Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
, xxv (1987)
Edward Grant
Indiana University-Bloomington
INTRODUCTION
Europe and from all social classes. None ofthis, I suspect, would heighten our
insight into the phenomenon of Aristotelianism. For, as we shall see, what is
most important and interesting about medieval and renaissance Aristotelia-
nism is the considerable variety of opinion amongst Aristotelians on a rather
wide range of topics. These differences of opinion do not appear to have any
detectable social motivation or regional differentiation. They seem rather to
emerge from the nature and structure of scholastic commentary literature. In
contrast to Hull, then, my analysis will emphasize only the intellectual aspect.
Aristotle differs from his system-building colleagues in yet another signifi-
cant manner. He not only wrote on a far greater range of subjects than most, if
not all, of them, but his impact was significant in all the areas in which he
chose to write - that is, in politics, poetics, economics, cosmology, natural
philosophy, logic, and biology. To attempt to embrace these disparate subjects
under the rubric of Aristotelianism would be unfeasible and impractical. It is
thus essential to focus our efforts. Aristotelianism in this paper will therefore
encompass natural philosophy in the broad sense and cosmology in particular.
My objective is twofold: to identify and describe anomalies, or departures,
from Aristotle that occurred primarily, though not exclusively, in the late
Middle Ages and Renaissance and which occurred primarily, though not
exclusively, in cosmology; and secondly to examine the possible relevance and
significance of these anomalies for our understanding of the terms 'Aristote-
lian' and 'Aristotelianism' in the period from the thirteenth to the seventeenth
centuries.
The perfect circular motion of the planets, which was a basic ingredient of
Aristotle's cosmology, was also challenged, though with little impact. The
Sun's two simultaneous motions, that is, its daily east-to-west motion and its
annual west-to-east motion, produced a path that was spiral-like rather than
perfectly circular. This phenomenon was already mentioned by Plato in the
Timaeus" and was accepted by numerous subsequent authors, including John
of Sacrobosco," Roger Bacon," Albertus Magnus, and Nicole Oresme, most
of whom believed that all the planets as well as the fixed stars moved with
spiral motions compounded of two independent circular motions." Contrary
to ideas about medieval addiction to the perfection of the circle, John North
points to Richard Wallingford's intelligent use of ovals in astronomy."
Despite the fact that no one in the Middle Ages believed that actual vacua
could exist within our world, many were prepared to argue that, contrary to
Aristotle, the concept of motion in a vacuum was intelligible. This idea was
given further confirmation by another departure from Aristotle: the medieval
doctrine of mixed bodies, the natural and violent motions of which were
determined by a ratio of two opposing forces, lightness and heaviness, one
serving as an internal resistance, the other as an internal motive force. The
interaction of these two forces determined the direction and speed of the
body."
Indeed the medieval analysis of motion produced other significant and well-
known departures: impetus theory" and what has been called 'Bradwardine's
law', which related speeds of bodies in terms of geometrical proportionalities
rather than by the arithmetic relationships assumed by Aristotle."
The departures from Aristotle's natural philosophy that began soon after the
introduction of his physical works into the medieval universities in the
thirteenth century continued on into the seventeenth century. The discovery of
the new world and the impact of the new cosmology that was associated with
the names of Nicolaus Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, and Galileo Galilei brought
a number of Renaissance scholastic authors to break with Aristotle and the
more traditional medieval conceptions of the world. Among such departures
the following are especially noteworthy.
The Portuguese discoveries of land in the southern hemisphere around 1500,
helped shatter the traditional medieval Aristotelian belief that Earth and
Water formed separate spheres and that only a quarter of the Earth's sphere, a
part that lay wholly in the northern hemisphere, was elevated above the
waters. On this view, the southern hemisphere was completely submerged.
With land discovered in the southern hemisphere, the concept of two separate
spheres was abandoned in favour of a 'terraqueous sphere', in which Earth
and Water formed a single sphere and where it was now known that over the
entire surface of the globe Earth was partly submerged and partly elevated.
With the acceptance of this judgement by Christopher Clavius, the famous
Jesuit astronomer, many other scholastics also adopted it in the seventeenth
century."
In the aftermath of Tycho Brahe's rejection of physical spheres in the
celestial region, some scholastics not only agreed with Tycho, but also
accepted his geoheliocentric system." A few scholastics also abandoned the
long held fundamental Aristotelian judgement on the incorruptibility of the
celestial region." Indeed some would even argue that the heavens were less
perfect than living things on Earth" and at least one would infer from this that
because of the existence of life on Earth, the latter must be nobler than the
planets."
