Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993

ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
LEONARDO EBRALINAG, JUSTINIANA TANTOG, represented by her father AMOS TANTOG;
JEMILOYAO & JOEL OYAO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ELIEZER OYAO;
JANETH DIAMOS & JEREMIAS DIAMOS, represented by parents MR. & MRS. GODOFREDO
DIAMOS; SARA OSTIA & JONATHAN OSTIA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FAUTO
OSTIA; IRVIN SEQUINO & RENAN SEQUINO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LYDIO
SEQUINO; NAPTHALE TANACAO, represented by his parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL
TANACAO; PRECILA PINO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. FELIPE PINO; MARICRIS
ALFAR, RUWINA ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. HERMINIGILDO ALFAR;
FREDESMINDA ALFAR & GUMERSINDO ALFAR, represented by their parents ABDON ALFAR;
ALBERTO ALFAR & ARISTIO ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. GENEROSO
ALFAR; MARTINO VILLAR, represented by his parents MR. & MRS. GENARO VILLAR;
PERGEBRIEL GUINITA & CHAREN GUINITA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. CESAR
GUINITA; ALVIN DOOP, represented by his parents MR. & MRS. LEONIDES DOOP; RHILYN
LAUDE, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. RENE LAUDE; LEOREMINDA MONARES,
represented by her parents, MR. & MRS. FLORENCIO MONARES; MERCY MONTECILLO,
represented by her parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL MONTECILLO; ROBERTO TANGAHA,
represented by his parent ILUMINADA TANGAHA; EVELYN, MARIA & FLORA TANGAHA,
represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ALBERTO TANGAHA; MAXIMO EBRALINAG,
represented by his parents, MR. & MRS. PAQUITO EBRALINAG; JUTA CUMON, GIDEON
CUMON & JONATHAN CUMON, represented by their father RAFAEL CUMON; EVIE
LUMAKANG & JUNAR LUMAKANG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LUMAKANG;
EMILIO SARSOZO, PAZ AMOR SARSOZO & IGNA MARIE SARSOZO, represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. VIRGILIO SARSOZO; MICHAEL JOSEPH & HENRY JOSEPH, represented
by parent ANNIE JOSEPH; EMERSON TABLASON & MASTERLOU TABLASON, represented
by their parent EMERLITO TABLASON, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, respondent.

G.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993

MAY AMOLO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. ISAIAS AMOLO; REDFORD ALSADO,
JOEBERT ALSADO & RUDYARD ALSADO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS.
ABELARDO ALSADO; NELIA ALSADO, REU ALSADO & LILIBETH ALSADO, represented by
their parents MR. & MRS. ROLANDO ALSADO; SUZETTE NAPOLES, represented by her
parents ISMAILITO NAPOLES & OPHELIA NAPOLES; JESICA CARMELOTES, represented by
her parents MR. & MRS. SERGIO CARMELOTES; BABY JEAN MACAPAS, represented by her
parents MR. & MRS. TORIBIO MACAPAS; GERALDINE ALSADO, represented by her parents
MR. & MRS. JOEL ALSADO; RAQUEL DEMOTOR & LEAH DEMOTOR, represented by their
parents MR. & MRS. LEONARDO DEMOTOR; JURELL VILLA & MELONEY VILLA, represented
by their parents MR. & MRS. JOVENIANO VILLA; JONELL HOPE MAHINAY, MARY GRACE
MAHINAY and MAGDALENE MAHINAY, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FELIX
MAHINAY; JONALYN ANTIOLA and JERWIN ANTIOLA, represented by their parents FELIFE
ANTIOLA and ANECITA ANTIOLA; MARIA CONCEPCION CABUYAO, represented by her
parents WENIFREDO CABUYAO and ESTRELLITA CABUYAO, NOEMI TURNO represented by
her parents MANUEL TURNO and VEVENCIA TURNO; SOLOMON PALATULON, SALMERO
PALATULON and ROSALINDA PALATULON, represented by their parents MARTILLANO
PALATULON and CARMILA PALATULON, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and ANTONIO A. SANGUTAN,
respondents.

Felino M. Ganal for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

These two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were
consolidated because they raise essentially the same issue: whether school children
who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled
from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs,
to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the
Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.

In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high
school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan,
Carcar, and Taburan Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who
belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims some
100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Philippines.

In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students
enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses.
Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.

All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by
Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Republic Act No. 1265 provides:

Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag

ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the
playing or singing of the Philippine National anthem.
 Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to
issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of
the flag ceremony herein provided.

Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this

Act and in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary
of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall subject the
educational institution concerned and its head to public censure as an
administrative punishment which shall be published at least once in a
newspaper of general circulation.

In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag-ceremony

provided by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and
hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the
private educational institution responsible for such failure.

The implementing rules and regulations in Department Order No. 8 provide:

RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG

CEREMONY IN ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public

and private, every school day throughout the year. It shall be raised at
sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flag-staff must be straight, slightly and
gently tapering at the end, and of such height as would give the Flag a
commanding position in front of the building or within the compound.

2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising

ceremony every morning except when it is raining, in which event the
ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat
shall be held in the afternoon of the same day. The flag-raising ceremony
in the morning shall be conducted in the following manner:

a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who

are in school and its premises shall assemble in formation
facing the flag. At command, books shall be put away or held
in the left hand and everybody shall come to attention.
Those with hats shall uncover. No one shall enter or leave
the school grounds during the ceremony.

b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National

Anthem accompanied by the school band or without the
accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem may be played
by the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the
flag shall be raised briskly. While the flag is being raised, all
persons present shall stand at attention and execute a
 salute. Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing the
hat over the heart. Those without hat may stand with their
arms and hands down and straight at the sides. Those in
military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed
by their regulations. The salute shall be started as the Flag
rises, and completed upon last note of the anthem.

c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the

assembly shall recite in unison the following patriotic
pledge (English or vernacular version), which may bring the
ceremony to a close. This is required of all public schools
and of private schools which are intended for Filipino
students or whose population is predominantly Filipino.

English Version

I love the Philippines.

It is the land of my birth;
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be, strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true, Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.

xxx xxx xxx

Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
worship" or "religious devotion" (p. 10, Rollo) which they "cannot conscientiously
give . . . to anyone or anything except God" (p. 8, Rollo). They feel bound by the Bible's
command to "guard ourselves from
idols 1 John 5:21" (p. 9, Rollo). They consider the flag as an image or idol
representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's
power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect
against official control (p. 10, Rollo).

This is not the first time that the question, of whether the children of Jehovah's
Witnesses may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and
Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, has been raised before this Court.

The same issue was raised in 1959 in Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al.,
106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960).
This Court in the Gerona case upheld the expulsion of the students, thus:
 The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines,
an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect.
Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance.
Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute
is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a
public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar.

In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the
Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a
religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a
non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether
Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely
carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it
with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to
establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public
education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among other
things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship.

The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from

participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such
exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school
discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far
constitutes the great majority.

The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not

and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and
non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority. (pp. 2-3).

Gerona was reiterated in Balbuna, as follows:

The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by the Legislature thru

Republic Act 1265 to promulgate said Department Order, and its
provisions requiring the observance of the flag salute, not being a religious
ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of
loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of religion. (Balbuna, et al. vs.
Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150).

Republic Act No. 1265 and the ruling in Gerona have been incorporated in Section 28,
Title VI, Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which
took effect on September 21, 1988 (one year after its publication in the Official Gazette,
Vol. 63, No. 38 of September 21, 1987). Paragraph 5 of Section 28 gives legislative
cachet to the ruling in Gerona, thus:
 5. Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the
flag ceremony may be dismissed after due investigation.

However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the constitutionality of the
above provision of the new Administrative Code of 1987. They have targeted only
Republic Act No. 1265 and the implementing orders of the DECS.

In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and
pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private
schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag
and recite the patriotic pledge. Division Superintendent of Schools, Susana B. Cabahug
of the Cebu Division of DECS, and Dr. Atty. Marcelo M. Bacalso, Assistant Division
Superintendent, recalling this Court's decision in Gerona, issued Division Memorandum
No. 108, dated November 17, 1989 (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770) directing
District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational
institutions as follows:

1. Reports reaching this Office disclose that there are a number of

teachers, pupils, students, and school employees in public schools who
refuse to salute the Philippine flag or participate in the daily flag ceremony
because of some religious belief.

