort of thing that a
negotiation can generate, he says. (Meyer previously served as a Canadian
diplomat at the Conference on Disarmament.) Meyer suggests that US
resistance to more forceful space arms agreements might reflect a shift in
authority over space policy within the US government. Its [the Department
of Defense] and, to some degree, the intelligence community that really calls
the shots when it comes to what kind of space-security policy the US should
put forward, he says. The State Departments become basically a kind of
message boy for this policy rather than an equal determiner of it. Others
think that US resistance to diplomacy on the issue stems from the countrys
ambition to preserve its decisive military advantage in outer space. Whoever
controls space wins the wars, because all wars today on the earth are
coordinated and directed by space technology, Bruce Gagnon, secretary of
the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, tells
Quartz. The US didnt want to allow anyone else to have that ability.
Extensions coop cant solve space war
Cant solve motivations for ASAT use by China - Domestic
considerations drive Chinese actions plan cant change
that
Ash 2015
(Timothy Garton Ash If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably
be war 16 October 2015
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-
war-america accessed DDI ND)
the Chinese
All this is bubbling up while Xi is firmly in control at home, with no immediate domestic crisis. But
Communist party does face a long-term legitimation crisis. For decades, it has
derived political legitimacy from impressive economic growth, which is now
slowing down. I believe Xi is making a massive Leninist gamble that reasserted single-party rule can manage the
development of a complex, maturing economy and satisfy the growing expectations of an increasingly educated, urban
and informed society. The Chinese leaderships crude attempt to command the Chinese stock markets to rally earlier this
They can almost
year, reminiscent of King Canutes confrontation with the incoming tide, is not encouraging.
certainly keep the lid on for several years but, as always happens when
necessary reform is postponed, the eventual crisis will be larger. At that point,
the temptation for the Communist party leadership to play the nationalist card, perhaps with an actual military move,
Galtieri-style, against one of Chinas Malvinas/Falkland Islands, would be very strong. Probably this would not be a direct
With angry,
confrontation with a formal US ally, but the risks of miscalculation and escalation would be high.
nationalist public opinion in both countries, neither the Chinese nor the
American leader could be seen to lose, and both sides have nuclear weapons.
This is not idle scaremongering; its something the US military, intelligence
and thinktank communities think about all the time, in order to avoid it.
Precisely because Chinas future course will mainly depend on forces within
the country, beyond Washingtons control, the United States needs a wise,
consistent, strategic deployment of all the instruments at its disposal. This should
be something like the twin track strategy adopted by the west during the last two decades of the cold war (although
there should be no room for doubt
obviously not expecting it to end the same way). On the one hand,
in Chinese minds about what the US will accept militarily . US policy should be the
opposite of what Barack Obama did over Syria (declare a red line and then allow Bashar al-Assad to walk across it with
In Chinas case, the US should declare no public red lines but in private
impunity).
communication, and through deeds that speak louder than words, make it
clear that they exist. At the same time Washington should redouble its
attempts at constructive engagement. There should be intensive efforts to find shared ground on
climate change, the world economy and geopolitical issues from North Korea to Syria. The intensive business ties that
already exist should buttress the relationship. There is already an extraordinary people-to-people relationship, embracing
many millions of better-off Chinese who have studied, worked and lived in the west. This strategy should be
coordinated with key US allies who have their own major relationships with China, such as Australia,
Germany and Britain, which will welcome Xi on a state visit next week.
US wants space milalt causes other than China threat

RCW 14 (Reaching Critical Will, thinktank for Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Outer Space,
reachingcriticalwill.org, October 2014,
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-
outer-space DDI TM)
the US policy on outer
While as far as anyone knows there are currently no weapons deployed in space,
space is concerning. Under the Bush administration, the 2006 US National
Space Policy explained that the US will preserve its rights, capabilities, and
freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing
capabilities intending to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference;
and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US
national interests. At that point, the United States rejected treaties limiting its
actions in outer space and its space policy firmly opposed the development of new legal regimes or other
restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space , and insisted
that proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct
research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for
US national interests. In July 2010, the Obama administration released the
new US National Space Policy. It states that the US shall pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency
and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible action in, and the peaceful uses of, space. The new policy
also notes that the US will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively
verifiable, and enhance the national security of the US and its allies. The language in this new policy suggests that this is
a significant departure from its predecessor. However, the actual implications of this change are
still unknown. While claiming that it is open to considering space-related
arms control concepts and proposals, the US argues that such proposals must meet the
rigorous criteria of equitability, effective verifiability, and enhance the national security interests
of the US and its allies. The Russian-Chinese joint draft treaty on the Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) would not meet these criteria according to
the US, as it is fundamentally flawed and would not provide any grounds for commencing negotiations. The
United States Department of Defense continues to invest in programs that could provide anti-
satellite and space-based weapons capabilities. While the technology itself is highly
controversial, it presents major business opportunities to companies that know how to
overcome moral, logistical, and financial roadblocks. War has always been highly profitable, and dominance of
outer space leads to further profits in conventional warfare . As the Air Force
Space Command stated in its 2003 Strategic Master P lan, the ability to gain space
superiority (the ability to exploit space while selectively disallowing it to
adversaries) is critically important and maintaining space superiority is an essential
prerequisite in modern warfare . Superiority in conventional warfare relies on
military assets in space, especially satellites, which are used for intelligence, remote sensing,
navigation, and monitoring, among other things. Since the US currently asserts its political will through force,
protection of its own space assets and disturbance of others is key to
guaranteeing US dominance.
International agreements solve and US resistant to

agreements proves the plan cant solve
Bodner 15
(Matthew, journalist for The Moscow Times, UN approves Russia-led
proposal to limit militarization of space, The Moscow Times, 12/8/2015,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/un-approves-russia-led-
proposal-to-limit-militarization-of-space/552230.html (DDI AGH)
United Nations General Assembly has approved a Russian-led resolution calling for
The
nations to refrain from being the first to deploy weapons into outer space, in
spite of U.S. resistance and European silence on the proposed measure, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement. The
resolution was first drafted by Russia in 2014, but was rejected by the U nited
States and other nations last year, and then again this year , when the draft resolution was considered by a GA
committee focusing on issues of arms control. On Tuesday, 129 nations represented in the General Assembly voted to
adopt the measure, which was co-sponsored by 40 nations including China

and Syria and is known as the no first placement initiative. It is noteworthy that the only
government objecting to the substance of our initiative is the U nited States, which for
many years has stood in almost complete isolation trying to block successive efforts of the international community to prevent an arms race in
The initiative calls on nations to refrain from being the

outer space, the Foreign Ministry said.
first to place military weapons in outer space, thereby preventing a new and potentially
devastating arms race between the world's leading space-faring nations Russia, China and the U nited
States, who are all working on space weapons. Europe, which has an effective multi-national space
program of its own, has consistently abstained from ruling on the Russian proposal.
Extension SQuo shoulda solved
Cooperation already exists even with bans in place should
solve
Leonard David, Space, 8-21-2015, "US-China Space Freeze May Thaw with
Historic New Experiment," Space, http://www.space.com/30337-chinese-
experiment-international-space-station.html
Statements by U.S. politicians show that there may be an interesting "chess
playing" factor in America's dealings with China. Secretary of State John Kerry
shakes hands with Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang at the conclusion of the
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue/Consultation on People-to-People
Exchange at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, DC., on June 24,
2015. Some U.S. lawmakers have said they don't want the Russians to have a
clear, open field with the Chinese. Better to have the U.S. engaged in working
space deals with China, they say but how best to evolve and work with
China within the Wolf amendment? As for future U.S.-China space relations,
the first "U.S.-China Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue" is slated to take place
in China before the end of October. Last June, the United States and China
decided to establish regular bilateral, government-to-government
consultations on civil space cooperation. That agreement came out of the
seventh round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, held June
22-24 in Washington, D.C, with Secretary of State John Kerry taking active
part in the discussions. The two sides held in-depth talks on major bilateral,
regional and global issues. More than 70 important outcomes resulted from
the dialogue, including a number of space items. Aside from putting in place
a "Civil Space Cooperation Dialogue," the two sides also decided to have
exchanges on other space matters, including satellite-collision avoidance,
weather monitoring and climate research. The agreement signed by Kerry
reflects State Department activities with China, which are not prohibited by
law.
Extensions Squo solves debris
SQuo should solve through debris tracking
Kurt 15 (Joseph, Juris Doctor Candidate, William & Mary School of Law, 2016; B.A. Marquette
University, 2000. [NOTE: TRIUMPH OF THE SPACE COMMONS: ADDRESSING THE IMPENDING SPACE
DEBRIS CRISIS WITHOUT AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1641&context=wmelpr 40 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 305 Lexis]) //ddi gc
Fortunately, the targets for ADR that scientists believe will allow
us to forestall an irreversible cascade of collisions are relatively modest.121
The most common estimate is that removing five to ten large pieces of
debris per year is enough to keep the Kessler Syndrome at bay.122 And
even more encouraging is that a broad array of national and private actors
are exploring a plethora of ADR methods.123 For example, the Japanese
hope to deploy, by 2019, a magnetic net that will draw pieces of space
debris down to the Earths atmosphere, where they will burn up.124 Such
use of the atmosphere to incinerate debris is a common element of many
ADR strategies, whether they employ nets, harpoons, tentacles, or ion
thrusters to impact the debris.125 Meanwhile, a German Space Agency program
is developing the means to robotically capture satellites.126 Other
solutions include using enormous puffs of air, static electricity, or lasers
to throw objects out of orbit
AT legal obstacles to privates
US commercial launch act allows for a private US space
resource economy
By an overwhelming margin, Congress passed the US Commercial Space
Launch Competitiveness Act, whose intent is to stimulate commercial space
development including mining the Moon and asteroids. This is a major step
forward and demonstrates the commitment of the Obama Administration and
of Congress to commercial development of space. With the law now in place,
the space industry is expected to see the following: Simplification and
Improvement in licensing procedures for space launch by private parties;
Government support for commercial space development through the
renamed Office of Space Commerce, a unit of the US Department of
Commerce; Clarification of issues relating to transport of astronauts via
commercial crew vehicles; Extension of the life of ISS to 2024 and affirmation
of policies regarding governance of the ISS National Laboratory; and
Clarification of rights to explore and collect space resources. While the law
entitles the US citizen to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid
resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, it
does not confer exclusive rights to do so and, in fact, acknowledges that the
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits this: SEC. 403.
DISCLAIMER OF EXTRATERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY It is the sense of Congress
that by the enactment of this Act, the United States does not thereby assert
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the
ownership of, any celestial body
Offcase extensions
Privates Counterplan Extensions
Solves for space development better than the plan
Urry, , 2012 (Meg, Professor of Physics & Astronomy, Director of Yales
Center Astronomy & Astrophysics, Private space travel: A new era begins?,
CNN, May 22, http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/opinion/urry-private-space-
launch/, accessed 7/21/16 DDI SP)
Some NASA supporters are mourning what they see as the decline of U.S.
leadership in space. But they should really be celebrating the dawn of a new
era. After all, we've been stuck in low Earth orbit for several decades now, at
considerable cost. Visionary plans for genuine space exploration have
gathered dust at NASA, the National Research Council and other space-savvy
places. They advocate relearning how to land on the moon or figuring out
how to travel to Mars, an asteroid or the special orbital location where the
James Webb Space Telescope will eventually operate. But after more than two
decades of talking that talk, the U.S. has yet to walk that walk. Turning over
routine space trucking to private industry has important benefits. It frees
NASA to innovate and to develop a new heavy-lift capability commensurate
with real space exploration. At the same time, it empowers private industry to
play a significant role in the nation's space future. Liftoff of the Falcon 9
rocket, its Dragon capsule filled with food, supplies and science experiments,
had been scheduled for 4:55 a.m. ET from the SpaceX launch site at Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. When it launches, three days later,
astronauts will use a robotic arm to attach the Dragon capsule to the station.
Cargo will be unloaded, return cargo loaded in, and the capsule will return to
splash down in the Pacific. Light Years: SpaceX Dragon to launch Saturday It
will be the third launch of the Falcon 9 rocket; the second launch of the
Dragon capsule, the first with components needed for space station docking;
and one of 12 planned SpaceX flights to the International Space Station.
SpaceX admits the riskiness of its endeavor. The current flight has already
been delayed several times because of problems with the flight software.
Space-flight veterans in the company are well aware of the trial-and-error
nature of technology development, but they also know risk is an essential
part of innovation. NASA's Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
program is funding a handful of private companies -- including SpaceX (Space
Exploration Technologies Corporation); Orbital Sciences Corporation, which
built the Pegasus rocket launch system 20 years ago; Blue Origin; Boeing;
and Sierra Nevada -- to carry cargo to the International Space Station. ATK
(Alliant Techsystems Inc.) plans to use its Liberty rocket to launch humans
into orbit by 2015. CNN Explains: Commercial space flight Many of these
private companies have goals far beyond servicing the space station. Taking
over space trucking from NASA allows them to pay the bills as they develop
increasingly capable space vehicle systems. Then, providing they can reduce
space launch costs by a large factor, they may be able to exploit new
business opportunities, including passenger traffic to outer space. Still, they
are not motivated by purely commercial concerns. The financial backers of
these companies -- Elon Musk of SpaceX or Blue Origin's (and Amazon's) Jeff
Bezos -- have invested hundreds of millions of dollars of their own fortunes.
They doubtless would like their space adventures to turn a profit, but at heart
they are modern-day pioneers who want to do something profoundly
important for the future of humankind. Take the example of Planetary
Resources, a company that recently announced plans to investigate and
eventually mine rare metals from asteroids. The news stories emphasized
PR's business plan, but their goals are far broader. They will first build small
space telescopes to observe asteroids, so they can understand these building
blocks from which Earth formed. Asteroids larger than about 100 meters (328
feet) in diameter are a potential hazard for the Earth, and understanding their
composition will allow better prediction of their impact on the planet. Should
we ever need to deflect an asteroid, we'll need to travel to it. So, while
Planetary Resources might have a plan to make money down the road, they
will first contribute critical knowledge to humankind, perhaps helping save
the planet from destruction. Furthermore, with an asteroid visit and perhaps
even a sample return, Planetary Resources will discover whether materials
essential for human sustenance (hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, water) can be
recovered from these deep space objects. If so, they could set up
interplanetary supply depots to enable human colonization of space. So there
is a lot more to space commerce than mining asteroids for rare metals.
Solves info
Privates solve for space information better than the
government
Loomis, 2015 (Ilima, staff writer for Nature, Private firms
spy a market in spotting space junk, Nature, September
23, http://www.nature.com/news/private-firms-spy-a-
market-in-spotting-space-junk-1.18425, accessed 7/21/16
DDI SP)
Improvements in information technology have also helped to fuel demand for
commercial data on satellites and space junk, says Brian Weeden, technical
adviser for the Secure World Foundation, a non-profit group based in
Broomfield, Colorado, that works on issues of space sustainability. Private
companies have proved adept at developing software for managing big data,
even as the US Air Force has struggled to update the decades-old computer
systems at its Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California. Whereas the military tracks space debris with powerful,
multimillion-dollar radars and telescopes, ComSpOC relies on observations
from a larger network of off the shelf sensors around the globe. These
include eight optical sites, three radiofrequency tracking sites and two radar
installations. The centre purchases many of its data from outside contractors
that run the observation sites. A year and half after its launch, Welsh says
that ComSpOC is tracking 6,000 to 7,000 objects, including active and
inactive satellites and debris. That is many fewer than the approximately
23,000 objects being tracked by the US military, Welsh acknowledges. But
ComSpOC's quarry includes nearly all significant objects in geosynchronous
orbit, around 42,000 kilometres above Earth. AGI plans to bring two more
radar facilities online next year, which should allow the company to track
more objects in low Earth orbit, up to 2,000 kilometres above the planets
surface; this is where the largest population of satellites and debris is found,
says Welsh.
Solves better for debris
Private companies can solve space situational awareness
and space junktheyre already comparatively better at
monitoring debris
Loomis, staff writer for Nature, 2015
(Ilima, Private firms spy a market in spotting space junk, Nature, September
23, http://www.nature.com/news/private-firms-spy-a-market-in-spotting-
space-junk-1.18425 DDI -TM)
The US military has long taken the role of traffic cop in space: monitoring satellites, tracking debris and, in
recent years, warning satellite operators and foreign governments of potential collisions and hazards. But
A wave of private firms is seeking to build a commercial
now it has company.
market for space situational awareness (SSA) high-precision tracking of
artificial objects orbiting Earth. Defence contractor Analytical Graphics (AGI) of Exton,
Pennsylvania, opened its Commercial Space Operations Center (ComSpOC) in March last year to track
Lockheed Martin of
active satellites and space junk. Just a few months later, aerospace giant
Bethesda, Maryland, announced its own effort to develop a space-debris tracking
site in Western Australia. The emerging commercial demand for such services was
a hot topic last week at the Advanced Maui Optical and Space Surveillance
Technologies Conference in Wailea, Hawaii, which drew scientists and
representatives of private firms, government agencies and the military.
Everybodys getting into the SSA game, says Paul Welsh, vice-president of business
development at AGI. He attributes the growing interest to the expansion of military space
activity, the rapid growth of the commercial satellite industry and the
increasingly pressing problem of space debris . All three of those things are a
confluence of opportunity, Welsh says. Spot the Satellite Improvements in
information technology have also helped to fuel demand for commercial data
on satellites and space junk, says Brian Weeden, technical adviser for the Secure World
Foundation, a non-profit group based in Broomfield, Colorado, that works on issues of space sustainability.
Private companies have proved adept at developing software for managing
big data, even as the US Air Force has struggled to update the decades-old
computer systems at its Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.
Whereas the military tracks space debris with powerful, multimillion-dollar radars and telescopes,
ComSpOC relies on observations from a larger network of off the shelf sensors around the globe. These
include eight optical sites, three radiofrequency tracking sites and two radar installations. The centre
purchases many of its data from outside contractors that run the observation sites. A year and half after its
launch, Welsh says that ComSpOC is tracking 6,000 to 7,000 objects, including active and inactive
satellites and debris. That is many fewer than the approximately 23,000 objects being tracked by the US
military, Welsh acknowledges. But ComSpOC's quarry includes nearly all significant objects in
geosynchronous orbit, around 42,000 kilometres above Earth. AGI plans to bring two more radar facilities
online next year, which should allow the company to track more objects in low Earth orbit, up to 2,000
kilometres above the planets surface; this is where the largest population of satellites and debris is found,
says Welsh. Orbital observation US military and civilian agencies such as NASA, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are considered the biggest market for
orbital data; although the Air Force maintains its own sensor network, it is struggling to keep up with an
SSA firms also hope to attract
increasingly crowded and complex space environment. But
customers among private satellite operators. If there were no government buyers at all,
it would still be a very viable, meaningful business, says Clinton Clark, vice-president of sales at
ExoAnalytic Solutions in Houston, Texas, a technology company that sells satellite-observation data to
ComSpOC, among other customers. Satellite operators are accustomed to getting such
data free from the US government, but Clark sees a growing dissatisfaction
with the volume and quality of that information . Theres too many false alarms of
potential collisions, he says. Still, the commercial market for SSA data is in its infancy. Its a new thing,
says Weeden. Its something thats fairly dynamic. Just in the last six months to a year, theres been a ton
of change, and its hard to tell what the future is going to look like.
The Private Sector is key to protecting our orbits,