But what do these and other departures from the texts of Aristotle signify?
How, if at all, do they affect our understanding of Aristotelianism? It is now
time to tum to the second aspect of this paper.
From what has been said thus far, significant differences or departures from
Aristotle's natural philosophy, especially his cosmology and physics, began
virtually with its effective introduction into Western Europe in the early
thirteenth century and continued until the end of the seventeenth century,
when Aristotelianism ceased to be a viable world view. Although the magni-
tude of those departures is difficult to measure and seems relative to a
particular period, it does appear that the departures became more dramatic as
we approach the seventeenth century. If so, the explanation may lie in the
virtually exclusive and unchallenged dominance that Aristotle's works held in
the late Middle Ages as contrasted to the serious external challenges that arose
in the late fifteenth century when new Greek works and ideas that were largely
unknown in the preceding centuries entered Western Europe and offered
alternatives to Aristotle's natural philosophy. In the sixteenth century, Plato-
nism, Neoplatonism, Atomism, and Stoicism became flesh and blood alterna-
tives and rivals to Aristotelianism.
The contrast in the intellectual diversity between these two periods is
undoubtedly important for the study of Aristotelianism and must playa role
in understanding the history of that ideology. But our primary concern here is
to know whether the terms 'Aristotelianism' and 'Aristotelian' can be assigned
significant meaning. When one considers the wide range of doctrines and
individuals subsumed under those appellations, the terms appear to lack
reasonably precise defining characteristics. The terms take their broadest
signification from the fact that during the Middle Ages, and to a considerably
lesser extent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Aristotle's works on
natural philosophy formed the general basis for an understanding of the
structure and operation of the world. From Aristotle's physical treatises
scholastic authors derived and justified the geocentric system, the four
elements, the four causes, the doctrine of potentiality and actuality, the
doctrine of celestial intelligences, the sharp distinction between celestial and
terrestrial bodies and between lightness and heaviness, and other fundamental
concepts. By means of commentaries and questiones on Aristotle's physical
treatises, scholastics expounded and disseminated their ideas and interpre-
tations of natural philosophy and theology. Without Aristotle's physical
thought, medieval natural philosophy is hardly imaginable. And yet the
departures that have been mentioned here, and others that could be included,
are significant enough to compel attention and to demand some kind of an
explanation as to their relationship to our concept of the terms Aristotelian
and Aristotelianism.
To a considerable extent, the terms are largely ours, used for convenience to
characterize the central role that the natural wbrks of Aristotle held in the
Middle Ages. It was not usual for scholastics in that period to refer to
themselves as Aristotelians. Only later, in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, did terms like 'schoolmen' and 'peripatetics' come into vogue to
distinguish and contrast those who continued to study and comment on the
works of Aristotle as opposed to those who had begun to pursue and develop
quite different interpretations of nature. From the fact that hundreds, and
more likely thousands, of medieval natural philosophers and commentators
on the works of Aristotle saw no reason to identify themselves by explicit
terms such as 'Aristotelian " or 'Peripatetic', we must not infer that they do
not represent a real historical movement to whom the label 'Aristotelians' may
justly be applied; or that their overall views in natural philosophy may not be
rightly and appropriately described as 'Aristotelianism'. And above all, we
must not assume that the terms 'Aristotelian' and 'Aristotelianism' are merely
convenient labels that do not represent, or point to, a real historical
phenomenon."
Later in this paper, an attempt will be made to describe and explain the
sense of these terms. The real problem is to see if criteria can be established to
determine the members of the class of Aristotelians. Many different interpre-
tations are possible. But there should be no doubt that the members of the
class of Aristotelians were real and therefore constitute an historical phenome-
non. It is the real members of the class that we are trying to characterize, not
the convenient term or label 'Aristotelian', even though the latter has a
historical basis and is not an arbitrary invention of modern scholars. Our
problem is similar to that of most historians, as for example, those who write
the histories of wars or social movements. The names of those wars or social
movements may have been invented by the participants or by modern
historians. But when the latter investigate these wars or social movements,
they are fully aware that the name, however apt and even if conceived at the
time of the event itself, is a mere label, a convenient means of referring to the
event. But they also know that if historical events are in any sense real, those
wars and social movements are as real as any of them. So it is with
Aristotelians and the commentary literature they produced, which is often
called Aristotelianism.