2. Such refusal not only undermines Republic Act No. 1265 and the DECS
Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955 (Implementing Rules and
Regulations) but also strikes at the heart of the DECS sustained effort to
inculcate patriotism and nationalism.

3. Let it be stressed that any belief that considers the flag as an image is
not in any manner whatever a justification for not saluting the Philippine
flag or not participating in flag ceremony. Thus, the Supreme Court of the
Philippine says:

The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the

Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national
unity and cohesion and freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec.
of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.)

4. As regards the claim for freedom of belief, which an objectionist may

advance, the Supreme Court asserts:

But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said

belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise
of said religious belief clashes with the established
institutions of society and with the law, then the former must
 yield and give way to the latter. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of
Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.)

5. Accordingly, teachers and school employees who choose not to

participate in the daily flag ceremony or to obey the flag salute regulation
spelled out in Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955, shall be
considered removed from the service after due process.

6. In strong language about pupils and students who do the same the
Supreme Court has this to say:

If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they

merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained
at the expense of their fellow Citizens, nothing more.
According to a popular expression, they could take it or
leave it! Having elected not to comply with the regulation
about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public
schools. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106
Phil. 15.)

7. School administrators shall therefore submit to this Office a report on

those who choose not to participate in flag ceremony or salute the
Philippine flag. (pp. 147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770; Emphasis
supplied).

Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of

Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School,
the children were asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the Cebuano dialect
promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their breast until the end
of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag (Annex D, p. 46, Rollo of G.R.
No. 95770 and p. 48, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887), but they refused to sign the "Kasabutan"
(p. 20, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770).

In Tubigmanok Elementary School, the Teacher-In-Charge, Antonio A. Sangutan, met

with the Jehovah's Witnesses' parents, as disclosed in his letter of October 17, 1990,
excerpts from which reveal the following:

After two (2) fruitless confrontation meetings with the Jehovah's

Witnesses' parents on October 2, 1990 and yesterday due to their firm
stand not to salute the flag of the Republic of the Philippines during Flag
Ceremony and other occasions, as mandated by law specifically Republic
Act No. 1265, this Office hereby orders the dropping from the list in the
School Register (BPS Form I) of all teachers, all Jehovah Witness pupils
from Grade I up to Grade VI effective today.

xxx xxx xxx

 This order is in compliance with Division Memorandum No. 108 s. 1989
dated November 17, 1989 by virtue of Department Order No. 8 s. 1955
dated July 21, 1955 in accordance with Republic Act No. 1265 and
Supreme Court Decision of a case "Genaro Gerona, et al., Petitioners and
Appellants vs. The Honorable Secretary of Education, et al., Respondents
and Appellees' dated August 12, 1959 against their favor. (p. 149, Rollo of
G.R. No. 95770.)

In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the
"dropping from the rolls" of students who "opted to follow their religious belief which is
against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right to attend public
schools." (p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)

1st Indorsement
DAANBANTAYAN DISTRICT II
Daanbantayan, Cebu, July 24, 1990.

Respectfully returned to Mrs. Alicia A. Diaz, School In Charge [sic], Agujo

Elementary School with the information that this office is sad to order the
dropping of Jeremias Diamos and Jeaneth Diamos, Grades III and IV
pupils respectively from the roll since they opted to follow their religious
belief which is against the Flag Salute Law (R.A. 1265) and DECS Order
No. 8, series of 1955, having elected not to comply with the regulation
about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools
(Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Philippines 15). However,
should they change their mind to respect and follow the Flag Salute Law
they may be re-accepted.

(Sgd.) MANUEL F. BIONGCOG

District Supervisor

(p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)

The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students of the

Daanbantayan National High School, Agujo Elementary School, Calape Barangay
National High School, Pinamungajan Provincial High School, Tabuelan Central School,
Canasojan Elementary School, Liboron Elementary School, Tagaytay Primary School,
San Juan Primary School and Northern Central Elementary School of San Fernando,
Cebu, upon order of then Acting Division Superintendent Marcelo Bacalso, prompted
some Jehovah's Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the Secretary of Education Isidro
Cario but the latter did not answer their letter. (p. 21, Rollo.)

The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled
because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division
Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his predecessor.
Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of Jehovah's
Witnesses.

On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil actions
for Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion (1) in
ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right
to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech,
religion and worship (p. 23, Rollo). The petitioners pray that:

c. Judgment be rendered:

i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the

rolls of herein petitioners from their respective schools;

ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring

the petitioners from their classes or otherwise implementing
the expulsion ordered on petitioners; and

iii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him
to admit and order the re-admission of petitioners to their
respective schools. (p. 41, Rollo.)

and that pending the determination of the merits of these cases, a temporary restraining
order be issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the expulsion of the
petitioners and to re-admit them to their respective classes.

On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit
the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders from this Court (p.
57, Rollo).

The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and Cebu District Supervisor Manuel
F. Biongcog to be impleaded as respondents in these cases.

On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions (p.
98, Rollo) defending the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents on the
grounds that:

1. Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce

rebellious and anti-social school children and consequently disloyal and
mutant Filipino citizens.

2. There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the
Jehovah's Witnesses that the DECS' rules and regulations on the flag
salute ceremonies are violative of their freedom of religion and worship.
 3. The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it
inculcates respect and love of country, for which the flag stands.

4. The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful

regulations in question do not warrant exemption of the school children of
the Jehovah's Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies on the basis of
their own self-perceived religious convictions.

5. The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and

jurisprudence.

6. State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices

justified, besides having scriptural basis.

7. The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment
of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987).

Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year old decision of this court
in Gerona upholding the flag salute law and approving the expulsion of students who
refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.

It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative
cachet by its in corporation in the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court
believes that the time has come to re-examine it. The idea that one may be compelled
to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag
ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is
alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the
Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free exercise of
religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section
8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).

Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs.
Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute
as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-
177).

Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of
the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their
respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings
(Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 and Rollo of G.R. No. 95770, p. 48). Since
they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of

religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is
the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the
petitioners from the schools is not justified.

The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that:

The flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted
with very few participants, and the time will come when we would have
citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for
the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism
a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the
school population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an
exemption. (Gerona, p. 24.)

has not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's
Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic
pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school
population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught
and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country
and admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24).
After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not
exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the
democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences,
Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession and
be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national
heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2],
Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners
from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared
in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to
participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to
love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities.

As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):

. . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are

voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an
 unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . .
When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as those
we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order.

Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the
country, . . . assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained
through coercion is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the
expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042,
1046.)

Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where
they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education
accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the
exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop
agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of
their church not to join any labor group:

. . . It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the

laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling
state interests" intervenes. (Sherbert vs. Berner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed.
2d 965, 970, 83 S. Ct. 1790.)

We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with
regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs,
however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to
participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA
523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of
their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to
discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135
SCRA 514, 517).
Before we close this decision, it is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our
country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of
the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier.
Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not
quibble now about saluting the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and
our own flag was proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to behold that made
our hearts pound with pride and joy over the newly-regained freedom and sovereignty of
our nation.

Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution
to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs, we hope,
nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in order
for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion
orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order which was issued by this Court is
hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Quiason, J., took no part.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I am happy to concur with Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino in her quietly eloquent
affirmation of a vital postulate of freedom. I would only add my brief observations
concerning Gerona v. Secretary of Education.

In my humble view, Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that
promulgated it was apparently laboring under the conviction that the State had the right
to determine what was religious and what was not and to dictate to the individual what
he could and could not worship. In pronouncing that the flag was not a religious image
but a symbol of the nation, it
was implying that no one had the right to worship it or as the petitioners insisted
not to worship it. This was no different from saying that the cult that reveres Rizal as a
divinity should not and cannot do so because he is only a civic figure deserving honor
but not veneration.

It seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what to
worship or whether to worship at all. This is a personal decision he alone can make. The
individual may worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a tree (or a flag), and the State
cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can it compel him to do so.
As long as his beliefs are not externalized in acts that offend the public interest, he
cannot be prohibited from harboring them or punished for doing so.