sustaining our operations, and supporting innovation.
Simpson and Lpez, 2015 (Michael and Laura Delgado,
Simpson is the Executive Director of the Secure World
Foundation, Lpez is Project Manager at the Secure World
Foundation, Congested, contested, and invested: of
space debris, risky launches and private initiative, Room
space journal, March,
https://room.eu.com/article/Congested_contested_and_inv
ested_of_space_debris_risky_launches_and_private_initiati
ve, accessed 7/21/16 DDI SP)
Things are not business as usual in space. Broadening access to space
technology and capabilities is a key driver in a landscape that looks
dramatically different from the early days of the Space Age. This increased
availability is leading to more innovation, lowering of costs, and greater
access to beneficial capabilities and services available from satellites. Over
70 nations, private sector companies, non-governmental organisations, and
even individuals, make up a rapidly growing community of space actors. At
the same time, the accelerated growth in space activities and the influx of
new actors has the potential to exacerbate many of the current threats to the
long-term sustainable use of space, such as the risks posed by long-lived
space debris, on-orbit crowding, radio-frequency interference, and the
potential of an incident in space sparking or escalating geopolitical tensions
on Earth. Given these conditions, the US national security space community
has characterised space as congested, contested, and competitive. The
international community, through the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) and other forums, has been
grappling with developing technical and non-technical solutions to these
issues. While space sustainability has been approached traditionally as a
government-to-government issue, the growing presence of commercial space
ventures draws attention to the value of integrating private sector voices in
the conversation. In a space environment that is not only congested and
contested, but heavily invested as well, private capital could advance our
ability to protect critical orbits to sustain current operations and to support
innovative and profitable development.
AT perm
AT no solvency
AT CP links to the NB
AT DAs to the CP
Politics extensions
President would have to be involved in the
plan
Presidential initiative is needed to get restrictions on
cooperation revoked
David, Space.coms Space Insider Columnist, quoting various experts in-
text, has been reporting on the space industry for more than five decades,
former director of research for the National Commission on Space, 2015
[Leonard, US-China Cooperation in Space: Is It Possible, and What's in

Store?, Space.com, June 16, http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-
station-cooperation.html, 6.20.2016 DUDA-RGorman]
It will take presidential leadership to get started on enhanced U.S.-Chinese
space cooperation, said John Logsdon, professor emeritus of political science
and international affairs at The George Washington University's Space Policy
Institute in Washington, D.C. "The first step is the White House working with
congressional leadership to get current, unwise restrictions on such
cooperation revoked," Logsdon told Space.com. "Then, the United States can
invite China to work together with the United States and other spacefaring
countries on a wide variety of space activities and, most dramatically, human
spaceflight." Logsdon said the U.S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz docking and
"handshake in space" back in 1975 serves as a history lesson. "A similar
initiative bringing the United States and China together in orbit would be a
powerful indicator of the intent of the two 21st century superpowers to work
together on Earth as well as in space," Logsdon said. While it is impressive
that China has become the third country to launch its citizens into orbit, the
current state of the Chinese human spaceflight program is about equivalent
to the U.S. program in the Gemini era, 50 years ago, Logsdon noted. "China
has much more to learn from the United States in human spaceflight than the
converse," Logsdon said. "From the U.S. perspective, the main reason to
engage in space cooperation with China is political, not technical.
Plan unpopular
Cooperation with China unpopular
Matthew Pennington, 7-15-2011, "US lawmaker wields budget ax over
China space ties," CNS News, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/us-
lawmaker-wields-budget-ax-over-china-space-ties//DDI
WASHINGTON (AP) A Republican lawmaker is looking to make the Obama
administration pay a price for what he sees as its defiance of Congress in
pursuing cooperation with China in science and space technology. A proposal
by Rep. Frank Wolf, a fierce critic of Beijing, would slash by 55 percent the
$6.6 million budget of the White House's science policy office. The measure
was endorsed by a congressional committee this week, but faces more
legislative hurdles, and its prospects are unclear. President Barack Obama
has sought to deepen ties with China, which underwrites a major chunk of the
vast U.S. national debt and is emerging a challenge to American military
dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. Among the seemingly benign forms of
cooperation he has supported is in science and technology. Last year NASA's
administrator visited China, and during a high-profile state visit to
Washington by China's President Hu Jintao in January, the U.S. and China
resolved to "deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of space." Wolf, R-
Va., argues that cooperation in space would give technological assistance to a
country that steals U.S. industrial secrets and launches cyberattacks against
the United States. He says Obama's chief science adviser, John Holdren,
violated a clause tucked into budget legislation passed this year that bars the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and NASA from
technological cooperation with China. He says Holdren did so by meeting
twice with China's science minister in Washington during May. "I believe the
Office of Science and Technology Policy is in violation of the law," Wolf told
The Associated Press, adding that cutting its budget is the only response
available to him. Wolf chairs a House subcommittee that oversees the office's
budget. The punishment he proposes reflects his deep antipathy toward
China, which he accuses of persecuting religious minorities, plundering Tibet
and supporting genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan by backing Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir. He described the Obama administration's policy
toward the Asian power as a failure and railed against the president for
hosting Hu at the White House. Caught at the sharp end is Holdren's office,
whose mandate is to develop sound science and technology policies by the
U.S. government and pursue them with the public and private sectors and
other nations. Holdren told a Congressional hearing chaired by Wolf days
before his May meetings with Chinese Science Minister Wan Gang that he
would abide by the prohibition on such cooperation with China, but then
spelled out a rather large loophole: that it did not apply in instances where it
affected the president's ability to conduct foreign policy. At another
Congressional hearing shortly afterward, Wolf's annoyance was clear. He
threatened to "zero out" Holdren's office. Space cooperation between the two
world powers like the U.S. and the Soviet Union pursued in the Cold War still
seems a long way off. NASA Administrator Charles Bolden Jr. visited China in a
little-publicized trip in October and discussed "underlying principles of any
future interaction between our two nations in the area of human space flight,"
but no specific proposals. China sent an astronaut into space in 2003, and
plans to send the first building block of a space station into orbit this year,
but it still has comparatively limited experience. Another constraint on
cooperation is that its manned space program is dominated by its military,
whose other capabilities most clearly demonstrated by a 2007 test that
destroyed an orbiting satellite have alarmed American officials. But one
benefit of basic forms of cooperation, such as sharing data and basic design
criteria, could be to learn a little more about China's opaque space program.
Since 1999, the U.S. effectively banned use of its space technology by China.
That also has a commercial downside for American producers in an
increasingly globalized marketplace. "Renewing civil and commercial space
cooperation with China ... is not a blank check and need not provide China
with sensitive technologies," wrote James Clay Moltz of the Naval
Postgraduate School in testimony at a congressional hearing on China's
civilian and military space programs in May. Wolf has included the prohibition
on cooperation with China by NASA and the White House science policy office
in the bill approved Wednesday by the House Appropriations Committee. The
bill budgets $50.2 billion for a raft of federal agencies involved in law
enforcement, trade promotion, space and science for the fiscal year starting
in October. The 55 percent reduction faced by the science policy's office far
exceeds the overall 6 percent cut in spending across all government agencies
covered by the bill. Holdren's office could not be reached for comment Friday.
The bill now goes to the Republican-led House of Representatives for
approval. A version also must pass the Democrat-led Senate, and the two
bills would have to be reconciled before legislation can be sent to Obama to
be signed into law.
India Da extensions
Link extensions
Indias space rivalry with China means it perceives
changes in US China cooperation
Rajagopalan, 2016
(Rajeswari, Senior Fellow and Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative
at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi., n Interview with
Rajeswari Rajagopalan by Xiaodon Liang India's Space Program: Challenges,
Opportunities, and Strategic Concerns, The National Bureau of Asian
Research, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=651; DDI - AH)
The wake-up call for India came when China conducted its first anti-satellite
(ASAT) missile test in January 2007. The test clearly illustrated the challenges
right in India's own neighborhood. Beijing came under a huge amount of
criticism on two counts: one, for not announcing the test, and two, and more
importantly, for creating long-lasting debris in low-earth orbit. While the test
generated anger and public outcry, it did not result in any real punitive
measures. The informal moratorium on ASAT tests, which had lasted for two
and a half decades, was broken by the Chinese ASAT test. Thereafter, the
United States tested an ASAT missile in 2008, which the international
community was much more comfortable with because it was done openly and
did not lead to the creation of long-lasting debris. For India, however, China
has been of particular concern. Beijing's activities in recent years have been
driven by competition with the United States, so the capabilities it is
developing are much more advanced than what are necessary to deter India.
Nonetheless, India has to be mindful of Chinese advances. Following China's
ASAT test, the scientific and technical communities and the Indian Air Force
leadership, as well as sections of the political leadership, started debating
whether India should be developing its own ASAT capability, and whether this
capability should be demonstrated or simulated. India has a missile defense
system under development, and the potential for India to acquire an ASAT
capability is linked to its missile defense capabilities. The Indian Defence
Research and Development Organisation has been developing missile
defense capabilities independently but is also increasingly looking to partner
with the United States and other countries. In contrast, China has followed
the route of developing an ASAT capability first and later developing missile
defense based on its ASAT capability. How do China's space capabilities play
into the regional politics of the subcontinent? India is closely monitoring
China's space cooperation initiatives in South Asia. China launched a satellite
for Pakistan in 2011, and another for Sri Lanka in 2012. Our concerns are
informed by the nuclear precedent; cooperation with China was critical for
the Pakistani program. India feels that if Pakistan, which today has very
limited space capabilities, cooperated with China, it could become a capable
power in the space realm. The two major concerns are an independent
Pakistani ASAT capability and further development of Pakistan's long-range
missile capabilities. An ASAT capability is not quite as simple as rocket
technology, but it would not be the hardest thing for Pakistan to achieve
either. For China, Sri Lanka is extremely important in the maritime security
context, and for the Maritime Silk Road program. IndiaSri Lanka relations
have gone through ups and downs, but the new president, Maithripala
Sirisena, and new prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, both have a friendly
disposition toward India. Nonetheless, there are strict limits to Indian
influence in Colombo. Critically, Sri Lanka is in dire need of economic
opportunities and faces huge developmental challenges. Even if India had all
the goodwill to support and help Sri Lanka, it does not have the deep pockets
that China does. India is concerned that space cooperation may become yet
another path for China to make inroads in Colombo.
K (name of the 1nc k) extensions
T (name of the 1nc T) extensions
This would be a set of answer to answer blocks likely
exclusively analytical but might have some limits cards or
answers to the counterinterp
CT Space 1ac outline for
reference
Plan Text
The United States Federal government should engage
with China to exchange data on the operational
information of space systems on a transparency-based
system and to promote scientific collaboration in
developing a space economy through space exploration.
Contention 1 is Space
Weaponization
Current space competition between US and China
generates mistrust and escalates tension
Gallagher 14 (Interim Director at CISSM and a Senior Research Scholar at
the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy, co-directs Cooperative
Security Program to address the security implications of globalization by
developing comprehensive transparency arrangements, August, "Rethinking
U.S.-China Security Cooperation," Center for International and Security
Studies at Maryland,
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/15990/rethinking_uschina_sec
urity_cooperation__082714.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)//SZ
Application to space security. To think about how this might work in practice,consider space as a
strategic realm where the United States and China currently have high
mistrust and competition. Neither country can reliably protect all the satellites
on which their security, economy, and quality of life increasingly depend. But deterrence is
extremely difficult in this domain, and an offensive space security strategy
would be extremely dangerous. This creates a pressing need for mutual reassurance
that states and their citizens are not using whatever dualuse space
capabilities they have in ways that deliberately or inadvertently case harm,
or create excessive risks, for others.
High tension makes space arms race inevitable in squo

conflict escalates into widespread destruction
Axe, 8-10-2015, David Axe is the editor of War Is Boring and a regular
contributor to the Daily Beast. He has written for Danger Room, "Wired" and
"Popular Science." "When it comes to war in space, U.S. has the edge,"
Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/09/the-u-s-military-is-
preparing-for-the-real-star-wars/
Quietly and without most people noticing, some of the worlds leading space powers the
United States and China have been deploying new and more sophisticated
weaponry in space. Earths orbit is looking more and more like the planets surface
heavily armed and primed for an inevitable conflict. A growing number of
inspection satellites lurk in orbit, possibly awaiting commands to sneak up on and
disable or destroy other satellites. Down on the surface, more and more warships and
ground installations pack powerful rockets that, with accurate guidance, could reach into
orbit to destroy enemy spacecraft. A war in orbit could wreck the delicate satellite
constellations that the world relies on for navigation, communication,
scientific research and military surveillance. Widespread orbital destruction
could send humanity through a technological time warp. You go back to World War
Two, Air Force General John Hyten, in charge of U.S. Space Command, told 60 Minutes. You go
back to the Industrial Age. Its hard to say exactly how many weapons are in orbit. Thats because many
spacecraft are dual use. They have peaceful functions and potential
military applications. With the proverbial flip of a switch, an inspection satellite, ostensibly
configured for orbital repair work, could become a robotic assassin capable of taking out other satellites
with lasers, explosives or mechanical claws. Until the moment it attacks, however, the assassin spacecraft
might appear to be harmless. And its dual use gives its operators political cover. The United States
possesses more space weaponry than any other country, yet denies that any of its satellites warrant the
term.
Scenario 1: Economic Collapse
ASAT and space arms testing creates radioactive debris
that increases the threat of collision
Shackelford 14 (Scott J. American Business Law Journal 2014 Academy
of Legal Studies in Business, Governing the Final Frontier: A Polycentric
Approach to Managing Space Weaponization and Debris 16 APR 2014,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ablj.12031/full)//SZ
As mentioned in the Introduction,China performed a successful ASAT test in January
2007 that destroyed an aging Chinese weather satellite and resulted in at
least nine hundred objects large enough to be tracked .[405] NASA's Orbital Debris
Program Office is estimating more than 35,000 pieces larger than one centimeter,[406] making this the
largest debris-generating event in history and increasing total orbital debris
by as much as twenty-five percent in a single stroke.[407] Estimates show that the
strike has increased the chances of catastrophic collisions from once every
nineteen years to once every twelve to fourteen years.[408] The ISS is already
regularly dodging fragments.[409] The Chinese took this action after years of protestations about the
Yet this was a single ASAT test on a
destabilizing effects of ASAT technology.
nonnuclear satellite. The open question is what the security and
environmental results would be in a conflict in which multiple
satellites, some of which may be nuclear, are destroyed. The breakup
of a single large satellite of ten tons could roughly double the amount of orbital
debris now in low-earth orbit.[410] The problems associated with satellites that possess nuclear or
radioactive components exacerbate the problem of space debris. In total, [m]ore than fifty
satellites with radioactive components have been launched ; [and] at least six
nuclear-powered satellites have had uncontrolled re-entries .[411] An early
problem with radioactive space debris occurred in January 1978 when the Soviet nuclear-powered satellite
Estimates of the total amount of radioactive
Cosmos 954 disintegrated over Canada.[412]
material now in orbit range are as high as one metric ton. [413]
Large amounts of debris destroys satellites and renders

US space tech unusable
Blake 11 (Heidi Blake, the telegraph, 01 Feb 2011 Space so full of junk
that a satellite collision could destroy communications on Earth
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/space/8295546/Space-so-full-of-
junk-that-a-satellite-collision-could-destroy-communications-on-Earth.html)
A single collision between two satellites or large pieces of space junk could
send thousands of pieces of debris spinning into orbit, each capable of
destroying further satellites. Global positioning systems, international phone
connections, television signals and weather forecasts are among the services
which are at risk of crashing to a halt. This chain reaction could leave some
orbits so cluttered with debris that they become unusable for commercial or
military satellites, the US Defense Department's interim Space Posture
Review warned last year. There are also fears that large pieces of debris could
threaten the lives of astronauts in space shuttles or at the International Space
Station. The report, which was sent to Congress in March and not publicly
released, said space is "increasingly congested and contested" and warned
the situation is set to worsen. Bharath Gopalaswamy, an Indian rocket
scientist researching space debris at the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, estimates that there are now more than 370,000 pieces of
junk compared with 1,100 satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO), between 490
and 620 miles above the planet. The February 2009 crash between a defunct
Russian Cosmos satellite and an Iridium Communications Inc. satellite left
around 1,500 pieces of junk whizzing around the earth at 4.8 miles a second.
A Chinese missile test destroyed a satellite in January 2007, leaving 150,000
pieces of debris in the atmosphere, according to Dr Gopalaswamy. The space
junk, dubbed an orbiting rubbish dump, also comprises nuts, bolts, gloves
and other debris from space missions. "This is almost the tipping point," Dr
Gopalaswamy said. "No satellite can be reliably shielded against this kind of
destructive force."
The destruction of satellites threatens economic stability