For centuries, Aristotelians had regularly incorporated ideas of the kind we
have described. Almost from the outset, students of Aristotelian natural
philosophy showed a remarkable facility for incorporating ideas that were
Before describing the two approaches just mentioned, let me first describe and
dismiss a third possibility. One might apply to Aristotelianism the view of
species that prevailed in the early part of the nineteenth century and that
conceived species as composed of natural kinds." That is, each species was
described in as precise a definition as was possible and, with the exception of
accidental variations, it was expected that each member of the species fitted the
definition." If applied to Aristotelianism, this conception of species would be
wholly inadequate, since, however we defined Aristotelianism, the definition
could not possibly encompass all the departures we have mentioned. The
departures would have to be treated either as mere accidental variations from
some essence or fixed type that was embodied in the definition representing the
species, or we would have to assume a great variety of independent species, or
subspecies, of Aristotelianism, each accommodating a departure, or a few
proposed that disagreed with Aristotle and were departures from his teach-
ings. Thus in this first approach, we have a set of opinions in which medieval
natural philosophers were generally in agreement with Aristotle, and another
set of opinions with respect to which they departed in varying degrees from
Aristotle. The departures are determined by using Aristotle's own ideas as the
standard. But once these departures are identified, we have no criteria for
deciding which departure shall, or shall not, be a member of the species.
As I have described the process thus far, we seem to be concerned with ideas
rather than individual Aristotelians. Aristotelianism is constituted not of
Aristotelians but rather of an aggregate of ideas about the structure and
operation of the physical world based upon interpretations and opinions held
by Aristotle. In so far as these original, core ideas are repeated and elaborated,
they still remain a part of Aristotelianism. But as some of these ideas are
subsequently abandoned and replaced, criteria must be formulated for inclu-
sion of the replacements into the species of Aristotelianism. Are there
departures too radical for inclusion into the complex of ideas and concepts we
call Aristotelianism? If, for example, an Aristotelian commentator argued for
a substitution ofheliocentrism for geocentrism, would it make sense to include
his version of heliocentrism within Aristotelianism? Or would it be preferable
to designate our hypothetical Aristotelian commentator a Copernican rather
than an Aristotelian? Because of such seemingly intractable difficulties, I am
doubtful that, in the first interpretation, any reasonably consistent criteria
could be established for deciding which ideas would qualify for the deviant
cluster around the essential core of Aristotle's concepts.
Within the framework just described, we could also establish criteria for
determining who is an Aristotelian. Taking Aristotle as the essential type one
could then cluster a group of scholars around that type establishing arbitrary
criteria for inclusion. Individual scholars who were classified as Aristotelians
would largely agree with Aristotle's positions, but could depart from some of
them, and even add new ones. Here again, criteria for inclusion in the group of
Aristotelians would be extremely difficult to establish. For the late Middle
Ages, as contrasted with the early modern, or Renaissance, period, a major
dilemma would soon arise: to what group would we assign those who do not
meet the definitional criteria for an Aristotelian. Would we establish a species
of non-Aristotelians, or anti-Aristotelians? Somehow this runs counter to our
intuition that, whatever their differences, medieval natural philosophers were
all, in some meaningful sense, Aristotelians.
As we saw, in the typological approach anomalies or departures are
measured against what Aristotle said. Thus with regard to any particular
departure, it would not matter whether or not scholastic authors were
themselves aware that a departure had been made. Most of the departures
mentioned earlier were recognized as breaks with Aristotle (especially the
rejection of the eternity of the world, the assumption of real eccentrics and
epicycles and the consequences that flowed therefrom, and the various
hypothetical arguments in which the divine power acted in ways that were
contrary to Aristotle's basic principles). But sometimes medieval natural
philosophers failed to indicate any sense of difference with Aristotle or they
chose to ignore or reconcile those differences." Indeed what may seem to us a
departure from Aristotle may not have been so construed by those who
proposed or adopted it. Even in what seems an obvious rejection of Aristotle's
rules of motion in the seventh book of the Physics, Nicole Oresme, for
example, suggests that although the rules that appear in the Physics are false,
Aristotle may have understood them properly but been poorly translated."
Because Aristotle was a respected authority, scholastics were not eager to
criticize him or to seek credit for novel interpretations. As a consequence
departures were often made either unwittingly or without drawing attention to
differences of opinion. Only when Aristotle came under direct attack in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did scholastic authors more readily admit
their differences with him. Despite medieval reluctance to indicate conflicts
and disagreements with Aristotle, historical scholarship can identify most of
them and that is all that is required. In a typological system, conscious
awareness of departures or differences of opinion with Aristotle is not a
prerequisite for classification as a departure.