In requiring the herein petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony, the State has
declared ex cathedra that they are not violating the Bible by saluting the flag. This is to
me an unwarranted intrusion into their religious beliefs, which tell them the opposite.
The State cannot interpret the Bible for them; only they can read it as they see fit. Right
or wrong, the meaning they derive from it cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps
by their own acknowledged superiors. But certainly not the State. It has no competence
in this matter. Religion is forbidden territory that the State, for all its power and authority,
cannot invade.

I am not unaware of Justice Frankfurter's admonition that "the constitutional protection

of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave
religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma."

But in the case at bar, the law to which the petitioners are made to conform clashes with
their own understanding of their religious obligations. Significantly, as
the ponencia notes, their intransigence does not disturb the peaceful atmosphere of the
school or otherwise prejudice the public order. Their refusal to salute the flag and recite
the patriotic pledge does not disrupt the flag ceremony. They neither mock nor disdain it.
The petitioners simply stand at attention and keep quiet "to show their respect for the
right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings." It is for this
innocuous conduct that, pursuant to the challenged law and regulations, the teachers
have been dismissed and the students excelled.

Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of
Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also
guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a
symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written
or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it
can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition.
To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion
bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.

The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the
unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it
cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or
proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this case. The
conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who
disagree with them, are protected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the
individual speak when the soul within rebels.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur in the Court's decision penned by Madame Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino

that school teachers and students who cannot salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the pledge of loyalty to the country, on grounds of religious belief or
conviction, may not on this ground alone be dismissed from the service or expelled from
the school.

At the same time, I am really concerned with what could be the

far-reaching consequences of our ruling in that, we may in effect be sanctioning
a privileged or elite class of teachers and students who will hereafter be exempt from
participating, even when they are in the school premises, in the flag ceremony in
deference to their religious scruples. What happens, for instance, if some citizens,
based also on their religious beliefs, were to refuse to pay taxes and license fees to the
government? Perhaps problems of this nature should not be anticipated. They will be
resolved when and if they ever arise. But with today's decision, we may have created
more problems than we have solved.

It cannot also be denied that the State has the right and even the duty to promote
among its citizens, especially the youth, love and country, respect for the flag and
reverence for its national heroes. It cannot also be disputed that the State has the right
to adopt reasonable means by which these laudable objectives can be effectively
pursued and achieved. The flag ceremony is one such device intended to inspire
patriotism and evoke the finest sentiments of love of country and people.

In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitimate means to achieve legitimate (and noble) ends.
For a select few to be exempt from the flag ceremony and all that it represent seven if
the exemption is predicated on respect for religious scruples, could be divisive in its
impact on the school population or community.

I would therefore submit that, henceforth, teachers and students who because of
religious scruples or beliefs cannot actively participate in the flag ceremony conducted
in the school premises should be excluded beforehand from such ceremony. Instead of
allowing the religious objector to attend the flag ceremony and display therein his
inability to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to
the Republic, he or she should remain in the classroom while honors to the flag are
conducted and manifested in the "quadrangle" or equivalent place within school
premises; or if the flag ceremony must be held in a hall, the religious objector must take
his or her place at the rear of (or outside) the hall while those who actively participate in
the ceremony must take the front places. This arrangement can, in my view, achieve an
accommodation and, to a certain extent, harmonization of a citizen's constitutional right
to freedom of religion and a valid exercise of the State's fundamental and legitimate
authority to require homage and honor to the flag as the symbol of the Nation.

# Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I am happy to concur with Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino in her quietly eloquent
affirmation of a vital postulate of freedom. I would only add my brief observations
concerning Gerona v. Secretary of Education.

In my humble view, Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that
promulgated it was apparently laboring under the conviction that the State had the right
to determine what was religious and what was not and to dictate to the individual what
he could and could not worship. In pronouncing that the flag was not a religious image
but a symbol of the nation, it
was implying that no one had the right to worship it or as the petitioners insisted
not to worship it. This was no different from saying that the cult that reveres Rizal as a
divinity should not and cannot do so because he is only a civic figure deserving honor
but not veneration.

It seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what to
worship or whether to worship at all. This is a personal decision he alone can make. The
individual may worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a tree (or a flag), and the State
cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can it compel him to do so.
As long as his beliefs are not externalized in acts that offend the public interest, he
cannot be prohibited from harboring them or punished for doing so.

In requiring the herein petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony, the State has
declared ex cathedra that they are not violating the Bible by saluting the flag. This is to
me an unwarranted intrusion into their religious beliefs, which tell them the opposite.
The State cannot interpret the Bible for them; only they can read it as they see fit. Right
or wrong, the meaning they derive from it cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps
by their own acknowledged superiors. But certainly not the State. It has no competence
in this matter. Religion is forbidden territory that the State, for all its power and authority,
cannot invade.
I am not unaware of Justice Frankfurter's admonition that "the constitutional protection
of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave
religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma."

But in the case at bar, the law to which the petitioners are made to conform clashes with
their own understanding of their religious obligations. Significantly, as
the ponencia notes, their intransigence does not disturb the peaceful atmosphere of the
school or otherwise prejudice the public order. Their refusal to salute the flag and recite
the patriotic pledge does not disrupt the flag ceremony. They neither mock nor disdain it.
The petitioners simply stand at attention and keep quiet "to show their respect for the
right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings." It is for this
innocuous conduct that, pursuant to the challenged law and regulations, the teachers
have been dismissed and the students excelled.

Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of
Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also
guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a
symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written
or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it
can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition.
To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion
bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.

The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the
unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it
cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or
proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this case. The
conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who
disagree with them, are protected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the
individual speak when the soul within rebels.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur in the Court's decision penned by Madame Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino

that school teachers and students who cannot salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the pledge of loyalty to the country, on grounds of religious belief or
conviction, may not on this ground alone be dismissed from the service or expelled from
the school.

At the same time, I am really concerned with what could be the

far-reaching consequences of our ruling in that, we may in effect be sanctioning
a privileged or elite class of teachers and students who will hereafter be exempt from
participating, even when they are in the school premises, in the flag ceremony in
deference to their religious scruples. What happens, for instance, if some citizens,
based also on their religious beliefs, were to refuse to pay taxes and license fees to the
government? Perhaps problems of this nature should not be anticipated. They will be
resolved when and if they ever arise. But with today's decision, we may have created
more problems than we have solved.

It cannot also be denied that the State has the right and even the duty to promote
among its citizens, especially the youth, love and country, respect for the flag and
reverence for its national heroes. It cannot also be disputed that the State has the right
to adopt reasonable means by which these laudable objectives can be effectively
pursued and achieved. The flag ceremony is one such device intended to inspire
patriotism and evoke the finest sentiments of love of country and people.

In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitimate means to achieve legitimate (and noble) ends.
For a select few to be exempt from the flag ceremony and all that it represent seven if
the exemption is predicated on respect for religious scruples, could be divisive in its
impact on the school population or community.

I would therefore submit that, henceforth, teachers and students who because of
religious scruples or beliefs cannot actively participate in the flag ceremony conducted
in the school premises should be excluded beforehand from such ceremony. Instead of
allowing the religious objector to attend the flag ceremony and display therein his
inability to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to
the Republic, he or she should remain in the classroom while honors to the flag are
conducted and manifested in the "quadrangle" or equivalent place within school
premises; or if the flag ceremony must be held in a hall, the religious objector must take
his or her place at the rear of (or outside) the hall while those who actively participate in
the ceremony must take the front places. This arrangement can, in my view, achieve an
accommodation and, to a certain extent, harmonization of a citizen's constitutional right
to freedom of religion and a valid exercise of the State's fundamental and legitimate
authority to require homage and honor to the flag as the symbol of the Nation.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9637 April 30, 1957

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee.

City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Juan Nabong for appellant.

Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Naawa for appellee.
FELIX, J.:

Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered

and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in
November, 1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral in said City. The defendant appellee is a
municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines
and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer
of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise
since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal
license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and
3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees,
together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of
1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).

Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit
and pay under protest the sum of P5,891.45, if suit was to be taken in court regarding the same
(Annex B). To avoid the closing of its business as well as further fines and penalties in the premises
on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees in
the aforementioned amount, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be
taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which, the said fees were being
collected (Annex C), which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this
action. In its complaint plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364 illegal and
unconstitutional, and that the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45
paid under protest, together with legal interest thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further praying for
such other relief and remedy as the court may deem just equitable.