Walter Tam, 2015; (Walter Tam is a Walden Doctoral Scholar at Walden
University; The Space Debris Environment and Satellite Manufacturing;
Walden University Scholar Works;
http://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2659&context=dissertations)//SZ
Space debris has the potential to damage
A fifth factor relates to business economics.
operational space assets and reduce the expected value of space systems . The
increasing risk to high-value assets, combined with high volatility typical of the satellite insurance market
(Manikowski & Weiss, 2012), have implications to higher insurance premiums (P. V. Anderson & Schaub,
2014) that lead to higher operating cost. The higher cost might reduce the competitiveness of the services
Space debris
provided by the satellite system, thus reducing their overall value in the marketplace.
poses the greatest threat to the safe operations of satellites (Gopalaswamy &
Kampani, 2014). The threat extends to the global economy, in which satellite
technology is a deeply embedded, critical, and fragile component of the global
economic infrastructure (Horsham, Schmidt, & Gilland, 2011; Percy & Landrum, 2014). To
ensure economic stability and business growth on a global scale, it would be
necessary to address the space debris problem in a meaningful way. Solutions to the
space debris problem could come from technical, policy, organizational, and regulatory sources (Jakhu,
2010).
Satellite and space system loss causes economic chaos

Paul W. Gydesen; February, 2006; Gydesen is the Lieutenant
Colonel in the US airforce; Alabama Airforce Base; Economic
Impact with the Loss of Commercial Space Applications;
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/gydesen.pdf
The loss of satellites TV, television network broadcast, pay-at-the-pump
service, video teleconferencing, and GPS navigation would cause a huge
inconvenience and an upset population. Some critical areas, such as
emergency response, aircraft and shipping navigation would experience
greater problems. The most critical loss would be the GPS timing data, but
again this is a worst-case examplecommercial satellite services have
become embedded in our society. Individuals and businesses depend upon
satellites for financial transactions, entertainment, communication,
navigation, weather forecasting, timing data, and more. A sudden loss of
satellite services could cause economic chaos.
Economic collapse causes nuclear war with China

Walter Russell Mead, Senior Fellow, US Foreign Policy, Council on
Foreign Relations, 2/4/09, Only Makes You Stronger, The New
Republic, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-
2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2.
The crisis has not--yet--led to
The damage to China's position is more subtle.
the nightmare scenario that China-watchers fear : a recession or
slowdown producing the kind of social unrest that could challenge the
government. That may still come to pass--the recent economic news from China
has been consistently worse than most experts predicted--but, even if the worst case
is avoided, the financial crisis has nevertheless had significant effects. For one thing,
it has reminded China that its growth remains dependent on the health of
the U.S. economy. For another, it has shown that China's modernization is likely to
be long, dangerous, and complex rather than fast and sweet, as some assumed. In
the lead-up to last summer's Beijing Olympics, talk of a Chinese bid to challenge
America's global position reached fever pitch, and the inexorable rise of China is one
reason why so many commentators are fretting about the "post-American era." But
suggestions that China could grow at, say, 10 percent annually for the next 30 years
were already looking premature before the economic downturn. (In late 2007, the
World Bank slashed its estimate of China's GDP by 40 percent, citing inaccuracies in
the methods used to calculate purchasing power parity.) And the financial crisis
makes it certain that China's growth is likely to be much slower during some of those
years. Already exports are falling, unemployment is rising, and the Shanghai stock
market is down about 60 percent. At the same time, Beijing will have to devote more
resources and more attention to stabilizing Chinese society, building a national health
care system, providing a social security net, and caring for an aging population,
which, thanks to the one-child policy, will need massive help from the government to
support itself in old age. Doing so will leave China fewer resources for military build-
ups and foreign adventures. As the crisis has forcefully reminded Americans, creating
and regulating a functional and flexible financial system is difficult. Every other
country in the world has experienced significant financial crises while building such
systems, and China is unlikely to be an exception. All this means that China's rise
looks increasingly like a gradual process. A deceleration in China's long-term growth
rate would postpone indefinitely the date when China could emerge as a peer
competitor to the United States. The present global distribution of power could be
changing slowly, if at all. The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and
to American power itself is probably not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is
that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario,
the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major
economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both
state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be
unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset
bubbles in the stock and property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of
the Chinese middle class. The political consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter
climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both
Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.)
Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their
money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater
bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far
been able to manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and
change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops . India's future
is also a question. Support for global integration is a fairly recent development in
India, and many serious Indians remain skeptical of it. While India's 60-year-old
democratic system has resisted many shocks , a deep economic recession
in a country where mass poverty and even hunger are still major concerns could
undermine political order, long-term growth, and India's attitude toward
the United States and global economic integration. The violent Naxalite
insurrection plaguing a significant swath of the country could get worse;
religious extremism among both Hindus and Muslims could further
polarize Indian politics; and India's economic miracle could be nipped in the bud. If
current market turmoil seriously damaged the performance and prospects of
India and China, the current crisis could join the Great Depression in the
list of economic events that changed history , even if the recessions in
the West are relatively short and mild. The United States should stand ready to
assist Chinese and Indian financial authorities on an emergency basis--and work very
hard to help both countries escape or at least weather any economic downturn. It
may test the political will of the Obama administration, but the United States must
avoid a protectionist response to the economic slowdown. U.S. moves to limit market
access for Chinese and Indian producers could poison relations for years. For billions
of people in nuclear-armed countries to emerge from this crisis believing either
that the United States was indifferent to their well-being or that it had profited from their distress
could damage U.S. foreign policy far more severely than any mistake made
by George W. Bush. It's not just the great powers whose trajectories have been
affected by the crash. Lesser powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran also face new
constraints. The crisis has strengthened the U.S. position in the Middle East as falling
oil prices reduce Iranian influence and increase the dependence of the oil sheikdoms
on U.S. protection. Success in Iraq--however late, however undeserved, however
limited--had already improved the Obama administration's prospects for addressing
regional crises. Now, the collapse in oil prices has put the Iranian regime on the
defensive. The annual inflation rate rose above 29 percent last September, up from
about 17 percent in 2007, according to Iran's Bank Markazi. Economists forecast that
Iran's real GDP growth will drop markedly in the coming months as stagnating oil
revenues and the continued global economic downturn force the government to rein
in its expansionary fiscal policy. All this has weakened Ahmadinejad at home and Iran
abroad. Iranian officials must balance the relative merits of support for allies like
Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria against domestic needs, while international sanctions
and other diplomatic sticks have been made more painful and Western carrots (like
trade opportunities) have become more attractive. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and
other oil states have become more dependent on the United States for protection
against Iran, and they have fewer resources to fund religious extremism as they use
diminished oil revenues to support basic domestic spending and development goals.
None of this makes the Middle East an easy target for U.S. diplomacy, but thanks in
part to the economic crisis, the incoming administration has the chance to try some
new ideas and to enter negotiations with Iran (and Syria) from a position of enhanced
strength. Every crisis is different, but there seem to be reasons why, over time,
financial crises on balance reinforce rather than undermine the world position of the
leading capitalist countries. Since capitalism first emerged in early modern Europe,
the ability to exploit the advantages of rapid economic development has been a key
factor in international competition. Countries that can encourage--or at least allow
and sustain--the change, dislocation, upheaval, and pain that capitalism often
involves, while providing their tumultuous market societies with appropriate
regulatory and legal frameworks, grow swiftly. They produce cutting-edge
technologies that translate into military and economic power. They are able to invest
in education, making their workforces ever more productive. They typically develop
liberal political institutions and cultural norms that value, or at least tolerate, dissent
and that allow people of different political and religious viewpoints to collaborate on a
vast social project of modernization--and to maintain political stability in the face of
accelerating social and economic change. The vast productive capacity of leading
capitalist powers gives them the ability to project influence around the world and, to
some degree, to remake the world to suit their own interests and preferences. This is
what the United Kingdom and the United States have done in past centuries, and
what other capitalist powers like France, Germany, and Japan have done to a lesser
extent. In these countries, the social forces that support the idea of a competitive
market economy within an appropriately liberal legal and political framework are
relatively strong. But, in many other countries where capitalism rubs people the
wrong way, this is not the case. On either side of the Atlantic, for example, the Latin
world is often drawn to anti-capitalist movements and rulers on both the right and
the left. Russia, too, has never really taken to capitalism and liberal society--whether
during the time of the czars, the commissars, or the post-cold war leaders who so
signally failed to build a stable, open system of liberal democratic capitalism even as
many former Warsaw Pact nations were making rapid transitions. Partly as a result of
these internal cultural pressures, and partly because, in much of the world, capitalism
has appeared as an unwelcome interloper, imposed by foreign forces and shaped to
fit foreign rather than domestic interests and preferences, many countries are only
half-heartedly capitalist. When crisis strikes, they are quick to decide that capitalism
is a failure and look for alternatives. So far, such half-hearted experiments not only
have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a
progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by.
Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind
that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the
power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to
develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also
strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian
traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of
reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less
established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more
established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and
countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer
greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does.
And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global
distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which
means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that
financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has
other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a
normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system
under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg
and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American
Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list
of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can
breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the
Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to
power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start
slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United
States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back
on track, we may still have to fight.
Scenario 2: Space Weaponization
Space weaponization increases probability for conflict
electronic jamming, nuclear control, and ambiguity all
make space highly volatile
Finch 15 (James P. Finch is the Principal Director for Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where
he previously acted as the Principal Director for Space Policy. He has held
space-related leadership positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to
Earth, JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015)
**Note ADIZ = Air Defense Identification Zone
the overlapping ADIZs are, they are far less destabilizing
As potentially dangerous as
than actions in space could be during a crisis. All contestants in the great
game unfolding in Asia have fairly similar appreciations of the implications
that would follow engaging military or, worse, civilian aircraft transiting their ADIZ.
These understandings have been built over 100 years of air travel and were underscored dramatically in
the miscalculation associated with the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983.Such
shared understandings are largely nonexistent in space. Not only do nations have less
experience operating in the domain, but the criticality of space systems to broader
operational objectives also may create a tempting target early in a crisis.
Combined with the lack of potential human casualties from engagements in space,
this lack of common understanding may create a growing risk of
miscalculation in a terrestrial political crisis. If not explicitly addressed, this
instability in space could even create a chasm that undermines the otherwise
well-crafted tenets of strategic or nuclear stability. While much has been written about
how nuclear weapons contribute to, or detract from, crisis stability, space, in some ways, is more
complex than nuclear stability. First, today a clear taboo exists against the use of nuclear
weapons. Crossing that firebreak at any level has immediately recognizable and significant implications.
Second, in the context of nuclear weapons, theorists can (at least arguably) discriminate among escalatory
motives based on the type of weapon strategic or tacticaland based on the type of target
counterforce or countervalue targeting. This was most famously sketched out in the form of an escalation
ladder in Herman Kahns 1965 book, On Escalation. This convenient heuristic method for understanding
escalation based on the target and the weapon type is arguably more complex for space. This is a
byproduct of the lack of mutual understanding on the implications of the weapon and the value of the
target. These factors deserve detailed consideration because they describe the playing field on which a
terrestrial crisis could spiral into space conflict. Efforts to manage crises, therefore, must account for these
there is no taboo against many types of counterspace
complexities. To begin,
systems. Starting a framework with weapon type, the threshold for use of temporary and
reversible counterspace weapons appears much lower. There are
documented instances of electronic jamming happening all over the world
today, and the number of actors who possess counterspace weapons such as communications jammers
is much higher. Given the low cost and relative simplicity of some counterspace weapons, even nonstate
actors have found utility in employing them. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn noted,
Irregular warfare has come to space.8 Consequently, this type of weapon
temporary and reversiblemay appear at first glance to be less escalatory and less
prone to miscalculation than kinetic weapons. At the other end of the weapons spectrum are
weapons that have permanent and irreversible effects. The extreme version of such a weapon would be a
debris-generating kinetic kill device such as the kind that was tested by the United States
and Soviet Union during the Cold War and by China in 2007. These weapons are particularly insidious
generate large amounts of debris that indiscriminately threatens
because they
satellites and other space systems for decades into the future. One additional
dimension to the weapons spectrum that merits consideration in the context of crisis stability relates to the
space is an offense-dominant
survivability of a weapon. It is commonly accepted that
domain, which is to say that holding space targets at risk is far easier and cheaper
than defending them. This could lead to first-strike instability by creating
pressure for early action at the conventional level here on Earth before
counterspace attacks could undermine the capability for power projection. But
the offense-dominant nature of the domain has implications for both peaceful satellites as well as space-
This could also create first-strike instability regarding space-
based weapons.
based weapons since the advantage would go to the belligerents who use
their space weapon first. In this way, space-based weapons may be uniquely destabilizing in ways
that their more survivable, ground-based relatives are not. Adding complexity to Kahns heuristic, however,
is the situational context surrounding the employment of counterspace systems. In the space context,
strategists will have to consider weapon type, the nature of the target, and also the terrestrial context.
Todays electronic jamming has primarily been witnessed in the Middle East, where regimes have sought to
deny freedom of information to their populations by jamming commercial communications satellites. The
same weapon typeasatellite communications jammerapplied against a satellite
carrying strategic nuclear command and control communications during a
crisis could be perceived much differentl y. In such an instance, decisionmakers
might conclude that the other side is attempting to deprive them of
nuclear command and control as a prelude to escalation. Similarly, the
application of permanent, irreversible force against a commercial or third party satellite would have a
much different effect on crisis dynamics than mere jamming. Physically destroying or otherwise rendering
inoperable such assets could raise a partys stake in the conflict, by threatening either its power projection
Many militaries use
capabilities globally or its assured ability to retaliate against a nuclear strike.
commercial assets to communicate with deployed forces, and a show of
force strike against a commercial satellite could inadvertently engage an
adversarys vital interests. Simply put, the weapon, target, and context all
contribute to the perceived intent and effects of a counterspace attack . Unlike in
other domains, tremendous ambiguity exists regarding the use of
counterspace weapons. This means that all of these variables would be open to
interpretation in crises, and it should be remembered that an inherent
characteristic of crises is a short timeframe for decisionmaking. When time is
short and the potential cost of inaction is significant, or even catastrophic,
decisionmakers tend to lean toward worst-case interpretations of an
adversarys actions. This is a clear recipe for inadvertent
miscalculation.
Asymmetrical warfare in space makes ASATs prone to

miscalculation, proliferation, and deterrence failure
Gallagher 15 (Nancy, interim director of the Center for International
and Security Studies in Maryland, previous Executive Director of the Clinton
Administrations CTBT Treaty Committee, an arms control specialist at the
State Dept., and a faculty member at Wesleyan, Antisatellite warfare without
nuclear risk: A mirage, May 29, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346)
In recent decades, however, as space-based reconnaissance, communication, and
targeting capabilities have become integral elements of modern military
operations, strategists and policy makers have explored whether carrying out
antisatellite attacks could confer major military advantages without increasing
the risk of nuclear war. In theory, the answer might be yes. In practice, it is almost certainly
no. Hyping threats. No country has ever deliberately and destructively attacked a satellite belonging to
another country (though nations have sometimes interfered with satellites' radio transmissions). But the
United States, Russia, and China have all tested advanced kinetic antisatellite
weapons, and the United States has demonstrated that it can modify a missile-defense interceptor for
use in antisatellite mode. Any nation that can launch nuclear weapons on medium-
range ballistic missiles has the latent capability to attack satellites in low Earth
orbit. Because the United States depends heavily on space for its terrestrial military
superiority, some US strategists have predicted that potential adversaries will try
to neutralize US advantages by attacking satellites . They have also
recommended that the US military do everything it can to protect its own space
assets while maintaining a capability to disable or destroy satellites that
adversaries use for intelligence, communication, navigation, or targeting. Analysis of this sort often
exaggerates both potential adversaries ability to destroy US space assets and the military advantages
observers are once again
that either side would gain from antisatellite attacks. Nonetheless, some
advancing worst-case scenarios to support arguments for offensive
counterspace capabilities. In some other countries, interest in space warfare
may be increasing because of these arguments. If any nation, for whatever reason,
launched an attack on a second nation's satellites , nuclear retaliation against
terrestrial targets would be an irrational response. But powerful countries do
sometimes respond irrationally when attacked. Moreover, disproportionate retaliation
following a deliberate antisatellite attack is not the only way in which antisatellite weapons could
contribute to nuclear war. It is not even the likeliest way. As was clearly understood by the countries that
the risk of
negotiated the Outer Space Treaty, crisis management would become more difficult, and
inadvertent deterrence failure would increase , if satellites used for reconnaissance
and communication were disabled or destroyed. But even if the norm against attacking another
countrys satellites is never broken, developing and testing antisatellite weapons still
increase the risk of nuclear war. If, for instance, US military leaders became
seriously concerned that China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack,
pressure could build for a pre-emptive attack against Chinese or Russian
strategic forces. Should a satellite be struck by a piece of space debris during a
crisis or a low-level terrestrial conflict, leaders might mistakenly assume that a space
war had begun and retaliate before they knew what had actually happened. Such scenarios may
seem improbable, but they are no more implausible than the scenarios that are used to justify the
development and use of antisatellite weapons.
Weaponization and ASATS causes nuclear war