Thus the species of Aristotelianism that existed between, say 1200 and 1700,
consists of all extant, individual Aristotelianisms where each individual
Aristotelianism is the product of a single Aristotelian natural philosopher.
Thus there are as many Aristotelianisms as there were individual Aristotelian
natural philosophers. Construed as a species, therefore, Aristotelianism con-
sists of the whole population of individual Aristotelianisms each of which is
the unique product of a single Aristotelian natural philosopher whose ideas,
opinions and interpretations are shared with other members of the species,
that is, shared with other Aristotelian natural philosophers. An Aristotelian
natural philosopher is trained in a tradition and reveals this by repeating some
of what he has learned. As a unique member of the species, however, he will
also add to, detract from, or alter, however slightly, the sum total of his
Aristotelian inheritance.
Certain significant consequences follow from such an approach. There is no
need for a definition of Aristotelianism, since that term embraces a population
with inherent similarities and individual differences. Unlike the first interpre-
tation, there is no norm against which to measure whether a departure has
occurred. In this sense, there are no departures or anomalies. There are only
individual Aristotelians who produce individual Aristotelianisms each of
which consists of an array of ideas, principles, and interpretations. While some
Aristotelianisms are easily recognized as better organized and intellectually
more powerful than others, none is inherently more privileged than any other.
Aristotelianism is thus likened to the concept of a species as a population of
individuals where, though all differ in varying degrees, there is no typological
standard for the species as a whole, which is left undefined. The natural books
of Aristotle can no longer serve as a standard of measure. Indeed, with this
model, Aristotle himself becomes simply another unprivileged Aristotelian
producing just another, albeit the first, individual version of Aristotelianism.
But why do we name our species 'Aristotelianism'? In truth, we could have
named the species 'Aquinasism', or 'Buridanism', or 'Albert of Saxonyism',
and so on." Each of these individuals of the species could have legitimately
given his name to the species since none is more privileged than any other. But
there are good reasons for choosing the natural works of Aristotle as the name
of the species. In evolutionary terms, the members of the species share a
common descent. The works and ideas of Aristotle form the basis of that
common descent. Here of course, the intellectual version of a species differs
from its biological counterpart. In the latter, there is, of course, no first
member. In a strict sense, Aristotle is not the first true Aristotelian either
because he clearly drew upon ideas of his predecessors, especially Plato and the
Presocratics. Nevertheless, the aggregation of ideas in his books on natural
philosophy form a sufficiently independent system to warrant its conceptuali-
zation as a separate intellectual tradition, especially since there is a long
WHO IS AN ARISTOTELIAN?
telianism in its struggle with outside competitors. Nor indeed do I know how
we can determine the impact of a variation in the late Middle Ages, in the
period prior to the emergence of those competitors.
CONCLUSION
There is, of course, at least a third alternative to the two interpretations given
above, namely to ignore the problem. We could simply assume that we have a
fair idea of who the Aristotelians were and what Aristotelianism was and
probe no further. To date, this is precisely the approach that has been
employed. But if we follow such a course, it ought to be only because that
proves the best option after an examination of alternatives. This is not a trivial
problem. After all, some form of Aristotelianism was in effect for nearly five
hundred years and for much of that time it was the dominant intellectual force
in European thought. This paper is an attempt to see if we can relate and
interpret the realities that actually underlie the conceptual terms 'Aristotelian'
and 'Aristotelianism'.
From its entry into Europe, Aristotelianism was an extraordinarily capa-
cious natural philosophy. Over the centuries when it was a force to be
reckoned with, much that was deemed fundamental to Aristotelianism at some
period in its history was challenged, though not usually abandoned, at a later
time by something that was at variance with what Aristotle himself had said or
what his followers had at one time assumed. Aristotelianism often included
conflicting earlier and later opinions simultaneously. It was always a domain
of both traditional and innovative concepts and interpretations and was
therefore inevitably elastic and absorbent. Hence its most interesting feature
was a capaciousness that knew few limits. If Aristotelianism could absorb the
essential features of Copernicanism, how much easier could it accommodate
itself to the other rivals we mentioned above - Platonism, Neoplatonism,
Stoicism, and Atomism. In a variety of ways, Aristotelians incorporated
aspects of most, if not all, of these philosophies.