Defendant answered the complaint, maintaining in turn that said ordinances were enacted by the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection
(m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18, subsection
(1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and praying that the
complaint be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff. This answer was replied by the plaintiff
reiterating the unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances.

Before trial the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, thru their undersigned attorneys and
respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts:

1. That the plaintiff sold for the use of the purchasers at its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral,
Manila, Bibles, New Testaments, bible portions and bible concordance in English and other
foreign languages imported by it from the United States as well as Bibles, New Testaments
and bible portions in the local dialects imported and/or purchased locally; that from the fourth
quarter of 1945 to the first quarter of 1953 inclusive the sales made by the plaintiff were as
follows:
Quarter Amount of Sales

4th quarter 1945 P1,244.21

1st quarter 1946 2,206.85

2nd quarter 1946 1,950.38

3rd quarter 1946 2,235.99

4th quarter 1946 3,256.04

1st quarter 1947 13,241.07

2nd quarter 1947 15,774.55

3rd quarter 1947 14,654.13

4th quarter 1947 12,590.94

1st quarter 1948 11,143.90

2nd quarter 1948 14,715.26

3rd quarter 1948 38,333.83

4th quarter 1948 16,179.90

1st quarter 1949 23,975.10

2nd quarter 1949 17,802.08

3rd quarter 1949 16,640.79

4th quarter 1949 15,961.38

1st quarter 1950 18,562.46

2nd quarter 1950 21,816.32

3rd quarter 1950 25,004.55

4th quarter 1950 45,287.92

1st quarter 1951 37,841.21

2nd quarter 1951 29,103.98

3rd quarter 1951 20,181.10

 4th quarter 1951 22,968.91

1st quarter 1952 23,002.65

2nd quarter 1952 17,626.96

3rd quarter 1952 17,921.01

4th quarter 1952 24,180.72

1st quarter 1953 29,516.21

2. That the parties hereby reserve the right to present evidence of other facts not herein
stipulated.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this case be set for hearing so that the parties
may present further evidence on their behalf. (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-16).

When the case was set for hearing, plaintiff proved, among other things, that it has been in existence
in the Philippines since 1899, and that its parent society is in New York, United States of America;
that its, contiguous real properties located at Isaac Peral are exempt from real estate taxes; and that
it was never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor does the American
Bible Society in the United States pay any license fee or sales tax for the sale of bible therein.
Plaintiff further tried to establish that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles, which are
disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain its operating cost it
obtains substantial remittances from its New York office and voluntary contributions and gifts from
certain churches, both in the United States and in the Philippines, which are interested in its
missionary work. Regarding plaintiff's contention of lack of profit in the sale of bibles, defendant
retorts that the admissions of plaintiff-appellant's lone witness who testified on cross-examination
that bibles bearing the price of 70 cents each from plaintiff-appellant's New York office are sold here
by plaintiff-appellant at P1.30 each; those bearing the price of $4.50 each are sold here at P10 each;
those bearing the price of $7 each are sold here at P15 each; and those bearing the price of $11
each are sold here at P22 each, clearly show that plaintiff's contention that it never makes any profit
from the sale of its bible, is evidently untenable.
After hearing the Court rendered judgment, the last part of which is as follows:

As may be seen from the repealed section (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and the
repealing portions (o) of section 18 of Republic Act No. 409, although they seemingly differ in
the way the legislative intent is expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the
purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in said legal provisions, and that the taxes to
be levied by said ordinances is in the nature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended by Ordinance No. 3364).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court is of the opinion and so

holds that this case should be dismissed, as it is hereby dismissed, for lack of merits, with
costs against the plaintiff.

Not satisfied with this verdict plaintiff took up the matter to the Court of Appeals which certified the
case to Us for the reason that the errors assigned to the lower Court involved only questions of law.

Appellant contends that the lower Court erred:

1. In holding that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are not
unconstitutional;

2. In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code under
which Ordinances Nos. 2592 and 3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section 18
of Republic Act No. 409;

3. In not holding that an ordinance providing for taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in
order to be valid under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first be approved by the
President of the Philippines; and

4. In holding that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed commercial
proportions, it cannot escape from the operation of said municipal ordinances under the
cloak of religious privilege.

The issues. As may be seen from the proceeding statement of the case, the issues involved in the
present controversy may be reduced to the following: (1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of
Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid; and (2)
whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at bar.

Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, provides
that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Predicated on this constitutional mandate, plaintiff-appellant contends that Ordinances Nos. 2529
and 3000, as respectively amended, are unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is
concerned, because they provide for religious censorship and restrain the free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession, to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
literature to the people of the Philippines.

Before entering into a discussion of the constitutional aspect of the case, We shall first consider the
provisions of the questioned ordinances in relation to their application to the sale of bibles, etc. by
appellant. The records, show that by letter of May 29, 1953 (Annex A), the City Treasurer required
plaintiff to secure a Mayor's permit in connection with the society's alleged business of distributing
and selling bibles, etc. and to pay permit dues in the sum of P35 for the period covered in this
litigation, plus the sum of P35 for compromise on account of plaintiff's failure to secure the permit
required by Ordinance No. 3000 of the City of Manila, as amended. This Ordinance is of general
application and not particularly directed against institutions like the plaintiff, and it does not contain
any provisions whatever prescribing religious censorship nor restraining the free exercise and
enjoyment of any religious profession. Section 1 of Ordinance No. 3000 reads as follows:

SEC. 1. PERMITS NECESSARY. It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to conduct or
engage in any of the businesses, trades, or occupations enumerated in Section 3 of this
Ordinance or other businesses, trades, or occupations for which a permit is required for the
proper supervision and enforcement of existing laws and ordinances governing the
sanitation, security, and welfare of the public and the health of the employees engaged in the
business specified in said section 3 hereof, WITHOUT FIRST HAVING OBTAINED A
PERMIT THEREFOR FROM THE MAYOR AND THE NECESSARY LICENSE FROM THE
CITY TREASURER.

The business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff involved in this case is not particularly mentioned in
Section 3 of the Ordinance, and the record does not show that a permit is required therefor under
existing laws and ordinances for the proper supervision and enforcement of their provisions
governing the sanitation, security and welfare of the public and the health of the employees engaged
in the business of the plaintiff. However, sections 3 of Ordinance 3000 contains item No. 79, which
reads as follows:

79. All other businesses, trades or occupations not

mentioned in this Ordinance, except those upon which the
City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00

Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax
said business, trade or occupation.

As to the license fees that the Treasurer of the City of Manila required the society to pay from the 4th
quarter of 1945 to the 1st quarter of 1953 in the sum of P5,821.45, including the sum of P50 as
compromise, Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028
prescribes the following:

SEC. 1. FEES. Subject to the provisions of section 578 of the Revised Ordinances of the
City of Manila, as amended, there shall be paid to the City Treasurer for engaging in any of
the businesses or occupations below enumerated, quarterly, license fees based on gross
sales or receipts realized during the preceding quarter in accordance with the rates herein
prescribed: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That a person engaged in any businesses or
occupation for the first time shall pay the initial license fee based on the probable gross sales
or receipts for the first quarter beginning from the date of the opening of the business as
indicated herein for the corresponding business or occupation.

xxx xxx xxx

 GROUP 2. Retail dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet
subject to the payment of any municipal tax, such as (1) retail dealers in general
merchandise; (2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of . . . books, including
stationery.

xxx xxx xxx

As may be seen, the license fees required to be paid quarterly in Section 1 of said Ordinance No.
2529, as amended, are not imposed directly upon any religious institution but upon those engaged in
any of the business or occupations therein enumerated, such as retail "dealers in general
merchandise" which, it is alleged, cover the business or occupation of selling bibles, books, etc.

Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code which includes section 2444, subsection (m-2) of
said legal body, as amended by Act No. 3659, approved on December 8, 1929, empowers the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila:

(M-2) To tax and fix the license fee on (a) dealers in new automobiles or accessories or both,
and (b) retail dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to
the payment of any municipal tax.

