CHAPTER - 4

ATHEISM IN JAINISM
 ATHEISM IN JAINISM

The foundation o f Jainism has been attributed by occidental historians

to vardhamana MahlvTra'a contemporary o f the Buddha, who died in 526 B.C.

The Jainism, which has affinities with the Buddhism and with the Sanikhya

does not recognize the validity o f the vedic (Hindu) scriptures and thus is

considered heterodox in the Indian tradition.

The Jainism, as Zimmer1says, is not derived from Brahman Aryan source

but reflects the cosmology and anthropology o f a much older Pre- Aryan upper

class being rooted in the same subsoil o f archaic metaphysical speculation as

Y oga, Sankhya, and Buddhism (the other non-vedic) Indian systems.

The M ula Sutras2 are considered as the original stttras or commandments,

as they are primarily needed to guide the Jaina monks in their religious practices.

By the Orthodox systems, as mentioned in the Prava cancara3the Jainism

is called Nastika. Nastika, according to grammarians is one who does not believe

in the other worlds, and in this sense the Jainas are nastikas. B ut according to

smrtis nastika means one who denies creation by an intelligent agent and also

one w ho denies the authority o f the Vedas. In both these senses, the Jainism is

nastika because it never accepts the theory o f creation and also it does not accept

the authority o f the Vedas.

1. Philosophiesof IndiaH-Zimmer P. 217

2. Gandharva Vada Muniratna Prabha Vijaya P 5
3. Pravacancara i&NUpadhye P 10c14
 (98)

But the Jainism does accept a God. and hence the term atheist in its

etymological, sense can not be leveled against Jainism .If atheism means non-

acceptance of a popular God. who creates, protects and4:stroys the world assumed

in many Indian sistems. then Jainism is atheistic .

The Universe according to the Jainas is eternal and uncreated and n

contains two types o f entities - souls or life monads (jivas) and non-living mattei

(ajives or pudgals). The main teachings o f the Jainas are that there is a sharp

distinction between souls and matter that normally souls are implicated through

karma in the painful round o f rein incarnation and that by the practice o f virtue

meditation and great austerity. the ultimate release o f the soul is possible. Jainism

is atheistic but does not deny the existence o f gods as beings inside the cosmos

Henry Z im m er. therefore has called the Jainsm as trans theistic for it regards

the worship o f the gods as spiritually unimportant.

One o f the great figures o f humanity' was MahavTra. He is called \lina

the conqueror. He conquered his own self. He turned his attention from outw ard

nature to the study o f the human self. By a steady process o f austerity, discipline

self purification and under standing who had attained divine status. His example

is an incentive to others to pursue the same ideal o f self-conquest.

In contrast to the Buddha, MahavTra has never declared any nc\'

philosophical principle which he has received through enlightenment. Zimmc

puts. He was not the founder o f a new ascetic community but the reformer o l ' a i i

4 Ibid P xciv
5 Philosophies of India P 182
 (9 9 )

old one. H e was not the teacher o f a new doctrine, but is represented as having

gained at the time of his illumination the perfect knowledge o f something which

both he and his community had known before only imperfectly and in part6.

Sruti considers that o f all sciences the science o f die self is the greatest adhyatma

vidya vidyanam; the Upanisad tells us atmanamividhi, knowthey s e lf , Samkara

lays down as an essential condition o f spiritual life atma anatma vastu viveka,

the knowledge o f the distinction between the soul and the non - soul. There is

nothing higher as Radhakrishnan 7 maintains in this world than the possession o f

ones soul.

In MahavTra, we find the example o f a man, who renounced the things o f

the w orld like Buddha, who was not entangled in the bonds o f matter, but who

was able to realize the inward dignity o f his own self. W hat are the ways by

which w e can attain this self realization? O ur scriptures tell us, if w e w ish to

know;! the self, sravana, manana and nididyasana as Vedanta maintains are to be

practiced. The Bhagvad Gita also says, Tad vidhi pranipatena pariprasnena

sevaya8.