Aristotelianism was seemingly indestructible and irrefutable because it was
so much more absorbent than adaptable. In this it was unlike two other
scientific 'isms' - Newtonianism and Darwinism - whose adherents con-
sciously sought to retain and improve the consistency of their respective
systems. There was no real effort to adapt Aristotelianism to the newly
evolving science and natural philosophy of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Rather, as we saw, individual Aristotelians simply accepted some of
the new ideas and incorporated them into the available matrix of Aristotelia-
nism, which simply grew larger and more complex, if not incoherent.
No serious effort was made to mesh the new ideas with the old in order to
forge a more viable Aristotelianism. As a natural philosophy in which neither
REFERENCES
I. No one laboured more heroically to describe and understand medieval and renaissance
Aristotelianism than the late, and much lamented, Charles Schmitt. All who venture into
the subject, owe him a great debt. Although we shall never know whether he would have
approved of the approach taken in this article, I think it highly probable that he would
have welcomed another effort to shed light on the perplexing phenomenon of
Aristotelianism.
Although the loss of Charles Schmitt was a heavy blow, we must take comfort in the
fact that he was not alone in the study of renaissance Aristotelianism. Significant
contributions have been made by others (two noteworthy contributors are Charles H.
Lohr and L. W. B. Brockliss) and, judging from the calibre of past achievements, we have
good reason for optimism about future research.
I am grateful to the two reviewers who passed judgement on my article and raised
pertinent questions. My replies to their major points appear below.
2. Edward Grant, "A new look at medieval cosmology", Proceedings of the American Philoso-
phical Society, cxxix, pt 4 (1985), 424.
3. By "external stimulation" I mean influences by other philosophical systems - for example,
Platonism, Neoplatonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Atomism - as would happen in the
sixteenth century. I do not mean such events as the theological condemnation issued at
Paris in 1277, which clearly had some effect on the course of medieval natural philosophy.
In that action the theologians who condemned and the theologians and masters of arts
who were warned not to hold or teach the 219 condemned propositions were almost all-
if not all - versed in Aristotelian natural philosophy. Their quarrels lay within the
confines of ideas and concepts about natural philosophy and theology that had been
debated at Paris for some decades prior to 1277.
4. See Edward Grant, "In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility: Scholastic reaction
to Copernicanism in the seventeenth century", Transactions of the American Philosophi-
cal Society. lxxiv, pt 4 (1984), 3-4.
5. David L. Hull, "Darwinism as a historical entity: A historiographic proposal", in The
Darwinian heritage: including proceedings 0/ the Charles Darwin Centenary Conference.
Florence Center/or the History and Philosophy 0/ Science. June 1982, ed. by David Kohn,
with bibliographic assistance by Malcolm J. Kottler (princeton, N. J., 1985),773-812.
6. Hull explains that "although Darwin's name appears in the term 'Darwinians', it might seem
natural to use him as the type specimen in defining the Darwinian nexus. It is, but other
Darwinians such as Hooker and Huxley would serve as well" (ibid., 786). In his
conclusion (p. 809), he declares that "a scientist can be a Darwinian without accepting all
hold such an opinion. Despite their silence, it seems likely that both Albertus and Cecco
realized that on this issue they had departed from Aristotle.
16. Aristotle, De caelo, 2.8.290a. 25-27.
17. In support of the Moon's rotatory motion, see Albert of Saxony, Questions on De celo, bk 2,
qu.7, fo1.106r, col.2 (the fifth principal argument) in Questiones et decisiones physicales
insignium virorum: Alberti de Saxonia in octo libros Physicorum; tres libros De celo et
mundo; ... Recognitae rursus et emendatae summa accuratione et iudicio Magistri Georgii
Lokert Scotia quo sunt Tractatus proportionum (Paris, 1518); Pierre d'Ailly, 14 Quaes-
tiones in Spherae tractatus Ioannis de Sacro Busto Anglici viri clariss.; Gerardi Cremonen-
sis Theoricae planetarum novae; Prosdocimo de Beldomando Patavini super tractatus
sphaerico commentaria, nuper in lucem diducta per L.GA. nunquam amplius impressae...Pe-
tri Cardin. de Aliaco episcopi Camaracensis 14 Quaestiones ...Alpetragii Arabi Theorica
planetarum nuperrime Latinis mandata literis a Calo Calonymos Hebreo Neapolitano, ubi
nititur salvare apparentias in motibus planetarum absque eccentricis et epicyclis (Venice,
1531),fols 163v and 164v;and Paul of Venice, Summa naturalium (Venice, 1476): Liber
celi et mundi, 31, col.2 (because the work is unfoliated and provided with few signatures,
the page numbers have been counted from the beginning of the Liber celi et mundi).