For the purpose of taxation, these retail dealers shall be classified as (1) retail dealers in
general merchandise, and (2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of (a) textiles . . .
(e) books, including stationery, paper and office supplies, . . .: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That
the combined total tax of any debtor or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under these
subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned herein,
SHALL NOT BE IN EXCESS OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS PER ANNUM.

and appellee's counsel maintains that City Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, were
enacted in virtue of the power that said Act No. 3669 conferred upon the City of Manila. Appellant,
however, contends that said ordinances are longer in force and effect as the law under which they
were promulgated has been expressly repealed by Section 102 of Republic Act No. 409 passed
on June 18, 1949, known as the Revised Manila Charter.

Passing upon this point the lower Court categorically stated that Republic Act No. 409 expressly
repealed the provisions of Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code but in the opinion of the
trial Judge, although Section 2444 (m-2) of the former Manila Charter and section 18 (o) of the new
seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent was expressed, yet their meaning is practically the
same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in both legal provisions and,
consequently, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, are to be considered as still in full
force and effect uninterruptedly up to the present.

Often the legislature, instead of simply amending the pre-existing statute, will repeal the old
statute in its entirety and by the same enactment re-enact all or certain portions of the
preexisting law. Of course, the problem created by this sort of legislative action involves
mainly the effect of the repeal upon rights and liabilities which accrued under the original
statute. Are those rights and liabilities destroyed or preserved? The authorities are divided as
to the effect of simultaneous repeals and re-enactments. Some adhere to the view that the
rights and liabilities accrued under the repealed act are destroyed, since the statutes from
which they sprang are actually terminated, even though for only a very short period of
time. Others, and they seem to be in the majority, refuse to accept this view of the situation,
and consequently maintain that all rights an liabilities which have accrued under the original
statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal,
 therefore, continuing the law in force without interruption. (Crawford-Statutory Construction,
Sec. 322).

Appellant's counsel states that section 18 (o) of Republic Act No, 409 introduces a new and wider
concept of taxation and is different from the provisions of Section 2444(m-2) that the former cannot
be considered as a substantial re-enactment of the provisions of the latter. We have quoted above
the provisions of section 2444(m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and We shall now copy
hereunder the provisions of Section 18, subdivision (o) of Republic Act No. 409, which reads as
follows:

(o) To tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers and
indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some other
municipal tax under the provisions of this section.

Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail
dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified
into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential
commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for each
class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall
not be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or
highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as
such, as may be provided by ordinance.

For purposes of this section, the term "General merchandise" shall include poultry and
livestock, agricultural products, fish and other allied products.

The only essential difference that We find between these two provisions that may have any bearing
on the case at bar, is that, while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any
dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in
one or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the
corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as
to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in
accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and
liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since
the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption",
We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect.

Plaintiff, however, argues that the questioned ordinances, to be valid, must first be approved by the
President of the Philippines as per section 18, subsection (ii) of Republic Act No. 409, which reads
as follows:

(ii) To tax, license and regulate any business, trade or occupation being conducted within the
City of Manila, not otherwise enumerated in the preceding subsections, including percentage
taxes based on gross sales or receipts, subject to the approval of the PRESIDENT, except
amusement taxes.

but this requirement of the President's approval was not contained in section 2444 of the former
Charter of the City of Manila under which Ordinance No. 2529 was promulgated. Anyway, as stated
by appellee's counsel, the business of "retail dealers in general merchandise" is expressly
enumerated in subsection (o), section 18 of Republic Act No. 409; hence, an ordinance prescribing a
municipal tax on said business does not have to be approved by the President to be effective, as it is
not among those referred to in said subsection (ii). Moreover, the questioned ordinances are still in
force, having been promulgated by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila under the authority
granted to it by law.

The question that now remains to be determined is whether said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid
or unconstitutional if applied to the alleged business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of
the Philippines by a religious corporation like the American Bible Society, plaintiff herein.

With regard to Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028,
appellant contends that it is unconstitutional and illegal because it restrains the free exercise and
enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant.

Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines aforequoted, guarantees the
freedom of religious profession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to its Creator" (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil., 201).It has
reference to one's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of
reverence to His being and character, and obedience to His Will (Davis vs. Beason, 133 U.S., 342).
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraints of such right can only be
justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Taada and
Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license
fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other
religious literature:

In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held that an ordinance requiring that a
license be obtained before a person could canvass or solicit orders for goods, paintings,
pictures, wares or merchandise cannot be made to apply to members of Jehovah's
Witnesses who went about from door to door distributing literature and soliciting people to
"purchase" certain religious books and pamphlets, all published by the Watch Tower Bible &
Tract Society. The "price" of the books was twenty-five cents each, the "price" of the
pamphlets five cents each. It was shown that in making the solicitations there was a request
for additional "contribution" of twenty-five cents each for the books and five cents each for
the pamphlets. Lesser sum were accepted, however, and books were even donated in case
interested persons were without funds.

On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that petitioners were
engaged in commercial rather than a religious venture. Their activities could not be
described as embraced in the occupation of selling books and pamphlets. Then the Court
continued:

"We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial
burdens of government. See Grosjean vs. American Press Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed.
660, 668, 56 S. Ct. 444. We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on
the income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed
in connection with activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon.
The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition
of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege
is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this
religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary
for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary
 evangelism can close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading
religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . . .

It is contended however that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity
is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license
tax a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights . . . The
power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedom is indeed as potent as the
power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. . . . It is not a nominal fee
imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in
question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition
to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of
press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly
recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax."

Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditioned upon the approval of an

official or manager even if the town were owned by a corporation as held in the case
of Marsh vs. State of Alabama (326 U.S. 501), or by the United States itself as held in the
case of Tucker vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Court expressed
the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the press and religion occupies a preferred
position as against the constitutional right of property owners.

"When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people
to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that
the latter occupy a preferred position. . . . In our view the circumstance that the property
rights to the premises where the deprivation of property here involved, took place, were held
by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the
enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute." (Taada and Fernando
on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 304-306).

Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code,
provides:

SEC. 27. EXEMPTIONS FROM TAX ON CORPORATIONS. The following organizations

shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received by them as such

(e) Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious,

charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever
kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted
for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax
imposed under this Code;

Appellant's counsel claims that the Collector of Internal Revenue has exempted the plaintiff from this
tax and says that such exemption clearly indicates that the act of distributing and selling bibles, etc.
is purely religious and does not fall under the above legal provisions.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was
in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that
appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this
reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be
applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention the Mayor's permit
before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein,
We do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution,
nor tax the exercise of religious practices. In the case of Coleman vs. City of Griffin, 189 S.E. 427,
this point was elucidated as follows:

An ordinance by the City of Griffin, declaring that the practice of distributing either by hand or
otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles
are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold within the city limits of the City of
Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the city manager of the City of Griffin,
shall be deemed a nuisance and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin, does
not deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing and carrying
out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious system.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if
applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not
applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of
plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination
of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is also inapplicable to said
business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision
appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.
Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Santiago V. Marcos, Jr. for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:
It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were moved by their desire to devote their
remaining years to the service of their Creator by forming their own civic organization for that
purpose, should find themselves enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from a
community member allegedly without the required permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.

The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic
organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the
purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the
chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a
resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation
was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information 1 was filed against
petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information 2 on
the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree
No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for
a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied 3 by the trial court, and
petitioner's motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.

On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment 4 finding accused Vicente Yco and
petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of P200.00.
Nevertheless, the trial court recommended that the accused be pardoned on the basis of its finding that
they acted in good faith, plus the fact that it believed that the latter should not have been criminally liable
were it not for the existence of Presidential Decree
No. 1564 which the court opined it had the duty to apply in the instant case.

Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
10. However, accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the case proceeded only with
respect to petitioner Centeno. On May 21, 1993, respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the
decision of the lower court but modified the penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act
committed which caused damage and prejudice to the complainant, by sentencing petitioner
Centeno to suffer an increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 5 The motion for reconsideration of the decision was
denied by the court. 6

Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the judicial hierarchy
eventually reached this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of whether solicitations for
religious purposes are within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the financial
sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a question of principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court is
gratified that it can now grant this case the benefit of a final adjudication.

Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions
intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious purpose" is not
expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes;
(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused; and
(3) to subject to State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an
abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.

Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation
Permit Law), provides as follows:
 Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or
receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a
permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and
Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of a
written application for a permit in the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the
Department of Social Services and Development, the Regional Director or his duly
authorized representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary
permit or disapprove the application. In the interest of the public, he may in his
discretion renew or revoke any permit issued under Act 4075.

The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed
in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negative.

I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 7

It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words
"charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable"
is only one of three descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides that "charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions in statutes wherein these two
terms are likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e)
(corporations exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National
Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for the organization of non-stock corporations) of the
Corporation Code; and
Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government Code.

That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare
purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not
have so stated expressly.

All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since
religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. 8 However, "religious purpose"
is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious
purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a
"charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term. 9 Although the term "charitable"
may include matters which are "religious," it is a broader term and includes matters which are not
"religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose,"
except where the two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the distinction has been done
away with by statute. 10 The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is capable of different
significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a very wide
meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad
application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners.

To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer.
However, there are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for "religious purposes" have been
liberally construed as covered in the law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes." Thus, the
term "charitable purposes," within the meaning of a statute providing that the succession of any
property passing to or for the use of any institution for purposes only of public charity shall not be
subject to succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes. 11 A gift for "religious purposes"
was considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as regards exemption from inheritance tax. 12

On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation within the concept of
"charitable" purpose which under Presidential Decree
No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services and Development, under
paid of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term
"charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes.
Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that such
interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused.

For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications,
intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to
spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of
a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness
as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable
but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions
is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held
to be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make
them such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as
without its intendment. 13

The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 14 The word "charitable" is a matter of
description rather than of precise definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is
charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances. 15 The law does not operate in
vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract.

Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above, the
enumerations therein given which include the words "charitable" and "religious" make use of the
disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an
alternative. It often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When
"or" is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately. 16 Accordingly,
"charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive "or" should be
given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration why the same
treatment or usage of these words cannot be made applicable to the questioned provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1564.

II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the law
for, otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed
under the Constitution.

It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and,
consequently, solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. Prefatorily, it
is not implausible that the regulatory powers of the State may, to a certain degree, extend to
solicitations of this nature. Considering, however, that such an activity is within the cloak of the free
exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, it becomes
imperative to delve into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the power to regulate the exercise
of this constitutional right and the allowable restrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one
hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that
is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom
to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every
case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly
infringe on the protected
freedom. 17

Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that
the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from
fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to
solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he
purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation
generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. 18

It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that
everything which may be so called can be tolerated. 19 It has been said that a law advancing a
legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of
religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more
religion. 20 Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any
religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any
constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not
constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible
obstacle to its exercise. 21

Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are carried on
by persons and associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of benevolent purposes,
succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous public. It is in fact amazing how profitable the
fraudulent schemes and practices are to people who manipulate them. The State has authority
under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on
soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That
solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused
is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy
purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within
reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy. 22 The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons
are prejudicial to worthy and proper charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in
campaigns for the raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed. 23 Some regulation of public
solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest. 24

To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in
the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a
religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent judge for increasing the penalty
imposed by the trial court, premised on the supposed perversity of petitioner's act which thereby
caused damage to the complainant. It must be here emphasized that the trial court, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, even recommended executive clemency in favor of petitioner and the other
accused after finding that the latter acted in good faith in making the solicitation from the
complainant, an observation with which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a doubtful and difficult
question of law can be the basis of good faith, especially for a layman.

There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge which would indicate, impliedly or
otherwise, that petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. This could be
reflective upon her objectivity, considering that the complainant in this case is herself a judge of the
Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City. It bears stressing at this point that a judge is required to so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, 25 should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert its independence, and must resist any
pressure from whatever source. 26

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner
Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J.:

I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel
is not covered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for
"charitable or public welfare purposes." My reasons are three-fold.

First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or
public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a
charitable or public welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not
like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and
the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of
religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as
those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation
does not engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for
contribution.

Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation
of fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives
are usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection
against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection
with respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation.

Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to
lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well justify
requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American
Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee
before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because that
would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for the same reason that religious
rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other uses of public
parks and streets. 2 To read the Decree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations for religious
purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the
Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided.

For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from and to acquit petitioner.

Padilla, J., concurs.

# Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J.:

I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel
is not covered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for
"charitable or public welfare purposes." My reasons are three-fold.

First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or
public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a
charitable or public welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not
like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and
the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of
religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as
those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation
does not engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for
contribution.

Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation
of fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives
are usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection
against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection
with respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation.

Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to
lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well justify
requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American
Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee
before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because that
would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for the same reason that religious
rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other uses of public
parks and streets. 2 To read the Decree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations for religious
purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the
Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided.

For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from and to acquit petitioner.
 Padilla, J., concurs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants,
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.

Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.

The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:

Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as
the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining
agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:

Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all

permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.

The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day,
March 4, 1964.

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act
No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted,
introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875,
as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was
taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a
formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the
fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn
notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement
with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted
Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the
Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 2Upon the facts agreed upon by the
parties during the pre-trial conference, the Court a quo rendered its decision on August 26, 1965, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered enjoining the defendant

Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment
and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500
for attorney's fees and the costs of this action. 3

From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of law, assigning
the following errors:

I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional.

II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay plaintiff the
sum of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost thereof.

In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Union contented, firstly,
that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations; that "the very phraseology
of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a labor organization is banned to all those belonging
to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor organization" 4 , "prohibits all the members of
a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members
thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful
associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III,
Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution. 6

Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for impairing the
obligation of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining
agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the employer from its reciprocal
obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment;
and that said Act, furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from
members who, under the Act, are relieved from the obligation to continue as such members. 7

Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects
which ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill, Section 1 (7) of the 1935
Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or
protection to labor organizations. 8

Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional provision that "no
religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil
right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be determined under the Act by his
affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a worker has to sever his religious connection with
a sect that prohibits membership in a labor organization in order to be able to join a labor
organization, said Act would violate religious freedom. 9

Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection of laws"
clause of the Constitution, it being a discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the
operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said
members undue advantages over their fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them from union
obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the enjoyment of all
concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the union might secure from the employer. 10

Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision
regarding the promotion of social justice. 11

Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a collective bargaining
agreement cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12and that unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared
unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as employers would prefer to hire or
employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away with labor organizations. 13

Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate
the right to form lawful associations, for the right to join associations includes the right not to join or
to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience does not allow his membership therein, and
the Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor
organizations; 14 that said Act does not impair the obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and
was incorporated into, the terms of the closed shop agreement; 15 that the Act does not violate the
establishment of religion clause or separation of Church and State, for Congress, in enacting said law,
merely accommodated the religious needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members from
joining labor unions, and balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the constitutional right of an
individual to freely exercise his chosen religion; that the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's
religion has primacy and preference over union security measures which are merely contractual 16 ; that
said Act does not violate the constitutional provision of equal protection, for the classification of workers
under the Act depending on their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the
purpose of the law, and applies to all the members of a given class; 17 that said Act, finally, does not
violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said Act was enacted precisely to equalize
employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the diversities of their religious beliefs." 18

I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is necessary to premise that
there are some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in all cases where
questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved. All presumptions are
indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must
prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be
upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with
the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 19

1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the members of such
religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining labor unions
appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by
necessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant, having thus misread
the Act, committed the error of contending that said Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision
on freedom of association.

Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. Section 1 (6) of
Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973,
provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and
guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories
propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it
can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad
notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee
may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may,
as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should
decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he
himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he
still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at
any time. 20 It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any
union. 21 Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and
guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that
the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does
not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.

The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace
Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn
by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of
which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees
must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs.
Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350,
provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard
to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an
agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if
such labor organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed
shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his
religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member of
the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is
curtailed and withdrawn.

To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced
an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the
application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception
provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite
of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining
union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on
freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to
affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty
to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join;
neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel
them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association.