flashpoints with China are inevitable outweighs
probability of ground-based conflicts
Billings 15 (Lee Billings is an editor at Scientific American covering space
and physics, Citing Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of
the Stimson Center, and James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, The
Scientific American, August 10, 2015, War in Space May Be Closer Than
Ever, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-
than-ever)
The worlds most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of
Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of
Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-mans-land of
Earth orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name.
The emptiness of outer space might be the last place youd expect militaries to vie over contested
territory, except thatouter space isnt so empty anymore. About 1,300 active
satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide
communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary
surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern
warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground , with the U.S. as the
undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge
U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own ,
the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could cripple [destroy]
the entire planets space-based infrastructure. And though it might begin in
space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth. The long-
simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several
events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China
and Russia, as well as last months failure of tension-easing talks at the United
Nations. Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat to U.S. satellites,
China and Russia are both developing capabilities to deny access in
saying that
a conflict, such as those that might erupt over Chinas military
activities in the South China Sea or Russias in Ukraine. China in particular, Clapper
said, has demonstrated the need to interfere with, damage and
destroy U.S. satellites, referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began
in 2007. There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with
missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap
off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or
permanently damage a satellites components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves
can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers. In response to these possible
threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least 5 billion to be spent over the next
five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military
space program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem
through diplomacy, although with minimal success; in late July at the United
Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of
conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several
other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed
diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo , likely leading to years of
further debate within the UNs General Assembly. The bottom line is the United States does not want
conflict in outer space, says Frank Rose, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and
compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms race. The U.S., he says, is
willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure. But let me make it very clear: we will defend
our space assets if attacked. Offensive space weapons tested The prospect of war in space is not new.
Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from orbit, the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the
late 1950s. It even tested nuclear bombs in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned
through the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, space-based surveillance became a
crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems
on alert for the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War,
the U.S.S.R. developed and tested space mines, self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy
U.S. spy satellites by peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space peaked with
the Reagan administrations multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop
orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force
staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that
took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit. Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts
erupted. According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center think
tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their
satellites wereparticularly the ones in geosynchronous orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or
satellites effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them
more. Such
sitting ducks. But because any hostile action against those satellites could
easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth, both superpowers backed
down. Neither one of us signed a treaty about this, Krepon says. We just independently came to the
conclusion that our security would be worse off if we went after those satellites, because if one of us did it,
then the other guy would, too. Today, the situation is much more complicated.
Low- and high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial
activity, filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different
nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, each and every satellite is at risk , in
part because not all members of the growing club of military space powers are
willing to play by the same rulesand they dont have to, because the rules
remain as yet unwritten. Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race through space at very
high velocities, so the quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply launch something into space to get in its
way. Even the impact of an object as small and low-tech as a marble can disable or entirely destroy a
And if a nation uses such a kinetic method to destroy an
billion-dollar satellite.
adversarys satellite, it can easily create even more dangerous debris,
potentially cascading into a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a
demolition derby. In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when China launched a missile that
destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-lived
shrapnel that constitutes nearly one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in
kind in 2008, repurposing a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a malfunctioning U.S. military
satellite shortly before it tumbled into the atmosphere. That test produced dangerous junk too, though in
smaller amounts, and the debris was shorter-lived because it was generated at a much lower altitude.
More recently, China has launched what many experts say are additional tests of
ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons. None of these subsequent launches have
destroyed satellites, but Krepon and other experts say this is because the Chinese are now merely testing
to miss, rather than to hit, with the same hostile capability as an end result. The latest test occurred on
July 23 of last year. Chinese officials insist the tests only purpose is peaceful missile defense and scientific
one test in May 2013 sent a missile soaring as high as 30,000
experimentation. But
kilometers above Earth, approaching the safe haven of strategic
geosynchronous satellites.
That causes extinction

Starr 15 (Steven is the director of the University of Missouris Clinical
Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for
Social Responsibility, Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,
https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/)//SZ
While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it
a nuclear winter would
is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is,
cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass
extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs . Following the
detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear
weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land
surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These
mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of
millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed
studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the
calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear
The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies
conflicts.]
on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke,
producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke
into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep
the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more . The longevity of the smoke layer
would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the
smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would
rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer . The smoke
from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from
reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the
Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather
conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would
fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an
explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current
Nuclear winter would cause average
nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.]
global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of
the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a
decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are
Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would
obvious.
remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to
death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant
nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being
released into the biosphere. We dont need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age
Would the few
temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet.
remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?
Contention 2 is Space Economy
Cooperation with China is key for the development of a
space economy.
Beldavs 15 (Vid Beldavs, has been engaged in thinking
about space industrial development since he taught the
first college class in the US on the topic in 1977 at Coe
College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa on executive leave from his
duties as business trends advisor (corporate futurist) for
Cummins, Inc. Vid now works for the FOTONIKA-LV
photonics research center of the University of Latvia,
Prospects for US-China space cooperation,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2878/1, December
7 2015)
What if the US and China worked out a structure for SDIB that would promote accelerated commercial
SDIB could provide the long-term
development of space? Capitalized at, say, $100 billion,
financing for infrastructure such as a lunar power utility whose role would be
to supply power initially to exploration activities and, later, to ISRU
development. Other projects could include space hubs for transportation ,
logistics management, refueling, and no doubt tourist and recreational
facilities. Insofar as SDIB would fund projects that enable or encourage national
space initiatives, the capitalization of the bank would be on call to spend as the investment
committee chooses to serve the global interest of advancing development of a robust
space economy that brings benefits to all member states. SDIB could leverage
funding by governments as well as by private sources of capital... A self-sustaining space
economy is one where investment generates positive returns. The breakthrough to
a self-sustaining space economy would mark a historical inflection point where investment in space
is businesses will start to see exponential growth. Achieving that breakthrough is in the
interests of all participating states insofar as that will mark the point at which significant gains in the
To
benefits of space to all of Earths people will exceed the investment required to achieve them.
engage China as a strategic partner in the opening of the space frontier the
following actions are needed: The Wolf Amendment needs to be annulled. The
Administration needs to take steps to engage China in space collaboration . In
the longer term this would include measures such as the Space Development
Investment Bank. Immediate steps would include collaboration on remote
sensing for disaster relief, space debris research, and space situation
awareness. Appropriate steps in the intermediate term would include measures such as opening ISS
and its successor facilities to China. The International Lunar Decade could provide a unifying framework for
international collaboration in space development through 2030.
The space economy provides a market for the usage and

testing of asteroid mining technology.
Shaer 4/28/16 (Matthew Shaer, foreign policy writer for Chicago Tribune,
The asteroid miner's guide to the galaxy,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-asteroid-mining-60cf5082-0d71-
11e6-8ab8-9ad050f76d7d-20160428-story.html, 4/28/16)
heavens are not just a frontier but a vast and

To evangelists of asteroid mining, the
resource-rich place teeming with opportunity. According to NASA, there are potentially
100,000 near-Earth objects - including asteroids and comets - in the neighborhood of our planet. Some of
these NEOs, as they're called, are small. Others are substantial and potentially packed
full of water and various important minerals, such as nickel, cobalt, and iron .
One day, advocates believe, those objects will be tapped by variations on the equipment used in
the coal mines of Kentucky or in the diamond mines of Africa. And for immense gain: According
to industry experts, the contents of a single asteroid could be worth trillions
of dollars. Kfir pitched me on the long-term plan. First, a fleet of satellites will be
dispatched to outer space, fitted with probes that can measure the quality
and quantity of water and minerals in nearby asteroids and comets. Later, armed
with that information, mining companies like DSI will send out vessels to
mechanically remove and refine the material extracted. In some cases, the take will
be returned to Earth. But most of the time, it will be processed in space - for instance, to produce rocket
fuel - and stored in container vessels that will serve as the equivalent of gas stations for outbound
Consider the recent and seismic
spacecraft. This possibility isn't so unrealistic, Kfir said.
growth of the space industry, he suggested, as we climbed the stairs to DSI's second-floor suite.
Every year, the private spaceflight sector grows larger, and every year the goals become grander. Jeff
Bezos, founder of Amazon and the space exploration company Blue Origin, has spoken of the day " when
millions of people are living and working in spac e"; Elon Musk's SpaceX is expected to
reveal a Mars colonization plan this year. "But how are they going to sustain this new
space economy?" Kfir asked rhetorically. He nudged open DSI's office door. "Easy: by mining
asteroids." Bezos, Musk, and the other billionaires who plan to be cruising around space in the near future
won't be able to do so without celestial pit stops.
Asteroid Mining yields resources key prevents future

resource wars.
Aziz 13 (John Aziz, a writer and analyst. His interests include various topics
in economics, finance, geopolitics and history including global trade
dynamics, How asteroid mining could add trillions to the world economy,
http://theweek.com/articles/462830/how-asteroid-mining-could-add-trillions-
world-economy, Jun 25, 2013)
Our planet was born with a fixed amount of water,

Resources on Earth are limited.
hydrocarbons, nitrogen, and industrial and precious metals . And we're collecting,
processing, and eventually throwing out those resources at an alarming rate: A United Nations report on
resource depletion says that per capita declined by 20 percent in the United
States, 33 percent in South Africa, 25 percent in Brazil, and 17 percent in
China. For now, only protection and better resource management can
safeguard the planet. As we burn through Earth's resources, a wealth of physical
resources like metals, water, and hydrocarbons are floating around in
asteroids, moons, and other planets, ready to be harvested . If human civilization is
to continue to grow and expand over the centuries and millennia to come, hunger for resources is
likely to drive us to explore and mine what's way, way out there . And as wild as it
may sound, asteroids in particular could be highly profitable . In 1997 scientists
speculated that a relatively small metallic asteroid with a diameter of 0.99 miles
contains more than $20 trillion worth of industrial and precious metals. Yet,
space mining is still in its infancy, and exploring it is costly . A NASA mission to an
asteroid to bring back 2 kg (about 4.5 pounds) of material in 2021 is expected to cost the space agency $1
billion. But two companies are exploring asteroid mining, as well: Deep Space Industries, and Planetary
Resources, which has the backing of several billionaire investors, including Google's Larry Page and Eric
Schmidt, software executive Charles Simonyi, and filmmaker James Cameron. When Planetary Resources
was founded in 2012, its founders boldly claimed the company could "add trillions of dollars to the global
GDP" and "create a new industry and a new definition of 'natural resources.'" While neither company has
gotten off the ground yet, Planetary Resources successfully raised $1 million in crowdfunding to place a
new telescope, ARKYD, in space to hunt for Earthlike planets. Peter Diamandis, Planetary Resources' CEO,
estimates that an asteroid 98 feet long could contain as much as $50 billion in platinum, and might also
yield water for human consumption, or for producing hydrogen fuel.The potential benefits to
asteroid mining reach far beyond just profit, economic growth, and expanding
Earth's resource base. While mining on Earth can be highly destructive
to natural habitats resulting in deforestation, soil erosion,
chemical contamination, and the pollution of groundwater mining
in space doesn't damage any natural habitats. Even more significantly, less
resource bottlenecks means less potential for future resource wars between
competing countries a frightening scenario which the Pentagon has begun planning to address if
need be. In the long run, being able to mine resources in space will help humans
create space-based communities, and explore deeper and deeper into the
universe, eventually transitioning us away from an entirely Earth-based civilization.
Lack of Resources Lead to Resource Wars.

Collins & Autino 10 Patrick Collins (Expert in the economics of energy supply from space) &
Adriano Autino, What the growth of a space tourism industry could contribute to employment, economic
growth, environmental protection, education, culture and world peace, (2010)
http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/what_the_growth_of_a_space_tourism_industry_could_contribute_to_
employment_economic_growth_environmental_protection_education_culture_and_world_peace.shtml. TQ)
World peace and preservation of human civilization - The major source of social friction, including international
friction, has surely always been unequal access to resources. People - fight to control the valuable
resources on and under the land, and in and under the sea. The natural resources of Earth are limited in
quantity, and economically accessible resources even more so. As the population grows, and
demand grows for a higher material standard of living, industrial activity grows exponentially. The threat of
resources becoming scarce has led to the concept of Resource Wars. Having begun long ago
with wars to control the gold and diamonds of Africa and South America, and oil in the Middle
East, the current phase is at centre stage of world events today [37]. A particular danger of
resource wars is that, if the general public can be persuaded to support them, they may become
impossible to stop as resources become increasingly scarce. Many commentators have noted the similarity of the language of US
and UK government advocates of war on terror to the language of the novel 1984 which describes. a dystopian future of
endless, fraudulent war in which citizens are reduced to slaves.
Contention 3 is Solvency
Both China and US want to cooperate with one another,
starting with transparency and confidence-building
measures
Xiaodan Wu 14 (6/16/14, The Law Faculty, China Central University of
Finance and Economics, "China and space security: How to bridge the gap
between its stated and perceived intentions,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964615300023)//SZ
China and the U.S., have a long-term interest in maintaining
All the states, including
the stability of the space environment and are bound together by mutually
beneficial economic relationships in this globalization era. First, both China and the
U.S. have strong incentives to avoid the actual use of counter-space
weapons, counter-space warfare and actions producing substantial quantities
of long-lasting space debris, and shape a more stable and secure space
environment for themselves and other space-faring nations .48 War between China
and the United States seems unlikely, given their increasing economic interdependence and the ongoing
if China or the U.S. attacked the
efforts in both countries to improve relations. At any rate,
other's military satellites, it would escalate any conflict between them and
conflict in space would be a catastrophe for these two nations, even the
entire world. The overwhelming adverse security and economic consequences of such warfare should
outweigh most other considerations. The risks inherent in space conflict, where vital U.S. and Chinese
preventing space conflict should be a major
interests are at stake, suggest that
security objective of both sides and that all their instruments of power should
be brought to bear on preventing space conflict . This common understanding is the
firm foundation to increase understanding and develop mutual trust through
TCBMs. Second, space collaboration between China and the U.S. represents the
best hope for allaying mutual suspicion. The impetus for strategic cooperation comes from
the shared interest that potential adversaries have avoiding mutual disaster.49 The competitors can use
formal or informal cooperation at the margins of their relationship to reduce misperceptions and bring
A strong U.S. China bilateral relationship includes a
about strategic stability.50
healthy, stable, reliable and continuous militarymilitary relationship . Although
this relationship historically has never been without disagreement and difficulty, it is not predestined that
China's steady integration into the global
the two militaries must be adversaries. Moreover,
economy creates new incentives for partnership and cooperation . China has
every reason to desire cooperation with a space superpower like the U.S. and
sees great opportunity to enhance its capabilities and the well being of its
people through joint efforts to explore space and to utilize its resources
peacefully. For instance, China's investment in the Beidou system and the remarkable achievement in
a few years suggests its common interests with the United States in creating norms and rules for non-
attack of PNT systems. Thus, despite a difference of perception between the United
States and China on the outer space issues, diplomatic progress should be
possible. Third, a certain degree of strategic trust and cooperation in spite of
military and ideological consideration is not without precedent . The U.S. and Russia
successfully separated their military and civilian space programs and found ways to cooperate. Even
during the Cold War, a joint US-Soviet space docking exercise in 1975
achieved important technical and political breakthroughs. The competition
has evolved into
between the U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War for dominance of space
cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on the International Space Station ,
which marked a key moment for international space cooperation. Another example is India and Pakistan,
which together announced in the Lahore Declaration of 1999 that they would provide each other with pre-
launch notifications for their ballistic missiles. Consequently, there is no reason why China and the United
States cannot move towards interdependence and away from historic mistrust. 3.2. Deepen reformation to
Transparency and
further enhance the transparency of China's space policies and activities
engagement are the primary means of confidence-building measures
to establish trust between nations. In other words, transparency is the
key for any specific confidence building measures. China used to be reluctant to provide
sensitive information due to cultural and strategic reasons. Gradually, it has realized the reassurance value
of TCBMs, such as publication of national space policies and confidentiality could prompt the other States
to form their own worst-case judgments. But China should deepen reformation to further enhance the
transparency and openness of its space policies and activities.
TCBMS can help build a relationship to support China and

the US s interests in increased bilateral cooperation in
space sustainability, science, exploration, and security
Brian Weeden and Xiao He; July 13, 2016 ((Brian Weeden is the Technical
Adviser at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C. Xiao He is an
Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences). National Bureau of Asian Research;
US-China Relations in Strategic Domains)//SZ
A more promising approach is to focus on transparency and confidence-building measures for both direct
TCBMs are a means by which governments can share information
ascent and RPO.
to help create mutual understanding and trust and reduce misperceptions
and miscalculations. Although not new, TCBMs represent a shift for the space
world, which has long focused its efforts on pushing for legally binding arms
control agreements and treaties. The recent report from the UN Group of Governmental
Experts, in which the United States and China both participated, highlights several areas for space TCBMs:
information exchange on space policies, information exchange and
notifications related to outer space activities, risk reduction notifications, and
contact and visits to space launch sites and facilities .70 Improving information
on activities in space likely holds the most promise for mitigating tensions in
the U.S.-China relationship in this domain. While determining a satellites exact capabilities
and function is still difficult, SSA capabilities have developed to the point where it is becoming possible to
verify actions and activities in space. The U.S. military already maintains a catalog of more than 22,000
human-generated space objects in earth orbit, much of which is available publicly and also shared with all
China is currently developing its own SSA capabilities and,
satellite operators.71
presumably, its own catalog of space objects. Russia, several European countries, India,
and many other spacefaring nations are also increasing their own SSA capabilities, and most recently
As SSA capabilities
actors in the private sector have started to develop such capabilities as well.72
continue to improve and proliferate to other countries, it becomes
increasingly possible that they may be able to serve as a new type of national
technical means to underpin bilateral and multilateral political agreements on
responsible and irresponsible behavior in space .73 Such agreements should be
aimed at limiting dangerous or provocative actions, such as close approaches
of national security satellites;74 signaling restraint for kinetic testing and deployment of new
capabilities; and making political pledges to refrain from first use of destructive counter-space weapons.75
A key challenge in developing these agreements will be overcoming cultural
and bureaucratic incentives for opacity on both sides. In the United States, the
national security community has a deeply rooted culture of secrecy and unilateralism
in the space domain that results from policy decisions made during the Kennedy
administration as well as the consideration that space remains the last domain where the United States
China, which sees itself as significantly inferior to the United States,
has a decisive advantage. For
opacity in space activities and programs is seen as one of the few tools to
offset overwhelming U.S. capabilities and resources . Both countries also have
the usual organizational silos and impediments to sharing information
internally that are inherent to all large bureaucracies and undermine bilateral
sharing. Enhancing SSA capabilities and increasing transparency on activities
in space are in their national interests . While some more exquisite national SSA capabilities
should be reserved for security uses, there is a much broader set of basic SSA capabilities that are
relatively common among all spacefaring nations and essential to safe space activities, including those of
Increased sharing of data from these capabilities and
commercial satellite operators.
collaboration on enhancing and improving them will result in positive
externalities that will benefit all countries. Given that both the United States
and China have considerable national security, civil, and commercial interests
in space, this domain will have a significant impact on the future of bilateral
relations. Although it is tempting to view the U.S.-China relationship in space
through a similar lens as the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the differences between
the two relationships and their contexts may ultimately matter more than the
similarities. The key question is whether space will be a source of tension that
creates instability and risk or an area of positive engagement that can
strengthen the relationship. Both the United States and China should look at
where their interests in space overlap to find potential areas to strengthen
their relationship. Both have interests in working with the rest of the
international community to strengthen the space governance regime in a
manner that enhances the long-term sustainability of space, including by
addressing both environmental threats and security challenges. Both
countries should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil
space projects, including science and exploration. Doing so would create an
element to their relationship that has a different dynamic from military-to-
military interactions. At the same time, both the United States and China
should be cognizant of where their interests in space differ and look to enact
confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis
escalating into outright conflict. While the prospects for legally binding arms
control measures are slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and
bilateral measures to reduce tensions created by the testing and
development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and RPO capabilities. Finally, both
countries would benefit significantly from improving their national SSA
capabilities and increasing data sharing with each other.
Head of NASA and CNSA call for cooperation on space

