Ferrer vs Ferrer

Facts:

Petitioner is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer, a half- brother of Respondents. She

filed a Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and
accounting with prayer for injunction and damages. She alleged that before her
marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927. He applied for a loan with the SSS to build
improvements thereon, including a residential house and a two-door apartment
building. However, it was during their marriage that payment of the loan was made
using the couples conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited,
they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that
respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the
warehouse; however, in September 1991, he stopped paying rentals thereon,
alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of
Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their
spouses. TCT No. 67927 was cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued and registered
in the names of respondents. According to petitioner, that when Alfredo died on 29
September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she
had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredos lot.
She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to P500,000.00; hence,
one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the
registered owners of Alfredos lot.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has the right to be reimbursed for the cost of
improvements under Article 120 of the Family Code?

Held: No. Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of
the respondents to respect or not to violate her right. The right of the spouse as
contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom
ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the
purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse. Indeed,
Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements
that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the
cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of
the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of
the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF APPEALS and ROMULO NICOL

FACTS:

- Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda Nicol.- On April 1987, the trial
court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the petitioners.- The
personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the damages.- The sheriff
levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda.- An auction sale was held with the
petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr.and
Mrs. Buado.- After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a
complaint for the annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary
injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff.- He argued that there was no
proper publication and posting for the auction sale. He also claimed that the
judgmentobligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado
obtained the P500,000 worth of propertyfor only P51,685.- The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol.- The Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on thecomplaint filed by
the respondent in this case.- The petitioners filed a petition where they said that the
Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the decision
given by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

HELD:

NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not

chargeable to the conjugal partnership.Unlike in the system of absolute community

where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of
the exclusive property of thedebtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in
the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugalpartnership of gains has
no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.Petitioners
argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable
to the conjugal partnership.The Supreme Court does not agree to the contention of
Mr. and Mrs. Buado.In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was
claimed by the third party complainant to be conjugalproperty was being levied
upon to enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third person, the third-party
claim of the wifeis proper since the obligation which is personal to the husband is
chargeable not on the conjugal property but on hisseparate property. Hence, the
filing of a separate action by Romulo Nicol was proper.The decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.

ELENITA M. DEWARA vs. SPOUSES RONNIE & GINA LAMELA

G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 483

FACTS: Eduardo and Elenita were married before the enactment of the Family Code
and thus the New Civil Code governed their marital relations. They were separated-
in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, USA, while Eduardo stayed in
Bacolod City. On January 20, 1985, while Eduardo was driving the private jeep
registered in the name of Elenita, hit Ronnie. As a result, MTCC found Eduardo guilty
of reckless imprudence and sentenced him to pay civil indemnities. The judgment
became final and executory and the sheriff levied the real property registered to
Elenita married to Eduardo. Elenita claimed that the said property was her
paraphernal property or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the
personal liability of her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of

Elenita.

HELD: NO. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it can be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy
this presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal
nature.

Moreover, the presumption of conjugal partnership applies even when the manner
in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds
is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise. The presumption that
the property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by strong, clear,

categorical, and convincing evidence -- there must be strict proof of the exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.
Security Bank and Trust Company vs Mar Tierra Corp

FACTS:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez,
applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and
Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line
agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement
executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and
Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent
corporation for the payment of the loan.

Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered
business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint
against respondent corp and individual respondents.

RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of

respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal
house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his
family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot
of the spouses Martinez. Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC decision.
Petitioned to SC.

ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity
agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party

HELD: No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.

The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor
or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. In Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the husband
himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money
and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls
within the term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In other
words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business,
there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. On the other hand, if the money or services are given to
another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the
transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his
family. In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between
petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The
accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent
Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was
similarly for the latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It
failed to discharge that burden.

PATROCINIA RAVINA and WILFREDO RAVINA vs. MARY ANN VILLA-ABRILLE,

for herself and in behalf of INGRID DLYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK
DWIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN
DYAN VILLA ABRILLE G.R. No. 160708

October 16, 2009

FACTS

In 1982, during the marriage of respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro,
Villa Abrille, they acquired a parcel of land in Davao City (Lot 7) registered in their
names. This lot is adjacent to another land (Lot 8), Pedros separate property. When
Pedro had a mistress in 1991 and neglected his family, Mary Ann sold/mortgaged
their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. Pedro, by
himself, offered to sell the house and the two lots to petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann
objected and notified the petitioners of such objection, but in June 1991, Pedro still
sold the house and lots without her consent. Later, Pedro, with armed members of
the CAFGU and in connivance with the petitioners, surreptitiously transferred all
their (Mary Ann+children) belongings from the house to an apartment. Mary Ann
and her children were also stopped from entering the house. Mary Ann and her
children (respondents) filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific
Performance, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against Pedro and the Ravinas. During trial Pedro claimed that the house was built
with his own money. Petitioners assert that Lot 7 was Pedros exclusive property,
acquired by him through barter or exchange. They also claim that Wilfredo Ravina
examined the titles when they bought the property from Pedro.TC ruled that the
sale of the house and the lots 7 & 8 were valid as to the half of the share of Pedro
and void as to the other half of the share of Mary Ann. CA modified, ruling that the
sale of lot 8 is valid, while the sale of lot 7 is void. CA also ordered Pedro to return
the value of the consideration for lot 7 and the house to Sps Ravina. Respondents
were also given the option to exercise their rights under Art. 450 NCC with respect
to the improvements introduced by Sps Ravina..

ISSUES

(1) Whether the Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property

 (2) Whether the sale of Lot 7 was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns
consent

(3) Whether the petitioners are buyers in good faith, hence, entitled to
reimbursement of their payment

RULING

1. Conjugal Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during Pedro and Mary Anns marriage. No
evidence was adduced to show that the property was acquired through exchange or
barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.
Likewise, the house built on Lot 7 is conjugal property, having been constructed
through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had obtained a loan from DBP to
construct the house.

2. Sale was VOID Under Art. 124 of the FC, disposition of a conjugal property is void
if done a) without the consent of both the husband and wife, or b) in case of one
spouses inability, the authority of the court. Here, Mary Ann timely filed the action
for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the
deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and
lot and does not include the lot covered by Lot 8, a property exclusively belonging
to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Anns consent.

3.) Buyers in bad faith; no reimbursement

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full
and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of
the claim or interest of some other person in the property. To establish his status as
a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of
and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the sellers
certificate of title.

For a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller
whose capacity is restricted, such as Arts. 166/173 /124 of the FC, to establish
status as a buyer in GF, he must show that he inquired into the latters capacity to
sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith. Here, the
property is registered in Pedro and Mary Anns names. Also, petitioners were
apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still
proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Anns written consent. Moreover,
the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public possession of the
property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of sale,
petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties
and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners
cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.

Fuentes vs Conrado Roca

FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales
from his mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the
petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the
documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between
Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php
140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land
and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained.
Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he went to
Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga .
The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and
Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the lot.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul
the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the
consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere
forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to
annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that
the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given
weight, and that the action has already prescribed.

On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA stating that the action has
not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that
the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable
and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in
1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive
period.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her

husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;

2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed; and

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the
action to annul that sale.

RULING: 1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the
signatures of Rosario in the document giving consent and another document
executed at the same time period. The SC noted that the CA was correct in ruling
that the heavy handwriting in the document which stated consent was completely
different from the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain why
there was such difference in the handwriting.

2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale
was done in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies
to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the enactment of the Family Code.
The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is
completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a given fact that
assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that the action has
already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period
applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such
contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to
assail a sale based on no consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe
since it is a void contract.

3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can
file such a case to assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already
dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is
wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently,
the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the
two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the
Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil
Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.