18. Unlike Albert of Saxony, John Buridan had argued for uniformity of planetary behaviour and
properties: either all planets rotated around their own centres or none did. Buridan
adopted the latter alternative. See Edward Grant (ed.), A source book in medieval science
(Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 524-6, where Buridan's discussion of this issue is translated
from his Questions on the metaphysics, bk 12, qu.Ll ,
19. Plato, Timaeus, 39A-B. For a discussion of Plato's meaning and the manner in which the
spiral is generated, see Thomas L. Heath, Aristarchus of Samos: The ancient Copernicus
(Oxford, 1913), 169; for the relevant figure, see p.I60. This part of the Timaeus was
known in Latin translation during the Middle Ages.
20. The Sphere of Sacrobosco, ch.3, in Thorndike (ed. and tr.), The sphere of Sacrobosco (ref. 15),
133 (Latin text, p.IOI).
2!. Roger Bacon (see ref. 13), Communia naturalium, 433 (in line 14, the text has speras instead of
spirasi.
22. Earlier Theon of Alexandria, Averroes, and al-Bitruji had also described the spiral motion.
See Francis J. Carmody, De motibus celorum, critical edition of the Latin translation of
Michael Scot (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952), 52-54 and Nicole Oresme and the
kinematics of circular motion: Tractatus de commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate
motuum celi, ed. with an introduction, English translation, and commentary by Edward
Grant (Madison, Wis., 1971), 31-33, 240, 241.
23. See John North, "Coordinates and categories: The graphical representation of functions in
medieval astronomy", in Edward Grant and John E. Murdoch (eds), Mathematics and its
applications to science and natural philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1987), 173-
88, p. 184.
24. For example, Richard of Middleton (Clarissimi theologi magistri Ricardi Media Villa...super
quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae (4 vols, Brescia,
1591;reprinted Frankfurt-am-Main, 1963),bk 2, dist.14, art.2, question 5 in vol. ii, 182-
3) and Hervaeus Natalis (De materia celi, questions 7 and 8 in Quolibet Hervei...quolibeta
undecim cum octo ipsius...tractatibus infra per ordinem descriptis...De beatitudine; De
verbo; De eternitate mundi; De materia celi... (Venice, 1513; reprinted Ridgewood, N.J.,
1966),fols 47v-5Iv) in the thirteenth century; Buridan (Quaestiones super libris quattuor
De caelo et mundo (ref. 14), 170)and Oresme (Le Livre du ciel et du monde (ref. 14), bk 2,
ch.S, 375-7) in the fourteenth century; and the Coimbra Jesuits (Commentarii Collegii
Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu in quatuor libros De coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae, 2nd edn
(Lyons, 1598), bk 2, ch.3, quA, p.203) at the end of the sixteenth century.
25. See Edward Grant, Much ado about nothing: Theories of space and vacuum from the Middle
Ages to the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge, 1981), part II.
26. This important theme was discussed at some length by Pierre Duhem, Le systeme du monde
(ref. 13), ix, ch.20, 363-430 for the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and vo!. x (in
various places as indicated in the table of contents). For an English translation of
Duhem's account of the plurality of worlds, see Pierre Duhem, Medieval cosmology:
Theories ofinfinity. place. time. void. and the plurality of worlds, ed. and trans!. by Roger
Ariew (Chicago, 1985).A fine, but briefer, account appears in Steven J. Dick, Plurality of
worlds: The origins ofthe extraterrestrial life debate from Democritus to Kant (Cambridge,
1982),ch.2, 23-43. See also Edward Grant, "The condemnation of 1277, God's absolute
power, and physical thought in the late Middle Ages", Viator, x (1979), 211-44,
pp.219-26.
27. A detailed discussion appears in Grant, Much ado about nothing (ref. 25), 24-66;also Duhem,
Le systeme du monde (ref. 13),viii, 7-120,and pp. 369-427in Ariew's partial translation of
Duhem's discussion (ref. 26).
28. For the major accounts, see Marshall Clagett, The science of mechanics in the Middle Ages
(Madison, Wis., 1959), ch.8, 505-40 and Anneliese Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der
scholastischen Naturphilosophie, 2nd edn (Rome, 1951), part II: "Die Impetustheorie",
113-314.