exploration
Arthur Dominic Villasanta, 6-27-2016, "Heads of China and US Space
Agencies Appeal for Cooperation in Space Exploration," Chinatopix,
http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/93677/20160627/heads-china-space-
agencies-appeal-cooperation-exploration.htm
Over the past two months, the heads of NASA and the China National Space
Administration (CNSA) have jointly and separately called for renewing
cooperation in space exploration between the United States and China. The
renewed call for cooperation comes amid separate programs by both NASA
and CNSA to land humans on Mars by the 2030s. NASA later this year will see
the first launch of its Space Launch System (SLS) heavy rocket that will take a
multinational team of astronauts to land on Mars by 2035. China plans to
land its first robot rover on Mars by 2021 and is currently developing a heavy
rocket that can reach the Red Planet. Over the next 15 years, China will
develop and launch a heavy lift rocket nearly 10 meters in diameter and with
five times the carrying capacity of current rockets for voyages to Mars. Last
April, CNSA head Prof. Wu Weiren affirmed China is ready to again work with
the U.S. despite the legal ban on cooperation imposed by the U.S. and the
perception among influential members of the U.S. Congress that CNSA
remains a military-led organization whose priority is to ensure China's military
dominance of space beneath the guise of a civilian space program. CNSA is
an agency of the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry
for National Defense (SASTIND), a pseudo-civilian organization apparently led
by military officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). SASTIND and its
predecessor have played a key role in developing China's space program
since 1956 when China began its ballistic missile program. Today, SASTIND is
China's comprehensive administrative office for national defense science;
military technology and military industries. "We would like to cooperate with
the US, especially for space and moon exploration. We would welcome this
very much," said Wu. "We have urged the US many times to get rid of
restrictions, so scientists from both countries can work together on future
exploration.'" And this May, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden suggested
the United States resume cooperation with China in space by having
Congress revise U.S. Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 that bans any cooperative
effort among the space programs of both the U.S. and China. "We were in an
incredible Cold War with the Soviets at the time we flew Apollo-Soyuz. It was
because leaders in both nations felt it was time," said Bolden. "That
represented a great use of soft power, if you will. Look where we are today. I
think we will get there (with China). And I think it is necessary." Bolden
suggested initial steps to unfreeze the thaw such as "working on weather
satellite data sharing and things like that. Things that will make critics on
China on Capitol Hill a little bit more relaxed about the idea of cooperation."
The 112th U.S. Congress in November 2011 banned NASA from engaging in
bilateral agreements and coordination with China, a ban enforced under
Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539. The probability of the U.S. Congress enacting a
new law to overturn Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 is remote considering the
animosity between China and the U.S. over the South China Sea and the
absence of lawmakers willing to go to bat for China. The right wing
Republican Party remains hostile towards China and its members control the
committee in the House of Representatives responsible for NASA
appropriations. The man who chairs the House of Representatives
appropriations subpanel that oversees NASA, John Culberson (R-TX), in 2010
urged President Barack Obama not to allow further contact between NASA
and CNSA. "I have grave concerns about the nature and goals of China's
space program and strongly oppose any cooperation between NASA and
CNSA's human space flight programs without Congressional authorization,"
he said in a letter to Obama. Bolden said he doesn't not expect the ban to be
lifted during his tenure that ends with that of Obama's.
MS Space aff outline for
reference
1AC Inherency
Currently, the USFG prohibits NASA and CNSA
collaboration
Fernholz 15 [Tim, fellow at the New America Foundation, NASA has no
choice but to refuse Chinas request for help on a new space station Quartz
10/13/15, http://qz.com/523094/nasa-has-no-choice-but-to-refuse-chinas-
request-for-help-on-a-new-space-station //GK]
The chief designer of Chinas space program , Zhou Jianping, said his country
would solicit international partners for a space station it plans to launch in
2022, with opportunities ranging from shared experiments and spacecraft
visits by foreign crews to building permanent modules to attach to the main
station. The European and Russian space agencies already have signed preliminary agreements with
China, but NASA will have to snub the project. The ban on cooperation between
NASA and the China Manned Space Program is a legacy of conservative
lawmaker Frank Wolf, who cut off any funding for work with China in protest
of political repression there and for fear of sharing advanced technology; he
retired in January, but the restrictions remain in place. And NASA is not a fan
of them. In his own remarks at the IAC, NASA administrator Charles Bolden said the
US, for its own good, ought to dump the four-year-old ban. We will find ourselves on
the outside looking in, because everybodywho has any hope of a human spaceflight programwill go to
whoever will fly their people, Bolden said, according to a report from Reuters. Currently, China operates a
space station called Tiangong 1 that has hosted several multi-week visits by groups of Chinese astronauts.
The US supports the International Space Station and its permanent crew of three to six astronauts
alongside 15 other countries, including Russia. Both the US and Russia have committed to provide support
to the station through 2024. The US has a long history of space diplomacy with
opponentsas with the USSR during the 1970s. With US policy framing China as a
peaceful competitor rather than ideological enemy, the current restrictions on
consorting with the Chinese space program has put NASA in a tough spot
with space scientists from outside the agency , some of whom have protested the ban by
boycotting scientific conferences. If the desire for manned cooperation with the
Chinese is not enough to persuade US lawmakers to loosen their restrictions,
theres also the increasing concerns among space agencies and satellite
operators that a lack of coordination between burgeoning space programs
will lead to potential orbital disaster. Tests of anti-satellite weapons have already resulted in
costly, in-orbit accidents. Civil space cooperation between the US and China could
provide trust and lines of communication for de-escalation as fears of space
militarization increase. And its not like there isnt some cross-pollination alreadySpaceNews
notes that Zhou received some of his training at the University of Southern California.
1AC Space War
Differing goals in space and Chinas desire to be a global
power in space will lead to increased tensions that will
escalate into a renewed arms race
Weeden 15 Brian Weeden is the Technical Advisor for Secure World
Foundation and a former U.S. Air Force 9/9/15 An Opportunity to Use the
Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship
http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602
The United States and China have identified space as a strategic

domain that is critical to their national interests and development. Both
nations are dedicating considerable resources to developing their
civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Beijing and Washington see
their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and
international prestige. Over time, what happens in space could serve as either a
source of instability, or a means of strengthening the U.S.-China relationship. The
United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space. The United
States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as
a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space- based
capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national
security, enabling communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the
verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of
the United States intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States ability to
defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and
defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the U.S. and
the global economy. China is focused on developing its own
capabilities in the space domain , and increasingly depends on space-
based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly
incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially the
United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national
security and securing its role as a rising power. From China s
perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap
between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a
voice in the creation of international norms and institutions particularly
because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by
the United States. As the two nations act on these differing priorities and
goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the
overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing and development of anti-
satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on active defense have
caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection
and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such
capabilities to support national security, close the power gap, and defend itself
from American aggression., Failure to reconcile their differences in this
domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the
detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the importance
of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in
space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for
greater international space security.
Space Weaponization causes war

Mitchell, 01 Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at
the University of Pittsburghm (Dr. Gordon, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence,
Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads, No. 6 July,
http://www.isisuk.demon.co.uk/0811/isis/uk/bmd/no6.html)
A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but
this rationale glosses over the tendency that ' the presence of space weaponswill result in the increased
likelihood of their use'.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to
arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'.34 The interlocking nature
of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne
weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to
intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile
interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death
Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space
warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-
second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair trigger' devices . In theory,
this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to
commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military
planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly
interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on
each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different
ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system
characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable'.36 Deployment of space weapons with pre-
delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable,
given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a
space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the
earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage even more than would be done by a
nuclear weapon of the same size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence
analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of
microwave-grilled people'.38 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected
to
space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or
chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into
the most destructive military conflict ever seen.
Space debris poses a considerable threat to US satellites,

a collision between space debris and a US satellite runs
the high risk of being misinterpreted as an attack on the
satellite, and consequently a declaration of war
Billings 15
Lee Billings, 8-10-2015, "War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever," Scientific
American, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-
closer-than-ever/
For Krepon, the debate over the definitions of space weapons and the
saber-rattling between Russia, China and the U.S. is unhelpfully
eclipsing the more pressing issue of debris. Everyone is talking about
purposeful, man-made objects dedicated to warfighting in space, and its like
we are back in the Cold War, Krepon says. Meanwhile, there are about
20,000 weapons already up there in the form of debris. Theyre not
purposefultheyre unguided. Theyre not seeking out enemy satellites.
Theyre just whizzing around, doing what they do.
The space environment, he says, must be protected as a global commons,
similar to the Earths oceans and atmosphere. Space junk is very easy to
make and very hard to clean up, so international efforts should focus on
preventing its creation. Beyond the threat of deliberate destruction, the risk
of accidental collisions and debris strikes will continue to grow as
more nations launch and operate more satellites without rigorous
international accountability and oversight. And as the chance of
accidents increases, so too does the possibility of their being
misinterpreted as deliberate, hostile actions in the high-tension
cloak-and-dagger military struggle in space.
The amount of space debris continues to grow, and an

unintended impact will cause a major crisis between the
US and China
Zenko 14
Micah Zenko, April 2014, "Dangerous Space Incidents," Council on Foreign
Relations, http://www.cfr.org/space/dangerous-space-incidents/p32790
A January 2007 direct ascent ASAT test carried out by China against its
defunct Fengyun-1C weather satellite instantly increased the amount of
space debris in low earth orbit (LEO) by 40 percent. Debris is
especially problematic in LEO, where half of the world's 1,100 active
satellites operate. Space objectseven flecks of painttravel as fast as
eighteen thousand miles per hour and can cause catastrophic damage to
manned and unmanned spacecraftcreating even more debris in the
process. The U.S. National Research Council estimates that portions of LEO
have reached a "tipping point," with hundreds of thousands of space
debris larger than one centimeter stuck in orbit that will collide with other
pieces of debris or spacecraft, thus creating exponentially more debris.
Significant growth in the quantity or density of space debris could render
certain high-demand portions of outer space unnavigable and inutile.
Currently, there are no legal or internationally accepted means for removing
existing debris. China could also test co-orbital antisatellite systems in which
an interceptor spacecraft destroys its target by exploding in close proximity,
creating even more debris. For several years, Beijing has conducted a series
of close proximity maneuvers with its satellites in LEO; the most recent
occurred after a July 20, 2013, launch of three satellites on the same rocket,
which have since conducted sudden maneuvers toward other Chinese
satellites. Human or operating errors during these maneuvers could
inadvertently result in a collision that produces harmful debris. While these
maneuvers could eventually be used for civilian purposes, most U.S. officials
believe these experiments are primarily intended to demonstrate latent ASAT
capabilities. An ASAT test that causes unintended damage to U.S. and
ally satellites or an accident in space caused by debris could trigger
a major international crisis between the United States and China.
The risk is heightened by the fact that both countries have no prespace-
launch notification arrangements, similar to the U.S.-Russia agreement on
notifications of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. Management of such a crisis
could also be hindered by a lack of direct communication between
U.S. authorities and the PLA agency that oversees Chinese military
space launches.
The consequences of Space warfare extremely high, equal
to that of nuke war Lamrani 16 Omar Lamrani, 5-18-2016, "What
the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-the-us-military-fears-most-
massive-space-war-16248?page=2
Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one
with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space
systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other
functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future breakthroughs may
await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste
disposal and extraterrestrial mining.
A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and the
resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage
to the world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the
consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of
nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early
launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear
attack, driving the threat of a wider conflagration.
The United States and China focusing on common

interests, exchanging views on space policy, discussing
ideas for cooperation, and increasing transparency will
solve for differing goals, misperceptions,
misinterpretations, and strategic instabilities that pave
the way for global conflict Weeden 15 Brian Weeden, 9-9-2015,
"An Opportunity to Use the Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China
Relationship," No Publication, http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602
Despite these challenges and concerns, there are concrete steps that the
United States and China can take to manage tensions and possibly
even work toward positive engagement. In 2011, President Barack Obama and
then Chinese president Hu Jintao issued a joint statement on strengthening U.S.-China relations
during a visit by President Hu to the White House. As one of the steps outlined in the statement, the
two presidents agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of
space and discuss opportunities for practical future cooperation. President Xi Jinpings upcoming
visit presents an opportunity to build on the 2011 agreement and take steps toward these goals.
The first step should be to have a substantive discussion on space
security. President Obama should clearly communicate the importance that the United States
places on assured access to space, U.S. concerns with recent Chinese counterspace testing, and the
potential negative consequences of any aggressive acts in space . Both countries should
exchange views on space policies, including their interpretations of how self-defense
applies to satellites and hostile actions in space. Doing so can help avoid
misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead either
country to unwittingly take actions that escalate a crisis. Second,
Presidents Obama and Xi should discuss specific ideas for
cooperation in civil and scientific space activities and the use of
space for peaceful applications on earth. Continuing to exclude
China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from
developing its own capabilities; this approach will only ensure that China cooperates
with other countries in space in a way that advances its own national interests and goals. Space
weather, scientific research, exploration, capacity building for
disaster response, and global environmental monitoring are all areas
where the United States and China share joint interests and could
collaborate with each other and other interested countries to help establish
broader relationships outside the military realm. In addition, the United States
should take steps on its own to stabilize the relationship. First and foremost, it
should get serious about making U.S. space capabilities more resilient. Increasing
resilience would support deterrence by decreasing the benefits an adversary might hope to achieve
and also help ensure that critical capabilities can survive should deterrence fail. While resilience has
been a talking point for the last few years, the United States has made little progress toward
achieving the goal. Radical change is thus needed in how Washington develops and organizes
national security space capabilities. Moreover, the United States should embrace commercial
services to diversify and augment governmental capabilities, while encouraging allies to develop
their own space capabilities. Second,the United States should continue to
bolster the transparency of space activities by increasing the amount of space
situational awareness (SSA) data available to satellite operators and the public. Greater
transparency reinforces ongoing U.S. and international initiatives to
promote responsible behavior in space and also helps mitigate the
possibility for accidents or naturally caused events to spark or
escalate tensions. Shifting responsibility for space safety to a civil agency that can share
and cooperate more easily with the international community and working with the international
community to develop more publicly available sources of SSA data outside the U.S. government are
The
two steps that would enhance trust, improve data reliability, and reinforce norms of behavior.
consequences of not addressing the current strategic instability in
space are real. A future conflict in space between the United States
and China would have devastating impacts on everyone who uses and relies on
space. Both the United States and China have acknowledged the dangers of outright conflict and
the initial steps
have pledged their interest in avoiding such an outcome. Taken together,
outlined here could help stabilize the U.S.-China strategic
relationship in space, mitigate the threat of the worst-case scenario,
and work toward a more positive outcome that benefits all. An arms
race in space will eventually lead other states to catch up with the
United States and thereby placing Washingtons commercial satellites
at risk. Space weaponization may well have cataclysmic
consequences given the link between space weapons and nuclear
weapons strategy. This is because Russia, and the United States, to a
certain extent rely on satellites for early warning of nuclear attack. As
other space nations with nuclear weapons develop their space
capacity it is expected that they will follow suit. The deployment of
space weapons means that the first shot in a nuclear war would be fired
against these early warning satellites. Currently strategic planners in
Moscow have about 10 minutes between warning of an attack and the
decision to launch nuclear weapons in response before they impact. Weapons
in space would lower this in certain scenarios down to seconds. This would
also apply for weapons placed in space that would be considered to be
defensive such as say a space based BMD interceptor or a counter-ASAT
weapon. On occasion, ground warning radars falsely show that a nuclear
attack has been launched. In the 1990s a false alarm went all the way up to
President Boris Yeltsin and was terminated after approximately eight minutes.
We are still here, noted analysts believe, because warning satellites would
have given Moscow real time information showing the alarm to be false.
Should such a false alarm coincide with an accident involving an early
warning satellite when space weapons are known to exist, an accidental
nuclear exchange could result. The risk would increase if the false alarm
occurred during a crisis. Space weapons could lead to itchy fingers on
nuclear triggers. They would therefore significantly increase the importance
nuclear weapon states place upon nuclear deterrence.
1AC Cooperation Spill Over Adv.
Co-op Spills Over to Other Science Empirically Proven
Zheng, 15 -- scientist at the National Astronomical Observatories, Chinese
Academy of Sciences [Yong-Chun, "Could Sino-U.S. cooperation bring The
Martian home?" Planetary Society, 11-10-2015,
www.planetary.org/blogs/guest-blogs/2015/1110-could-sino-us-cooperation-
bring-the-martian-home.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/, accessed 6-
20-16]
Before the implementation of the exclusionary U.S. law, Chinese and American
scientists laid a good foundation for cooperation. The two sides should
strengthen contacts and exchanges, and use multinational cooperation to avoid
political risks. This cooperation could start from key points and expand to larger
areas. Such an approach has precedent. During the Cold War, U.S. scientists
engaged with their Soviet counterparts, and the Apollo-Soyuz mission was an
example of the two powers specifically using space as a means to cooperate
peacefully, despite other tensions. The space industries of China and the United States
should reduce suspicions, negotiate rules of conduct, promote in-depth and
substantial cooperation, and achieve mutual benefits . Together, these two nations
could bring home The Martian.
Science Diplomacy solves Nuclear War and Multiple Other

