RE JURISDICTION IN MILITARY OFFENSES
code.
G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: By Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission,
section 56 (6), Courts of First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in
all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months'
imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed."
Accused in this case is a military officer who is charged for an offense
against his superior. His case was filed before the CFI.
CONTENTIONS OF THE ACCUSED:
i. that an assault committed by a soldier or military employee
upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the Penal
Code;
ii. that if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the
military character sustained by the person charged with the
offense at the time of its commission exempts him from the
ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
ISSUE: WoN CFI has jurisdiction over the case of a military officer
HELD: YES.
- An assault of the character charged in the complaint committed
in time of war by a military person upon a prisoner of war is
punishable as an offense under the Spanish Code of Military
Justice (art. 232), and it is also true that under the provisions of
the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the military tribunals have exclusive
cognizance of all offenses, whether of a purely military nature or
otherwise, committed by military persons. But the fact that the
acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as an
offense under the Spanish military legislation does not
render them any less an offense under the article of the
Penal Code above cited. Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of
Military Justice above cited a military person could not be
brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an assault upon a
prisoner of war, but by the commission of that offense he
incurred a criminal responsibility for which he was amenable
only to the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility,
however, arose from an infraction of the general penal laws,
although the same acts, viewed in another aspect, might also, if
committed in time of war, constitute an infraction of the military
- These provisions of the Spanish Military Code are no longer in
force here and which indeed never had any application to the
Army of the United States.
RE THE FACT THAT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED
BY AN EMPLOYEE OF US MILITARY AUTHORITIES
- The case is open to the application of the general principle
that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by
the military or other special character of the person
brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in
the law of England and America and which must, we think,
prevail under any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by
express legislation to the contrary.
- The appellant's claim that the acts alleged to constitute the
offense were performed by him in the execution of the orders of
his military superiors may, if true, be available by way of
defense upon the merits in the trial in the court below, but can
not under this principle affect the right of that court to take
jurisdiction of the case.
- Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in
this case a court of one of the United States would have
jurisdiction to try the offender against the State laws (see In
re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149), it is not necessary to consider. The
present is not a case where the courts of one government are
attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the military agents or
employees of another and distinct government, because the
court asserting jurisdiction here derives its existence and
powers from the same Government under the authority of
which the acts alleged to constitute the offense are claimed
to have been performed.
- There is no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions in the
present case nor any claim of jurisdiction on the part of the
military tribunals. On the contrary it appears from the findings of
the court below that the complaint was entered by order of the
commanding general of the Division of the Philippines, a fact
not important, perhaps, as regards the technical question of
jurisdiction, but which relieves the case from any practical
embarrassment which might result from a claim on the part of
the military tribunals to exclusive cognizance of the offense.
 (Ratio for the said rule: on account that such foreign vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality)
RE TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE
- In the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910 upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the
laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime,
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, only the court established in that said place itself had competent
vs. jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant. international treaty.
- It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the
drug seized, the subject matter of the present case, was
FACTS: considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two
penalties fixed by the law on the subject, should be imposed in
- Accused in this case was charged for illegal possession and the maximum degree.
selling of 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium.
- On August 19, 1909, the chief of the department of the port of - DISPOSITIVE: Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the
Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu went aboard the fine imposed to six months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm
steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found, first in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs
in a cabin near the saloon two sacks containing several cans of of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
opium.
- One of the sacks was found under the defendant's control, who
moreover, freely and of his own will and accord admitted that
this sack, as well as the other referred to in Exhibit B and found
in the cabin, belonged to him. He also voluntarily admitted that
he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the
intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz,
and that, as his hold had already been searched several times
for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack.
- It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English
nationality from Hongkong, and that it was bound for
Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.
- DEFENSE: that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case and
the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime.
- LOWER COURT: The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction,
inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on
the wharf of Cebu.

ISSUE: WoN Philippine courts has jurisdiction since the opium seized in
a foreign vessel

HELD: YES. As a general rule, although the mere possession of a thing

of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in
any of their ports, does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of this
country, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is
prohibited within the Philippine Islands.