29. The major medieval treatises on this important theme were by Thomas Bradwardine and
Nicole Oresme. For the text and translation by the former, with commentary, see Thomas
of Bradwardine, his Tractatus de proportionibus, ed. and trans!. by H. Lamar Crosby, Jr
(Madison, Wis., 1955);for the latter, see Nicole Oresme, "De proportionibus proportio-
num" and "Ad pauca respicientes", ed. with introductions, English translations, and
critical notes by Edward Grant (Madison, Wis., 1966).
30. On the terraqueous sphere, see Grant, "In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility"
(ref. 4), 22-32.
3I. Many scholastics who sided with Tycho were Jesuits. See Christine Jones Schofield, Tychonic
and semi-Tychonic world systems (New York, 1981;Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University,
1964), 277-89, especially p.286, and Grant, "In defense of the Earth's centrality and
immobility", 12-13.
32. For example the three Jesuits, Giovanni Baptista Riccioli (1598-1671) (Almagestum novum
(Bologna, 165I), pars posterior, 238, co!.I), Melchior Comaeus (1598-1665) (Curriculum
philosophiae peripateticae uti hoc tempore in scholis decurri solet (Herbipolis (Wiirzburg),
1657), 489), and George de Rhodes (1597-1671) (Philosophia peripateticae ad veram
Aristotelis mentem libris quatuor digesta et disputata (Lyons, 1671),278-81).
33. See Edward Grant, "Celestial perfection from the Middle Ages to the late seventeenth
century", in Religion. science. and world view: Essays in honor of Richard S. Westfall, ed.
by Margaret J. Osler and Paul L. Farber (Cambridge, 1985), 152-7.
34. Riccioli came to this conclusion (op. cit. (ref. 32), 157-61).
35. One reviewer made this a fundamental criticism, charging that the term 'Aristotelianism' is
only an historiographical convenience that refers to no real historical phenomenon. I am
charged with talking "about Aristotelians as though they are a real constituency of
European intelligentsia from 1300 to 1650". The fact that 'Aristotelians' were dis-
tinguished as a group in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, prompts our reviewer to
declare that" 'Aristotelian' is an indispensable category for a historian of late Renais-
sance and early-modem science, to enable him to distinguish such academic traditiona-
lists from the 'new philosophers'. But the category is of far less use to a medievalist who is
dealing with thinkers who all share the same premises and attitudes."
For my critic, terms like 'Aristotelian' and 'Aristotelianism' are mere convenient labels
to enable us to categorize things and perhaps to talk about them, but they point to
nothing that is historically real. No doubt terms have been used in this manner. But it
does not seem true about the terms 'Aristotelian' and 'Aristotelianism'. For although the
terms may be convenient, they represent real historical phenomena, which are the major
focus of this study. For we need only ask to whom were those in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries referring when they used the term 'Aristotelian', or 'Aristotelians'?
Surely most of those who used that term had some real flesh and blood individuals in
mind whom they thought of as 'Aristotelians'. Indeed, the same applies to modem
historians of the Renaissance. When they use that same term, they must surely believe
that some individuals were'Aristotelians'. Therefore all act as though they are concerned
with what is, or was, a real phenomenon (if it is unreal, then what is it?).
And what about the Middle Ages? Since they did not identify or label themselves as
Aristotelians do we modems have any warrant to do so? Our critic has supplied the best
reason for believing that we have. For he, or she, has argued that during the Middle Ages
scholastic natural philosophers formed a cohesive group because they shared "the same
premises and attitudes" about the thought of Aristotle. Because those "premises and
attitudes", as well as opinions, judgements and even education were shared to a great
degree with a similar group labelled as 'Aristotelians' in the sixteenth century, we are
justified in applying the same term to the group that preceded. The fact that the term
'Aristotelian' was only applied in the sixteenth century - perhaps first by the enemies of
Aristotle's followers - does not alter the real connections and historical affiliations
between scholastic followers of Aristotle in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Aristote-
lianism was as real an historical phenomenon in the Middle Ages, as it was in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
36. See Edward Grant, "Aristotelianism" and the longevity of the medieval world view", History
of science, xvi (1978), 93-106, especially pp.IOZ-3. In this article, I emphasized the
capaciousness of Aristotelianism with respect to cosmology.
37. Charles SChmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1983), 10;
also quoted in Grant, "In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility" (ref. 4), 4,
n.lI.
38. Charles SChmitt, "A critical survey and bibliography of studies on renaissance Aristotelia-
nism, 1958-1969", Saggi e testi, xi (padua, 1971), 17; also quoted in Grant, "Aristotelia-
nism and the longevity of the medieval world view" (ref. 36), IOZ.