Impacts
Fedoroff, 8 US State Dept Science and Technology adviser [Nina, member of the
National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the European
Academy of Sciences, she has served on the National Science Board of the National Science
Foundation, International Science and Technology Cooperation, Testimony before congress,
4-2-8, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg41470/html/CHRG-110hhrg41470.htm,]
Chairman Baird, Ranking Member Ehlers, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
this opportunity to discuss science diplomacy at the U.S. Department of State. The U.S. is recognized
globally for its leadership in science and technology. Our scientific strength is both a tool of ``soft power''--
part of our strategic diplomatic arsenal--and a basis for creating partnerships with countries as they move
Science diplomacy is a central element of
beyond basic economic and social development.
transformational diplomacy initiative, because science and technology
the Secretary's
are essential to achieving stability and strengthening failed and fragile states. S&T
advances have immediate and enormous influence on national and global economies, and thus on the
international relations between societies. Nation states, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational
corporations are largely shaped by their expertise in and access to intellectual and physical capital in
science, technology, and engineering. Even as S&T advances of our modern era provide opportunities for
economic prosperity, some also challenge the relative position of countries in the world order, and
influence our social institutions and principles. America must remain at the forefront of this new world by
maintaining its technological edge, and leading the way internationally through science diplomacy and
Science by its nature facilitates diplomacy
engagement. The Public Diplomacy Role of
because it strengthens political relationships, embodies powerful ideals, and
creates opportunities for all. The global scientific community embraces principles Americans
cherish: transparency, meritocracy, accountability, the objective evaluation of evidence, and broad and
frequently democratic participation. Science is inherently democratic, respecting evidence and truth above
Science is also a common global language, able to bridge deep political
all.
and religious divides. Scientists share a common language. Scientific
interactions serve to keep open lines of communication and cultural
understanding. As scientists everywhere have a common evidentiary external reference system,
members of ideologically divergent societies can use the common language
of science to cooperatively address both domestic and the increasingly trans-national and
global problems confronting humanity in the 21st century. There is a growing recognition that
science and technology will increasingly drive the successful economies of the 21st century. Science and
technology provide an immeasurable benefit to the U.S. by bringing scientists and students here,
especially from developing countries, where they see democracy in action, make friends in the
international scientific community, become familiar with American technology, and contribute to the U.S.
and global economy. For example, in 2005, over 50 percent of physical science and engineering graduate
students and postdoctoral researchers trained in the U.S. have been foreign nationals. Moreover, many
foreign-born scientists who were educated and have worked in the U.S. eventually progress in their careers
to hold influential positions in ministries and institutions both in this country and in their home countries.
They also contribute to U.S. scientific and technologic development: According to the National Science
Board's 2008 Science and Engineering Indicators, 47 percent of full-time doctoral science and engineering
faculty in U.S. research institutions were foreign-born. Finally, some types of science--particularly those
that address the grand challenges in science and technology--are inherently international in scope and
collaborative by necessity. The ITER Project, an international fusion research and development
collaboration, is a product of the thaw in superpower relations between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
and U.S. President Ronald Reagan. This reactor will harness the power of nuclear fusion as a possible new
and viable energy source by bringing a star to Earth. ITER serves as a symbol of international scientific
cooperation among key scientific leaders in the developed and developing world--Japan, Korea, China, E.U.,
India, Russia, and United States--representing 70 percent of the world's current population. The recent
elimination of funding for FY08 U.S. contributions to the ITER project comes at an inopportune time as the
Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion Energy Organization for the Joint
Implementation of the ITER Project had entered into force only on October 2007. The elimination of the
promised U.S. contribution drew our allies to question our commitment and credibility in international
cooperative ventures. More problematically, it jeopardizes a platform for reaffirming U.S. relations with key
even at the height of the cold war, the U nited States used
states. It should be noted that
science diplomacy as a means to maintain communications and avoid
misunderstanding between the world's two nuclear powers--the Soviet Union and
the United States. In a complex multi-polar world, relations are more challenging,
the threats perhaps greater, and the need for engagement more paramount.
Using Science Diplomacy to Achieve National Security Objectives The welfare and stability of
countries and regions in many parts of the globe require a concerted effort by the
developed world to address the causal factors that render countries fragile and cause states to fail.
Countries that are unable to defend their people against starvation, or fail to provide economic
opportunity, are susceptible to extremist ideologies, autocratic rule, and abuses of human rights. As well,
the world faces common threats, among them climate change, energy and water
shortages, public health emergencies, environmental degradation, poverty, food
insecurity, and religious extremism. These threats can undermine the national security of the
United States, both directly and indirectly. Many are blind to political boundaries , becoming
regional or global threats. The United States has no monopoly on knowledge in a globalizing world and the
scientific challenges facing humankind are enormous. Addressing these common challenges
demands common solutions and necessitates scientific cooperation , common standards, and
common goals. We must increasingly harness the power of American ingenuity in science and technology
through strong partnerships with the science community in both academia and the private sector, in the
U.S. and abroad among our allies, to advance U.S. interests in foreign policy. There are also important
challenges to the ability of states to supply their populations with sufficient food. The still-growing human
population, rising affluence in emerging economies, and other factors have combined to create
unprecedented pressures on global prices of staples such as edible oils and grains. Encouraging and
promoting the use of contemporary molecular techniques in crop improvement is an essential goal for U.S.
An essential part of the war on terrorism is a war of ideas. The
science diplomacy.
creation of economic opportunity can do much more to combat the rise of
fanaticism than can any weapon. The war of ideas is a war about rationalism as
opposed to irrationalism. Science and technology put us firmly on the side of
rationalism by providing ideas and opportunities that improve people's lives.
We may use the recognition and the goodwill that science still generates for the United States to achieve
the Department continues to use
our diplomatic and developmental goals. Additionally,
science as a means to reduce the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and
prevent what has been dubbed `brain drain.' Through cooperative threat reduction
activities, former weapons scientists redirect their skills to participate in peaceful,
collaborative international research in a large variety of scientific fields. In addition, new
global efforts focus on improving biological , chemical, and nuclear security by
promoting and implementing best scientific practices as a means to enhance
security, increase global partnerships,
Space is keyit spills over to broader cooperation.

Zhou 8 (Yi Zhou, Center for Space Science and Applied Research, Chinese
Academy of Sciences, George Washington University, "Perspectives on Sino-
US cooperation in civil space programs", 7/14/08,
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964608000404//avi)
Benefits for geopolitical issues and global stability. A country's strategic
interests may provide the primary motivation for engaging partner nations in
cooperative space ventures. The International Space Station (ISS) is a good
example of this. China and the USA are both important countries and a stable
relationship between them is a key factor in global stability. Space could be
a focal point for promoting this kind of stability . Several European
countries and Russia have undertaken cooperative activities in space with
China to satisfy their geopolitical demands and other interests. Chinese
participation in US-led space exploration would send a strong signal to the
world of good USChina relations [8], which would be good for US international
relations and would provide geopolitical benefits. The United States will be
able to understand more about China's space development and direction
through actual cooperation. At the moment the USA observes China's space policy and
capabilities through statements in China's white papers. But studying one paper every five years is too
Some American consulting and research
limited and does not provide sufficient detail.
institutions may simply rely on graduate students superficial papers to try to
gain insight into the direction of China's space development. These are not
full-scale or always entirely accurate, and may sometimes result in
misunderstandings. If NASA signed an agreement with CNSA and began joint
space projects, they would more easily and directly understand China's space
activities and directions. They may even be able to make some good suggestions for China's
space projects and policies. These winwin suggestions should be readily adopted by
China's policy makers to extend the two countries space and national
benefits.
Cooperation between the US and China is necessary for
both global cooperation and the overcoming of global
challenges
Fingar and Garrett 13 Thomas Fingar (Stanford University) and Banning Garrett (Atlantic
Council), 2013 China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future http://cusef.org.hk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf
The next round of challenges can only be managed successfully if nations, especially major
powers, cooperate. Moreover, the most difficult and most consequential challenges cannot
be managed effectively without sustained cooperation between the largest developing
country, China, and the largest developed country, the United States. Stated another way, the
ability of China and the United States to work together on critical global challenges will
determine whether the world is able to sustain and enhance mutually beneficial developments
or fails to cope with the issues critical to the global future and to the security and prosperity of
the United States and China. This shared conviction persuades us that we must do more than just
hope that our countries will find ways to cooperate. This report represents a joint effort to develop
both the rationale and concrete mechanisms for sustained, proactive collaboration to address
challenges resulting from long-term global trends and consequential uncertainties. It builds on
the findings of independent efforts to identify megatrends and potential game-changers with
the goal of developing a framework for the USChina relationship that will better enable
us to meet the challenges facing the global community and the strategic needs of both
countries. The Joint Working Group recognizes that China and the United States hold different
views on many bilateral and international issues, and that our relationship is constrained by
mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust. Nevertheless, our common strategic interests and
responsibility as major powers are more important than the specific issues that divide us;
we must not make cooperation on critical global issues contingent on prior resolution of bilateral
disputes. Our disagreements on bilateral issues are important, but they are not as important to
our long-term security and prosperity as is our ability to cooperate on key challenges to
global security and our increasingly intertwined futures. We must cooperate on global challenges
not as a favor to one another or because other nations expect us to exercise leadership in the
international system. We must do it because failure to cooperate on key global challenges will
have profoundly negative consequences for the citizens of our own countries.
1AC Plan Text
The US congress should lift bans on Sino-US space
cooperation and offer cooperation between NASA and the
CNSA
1AC Solvency
Lifting Nasa CNSA coop bans will lead to international
cooperation between US and China, which is necessary for
the start of bilateral projects and cooperation, which
solves each of our advantages
Kohler 15 - Hannah Kohler is a Research Assistant at Edward Bennett
Williams Law Library at Georgetown University Law Center, The Eagle and
the Hare: U.S.Chinese Relations, the Wolf Amendment, and the Future of
International Cooperation in Space, 2015,
http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/04/Kohler-
TheEagleandtheHare.pdf
international cooperation is both widespread and necessary . Just as the
international sharing of such sensitive and cutting-edge technology is a valid national
security concern, so too should be rejecting the contributions of a
major developing power, especially considering the relative political stagnation
of space exploration in the United States and the burgeoning enthusiasm for
it in China. Although it is impossible to predict what the future will hold for the space explorers of
tomorrow, it[s] seems fully necessary to initiate cautious, but optimistic, cooperation
with China in space: inviting them as a party to the ISS, certainly,
and potentially opening the door for future jointor even bilateral
projects. The Hughes/Loral debacle limited the U.S. communications-satellite industry for decades,130
and its consequences have only recently been corrected in part; Congress must take care not to make the
Isolating NASA from a country
same mistakes with regard to other U.S. investments in space.
space superpower and one of the largest economies in the world
that is both a
will only hurt the United States in the long run. China has a long history of self-sufficiency in space,
and it is demonstrably capable of overcoming the challenges posed by having to reinvent the wheel (or, as
it may be, the rocket) because its global neighbors have historically been too afraid of its military
capabilities and ambitions to share what they know. Would a free flow of technologyif not launching
systems or ballistic information, then at least those many nonmilitary elements of space travel,
exploration, and studytruly hurt the United States? Or would it pique the desire of the Chinese citizens to
be free from their repressive government and experience the freedom of a democratic society? If NASA is
open
truly the pinnacle of American ingenuity, courage, optimism, and grace, then (sensibly)
communication between the scientists and engineers in the CNSA
can only inspire the latter to demand better for themselves, their country, and
their space program.
China wants space cooperation with the US

China Daily 16 China Daily 4/25/16 China Open to Sino-US
Space Cooperation
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-
04/25/content_24813817.htm
China is open to space cooperation with all nations including the
United States, the heavyweights of China's space program said on Sunday, the
anniversary of China's first satellite launch 46 years ago. "China will not rule out
cooperating with any country, and that includes the United States,"
said Yang Liwei, China's first astronaut. Payload has been reserved in the
Chinese space station, due to enter service around 2022, for international projects and
foreign astronauts, said Yang on the occasion of the first China Space Day, an annual
celebration newly designated by the government. Upon request, China will also
train astronauts for other countries, and jointly train astronauts with the
European space station, Yang said. "The future of space exploration lies in
international cooperation. It's true for us, and for the United States
too," according to the senior astronaut. His words were echoed by Zhou Jianping, chief
engineer of China's manned space program. Zhou said, "It is well understood that the
United States is a global leader in space technology. But China is no less ambitious in
contributing to human development." "Cooperation between major space
players will be conducive to the development of all mankind," Zhou
added. Citing security reasons, the U.S. Congress passed a law in 2011 to prohibit
NASA from hosting Chinese visitors at its facilities and working with researchers
affiliated to any Chinese government entity or enterprise
Other Cards/2ac
A/2 Increased Tech stealing : Space coop with China
ensures we keep an eye on their transactions.
Ressler 9 (Aaron R, Major, USAF, under the direction of Edwina S.
Campbell, Ph.D, ADVANCING SINO-U.S. SPACE COOPERATION,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA539619//sb)
this deterrence would be a secondary
While possibly deterring Chinese ASAT operations,
effect (or benefit for that matter) of successful U.S.-China space cooperation . In order
for this cooperation to take place, the benefits will have to outweigh the
challenges (some which will likely be viewed as risks) for both nations. The first benefit of
cooperation would be improved transparency . 82 Secrecy of Chinas space
program has led to a suspicious outlook by many critics of this program. Space
cooperation between the two countries could be based on regular
meetings which could help the two nations understand each others
intentions more clearly. 83 With China as a partner, the U.S. would have better
visibility and communication with the CNSA concerning Chinas space
activities, and the same would hold true for China. Reviewing Chinas White Paper on its
space policy and trying to make sense of its counterspace capabilities after the fact is the wrong approach.
If NASA signed an agreement with CNSA and began joint space projects,
they would more easily and directly understand Chinas space activities and
directions. 84
Space is a key issuemistrust of China in space makes in-

depth cooperation impossible.
Washington Post 11 ("Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation",
1/22/11, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html) AK
TheObama administration views space as ripe territory for cooperation with China .
Gates has called it one of four potential areas of "strategic
Defense Secretary Robert M.
dialogue," along with cybersecurity, missile defense and nuclear weapons. And President Obama and
Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed after their White House summit last week to "deepen dialogue and
exchanges" in the field. But as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic talk of cooperation has
so far found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant interest in opening up the most
sensitive details of its program, much of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). At the
Chinese scientists and space officials say that Washington's wariness
same time,
of China's intentions in space, as well as U.S. bans on some high-technology
exports, makes cooperation problematic. For now, the U.S.-China relationship in
space appears to mirror the one on Earth - a still-dominant but fading
superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides.
"What you have are two major powers, both of whom use space for military, civilian and commercial
purposes," said Dean Cheng, a researcher with the Washington-based Heritage Foundation and an expert
NASA's human spaceflight program has been
on the Chinese military and space program.
in flux in recent years, fueling particular concern among some U.S. observers
about the challenge posed by China's initiatives in that area. There is "a lot of
very wary, careful, mutual watching," Cheng said. Song Xiaojun, a military expert
and commentator on China's CCTV, said that substantial cooperation in the
space field is impossible without mutual trust. Achieving that , he said, "depends
on whether the U.S. can put away its pride and treat China as a partner to
cooperate on equal terms. But I don't see that happening in the near future, since the U.S. is
experiencing menopause while China is going through puberty."
Issues in US-China relations are interconnectedtensions

in space spill over to other areas.
Foust 6 (Jeff Foust is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, "US-
China space cooperation: the Congressional view", 7/17/06,
www.thespacereview.com/article/661/1) AK
Inevitably, any China-US space cooperation will get tangled up in
bigger issues between the two countries, like economic policy and
human rights, something that the congressmen said shouldnt be avoided .
The fact is when you talk to the United States you have to talk democracy and human rights; its just part
Were going to talk jobs, and were going to talk about the
of who we are.
economy. Were going to talk about military issues, said Larsen. They may be
uncomfortable to talk about, but were going to have to address these issues
if were going to even get to a point where we can talk about moving
forward. This gets back to the question of what each country has to gain by
cooperating with one another in space exploration , an issue that arguably has not yet
been convincingly answered in either country. Larsen, looking at the big picture, notes that China is
working hard on a number of fronts to become more technologically advanced. The
space program
is part of that economic development goal, he said. US policy needs to
understand that, address it, and find ways to engage China on any number of
issues because that country is thinking more strategically in terms of goal of
competitiveness than I think we are. How space fits into that big pictureor even if it does
has yet to be determined.
Bilateral US-China coop is necessary for the future of