RE PROSPECTIVE
[G.R. No. 123918. December 9, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AUGUSTO
LORETO RINGOR, JR., accused-appellant.
FACTS:
-
Accused Augusto Loreto Ringor was sentenced guilty for the
crime of murder and possession of illegal firearms. On the night
of June 23, 1994, he was seen entering Peoples Restaurant.
-
After seating themselves, accused approached one of the
tables where Florida (victim), was drinking beer. Subsequently,
he pulled Floridas hair and poked a knide on the latters throat.
Florida pleaded not to harm him.He released and left the
restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw such happening.
-
After few minutes, appeland came back and approached Florida
from behind, he fired six successive shot at him.
-
The defendant was later apprehended and caught in his
possession was an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in
Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not a licensed
firearm holder and that the gun was not licensed.
-
ACCUSED RINGORS THEORY: he admitted the shooting
incident but put up self-defense. That when he inquired Florida
about his brother, Fernandez, the former got angry and shouted
at them. That there was a quarrel between the brothers so it
was the accused who pacified them.
-
That the gun was from Fernandez and he only used it because
Florida was about to attack him with a bolo.
-
TRIAL COURT RULING: He was found guilty of murder
qualified by treachery and was sentenced to death. He was also
found guilty of a separate charge of possession of an
unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17 to 20 years.
ISSUE: WoN the amendatory law of murder RA 8294 can be applicable
HELD: NO. Thus, before R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect on July 6,
1997) made the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, the penalty for the murder
committed by accused-appellant on June 23, 1994 was not death, as
erroneously imposed by the trial court. There was yet no such
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm to raise the
penalty for murder from reclusion perpetua to death, at the time of
commission of the crime.
-
The amendatory law making the use of an unlicensed firearm as
an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, cannot be
applied here because the said provision of R.A. No. 8294 is not
favorable to accused-appellant, lest it becomes an ex post
facto law.
SELF-DEFENSE UNTENABLE
For self-defense to prosper, it must be established that: (1) there was
unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression was reasonable; and (3) that there was
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
-
In the case at bar, accused failed to prove the element of
unlawful aggression. The allegation that the victim allegedly
went out of the kitchen armed with a bolo, and was about to
hack him who was then at an almost prone lying position on the
table he was occupying,is a self-serving and unconvincing
statement which did not in anyway constitute the requisite
quantum of proof for unlawful aggression.
-
Prosecution witness Fely Batanes, a waitress in the restaurant
where the shooting incident occurred, was firm in her
declaration that the victim was in the kitchen unarmed when the
accused-appellant shot him. The victim had no weapon or
bolo. He was neither threatening to attack nor in any manner
manifesting any aggressive act which could have imperiled
accused-appellants safety and well-being.
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE IMPOSITION OF PEANLTY
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder.
-
When, as in this case, neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance is attendant, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua has to be applied, in accordance with Article 63(2) of
the Revised Penal Code.
-
With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal
possession of firearms under P. D. No. 1866, jurisprudence
provides that in cases where murder or homicide is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate
 conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under
P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 8294.Thereunder, the use of unlicensed
firearm in murder or homicide is simply considered as an
aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide and no
longer as a separate offense. Furthermore, the penalty for
illegal possession of firearms shall be imposed provided that no
other crime is committed. In other words, where murder or
homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal possession
of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely
a special aggravating circumstance
RE RETROACTIVITY
Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, where the new
law is favorable to the accused, it has to be applied retroactively. Thus,
insofar as it spares accused-appellant a separate conviction for illegal
possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 has to be given
retroactive application in Criminal Case No. 13100-R.
- On the matter of the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm in the commission of murder or homicide, the trial court erred in
appreciating the same to qualify to death the penalty for the murder
committed by accused-appellant. It should be noted that at the time
accused-appellant perpetrated the offense, the unlicensed character of a
firearm used in taking the life of another was not yet an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder, to wot:

There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed

firearm as an aggravating circumstance
in homicide or murder. Under an information charging
homicide or muder, the fact that the death weapon was
an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the
penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to
death (or reclusion perpetua under the 1987
Constitution). The essential point is that the unlicensed
character or condition of the instrument used in destroying
human life or committing some other crime, is not included in
the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code.

A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an

unlicensed firearm as a qualifying circumstance