The same three great principles w ere asserted by MahavTra, when he

mentioned darsana, jnana, caritra in his teaching.

In the very first sutra o f Tattvarthadahigama su tra, Umasvami 9 states this

cardinal teaching o f Jainism . The path to liberation lies through right faith,

knowledge, and conduct. Samyag- darsana-Jnana- caritrani moksa m argah

6. Ibid P. 224
7. Religion &Culture Radha Krishnan P. 135
8 Srimat Bhagvad Gita Sloka 34 P 134
Qtd in Ibid. P 135
9 Umasvami Tat sut 1 2 3
Qtd in Introduction to Indian Phil. S.C. Chattejee P 105
 ( 100)

As the Buddhism, has mentioned the three jew els o f the Buddha, the

Dharma and the Sangha, the Jainism also has mentioned these three jew els o f

moral conduct.

According Mahavira, we must have visvasa (faith), Sraddha, that there is

something superior to the things o f this world. M ere faith, blind unthinking

faith w ill not do. We must have manana (reflection). By reflection, w e convert

the product o f faith into a product o f enlightenment. B ut mere theoretical

knowledge is not enough. Vakyartha Jnanamatrena na amrtam - w e cannot get

life eternal by mere textual learning10. We m ust embody these principles in our

own life. Caritra or conduct therefore, is equally essential. We m ust start with

darsana pranipata or sravana. We come to Jnana, manana or pa|uprasna, then we

come to nididhiyasana, seva or caritra. According to the Jainas, these all are

essential in realizing the true self.

The Jaina Tirthankaras er-as mentioned by ZimmerJUhe M akers o f the

River-Crossing who represent the goal o f all human beings, the goal infact of

all living entities in this living universe o f re-incamating monads - are cut o f f

(Kevala) from the provinces o f creation, preservation and destruction, which

are the concerns and spheres o f operation o f the gods.

Although the Jainas maintain the Upanisadic ideal o f self realisation but

w ith certain variations. The Jainism differs from the Hindu and the Buddhist

10 Religion & culture Radha Knshnan P.136

11 Philosophies of India Zimmer P 181
 ( 101)

views and equated Atman and Jiva, only the Jiva is corrupt. The Jainism teaches

the theory o f Anekantavada or the Indefmiteness o f Being. The permanence o f

existing things are stressed only as regards their substance, hence soul and

body are considered to lee more intimate than m ilk and w ater12. Teaching the

doctrine o f pudgala, material or cosmic particles were thought to have infiltrated

and corrupted the soul. The Sankhya system, in a like manner uses empirical

facts to prove the plurality o f souls as transcendental b ein g s. These plurality

o f selves can be demonstrated by the obvious difference in the birth and death,

and the sensory and motor endowments o f different individuals . It shows

that there are plurality o f selves . Regarding the plurality souls o f Jainas Prof.

Jacobi sa y s , A characteristic dogma o f the Jainas which pervades the whole

philosophical system and code o f morals is the hylozoistic theory that not only

animals and plants but also the smallest particles o f the elements, earth, fire,

w ater and air are endowed with souls (Jiva)13.

According to the Jainas, space which is also infinite is conceived o f as

being in two parts-one (Lokakasa) where movement is possible and the other

(alokakasa) where it is not. W hatever is, is only the former and the latter is
14
empty akasa, an abyss o f nothing , stretching infinitely beyond it. M atter

possesses colour, flavour odour and touch'5,sound being looked upon not as a

quality but as mode o f it ( Pudgala parinama ) . 16

The Jainas and the M imamsakas also agree in holding that Atman is

12. The concept of man D.K Sankeethanany P 392
Qtd. Divyadaan Vol-2
13. Prof. Jacobi- Op. cit.Part 1 P xxxm
Qtd in outlines of Indian Phil. Hirriyana P 160
14 Ibid P 160
15. Sparsa-rasa-gandha-varnavantah pudgalah
Umasvati Tattvarthadhigama sutra v. 23
Qtd m Ibid P. 160
16 Gunaratna- Op. Cit p.p.69-70
Qtd in Ibid P 160
 ( 102)

constituted o f caitanya, and that there is a multitute o f separate souls. Pleasure

and pain come to be experienced because o f karmic association according to

Jainism. B ut M imamsakas simply say that they are changes in the soul staff.