space exploration both sides agree
Liu 16 [Libo, NASA Chief: Congress Should Revise US-China Space
Cooperation Law Voices of America 5/24/16,
http://www.voanews.com/content/nasa-congress-us-china-space-cooperation-
law/3344926.html //GK]
NASA says the U.S. can someday cooperate with China as it did with the
Soviet Union on the Apollo-Soyuz joint project in 1975. Responding to questions
Monday at an event hosted by the Mitchell Institute on Capitol Hill, NASA Administrator Charles
Bolden said the U.S. should pursue such a relationship with China in human
space exploration. "We were in an incredible Cold War with the Soviets at the time we flew Apollo-
Soyuz; it was because leaders in both nations felt it was time," he said. "That represented a great use of
Look where we are today. I think we will get there [with
soft power, if you will.
China]. And I think it is necessary." Current law prohibits NASA from engaging
with its Chinese counterparts on such projects. But Bolden, who will travel to
Beijing later this year, says Congress should consider revising the law. Peter
Huessy, a senior adviser at the Mitchell Institute and prominent defense consultant, tells VOA he is not
opposed to a revision of relevant law, but cautions against any premature enthusiasm. "We tend to engage
in a lot of wishful thinking when it comes to China," he said. "We should understand China is an explicit
adversary and enemy of the United States, according to their own internal documents and strategies and
publications." Brendan Curry, vice president of the Space Foundation, tells VOA that small steps can be
taken in bilateral relations to calm lawmakers' fears about China's threat to U.S. space assets. The initial
steps, he said, would perhaps involve such projects as "working on weather satellite data sharing and
things like that things that will make critics on China on Capitol Hill a little bit more relaxed about the
idea of cooperation."
Policy shift to allow for US-China space coop is key now

solves budget stunts and allows for unprecedented
innovation
Dickerson 15 [Kelly, science reporter, Here's why NASA won't work with
China to explore space Tech Insider 10/19/15, http://www.techinsider.io/nasa-
china-collaboration-illegal-2015-10 //GK]
It will take a big policy shift to change that sentiment and foster collaboration
between NASA and the China National Space Administration (CNSA). One of the
biggest collaborative projects in which NASA is involved is the International Space Station (ISS). It's a space
China,
station built and maintained by the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, and Canada.
however, is banned from involvement in the ISS, thanks to US lawmakers. But
CNSA seems to be doing just fine on its own. Since its founding in 1993, the Chinese space agency has
launched 10 people and a small space station into orbit, among other missions. China's successes
in space have impressed NASA enough to broach the topic of collaboration
several times at the White House. But according to space policy expert John Logsdon, getting
the US to work together with China on spaceward missions will take a long policy battle. " The first
step is the White House working with congressional leadership to get current,
unwise restrictions on such cooperation revoked ," Logsdon told Space.com. "Then,
the United States can invite China to work together with the United States
and other spacefaring countries on a wide variety of space activities and,
most dramatically, human spaceflight. " NASA could have much to gain in the
future in working with China. China became the third country ever to successfully launch
humans into space, behind Russia and the US, and it's made much progress since. Two years ago, CNSA
landed a small telescope on the moon, which is still up there taking crystal-clear images of the cosmos
(because Earth's dirty atmosphere isn't in the way). The agency also operates its own space lab called
Tiangong 1, is testing powerful new rockets, and has ambitious plans to land more probes on the moon and
perhaps a colony there one day. If CNSA's progress in space exploration and tech
development isn't a compelling enough reason to work with China, then
NASA's stunted budget offers another. More international collaboration could
only be positive for a space agency that has faced budget cut after budget
cut. President John F. Kennedy committed to a moon landing by the end of the 1960s, then Nixon took the
helm and slammed on the brakes after a handful of crewed lunar missions. As Logsdon writes in an article
for NASA: "Nixon rejected NASA's ambitious post-Apollo plans, which included developing a series of large
space stations, continued missions to the moon, and an initial mission to Mars in the 1980s," Logsdon
writes. "By
the time Nixon left the White House, the NASA budget had fallen
from its peak of almost 4% of the total federal budget to less than 1% ." Some
argue that we would already have sent humans to Mars if NASA had kept its
momentum. More collaboration could help get NASA back on track. NASA
administrator Charles Bolden event wrote in a recent blog post that he thinks more collaboration will help
get us get boots on Mars: A Journey such as this is something that no one person, crew, or Agency can
undertake alone. [...] A mission of this magnitude is made stronger with international partnership the sort
of spirit and cooperation that is demonstrated so vividly by the tens of thousands of people across 15
countries who have been involved in the development and operation of the International Space Station. In
fact, NASA just announced a partnership with the Israel Space Agency that will allow the two agencies to
conduct joint missions and share research facilities. I personally think it would be great to see a similar
agreement with China some day soon especially since the nation announced it's seeking international
partners to help build another space station in the 2020s (and the station sounds really cool). But again,
current US law forbids NASA from helping out or getting involved at all. Russia will only support the $100
billion space station until 2024, and that's a huge problem because, right now, NASA relies on Russia's
Working
rockets to get its astronauts into space. It's unclear what NASA will do once Russia pulls out.
with China and other nations to build a bigger and better space station would
be a great option. Instead of two space stations, we could have one truly
international station with the most brilliant scientists around the world
working together. That kind of collaboration would speed up tech
development; instead of space stations just copying each other's rockets and
space probes, we could start working together to advance technology at a
much faster pace than we are right now. We'll need a new generation of
space tech if we ever hope to get to Mars. It already seems like the two
agencies do want to collaborate, since discussion of that possibility has
reached the White House several times. US scientists have also openly
criticized policy makers in the past for preventing Chinese scientists from
attending space conferences. It seems like politics shouldn't get in the way of pure scientific
pursuit, but the reality is US lawmakers won't allow collaboration with China because they are worried
about national security and protecting state secrets. But who knows, if the two space agencies
started working together, it might open up enough lines of communication
between the US and China for the two nations to defrost their icy relationship.
In the meantime China will continue to expand its space exploration efforts. Unless a big policy
shift happens, NASA might have to sit on the sidelines while an incredible
new chapter of space exploration begins.
China is already cooperating with Europe and Russia

lack of US-China coop leaves the US in the dust
Messier 16 [Doug, co-founder of the Earth and Space Foundation, Masters
in science, technology, and public policy from George Washington University,
Chinese Space Program Increases International Cooperation Parabolic Arc
5/10/16, http://www.parabolicarc.com/2016/05/10/chinese-space-program-
increases-international-cooperation //GK]
Chinas growing space program is deepening its cooperation with Russia and
Europe while partnerships with the United States remain severely limited due
to Congressional restrictions. It is well understood that the United States is a
global leader in space technology. But China is no less ambitious in
contributing to human development, said Zhou Jianping, chief engineer of Chinas human
space program. Cooperation between major space players will be conducive to
the development of all mankind. Chinas Russia Connection Russia and China are pursuing a
broad range of cooperative programs. Russia and China have good interaction mechanisms. We have a
plan of cooperation in several dozens of projects that are successfully implemented, said Xu Dazhe,
Chinas Deputy Industry and Information Technology Minister. The two sides are cooperating in the fields
of engine technology, electronics, joint research of the Universe, development of new technologies and
optimized use of space resources, he added. Russia is trading its expertise in liquid fuel engine
technologies for Chinese expertise in radiation-resistant electronic for use in satellites. The exchange will
help China improve its launch vehicles while Russia can evade Western sanctions imposed over its military
intervention in Ukraine. As a sign of the deepening cooperation, Roscosmos CEO Igor Komarov took part in
Chinas National Space Day on April 24 to commemorate the 46th anniversary of the launch of the first
Chinese satellite. European Cooperation Expands Meanwhile, ESA has been expanding its cooperation with
China, with it has named one of its three strategic partners along with the United States and Russia. Last
month, ESA Director General Johann-Dietrich Woerner completed a visit to China where he met with top
space officials. Lets
open space. Space is beyond all borders so lets also have
the cooperation beyond borders, Woerner said during his visit. When you ask
astronauts, and Im sure also the Chinese astronauts will tell you the same:
they cannot see any border from space. So this is a very nice vision. We
should use this and cooperate worldwide on different schemes, and I think Moon
Village has its value for that. Woerners Moon Village plan involves selecting a location on the lunar
surface where different countries could place habitats and other elements for human exploration. The
village would not be a single, integrated program like the International Space Station. The Moon Village
remains a concept that lacks any formal approval by ESA, NASA or any other space agency. For now, ESA
and China are working together on a space-weather observatory. A European experiment flew aboard the
Shijan-10 experimental capsule, which flew in orbit for 12 days last month before parachuting back to
Earth. ESA has also sent personnel to visit Chinese human spaceflight training facilities. Several European
astronauts have been learning Chinese as part of a joint cooperation program. The long-term goal is for a
European astronaut to fly aboard a Shenzhou spacecraft to a Chinese space station. China plans to launch
the core module of a permanent multi-module space station around 2018, with completion set for 2022.
Chinese officials are looking to use the space station to fly astronauts and experiments from multiple
Chinese officials say they would like to
countries. U.S. Cooperation Remains Difficult
cooperate with United States in space. China will not rule out
cooperating with any country, and that includes the United States , said Yang
Liwei, Chinas first astronaut.The future of space exploration lies in international
cooperation. Its true for us, and for the United States, too. Cooperation is
strictly limited, however. Under U.S. law prohibits NASA and the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from spending any money on
cooperating with China in space. The prohibiion does not apply to the State Department.
American and Chinese diplomats held discussions on civil space cooperation during the seventh round of
the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue last June. The three-day meeting led to the establishment
of a plan to hold regular talks on civil space cooperation in areas such as satellite-collision avoidance,
weather monitoring and climate research. Meanwhile, some cooperation is taking place. A commercial
Chinese experiment will be flown to the International Space Station later this year under a private
agreement between NanoRacks and the Beijing Institute of Technology. The experiment will test the effect
of the space environment on DNA. An earlier experiment flew to Chinas Tiangong-1 space station in 2011.
Congressional restrictions prevent cooperation sought by

scientists in BOTH the US and China
Kwong 16 [Ray, China business strategist, Space: China seeks
cooperation with the US Ejinsight 4/26/16,
http://www.ejinsight.com/20160426-space-china-seeks-cooperation-with-the-
us //GK]
If memory serves, the Moon is Americas turf. Over the course of six manned missions, the United States
sent 24 astronauts to the Moon, 12 of whom actually walked around on the lunar surface, planting flags
and stopping here and there to pose for pictures. Manned missions were so A-OK that at least one
astronaut famously took time out to hit some golf balls. Thats all to say that when it comes to the Moon,
This past Sunday, China, with space ambitions of its
the US has been there, done that.
own, floated an open invitation to the US for a joint cosmic road trip to the
Moon or to Mars, to your space station or ours, wherever, whenever. The
future of space exploration lies in international cooperation. Its true for us,
and for the United States too, said Chinas first astronaut Yang Liwei, according to Xinhua,
Chinas official press agency. His words were echoed by Zhou Jianping, chief engineer of Chinas manned
space program. Zhou said, It
is well understood that the United States is a global
leader in space technology. But China is no less ambitious in contributing to
human development. Cooperation between major space players will be
conducive to the development of all mankind , Zhou added. Chinese President Xi Jinping
asked scientists to help realize Chinas dream of becoming a global space giant as the Communist nation
marked its first Space Day, an annual celebration newly designated by the government, according to
NDTV. In establishing Space Day, we are commemorating history, passing on the spirit, and galvanizing
popular enthusiasm for science, exploration of the unknown and innovation, particularly among young
people, Xi said. He asked space scientists and engineers to make China a space power. Becoming an
With or without
aerospace power has always been a dream weve been striving for, Xi added.
some sort of collaborative effort with the US, China is nothing but committed.
Xu Dazhe, director of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), at a press conference on April 22 in
Beijing, described Chinas Mars mission, slated for 2020, as one which includes an orbiter, lander, and
rover which will walk on Mars, according to a press release. China is also building its own space station
with the core module to be lofted in 2018, followed by another in 2020; the station is expected to be
operational by 2022. In 2013, three Chinese astronauts spent 15 days in orbit aboard an experimental
space lab, the Tiangong 1, before returning to Earth. Later that year, the Change 3 probe made the first
The US may have
soft landing on the moon since 1976 when it deployed the Jade Rabbit moon rover.
to watch China from the sidelines as NASA scientists are currently forbidden
from working with the Chinese space program thanks to a 2011 bill passed by
US Congress, citing security concerns. Be that as it may, China still hopes for
an American assist, with Xu the CNSA director offering proof that NASA is
on board. When I saw the US film The Martian, which envisages China-US cooperation on a Mars
rescue mission under emergency circumstances, it shows that our US counterparts very much hope to
cooperate with us, Xu said, according to Reuters.However, its very regrettable that, for
reasons everyone is aware of, there are currently some impediments to
cooperation, he said. As nutty as that sounds, crazier things have happened. For chief engineer Zhou,
according to Xinhua, the movie simply reflects what most people want. Many American
astronauts and scientists that I have met said they would like to work with us,
if given the freedom of choice. Despite Washingtons ban on cooperation, the two
governments held their first civil space talks in September to discuss each others plans and policies,
Reuters noted, with Xu on record saying that talks would continue this year. Since NASAs last Moon walk in
1972the same year Richard Nixon visited China to normalize relationsand the Skylab space station, the
focus of the space agencys manned operations have been the Space Shuttle program (ending in 2011)
and ISS Expeditions (ongoing, but scheduled to end in 2024 with a possible extension to 2028). NASAs
current space objectives are to capture an asteroid, tow it into orbit near Earth, and send astronauts to
visit the space rock in 2020 as it prepares for a manned mission to Mars in 2030, according to Inquisitr.
Cooperation is in the Best Interest of US National Power

Experts Agree
Jones 15 [Andrew, NASA chief says ban on China space cooperation is
temporary GB Times 10/13/15, http://gbtimes.com/china/nasa-chief-says-
ban-china-space-cooperation-temporary //GK]
NASA administrator Charles Bolden has said the United States should work
with China on human spaceflight projects or find itself frozen out of future
international space exploration. NASA has been effectively banned by
Congress from any bilateral cooperation with China since 2011, and China
has not been allowed to join the 15-nation collaborative International Space
Station project. However, Mr. Bolden, speaking on a panel of heads of space agencies at the 2015
International Astronautical Congress in Jerusalem on Monday, believes this state of affairs is temporary.
"The reason I think that where we are today is temporary is because of a
practical statement that we will find ourselves on the outside looking in,
because everybody...who has any hope of a human spaceflight program ...
will go to whoever will fly their people , Reuters reported Bolden as saying. Chinas own
representative, Xu Dazhe, the head of the body which oversees the countrys space activities, welcomed
Boldens words, saying, "China has no difficulties in our cooperation policies with other agencies. Xu, chief
of the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND), added
that he wished the ban on cooperation can brought to an end sooner rather than later. However, Bolden
did note a number of issues that hinder chances of cooperation, including concerns over transparency,
reciprocity and finding areas of mutual benefit. Xu also reiterated Chinas plans to launch a lunar sample
return mission, Change-5, in 2017 and is looking for partners for a 2018 mission to put a lander and rover
The statements come at a time of a potential
on the far side of the moon. Turning point?
shift in Sino-American space cooperation. Despite the Congressional ban ,
included in US legislation by a now former Republican Representative Frank Wolf, a fierce critic of Chinas
a number of developments suggest the
human rights and religious freedoms records,
possibility of a move towards collaboration. In August it was announced that Houston
company NanoRacks had negotiated a ground-breaking deal to send a Chinese experiment to the
Last month the US State Department, which is not
International Space Station.
affected by Wolfs clause, hosted the first meeting of the US-China Dialogue
on Civil Space Cooperation, which aims to enhance cooperation between the
two countries and provide better transparency on a variety of space related
topics. The notion of the United States working with China in the realm of space has long been
contentious, with concerns over the involvement of Chinas military in the Chinese space program, a lack
of transparency and the potential transfer of technology. Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation gave
testimony to a Senate Committee last year, in which he described the Chinese space program is closely
tied to the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). Therefore, any cooperation with the PRC in terms of
space must mean interacting, at some level, with the PLA, Cheng said, adding concerns over information
Conversely, Professor Joan Johnson-Freese of the
security and electronic espionage.
Naval War College told a hearing of the US-China Economic and Security
Review Commission earlier this year that, "the United States must use all
tools of national power" to achieve its space related objectives. Cooperation
with China, Johnson-Freese says, would allow the US the chance to learn how
about how China operates, its decision-making processes and help in
assessing Chinas goals in space. Meanwhile, Johann-Dietrich Woerner, the new Director
General of the European Space Agency, told gbtimes in July that, in general, international collaboration is a
benefit in itself, and ESA is actively looking at cooperating with China in some areas. Mr. Woerner, looking
beyond the end of the ISS in 2024 or 2028, is looking to initiative discussions on what comes next, but
stresses the importance of inclusive international collaboration being a central point. China's space
ambitions In 2003 Yang Liwei became the first Chinese in space, making his country only the third country
to independently put people in space, after Russia (and the former Soviet Union) and the United States,
Regardless of
and has become increasingly ambitious since then, becoming a major space power.
future developments in the climate of international space cooperation, China
is pressing ahead with its own plans, including a multi-module space station.
2016 will also be a big year in space for China. The countrys new heavy-lift Long March 5 and medium-lift
Long March 7 rockets, designed to launch and service Chinas future space station and perform lunar
sample return missions, will make their debut launches. There will also be the first crewed space mission
since 2013, Shenzhou-11, which will dock with Chinas upcoming second space lab, Tiangong-2.
Now specifically is the time to renew the Wolf Amendment
cooperation allows for a thriving space program
Minter 15 [Adam, Asia-based politics and culture journalist, NASA Should
Boldly Go ... to China Bloomberg View 10/19/15,
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-10-19/nasa-should-cooperate-
with-china-in-space //GK]
When Matt Damon is rescued from Mars in this falls sci-fi blockbuster, The Martian, an assist from the
Chinese space program is critical to getting the American home. The plot twist is heartwarming -- not to
mention about as far-fetched as a large-scale manned Mars mission.The problem is U.S. law,
which since 2011 has prohibited bilateral collaboration with China in space. In
other words, a mission to rescue Matt Damon would be illegal. That shouldnt -- and doesnt
have to be -- the case. The clause about cooperating with the Chinese is
embedded in NASAs annual appropriation and must be renewed every year.
In 2016, Congress should simply let it die. Doing so would not only be in the interest of
future Matt Damons, but would help ensure that the U.S. doesnt get left behind in a space race it currently
leads. Of course, U.S. policy makers have good reason to be wary of Chinas space ambitions. The Chinese
space program, like those of many spacefaring nations (including the U.S.), has close ties to its military,
raising concerns about whether the regime is really seeking dual-use technologies that might eventually
find their way into weapons systems. Likewise, Chinas well-documented history of industrial espionage
feeds suspicions that collaboration would lead to the theft of critical U.S. technology. The New Space Race
Such objections, however, presume that the U.S. can somehow isolate China
from a globalized scientific and industrial endeavor in which collaboration is
the norm. Already, long-standing U.S. space partners like the European Space
Agency and Russia are working with Chinas National Space Agency in order
to take advantage of the countrys funding largesse and ambition. This can
have embarrassing consequences: NASA is so keen to join a proposed 2021 Sino-European
solar-science mission that its devising ways to funnel its hardware and personnel through the European
Thats hardly in the interest of the U.S.
Space Agency, so as to follow the spirit of U.S. law.
space program, which has thrived in part because it has remained open to
cooperating with nations around the world , including the Soviet Union at the height of the
Cold War (the Apollo-Soyuz collaboration) and Russia (the International Space Station). Remaining aloof
Meanwhile, the
means depriving U.S. scientists of rich opportunities for innovation and exploration.
current restrictions may well limit the potential for future collaboration, too.
For example, in pursuit of its own space station (its currently excluded from the ISS),
China has developed its own docking technology for space modules instead
of committing to a standard being developed in the U.S. and Europe. That
may seem like a small matter now, but such international rules of the road for
space will grow in importance in coming years. As with trade, maritime navigation and
multilateral finance, this is the time to strengthen standards and rules that all countries, including China,
Finally, there are the financial practicalities of a large-scale space
accept.
mission such as one to Mars (whose cost could reach into the hundreds of billions of dollars). At
its high point during the Apollo lunar program, NASAs budget represented 5.3 percent of the federal
budget. Today, its less than one percent -- a serious constraint on NASAs ambitions. China is already
repeating NASAs past exploration path, going from simple orbital missions to unmanned lunar probes to
its own space station. Though the Chinese cant be expected to renounce their solo
ambitions, both the U.S. and China would benefit from ensuring that Chinas
programs dont needlessly overlap with NASAs, and instead advance the
cause of space exploration. A good place to start would be to bring China into the ISS. Russia, a
U.S. geopolitical rival, is already a core member. China should be offered the opportunity to
take part as well. Back in 2009 -- when it was still legal to discuss space with China -- Beijing also
proposed that the two nations cooperate on smaller scientific missions. Thats still a good idea. If those
experiments dont work out, Congress can always tighten the purse strings later. But as the rescue in The
Martian demonstrated,
keeping lines of communication and collaboration open are
in the interests of everyone, including NASA. Its time to reopen them with
China.
Currently, NASA is forced to decline cooperation with