2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of its
contract, specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement
with the Company, by virtue of which "membership in the union was required as a condition for
employment for all permanent employees workers". This agreement was already in existence at the
time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to
have been incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well as
others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his job even if he should cease to be a
member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could continue employing him
notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the
express terms of the union security clause; the Company was partly absolved by law from the
contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent
positions, It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of said union security
clause.

According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express terms of the contract, or
its legal construction, or its validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement, impairs the
contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not a question of degree or manner or cause,
but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation or dispensing with any part of its force. There is
an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved by law from its performance. 22 Impairment
has also been predicated on laws which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial
contractual rights. 23

It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not
absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring
construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. 24 In spite of the constitutional
prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people.
Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in
effect. 25 For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation
under the police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that
power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering
into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society. The contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony
with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard
the vital interests of the people. It follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of impairing a
contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the
legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights, must be
upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts regulating relations between capital and
labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public interest,
must yield to the common good. 27
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the obligations of
contracts has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general
legislative powers of the state involving public welfare. 28 Thus, this Court also held that the Blue
Sunday Law was not an infringement of the obligation of a contract that required the employer to furnish
work on Sundays to his employees, the law having been enacted to secure the well-being and happiness
of the laboring class, and being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of the police power. 29

In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no

unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of
each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be
determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be
sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the
means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted
must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony
with the constitutional limitation of that power. 30

What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to
insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing
discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of
which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their
dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.

The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two
aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at
various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power collective labor,
directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an institution
developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual employee from the
power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new
source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a
third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection the collective
bargaining relationship. 31

The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory Note to House
Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:

It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on account of his

religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership in a labor organization
although he possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is tantamount to
punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a right under the law to
believe in. The law would not allow discrimination to flourish to the detriment of those
whose religion discards membership in any labor organization. Likewise, the law
would not commend the deprivation of their right to work and pursue a modest
means of livelihood, without in any manner violating their religious faith and/or
belief. 32

It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose
exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union security agreements is
reasonable.

It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior
to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme
Court of the United States has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First
Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional
system. 33 Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, 34 and
has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of
religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional, appellant Union
averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in violation of Section
1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or
the practice of any form of worship, 35 but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion
within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good. 36 Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even
though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. 37 But if the stage regulates conduct by
enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. 38

In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be precluded from
pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion
or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional
prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. 40 Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional
inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or
holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to
the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from
work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of
livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment
whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the
state. In fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate
the relations between labor and capital and industry. 41 More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is
mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation
between workers and employers. 42

The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious
sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said
employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain
citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic
insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the
people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption
from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of
any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious
sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is
merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions. 43 The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious
exercise be preferentially aided. 44

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the
constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a
burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that
burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so
deems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be
accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. 45 In
the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.

Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certain religious sects, it
leaves no right to, and is silent as to the protection of, labor organizations. The purpose of Republic
Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided
for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code. As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding
the rights and protection of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a statute is
determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46 ; and, second, the fact that the law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional. 47

It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join and remain
members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than
help, labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance spread
to other workers, for religious objections have contagious potentialities more than political and
philosophic objections.

Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, and a fortiori to a
labor union assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion is not a goal
that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. 48 A desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means.

4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional prohibition
against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well taken.
The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association
membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation
with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or
qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a
positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the
coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a
positive act to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso
jure without need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious objector need not perform
a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union he is exempted from the
coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. How then can
there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when no right need be exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act No. 3350, and
that its purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a
constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result, which is lawful in itself, by
discovering or following a legal way to do it. 49

5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory legislation,
inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue advantages over other
workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the denial to any
person of the equal protection of the laws. 50

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. 51 It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. 52 The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. 53 All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. 54 This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. 56 It is not
necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. 57 Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. 58 Hence
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, 59for the equal protection
guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is
addressed to evils as they may appear.

We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies
employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those
who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those
whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the
beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith
and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and
practices, though they are found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied forms as to be
almost beyond imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious
beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the
lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion
than before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are important and should not be
ignored.
Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is based on real and important
differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they
carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain rules. of human conduct and
the justification of certain acts. 60 Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events in their
relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive character, its tone, its happiness or unhappiness its
enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved in a religious belief. To
certain persons, no single factor of their experience is more important to them than their religion, or their
not having any religion. Because of differences in religious belief and sentiments, a very poor person may
consider himself better than the rich, and the man who even lacks the necessities of life may be more
cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries. Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs,
became resigned to the inevitable and accepted cheerfully even the most painful and excruciating pains.
Because of differences in religious beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution,
hatred, bloodshed and war, generated to a large extent by members of sects who were intolerant of other
religious beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial
distinctions.

The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is
precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from being
deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop
security agreements.

Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time
of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It
is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As
long as there are closed shop agreements between an employer and a labor union, and there are
employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from
the coverage of said agreements continues.

Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from its
provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by itself
render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them their
freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in the same
plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions. The
circumstance, that the other employees, because they are differently situated, are not granted the
same privilege, does not render the law unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the
Constitution by its nature involves inequality.

The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the
right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification otherwise
reasonable does not offend the constitution simply because in practice it results in some
inequality. 61 Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law
that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained are of
public character, the law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond
those enjoyed by the general public. 62

6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision on
social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the
people. 63 Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who,
because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work
and of the means of livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is
not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited it is sufficient that a portion of the state be
benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the community. 64 Republic
Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who
are also component elements of society, for it insures security in their employment, notwithstanding their
failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the
proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot join labor
unions, for it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed
shop agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose religion
prohibits membership in labor unions with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership. Social
justice does not imply social equality, because social inequality will always exist as long as social relations
depend on personal or subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality because legal
equality, being a relative term, is necessarily premised on differentiations based on personal or natural
conditions. 65 Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is precisely what Republic Act
No. 3350 proposes to accomplish it gives laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal
opportunity for work.

7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is
not called for in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has
been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in
determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the
necessity for the enactment of the legislation in question. 67 Courts do inquire into the wisdom of
laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly
appreciate the needs of the people, and it may change the laws accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by
appellant that unless the Act is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism.
We do not agree. The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who are members of
the religious sects that control the demands of the labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go
further and anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity
of a statute is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired,
not from its effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be
measured. 71

II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which the Union argued that the
decision of the trial court ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves an industrial dispute wherein the
Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in the exercise of its rights under the union shop
provision of its existing collective bargaining contract with the Company; that said order also
contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore, Appellee was never actually dismissed
by the defendant Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at all . 72

In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instant case there was really no
industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its membership in the union
under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted intentional harm on Appellee; that
since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to protect his right to work, appellant could
legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code. 73

The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is relied upon by appellant
provides that:

No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court against a

labor organization or any officer or member thereof for any act done by or on behalf
 of such organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it is a party, on
the ground only that such act induces some other person to break a contract of
employment or that it is in restraint of trade or interferes with the trade, business or
employment of some other person or with the right of some other person to dispose
of his capital or labor. (Emphasis supplied)

That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed for appellant sought the
discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic
Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment is included in the term "labor dispute". 74 The
discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It being the labor dispute itself, that very same
act of the Union in asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done ... in furtherance of an
industrial dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts
are in furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its favor Section
24 of Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing at the
time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.

Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its shield. The article
provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act
or omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to protect his interest"; and "in any other
case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in
demanding Appellee's dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed
from his job. Costs according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as a
matter of course to the prevailing party.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated August 26, 1965, of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant Union. It is so ordered.

Makalintal, C.J, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J, concurring:

The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that Republic Act No. 3350 is free from the
constitutional infirmities imputed to it was demonstrated in a manner wellnigh conclusive in the
learned, scholarly, and comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts of the ponente, Justice
Zaldivar. Like the rest of my brethren, I concur fully. Considering moreover, the detailed attention
paid to each and every objection raised as to its validity and the clarity and persuasiveness with
which it was shown to be devoid of support in authoritative doctrines, it would appear that the last
word has been written on this particular subject. Nonetheless, I deem it proper to submit this brief
expression of my views on the transcendent character of religious freedom 1 and its primacy even as
against the claims of protection to labor, 2 also one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution.