Thus Jainism is realistic and Atman is a substance endowed w ith sentiency as

distinguished from pudgala or matter which is devoid o f sentiency. Jainism does

not accept any idea like the individual souls being drawn back into some higher

soul, Brahman or Isvara17.

The'jainas uphold that karmic matter can be anrihilated by austerities, So

that gradually it can be totally removed from an individual.

We do not have the evidence o f a perm anent se lf w ithin us. W hat

introspection reveals when w e look within is a ceaseless flow o f thoughts,

feelings or desires. W hat is given in introspection is some state o f thinking

feeling or desire. It is wrong interpretation to hold that these changing states

m ust belong to something which itself does not change. This interpretation is

false, for it makes unintelligible.-the facts o f ceaseless change o f states. In

fact, Indian philosophy holds that our M ana or mind is in ceaseless change.

B ut they appeal to an intuition for the evidence o f perm anent transcendental

self is said to be a factor w hich accounts for the empirical w orld o f change.

But for Devatma, the naturalist o f the nineteenth century, what ever exists

is in ceaseless change therefore according to him if to be is to change, there

canot be a noumenal world o f changeless beings, God, souls, Brahman or Atman.

17 Pravacancara A N. Upadhye P. Lxx

 ( 103)

Buddhas anattavada is also the removal o f the soul from the noumenal world and

make it part o f empirical world. Devatma in affirming the universal law o f change,

denies substantial being to God or soul. There is no God, for there can be no

changeless being.

The Jainism, like the Budhism, establishes the self-sufficiency o f the

moral law and lay the basis for classical doctrine o f karma, according to which

moral action produced their our fruits w ithout reference to any kind o f divine

dispensation.

Hermann Jacobi concludes, It is clear that Brahmanieal speculations

are concerned w ith being as given in common experience 18.

A ccording to Jaina cosmology, the universe is a living organism, made

animate throughout by life monads which circulate through its limbs and spheres

and this organism will never die. We, ourselves i.e. the lifemonads contained

w ithin and constituting the very substance o f the imperishable great body are

imperishable too. We ascend and descend through various states o f being now

human, now divine, now animal, The bodies seem to die and to be bom , but the

chain is continuous, the transformations are endless, and all w e do have passed

form one state to the next19. Leibnitz, in his Monadology, similarly states, the

monad has no windows through which anything pass in or out, but in its action it

is dependent only on God and on its e lf. To have clear and distinct perceptions

only is the prerogative o f God. Leibnitz calls the active principle form, the

18. Jacobi 7:467

Qtd in The concept of Man D.K. Sankethamony P. 393
19. Philosophies of India H. Zimmer PP. 227,228
 ( 104)

passive matter, and makes the monad, since it is not like God. purus actus and

pure form consist o f both form and matter.

In regard to the dependence o f the world on God. there is certain conflict

noticeable in Leibnitz's monads; conflict between the metaphysical interests

involved in the substantiality o f individual beings together with the moral interests

and the opposing interests o f religion. On the one hand, creation for him is an

actualization o f finished, unchangeable possibilities and on the other hand he

teaches with the mediaeval philosophers that it was not accomplished by a single

act o f realization, the world is in a continuous creation. Jainism, represents a

scientific, practically atheistic, interpretation o f existence. For the gods are

nothing but life monads, wearing temporarily favourable masks, as Zimmer

points in supremely fortunate surroundings, where as the material univ erse L

uncreated and everlasting. The universe is composed o f six constitutes such as

Jiva, Ajiva, Dharma, Adhanna. Kala, and Pudgala.