China in space due to the Wolf Amendment
Fernholz 15 [Tim, fellow at the New America Foundation, NASA has no
choice but to refuse Chinas request for help on a new space station Quartz
10/13/15, http://qz.com/523094/nasa-has-no-choice-but-to-refuse-chinas-
request-for-help-on-a-new-space-station //GK]
The chief designer of Chinas space program , Zhou Jianping, said his country
would solicit international partners for a space station it plans to launch in
2022, with opportunities ranging from shared experiments and spacecraft
visits by foreign crews to building permanent modules to attach to the main
station. The European and Russian space agencies already have signed preliminary agreements with
China, but NASA will have to snub the project. The ban on cooperation between
NASA and the China Manned Space Program is a legacy of conservative
lawmaker Frank Wolf, who cut off any funding for work with China in protest
of political repression there and for fear of sharing advanced technology; he
retired in January, but the restrictions remain in place. And NASA is not a fan
of them. In his own remarks at the IAC, NASA administrator Charles Bolden said the
US, for its own good, ought to dump the four-year-old ban. We will find ourselves on
the outside looking in, because everybodywho has any hope of a human spaceflight programwill go to
whoever will fly their people, Bolden said, according to a report from Reuters. Currently, China operates a
space station called Tiangong 1 that has hosted several multi-week visits by groups of Chinese astronauts.
The US supports the International Space Station and its permanent crew of three to six astronauts
alongside 15 other countries, including Russia. Both the US and Russia have committed to provide support
to the station through 2024. The US has a long history of space diplomacy with
opponentsas with the USSR during the 1970s. With US policy framing China as a
peaceful competitor rather than ideological enemy, the current restrictions on
consorting with the Chinese space program has put NASA in a tough spot
with space scientists from outside the agency , some of whom have protested the ban by
boycotting scientific conferences. If the desire for manned cooperation with the
Chinese is not enough to persuade US lawmakers to loosen their restrictions,
theres also the increasing concerns among space agencies and satellite
operators that a lack of coordination between burgeoning space programs
will lead to potential orbital disaster. Tests of anti-satellite weapons have already resulted in
costly, in-orbit accidents. Civil space cooperation between the US and China could
provide trust and lines of communication for de-escalation as fears of space
militarization increase. And its not like there isnt some cross-pollination alreadySpaceNews
notes that Zhou received some of his training at the University of Southern California.
Wolf amendment is ineffective and harms US interests

repeal now is key to set the stage for cooperation
Listner 14 [Michael, founder and principal of Space Law and Policy
Solutions, Two Perspectives on US-China Space Cooperation, Spacenews
7/14/14 http://spacenews.com/41256two-perspectives-on-us-china-space-
cooperation //GK]
The National Research Council (NRC) recently released a report on the future of U.S. human
spaceflight. Besides advocating a Mars mission the report also advocated pursuing more
international collaboration, specifically to include China. That would require a
distinct change in U.S. policy. There will likely be resistance to that recommendation from the
small but powerful congressional enclave behind the legislatively imposed restrictions on U.S-Sino
the realist approach advocated by the NRC report has a
cooperation since 2011. But
much better chance of serving U.S. security interests than the current
ineffectual policy that attempts to isolate and punish China for domestic
policies. President Barack Obama met with then-Chinese President Hu Jintao
in January 2011. Part of their joint statement addressed the desire for
deepened dialogue and interaction in space, which many people interpreted
as a new willingness on the part of the United States to work with China,
perhaps leading to a cooperative program. U.S.-Sino relations had basically been moribund
since the sensationalist 1999 Cox Committee report alleging theft of information on American
thermonuclear weapons and transfer of sensitive missile technology by profit-hungry American aerospace
companies. Though nonpoliticized analysis from experts at institutions such as Stanford University largely
discredited the report,congressional caterwauling successfully pushed the United
States into the impossible position of trying to isolate Chinese space activities
in a globalized world, and ended up primarily hurting U.S. aerospace
companies through the draconian export control measures issued consequent
to the Cox Committee report. But cooperation was not to be. In April 2011, Rep. Frank
Wolf (R-Va.), chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee overseeing NASA and a long-time
China hardliner, especially regarding freedom of religion issues, inserted two sentences into
funding legislation that prohibits any joint scientific activity between the
United States and China that involves NASA or is coordinated by the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). That legislation has
endured. NASA and OSTP remain banned from bilateral activity with China.
Though Wolf is retiring in January 2015, speculation regarding potential successors includes individuals
with views similar to his. Wolfs rationale for banning bilateral U.S.-China relations, given in a 2011
interview, includes three key points. We dont want to give them the opportunity to take advantage of our
technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them, Wolf said. And frankly, it boils down to
a moral issue. Would you have a bilateral program with Stalin? The three assumptions in that
statement are, quite simply, wrong, and counterproductive to U.S. interests. First, it assumes that working
with the United States would give China opportunities not otherwise available and implies that the United
States would be doing China a favor. Though China has wanted to participate on the international space
station program and was banned from doing so by the United States, it will have its own space station
soon. In fact, when Chinas space station becomes operational around 2022, it could quickly become the
de facto international space station, given that the ISS is currently funded only through 2024, and that
In terms of the U.S. doing China a
China has already invited other countries to visit its facility.
favor, Chinese politicians are still interested in the ISS for symbolic reasons,
specifically, being accepted as part of the international family of spacefaring
nations. But many Chinese space professionals fear that cooperation with the United States would just
slow them down. American politicians are viewed as fickle and without the political will to see programs to
other countries, including U.S. allies,
completion, a view not exclusive to China. Further,
regularly work with and sell aerospace technology to China. China has not
been isolated. Second, Wolfs rationale assumes the United States has nothing
to gain by working with the Chinese. On the contrary, the United States could
learn about how they work their decision-making processes, institutional
policies and standard operating procedures. This is valuable information in
accurately deciphering the intended use of dual-use space technology, long a
weakness and so a vulnerability in U.S. analysis. Working together on an
actual project where people confront and solve problems together, perhaps
beginning with a space science or space debris project where both parties
can contribute something of value, builds trust on both sides, trust that is
currently severely lacking. It also allows each side to understand the others
cultural proclivities, reasoning and institutional constraints with minimal risk
of technology sharing. From a practical perspective, working with China could
diversify U.S. options for reaching the ISS. The need for diversification has
become painfully apparent consequent to Vladimir Putins expansionist
actions in Ukraine resulting in U.S. sanctions. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry
Rogozin subsequently stated, I propose that the United States delivers its astronauts to the ISS with the
help of a trampoline. And finally, Wolf stated that the United States should not work with China based on
moral grounds. While clearly the United States would prefer not to work with authoritarian regimes, it has
done so in war and in peacetime when it has served American interests. That is the basis of realism: Serve
American interests first. While the United States would prefer not to work with Stalin, we continue to work
with Putin when it benefits us to do so. Were the U.S. not to work with authoritarian regimes, it would have
We live in a globalized world. Attempting to
few to work with at all in the Middle East.
isolate Chinese space activities has proved futile, and in fact pushed China
and other countries into developing indigenous space industries totally
beyond any U.S. control that they might have done otherwise. High fences
around areas of technology where the United States has a monopoly and there
are few of those left combined with a realist approach to working with China when
and were we can, will allow the U.S. to lead rather futilely playing whack-a-mole,
trying to beat back anticipated Chinese space achievements.
Bilateral space cooperation is integral to stopping

deterioration of US-China relations and a consequential
arms race
Weeden and He 15 [Brian, technical adviser at the Secure World
Foundation, and Xiao, assistant research fellow at the Institute of World
Economics and Politics, Use Outer Space to Strengthen US-China Ties War
on the Rocks 4/26/16, http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-
strengthen-u-s-china-ties //GK]
With the end of the Cold War, outer space activities lost much of their urgency and hipness. But today
space is back, and more important than ever. Modern militaries and the
global economy are dependent on space capabilities. Private companies are daring to
take on challenges that were once the domain of superpowers. And in national security circles, there is
discussion of a renewed strategic competition in space that could pit the winner of the last space race, the
The United States and China have
United States, against the rising power of China.
identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their national
interests and development. Both nations are dedicating considerable
resources to developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors.
Beijing and Washington see their space accomplishments as important to
boosting national pride and international prestige. Over time , what happens
in space could serve as either a source of instability, or a means of
strengthening the U.S.-China relationship. The United States and China have
differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space
and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and
services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications
with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the
cornerstone of the United States intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and
serving as essential enablers for the United States ability to defend its borders, project power to protect
Space capabilities are also a critical
its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries.
piece of the U.S. and the global economy. China is focused on developing its own
capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and
military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially
the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security
and securing its role as a rising power. From Chinas perspective, the most
urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States
and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international
norms and institutions particularly because it perceives that it must accept
rules that have been decided mainly by the United States. As the two nations act on
these differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had
ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing and
development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on
active defense have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger
focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is
necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security, close the
power gap, and defend itself from American aggression., Failure to reconcile
their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could
be to the detriment of both sides. Both countries have acknowledged the
importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting
bilateral relationship in space. Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner
for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-
based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote
bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics
were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia
attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term
sustainability of space activities. Thus, the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities
Accordingly, the United States and China
for cooperation and bilateral engagement.
should continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral
initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability and security of
space. Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives
would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in
The United States and China, as well
space governance and being responsible space powers.
as the private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage
in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human
exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political
challenges. At the same time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their
interests differ in space and look to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of
a crisis escalating into outright conflict. While the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are
slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and bilateral measures to reduce tensions and
development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) capabilities.
Finally, both countries would benefit significantly from improving their
national space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, and increasing data
sharing with each other and the spacefaring community.
The Wolf amendment is flat out wrong, leaves the US
vulnerable and limits US capabilities in space
cooperation is in the USs best interest
Smith 15 [Marcia S., president of Space and Technology Policy Group, LLC,
Johnson-Freese: Why Wolf is Wrong About U.S.-China Space Cooperation
Space Policy Online 2/18/15,
http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/johnson-freese-why-wolf-is-wrong-
about-us-china-space-cooperation //GK]
Joan Johnson-Freese explained to the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission today why former Rep. Frank Wolf was wrong to
effectively ban all U.S.-China bilateral space cooperation. Wolf retired at the end of
the last Congress, but his successor as chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that funds
NASA holds similar views. Johnson-Freese is a professor at the Naval War College and author of "The
Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze" and "Heavenly Ambitions: America's Quest to Dominate
Space." She was one of the witnesses at today's hearing on China's space and counterspace programs.
Wolf included language in several Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS)
appropriations bills that prohibits NASA and the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) from engaging in any bilateral activities with
China on civil space cooperation unless specifically authorized by Congress or
unless NASA or OSTP certifies to Congress 14 days in advance that the
activity would not result in the transfer of any technology, data, or other
information with national security or economic implications. His indefatigable
opposition to cooperating with China was based largely on its human rights abuses and efforts to obtain
U.S. technology. He was one of the strongest, but certainly not only, congressional critic of China, always
Rep. John Culberson
stressing that he loved the Chinese people, but not the Chinese government.
(R-TX) is Wolf's successor as chairman of the CJS subcommittee. In December 2013
when rumors swirled that he would replace Wolf, he was interviewed by a reporter for the Houston
when asked whether he agreed with Wolf about China replied: "Yes.
Chronicle and
We need to keep them out of our space program, and we need to keep NASA
out of China. They are not our friends." It remains to be seen whether he will include the
same language in this year's CJS bill, but Johnson-Freese spelled out why she thinks it is the wrong
in essence her
approach. She provides a comprehensive rebuttal to Wolf's reasoning, but
contention is that "the United States must use all tools of national power" to
achieve its space-related goals as stated in U.S. National Space Policy,
National Security Strategy, and National Security Space Strategy. Wolf's
restrictions on space cooperation simply constrain U.S. options, she argues:
"Limiting U.S. options has never been in U.S. national interest and isn't on
this issue either." She disagrees with Wolf's assumption that the United States
has nothing to gain from working with China: "On the contrary, the United
States could learn about how they work -- their decision-making processes,
institutional policies and standard operating procedures. This is valuable
information in accurately deciphering the intended use of dual-use space
technology, long a weakness and so a vulnerability in U.S. analysis." For some
issues, there really is no choice, she continues. China must be involved in international efforts towards
Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) and space sustainability, especially with regard
to space debris, a topic given urgency by China's 2007 antisatellite (ASAT) test that created more than
She notes that since that test and the resulting
3,000 pieces of debris in low Earth orbit.
international condemnation, "China has done nothing further in space that
can be considered irresponsible or outside the norms set the United States."

Space Case Neg - DDI 2016 BAM

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Space Case Neg - DDI 2016 BAM

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Strategy notes in progress

And, erosion of US position increases the risk of great

2. No internal link - China cant militarize space

Advantage empirically denied or they have no impact

4. No solvency debris and collisions inevitable

5. No time frame for the advantage no evidence about

China's involvement has always been a non-

Space is a family affair, many countries are developing their

China said that outer space had become an

area of "strategic competition." "The Chinese government has always

Security Review Commission said China's improving space capabilities had

Chinese expect to finish their space station by

With support from the highest

echelons of the ruling Chinese Communist Party and exceptionally deep

Space Colonization is impossible and is a self-fulfilling

Space debris and lack of unity prevents colonization

Williams 10 (Lynda, M.S. in Physics and a physics faculty member at

We need to focus on Earth or risk a self-fulfilling prophecy

Williams 10 (Lynda, M.S. in Physics and a physics faculty member at

Space exploration could kill us all through space radiation

Space colonisation could wipe out the human species

And, erosion of US position increases the risk of great

2. No internal link - China cant militarize space

3. Advantage empirically denied or they have no impact

4. No solvency debris and collisions inevitable

5. No time frame for the advantage no evidence about

China's involvement has always been a non-

Space is a family affair, many countries are developing their

Security Review Commission said China's improving space capabilities had

Chinese expect to finish their space station by

With support from the highest

echelons of the ruling Chinese Communist Party and exceptionally deep

And, erosion of US position increases the risk of great

2. No internal link - China cant militarize space

3. Advantage empirically denied or they have no impact

4. No solvency debris and collisions inevitable

5. no time frame for the advantage no evidence about

China's involvement has always been a non-

Space is a family affair, many countries are developing their

China said that outer space had become an

area of "strategic competition." "The Chinese government has always

Security Review Commission said China's improving space capabilities had

Chinese expect to finish their space station by

With support from the highest

echelons of the ruling Chinese Communist Party and exceptionally deep

2. no solvency - South china sea hurts relations and the

3. NO impact to science diplomacy no reason why

2. No solvency entrenched mutual mistrust prevents

3. China says no and the plan doesnt create any

2. No solvency entrenched mutual mistrust prevents

3. China says no and the plan doesnt create any

2. No solvency entrenched mutual mistrust prevents

3. China says no and the plan doesnt create any

US-China space cooperation requires significant political

US China space cooperation represents a realignment in

(Evgeniy, The Dragon vs. the Elephant, Brics Magazine, 7/15/16

Erosion of relations bad - strong US India Relations by

nuclear weapons. Instead, Pakistani leaders have stated that they

will reportedly have enough fissile material by 2020 to build more

Pakistan clearly intends to use these weapons on its own soil if

the prospects of local commanders

being given decentralized control of the weapons a use it or lose

humiliation were overwhelming. Only through the combination of diplomatic pressure

A nuclear war between India and