39. The idea for using biological models was suggested by my departmental colleagues, Professors
Ronald Giere and Michael Bradie. Professor Frederick Churchill, who first drew my
attention to David Hull's work, helped me to understand the differences between the
models. Professor Noretta Koertge also responded generously to my queries. To all of
them I am grateful. Any errors, misunderstandings, and misapplications that may appear
here are in no way attributable to them.
40. In much of what follows, I am using as a guide two articles by David L. Hull. The first has
already been mentioned ("Darwinism as a historical entity" (ref. 5; the second is
"Exemplars and scientific change", in PSA 1982: Proceedings ofthe 1982 biennial meeting
ofthe Philosophy of Science Association, ed. by Peter D. Asquith and Thomas Nickles (Z
vols, East Lansing, Mich., 1983), ii, 479-503. Ernst Mayr provides an important critique
of Hull's paper ("Comments on David Hull's paper on exemplar's and type specimens",
ibid., 504-11).
41. See Hull, "Darwinism as a historical entity" (ref. 5), 781.
42. Hull rejects the idea that Darwinism, or other conceptual systems, can have essences. See
'Darwinism as a historical entity" (ref. 5), 778.
43. For Whewell, see Hull, op. cit. (ref. 40), 481-2; for Cuvier, see William Coleman, Georges
Cuvier zoologist: A study in the history ofevolution theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1964),3,
143-6.
44. For the points of agreement on the macrostructure, see my article, "Aristotelianism and the
longevity of the medieval world view" (ref. 36), 94-95.
45. Although Aristotle manifestly believed in an eternal world without beginning or end and was
thus at odds with medieval Christians, who were committed to a world that had a
supernatural beginning, some sought to explain away and reconcile those differences. See
Richard Dales's description of the manner in which certain thirteenth century scholastics
denied that Aristotle actually believed in a world without a beginning. In their view,
Aristotle intended only to claim that the world and time came into being together. Hence
Christians were free to believe that the world existed through all of time and yet could
have had a beginning by means of a supernatural creation ("The origin of the doctrine of
the double truth", Viator, xv (1984),169-79).
46. See Oresme, op. cit. (ref. 29), 274.
47. Cited by Hull, op. cit. (ref. 40), 484, from Ernst Mayr, Principles of systematic zoology (New
York, 1969),369.
48. Hull observes that in a species, the notion of a "typical" member is inappropriate. Any
member can serve that function ("Darwinism as a historical entity" (ref. 5), 782). He
concludes (p. 784) that "if one wanted to individuate the Darwinians in 1859, Huxley
would do as well as Hooker, Hooker as well as Darwin, and so on. Similarly, if one
wanted to individuate Darwinism in 1859,Hooker's treatment of evolution in his Flora of
Australia ... would do as well as Darwin's treatment in the Origin."
49. The opinion in this lengthy sentence is not my creation, but I cannot recall the source.
50. See Grant, "In defense of the Earth's centrality and immobility" (ref. 4), 8-9.
51. In my article, "A new look at medieval cosmology, 1200-1687"(ref. 2),426, I had argued that
"Insofar as White had accepted the heliocentric system, we must conclude that he had
effectively abandoned Aristotelian cosmology. But he could nonetheless continue to
consider himself an Aristotelian if he retained other significant aspects of Aristotelian
natural philosophy." On the basis of the two approaches outlined in this paper, I would
now hold that, despite his extraordinary view, White remains an Aristotelian in
cosmology.
The second reviewer asks whether Gassendists and Cartesians, many of whom fit the
population conception of an Aristotelian (that is, they commented on one or more works
of Aristotle and accepted some or many of his assumptions), ought also to be identified as
Aristotelians. If they meet the general criteria established earlier then they may indeed be
properly categorized as Aristotelians. But if analogous population criteria are formulated
for Gassendists and Cartesians, nothing prevents some or all of them from also being
classified as Gassendists or Cartesians. Under such circumstances, it would follow that
the species of Aristotelianism and Cartesianism or Gassendism would possess certain
features in common. However an individual may belong to more than one group,
whether or not they share overlapping or common descriptive features. Thus Thomas
White may be appropriately classified as both an Aristotelian and a Copernican.
52. Stephen Toulmin, Human understanding: The collective use and evolution ofconcepts (prince-
ton, N.J., 1972), 139.
53. Ibid., 142.
54. Ibid., 138.