Jainas interpretation o f matter and spirit has some points o f similarity

with the Sankhya as they both believe in the eternity o f matter and the perpetuus

o f the world. The Sankhya derives the development o f the material world ant;

living beings from the principles o f purusa and prakriti. The Jainas trace then

all to primeval nature. The Jaina conception o f the activity o f the soul has more

in common with the Nyaya Vaisesika.

20. Ibid. P.P. 270-271

 ( 1 0 5 )

InJainism, noattempt is madetosynthesise JivaandPudgala. spirit and

matter, subject andobject intoahigher unity. Thetheoryofrelativitycan not be
logically sustained without the hypothesis of an absolute Jainismoffers us an
empirical classificationofthings inthe universeandsoargues for aplurality ot
spirits. Jainismlooks upon the universe as filled with Jivas, even as I.eibnii/
thought that the world was filled with monads. There is affinity of Jainas
metaphysical schemewithLeibnitzsmonadismandBergsonscreativeevolution
InSamkara'sviewalsowehavethedoctrineofthepluralityofJivas onl\
so long as we treat the subject as an object which can be scrutinized. If \u
followthe implicationsofthought anddisentanglethesubject fromembodimen
in sensation and feeling, free it fromcontact with the object, we shall see tha:
there is onlyone subject inreality. The selfparticipated inactions, and yet die
not become involved inthe processes and consequences. It was all pervading
andyet unentangled.
TheJainism, andthe Sankhyaassignedapassiveroletoself. It describes
the selfnot as the force and substance ofthe cosmos but as the indivisual life
monand. Therewas nounique, all inclusive, divineBeingemanatingenergy and
substance fromatranscendental abyss, abyss. All actions belonged tothe \\ orld
ofmatter(ajivaprakriti). Eachlifemonads (ajTva,purusa)wasanindividual entity
a solitary stranger, dwelling inthewhirlpool ofcosmic matter1.

21. Ibid P.412

 ( 106)

A peculiar feature o f the Jaina theory is its doctrine that there are souls

even in inorganic objects, like metals and stones. The condition o f a soul depends

on the condition o f its body. Devatma, also shows compassion not only for

animals but also the feeling o f care even for inanimate things. It is no wonder

like the Jainas, that he made it a part o f the religion for his disciples to realize

their deep dependence on and inseparable relation with the inanimate w orld to

protect, preserve w hat was beautiful in it. In Jainas view, in an inorganic body

the souls consciousness remains dormant, while it ju st stirs in the organic body;

consciousness active in human beings.

Throughout the entire Jaina view o f the souls getting entangled in the not

souls and seeking to get disentangled from these, there was absolutely no place

for any God or Isvara. The development o f the world is rendered possible by the

doctrine o f the indefiniteness o f being and interaction o f substances. God, is

not necessary for creation or destruction. The substances by their interaction

produce new sets o f qualities. It is quite contrary to Carvaka view. The Jainas

repudiate the theory o f creation o f the world out o f nothing or a series o f

accidents, W hen the Jainas confronted w ith the theistic assumption, or the

doctrine o f G od (Isvara-vada), they felt obliged to declare clearly and

categorically against it. Hence, the Jainas were committed atheists orjisVara-

22 Indian Atheism D.P Chottapadhyaya P. 163

 ( 107)

Haribhadra was a prolific Jaina writer who wrote Sadadarsana Saniucca> a

belonged to the eight century A.D. Gunaratna, who was an acute logician of the

fifteenth century wrote commentary on Harbhadras text known as Tarkarahas\ a

dipika23. He was interested in refuting the Nyaya Vaisesika's proofs for tin.

existence o f God. In the whole of Indian history, we come across only two majoi

philosophies with a distinct bias for theism. These were the Vedanta and tin

later Nyaya Vaisesikas Vedanta was basically satisfied with the scriptura

declarations in favour o f the existence o f God and therefore was not mud

bothered by any need o f logically proving the existence of God. To the Vedanm

philosophers the scriptures were absolutely beyond the scope o f any possible

doubt. But in contrast, the Nyaya Vaisesikas were firm followers of logic am

therefore when they felt the need o f admitting God. they could not reman

satisfied with anything short of a formal proof for His existence. Therefore

they were the only philosophers in India to have insisted on a formal proof fot

the existence of God.