1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individual possesses to worship or not a
Supreme Being, and if a devotee of any sect, to act in accordance with its creed. Thus is
constitutionally safeguarded, according to Justice Laurel, that "profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator ...." 3 The choice of what a man wishes to believe in is his
and his alone. That is a domain left untouched, where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to which the law is
denied entry, whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In that sphere, what he wills reigns supreme. The
doctrine to which he pays fealty may for some be unsupported by evidence, devoid of rational foundation.
No matter. There is no requirement as to its conformity to what has found acceptance. It suffices that for
him such a concept holds undisputed sway. That is a recognition of man's freedom. That for him is one of
the ways of self- realization. It would be to disregard the dignity that attaches to every human being to
deprive him of such an attribute. The "fixed star on our constitutional constellation," to borrow the
felicitous phrase of Justice Jackson, is that no official, not excluding the highest, has it in his power to
prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of conscience or to mundane affairs, for that matter.

Gerona v. Secretary of Education 4 speaks similarly. In the language of its ponente, Justice Montemayor: "The realm of belief
and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to
others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards." 5 There was this qualification though:
"But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.
If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law,
then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said
exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it." 6 It was on that basis that the daily compulsory flag
ceremony in accordance with a statute7 was found free from the constitutional objection on the part of a
religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose members alleged that their participation would be
offensive to their religious beliefs. In a case not dissimilar, West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 8 the American Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion. Justice Jackson's eloquent
opinion is, for this writer, highly persuasive. Thus: "The case is made difficult not because the principles of
its decision are obscure but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations
of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will
disintegrate the social organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the
appeal of our institutions to free minds. We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural
diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal
attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not
too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order." 9

There is moreover this ringing affirmation by Chief Justice Hughes of the primacy of religious
freedom in the forum of conscience even as against the command of the State itself: "Much has
been said of the paramount duty to the state, a duty to be recognized, it is urged, even though it
conflicts with convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the state exists within the domain
of power, for government may enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. When one's belief
collides with the power of the state, the latter is supreme within its sphere and submission or
punishment follows. But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has
always been maintained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would
unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of
religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation." 10 The American Chief Justice spoke in dissent, it is true, but with him in agreement were three
of the foremost jurists who ever sat in that Tribunal, Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone.
2. As I view Justice Zaldivar's opinion in that light, my concurrence, as set forth earlier, is
wholehearted and entire. With such a cardinal postulate as the basis of our polity, it has a message
that cannot be misread. Thus is intoned with a reverberating clang, to paraphrase Cardozo, a
fundamental principle that drowns all weaker sounds. The labored effort to cast doubt on the validity
of the statutory provision in question is far from persuasive. It is attended by futility. It is not for this
Court, as I conceive of the judicial function, to restrict the scope of a preferred freedom.

3. There is, however, the question of whether such an exception possesses an implication that
lessens the effectiveness of state efforts to protect labor, likewise, as noted, constitutionally
ordained. Such a view, on the surface, may not be lacking in plausibility, but upon closer analysis, it
cannot stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the freedom of association, likewise an aspect of
intellectual liberty. For the late Professor Howe a constitutionalist and in his lifetime the biographer of
the great Holmes, it even partakes of the political theory of pluralistic sovereignty. So great is the
respect for the autonomy accorded voluntary societies. 11 Such a right implies at the very least that one
can determine for himself whether or not he should join or refrain from joining a labor organization, an
institutional device for promoting the welfare of the working man. A closed shop, on the other hand, is
inherently coercive. That is why, as is unmistakably reflected in our decisions, the latest of which
is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial Relations, 12 it is far from being a favorite of the law. For a statutory
provision then to further curtail its operation, is precisely to follow the dictates of sound public policy.

The exhaustive and well-researched opinion of Justice Zaldivar thus is in the mainstream of
constitutional tradition. That, for me, is the channel to follow.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J, concurring:

The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that Republic Act No. 3350 is free from the
constitutional infirmities imputed to it was demonstrated in a manner wellnigh conclusive in the
learned, scholarly, and comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts of the ponente, Justice
Zaldivar. Like the rest of my brethren, I concur fully. Considering moreover, the detailed attention
paid to each and every objection raised as to its validity and the clarity and persuasiveness with
which it was shown to be devoid of support in authoritative doctrines, it would appear that the last
word has been written on this particular subject. Nonetheless, I deem it proper to submit this brief
expression of my views on the transcendent character of religious freedom 1 and its primacy even as
against the claims of protection to labor, 2 also one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution.

1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individual possesses to worship or not a
Supreme Being, and if a devotee of any sect, to act in accordance with its creed. Thus is
constitutionally safeguarded, according to Justice Laurel, that "profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator ...." 3 The choice of what a man wishes to believe in is his
and his alone. That is a domain left untouched, where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to which the law is
denied entry, whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In that sphere, what he wills reigns supreme. The
doctrine to which he pays fealty may for some be unsupported by evidence, devoid of rational foundation.
No matter. There is no requirement as to its conformity to what has found acceptance. It suffices that for
him such a concept holds undisputed sway. That is a recognition of man's freedom. That for him is one of
the ways of self- realization. It would be to disregard the dignity that attaches to every human being to
deprive him of such an attribute. The "fixed star on our constitutional constellation," to borrow the
felicitous phrase of Justice Jackson, is that no official, not excluding the highest, has it in his power to
prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of conscience or to mundane affairs, for that matter.

Gerona v. Secretary of Education 4 speaks similarly. In the language of its ponente, Justice Montemayor: "The realm of belief
and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to
others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards." 5 There was this qualification though:
"But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.
If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law,
then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said
exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it." 6 It was on that basis that the daily compulsory flag
ceremony in accordance with a statute7 was found free from the constitutional objection on the part of a
religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose members alleged that their participation would be
offensive to their religious beliefs. In a case not dissimilar, West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 8 the American Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion. Justice Jackson's eloquent
opinion is, for this writer, highly persuasive. Thus: "The case is made difficult not because the principles of
its decision are obscure but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations
of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will
disintegrate the social organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the
appeal of our institutions to free minds. We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural
diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal
attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not
too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order." 9

There is moreover this ringing affirmation by Chief Justice Hughes of the primacy of religious
freedom in the forum of conscience even as against the command of the State itself: "Much has
been said of the paramount duty to the state, a duty to be recognized, it is urged, even though it
conflicts with convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the state exists within the domain
of power, for government may enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. When one's belief
collides with the power of the state, the latter is supreme within its sphere and submission or
punishment follows. But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has
always been maintained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would
unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of
religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation." 10 The American Chief Justice spoke in dissent, it is true, but with him in agreement were three
of the foremost jurists who ever sat in that Tribunal, Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone.

2. As I view Justice Zaldivar's opinion in that light, my concurrence, as set forth earlier, is
wholehearted and entire. With such a cardinal postulate as the basis of our polity, it has a message
that cannot be misread. Thus is intoned with a reverberating clang, to paraphrase Cardozo, a
fundamental principle that drowns all weaker sounds. The labored effort to cast doubt on the validity
of the statutory provision in question is far from persuasive. It is attended by futility. It is not for this
Court, as I conceive of the judicial function, to restrict the scope of a preferred freedom.

3. There is, however, the question of whether such an exception possesses an implication that
lessens the effectiveness of state efforts to protect labor, likewise, as noted, constitutionally
ordained. Such a view, on the surface, may not be lacking in plausibility, but upon closer analysis, it
cannot stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the freedom of association, likewise an aspect of
intellectual liberty. For the late Professor Howe a constitutionalist and in his lifetime the biographer of
the great Holmes, it even partakes of the political theory of pluralistic sovereignty. So great is the
respect for the autonomy accorded voluntary societies. 11 Such a right implies at the very least that one
can determine for himself whether or not he should join or refrain from joining a labor organization, an
institutional device for promoting the welfare of the working man. A closed shop, on the other hand, is
inherently coercive. That is why, as is unmistakably reflected in our decisions, the latest of which
is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial Relations, 12 it is far from being a favorite of the law. For a statutory
provision then to further curtail its operation, is precisely to follow the dictates of sound public policy.

The exhaustive and well-researched opinion of Justice Zaldivar thus is in the mainstream of
constitutional tradition. That, for me, is the channel to follow.