Gunaratna2 4 in a similar manner with Santaraksita refutes the Nya\ a

Vaisesikas inference of God. He first scrutinizes the Nyaya Vaisesika's inference

of God and then refutes these proofs.

Nyaya Vaisesikas maintain that Gods existence can be proved h\

inference. The inference is as follows -

Earth, jar etc. are caused by an intelligent agent, because there are of the

mature o f being effects, as for instance the jar.___________________________

23. Ibid P. 163 The other Jaina work famous for its polemic against the doctrine of God is 'Syadvadamanjari
24 Ibid P.P. 167-169
 ( 108 )

In order to prove the probans, because these (earth etc.) are o f the nature

o f being effects", suffer from no logical defect, the Nyaya Vaisesikas analyse

the following points -

Firstly, it is not an unproved (asiddha) one, because it can be definitely

proved that earth etc are actually o f the nature o f being effects, and hence it

must have an efficient cause. This intelligent agent or cause is God. The order,

design, co-ordination between different phenomena comes from God (kar\ a t).

Secondly, it cannot be objected that the probans o f the (original) inference is

contradictoy (viruddha). Thus, for example, the probans o f the inference ' sound

is eternal*, because it is 'produced* is contradictory* in as much as being

produced is flatly opposed to being eternal. But such contradiction is not

found in the probans ofN yaya Vaisesikas inference o f an intelligent cause ('1

earth etc. Thirdly, it is not possible to object that, the probans under consideration

is irregular (anaikantika or Savyabhicara). On the one hand, the presence ol

the probans is connected with the presence o f the probandum, while on the other

hand, the absence o f the probans is definitely connected with the absence o f the

probandum. Lastly, it cannot be objected that the probans under consideration is

negated by another and more powerful instrument o f valid knowledge (Kulatita

or Vadhita), in as much as neither perception nor scriptural authority goes against

it.

Gunaratna, advances his refutations against Nyaya Vaisesikas inference

o f God25. He presupposes four possible alternatives to the question - What is

25. Ibid P.178
 ( 109)

meant by earth etc. "being effects?" These are -

( i) Being composed o f parts

(ii) (ii)The inherence (sam avaya)ofthe being (satta) o f the previously non

existing effects like the earth etc. in their required causes.

(iii) Being the object o f the knowledge in the form "It is p ro d u ced '

(iv) Being characterized by transformation.

In each case, G unaratna show s the futility o f all the possible

interpretations o f the Nyaya Vaisesikas probans for the inference o f God. lu

concludes that it is nothing more than a pseudo-probans26.

Again, God is said to be without body or form. How can He then w o rk >i

matter to produce the world?

Like the existence o f God, the qualities o f omnipotence, unit), eternin

and perfection generally attributed to Him are also doubtful. If God is omnipotent

He should be supposed to be the cause o f all things. But this is not true as w <.

come across various objects like houses, pots etc. are not created by God. Again,

if He is eternally Perfect Being, then also it does not sound good. Because

perfection is the negation o f imperfection and it is meaningless to call a person

perfect who was never imperfect. Did God or didn't He exist in some form

prior to the making o f the world? If it is said that it all depends on the inscrutable

will o f God, we should put and end to all science and philosophy. Water can burn

and fire cool if that be the will o f God.

26. Ibid P. 182.

 ( 1 1 0 )

Gods are only according to the Jainas embodied souls like men and

animals, different from them in degree but not in kind27. Although the Jainas

reject God as the creator o f the world, they think it necessary to meditate or

and worship the liberated perfect souls (Siddhas). The liberated souls possessing

the God like perfections take the place o f God. Prayers are offered to them loi

guidance and inspiration. The offering o f prayers to five kinds o f pure so u f

(panca paramesti)28also forms a part o f the daily routine o f the devout Jainas

The liberated souls serve only as beacon lights. Realisation o f one's true sel

and not devotion to Tirthankaras is the way to freedom. We. conscious living-

souls. find ourselves bound to Karmic matter and the end o f our life is to remov i

this Karmic dress and regain our intrinsic nature. Hence Jainism also lift.

Buddhism aims at an ethical teaching and its aim is the perfection o f soul. Jainisn.

is a theological mean between Brahmanism and early Buddhism 2 . Brahmanisn i

emphasises the one, the permanent, the real and early Buddhism emphasizes tlu

many.the changing, the unreal. Jainism points out that both are the two sides o*

the same thing. Substance has its unchanging essence and therefore is permanent.

But it also has its changing modes and therefore it is subject to origination and

decay. Jainas take into account all the partial views; therefore it is called

Anekantavada. Jsainas epistemological and logical theory known as 'Syadvada

goes hand in hand with Anekantavada. They are like two sides o f the same com

The m etaphysical side that reality has innum erable characters is called

2 7 A n I n t r o d u c tio n to In d ia n P h ilo s o p h y S .C .C h a tte r je e P 110.

2 8 . T h e s e a re T h e A rh a ts , T h e S id d h a s , T h e A c a ry a s ,

T h e U p a d h y a y s , T h e s a d h u s V id e D ra v y a S a m g ra h a P. 4 9

2 9 . H o p k in s R e lig io n s o f In d ia P .2 8 3

Q t d . in O u t l i n e s o f In d P h il. H ir r iy a n a P. 1 5 5
 (Ill)

Anekantavada. Jainas epistemological and logical side that we can know onl\

some aspects o f reality and that therefore all our judgem ents are necessarih

relative, is called Syadvada.

Jainism has rightly points out that all our knowledge is necessarily relati\ e.

conditional and partial. All human knowledge is empirical, therefore relatix e

The Buddhist doctrine of Dependent Origination, Shunyavada, Vijnanavada and

Advaita Vedanta have also maintained the necessary relative character o f om

empirical knowledge. But while they all agree in maintaining a distinction

between empirical and absolute, phenomenal and noumenal. Samvrti and

paramartha, the Jainas bluntly refused any such distinction50. But according n

the Jainas right belief is constituted by a clear comprehension from the reai

point o f view o f the nature o f the following categories - Jiva (soul), Aj iva (non

soul). Punya (virtue), papa (vice), Asrava (in flow o f karmas) Samvara (stoppage

o f karmas) Nirjara (shedding o f karmas) bandha (bondage) and Moksha

(emancipation).

Bhutadatthenathigada jivajivaya punnapavam cha

A savasamvaranijjara bandhomokkho ya sam m attam ''.

Therefore, Jainas theory o f Anekantavada and Syadvada had to face seven

criticism from its opponents. The Jainas take relative views ^ a b s o lu te while

all other teachings are relatively real, the Jaina teaching is held to be absolutely

real. This goes against the Jaina doctrine itself. If relatively is the only truth

how can the Jaina teaching be absolutely true? Jaina's acceptance o f Kevalajnana

30. A Critical Survey of Ind. phil.C.D. Sharma P.56

31. Samanya Sara (The nature of the self) chap.1 Sri Kundakundacarya P.23
 ( 112)

is also a halfhearted confession o f absolutism inspite o f its Syadvada, 1he

knowledge o f Kevalajnana is pure, full, perfect, direct and intuitive omniscience

This is certainly an admission o f absolutism32.

Though the Jainas rejected explicitly distinction between empirical anti

transcendental yet they have by implication always admitted it. The distinction

is vital and it is maintained in some form or other by many o f the great

philosophers o f the world. It is opinion and truth in Parmenides, the world and

the form o f Socrates, the sense and the idea o f Plato, the matter and the mover

o f Aristotle, the phenomenal and the noumenal o f kant.the Apara Vidya and

Paravidya o f the Upanisads, the Samvrti and paramartha o f Sunyavada. the

Vyavahara and Paramartha o f Vedanta are some instances. In Jainism, thn

distinction appears as the distinction between the indirect (paroksa) and tIn

direct (aparoksa), knowledge (perceptual knowledge which is ordinarialy regarded

as direct is here called indirect) between Syadvada and Kevalajnana. betw een

Paryaya and Dravya33.

Jainism, like Buddhism is intensely spiritual and ethical. It like Buddhism,

believes in the transmigration o f soul and law o f Karma. Like Vedanta. Sahkhy.i

and Buddhism, it holds ignorance to be the real cause o f bondage and ignorance

can be removed only by right knowledge. Karma is the link which unites the

soul to the body. Ignorance o f truth and four passions anger (krodha)greed (lobha >

pride (mana) and delusion (maya) which are called Kasaya or sticky substances

32. A critical survey of Ind. Phil. C D. Sharma P. 59

33. Ibid P. 59
34. Tot. Sut 8.9 Qtd in Intro, to Ind. Phil. S. C. Chatterjee P. 102
 ( 113 )

where Karmic particles stick, attract the flow o f karmic matter towards the soul

I f through proper self discipline all karma is worked out and there arises the

full blaze o f omniscience in the Jiva, it becomes free. A free liberated soul in

Jainism is called a Siddha or the perfected'. In Buddhism, it is called an arhant

What Vedanta puts negatively. Jainism puts positively, the former links nescience

with misery' and the latter omniscience with eternal bliss, the Vedanta annihilates

nescience by submerging the individual into the universal while Jainism sa> s

that the individual itself becomes universal, still each retaining its separate

individuality, with this omniscient bliss, when stripped o f its karmas. 1lie

omniscience is possessed by Jaina prophets like Mahavtra and b> all liberated

souls 6.

Every Jaina has to take five vows - not to kill anything (A him sa). not to

lie (Satya) not to take what is not given (A steya), to pressure chastitv

(Brahmacharya) and to renounce pleasure in external things (A parigraha). But

the most important o f all is the vow o f ahimsa, the vow o f non violence, o f non

injury to living beings. Some Jainas even renounce agriculture for it tears up the

soil and crushes insects. In this world it is not possible to abstain from v iolenc e

altogether. As in the BhSgavata Purana 1.13.46, it is said Jiva Jivasya Jivanam-

Life is the food o f life37. Sikhism also favours highly o f ahiriisa but it has not

stretched it like the Jainas. The Jainas accepted the caste system and some ol

their teachings are the same as those o f the Brahmanical religion. But the>

35. Outlines of Ind. phil. Hirriyana P. 168.

36. Pravacancra Kundkundacrya A. N. upadhye. P. Lxxi
37 Religion and Culture Radha Krishnan P. 137
 ( 114)

rejected the Vedas, forbade sacrifices and prohibited the killing o f living beings.

Their spirit was similar to that o f Buddhism. M. K. Gandhi, shares the same

faith in non-violence and the pow er o f love. In his words there is no other way

o f apprehending God than the way o f love. God is present in everyone o f us and

thereby a gradual process o f extending love we can love everybody and thereby

God himself. This kind o f love demands a kind o f self - sacrifice - a sacrifice

o f the egoistic and selfish ways for the love, and the good o f others. For Gandhi

Truth is G od. To him, God is a matter o f inner realization and faith. Jainism

also brings down God to the level o f man. It looks upon man him self as God

w hen his inherent powers are fully in blossom. God is only another w ord for the

soul at its best. Jainism, therefore can be called atheistic. To Jainism, karma, by

itself w ithout the intervention o f any divine pow er is adequate to explain the

w hole o f experience and thus im press on the individual his com plete
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responsibility for w hat he does .

Jainism more than any other creed gives absolute religious independence

and freedom to man.

It is basical ly^religi on which promotes human beings w ith the qualities

o f tolerance and appreciation o f others point o f view.

38. Outlines of Ind phil. Hirriyana P. 171